

2317

CONFIDENTIAL.]

PRINCIPALS OF THE PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE, &c.,

SHOWING

THE POLICY

AND

RELATIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT  
TOWARD AFGHANISTAN.

APRIL 1872-MAY 1879.

WITH APPENDICES AND TWO MAPS.

COMPILED BY

TREVOR CHICHELE PLOWDEN, B. C. S.,

UNDER-SECTY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, FOREIGN DEPT.



CALCUTTA.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT PRESS.

1879.



Para.	Subject.	Page.
135	The Amir's jihad preparations at Kabul. Remonstrance addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to the Kabul Envoy ... ..	213
136	General information as to the Amir's preparations for a jihad prior to and during the Peshawur Conference ... ..	216
137	Dealings of the Amir with the Khans of Bajour, Swat, and Dir. Position of the Amir towards Bajour and Swat as defined by the British Government	218
138	Ill-treatment of persons suspected to be British news-writers and other unfriendly acts ... ..	220
139	Final report to the Secretary of State ... ..	221
140	Reply from the Secretary of State ... ..	232
<hr/> <b>CHAPTER VIII.</b>		
<b>THE TURKISH MISSION TO KABUL—JUNE TO NOVEMBER 1877.</b>		
141	Intimation from the British Ambassador at Constantinople of the Sultan's desire to send an Envoy to Kabul. Proposal to establish a Turkish Consulate at Peshawur ... ..	235
142	Communications with the Secretary of State on subject of the Turkish Mission. Temporary misunderstanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India ... ..	236
143	The story of the Mission resumed. Views of the Turkish Government regarding the object of the Mission. Instructions given to the Envoy ...	239
144	Opinion of the Khedive regarding the Mission ... ..	239
145	Preparations for the reception of the Mission in India. Arrival of the Envoy in India ... ..	240
146	Deputation of two members of the Mission to the Akhund of Swat. Account of their proceedings ... ..	240
147	The Envoy's journey to, and reception at, Kabul. Brief account of his conversations in Durbar with the Amir ... ..	241
148	Return of the Turkish Envoy to India. Information as to the result attained	242
149	Departure of the Envoy from India. Thanks of the Sultan of Turkey for the manner in which the Envoy had been treated ... ..	243
150	Interrogations by the Russian Government in respect to the Mission of the Turkish Envoy ... ..	243
151	Ahmed Khulussi's official report of his Mission ... ..	244
<hr/> <b>CHAPTER IX.</b>		
<b>THE RUSSIAN MISSION TO KABUL. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMIR FOR THE RECEPTION OF A BRITISH MISSION. THE DECLARATION OF WAR. THE TREATY OF GANDAMAK.</b>		
152	News of the intended deputation of a Russian Envoy to Kabul and of the movement of Russian troops towards the Afghan frontier ... ..	246



Para.	Subject.	Page.
153	Arrival of the Russian Envoy at Kabul ... ..	246
154	Proposal to insist on the reception by the Amir of an English Mission referred to the Secretary of State. Arrangements for the passage of Mission to the Khaibar ... ..	247
155	Orders issued by the Secretary of State. Further information as to the proceedings of the Russian Envoy at Kabul... ..	248
156	Preparations for the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul. Nawab Ghulam Hassan to go in advance with letter from the Viceroy to the Amir ... ..	249
157	Postponement of Nawab Ghulam Hassan's departure on account of the death of the Heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdulla Jan. Letter of condolence from the Viceroy to the Amir ... ..	250
158	Personnel of the English Mission to Kabul and instructions to the Envoy Extraordinary. Text of letter to be delivered to the Amir by Sir Neville Chamberlain ... ..	250
159	Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Despatch to Secretary of State...	254
160	Proceedings at Kabul. Departure of Ghulam Hassan Khan. Intimation to the Mustaufi, the Mirakhor, and Faiz Mahomed Khan that the Mission would start on the 16th September ... ..	254
161	Communications between Sir Neville Chamberlain and Faiz Mahomed Khan. Apprehensions entertained by the Khaibaris ... ..	256
162	Reception of Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan at Kabul. His interviews with the Amir ... ..	257
163	Question of the reply to be sent to Faiz Mahomed's letter, dated 16th September. Decision to arrange for the advance of the Mission ... ..	258
164	Further news from Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan of his proceedings at Kabul ... ..	258
165	Faiz Mahomed Khan refuses to allow the Mission to pass Ali Masjid. Orders issued for its withdrawal ... ..	259
166	Despatch to the Secretary of State reporting Faiz Mahomed's refusal of a free passage ... ..	261
167	Preparations for war and policy proposed to be followed by the British Government ... ..	262
168	Return of Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan with Amir Shere Ali's reply. Measures recommended to the Secretary of State ... ..	263
169	Decision of Her Majesty's Government to address a further letter to the Amir ... ..	265
170	Text of further letter to the Amir. No reply received by fixed date. Issue of manifesto and commencement of the second Afghan war ... ..	265
171	Review of the political situation by the Secretary of State up to the date of the despatch of the Viceroy's ultimatum to the Amir ... ..	268



Para.	Subject.	Page.
172	Russian Mission at Kabul. M. deGiers denies its existence ... ..	273
173	Her Majesty's Government instruct the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to request the withdrawal of the Russian Mission. M. deGiers' reply and M. Bartholomei's explanations to Lord Salisbury ... ..	273
174	General proceedings of the Russian Mission. Return of General Stoletoff to Tashkend accompanied by an Afghan Embassy ... ..	275
175	Further steps taken by the British Government in regard to the retention of the Russian Mission at Kabul after withdrawal of the Russian Envoy. Exchange of notes between Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff ... ..	276
176	The Amir's reply to Viceroy's ultimatum ... ..	277
177	Flight of the Amir from Kabul and release of Sirdar Yakub Khan ... ..	279
178	Measures taken by the Government of India to ascertain Yakub Khan's sentiments. The Sirdar's reply ... ..	279
179	Further communication from Sirdar Yakub Khan. Death of Amir Shere Ali. Conditions of peace offered to Sirdar Yakub ... ..	280
180	Return of Bakhtiar Khan with Yakub Khan's reply to Major Cavagnari's letter, dated 7th March, and with a separate letter from Yakub to the Viceroy. Proposal to send a British Mission under Major Cavagnari to Kabul ... ..	282
181	Yakub Khan proposes to come in person to the British camp and there arrange matters with the British authorities ... ..	285
182	Arrival of the Amir Yakub Khan at Gandamak and conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879 ... ..	287
183	Final report to the Secretary of State ... ..	289
184	The Secretary of State's reply ... ..	300

## APPENDICES.

	Page.
I.—Mr. Eastwick's memorandum written about 1858 on the Persian claims to Seistán ... ..	i
II.—Draft instructions by the Duke of Argyll to General Goldsmid of 9th August 1870 ... ..	iii
III.—Memorandum on Seistán by General Goldsmid, dated 17th March 1872. Memorandum and demi-official letter, dated 11th and 18th March 1872, by General Pollock ... ..	vii
IV.—Report, dated 22nd May 1872, by General Goldsmid on the Province of Seistán, with reference to the proposed arbitration of Her Majesty's Government on the question of ancient rights and present possession ... ..	xv
V.—Complete statement of General Goldsmid's arbitral opinion ... ..	xviii
VI.—Further reports by General Goldsmid on the political aspect of his arbitral decision ... ..	xxv
VII.—Account of the families of the Kaiani, Sirbundi, Shahraki, Nharni, and Sanjurani Chiefs ... ..	xxxiii



	Page.
VIII.—General Pollock's final report of the proceedings of the Seistán Mission ... ..	xxviii
IX.—Report by Captain the Hon'ble G. C. Napier on the present situation in Seistán with reference to late arbitration, dated 1st March 1875 ... ..	xliv
X.—Letter from General Kauffmann to General Labanov, dated St. Petersburg, 29th November 1872, No. 121 ... ..	lii
XI.—First private meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Highness the Amir of Kabul at 4 P.M., 29th March 1869.	liv
XII.—Persian text of letter from Amir Shere Ali Khan, to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated Thursday, the 21st Ramazan, 1290 A.H., corresponding with 13th November 1873 ... ..	lxi
XIII.—Account of Herat by Resaldar Daud Khan (1872) ... ..	lxiv
XIV.—Narrative by Extra Assistant Commissioner Gholam Ahmed of his visit to Kabul in 1874 ... ..	lxvii
XV.—A comparison of the present with the past condition of Kabul under Amir Shere Ali Khan ... ..	lxxx
XVI.—Opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (Sir R. H. Davies) and other Punjab officers on the question of locating English Residents at Herat or Kandahar, &c. (March-April 1875) ... ..	xc i
XVII.—Letter, dated Delhi, 21st May 1876, from Agha Saheb, to Lieutenant-Colonel O. T. Burne ... ..	xcvi
XVIII.—(1).—Extracts from Kabul diaries from the 30th June to the 3rd July, and from the 4th to the 6th July 1876, inclusive...	xcvii
(2).—Letters, &c., showing proceedings at Kabul after delivery to the Amir of Sir R. Pollock's letter, dated 8th July ...	xcviii
(3).—Further letter from Agha Saheb, to Colonel O. T. Burne, enclosing extract from letter, dated 28th July, from Kabul	xcix
(4).—Russian Native Agents at Kabul ... ..	c—cii
XIX.—Interviews at Simla in October 1876 with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul :—	
i.—Summary of a conversation with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Kabul, held at Simla on the 7th October 1876 ... ..	ciii
ii.—Memorandum of an interview at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul, on 10th October 1876 ...	cvi
iii.—Memorandum by Sir Lewis Pelly, dated Simla, 11th October 1876 ... ..	cviii
iv.—Memorandum of the second interview at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul, on the 13th October 1876, after consultation in Council in regard to certain points connected with its purport ... ..	cix
v.—Aide Memoire from the British Agent at Kabul...	cx
XX.—Instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly :—	
i.—Letter, dated Mushobra, 17th October 1876, from Mr. T. H. Thornton, Officiating Foreign Secretary, to Sir Lewis Pelly	cxii
ii.—Letter, dated Mushobra, near Simla, 17th October 1876, from His Excellency the Viceroy, to Sir Lewis Pelly, with enclosures, viz., (A) Aide Memoire for a Treaty, (B) Aide Memoire for Secret Agreement ... ..	cxv



	Page.
XXI.—Letter from Mr. Macnabb, dated Peshawur, 18th October 1876, enclosing translation of a letter from Moonshee Baktiar Khan, dated Kabul, 12th October 1876 ... ..	cxxv
XXII.—Information as to proceedings at Kabul after return of the British Agent in October-November 1876 ... ..	cxxvi
XXIII.—Memorandum by Mahomed Hyat Khan, Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, regarding Kabul policy, dated Lahore, 19th November 1876 ... ..	cxxxiii
XXIV.—Replies from the Amir to His Excellency's letters, dated 11th October 1876 ... ..	cxxxvii
XXV.—Correspondence, &c., to and from Sir Lewis Pelly during the Conference ... ..	cxxxviii
XXVI.—Sir Lewis Pelly's telegram and letter, dated 16th March 1877, and enclosure ... ..	cl
XXVII.—Papers relating to the jehad preparations ... ..	clii
XXVIII.—Information relating to the first Turkish Agent ... ..	clxiii
XXIX.—Copy of the instructions furnished to the Envoy by the Turkish Government ... ..	clxiv
XXX.—Instructions with reference to the reception and journey through India of the Turkish Envoy ... ..	clxvi
XXXI.—Syud Lall Shah ... ..	clxvii
XXXII.—Translation of an account of the interviews of the Turkish Mission with the Amir of Kabul during the months of September and October 1877, prepared by Syud Lall Shah ... ..	clxix
XXXIII.—Memorandum, dated 11th July 1878, by His Excellency the Viceroy, calling for expressions of opinion on certain questions relating to Kabul affairs, and answers submitted by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Major Cavagnari, Dr. Bellew, Mr. Plowden, and others ... ..	clxxv
XXXIV.—Memorandum on the political state of Kabul, dated Amritsar, 25th October 1878 by Chetan Shah ... ..	cciii
XXXV.—Minute by His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 4th September 1878 ... ..	ccix
XXXVI.—Persian text of letters, dated 7th and 10th September 1878, addressed by Colonel Waterfield to the Mustaufi, the Mirakhor, and Faiz Mahomed Khan ... ..	ccxxiii
XXXVII.—Letter from His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., late Envoy Extraordinary to Kabul, to A. C. Lyall, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th October 1878, with enclosures ... ..	ccxxiv
XXXVIII.—Persian text of Amir Shere Ali's letters, dated 6th October 1878, to the Viceroy. Brought from Kabul by Nawab Ghulam Hassan ... ..	ccxxxii
XXXIX.—Persian translation of British manifesto referred to in paragraph 170, Chapter IV ... ..	ccxxxiii



	Page.
XL.—Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy of operations to be undertaken on 21st November 1878, if the Amir of Kabul is declared an enemy of the British Government ...	ccxxxv
XLI.—Translation of memorandum on Kabul affairs by Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, C.S.I., dated Kohat, 19th October 1878 ...	ccxxxvii
XLII.—Collection of papers relating to proceedings of the Russian Mission at Kabul. Extract from Russian newspapers in respect to policy of England and Russia in Central Asia ...	ccxl
XLIII.—Instructions, dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari, in the event of a British Mission proceeding to Kabul to arrange the terms of peace ... ..	ccxvi
XLIV.—Collection of papers relating to the Amir's reception at Gandamak and the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the treaty of peace ... ..	cclx







# ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Abbas Khan, Kaiani, Malik,</b> a Seistāni Chief ... .. joins in a rebellion against Mir Alum Khan, Persian Governor of Seistān ... ..	App. III App. IX	x xliv
<b>Abdul Aziz, Kandahari.</b> Execution of — at Kabul on a charge of being an English news-agent ... ..	138	221
— <b>Rahman Khan, Sirdar.</b> • Salisbury's (Lord) proposal about effecting a reconciliation between Amir Shere Ali and —	111	167
— <b>Tahir.</b> Arrival of — at Kabul with a statement of Sirdar Yakub Khan's conditions... deputed by Sirdar Yakub Khan to Amir Shere Ali ... ..	97 96	139 138
<b>Abdulla.</b> Expulsion from Kabul of —, a dāk-runner in the service of the British Agent ... ..	138	220—221
— <b>Jan, Sirdar.</b> Account of the illness and death of — — — — — Atta Mahomed Khan (Nawab) congratulates Amir Shere Ali on the nomination of — as Heir-apparent ... .. Brothers of — dissatisfied at his recognition as Heir-apparent ... .. Death of —, and letter of condolence from the Viceroy to the Amir ... .. Nomination of — as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali accepted by the Afghan Chiefs and people ... .. Nomination of — as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali of Afghanistan ... .. Precedents before the Government of India for not formally recognizing the selection of — as Heir-apparent ... .. Proposed limits to the action of the British Government in recognizing — as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali Khan ... .. Salisbury's (Lord) instructions as to the recognition of — as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali ... .. Selection of — as Heir-apparent. Amir Shere Ali's letter (not acknowledged) to Shah of Persia regarding the, ... .. Selection of — as Heir-apparent. Correspondence between Amir Shere Ali and Lord Northbrook regarding the, ... .. Selection of — as Heir-apparent. Despatch to Secretary of State regarding the, ... .. Selection of — as Heir-apparent. Interchange of letters between Amir Shere Ali and General Kauffmann regarding the, ... .. Selection of — as Heir-apparent announced to the Amir of Bokhara ... .. Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Refusal of, to accept —'s nomination as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali ... ..	App. XLII 87 87 157 87 87 88 App. XX 111 89 88 88 89 89 97	ccxlix 125 127 250 126—127 125 128 cxix 167 130 127—128 128—129 129—130 129 139
— <b>Khan, Barakzai,</b> an adherent of Sirdar Ayub Khan ... ..	104	145
— <b>Khan, Sirdar, Nasiri,</b> accompanies the Amir's troops to Herat ... .. Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Advice given by — to Amir Shere Ali regarding, ... ..	104 92	144 133
<b>Afghan Embassy.</b> Stoletoff, General. Return of, to Tashkend, accompanied by an — — — — —	174	276
<b>Afghanistan.</b> Abdul Rahman Khan, Sirdar. Lord Salisbury's proposal about effecting a reconciliation between the Amir and, ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Communications addressed by the Amir to Russia, Bokhara, and Persia regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Correspondence between the Amir and Lord Northbrook regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Despatch to Secretary of State regarding selection of, as Heir-apparent ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Dissatisfaction of the brothers of, at his recognition as Heir-apparent ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Lord Salisbury's instructions as to the recognition of, as Heir-apparent to the Amir ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan's congratulations to the Amir on the nomination of, as Heir-apparent ... .. Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Nomination of, as Heir-apparent to the Amir ... ..	111 89 88 88 87 111 87 87	167 129—130 127—128 128—129 127 166—167 125 125

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Nomination of, as Heir-apparent to the Amir, accepted by the Chiefs and people of ———	87	126—127
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Precedents before the Government of India for not formally recognizing the selection of, as Heir-apparent	88	128
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Proposed limits to the action of the British Government in formally recognizing this Prince as Heir-apparent	App. XX	cxix
Afridi tribes infesting the Khaibar Pass. Amir's co-operation necessary for the better control of the, ...	App. XX	cxviii
Agent from the Amir. Government of India decline to receive an, ...	114	173
Agha Sahob. Letter from, to Lieut.-Col. O. T. Burne, on the affairs of ———	App. XVII	xcvi
Agha Sahob. Receipt of a letter from, on Kabul matters	113	170
Agha Sahob. Second letter from, to Colonel O. T. Burne, on the affairs of ———	App. XVIII	xcix
Ahmed Khan, Mir Akhor. Appointment of, as Civil Governor of Herat	104	144
Akhund of Swat. Amir's application to the, for aid in a jihad against the English	134	212—213
Akhund of Swat. Amir's communications with the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Akhund of Swat. Amir's intrigue with Mian Gul, son of the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Akhund of Swat. Message sent by Amir to the, on arrival of the Turkish Envoy	147	242
Ambala Conference. Result of the, ...	107	149—150
Amir Shere Ali's reception in India. Shah of Persia's uneasiness at, ...	13	15
Amir's expectations as to the present assistance to be rendered to ———. Discussion with Kabul Envoy regarding, ...	78	102—104
Arms. Amir's dissatisfaction with the, supplied to him	81	109
Arms. Correspondence regarding present of, to the Amir...	80	107—108
Arms. Reply to Amir's request for 20,000 stand of, ...	79	104—105
Arms promised to the Amir. Delay in the supply of, and consequent suspicions of the Kabul Durbar...	81	108—109
Arms supplied to the Amir. Cost of the, ...	81	109
Army, reorganization and improvement of the. Amir's attention given to the, ...	95	137
Assistance to be rendered to ——— by the British Government, to strengthen that country against foreign aggression. Discussion between the Kabul Envoy and the Foreign Secretary as to the, ...	64	74—75
Atta Mahomed Khan, Nawab. Communication to, of the views of the Government of India in regard to ———	118	177—178
Atta Mahomed Khan, Nawab. Interviews between Lord Lytton and, at Simla, in regard to the affairs of ———	118	177—178
Atta Mahomed Khan, Nawab. Proceedings of the Amir and his Durbar in regard to proposals made by the British Government through, ...	App. XXII	cxvii to cxviii
Atta Mahomed Khan, Nawab. Return of, to Kabul from Simla	119	180
Atta Mahomed Khan (Nawab) and Lord Lytton. Memoranda of two interviews at Simla between, ...	App. XIX	cvi—cxi
Atta Mahomed Khan (Nawab) and Sir L. Pelly. Summary of a conversation at Simla between, ...	App. XIX	ciii—cvi
Atta Mahomed Khan (Nawab) said to be loyal himself, but opposed to Lord Lytton's policy towards ———	Ap. XXVII	cliv
Atta Mahomed Khan's (Nawab) interview with Sir L. Pelly in regard to the affairs of ———	117	177
Ayub Khan, Sirdar. Amir's warning to, ...	104	144
Ayub Khan, Sirdar. Proposal to place, under British protection, negatived	106	147—148
Ayub Khan, (Sirdar) and others. Flight of, to Persia from Herat	104	145
Ayub Khan, (Sirdar) ordered to be deported from Herat to Kabul	104	144
Ayub Khan, (Sirdar) refuses to trust the Amir...	104	145
Badakshan and Wakhan. Russia's objection to the admission of Afghan sovereignty over, ...	74	88—89
Bajour. Amir Shere Ali's attempt to secure the submission of the Khans of, ...	137	219—220
Bajour. Claim of the Amir to, ...	137	219
Bajour. Real feelings of the people of, towards the Amir	Ap. XXVII	cliii
Bajour and Swat. Inexpediency of permitting an Afghan occupation of, ...	Ap. XXVII	clix—clxi
Baker's (Colonel) visit to ——— objected to by the Amir	85	117—118
Bakhtiar Khan. Mr. Macnabb's unfavourable opinion of, ...	App. XXII	cxvii
Bakhtiar Khan (Munshi) said to be a mere creature of the Amir and owner of land and property in Kabul	Ap. XXVII	cliv
Bokhara. Discussion regarding confirmation by, of the claims of ———	78	100
Boundaries of ———. Correspondence between the British and Russian Governments regarding the, ...	74	86—90
Boundaries of ———. Government of India's correspondence with Amir Shere Ali about the understanding with Russia as to the, ...	76	91—95
Boundaries of ———. Russian acceptance of the views of Her Majesty's Government regarding the, ...	75	90
Boundary Commission. Question of a, how to be put before the Amir	App. XX	cxvii

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
Boundary question. Conversations of Lord Northbrook and the Foreign Secretary with the Kabul Envoy regarding, ...	77	96—104
Boundary question and other matters. Amir Sher Ali sends an Envoy to India to represent his views on the, ...	78	94
Boundary question and other matters. Final letter to the Amir summing up the result of the Conferences with the Kabul Envoy on the, ...	79	104—105
British Agent. Amir willing to permit the location of a, at Balkh, Herat, or Kandahar ...	107	149
British Agent. Amir's objection to the location of a, at Kabul ...	107	149
British Agents. Arguments of the Kabul Envoy against location of, in ———	126	195—196
British Agents. Conference between Sir L. Pelly and the Kabul Envoy regarding the location of, in ———	121	183—184
British Agents. Continued wish of Her Majesty's Government to locate, at Herat and Kandahar ...	140	233
British Agents. Discussion between the Foreign Secretary and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah regarding the location of, in ———	107	150
British Agents. Further discussion between Sir L. Pelly and the Kabul Envoy regarding location of, in ———	123	186—189
British Agents. Location of, in ———. Instructions sent to Sir L. Pelly at Peshawur on this and other points ...	124	189
British Agents. Rejection by the Kabul Envoy of the principle of the location of, in ———	128	199—203
British Agents. Reply of Sir L. Pelly to Kabul Envoy's arguments against location of, in ———	127	198—199
British Agents in ———. Government of India's views on the question of the appointment of, ...	108	151—156
British Agents in ———. Views of Indian officials on the question of appointing, ...	108	151—156
British Agents on the Kabul frontier. Renewal of proposals to the Amir for the establishment of, ...	118	178
British Embassy, temporary. Instructions of the Home Government regarding the despatch to Kabul of a, ...	109	157—159
British Embassy, temporary. Secret instructions of 1876 from the Home Government for the despatch to Kabul of a, ...	111	164—169
British Government (the) offer the Amir 15 lakhs of rupees including the value of the arms to be presented to His Highness ...	64	75
British Mission. Amir consults Akhund Mulla Mashk-i-Alam of Ghazni, who warns him against receiving a, ...	115	175
British Mission. Bellew's (Dr.) private letter to the Amir regarding reception of a, at Kabul ...	114	175
British Mission. Courses proposed by the Amir as alternatives for the despatch to Kabul of a, ...	116	176
British Mission. Deliberations of the Durbar on the question of receiving a, ...	115	175—176
British Mission. Kabul Agent's letter to Commissioner, Peshawur, regarding the Amir's refusal to receive a, ...	113	171—172
British Mission. Renewed attempt to induce the Amir to receive a, ...	114	172—175
British Mission. Views of Lord Northbrook's Government as to the policy of sending a, to Kabul ...	110	159—164
British Mission to ———. Amir's proposal to send an Envoy to India in lieu of receiving a, ...	113	170—171
British Officers. Discussion between the Kabul Envoy and the Foreign Secretary regarding the location of, in certain towns of ———	64	74—75
British Officers. Location of, in certain towns of ———. Question regarding, discussed with Kabul Envoy ...	78	102—103
British policy towards ———. Memorandum by Mahomed Hyat Khan regarding, ...	App. XXIII	{ cxxxiv to cxxxvi
British Residents. Opinions of certain officers on the question of locating, at Herat and Kandahar ...	App. XVI	xcv—xcv
British Residents. Proposed location of, at Herat, Kandahar, and Balkh ...	App. XX	cxvi
British rule said to be desired by the people of ———	Ap. XXVII	cliii
Concessions offered by the Government of India to the Amir. Conditions attached thereto ...	118	177—178
Conference on the border between a British and an Afghan Agent. Amir proposes a, ...	115	176
Conferences at Peshawur between the Kabul Envoy and Sir L. Pelly. Views of the Governor-General as to what passed at the, ...	130	203—210
Debt, national. Freedom of ——— from a, ...	95	137
Dost Mahomed Khan, Amir. Alleged promise of, to form an alliance with the Russians, upon their conquering Samarcand ...	App. XXIII	cxxxv
Dost Mahomed Khan, Amir. Descendants of, ...	App. XXIII	cxxxiv
Dost Mahomed Khan, brother of Sharif Khan. Release of, from detention in Persia ...	66	77
Eastern frontier of ———. Amir's reason for strengthening the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
England and Russia. Engagement between, regarding ———. Mr. Gladstone's view of the, ...	75	91



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
English newspapers and books upon Indian questions said to be translated for the Amir's information ...	111	166
Envoy from ———. Lord Salisbury's suggestion as to the permanent presence in India of an, ...	111	168—169
Envoy from the Amir. <i>Ad interim</i> arrangements pending the expected arrival in India of the, ...	119	180
Europeans, English and Russian. Secret visits of, to ——— ...	App. XVIII	o
Figurative language. Use of, in correspondence between Kabul merchants and their agents in Peshawur ...	Ap. XXVII	clviii
Forsyth's (Mr.) Mission to Yarkund. Amir's objection to the return of, <i>via</i> Badakshan ...	85	119—119
Forsyth's (Mr.) Mission to Yarkund. Question regarding return of, <i>via</i> Badakshan discussed with Kabul Envoy ...	78	103
Forsyth's (Sir D.) Mission to Yarkund. True reason of the Amir's objection to the return <i>via</i> Kabul of, ...	95	137
Free intercourse between India and ———. Amir to be required to encourage, ...	App. XX	cxviii
Frontier of ———, northern. Memorandum on the, by General Kauffmann ...	App. X	lii—liv
Ghulam Ahmed, Extra Assistant Commissioner. Visit of, to Kabul, 1874 ...	95	135—136
Gortchakoff, Prince. Despatches from, to Count Brunnow, regarding the, ...	74	86—90
Helmund. Question of constructing irrigation works on the, decided in favor of ——— ...	69	80
Herat. Amir's opinion as to the political importance of, ...	104	145
Herat. Appointment of Mir Akhor, Ahmed Khan, as Civil Governor of, ...	104	144
Herat. Arrival at, of an Agent from the Prince Governor of Khorassan ...	91	132
Herat. Arrival at, of an Agent from the Prince Governor of Meshed ...	91	132
Herat. March of Amir's troops against, ...	104	144
Herat. Occupation of, by the Amir's troops ...	104	145
Ibrahim Khan of Seistan. Application of, to Amir of Kabul for aid against the Persians ...	10	12
Ill-treatment at Kabul of persons suspected of having relations with the British Government...	138	220—221
Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. Importance attached to the Amir's attendance at the, ...	App. XX	cxix
Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. Lord Lytton's invitation to the Amir to be present at the, ...	118	179—180
Imperial title, the. Proclamation of, in India suggested by Lord Salisbury as affording a favourable opportunity for renewing friendly relations with ——— ...	111	165
India and ———. Amir to be required to encourage free intercourse between, ..	App. XX	cxviii
India, Government of. Objection of, against expending large sums of money for the purpose of strengthening ——— ...	110	162
India, Government of, promise the Amir their moral support and aid in money, arms, native artificers, &c. ...	107	149
Internal affairs of ———. Interference of Foreign powers with the, ...	78	100
Jehad. Proclamation summoning the people of ——— to join in a, ...	Ap. XXVII	clviii
Jehad. Rumours of a, prevalent at Kabul ...	116	176
Jehad against the British. Account of the Amir's preparations for a, ...	136	216—218
Jehad against the British. Amir dissuaded by Mir Afzul Khan from waging a, ...	Ap. XXVII	clvii
Jehad against the British. Amir's application to the Akhund of Swat for aid in a, ...	134	212—213
Jehad against the British. Amir's preparations at Kabul for a. Remonstrance addressed to the Kabul Envoy on the subject ...	135	213—216
Jehad against the British. Papers relating to Amir's preparations for a, ...	Ap. XXVII	clii—clxii
Jehad proclamations. Issue of, by Akhund of Swat ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Jelalabad, Kandahar, and Kuram. Amir's object in strengthening the positions at ——— ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Kabul Envoy. Arrival of the, at Peshawur. Informal interview between him and Dr. Bellew ...	120	182
Kabul Envoy. Communication to the, of the Governor-General's view of the result of the Conferences at Peshawur ...	131	210
Kabul Envoy. Eighth meeting at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	127	197—199
Kabul Envoy. Fifth and sixth meetings at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	125	189—194
Kabul Envoy. Final report to Secretary of State on the Conferences held at Peshawur with the, ...	139	221—232
Kabul Envoy. First meeting at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	121	183
Kabul Envoy. Ninth meeting at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	128	199—203
Kabul Envoy. Second meeting at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	122	184—186
Kabul Envoy. Seventh meeting at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	126	194—196
Kabul Envoy. Third and fourth meetings at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	123	186—189
Kabul Envoy. Views of Her Majesty's Government as to the results of the Conferences held at Peshawur with the, ...	140	232—234
Kabul Envoy solicits a written assurance that any one interfering with ——— would be considered an enemy of the British Government ...	78	99—102
Kabul Envoy, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah. Death of, at Peshawur ...	132	211
Kabul Envoy, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah. Serious indisposition of, at Peshawur...	129	203

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
Kabul Envoy's misrepresentation of the policy of the British Government toward —	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Kamal Khan and Sharif Khan. Request of Kabul Government as to release from detention in Persia of the sons of, ...	66	77
Kandahar. Report to Amir of the favourable disposition towards the English of the people of, ...	Ap. XXVII	clvii
Kandahar, Kuram and Jolalabad. Amir's object in strengthening the positions at, ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Kauffmann, General. Complimentary letter from, to Amir Shere Ali...	App. XVIII	c—cii
Kelat. British proceedings in. Instructions sent to Sir L. Pelly at Peshawur on this and other points likely to be raised by Kabul Envoy ...	124	189
Kelat. Khan of, advised by Amir to hold out against the English until he could aid him ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Khanan Khan, Ressaldar-Major. Deputation of, to — with a letter for the Amir ...	112	169—170
Khanan Khan's Mission to the Amir. Failure of, ...	113	170
Kuram, Kandahar and Jelalabad. Amir's object in strengthening the positions at, ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Lash-Jowain and Seistan. Relations of — with Persia in respect of, ...	7	7—9
Lytton (Lord) and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan. Memoranda of two interviews at Simla between, ...	App. XIX	cvi—cxi
Lytton (Lord) and Sir R. Pollock. Meeting between, at Ambala for the discussion of Kabul affairs ...	112	169
Lytton's (Lord) interviews with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan at Simla in regard to the affairs of — ...	118	177—178
Lytton's (Lord) letter to the Amir regarding the negotiation of a Treaty with — ...	118	179
Lytton's (Lord) offer to meet the Amir at Peshawur ...	114	174
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Amir's instructions to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah in regard to, ...	76	95
Mahomed Hyat Khan. Memorandum by, regarding British policy towards — ...	App. XXIII	{ cxxiv to cxxvi 95
Material aid to — in case of need. Question of giving, ...	77	
Material assistance to — in repelling invaders. Promise of the Government of India to give, ...	77	97 & 101
Material support in case of foreign aggression. Lord Salisbury's instructions about giving the Amir an explicit pledge of, ...	111	167—168
Mayo's (Lord) despatch of 20th May 1870 regarding the boundaries of —. Russian views of the position taken up in, ...	74	86—87
Merv, Russian occupation of. Question of a, considered in relation to — ...	108	156
Mission to —, Sir L. Pelly's. Amir refuses to receive, ...	113	170
Money, Amir's request for. Reply to, ...	79	105—106
National debt. Freedom of — from a, ...	95	137
Native Agent. Deputation of a, to — with a letter for the Amir ...	112	169—170
Native Agent at Kabul. Amir proposes to send Atta Mahomed Khan on a mission to India ...	115	176
Native Agent at Kabul. Embarrassing position of the, ...	App. XXII	cxixvi
Native Agent at Kabul summoned to Simla ...	116	176
Newspapers, British. Effect on the Amir of the comments of, on the affairs of — ...	95	137
Northbrook's (Lord) letter to Amir Shere Ali postponing, till a more convenient opportunity, the consideration of certain important matters ...	67	78—79
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Deputation of, on a mission to Lord Lytton ...	119	180
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Deputation of, to India as Envoy from Amir Shere Ali ...	76	94
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Friendly letters written by Sir L. Pelly and Captain Grey to, ...	118	178
Nur Mahomed Shah (Syud) advises against free intercourse between British India and — ...	App. XVII	xovi
Nur Mahomed Shah's (Syud) Mission to India. The ill-success of, a cause of the Amir's estrangement from the British Government ...	117	177
Pelly, Sir L. Instructions given to, on his deputation to meet an Afghan Envoy on the border ...	App. XX	cxii—cxiv
Pelly, Sir L. Peshawur Commissioner's letter to the Amir regarding the intended deputation of, to Kabul...	112	169—170
Pelly (Sir L.) and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan. Summary of a conversation at Simla between, ...	App. XIX	ciii—cvi
Pelly (Sir L.) deputed to the frontier to await the Amir's reply to Lord Lytton's messages ...	119	180
Pelly's (Sir L.) interview with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan at Simla in regard to the affairs of — ...	117	177
Pelly's (Sir L.) Mission to —. Amir refuses to receive, ...	113	170
Persia. Relations of, to — under the Treaty of Paris, 1857 ...	App. II	iii
Persia and —, boundary between. Interest taken by Russia in the question of the, ...	App. VI	xxxi
Persian raids on Afghans. Government of India promise Amir Shere Ali 5 lakhs of rupees as compensation for, ...	51	58
Peshawur Conferences between the Kabul Envoy and Sir L. Pelly. Final report to Secretary of State on the, ...	139	221—232
Peshawur Conferences between the Kabul Envoy and Sir L. Pelly. Termination of the, ...	130	203—210
Peshawur Conferences between the Kabul Envoy and Sir L. Pelly. Views of Her Majesty's Government as to the results of the, ...	140	232—234

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
Pollock, Sir R. Difficulty experienced by, in obtaining — news ...	95	137
Pollock, Sir R. Observations of, on British relations with — (1874) ...	95	136—138
Pollock, Sir R. Presents sent by, to the Amir and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, 1874 ...	95	136
Pollock's (Sir R.) letter to the Amir, warning him as to the consequences of his rejection of British overtures. Proceedings at Kabul on receipt of, ...	App. XVIII	xcviii
Presents sent by Viceroy to Amir Shere Ali in return for hospitality shown to General Pollock	51	58
Revenues of —. Remarks on the, ...	95	137
Russia. Report as to the offer of a subsidy to the Amir by, ...	App. XXII	cxixvi
Russia. Understanding with, in regard to —. Government of India's discussions with the Kabul Envoy on the, ...	77—78	95—104
Russia and England. Amir considers himself in a critical situation between, ...	115	175—176
Russia and England. Contravention of the understanding between, in regard to — ...	150	244
Russia and England. Engagement between, regarding —. Mr. Gladstone's view of the, ...	75	91
Russia informed that the engagements between England and herself regarding — merely implied the exercise of a moral influence on the Amir ...	75	91
Russia's engagements in regard to —. Prince Gortschakoff re-assures Lord Loftus on the subject of, ...	75	91
Russian Agents. Arrival at — of two, ...	App. XVIII	c—cii
Russian Agents. Intrigue of, with the Amir ...	115	175
Russian Agents. Presence of, at Kabul ...	115 and App. XXV	175 and cxlv
Russian aggression on —. Request of Kabul Envoy that the contingency of, should be specifically mentioned on the written assurances to be given by the Government of India to the Amir ...	78	99 & 102
Russian alliance with —. Report of a proposed, ...	App. XXII	cxixvi
Russian Ambassador in London. Proposals of the, aiming at the disintegration of — ...	118	178
Russian Ambassador in London informed of the objects of British policy in respect of — ...	111	166
Russian assurances in regard to — ...	150	243
Russian Emissaries at Kabul. Proceedings of, ...	App. XXII	cxixvii
Russian Emissaries at Kabul placed under the charge of Sirdar Mahomed Yusuf Khan ...	App. XXII	cxixvii
Russian Generals in Central Asia. Desire of British Government to stop all Amir's correspondence with — ...	App. XX	cxvii
Russian Government's instructions to General Kauffmann in respect of — ...	150	243
Russian Mission. Plea of the Kabul Durbar that a British Embassy to — might be followed by a, ...	113	170 & 172
Russian overtures to the Amir ...	Ap. XXV	cxlv
Russian progress in Central Asia. Alarm of the people of — at the, ...	77	97
Russians. Alleged promise of Dot Mahomed Khan to form an alliance with the, upon their conquering Samarcand ...	App. XIII	cxixxiv
Russians. Amir's dealings with the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clviii
Russians. Amir's despair of obtaining open aid from the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clvii
Russians. Amir's secret dealings with the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clv
Russians. Amir's secret overtures to the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Sarfaraz Khan, son of Ibrahim Khan. Release of, from detention in Persia ...	66	77
Secretary of State. Despatch to, regarding the Conferences with the Kabul Envoy on the Seistán and other questions ...	79	106—107
Seistán. Amir Shere Ali's representations in regard to, ...	13	14
Seistán. Sirdar Afzal Khan's representations to Amir Shere Ali regarding hostile encroachments of Amir of Kain on, ...	14	15
Seistán. Statement by Syud Nur Mahomed Shah of the Afghan claim to, ...	39	39—43
Seistán added to — by Ahmed Shah, Durani ...	2	1
Seistán and Lash-Jowain. Relations of — with Persia in respect of, ...	7	7—9
Seistán arbitration. Amir Shere Ali and the Kabul Durbar. Sentiments of the, in regard to the, ...	52	59
Seistán arbitration. Amir Shere Ali informed of the delivery of General Goldsmid's award ...	47	51
Seistán arbitration. Amir Shere Ali re-opens the question of the, ...	27	28
Seistán arbitration. Amir Shere Ali's proposal to depute an Envoy to India ...	59	69—70
Seistán arbitration. Amir Shere Ali's sarcastic reply to Lord Northbrook's khureeta on the results of the, ...	67	78
Seistán arbitration. Appeal lodged by the Afghan Commissioner against General Goldsmid's award ...	60	55—57
Seistán arbitration. Kabul Envoy. Arrival of, at Simla ...	60	70
Seistán arbitration. Kabul Envoy's announcement that the boundary laid down by General Goldsmid would be scrupulously respected by — ...	63	74
Seistán arbitration. Macnabb (Mr.). Proposed deputation of, to — to explain matters ...	57	66
Seistán arbitration. Macnabb's (Mr.) proposed Mission to —. Views of Amir Shere Ali and his Durbar as to, ...	58	67—68



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
Seistan arbitration. Mayo's (Lord) letter to Amir Shere Ali, explanatory of the course which the proceedings would take ...	23	26—27
Seistan arbitration. Persian case. Rejoinder by the Afghan Commissioner to the statement of the, ...	44	47—48
Seistan arbitration. Postponement of the, at Amir Shere Ali's request, owing to Yakub Khan's rebellion ...	25	27
Seistan arbitration. Protest by the Afghan Commissioner against General Goldsmid's award ...	46	50
Seistan arbitration. Syud Nur Mahomed Shah selected to represent Amir Shere Ali at the, ...	31	33
Seistan arbitration. The award in the, a cause of the Amir's estrangement from the British Government ...	117	177
Seistan arbitration and its results. Northbrook's (Lord) khureeta to Amir Shere Ali on the, ...	65	75—76
Seistan arbitration and other matters. Final letter to the Amir summing up result of the Conferences with the Kabul Envoy on the, ...	79	104—105
Seistan frontier. Discussion between the Kabul Envoy and the Foreign Secretary as to the measures to be taken for strengthening the, ...	64	74—75
Seistan frontier of ——. Discussion with Kabul Envoy regarding the measures to be taken for strengthening the, ...	78	102—103
Seistan, Persian. Persia's complaint of Afghan aggressions on, in aid of Sharif Khan ...	71	81—82
Seistan, Persian. Rumours of an intended attack on, from Herat ...	72	82—85
Shams-ul-Nahar, newspaper. Publication of the, stopped by Amir ...	Ap. XXVII	cliv
Sharif Khan and Kamal Khan. Request of Kabul Government as to release from detention in Persia of the sons of, ...	66	77
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Desire of, to have some property assigned to him in India or Europe...	76	93
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Anxiety of, as to his eastern frontier ...	App. XXI	cxix
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Appeals to Akhund Mulla Mashk-i-Alam in his difficulties with the British Government ...	App. XVIII	xcvii, xcvi, ci
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Embarrassment caused to, by British overtures ...	App. XVIII	xcix
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Family of, ...	App. XXIII	cxixiv
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Grievances of, against the British Government ...	125	193—194
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Letter to, from Commissioner of Peshawur, regarding the intended deputation of Sir L. Pelly to Kabul ...	112	169—170
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Letters from, to the Viceroy, acknowledging khureetas regarding His Excellency's assumption of office and the Imperial Assemblage ...	App. XXIV	cxixvii
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Misgivings of, as to the intentions of the British Government towards ——— ...	App. XVIII	xcvii
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Peshawur Commissioner's letter to, regarding Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan's deputation to Simla ...	116	176—177
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) estrangement from the British Government. Causes of, ...	117	177
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) objection to the deputation of a British officer to Kabul connected with Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	76	92—93
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) proposal for a conference between British and Afghan representatives on the border accepted on certain conditions ...	118	178
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) request for British aid in money and arms ...	77	98—101
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) request for money and arms and for aid in fortifying the northern frontier of his kingdom and organizing his troops ...	76	93—94
Subsidy. Report as to the offer of a, to the Amir by Russia ...	App. XXII	cxixvi
Subsidy, fixed and augmented. Lord Salisbury's instructions about giving the Amir a, ...	111	166—167
Subsidy from the British Government. Amir's expectations in regard to a, ...	95	137—138
Subsidy proposed to be offered to the Amir ...	App. XX	cxixiv
Telegraph between India and Kabul <i>via</i> Kuram. Establishment of a, suggested by Lord Salisbury ...	111	167
Telegraph line between Kabul and India. Importance of a, ...	App. XX	cxviii
Titles. Conferment of, by the Amir on Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Arsla Khan ...	87	125
Treaty of alliance with ———. Proposed conditions of a, ...	App. XX	cxii—cxixiv
Treaty (Secret) with ———. Aide Memoire furnished to Sir L. Pelly for a, ...	App. XX	cxxi & cxixiv
Treaty (Secret) with ———. Question of concluding a, ...	111	169
Tribes from iluchistan to Swat tampered with by the Amir ...	Ap. XXVII	clii
Tribes (independent) between Kabul and India. Amir's attempt to gain over the, ...	Ap. XXIII	cxixv
Turkey. Desire of the Sultan of, to send an Envoy to Kabul ...	141	235
Turkey. Mission to Kabul of Haji Mahomed Hassan, a servant of the Sultan of, ...	Ap. XXVIII	clxiii
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Account of the, ...	141	235—236
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Account of the interviews of the, with the Amir ...	Ap. XXVII	clxviii
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Advantages to British interests anticipated from a, ...	142	236
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Ahmet Khulusi's official report to his Government on the proceedings of the, ...	151	244—245

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Afghanistan.</b>		
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Amir's interview with the Envoy ... ..	147	242
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Appointment of Ahmet Khulussi Effendi as Turkish Envoy to the Amir ... ..	143	239
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Arrival and manner of reception in India of the, ... ..	145	240
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Arrival and reception of the, at the Amir's Court ... ..	147	241—242
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Communications with Secretary of State regarding the proposed, ... ..	142	236—239
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Interrogations of the Russian Government in regard to the, ... ..	150	243
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Object of the. Porte's instructions to its Envoy ... ..	143	239
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Result attained by the, ... ..	148	242
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Return to India of the, ... ..	148	242
Turkomans beyond the ——— frontier. Amir advised not to interfere with the, ... ..	78	99
Unfriendly acts of the Amir towards the British Government ... ..	138	220—221
Wakhan. Deputation from India to the Mir of, represented as one of the Amir's grievances against the British Government ... ..	126	194—196
Wakhan, the Mir of. The bestowal of presents on, a cause of the Amir's estrangement from the British Government ... ..	117	177
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Account of the rebellious designs and proceedings of, at Herat ... ..	92	133—135
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Alarm of Mir Afzul Khan, Governor of Furrab, at the designs of, ... ..	90	131
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Arrival of, at Kabul ... ..	99	140—141
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. British Government willing to take charge of, on certain conditions ... ..	App. XX	cxxi
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Conditions proposed by, to the Amir as those on which he would return to his allegiance ... ..	97	139
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Correspondence of, with Mir Alum, Governor of Kain ... ..	91	131—132
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Desire of, to be independent at Herat ... ..	92	133
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Imprisonment of, at Kabul ... ..	100	141
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Lord Northbrook's interposition in favor of, a cause of the Amir's estrangement from the British Government ... ..	117	177
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Lord Salisbury's suggestion as to the deportation of, to India ... ..	111	167
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Overtures of, to Persia. Shah's Government repudiate political intrigue with him ... ..	91	131—132
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Proposal of, that Furrab, Zamindawar, Girishk, and Kandahar should be made over to him in addition to Herat ... ..	90	131
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Rebellious proceedings of, at Herat... ..	90	131
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Refusal of, to return to Kabul. Account of his proceedings at Herat... ..	96	138—139
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Terms offered by the Amir to, ... ..	90	135
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Thomson's (Mr. Taylour) suggestion for British intervention on behalf of, ... ..	105	146
Yakub Khan Sirdar, and Mr. Taylour Thomson. Government of India object to communications between, on Kabul affairs ... ..	105	146
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) is persuaded to go to Kabul ... ..	98	140
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) summoned by the Amir to Kabul ... ..	94	135
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) visit to Kabul attributed to Lord Northbrook's instigation ... ..	100	141
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) arrest and imprisonment at Kabul. Detailed account of, ... ..	101	142
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) arrest and imprisonment at Kabul. Protest of Arela Khan and Asmut-ulla Khan, Ghilzais, against, ... ..	101	142
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Amir's message to Lord Northbrook regarding, ... ..	102	143—144
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Lord Northbrook's despatch to Secretary of State regarding... ..	100	141
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Lord Northbrook's message to the Amir regarding, ... ..	100	141
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Effect on the Amir and Kabul Darbar of Lord Northbrook's message regarding, ... ..	102	142—144
Yarkund Mission. True reason of the Amir's objection to the return <i>via</i> Kabul of the, ... ..	95	137
<b>Afridi Tribes.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali Khan's co-operation necessary for better control of the ——— infesting the Khauibar Pass ... ..	App. XX	cxviii
<b>Agha Saheb.</b>		
Information given by ——— regarding arrival at Kabul of a Russian Agent ... ..	App. XVIII	cii
Letter from ——— to Lieut.-Col. O. T. Burne on the affairs of Afghanistan ... ..	App. XVII	xcvi
Receipt of a letter on Kabul matters from ———, a Government pensioner ... ..	113	170
Second letter from ——— to Colonel O. T. Burne on Afghan affairs ... ..	App. XVIII	xcix
<b>Ahmad Khan of Lash-Jowain,</b>		
joins in a rebellion against Mir Alum Khan, Persian Governor of Seistan ... ..	App. IX	xliv

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Ahmed Khan, Mir Akhor.</b>		
accompanies Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to Peshawur ... ..	120	182
accompanies the Amir's troops to Herat ... ..	104	144
Appointment of — as Civil Governor of Herat. His temper ... ..	104	144
Doubtful conduct of — at Peshawur ... ..	121	184
sent to Herat to offer terms to Sirdar Yakub Khan ... ..	94	135
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. — advises suppression of, ... ..	92	133—134
— <b>Shah, Durani.</b>		
Seistán and Lash-Jowain added to Afghanistan by — ... ..	2	1—2
— <b>Mundi Effendi,</b>		
a member of the Turkish Mission to Kabul ... ..	144	239
left at Peshawur on departure of the Turkish Mission for Kabul ... ..	147	241
Visit to the Akhund of Swat of — and Syud Lall Shah, members of the Turkish Mission to Kabul. Their antecedents ... ..	146	240—241
<b>Ahmet Khulussi Effendi.</b>		
Appointment of — by the Sultan of Turkey as his Envoy to the Amir of Afghanistan ... ..	143	239
<b>Aitchison, Mr. C. U.</b>		
See "Foreign Secretary."		
<b>Akhund Mulla Mashk-i-Alam of Ghazni</b>		
appealed to by Amir Shere Ali in his difficulties with the British Government ... ..	App. XVIII	xcvii, xcvi & ci
consulted by Amir Shere Ali, whom he warns against receiving a British Mission ... ..	115	175
— <b>of Swat.</b>		
Jehad against Russia proclaimed by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Disapproval by the — of the, ... ..	141	236
Jehad proclamations. Issue of, by the — ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clii
Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan of Kabul. Intrigues of, with the — ... ..	134	212—213
Question of the British Government sending a messenger to the — ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clii
Result of Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan's visit to the — ... ..	App. XXV	cxviii
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Application of, to the — for aid in a jihad against the English ... ..	134	212—213
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Message sent by, to the — on arrival of the Turkish Envoy at Kabul ... ..	147	242
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) communications with the — ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Deputation to the — of two members of the, ... ..	146	240—241
<b>Ali Khan of Chakansur.</b>		
Chief of Seistán. Correspondence between British Minister at Teheran and Persian Government regarding murder of —, by his nephew, Taj Mahomed Khan ... ..	4	5—6
mentioned by Ferrier as Chief of a part of Seistán. Murdered Dr. Forbes ... ..	2	2—3
Return of — to his Chiefship of Seistán, supported by a small Persian force ... ..	3	4—5
usurps the Chiefship of Seistán with aid from Kandahar. Retires to Teheran, where he is received into the pay of the Persian Court and marries a Kajar Princess ... ..	2	3—4
<b>Ali Masjid.</b>		
Faiz Mahomed Khan. Letter from, the Commandant of —, stating that he could not allow the British Mission to pass unopposed without permission from Kabul ... ..	160	255
<b>Alison, Mr.</b>		
Persian claim to Seistán and Lash-Jowain. Letters from — to Mr. Eastwick regarding the, ... ..	7	9
Seistán. Correspondence between — and Dost Mahomed regarding Persian fears as to the latter's designs on, ... ..	7	8
Seistán arbitration. — thanked by Government of India for successfully concluding the preliminaries of the, ... ..	30	32
<b>Alum Khan, Mir, of Kain.</b>		
Revolt against —, Governor of Seistán. Ordered out of the country. His return and resumption of the Governorship ... ..	App. IX	xliv—xlv
See "Kain, Amir of."		
<b>Ambala.</b>		
Conferences with Amir Shere Ali and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at — in 1869 ... ..	App. XI	liv—lx
Meeting between Lord Lytton and Sir R. Pollock at — for the discussion of Afghan affairs ... ..	112	169
— <b>Conferences.</b>		
Result of the — ... ..	107	149—150



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Ambala Durbar.</b>		
Persian apprehensions arising out of the ——— ... ..	15	15—17
<b>Apology.</b>		
Opinion of Her Majesty's Government that an ——— should be demanded from the Amir, before British troops crossed the frontier line ... ..	169	265
<b>Argyll, Duke of.</b>		
Seistán arbitration. Draft instructions of ——— to General Goldsmid regarding the, ...	App. II	iii—vi
<b>Arjun Khan.</b>		
Favor obtained at Kabul by ———, late Khan of Tangi, an outlaw from British territory ...	138	221
<b>Army of Afganistan.</b>		
Attention given by Amir Shere Ali to the reorganization and improvement of the ——— ...	95	137
<b>Arsla Khan, Ghilzai.</b>		
Hostility of ——— to British influence in Afghanistan ... ..	App. XXV	cxl
Protest of ——— and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, against Sirdar Yakub Khan's imprisonment at Kabul ... ..	101	142
Title of "Amin-i-Kharija" (Foreign Minister) bestowed on ——— by Amir Shere Ali ...	87	125
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) persuaded by ——— and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, to go to Kabul ...	98	140
<b>Asaf Khan.</b>		
Favor obtained at Kabul by ———, son of an outlaw from British territory ... ..	138	221
<b>Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai.</b>		
Protest of ——— and Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, against Sirdar Yakub Khan's imprisonment at Kabul ... ..	101	142
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) persuaded by ——— and Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, to go to Kabul ...	98	140
<b>Atta Mahomed Khan, Nawab.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Congratulations of ——— to Amir Shere Ali on the nomination of, as Heir-apparent ... ..	87	125
Afghanistan. Proceedings of the Amir and his Durbar in regard to the proposals made by the British Government through ——— ... ..	App. XXII	{ cxxvi to cxxxii
Arrival of ——— at Simla ... ..	117	177
Deputation of ——— on a mission to India proposed by Amir Shere Ali ... ..	115	176
Embarrassing position of ——— at Kabul ... ..	App. XXII	cxxvi
Evasive conduct of ——— at his interview with Sir L. Pelly at Simla ... ..	117	177
India, Government of. Communication to ——— of the views of the, in regard to Afghanistan ... ..	118	177—178
Interview between Sir Lewis Pelly and ——— at Simla in regard to Kabul affairs ...	117	177
Interviews between Lord Lytton and ——— at Simla in regard to Kabul affairs ...	118	177—178
Lytton (Lord) and ———. Memoranda of two interviews at Simla between, ... ..	App. XIX	cvi—cxi
Pelly (Sir L.) and ———. Summary of a conversation at Simla between, ... ..	App. XIX	ciii—cvi
Pelly's (Sir L.) proposal to get rid of ——— ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clv
Return of ——— to Kabul from Simla ... ..	119	180
said to be loyal himself but opposed to Lord Lytton's policy towards Afghanistan ...	Ap. XXVII	cliv
Secret opposition of ——— to the policy of Government ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clv—clvi
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) estrangement from the British Government. ———'s opinion as to the cause of, ... ..	117	177
summoned to Simla ... ..	116	176
See also "Kabul, Native Agent at."		
<b>Attaulla, Kandahari.</b>		
Execution of ——— at Kabul on a charge of being an English news-agent ... ..	138	221
<b>Ayub Khan, Sirdar,</b>		
Amir Shere Ali's warning to ——— ... ..	104	144
dissatisfied with his reception in Persia ... ..	106	147
Flight of ——— to Persia ... ..	104	145
ordered to be deported from Herat to Kabul ... ..	104	144
Proposal to place ——— under British protection, negatived ... ..	106	147—148
refuses to trust the Amir ... ..	104	145
threatens the life of General Fakir Mahomed Khan in Persia ... ..	106	148
warned by Sirdar Yakub Khan to put Herat in a state of defence against the Amir's troops. ...	104	145
<b>Azim Khan,</b>		
a Seistáni Chief ... ..	App. III	x

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Baba Azim.</b>		
Expulsion from Kabul of ———, a servant of the exiled Sirdars Zulfikar Khan and Salik Khan, on suspicion of being a British correspondent ...	138	221
<b>Badakshan.</b>		
Afghan sovereignty over ——— and Wakhan. Russia's objection to the admission of, ...	74	68—89
<b>Bahadur Khan,</b>		
a leading supporter of Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	90	131
<b>Bahram Khan.</b>		
Latest news regarding ———, the murderer of Major Macdonald ...	84	117
Macdonald, Major. Murder of, by ———, half-brother of Nowroz Khan of Lalpura ...	82	110
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Proclamation offering rewards for the capture of ——— and others concerned in, ...	84	115—116
— <b>Khan, Barakzai,</b>		
tutor of Sirdar Ayub Khan ...	104	145
<b>Bajour.</b>		
Afghan claim to ——— ...	137	219
Afghan occupation of ——— and Swat. Inexpediency of permitting an, ...	App. XXVII	clix—clxi
British policy towards ——— and Swat ...	137	19
Kabul, Amir of. Real feelings of the people of ——— towards the, ...	App. XXVII	cliii
Khans of ——— visit Kabul. Amir's attempt to secure their submission ...	137	219—220
Mahomed Sharif Khan. Translation of a firman granted by Amir Shere Ali to, ...	App. XXVII	clxii
Mian Abdur Rahman sent by Commissioner, Peshawur, to confer with the Khans of ——— regarding their dealings with Kabul ...	137	220
Nawagai in ———. A son of the Khan of, persuaded to go to Kabul on promise of restoration of the fief of Donai ...	App. XXVII	cliii—cliv
Rahimatullah Khan of Dir. Translation of a firman granted by Amir Shere Ali to, ...	App. XXVII	clxi
Safdar Khan, son of the Khan of Nawagai in ———. Visit of, to Sir L. Pelly at Peshawur. ...	App. XXVII	cliii
<b>Baker, Colonel V.</b>		
Visit of ——— to Afghanistan objected to by the Amir ...	85	117—118
<b>Bakhtiar Khan.</b>		
Afghanistan. Letter from ——— regarding Amir's anxiety as to his Eastern Frontier ...	App. XXI	cixv
Despatch of ——— with letter to Yakub Khan explaining terms of peace ...	179	281—282
Macnabb's (Mr.) unfavorable opinion of ——— ...	App. XXII	cxxvi
— <b>Khan, Munshi.</b>		
Complaint of ——— regarding the conduct towards him of the Kabul Court ...	App. XXVII	clv
said to be a mere creature of the Amir of Kabul and owner of land and property in Kabul ...	App. XXVII	cliv
<b>Bala Effendi,</b>		
a member of the Turkish Mission to Kabul ...	144	239
<b>Balkh.</b>		
British Agent. Amir willing to permit the location of a, at Kandahar, Herat or ——— ...	107	149
British Residents. Proposed location of, at Herat, Kandahar, and ——— ...	App. XX	cxvi
<b>Bazmir.</b>		
Execution of a man named ——— on a charge of supplying Kabul news to the British Government ...	138	220
<b>Bellew, Dr. H. W.,</b>		
accompanies Colonel Pollock to Seistan ...	32	34
appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ...	158	251
Kabul Envoy. Informal interview between ——— and the, ...	120	182
Memorandum by ——— on Kabul affairs ...	App. XXXIII	clxxix
Note of private interview of ——— with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Peshawur ...	App. XXV	cxlvi
Persian encroachment upon Afghan territory. Review by ——— of the political results of, ...	App. VIII	xl—xliii
Private letter from ——— to Amir Shere Ali Khan, regarding reception of a British Mission at Kabul ...	114	175
Proposed deputation of ——— to Kabul with Sir L. Pelly ...	112	169
<b>Beluch Chiefs in Seistan.</b>		
Question of the political status of the ——— brought before Persian Government ...	66	77
<b>Beluchis of Seistan, the ...</b>	App. III	ix—i
<b>Beluchistan.</b>		
Persia and ———, boundary between. Interest taken by Russia on the question of the, ...	App. VI	xxxi
Seistan. General Goldsmid's view as to the best means of bringing the boundary proposed to be laid down in, into correspondence with that of ——— ...	App. VI	xxx—xxxi

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Bokhara.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Selection of, as Heir-apparent to the Kabul throne announced to the Amir of ———	89	129
Russia. Restrictions imposed by, on the Indian trade with Samarkand and ———	App. XVIII	c
Turkish Envoy to Kabul. Extension of Afghan rule over ——— suggested by the,	148	242
<b>Boundaries.</b>		
Goldsmid's (General) opinion as to the rule to be followed in fixing ——— between semi-civilized Oriental States	App. VI	xxix
<b>Bradford, Major.</b>		
Turkish Envoy to Kabul. ——— entrusted with the arrangements for reception in India of the, ...	145	240
Turkish Envoy to Kabul. Instructions issued to ——— in regard to the reception in India of the, ...	App. XXX	clvi
<b>British Government.</b>		
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Correspondence between the ——— and that of Russia regarding the,	74	86—90
— <b>Mission to Kabul.</b>		
Chamberlain, Sir Neville. Instructions to ———	158	251—253
Determination of the Government of India that the ——— should leave Peshawur about the 16th September 1878, whether Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan had reached Kabul or not ...	160	253
Khaibaris. Agreement with the, to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid ...	165	260
Khaibaris. Arrangements with the, to escort the ——— to Ali Masjid ...	163	258
Letter to the Amir informing him of the intention of the Government of India to send a ———	156	249—250
Orders for withdrawal of ———	165	259—260
Persian text of letters sent to Ali Masjid, Dakka, Jalalabad, and to the Mustaufi intimating that the Mission would leave Peshawur about 16th September 1878	App. XXXVI	ccxxiii
Refusal of Faiz Mahomed Khan to allow the Mission to pass Ali Masjid	165	259—260
<b>Brown, Lieut.-Genl. Sir S.</b>		
Memorandum of interview of Amir Yakub Khan with ——— and Major Cavagnari at Gandamak	App. XLIV	cclx
<b>Cavagnari, Major P. L. N.</b>		
appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul	158	251
British Residents. Opinion of ——— on the question of locating, at Herat and Kandahar ...	App. XVI	xcii
Instructions to ——— in the event of a British Mission proceeding to Kabul to arrange the terms of peace	App. XLIV	cclvi—cclix
Memorandum by ——— on Kabul affairs	App. XXXIII	clxxv
Memorandum on Amir Yakub Khan's visit to Sir S. Browne and Major Cavagnari at Gandamak	App. XLIV	cclxx
Personal interview between ——— and Amir Yakub Khan at Safed Sang	App. XLIV	cclxi
Report of ——— regarding the refusal of Faiz Mahomed Khan to allow the British Mission to pass through the Khaibar	App. XXXVII	ccxxvii
<b>Central Asia.</b>		
Russia. Measures taken by, in ——— in view of war with England declared to be stopped...	173	275
<b>Chaburjak,</b>		
a fort and village in Seistan, held by Imam Khan, Sanjurani	36	37
<b>Chamberlain, Sir Neville.</b>		
appointed to take charge of British Mission to Kabul	156 & 158	249—251
Faiz Mahomed Khan. Communications between ——— and,	161	256—257
Instructions to ——— when proceeding on Mission to Kabul	158	251—253
Letter from ——— directing Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan to leave Kabul and return to Peshawur	App. XXXVII	ccxxxi
Letter from ——— to Faiz Mahomed Khan informing him that his reply refusing to allow the British Mission to pass through the Khaibar was considered as that of the Amir	App. XXXVII	ccxxxi
Report by ——— regarding the British Mission to Kabul...	App. XXXVII	ccxxiv
<b>Chetan Shah.</b>		
Memorandum by ——— on political state of Kabul	App. XXXIV	cciii
<b>Christie, Captain.</b>		
Journey of ——— through Seistan, 1810	2	2
<b>Condolence.</b>		
Letter of ——— on the death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan	157	250



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Conolly, Captain.</b>		
Visit of ——— to Seistán ... ..	2	2
<b>Daud Khan, Rissaldar.</b>		
Information given by ———, news-writer at Kandahar, regarding the arrival at Kabul of a Russian Agent ... ..	App. XVIII	ci
<b>—— Shah, General.</b>		
March of ——— with the Amir's troops against Herat ... ..	104	144
<b>Davies, Sir R. H.</b>		
Minute by ——— on the question of locating English Residents at Herat and Kandahar ..	App. XVI	xc
<b>Delhi Assemblage.</b>		
See "Imperial Assemblage at Delhi."		
<b>Dervish, Nharni,</b>		
A Seistáni Chief ... ..	App. III	x
<b>Dilaram Khan.</b>		
Visit to Kabul of ——— of Khar (Bajour). Title of "Sirdar" conferred upon him by Amir Shere Ali ... ..	137	219
<b>Din Mahomed Khan.</b>		
Capture of ——— by Sirdar Yakub Khan's adherents ... ..	104	145
<b>Dir.</b>		
Mahomed Sharif Khan. Translation of a firman granted by Amir Shere Ali to, recognizing him as successor to his father, the Khan of ——— ... ..	App. XXVII	clxii
Rahmatullah Khan, of ———. Translation of a firman granted by Amir Shere Ali to, ...	App. XXVII	clxi
<b>Disbrowe, Colonel,</b>		
placed in charge of the Turkish Mission to Kabul on its arrival in India ... ..	145	240
<b>Donsi.</b>		
History of the sief of ———, held temporarily by the Chief of Nawagai from the Amir of Kabul ... ..	App. XXVII	cliv
<b>Doria, Mr.</b>		
Correspondence of ——— with the Persian Government regarding murder of Ali Khan, Chief of Seistán, ... ..	4	5—6
<b>Dost Mahomed.</b>		
Seistán. Promise of ——— to Mr. Alison to abstain from hostilities against, ... ..	7	8
<b>—— Mahomed Khan.</b>		
Release of ———, brother of Sharif Khan, from detention in Persia ... ..	66	77
<b>—— Mahomed Khan, Amir.</b>		
Alleged promise of ——— to form an alliance with the Russians upon their conquering Samarkand ... ..	App. XXIII	cxliiv
Descendants of the late ——— of Afghanistan ... ..	App. XXIII	cxliiv
<b>—— Mahomed of Kabul.</b>		
Lash-Jowan. Persian occupation of. Speech of ——— regarding. His own claim to the district ... ..	6	6
<b>Dubsky, Count.</b>		
Misrepresentations of ———, Austrian Representative at Teheran, as to the action taken by the Persian Government on a letter from Amir Shere Ali, announcing the selection of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as his Heir-apparent ... ..	89	130
<b>Eastwick, Mr.</b>		
Dost Mahomed's proceedings against Seistán. ——— sent to Meshed to watch, ... ..	7	7
Enquiry by ——— into the Persian claim to Seistán and Lash-Jowain ... ..	7	7—8
Interview of ——— with the Shah for the prevention of war between Persia and Afghanistan ... ..	7	8
Memorandum by ——— on the Persian claims to Seistán ... ..	App. I	i—ii
Opinion of ——— on the Persian claim to Seistán ... ..	5	6
<b>Egerton, Hon'ble Sir R. E.</b>		
Memorandum by ——— on Kabul affairs ... ..	App. XXIII	clxxvii
<b>Egypt.</b>		
Turkish Mission to Kabul. The Khedive's opinion regarding tho, ... ..	144	240
<b>Ellis, Mr.</b>		
Letter from ——— to Lord Palmerston. A Persian appeal to, in support of their claims to Seistán ... ..	App. VI	xxvii

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Embassy, Afghan.</b>		
Reception of the — at Tashkend ... ..	174	276
Stoletoff, General. Return of, to Tashkend, accompanied by an — ... ..	174	276
<b>Envoy from Kabul.</b>		
Salisbury's (Lord) suggestion as to the permanent presence in India of an — ... ..	111	168—169
<b>Eshan Khwaja Buzurg, Samarkandi,</b>		
brings a letter from General Kauffmann to the Amir of Kabul ... ..	89	129
<b>Faiz Mahomed Khan.</b>		
Chamberlain, Sir Neville. Communications between, and — ... ..	161	256—257
Letter from — stating that he could not allow the British Mission to pass Ali Masjid without permission from Kabul ... ..	160	255
Letter from — to Sir Neville Chamberlain regarding the Mission to Kabul ... ..	App. XXXVII	ccxxvii
<b>Fakir Mahomed Khan, General.</b>		
Flight of — to Persia with Sirdar Ayub Khan ... ..	104	145
Life of — threatened by Sirdar Ayub Khan ... ..	106	148
refuses to submit to the Amir ... ..	104	145
<b>Fateh Ali Shah, Mir.</b>		
Gordon, Col. T. Courteous reception of, at Wakhan by — ... ..	86	119
Letter and presents to — of Wakhan from the Punjab Government ... ..	86	119—120
<b>Ferrier, General.</b>		
Visit of — to Seistan and Lash-Jowain ... ..	2	2—3
<b>Figurative Language.</b>		
Use of — in correspondence between Kabul merchants and their Agents in Peshawur ... ..	App. XXVII	clviii
<b>Flag.</b>		
Objection made to General Goldemid's hoisting his — in Seistan ... ..	{ 32 34	{ 34 35
<b>Forbes, Dr.</b>		
Goldsmid's (Genl.) opinion that Ibrahim Khan of Chakansur was the murderer of — ... ..	App. VI	xxvii
Murder of — by Ali Khan of Chakansur ... ..	2	3
<b>Foreign Secretary.</b>		
Afghanistan. Discussion between the Kabul Envoy and the — regarding the assistance to be rendered to, in order to strengthen that country against foreign aggression ... ..	64	74—75
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Conversations of the — with the Kabul Envoy regarding the question of the, ... ..	77	96—104
British Agents. Discussion between Syud Nur Mahomed and — regarding the location of, in Afghanistan ... ..	107	150
British officers. Discussion between the Kabul Envoy and the — regarding the location of, in certain towns of Afghanistan ... ..	64	74—75
Seistan arbitration. Memorandum of a conversation between the Kabul Envoy and the — ... ..	61	71—72
Seistan arbitration. Memorandum of a second conversation between the Kabul Envoy and the — ... ..	62	72—74
Seistan arbitration. Memorandum of a third and a fourth conversation between the Kabul Envoy and the — ... ..	64	74—75
Seistan frontier of Afghanistan. Discussion between the Kabul Envoy and the — as to the measures to be taken for strengthening the, ... ..	64	74—75
<b>Forsyth's (Mr.) Mission to Yarkand.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali's objection to the return of — <i>via</i> Badakshan ... ..	85	118—119
Question regarding return of, <i>via</i> Badakshan discussed with Kabul Envoy ... ..	78	103
True reason of the Amir's objection to the return <i>via</i> Kabul of — ... ..	95	137
<b>Frontier Tribes.</b>		
Measures to detach the — from the Afghan Government previous to the war ... ..	168	263
<b>Gandamak.</b>		
Yakub Khan. Arrival of, at — ... ..	182	287
Yakub Khan, Amir. Memorandum of interview between — and Sir S. Browne and Major Cavagnari ... ..	App. XLIV	cclx
<b>Ghilzai Chiefs, the,</b>		
accept the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent to the Amir of Kabul ... ..	87	127
<b>Ghulam Ahmed, Extra Assistant Commissioner.</b>		
Visit of — to Kabul, 1874 ... ..	95	135—136
<b>— Hassan Khan, Nawab,</b>		
Departure of — for Kabul ... ..	160	255

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Ghulam Hassan Khan, Nawab.</b>		
Deputation to Kabul with the Viceroy's letter to the Amir of the 14th August 1878 ...	154—157	249—250
Endeavours to delay him on his way to Kabul ...	160	255
Memorandum by — on Kabul affairs, dated 19th October 1878 ...	App. XLI	ccxxvii—ccxxix
Postponement of departure for Kabul with Viceroy's letter of 14th August 1878, on account of Sirdar Abdulla Jan's death ...	157	250
Proceedings of — at Kabul ...	164—165	258
Reception of — at Kabul, and interviews with the Amir ...	162	257
Return of —, with Shere Ali's reply of 6th October 1878 ...	168	263
<b>Gladstone, Mr.</b>		
Afghanistan. View taken by — of the engagement between England and Russia regarding, ...	75	91
<b>Goldsmid, Genl.</b>		
Arrival of — in Seistán. Objection made to his hoisting his flag there ...	32	34
India, frontier policy of. Advice of — in respect of the, ...	App. VI	xxxii
Opinion of — as to the principle to be followed in fixing boundaries between semi-civilized Oriental States ...	App. VI	xxix
Report to Secretary of State regarding the completion of the work in Seistán ...	38	38—39
Seistán. Documents consulted by — in forming his arbitral opinion in regard to, ...	App. VI	xvi
Seistán. Informal memorandum on, by — ...	40	43
Seistán. Memorandum on, by — ...	App. III	vii—x
Seistán. Report on, by —, with reference to the proposed British arbitration on the question of ancient rights and present possession ...	App. IV	xv—xvii
Seistán. Special report by — to Government of India on the subject of his arbitral decision ...	App. VI	{ xxv— xxxvii
Seistán arbitration. Condensed statement of —'s opinion ...	46	51—53
Seistán arbitration. Decision of — ...	46	50
Seistán arbitration. Difficulty of — about an interview with the Amir of Kain ...	85	35—36
Seistán arbitration. Duke of Argyll's draft instructions to — regarding the, ...	App. II	iii—vi
Seistán arbitration. — instructed not to deliver arbitral opinion unless Persia accepted ancient right as well as present possession as basis of, ...	41	43—44
Seistán arbitration. Selection of — to act on part of England in the, ...	19	19—20
Seistáni Chiefs. Account of the families of the, by — ...	App. VII	{ xxxiii xxxvii
Seistán question. Complete statement of —'s arbitral opinion on the, ...	App. V	xviii—xxiv
Seistán, Proper and Outer. Description of, by — ...	App. IV	xv—xvii
Seistán up the Helmund. Tour of — in, ...	36	36—38
<b>Gordon, Colonel T.</b>		
Courteous reception of — by the Mir of Wakhan ...	86	119
<b>Gortschakoff, Prince.</b>		
Afghanistan. — reassures Lord Loftus on the subject of Russia's engagements in regard to, ...	75	91
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Despatch from — to Count Brunnow, accepting the, as defined by the British Government ...	75	90
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Despatches from — to Count Brunnow regarding the, ...	74	86—90
<b>Government of India.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Correspondence between the Amir and the — regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ...	88	128
<b>Granville, Lord.</b>		
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Despatch from — to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding the, ...	74	87
Seistán arbitration. Instructions of — to Mr. Alison in the matter of the, ...	19	20
<b>Green, Sir H.</b>		
Seistán. Despatch of Persian troops into. —'s account of the, ...	10	11
<b>Grey, Captain H.</b>		
British Residents. Letter from — regarding Amir Shere Ali's assent to the location of, in Afghanistan ...	App. XVI	xcv
Letter written by — to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Kabul ...	118	178
<b>Gulzar Khan,</b>		
Governor of Jowain, for Mahomed Saleh Khan, Chief of Lash-Jowain ...	2	2
<b>Habibulla Khan, Mustaufi,</b>		
accompanies the Amir's troops to Herat ...	104	144

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Habibulla Khan, Mustaufi.</b>		
Title of "Amin-ul-Mulk" (Home Minister) bestowed on — by Amir Shere Ali ...	87	125
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Advice of — to Amir Shere Ali in regard to the evil designs of, ...	90	131
<b>Haboo Jan.</b>		
Visit to Kabul of —, son of Haidar Khan of Nawagai (Bajour) ...	137	219
<b>Hafiz Mahomed Amin.</b>		
Account given by — of a Turkish messenger to Kabul ...	App. XXVIII	clxiii
<b>Haidar Khan.</b>		
Title of "Sirdar" conferred by Amir Shere Ali on — of Nawagai (Bajour) ...	137	219
<b>— Shah.</b>		
Execution of — at Kabul on a charge of supplying news to the British Government ...	138	221
<b>Haji Azad Khan.</b>		
Deputation of — to Herat on a Mission from the Prince Governor of Meshed ...	91	132
<b>— Mahomed Hassan,</b>		
a messenger sent by the Sultan of Turkey to Kabul ...	141	235
Mission to Kabul of —, a servant of the Sultan of Turkey ...	App. XXVIII	clxiii
<b>Hakim Khan.</b>		
Zeal displayed by —, an outlaw from Peshawar, in denouncing persons suspected at Kabul of communicating news to the British Government ...	138	220
<b>Hammick, Capt. St. V. A.,</b>		
appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ...	156	251
<b>Hashim,</b>		
a Chief of Seistán ...	App. III	x
<b>Hazrat Ali Khan.</b>		
Visit to Kabul of — of Asmar (Bajour) ...	137	219
<b>Heir-apparent(s).</b>		
Precedents before the Government of India for not formally recognizing the selection of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as — to the Amir of Kabul ...	88	128
<b>Helmund.</b>		
Question of constructing irrigation works on the — decided in favor of the Afghans ...	69	80
Question raised by Kabul Envoy as to right of Afghans, under Seistán award, to construct new, or repair existing, channels leading from the —, for irrigation purposes ...	66	76—77
The — and the — Canal ...	36	36—37
<b>Herat.</b>		
Ahmed Khan, Mirakhor. Appointment of, as Civil Governor of — ...	104	144
Amir's opinion as to the political importance of — ...	104	145
Ayub Khan, Sirdar. Amir's warning to, ...	104	144
Ayub Khan, Sirdar. Flight of, to Persia ...	104	145
Ayub Khan, Sirdar, ordered to be deported from — to Kabul ...	104	144
Ayub Khan, Sirdar, warned by Sirdar Yakub Khan to put — in a state of defence against the Amir's troops ...	104	145
British Agent. Amir willing to permit the location of a, at Kandahar, Balkh, or — ...	107	149
British Agent. Continued wish of Her Majesty's Government to station a, at — ...	140	232
British Agent. Government of India's views on the question of appointing a, at — ...	108	151—156
British Agent at —. Lord Salisbury's instructions in respect to the appointment of an English Officer as, ...	107	150—151
British Residents. Opinions of certain officers on the question of locating, at — and Kandahar ...	App. XVI	xcv—xcv
British Residents. Proposed location of, at —, Kandahar, and Balkh ...	App. XX	cxvi
Capture of — by Dost Mahomed, of Kabul, alarms the Persian Government ...	7	7
Khorasan, Prince Governor of. Arrival at — of an Agent from the, ...	91	132
March of the Amir's troops against — ...	104	144
Meshed, Prince Governor of. Arrival at — of an Agent from the, ...	91	132
Occupation of — by Amir Shere Ali's troops ...	104	145
Persia. Relations of, to — under the Treaty of Paris, 1857 ...	App. II	iii
Persian aid to Sirdar Yakub Khan at —. Report regarding promise of, ...	103	144
Persian intrigues at — and Kandahar. News received at Kabul of, ...	App. XXVII	clii
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Account of the rebellious designs and proceedings at — ...	92	133—135
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Alleged intention of, to sell — to Persia or Russia ...	103	144
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Arrest and imprisonment of, at Kabul ...	100	141
Yakub Khan, Sirdar, consents to go to Kabul ...	98	140

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Herat.</b>		
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Correspondence of, with the Governor of Kain...	91	131—132
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Desire of, to be independent at ———	92	133
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Overtures of, to Persia. Shuh's Government deny political intrigue with him	91	131—132
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Rebellious proceedings of, at ———	90	131
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Refusal of, to return to Kabul. Account of his proceedings at ———	96	138—139
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) offers to go to Kabul on certain conditions	97	139
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) summoned by the Amir to Kabul	94	135
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul attributed to the Amir's fear that he would transfer ——— to Persia	101	142
Yar Mahomed Khan, Chief of ——— fails to secure the allegiance of Mahomed Saleh Khan of Lash-Jowai. Leads an expedition against Seistán. His death	2	3
<b>Hussein Effendi.</b>		
Turkish Mission to Kabul joined by ———, Turkish Consul-General at Bombay	144	239
<b>Ibrahim Effendi,</b>		
a member of the Turkish Mission to Kabul	144	239
<b>— Khan.</b>		
Application of ——— of Seistán to the Amir of Kabul for aid against Persia	10	12
Attack on ——— of Seistán by the Amir of Kain	10	12
British aid sought by ———, of Seistán, against the Persians	12	13—14
Deputation of ——— to Wakhan by the Government of India. Amir Shere Ali's annoyance at the,	86	119—124
Refusal of ——— of Seistán to pay allegiance to the Persians	10	12
<b>— Khan, of Chakansur,</b>		
abandons his villages on the Persian side of Seistán	App. IX	xiv.
Chief of a part of Seistán	{ App. III 2	x 2—3
Goldsmid's (General) opinion that ——— was the murderer of Dr. Forbes	App. VI	xxvii
joins in a rebellion against Mir Alum Khan, Persian Governor of Seistán	App. IX	xiv
<b>— Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Dissatisfaction of ——— at the recognition of, as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali	87	127
<b>Imam Khan,</b>		
a Seistáni Chief	App. III	x
<b>— Khan, of Roodbar,</b>		
joins in a rebellion against Mir Alum Khan, Persian Governor of Seistán	App. IX	xiv
<b>— Khan, Sanjuraní,</b>		
owner of the village and fort of Chaburjak in Seistán	86	37
<b>Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.</b>		
Importance attached to the attendance of Amir Shere Ali Khan at the ———	App. XX	cxix
Shere Ali Khan (Amir) invited by Lord Lytton to be present at the ———	118	179—180
<b>— Title.</b>		
Proclamation of the ——— in India suggested by Lord Salisbury as affording a favorable opportunity for renewing friendly relations with Afghanistan	111	165
<b>India. Frontier Policy of.</b>		
Goldsmid's (General) advice in respect of the ———	App. VI	xxxii
<b>—, Government of.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Despatch from ——— to the Secretary of State regarding selection of, as Heir-apparant	88	128—129
Accused of hostility towards Persia, and of undue preference of Afghan interests	56	65—66
Afghanistan. Objection of the ——— against expending large sums of money for the purpose of strengthening,	110	162
Afghanistan. Views of the ——— in regard to,	118	177—178
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Correspondence of the ——— with Amir Shere Ali about the understanding with Russia as to the,	76	91—95
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Despatch from the ——— regarding the,	74	87
Agent from Amir Shere Ali. ——— decline to receive an	114	173
Ayub Khan, Sirdar. ——— decline to offer British protection to,	106	143
British Agents in Afghanistan. Views of the ——— on the question of appointing.	108	151—166
British Agents on the Afghan frontier. Renewal of proposals to the Amir for the establishment of,	118	178



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>India, Government of.</b>		
British Mission. Views of Lord Northbrook's Government as to the policy of sending a, to Kabul ... ..	110	159—164
Conference between British and Afghan representatives on the border. Conditional acceptance by the — of the Amir's proposal for a, ... ..	118	178
Merv, Russian occupation of. Views of the — as to a, ... ..	108	156
Offer by the — to Amir Shere Ali of their moral support and aid in money, arms, native artificers, &c. ... ..	107	149
Persian raids on Afghans. — promise the Amir of Kabul five lakhs of rupees as compensation for, ... ..	51	58
Seistán. Despatch from the — to Secretary of State, summarizing result of the discussions with the Kabul Envoy in regard to, ... ..	66	76—77
Seistán arbitration. Action taken by the — on hearing of the confirmation of the award ... ..	57	66
Seistán arbitration. Correspondence of the — with the Secretary of State and Mr. Alison on the subject of the, ... ..	18	18—19
Seistán arbitration. Despatch from — to Secretary of State on General Goldsmid's award ... ..	49	53—54
Seistán arbitration. Despatches from the — on the subject of the, ... ..	20	20—22
Seistán arbitration. — represent impossibility of asking Amir Shere Ali to consent to, on limited terms accepted by Persia ... ..	29	30—31
Seistán arbitration. — inform Amir Shere Ali of the delivery of General Goldsmid's award	47	51
Seistán arbitration. Selection of Colonel Pollock to represent the — at the. His functions ... ..	24	27
Seistán, Persian. Inability of the — from loss of influence over the Amir, to prevent Afghan aggressions on, ... ..	72	84
Shere Ali, Amir. Promise of — to give material assistance to, in repelling invaders ...	77	97 & 101
Shere Ali, Amir. Proposal of, to promise material assistance to, in case of need ...	77	95
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Concessions offered by the — to. Conditions attached thereto ...	118	177—178
Treaty of Paris, 1857. — represent the inconvenience of the responsibilities imposed by the, on the British Government ... ..	73	85
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Mr. Tylour Thomson's suggestion for intervention on behalf of, disapproved by — ... ..	105	146
Yakub Khan, Sirdar, and Mr. Tylour Thomson. — object to communications between, on Kabul affairs ... ..	105	146
<b>Ismatulla Khan,</b>		
Chief of the Jabbar Khel Ghilzais ... ..	App. XVIII	xcvii
<b>Jalaluddin, Malik,</b>		
last of the Karani (Kaiani ?) Chiefs of Seistán ... ..	App. VI	xxvii
<b>Jehad.</b>		
Rumours of an intended — prevalent at Kabul ... ..	115	175
<b>Jenkins, Lieutenant-Colonel F. H.</b>		
Memorandum by — on Kabul affairs ... ..	Ap. XXXIII	cxcix
Report of — regarding the refusal of Faiz Mahomed Khan to allow the British Mission to pass through the Khaibar ... ..	Ap. XXXVII	ccxix
<b>Kabul.</b>		
Bad state of affairs in — during the peace negotiations ... ..	181	287
British Agent. Amir's objection to the location of a, at — ... ..	107	149
British Embassy, temporary. Instructions of the Home Government regarding the despatch to — of a, ... ..	109	157—159
British Embassy, temporary. Secret instructions of 1876, from the Home Government, for the despatch to — of a, ... ..	111	164—169
British Mission. Deliberations of the — Durbar on the question of receiving a, ...	115	175—176
British Mission. Proposal to send a, to — under Major Cavagnari ... ..	180	283
British Mission. Views of Lord Northbrook's Government as to the policy of sending a, to — ... ..	110	159—164
British Mission to —. Letter to the Amir, dated 29th October 1878, after return of, ...	170	285
Ghulam Ahmed, Extra Assistant Commissioner. Visit of, to — in 1874 ... ..	95	135—136
Jehad. Rumours of a, prevalent at — ... ..	115	175
Lash-Jowain claimed by the Amir of — ... ..	6	6
Mission to —. Deputation of Bessalder-Major Khanan Khan on a, ... ..	112	169
Mission to —. Failure of Bessalder-Major Khanan Khan's, ... ..	113	170
Mission to —. Intended deputation of Sir L. Pelly on a, ... ..	112	169
Native Agent at —. Embarrassing position of the, ... ..	App. XXII	cxixi
Pollock's (Sir B.) letter to the Amir, warning him as to the consequences of his rejection of British overtures. Proceedings at — on receipt of, ... ..	App. XVIII	xcviii
Russian Agents. Arrival at — of two, ... ..	App. XVIII	c—cii

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Kabul.</b>		
Russian Agents. Presence of, at ———	115	175
Russian Emissary. Denial of M. deGiers that a, had proceeded to ——— with letters from the Emperor	173	275
Russian Mission at ———. Account of the proceedings of the,	172	273
Russian Mission at ———. British Ambassador at St. Petersburg instructed to request the withdrawal of the,	173	274
Russian Mission at ———. Denial of its existence by Russian officials	174	273
Russian Mission at ———. Discussion between the Marquis of Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff regarding the,	175	276
Russian Mission at ———. Orders for the withdrawal of the,	175	277
Russian Mission at ———. Retention of the, after recall of the Envoy	175	278
Russian Mission to ———. Collection of papers relating to the,	App. XLII	ccxli-cclv
Russian Mission to ———. Extract from the <i>Novoe Vremia</i> regarding,	App. XLII	{ ccxl-i ccli-i
Russian Mission to ———. Extract from the <i>Agence Russe</i> regarding the,	App. XLII	ccliii
Russian Mission to ———. Extract from the <i>Russki Mir</i> regarding the,	App. XLII	ccli
Russian Mission to ———. Extracts from the <i>Golos</i> regarding the,	App. XLII	{ ccxli-lii cclii-lv
Russian Mission to ———. Professed objects of the,	174	276
Russian Mission to ———. Reception of the,	174	276
Telegraph between India and ——— <i>via</i> Kuram. Establishment of a, suggested by Lord Salisbury	111	167
Telegraph line between India and ———. Importance of a,	App. XX	cxviii
<b>— Envoy.</b>		
Arrival of the ——— at Peshawur. Interview between him and Dr. Bellew	120	182
British Agents. Arguments of the ——— against the location of, in Afghanistan...	126	195-196
British Agents. Rejection by the ——— of the principle of the location of, in Afghanistan...	128	199-203
Conferences at Peshawur. Communication to the ——— of the Governor-General's view of the result of the,	131	210
Conferences at Peshawur with the ———. Final report to Secretary of State on the,	139	231-232
Conferences at Peshawur with the ———. Views of Her Majesty's Government as to the results of the,	140	232-234
Conferences between Sir L. Pelly and the ———. Termination of the,	130	203-210
Death of the ———, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, at Peshawur	131	211
Jehad against the English. Remonstrance addressed to the ——— regarding the Amir's preparations for a,	135	214-216
Misrepresentations by the ——— of the British policy towards Afghanistan	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Pelly, Sir L. Eighth meeting at Peshawur between the ——— and,	127	197-199
Pelly, Sir L. First meeting at Peshawur between, and the ———	121	183-184
Pelly, Sir L. Fifth and sixth meetings at Peshawur between the ——— and,	125	189-194
Pelly, Sir L. Ninth meeting at Peshawur between the ——— and,	128	199-203
Pelly, Sir L. Second meeting at Peshawur between the ——— and,	122	184-186
Pelly, Sir L. Seventh meeting at Peshawur between the ——— and,	126	194-196
Pelly, Sir L. Third and fourth meetings at Peshawur between the ——— and,	123	186-189
See "Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud."		
<b>— Native Agent at.</b>		
British Mission. Letter from ——— to Commissioner, Peshawur, regarding the Amir's refusal to receive a,	113	171-172
British Mission. Letter to ——— on the necessity of the Amir's receiving a,	114	173-175
Deputation of the ——— to India proposed by the Amir	115	176
Evasive conduct of the ——— at his interview with Sir L. Pelly at Simla	117	177
Interviews between Lord Lytton and the ——— at Simla in regard to Kabul affairs	118	177-178
Interview between Sir L. Pelly and ——— at Simla in regard to Kabul affairs	117	177
Return of ——— to Afghanistan from Simla	119	180
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) estrangement from the British Government. Opinion of the ——— as to the causes of,	117	177
summoned to Simla	116	176
<b>Kaianis of Seistan.</b>		
The ———	App. III	vii-viii
<b>Kain, Amir of.</b>		
Attack of ——— on Ibrahim Khan of Seistan...	10	12
Seistan. Hostile encroachments of ——— on,	14	15
Seistan arbitration. General Goldsmid's difficulty about an interview with the ———	35	35-36
Seistan question. Persian Government's instructions to ——— pending settlement of the,	54	62-63

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Kala-i-Nao or Kala-i-Dost Mahomed,</b> a fort in Seistán held by Sirdar Sharif Khan ... ..	36	36
<b>Kamal Bandar,</b> a village and fort in Seistán, held by Sirdar Kamal Khan, Sanjurani, a Biluch Chief in Persian pay ... ..	36	37
— <b>Khan.</b> Request of Kabul Government as to release from detention in Persia of the sons of — and Sharif Khan ... ..	66	77
— <b>Khan, of Bandar,</b> joins in a rebellion against Mir Alam Khan, Persian Governor of Seistán ... ..	App. IX	xliv
— <b>Khan, Sanjurani,</b> a Biluch Chief in Persian pay, holding the village and fort of Kamal Bandar in Seistán ...	36	37
<b>Kandahar.</b> British Agent. Amir willing to permit the location of a, at Balkh, Herat, or — ...	107	149
British Agent. Continued wish of Her Majesty's Government to locate a, at — ...	140	233
British Agent at —. Lord Salisbury's instructions in respect to the appointment of an English officer as, ... ..	107	150—151
British Residents. Opinions of certain officers on the question of locating, at Herat and — ... ..	App. XVI	xcv—xcv
British Residents. Proposed location of, at Herat, —, and Balkh ... ..	App. XX	cxvi
Jelalabad and Kurram. Amir's object in strengthening the positions at — ... ..	App. XXVII	clii
Kohendil Khan, Chief of —. Intrigues of, ... ..	App. VI	{ xxvii, xxviii
Kohendil Khan, Chief of —, subjugates a part of Seistán. Encourages the disaffection towards Herat of Mahomed Saleh Khan, Chief of Lash-Jowain. Assists Ali Khan of Chakansur into the Chiefship of Seistán ... ..	2	2—3
Persian intrigues at Herat and —. News received at Kabul of, ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clii
Persian raid on — ... ..	13	14—15
Report to Amir of the favorable disposition of the people of — towards the English ...	Ap. XXVII	clvii
<b>Karki.</b> Reported intention of Russia to establish a cantonment at the ferry of — ... ..	152	246
<b>Kauffmann, General.</b> Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Interchange of letters between Amir Shere Ali and — regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ... ..	89	130
Afghanistan, Northern Frontier of. Memorandum by — on the, ... ..	App. X	lii—liv
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Complimentary letter to, from — ... ..	App. XVIII	c—cii
Shere Ali Khan, Amir, receives letters from — ... ..	115	175
<b>Kazi Abdul Kadir,</b> Manager of the Press at Kabul ... ..	App. XXVII	cliv
<b>Kelat.</b> Khan of — advised by Amir Shere Ali to hold out against the English until he could aid him... ..	Ap. XXVII	clii
<b>Khaibar Pass.</b> Afridi tribes infesting the —. Amir of Kabul's co-operation necessary for better control of the, ... ..	App. XX	cxviii
<b>Khaibaris.</b> Arrangements for detaching the — from the Amir ... ..	165	260
British Mission to Kabul. Agreement with the — to escort the, to Ali Masjid ...	165	260
<b>Khan Aka Jamshidi</b> acts against Sirdar Ayub Khan at Herat ... ..	104	145
Conduct of — during Sirdar Yakub Khan's rebellion at Herat ... ..	92	133—134
<b>Khanan Khan, Ressaldar-Major.</b> Deputation of — to Kabul with a letter for the Amir ... ..	112	169—170
Failure of the Mission of — to Kabul ... ..	113	170
Khillut given to — by Amir Shere Ali ... ..	113	172
<b>Khillut (s.)</b> Khanan Khan, Ressaldar-Major. — given to, by Amir Shere Ali ... ..	113	172
<b>Khorasan.</b> Herat. The Prince Governor of — sends an Agent to, ... ..	91	132
<b>Kilif.</b> Reported intention of Russia to establish a cantonment at the ferry of — ... ..	152	246

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Kohendil Khan,</b>		
Chief of Kandahar, subjugates a part of Seistán. Encourages the disaffection towards Herat of Mahomed Saleh Khan, Chief of Lash-Jowain. Assists Ali Khan of Chakansur into the Chiefship of Seistán	2	2—3
Intrigues of ———, Chief of Kandahar	App. VI	xvii—xviii
Relations of ———, Chief of Seistán, with Persia	7	9
<b>Kohistani Chiefs, The,</b>		
accept the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent to the Amir of Kabul	67	127
<b>Kulb Ali,</b>		
a Chief of Seistán	App. III	x
<b>Kumal Khan,</b>		
a Seistán Chief	App. III	x
<b>Kuram.</b>		
Jelalabad and Kandahar. Amir's object in strengthening the positions at ———	App. XXVII	clii
<b>Lash-Jowain.</b>		
Afghanistan and Persia. Relations between, in respect of ———	7	7—9
Dost Mahomed of Kabul. Speech of, regarding the Persian occupation of ———. His own claim to the district	6	6
Ferrier's (Genl.) visit to ———	2	3
History, early, of the Province of ———	2	1—4
Mahomed Saleh Khan, Chief of ———. Refuses to acknowledge complete sovereignty of Herat. Is encouraged in his rebellion by the Courts of Persia and Kandahar. His political influence	2	3
Memorandum regarding Seistán and ———, submitted by Mr. Watson to British Minister at Teheran, December 1864	2	1—2
Persia. Claim of, to ———	2	2
Persia. Policy of, towards the Chief and people of ———	App. III	xiii
Persia and Afghanistan. Relations between, in respect of Seistán and ———	7	7—9
Persian claim to ———. Mr. Eastwick's enquiry into the,	7	7—8
Persian claim to ——— repudiated by Her Majesty's Government	7	8
Persian claim to ———. Reiteration of the,	6	7
Persian Government. Correspondence between Mr. Murray and the, regarding ———	6	6—7
Persian occupation of ———. Colonel Taylor's report regarding continuance of,	6	6
Persian occupation of ———. Speech of Dost Mahomed of Kabul regarding,	6	6
Seistán. Connection of ——— with,	2	2
Seistánis. Raid by a body of, on ———	54	62—63
Taylor, Colonel. Report by, regarding continuance of Persian occupation of ———	6	6
Yar Mahomed Khan, Chief of Herat, seizes ———	2	3
<b>Lawrence, Lord.</b>		
Seistán. Opinion of ——— as to absence of any Afghan design on, ...	9	11
<b>Letter (s).</b>		
Text of ——— to be delivered to the Amir by Sir Neville Chamberlain	158	253
to Ali Masjid, Dakka, and Jelalabad regarding the British Mission to Kabul	160	258
<b>Lovett, Major,</b>		
accompanies General Goldsmid to Seistán	32	34
Nasirabad or Shar-i-Nao. Description ———	33	34—35
<b>Lutf Ali Khan,</b>		
a Seistán Chief	App. III	x
succeeds his father, Mahomed Reza Khan, as Chief of Seistán. Is deprived of his power and his sight	2	3
<b>Lytton, Lord.</b>		
Afghan affairs, discussion of. Meeting between ——— and Sir R. Pollock at Umbala for the,	112	169
Afghanistan. Lord Salisbury's secret instructions to ——— regarding the policy to be pursued in future towards, ...	111	164—169
Afghanistan, Treaty with. Letter from ——— to Amir Shere Ali regarding the negotiation of a,	116	179
Atta Mahomed Khan (Nawab) and ———. Memoranda of two interviews at Simla between,	App. XIX	evi—cxii
Conferences at Peshawur between the Kabul Envoy and Sir L. Pelly. Views of ——— as to what passed at the,	130	203—210
Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. Amir Shere Ali invited by ——— to be present at the,	118	179—180
Interviews between ——— and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan at Simla in regard to Kabul affairs	118	177—178
Minute by ——— on Kabul affairs, and the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia	App. XXXV	ccix

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Lytton, Lord.</b>		
Offer of ——— to meet Amir Shere Ali at Peshawur ... ..	114	174
Pelly, Sir L. Instructions given by ——— to, on his deputation to meet an Afghan Envoy on the border ... ..	App. XX	cxii—cxiv
Peshawur conferences with the Kabul Envoy. Letters and messages exchanged between { ——— and Sir L. Pelly during the, ... .. }	App. XXV—XXVI	{ cxxxviii—cli
<b>Macdonald's (Major) murder.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali. Lord Northbrook's correspondence with, about the punishment of the parties concerned in ——— ... ..	84	117
Amir Shere Ali's instructions to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah in regard to ——— ... ..	76	95
Amir Shere Ali's remarks regarding ——— ... ..	82	111
Bahram Khan. Latest news regarding, ... ..	84	117
Kabul Envoy. Conversations with the, regarding ——— ... ..	83	111—114
Nowroz Khan. Temporary removal of, from the Governorship of Lalpura in connection with ——— ... ..	84	116
Particulars of ——— at Michni by Bahram Khan ... ..	82	109—110
Proclamation offering rewards for the capture of the persons concerned in ——— ... ..	84	115—116
Punjab Government's opinion as to the course to be pursued in the matter of ——— ... ..	82	110—111
<b>Macnabb, Mr.</b>		
Seistan arbitration. Proposed deputation of ——— to Kabul to explain matters... ..	57	66
Seistan arbitration. Views of Amir Shere Ali and his Durbar as to the proposed deputation of ——— to Kabul ... ..	58	67—68
<b>Mahomed Alum Khan, Naib.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Nomination of, as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali accepted by ———, Governor of Afghan Turkistan ... ..	87	127
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) intrigues with Persia. Report from ———, Governor of Afghan Turkistan, concerning, ... ..	91	132
— <b>Baqir, Munshi,</b>		
accompanies Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to Peshawur as his Private Secretary ... ..	121	183
— <b>Hassan Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
Flight of ———, Governor of Sabzwar, to Persia with Sirdar Ayub Khan ... ..	104	145
— <b>Hassan, Munshi.</b>		
Departure of ——— to Tashkend with General Stoletoff ... ..	174	276
— <b>Hyat Khan.</b>		
Memorandum by ——— regarding British policy towards Afghanistan ... ..	App. XXIII	{ cxxxiv to cxxxvi
— <b>Reza Khan,</b>		
Chief of a part of Seistan. His death. Sons left by him ... ..	2	2—3
— <b>Saleh Khan, alias Shah Pasand Khan, Chief of Lash-Jowain.</b>		
His political influence. Refuses to acknowledge complete sovereignty of Herat ... ..	2	2—3
— <b>Sharif Khan.</b>		
Translation of a firman granted by Amir Shere Ali recognizing ——— as successor to his father, the Khan of Dir ... ..	App. XXVII	clxii
Visit to Kabul of ———, son of Rahmatullah Khan of Dir (Bajour)... ..	137	219
— <b>Yakub Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
See "Yakub Khan, Sirdar."		
— <b>Yusuf Khan, Sirdar,</b>		
entrusted with the charge of the Russian emissaries at Kabul ... ..	App. XXII	cxxvii
— <b>Zaman Khan, Allkozai,</b>		
brother-in-law of Sirdar Yakub Khan ... ..	104	145
<b>Makri.</b>		
Execution of a man named ——— on a charge of supplying Kabul news to the British Government ... ..	138	220
<b>Manifesto.</b>		
Persian text of ——— issued by His Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir and people of } Afghanistan ... .. }	App. XXXIX	{ ccxxxiii & ccxxxiv
Publication of a ——— addressed to the Amir and people of Afghanistan ... ..	170	265
<b>Map (s).</b>		
Persia. ——— of, sold at Teheran ... ..	2	2
St. John's (Major) ——— illustrating the proposed Perso-Kelat boundary ... ..	App. VI	xxi
<b>Mashk-i-Alam, Akhund.</b>		
Jehad against the English. The Afghans incited by ——— to join in a, ... ..	136	216



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Mayo, Lord.</b>		
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Russian views of the position taken up in ———'s despatch of 20th May 1870 regarding the, ...	74	86—87
Seistán arbitration. Letter from ——— to Amir Shere Ali, explanatory of the course which the proceedings would take ...	23	26—27
Seistán question. Remarks by ——— on the, ...	21	22—25
<b>Merv.</b>		
Koshad Khan of ———. Arrival of the son of, at Kabul in consequence of Russian negotiations with the Tekke Turkomans ...	78	99
Russian occupation of ———. Question of a, considered ...	108	156
<b>Meshed.</b>		
Herat. The Prince Governor sends an agent to, ...	91	132
<b>Mian Abdur Rahman</b>		
sent by Commissioner, Peshawur, to confer with the Khan of Bajour regarding their dealings with Kabul ...	137	220
<b>— Gul Khan.</b>		
Endeavours of ———, son of the Akhund of Swat, to be acknowledged as Badshah of Swat	App. XXVII	clvi
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Intrigue of, with ———, son of the Akhund of Swat ...	App. XXVII	clvi
<b>Military Operations.</b>		
Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy of the ——— to be undertaken on 21st } November 1878 ...	App. XL	{ cccxxiv & cccxxvi
of 21st November 1878 ...	170	267
ordered after dissolution of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission ...	167	262—263
Proposed ——— after dissolution of British Mission ...	169	264
<b>Minute</b>		
by His Excellency the Viceroy on Kabul affairs, and the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia ...	App. XXXV	ccix
<b>Mir Afzul Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
Advice given by ——— to Amir Shere Ali Khan against a jihad ...	App. XXVII	clvii
Alarm of ———, Governor of Furrah, at the designs of Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	90	131
Hostility of ——— to British influence in Afghanistan ...	App. XXV	cxl
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Conduct of ——— towards, ...	95	137
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) intrigues with Persia. Report from ——— concerning, ...	91	132
<b>— Akhor Ahmed Khan.</b>		
Akhund of Swat. Intrigues of ——— with the, ...	134	212—213
Hostility of ——— to British influence in Afghanistan ...	App. XXV	cxl
Letter from Kabul representing ——— as favorable to British interests ...	App. XXV	cxliii
Result of his visit to the Akhund of Swat ...	App. XXV	cccxxviii
<b>— Akhor, The.</b>		
See "Ahmed Khan, Mir Akhor."		
<b>— Alum.</b>		
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) correspondence with ———, Governor of Kain ...	91	131—132
<b>Mirza Abdul Karim.</b>		
Arrival at Kabul of ———, a Russian Agent ...	App. XVIII	c
<b>— Maasum Khan.</b>		
Character and antecedents of ———, the Persian Commissioner at the Seistán arbitration ...	App. III	xiv
Seistán arbitration. Deputation of ——— as Persian Commissioner at the, ...	32	34
Seistán arbitration. Dishonest and offensive conduct of the Persian Commissioner, ——— ...	37	38
Seistán arbitration. Persian Government apologize for the conduct of ——— and suspend him from all official employment ...	46	50
Seistán arbitration. Under-handed proceedings of ———, the Persian Commissioner ...	35	35—36
Seistán up the Helmund. Endeavours of ——— to convince General Goldsmid of complete Persian sovereignty over, ...	36	36—37
<b>— Mahomed Ali.</b>		
Deputation of ——— to Herat on a mission from the Prince Governor of Khorassan. His antecedents ...	91	132—133
<b>— Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Merv.</b>		
Arrival at Kabul of ———, a Russian Agent ...	App. XVIII	ci

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Mirza Malcom Khan.</b>		
Seistán arbitration. Selection of — as the new Persian Commissioner ... ..	46	50
<b>Mission.</b>		
British — to Kabul proposed ... ..	154	247—248
Russian — to Kabul ... ..	152—153	246—247
<b>Mohsin Khan, General.</b>		
Seistán arbitration. Manner in which decision of Her Majesty's Government on the, was received by —, Persian Minister in London ... ..	56	65—66
<b>Mufti Shah Mahomed.</b>		
Deputation of — from Kabul to Saidugan, Swat ... ..	App. XXVII	clvi
<b>Mulla Yahya</b>		
gives a favorable account to Amir Shere Ali of Sirdar Yakub Khan ... ..	93	135
<b>Murray, Mr.</b>		
Correspondence of — with the Persian Government regarding Lash-Jowain ... ..	6	6—7
Correspondence of — with the Persian Government regarding their intention to despatch a military force to Seistán ... ..	3	4
<b>Mustaufi, The.</b>		
See "Habibulla Khan, Mustaufi."		
<b>Nad Ali.</b>		
Fort of — in Seistán captured by the Persians ... ..	10	12
Fort of — in Seistán held for the Persians by a son of Sirdar Sharif Khan, Nhami ... ..	36	38
<b>Naizar and Takht-i-Shah, The.</b>		
Seistán boundary. Desire of Persia to include — in her territory ... ..	70	80—81
<b>Napier, Captain the Hon'ble G. C.</b>		
Seistán. Present situation in, with reference to the late arbitration. Report by — on the, ... ..	App. IX	xliv—li
<b>Nasirabad or Shahr-i-Nao.</b>		
Description of — by Major Lovett ... ..	33	34—35
<b>Nawab Khan of Lahore.</b>		
Expulsion of — from Afghanistan on suspicion of being a British correspondent ... ..	138	221
<b>Nawagai.</b>		
Khan of — in Bajour. A son of the, persuaded to go to Kabul on promise of restoration of the fief of Donai ... ..	Ap. XXVII	cliii—cliv
<b>Newspapers.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali. Effect on, of the comments of British — on Afghan affairs ... ..	95	137
<b>Northbrook, Lord.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Correspondence between Amir Shere Ali and — regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ... ..	88	127—128
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Conversations of — with the Kabul Envoy regarding the question of the, ... ..	77	96—104
Amir Shere Ali. Letter to, from —, postponing, till a more convenient opportunity, the consideration of certain important matters ... ..	67	78—79
Kabul Envoy. Letter from — to Amir Shere Ali, summing up results of the conferences with the, on Seistán and other matters ... ..	79	104—105
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Correspondence between — and Amir Shere Ali about the punishment of the parties concerned in, ... ..	84	117
Seistán arbitration. Memorandum of an interview between — and the Kabul Envoy ... ..	63	74
Seistán arbitration and its results. Khurecta from — to Amir Shere Ali on the, ... ..	65	75—76
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment. Amir's message to — regarding, ... ..	102	143—144
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Effect on the Amir and Kabul Durbar of —'s message regarding, ... ..	102	142—144
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. —'s despatch to Secretary of State regarding, ... ..	100	141
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. —'s message to the Amir regarding, ... ..	100	141
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) visit to Kabul attributed to —'s instigation ... ..	100	141
<b>Nowroz Khan of Lalpura.</b>		
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Question of the connection of — with, ... ..	83	111—114
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Temporary removal of — from the Governorship of Lalpura in connection with, ... ..	84	116
<b>Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud.</b>		
Afghanistan. Amir's expectations as to the present assistance to be given to —, Discussion regarding, ... ..	78	102—104

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud.</b>		
Afghanistan. Discussion between — and the Foreign Secretary regarding the assistance to be rendered to, in order to strengthen that country against foreign aggression ...	64	74—75
Afghanistan. Location of British officers in certain towns of. Question regarding, discussed with — ...	78	102—103
Afghanistan. — solicits a written assurance that any one interfering with, would be considered an enemy of the British Government ...	78	99—102
Afghanistan. Question about interference of Foreign Powers with the internal affairs of, discussed with — ...	78	100
Afghanistan. Russian aggression on. Request of — that the contingency of, should be specifically mentioned on the written assurance to be given by the Government of India to the Amir ...	78	99—102
Afghanistan. Understanding with Russia in regard to. Discussions between Government of India and — on the, ...	77—78	95—104
Afghanistan and British India. — advises against free intercourse between, ...	App. XVII	xcvi
Afghanistan, Seistán frontier of. Discussion with — regarding the measures to be taken for strengthening the, ...	78	102—103
Arrival of — at Kabul on his return from Persia ...	52	59
Arrival of — at Peshawur and his informal interview with Dr. Bellew ...	120	182
Bellew's (Dr.) private interview with — at Peshawur. Note of, ...	Ap. XXV	cxlvi
Bokhara. Confirmation by, of the claims of Afghanistan. Discussion with — regarding, British Agents. Discussion between the Foreign Secretary and — regarding the location of, in Afghanistan ...	78	100
British Agents. Rejection by — of the principle of the location of, in Afghanistan ...	107	150
British Officers. Discussion between — and the Foreign Secretary regarding the location of, in certain towns of Afghanistan ...	128	199—203
Conferences at Peshawur. Communication to — of the Governor-General's view of the result of the, ...	64	74—75
Conferences at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly and —. Termination of the, ...	131	210
Conferences with Amir Shere Ali and — at Ambala in 1869 ...	130	203—210
Death of — at Peshawur ...	App. XI	liv—lx
Deputation of — to India as Envoy from Amir Shere Ali ...	132	211
Forsyth's (Mr.) Mission to Yarkand. Question regarding return of, <i>vid</i> Badakshan, discussed with — ...	76	94
Friendly letters written by Sir L. Pelly and Captain Grey to — ...	78	103
Helmand. Question raised by — as to right of Afghans to construct new or repair existing channels leading from the, for irrigation purposes ...	118	178
Letter from Kabul representing — as not well-disposed towards the British ...	66	76—77
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Conversations with — regarding, ...	Ap. XXV	cxliii
Misrepresentation by — of the policy of the British Government toward Afghanistan ...	83	111—114
Mission of — to India. The ill-success of, a cause of Amir Shere Ali's estrangement from the British Government ...	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Mission to Lord Lytton. Deputation of — on a, ...	117	177
Pelly, Sir L. Eighth meeting at Peshawur between — and, ...	119	180
Pelly, Sir L. Fifth and sixth meetings at Peshawur between — and, ...	127	197—199
Pelly, Sir L. First meeting at Peshawur between — and, ...	125	189—194
Pelly, Sir L. Ninth meeting at Peshawur between — and, ...	121	183
Pelly, Sir L. Second meeting at Peshawur between — and, ...	128	199—203
Pelly, Sir L. Seventh meeting at Peshawur between — and, ...	122	184—186
Pelly, Sir L. Third and fourth meetings at Peshawur between — and, ...	126	194—196
Presents sent to — in 1874 by Sir R. Pollock ...	123	186—189
Seistán. Despatch from Government of India to Secretary of State, summarizing result of the discussions with — in regard to, ...	95	136
Seistán arbitration. Appeal lodged by — against General Goldsmid's award ...	66	76—77
Seistán arbitration. Arrival of — at Simla as Envoy from Amir Shere Ali ...	50	55—57
Seistán arbitration. Memorandum of a conversation between — and the Foreign Secretary ...	60	70
Seistán arbitration. Memorandum of an interview between Lord Northbrook and — ...	61	71—72
Seistán arbitration. Memorandum of a second conversation between — and the Foreign Secretary ...	63	74
Seistán arbitration. Memorandum of a third and a fourth conversation between — and the Foreign Secretary ...	62	72—74
Seistán arbitration. Selection of — as Afghan Commissioner at the, ...	74	75
Seistán arbitration. Statement by — of the Afghan case ...	31	33
Seistán and boundary questions and other matters. Final letter to Amir Shere Ali summing up result of the conferences with — on the, ...	39	39—43
Seistán frontier of Afghanistan. Discussion between — and the Foreign Secretary as to the measures to be taken for strengthening the, ...	79	104—105
Title of "Sadr-i-Azam" (Prime Minister) bestowed on — by Amir Shere Ali ...	64	74—75
	87	125

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Obedulla Khan, Sirdar, of Tonk,</b> appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ... ..	158	251
<b>Onslow, Capt. F. M.,</b> appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ... ..	158	251
<b>Paris, Treaty of, 1857.</b> Persia. Relations of, to Herat and Afghanistan under the ——— ... ..	Ap. II	iii
<b>Pelly, Sir L.</b> Amir refuses to receive ———'s Mission to Kabul ... ..	113	170
Ata Mahomed Khan, Nawab, and ———. Summary of a conversation at Simla between, ... ..	Ap. XIX	ciii—cvi
British Agents. Reply of ——— to Kabul Envoy's arguments against location of, in Afghan- istan ... ..	127	198—199
Conferences at Peshawur between ——— and the Kabul Envoy. Termination of the, ... ..	130	203—210
deputed to the frontier to await a reply from Amir Shere Ali to Lord Lytton's messages ... ..	119	180
Instructions given to ——— on his deputation to meet an Afghan Envoy on the border ... ..	Ap. XX	cxii—cxiv
Instructions sent to ——— at Peshawur on certain points connected with his discussions with Kabul Envoy ... ..	124	189
Intended deputation of ——— on a Mission to Kabul ... ..	112	169—170
Interview between ——— and Nawab Ata Mahomed Khan at Simla in regard to Kabul affairs ... ..	117	177
Letter written by ——— to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Kabul ... ..	118	178
Letters and messages exchanged between the Viceroy and ——— during the conferences with { the Kabul Envoy at Peshawur... ..	Ap. XXV— XXVI }	cxixviii—cli
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Eighth meeting at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	127	197—199
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Fifth and sixth meetings at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	125	189—194
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. First meeting at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	121	183
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Ninth meeting at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	128	199—203
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Second meeting at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	122	184—186
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Seventh meeting at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	126	194—196
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Third and fourth meetings at Peshawur between ——— and, ... ..	123	186—189
<b>Persia.</b> Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Amir Shere Ali's letter (not acknowledged) to the Shah of ——— regard- ing selection of, as Heir-apparent ... ..	89	130
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Count Dubsky's misrepresentations as to the action taken by the —— Government on letter from Amir Shere Ali, announcing the selection of, as Heir- apparent ... ..	89	130
Afghanistan and Herat. Relations of ——— to, under the Treaty of Paris, 1857 ... ..	App. II	iii
Ambala Durbar. ———n apprehensions arising out of the, ... ..	15	15—17
Ayub Khan, Sirdar, dissatisfied with his reception in ——— ... ..	106	147
Division of ——— between Turkey and Afghanistan suggested by the Ottoman Envoy to Kabul ... ..	148	242
Dost Mahomed Khan, brother of Sharif Khan. Release of ——— from detention in ——— ... ..	66	77
Eastwick's (Mr.) interview with the Shah for the prevention of war between ——— and Afghanistan ... ..	7	8
Herat. Capture of, by the Afghans alarm the Government of ——— ... ..	7	7
Herat. Report regarding ———n intrigue with Sirdar Yakub Khan in respect of, ... ..	103	144
Herat and Kandahar. News received at Kabul of ———n intrigues at, ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clii
Ibrahim Khan, of Seistan. Application of, to Amir of Kabul for aid against ——— ... ..		
Kain, Amir of. Instructions of the ———n Government to, pending settlement of the Seis- tan question ... ..	54	62—63
Kandahar. ———n raid on, ... ..	13	14—15
Lash-Jowain. Claim of ——— to, repudiated by Her Majesty's Government ... ..	7	8
Lash-Jowain. Col. Taylor's report regarding continuance of ———n occupation of, ... ..	6	6
Lash-Jowain. Correspondence between Mr. Murray and the Government of ——— regarding, ... ..	6	6—7
Lash-Jowain. Mahomed Saleh Khan, Chief of. Disaffection of, towards Herat encouraged by ——— ... ..	2	3
Lash-Jowain. Policy of ——— towards the Chiefs and people of, ... ..	App. III	xiii
Lash-Jowain. Reiteration of the claim of ——— to, ... ..	6	7
Lash-Jowain and Seistan. Relations of ——— with Afghanistan in respect of, ... ..	7	7—9
Lash-Jowain claimed by ——— ... ..	2	2
Map of ——— sold at Teheran ... ..	2	2
Russian advance along the frontier of ——— to the north ... ..	App. VI	xxi
Seistan. Afghan designs on. Representations of the Persian Minister in London to Lord Clarendon in regard to, ... ..	16	17
Seistan. Ali Khan, Chief of. Correspondence between British Minister at Teheran and Government of ——— regarding murder of, ... ..	4	5—6

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Persia.</b>		
Seistán. Ali Khan, Chief of. Government of ——— dissuaded by the British Minister from sending troops to, in order to punish the murderers of, ...	4	5—6
Seistán. Ali Khan, Chief of, received into the pay of ——— ...	2	3—4
Seistán. Claim of ——— to. Mr. Eastwick's and Lord Stanley's views on, ...	5	6
Seistán. Claim of ——— to. The Shah's memorandum on the, ...	9	11
Seistán. Claim of ——— to, repudiated by Mr. Murray on part of the British Government...	3	4
Seistán. Claims of ——— to. Mr. Eastwick's memorandum on the,...	App. I	i—ii
Seistán. Despatch of ——— n troops into, ...	10	11—12
Seistán. Government of ——— accept conditional arbitration on their claim to,...	17	18
Seistán. Government of ——— propose to send a military force to. Correspondence between Mr. Murray and the Sadr Azim on the subject ...	3	4
Seistán. Government of ——— recognise and confirm Taj Mahomed Khan as Chief of, ...	4	6
Seistán. Her Majesty's Government permit ——— to assert her claims to, by force of arms...	6	10
Seistán. Kohendil Khan, Chief of. Relations of, with ——— ...	7	9
Seistán. Measures taken by the ——— n Government to maintain the existing order of things in, ...	54	62—63
Seistán. ——— n advance into. Pretexes for,...	11	12—13
Seistán. ——— n Government object to deputation of an Afghan Commissioner to, ...	26	27
Seistán. Precise basis of ——— n acceptance of British arbitration in regard to, ...	18	18—19
Seistán. Shah's representations to Mr. Thomson respecting, ...	15	16—17
Seistán. Statement of the claims of ——— to, ...	42	45—46
Seistán and Lash-Jowain. Relations of ——— with Afghanistan in respect of, ...	7	7—9
Seistán arbitration. Acceptance by ——— of the decision of Her Majesty's Government ...	60	71
Seistán arbitration. Apology of the ——— n Government for the conduct of Mirza Maasum Khan ...	46	50
Seistán arbitration. Appeal from the ——— n Government to England against General Goldsmid's award ...	55	63—65
Seistán arbitration. Counter-statement of the ——— n Government...	45	48—50
Seistán arbitration. Conversation at Teheran between Mr. Thomson and the Sadr Azam regarding the award ...	53	60—61
Seistán arbitration. Deputation of Mirza Maasum Khan as the Shah's representative at the, ...	32	34
Seistán arbitration. Final acceptance by ——— of terms drawn up by Mr. Alison ...	30	31—32
Seistán arbitration. ——— n case. Rejoinder by the Afghan Commissioner to the statement of the, ...	44	47—48
Seistán arbitration. Protest by the ——— n Commissioner against General Goldsmid's award ...	46	50
Seistán arbitration. Shah proposes a modification of the frontier line indicated by General Goldsmid ...	60	70
Seistán arbitration. Shah's (the) objection to the proposed line of frontier ...	53	61—62
Seistán boundary. Attempt of ——— in conjunction with the Afghan authorities to demarcate the, ...	App. IX	xlv—xlvii
Seistán boundary. ——— applies for a rectification of the, ...	70	80—81
Seistán claimed by ——— ...	2	2
Seistán formed part of ——— in the time of the Sefavian Kings ...	2	1
Seistán, Persian. Complaint by ——— of Afghan aggression on, in aid of Sharif Khan ...	71	81—82
Seistán, Persian. Proceedings of the Shah's Government on hearing of an intended attack on from Herat ...	72	82—85
Seistán question, the. General assent of the Shah to the conditions of British arbitration proposed by Her Majesty's Government ...	22	25
Seistáni Chiefs. Intrigues of ——— with the, ...	7	9
Seistáni Chiefs in receipt of an yearly pay from ——— ...	7	7
Shah's uneasiness at Amir Shere Ali's reception by the Viceroy at Ambala ...	13	15
Sharif Khan. Government of ——— apply for the removal of, from Kila-i-Fath ...	73	85
Thomson (Mr. Taylour). Suggestion of, for intervention on behalf of Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	105	146
Thomson (Mr. Taylour) and Sirdar Yakub Khan. Government of India object to communications between, on Kabul affairs ...	105	146
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Overtures of, to ———. Shah's Government repudiate political intrigue with him ...	91	131—132
<b>Persian raids on Afghans.</b>		
Government of India promise the Amir of Kabul five lakhs of rupees as compensation for ———	51	58
Proposed payment by the British Government to the Amir of Kabul as compensation for ———	43	46—47
<b>Perso-Kelat Boundary.</b>		
St. John's (Major) map in illustration of the proposed ——— ...	App. VI	xxxi
<b>Pertab Sing, Maharaj of Jodhpoor,</b>		
appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ...	159	251



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Peshawur.</b>		
Conferences at ——. Final report to Secretary of State on the, ...	139	221—232
Conferences at ——. Views of Her Majesty's Government as to the results of the, ...	140	232—234
Conferences at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the Kabul Envoy. Termination of the, ...	130	203—210
Conferences at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the Kabul Envoy. Views of the Governor-General as to what passed at the, ...	130	203—210
Conferences with the Kabul Envoy at ———. Letters and messages exchanged between { the Viceroy and Sir L. Pelly during the, ...	App. XXV XXVI.	cxviii— cli
Kabul Envoy. Eighth meeting at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	127	197—199
Kabul Envoy. Fifth and sixth meetings at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	125	189—194
Kabul Envoy. First meeting at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	121	183—184
Kabul Envoy. Ninth meeting at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	128	199—203
Kabul Envoy. Second meeting at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	122	184—186
Kabul Envoy. Seventh meeting at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	126	194—196
Kabul Envoy. Third and fourth meetings at ——— between Sir L. Pelly and the, ...	123	186—189
Turkish Consulate. Proposed establishment of a, at ——— ...	141	235—236
Turkish Consulate at ———. Refusal of Her Majesty's Government to sanction the establishment of a, ...	142	237
<b>—, Commissioner of.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali's letter to ——— refusing to receive a British Mission ...	113	170—171
Atta Mahomed Khan's deputation to Simla. Letter from ——— to the Amir regarding, ...	116	176—177
British Mission. Further letter from ——— to Amir Shere Ali to induce him to receive a, ...	114	173
British Mission. Kabul Agent's letter to ——— regarding the Amir's refusal to receive a, ...	113	171—172
British Mission. Letter from ——— to Kabul Agent on the necessity of the Amir's receiving a Pelly's (Sir L.) intended deputation to Kabul. Letter from ——— to the Amir regarding, ...	114 112	173—175 169—170
<b>Phayre, Colonel.</b>		
Ibrahim Khan of Seistán's application to ——— for British aid against the Persians ...	12	13—14
<b>Plowden, Mr. T. C.</b>		
Memorandum by ——— on Kabul affairs ...	Ap. XXXIII	cxcii
<b>Pollock, Sir Robert.</b>		
Afghan affairs. Discussion of meeting between Lord Lytton and ——— at Ambala for the, ...	112	169
Afghanistan. British relations with. Observations of ——— on, ...	95	136—138
Afghanistan news. Difficulty experienced by ——— in obtaining, ...	95	137
Agent sent by ——— to Kabul in 1874 to collect information ...	95	136
British Residents. Opinion of ——— on the question of locating, at Herat and Kandahar ...	App. XVI	xc
Leaves England to go to Persia ...	32	34
Persian suspicions in regard to presence of ——— with the Afghan Commissioner at Teheran ...	App. VI	xxv
Presents sent by ——— in 1874 to Amir Shere Ali and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah ...	95	136
Seistán. Arrival of ——— in, ...	37	38
Seistán. Informal memorandum on, by ——— ...	40	43
Seistán. Memorandum and demi-official letter from ——— on, ...	App. III	xi—xiv
Seistán arbitration. Remarks of the Persian Sadr Azam as to presence of ——— at the, ...	53	61
Seistán arbitration. Selection of ——— to represent the Government of India at the. His functions ...	24	27
Seistán Mission. Final report by ——— of the proceedings of the, ...	App. VIII	xxxviii—xlili
<b>Presents.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali. ——— to, in return for hospitality shown to General Pollock ...	51	58
<b>Press, Kabul.</b>		
Kazi Abdul Kadir, Manager of the ——— ...	Ap. XXVII	cliv
<b>Rahimatulla Khan.</b>		
Title of "Nawab" conferred by Amir Shere Ali on ——— of Dir (Bajour) ...	137	219
Translation of a firman granted by Amir Shere Ali to ——— of Dir, confirming him and his posterity in the Chiefship ...	Ap. XXVII	clxi
<b>Rehma Allah Khan, Ghilzai.</b>		
Hostility of ——— to British influence in Afghanistan ...	App. XXV	cxl
<b>Revenues of Afghanistan.</b>		
Remarks on the ——— ...	95	137
<b>Rukh Mian of Tangi.</b>		
Reward bestowed at Kabul on ———, chief instigator of the Swat Canal outrage ...	138	221
<b>Russell, Lord.</b>		
Seistán. Despatch from ——— permitting Persia to assert her claim to, by force of arms ...	8	10

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Russell, Lord.</b>		
Seistan, Persian claim to. Correspondence between the Persian Minister in London and — regarding the, ... ..	6	9—10
<b>Russia.</b>		
Afghanistan. Alarm of the people of, at the progress of — in Central Asia ... ..	77	97
Afghanistan. Amir's secret overtures to the — ns ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clii
Afghanistan. Assurances of — in regard to, ... ..	150	243
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Acceptance by — of the views of Her Majesty's Government regarding the, ... ..	75	90
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Correspondence between the British and — n Governments regarding the, ... ..	74	86—90
Afghanistan. British policy respecting — n Ambassador in London informed of the objects of ... ..	111	166
Afghanistan. Contravention of the understanding between England and — in regard to, ... ..	150	244
Afghanistan, disintegration of. Proposals of the — n Government, aiming at the, ... ..	118	178
Afghanistan. Gortschakoff (Prince) reassures Lord Loftus on the subject of — n's engagements in regard to, ... ..	75	91
Afghanistan. Instructions of the Government of — to General Kauffmann in regard to, ... ..	150	243
Afghanistan. Mr. Gladstone's view of the engagement between England and — regarding, ... ..	75	91
Afghanistan. Overtures of — to the Amir ... ..	App. XXV	cxlv
Afghanistan. Report of a proposed — n alliance with, ... ..	App. XXII	cxixvi
Afghanistan. Report as to the offer of a subsidy to the Amir by — ... ..	App. XXII	cxixvi
Afghanistan. — informed that the engagements between England and herself merely implied the exercise of a moral influence on the Amir ... ..	75	91
Afghanistan and Central Asia. Revival of understanding regarding — between Russia and England ... ..	175	277
Central Asia. Measures taken in, by — in view of war with England declared to be stopped ... ..	173	275
Gortschakoff, Prince. Despatches from, to Count Brunnow regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan ... ..	74	86—90
Indian trade with Bokhara and Samarkand. Restrictions imposed by — on the, ... ..	App. XVIII	o
Jihad against — proclaimed by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Disapproval by the Akhoond of Swat of the, ... ..	141	236
Mayo's (Lord) despatch of 20th May 1870 regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan. Views of — on the position taken up in, ... ..	74	86—87
Perso-Kelat and Perso-Afghan boundary questions. Interest taken by — in the, ... ..	App. VI	xxxi
Persian frontier to the north. Advance of — along the, ... ..	App. VI	xxxi
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) dealings with the — ns ... ..	Ap. XXVII	clviii
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) despair of obtaining open aid from the — ns ... ..	App. XXVII	clvii
Shere Ali Khan's (Amir) secret dealings with the — ns, ... ..	App. XXVII	clv
Troops. Movement of — towards the Afghan frontier ... ..	152	246
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Interrogations of the Government of — in regard to the, ... ..	150	243
Turkomans, Tekke. — n overtures to the, for a free passage through their country ... ..	78	99
<b>Russian Agents.</b>		
Intrigue of — with Amir Shere Ali ... ..	115	175
Kabul. Arrival at, of two — ... ..	App. XVIII	ci—cii
Presence of — at Kabul ... ..	116	175
Presence of — in Afghanistan ... ..	App. XXV	cxlv
Proceedings of — at Kabul ... ..	App. XXII	cxixvii
<b>— Emissary.</b>		
Denial of M. deGiers that a — had proceeded to Kabul with letters from the Emperor ... ..	173	275
<b>— Generals in Central Asia.</b>		
Correspondence between Amir Shere Ali Khan and —. Desire of British Government to stop all, ... ..	App. XX	cxvii
<b>— Mission to Kabul.</b>		
Arrival of — ... ..	153	246—247
Deputation of a — ... ..	152	246
Plea of the Amir's Durbar that a British Embassy might be followed by a — ... ..	113	170—172
Proposal to treat the question as a local one between the Government of India and the Amir ... ..	154	248
Reported attempt of the Afghan officials to stop the Mission at the Oxus ... ..	152	246
<b>— Spy.</b>		
No trace obtained by Sir L. Pelly at Peshawur of the supposed — ... ..	Ap. XXV	cxixviii
<b>Safdar Khan.</b>		
Visit to Sir L. Pelly at Peshawur of —, son of the Khan of Nawagai in Bajour ... ..	App. XXVII	cliii

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Salisbury, Lord.</b>		
British Agents. Instructions of — in respect to the location of, at Herat and Kandahar	107	150—151
British Embassy, temporary. Government of India desired by — to send to Kabul a, ..	109	157—159
British Embassy, temporary. Secret instructions of 1876 from — for the despatch to Kabul of a, ... ..	111	164—169
Suggestion of — as to the permanent presence in India of an Afghan Envoy...	111	168—169
<b>Samarcand.</b>		
Russia. Restrictions imposed by, on the Indian trade with Bokhara and — ...	App. XVIII	o
<b>Sarfaraz Khan.</b>		
Release of —, son of Ibrahim Khan, from detention in Persia ... ..	66	77
<b>Secretary of State.</b>		
Abdul Rahman Khan, Sirdar. Lord Salisbury's proposal about effecting a reconciliation between Amir Shere Ali and, ... ..	111	167
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Despatch to — regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali ... ..	88	128—129
Ambala Conferences. Despatch to — summing up results of the, ... ..	107	149—150
Apology. Opinion of — that an, should be demanded from the Amir before British troops crossed the frontier line ... ..	169	215
British Agents. Instructions from — in respect to the appointment of, at Herat and Kandahar ... ..	107	150—151
British Agents in Afghanistan. Government of India's views on the question of appointing,...	108	151—156
British Embassy, temporary. Instructions from — regarding the despatch to Kabul of a, ...	109	157—159
British Embassy, temporary. Secret instructions of 1876 from the — for the despatch to Kabul of a, ... ..	111	164—169
British Mission to Kabul. Approval of proposal to insist on reception of, ... ..	155	248—249
British Mission to Kabul. Despatch reporting refusal of a free passage to the, ... ..	166	261
Despatch to —, No. 79, dated 9th September 1878, regarding the deputation of the British Mission to Kabul ... ..	159	254
Envoy from Afghanistan. Lord Salisbury's suggestion as to the permanent presence in India of an, ... ..	111	168—169
Final report to the — regarding the results of the war, &c. (Secret despatch, No. 160, dated 7th July 1879) ... ..	183	289
Imperial title, the. Proclamation of, in India suggested by Lord Salisbury as affording a favorable opportunity for renewing friendly relations with Afghanistan ... ..	111	165
Kabul Envoy. Final report to — on the conferences held at Peshawur with the, ... ..	139	221—232
Kabul Envoy. Views of Her Majesty's Government as to the results of the conferences held at Peshawur with the, ... ..	140	232—234
Material support against foreign aggression. —'s instructions about giving the Amir of Kabul an explicit pledge of, ... ..	111	167—168
Reply of — to despatch reporting the results of the war ... ..	184	300—303
Review of the political situation by — up to the date of the Viceroy's ultimatum to the Amir (Secret despatch, No. 49, dated 18th November 1878) ... ..	171	258
Seistan and other questions. Despatch to — regarding the conferences with the Kabul Envoy on the, ... ..	79	106—107
Subsidy, fixed and augmented. —'s instructions about giving Amir Shere Ali a, ... ..	111	166—167
Telegraph between India and Kabul <i>via</i> Kuram. Establishment of a, suggested by Lord Salisbury ... ..	111	167
Turkish Mission to Kabul. Communications with the — regarding a, ... ..	142	236—239
Views of — as to the manner in which the military operations were carried on during the war ... ..	184	300—303
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Lord Salisbury's suggestion as to the deportation of, to India ... ..	111	167
Yakub Khan (Sirdar) and Mr. Tylour Thomson. Despatch to — regarding impropriety of any communications between, ... ..	105	146—147
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Lord Northbrook's despatch to — regarding, ... ..	100	141
<b>Seistan.</b>		
Afghan and Persian claims to compensation for raids on each other's territory ... ..	46	50
Afghan Commission. Lord Northbrook's conversations with the, at Poona regarding the — arbitration ... ..	51	57—58
Afghan designs on —. Representations of the Persian Minister in London to Lord Clarendon in regard to, ... ..	16	17
Afghanistan. Annexation of — to, by Ahmad Shah, Durani ... ..	2	1
Afghanistan and Persia. Relations between, in respect of — and Lash-Jowain ... ..	7	7—9
Afghanistan, northern frontier of —. Memorandum on the, by General Kauffmann ..	App. X	li—liv
Ali Khan, Chief of —. Correspondence between British Minister at Tcheran and Persian Government regarding murder of, ... ..	4	5—6
Ali Khan of Chakansur, mentioned by Ferrier as Chief of a part of —, murdered Dr. Forbes ... ..	2	2—3

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Seistan.</b>		
Ali Khan usurps Chiefship of ——— with aid from Kandahar. Retires to Teheran, where he is received into the pay of the Persian Court and marries a Kajar Princess ...	2	3—4
Alison, (Mr.) and Dost Mahomed. Correspondence between, regarding Persian fears as to the latter's designs on ——— ...	7	8
Ambala Durbar. Persian apprehensions in regard to ——— arising out of the, ...	15	15—17
Amir Shere Ali's representations in regard to ——— ...	13	14
Bellew's (Dr.) review of the political results of Persian encroachment upon Afghan territory...	App. VIII	xi—xliii
Biluch Chiefs in ———. Question of the political status of the, brought before Persian Government ...	66	77
Biluchistan. Goldsmid's (General) views as to the best means of bringing the boundary proposed to be laid down in ——— into correspondence with that of, ...	App. VI	xxx—xxxi
Boundary Commission in connection with ———. Question of a, how to be put before Amir Shere Ali Khan ...	App. XX	cxvii
Boundary of ———. Demarcation of the, attempted by the Persian Government in conjunction with the Afghan authorities ...	App. IX	xlv—xlv
British arbitration. Afghan case. Statement of the, ...	39	39—43
British arbitration. Amir Shere Ali and the Kabul Durbar. Sentiments of, in regard to the, ...	52	59
British arbitration. Amir Shere Ali informed of the delivery of General Goldsmid's award ...	47	51
British arbitration. Amir Shere Ali offers to depute an Envoy to India ...	59	69—70
British arbitration. Amir Shere Ali reopens question of, in regard to ——— ...	27	28
British arbitration. Arrival of General Goldsmid and the Persian Commissioner in ——— ...	32	34
British arbitration. Arrival of the Mission at Teheran ...	42	45
British arbitration. Conversation at Teheran between Mr. Thomson and the Sadr Azam regarding the award ...	53	60—61
British arbitration. Deputation of Mirza Maasum Khan to ——— as Persian Commissioner...	32	34
British arbitration. Despatch from Government of India to Secretary of State on General Goldsmid's award ...	49	53—54
British arbitration. Dishonest and offensive conduct of the Persian Commissioner in ——— ...	37	38
British arbitration. Final acceptance by Persia of terms drawn up by Mr. Alison ...	30	31—32
British arbitration. Final despatch from Secretary of State on this subject ...	68	79
British arbitration. Future prospects of the, ...	App. IX	xlix
British arbitration. General assent of the Shah to the conditions of, proposed by Her Majesty's Government ...	22	25
British arbitration. Goldsmid (General) instructed not to deliver arbitral opinion unless Persia accepted ancient right as well as present possession as basis of, ...	41	43—44
British arbitration. Goldsmid's (General) award. Appeal lodged by the Afghan Commissioner against, ...	50	55—57
British arbitration. Goldsmid's (General) award confirmed by Her Majesty's Government. How this decision was received by the Persian Minister in London ...	56	65—66
British arbitration. Goldsmid's (General) decision. Protests by the Persian and Afghan Commissioners ...	46	50
British arbitration. Goldsmid's (General) difficulty about an interview with the Amir of Kain ...	35	35—36
British arbitration. Goldsmid's (General) opinion. Condensed statement of, ...	48	51—53
British arbitration. Goldsmid's (General) report to Secretary of State regarding the completion of the work in ——— ...	38	38—39
British arbitration. Government of India represent impossibility of asking Amir Shere Ali to consent to, on limited terms accepted by Persia ...	29	30—31
British arbitration. India, Government of, accused of hostility towards Persia and of undue preference of Afghan interests ...	56	65—66
British arbitration. India, Government of. Action taken by the, on hearing of the confirmation of the award ...	57	66
British arbitration. Kabul Envoy. Arrival of, at Simla ...	60	70
British arbitration. Kabul Envoy's announcement that the boundary laid down by General Goldsmid would be scrupulously respected by his country ...	63	74
British arbitration. Macnabb (Mr). Proposed deputation of, to Kabul ...	57	66
British arbitration. Macnabb's (Mr.) proposed mission to Kabul. Views of Amir Shere Ali and his Durbar as to, ...	58	67—68
British arbitration. Mayo's (Lord) letter to Amir Shere Ali, explanatory of the course which the proceedings would take ...	23	26—27
British arbitration. Memorandum of a conversation between Syud Nur Mahomad Shah and the Foreign Secretary ...	61	71—72
British arbitration. Memorandum of an interview between Lord Northbrook and the Kabul Envoy ...	63	74
British arbitration. Memorandum of a second conversation between the Kabul Envoy and the Foreign Secretary ...	62	72—74
British arbitration. Memorandum of a third and a fourth conversation between the Kabul Envoy and the Foreign Secretary ...	64	74—75
British arbitration. Mirza Malcom Khan, the new Persian Commissioner ...	46	50

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Seistan.</b>		
British arbitration. Mr. Alison thanked by Government of India for successfully concluding the preliminaries of the, ...	30	32
British arbitration. Names of the British officers who went to ———	32	33–34
British arbitration. Objection made to General Goldsmid's hoisting his flag in ———	32	34
British arbitration. Persia accepts the decision of Her Majesty's Government ...	60	71
British arbitration. Persian case. Rejoinder by the Afghan Commissioner to the statement of the, ...	44	47–48
British arbitration. Persian case. Statement of the, ...	42	45–46
British arbitration. Persian Government's appeal to England against General Goldsmid's award ...	55	63–65
British arbitration. Persian Government's apology for Mirza Maasum Khan's conduct ...	46	50
British arbitration. Persian Government. Counter-statement of the, ...	45	48–50
British arbitration. Persian opinion of the, ...	App. IX	xlvi
British arbitration. Pollock's (General) presence at the. Remarks of the Persian Sadr Azam as to, ...	53	61
British arbitration. Precise basis of Persian acceptance of, ...	18	18–19
British arbitration. Proposals for submitting the ——— question to, ...	16	17
British arbitration. Question of sovereignty over the whole of ——— to be investigated ...	22	26
British arbitration. Reconsideration of the question as to the precise basis of the ———	28	29–30
British arbitration. Seistáni view of the, ...	App. IX	xlvi
British arbitration. Shah of Persia proposes a modification of the frontier line indicated by General Goldsmid ...	60	70
British arbitration. Shah's (the) objection to the proposed line of frontier ...	53	61–62
British arbitration. Shere Ali's (Amir) sarcastic reply to Lord Northbrook's khureeta on the results of the ———	67	78
British arbitration. Syud Nur Mahomed Shah selected to represent Amir Shere Ali at the settlement of the ——— question ...	31	33
British arbitration. Under-handed proceedings of the Persian Commissioner ...	35	35–36
British arbitration and its results. Northbrook's (Lord) khureeta to Amir Shere Ali on the, ...	65	75–76
British arbitration, basis of. Further correspondence regarding, ...	41	43–44
Chiefs of ———, Biluchis ...	App. III	vii–viii
Chiefs of ———. Goldsmid's (General) account of the families of the, ...	App. VII	xxiii–xxvii
Chiefs of ———; Kaianis, Shahrekis, Sirbundis ...	App. III.	vii–viii
Christie, Captain. Journey of, through ———, 1810 ...	2	2
Climate, &c., of ———	App. I	i
Commission broken up and adjourned to Teheran ...	37	38
Conferences with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah on the ——— and other questions. Final letter to the Amir summing up results of the, ...	79	104–105
Conolly's (Captain) visit to ——— ...	2	2
Dost Mahomed's intended expedition into ——— to levy contributions for his army. Rumours of, ...	7	7
Dost Mahomed's proceedings against ———. Mr. Eastwick sent to Meshed to watch, ...	7	7
Dost Mahomed's promise to Mr. Alison to abstain from hostilities against, ...	7	8
Eastwick, Mr. Opinion of, on Persian claim to ——— ...	5	6
Eastwick (Mr.) sent to Meshed to watch Dost Mahomed's proceedings against ———	7	7
Eastwick's (Mr.) interview with the Shah for the prevention of war between Persia and Afghanistan ...	7	8
Ellis, Mr. Persian appeal to a letter from, to Lord Palmerston in support of their claims to ———	App. VI	xxvii
Events in ——— from winter of 1872-73 to March 1875 ...	App. IX	xliv–li
Ferrier's (General) visit to ———	2	2–3
Flag question. Further correspondence regarding the (see conclusion of paragraph 32) ...	34	35
Geographical position of ———	App. I	i
Goldsmid, General. Documents consulted by, in forming his arbitral opinion in regard to ———	App. VI	xxvi
Goldsmid, General. Draft instructions of the Duke of Argyll to, regarding the ——— arbitration ...	App. II	iii–vi
Goldsmid, General. Selection of, to act on the part of England in the ——— arbitration ...	19	19–20
Goldsmid, General. Special report by, to the Government of India on the subject of his arbitral decision ...	App. VI	xxv–xxvii
Goldsmid, General. Tour of, in ——— up the Helmund. Mirza Maasum Khan's endeavors to convince him of complete Persian sovereignty over this part ...	36	36–38
Goldsmid's (General) arbitral opinion. Complete statement of, on the ——— question ...	App. V	xviii–xxiv
Goldsmid's (General) description of ——— Proper and Outer ———	App. IV	xv–xvii
Goldsmid's (General) further reports on the political aspect of his arbitral decision ...	App. VI	xxv–xxvii
Goldsmid's (General) memorandum on ———	App. III	vii–i



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Seistan.</b>		
Goldsmid's (General) report on ——— with reference to the proposed British arbitration on the question of ancient rights and present possession	App. IV	xv—xvii
Granville, Lord. Instructions of, to Mr. Alison in the matter of the ——— arbitration	19	20
Helmund. Question of constructing irrigation works on the, decided in favor of the Afghans	69	80
Helmund. Question raised by Kabul Envoy as to right of Afghans, under General Goldsmid's award, to construct new or repair existing channels leading from the, for irrigation purposes	66	76—77
History and political relations of ———, early	App. I	i—ii
History, early, of the Province of ———	2	1—4
Ibrahim Khan and Amir of Kain. Hostilities between,	10	12
Ibrahim Khan of ——— applies to the Amir of Kabul for aid against Persia	10	12
Ibrahim Khan, Chief of a part of ———	2	2—3
Ibrahim Khan of ———. Refusal of, to pay allegiance to the Persians	10	12
Ibrahim Khan of ——— seeks aid from the British Government against the Persians	12	13—14
India, Government of. Despatches from the, on the subject of the ——— arbitration	20	20—23
India, Government of. Inability of the, from loss of influence over the Amir, to prevent Afghan aggression on Persian ———	72	84
India, Government of. Refusal of, to propose arbitration on basis laid down by Persia	18	19
Irrigation in ———	App. IV	xv—xvii
Jalaluddin, Malik, last of the Karani (Kaiani?) Chiefs of ———	App. VI	xxvii
Kabul Envoy. Government of India's despatch to Secretary of State summarizing result of the discussions with the, in regard to ———	66	76—77
Kain, Amir of. Instructions of the Persian Government to, pending settlement of the ——— question	54	62—63
Kain, Amir of. Sirdar Afzal Khan's representations to Kabul regarding the hostile encroachments of,	14	15
Kain, Amir of, and Ibrahim Khan. Hostilities between,	10	12
Kandahar. Kobendil Khan, Chief of, brings a part of ——— under his rule	2	2
Kobendil Khan, Chief of ———. Relations of, with Persia	7	9
Lash-Jowain. Connection of, with ———	2	2
Lash-Jowain. Raid by a body of Seistanis on ...	54	62—63
Lawrence, Lord. Opinion of, as to absence of any Afghan design on ———	9	11
Lutf Ali Khan succeeds Mahomed Reza Khan as Chief of ———. Is deprived of his power and his sight	2	3
Mahomed Reza Khan, Chief of a part of ———. His death. Sons left by him	2	2—3
Mayo's (Lord) remarks on the ——— question...	21	22—25
Memoranda on ———, informal, by Generals Goldsmid and Pollock	40	43
Memorandum regarding ——— and Lash-Jowain, submitted by Mr. Watson to British Minister at Teheran, December 1864	2	1—2
Mir Alum Khan, of Kain, Governor of ———. Revolt against. Ordered out of the country. Returns and resumes his authority	App. IX	xliv—xlv
Money struck in ——— in the name of the Shah of Persia	4	5
Nad Ali. Fort of, in ———, captured by the Persians	10	12
Napier's (Capt. the Hon'ble) report on the present situation in ——— with reference to the late arbitration	App. IX	xliv—li
Nasirabad or Shahr-i-Nao, new capital of Persian ———. Description of	33	34—35
Northbrook's (Lord) conversation with the Afghan Commissioner at Poona regarding the ——— arbitration	51	67—68
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud, the Afghan Commissioner. Arrival of, in ———	37	38
Persia. Account of ——— in possession of, prior to the arbitration	App. III	vii
Persia. Claim of, to ———	2	2
Persia. Complaint by, of Afghan aggression on Persian ——— in aid of Sharif Khan	70	81—82
Persia. Possession by, of ———, in the time of the Sefavian Kings	2	1
Persia and Afghanistan. Relations between, in respect of ——— and Lash-Jowain	7	7—9
Persia applies for a rectification of the ——— boundary	70	80—81
Persia permitted by Her Majesty's Government to assert her right to ——— by force of arms	8	10
Persian advance into ———. Pretexts for,	11	12—13
Persian and Afghan claims to compensation for raids on each other's territory	46	50
Persian armament in. Government of India suggest reduction or limitation of the,	49	53
Persian claim to ———. Correspondence between the Persian Minister in London and Lord Russell regarding the,	8	9—10
Persian claim to ———. Mr Alison's opinion of the,	7	8
Persian claim to ———. Mr. Eastwick's enquiry into the,	7	7—8
Persian claim to ———. Mr. Eastwick's and Lord Stanley's views on,	5	6
Persian claim to ———. The Shah's memorandum on the,	9	11

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Seistan.</b>		
Persian claim to ——— repudiated by Mr. Murray on part of the British Government ...	8	4
Persian claims to ———. Mr. Eastwick's memorandum on the, ...	App. I	i—ii
Persian Government. Chiefs of ——— in receipt of an yearly pay from the, ...	7	7
Persian Government. Measures taken by the, to maintain the existing order of things in——	54	62—63
Persian Government accept conditional arbitration on their claim to ——— ...	17	18
Persian Government despatch a small force to ——— in support of Ali Khan ...	3	4—5
Persian Government object to deputation of an Afghan Commissioner to ——— ...	26	27
Persian Government propose to send a military force to ———. Correspondence between Mr. Murray and the Sadr Azim on the subject ...	3	4
Persian intrigues with the Chiefs of ——— ...	7	9
Persian raids on Afghans. Government of India promise the Amir of Kabul five lakhs of rupees as compensation for, ...	51	58
Persian raids on Afghans. Proposed payment by the British Government to the Amir of Kabul of compensation for, ...	43	46—47
Persian ———. Proceedings of the Shah's Government on hearing of an intended attack on, from Herat ...	72	82—85
Persian text of letters from Amir Shere Ali to Lord Northbrook on the ——— question, referred to in paragraphs 67 and 85 ...	App. XII	lxi—lxii
Persian text of letter from Amir Shere Ali Khan to the Shah of Persia on the ——— question	App. XII	lxii—lxiii
Persian troops. Despatch of, into ——— ...	10	11—12
Pollock, General. Arrival of, in ——— ...	37	38
Pollock, General. Selection of, to represent the Government of India at the ——— arbitration. His functions ...	24	27
Pollock's (General) final report of the proceedings of the ——— Mission ...	App. VIII	{ xxviii to xliii
Pollock's (General) memorandum and demi-official letter on ——— ...	App. III	xi—xiv
Pollock's (General) presence with the Afghan Commissioner at Teheran. Persian suspicions in regard to, ...	App. VI	xxv
Political relations of ———, early ...	App. I	i—ii
Population of ——— ...	App. I	i
Postponement of the ——— arbitration owing to Yakub Khan's rebellion ...	25	27
Revolt in ———, 1872-73 ...	App. IX	xliv—xlix
Sekoha. Fort of, in ——— destroyed by the Persians ...	10	12
Shah's representations to Mr. Thomson respecting ——— ...	15	16—17
Sharif Khan. Persian Government's application for the removal of, from Kila-i-Fath ...	73	85
Shere Ali. The ——— arbitration represented as one of the grievances of, against the British Government ...	126	194—196
Shere Ali. The award in the ——— arbitration a cause of estrangement of, from the British Government ...	117	177
Stanley, Lord. Views of, on Persian claim to ——— ...	5	6
Taj Mahomed Khan murders his uncle, Ali Khan, Chief of ———, and succeeds him under Persian auspices ...	4	5—6
Temple, Sir R. Remarks by, on the ——— question ...	21	22—25
Thomson's (Mr.) summary of the position in regard to ——— ...	15	15—16
Treaty of Paris. Question of British intervention under the, to prevent Afghan aggressions on Persian ——— ...	72	82—85
Villages in ———. List of, ...	App. IX	i—li
Wood, Sir C. Opinion of, as to the political status of ——— ...	8	9
Wynne's (Mr.) history of the Province of ———. General accuracy of, ...	App. VI	xxvi
Yar Mahomed Khan, Chief of Herat, leads an expedition against ———. Takes possession of Lash-Jowain. His death ...	2	3
<b>Sekoha.</b>		
Fort of ———, in Seistan, destroyed by the Persians ...	10	12
<b>Shah Pasand Khan.</b>		
See "Mahomed Saleh Khan."		
<b>Shahbaz Khan.</b>		
Efforts of ———, Governor of Kuram, in the cause of a jihad against the British ...	136	218
Violent proceedings of ———, Governor of Kuram, in stopping communication between Kabul and India ...	136	220
<b>Shahghassi, The.</b>		
See "Sherdil Khan, Shahghassi."		

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Shahpur, Shahzada.</b>		
Information derived from ——— regarding a Russian Agent at Kabul ...	App. XVIII	cii
<b>Shahrekis of Seistan, The</b> ...	App. III	vii—viii
<b>Shams-ud-din Khan, Sirdar,</b>		
accepts the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent to Amir of Kabul...	87	127
<b>Sharif Khan,</b>		
a Seistáni Chief ...	App. III	x
Persian Government. Application from, for the removal of ——— from Kila-i-Fath ...	73	85
Request of Kabul Government as to release from detention in Persia of the sons of ——— and Kamal Khan ...	66	77
Seistán, Persian. Complaint by Persia of Afghan aggressions on, in aid of ———	71	81—82
<b>—— Khan, Nahroe.</b>		
joins in a rebellion against Mir Alum Khan, Persian Governor of Seistán ...	App. IX	xliv
<b>—— Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
Fort of Kala-i-Nao, in Seistán, held by ——— ...	36	86
<b>Sherdil, Sirdar,</b>		
a Seistáni Chief ...	App. III	x
<b>—— Khan, Shahghassi.</b>		
Arrival of ——— at Kabul with a statement of Sirdar Yakub Khan's conditions ...	97	139
Capture of ——— by Sirdar Yakub Khan's adherents ...	104	145
said to be in league with Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	98	140
sent to Herat to offer terms to Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	94	135
<b>Shere Ali Khan, Amir.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Correspondence between ——— and Lord Northbrook, regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ...	88	127—128
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Interchange of letters between ——— and General Kauffmann regarding the selection of, as Heir-apparent ...	89	129—130
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Nomination of, as Heir-apparent to ——— ...	87	125
Afghanistan, boundaries of. Correspondence between the Government of India and ——— about the understanding with Russia as to the, ...	76	91—95
Akhund of Swat. Application of ——— to the, for aid in a jihad against the English ...	134	212—213
Akhund of Swat. Communications of ——— with the, ...	Ap. XXVII	clvi
Arms and money. Reply to request of ——— for, ...	80	104—106
Army. Attention paid by ——— to the reorganization and improvement of his, ...	95	137
Ayub Khan, Sirdar. ———'s warning to, ...	104	144
Boundary question and other matters. ——— sends an Envoy to India to represent his views on the, ...	60	70—71
British Agents. Views of ——— as to the location of, in Afghanistan ...	107	149
British Agents on the Afghan frontier. Renewal of proposals to ——— for the establishment of, ...	118	178
British Government (the) offer ——— 15 lakhs of rupees including the value of the arms to be presented to His Highness ...	64	75
British Mission. Courses proposed by ——— as alternatives for the despatch to Kabul of a, ...	116	176
British Mission. Dr. Bellew's private letter to ——— regarding reception of a, at Kabul ...	114	175
British Mission. Renewed attempt to induce ——— to receive a, ...	114	172—175
British Mission to Kabul. Proposal of ——— to send an Envoy to India in lieu of receiving a, ...	113	170—171
British overtures. Embarrassment caused to ——— by, ...	Ap. XVIII	xcix
Concessions offered by the Government of India to ———. Conditions attached thereto ...	118	177—178
Conference between British and Afghan representatives on the border. Conditional acceptance of ———'s proposal for a, ...	118	178
Conference on the border between a British and an Afghan Agent. Amir proposes a, ...	115	176
Conferences with ——— and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Ambala in 1869 ...	Ap. XI	liv—lx
Death of ———, ...	179	280—281
Desire of ——— to have some property assigned to him in India or Europe ...	76	93
Estrangement of ——— from the British Government. Causes of, ...	117	177
Family of ——— ...	Ap. XXIII	xxxiv
Final letter to ——— summing up the results of the conferences with the Kabul Envoy ...	79	104—105
Flight of ——— from Kabul to Afghan-Turkistan ...	177	279
Forsyth's (Mr.) Mission to Yarkund. Objection of ——— to the return of, <i>vid</i> Badakhshan ...	85	118—119
Grievances of ——— against the British Government ...	125	193—194
Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. ——— invited by Lord Lytton to be present at the, ...	118	179—180
India, Government of. Promise of, to give material assistance to ——— in repelling invaders...	77	97 & 101

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Shere Ali Khan, Amir.</b>		
Jehad against the British Government. Account of the preparations of — for a, ...	136	216—218
Jehad against the British Government. Papers relating to preparations of — for a, ...	Ap. XXVII	clii—clxii
Jehad against the British Government. Preparations of — at Kabul for a, ...	195	213—216
Kauffmann, General. Letters received by — from, ...	116	175
Letter from —. Persian text of, regarding the deputation of a British Mission to Kabul ...	Ap. XXXVIII	ccxxxii
Letter from —. Persian text of, to the Viceroy, acknowledging His Excellency's letter of condolence on the death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan ...	Ap. XXXVIII	ccxxxii
Letter from —, dated 13th December 1878, intimating his intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg, and laying his case before the European Powers ...	177	279
Letters from — to the Viceroy, acknowledging khureetas regarding His Excellency's assumption of office and the Imperial Assemblage ...	Ap. XXIV	cxixvii
Letters. Translation of, from —, dated 6th October 1878 ...	168	263
Lytton's (Lord) offer to meet — at Peshawur ...	114	174
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Lord Northbrook's correspondence with — about the punishment of the parties concerned in, ...	84	117
Macdonald's (Major) murder. Remarks of — regarding, ...	82	111
Misgivings of — as to the intentions of the British Government towards Afghanistan ...	Ap. XVIII	xcvii
Northbrook's (Lord) letter to — postponing, till a more convenient opportunity, the consideration of certain important matters ...	67	78—79
Nur Mahomed Shah, Syud. Deputation of, on a mission to Lord Lytton ...	119	180
Objection of — to the deputation of a British officer to Kabul connected with Sirdar Yakub Khan ...	76	92—93
Objects to visit of Colonel Baker or other British officers to Afghanistan ...	85	117—118
Pelly, Sir L. Peshawur Commissioner's letter to — regarding the intended deputation of, to Kabul ...	112	169—170
Pelly's (Sir L.) Mission to Kabul. Refusal of — to receive, ...	113	170
Persian text of letter from — to the Shah of Persia on the Seistan question ...	Ap. XII	lxii—lxiii
Persian text of letters from — to Lord Northbrook on the Seistan question, referred to in paragraphs 67 and 85 ...	Ap. XII	lxi—lxii
Peshawur Commissioner. Letter to, from —, refusing to receive a British Mission ...	113	170—171
Peshawur Commissioner's letter to — regarding Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan's deputation to Simla ...	116	176—177
Presents sent to — by Sir R. Pollock in 1874 ...	95	136
Question of giving material assistance to — in case of need ...	77	95
Reception of — in India. Shah of Persia's uneasiness at the, ...	13	16
Request of — for British aid in money and arms ...	77	98 & 101
Request of — for money and arms and for aid in fortifying the northern frontier of his kingdom and organizing his troops ...	76	93—94
Russia and England. — considers himself in a critical situation between, ...	115	175—176
Russian Agents. Intrigue of, with — ...	115	175
Russian Generals in Central Asia. Desire of British Government to stop all correspondence between — and, ...	App. XX	cxvii
Seistan. Representations of — in regard to, ...	13	14
Seistan arbitration. Mayo's (Lord) letter to — explanatory of the course which the proceedings would take ...	23	26—27
Seistan arbitration. Sarcastic reply of — to Lord Northbrook's khureeta on the results of the, ...	67	78
Seistan arbitration and its results. Northbrook's (Lord) khureeta to — on the, ...	65	75—76
Subsidy from the British Government. Expectations of — in regard to a, ...	95	137—138
Subsidy proposed to be offered to — ...	App. XX	cxixv
Treaty with Afghanistan. Lord Lytton's letter to — regarding the negotiation of a, ...	118	179
Turkish Envoy to Kabul. Interview of — with the, ...	147	242
Unfriendly acts of — towards the British Government. His conduct towards persons suspected of having relations with that Government ...	138	220—221
Wakhan. Annoyance of — at the deputation of Ibrahim Khan to, with a letter and presents from the Punjab Government for Mir Fateh Ali Shah ...	86	119—124
Yakub Khan, Sirdar. Terms offered by — to, ...	93—94	135
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Message from — to Lord Northbrook regarding, ...	102	143—144
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Lord Northbrook's message to — regarding, ...	100	141
<b>Shirabad.</b>		
Reported intention of Russia to establish a cantonment at — ...	152	246
<b>Sirbundis of Seistan, The</b> ...	App. III	vii—viii
<b>Smith, Capt. Euan,</b>		
accompanies General Goldsmid to Seistan ...	32	33

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Stanley, Lord.</b>		
Views of — on the Persian claim to Seistán. His instructions to the British Minister at Teheran on the subject ... ..	5	6
<b>St. John, Major O. B. C.,</b>		
appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ... ..	158	251
Map by — illustrating the proposed Perso-Kelat boundary ... ..	App. VI	xxi
Proposed deputation of — to Kabul with Sir L. Pelly ... ..	112	169
<b>Stoletoff, General.</b>		
Proceedings of — in Kabul ... ..	174	276
<b>Swat.</b>		
Afghan occupation of Bajour and —. Inexpediency of permitting an, ... ..	App. XXVII	clix—clxi
British policy towards Bajour and — ... ..	137	219
Khans of —. Determination of the, not to submit to Afghan rule ... ..	App. XXVII	clvi
Mian Gul Khan, son of the Akhund of —. Endeavours of, to be acknowledged as Badshah of — ... ..	App. XXVII	clvi
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. Intrigue of, with Mian Gul, son of the Akhund of — ... ..	App. XXVII	clvi
See "Akhund of Swat."		
—, <b>Akhund of,</b>		
accepts the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent to Amir Shere Ali ... ..	87	127
— <b>Canal Outrage.</b>		
Perpetrators of the —. Rewards bestowed at Kabul on the, ... ..	138	221
<b>Syud Ahmed, Kazi,</b>		
appointed a member of the British Mission to Kabul ... ..	158	251
— <b>Lall Shah,</b>		
a follower of the Turkish Envoy to Kabul ... ..	144	239
Antecedents of —, an Attaché of the Turkish Mission to Kabul. His suspicious proceedings in India ... ..	App. XXXI	clxvii
Faithless conduct of —, a member of the Turkish Mission to Kabul ... ..	151	244
Visit to the Akhund of Swat of — and Ahmed Effendi, members of the Turkish Mission to Kabul. Their antecedents ... ..	146	240—241
— <b>Mahomed Akhundzada,</b>		
father-in-law of Mian Gul (son of the Akhund of Swat) and brother of Tahir Jan, Hakim in Peshawur ... ..	App. XXVII	clvi
<b>Tahir Jan.</b>		
Relationship between —, Hakim in Peshawur, and Syud Mahomed Akhundzada of Swat. ... ..	App. XXVII	clvi
<b>Taj Mahomed Khan</b>		
murders his uncle, Ali Khan, Chief of Seistán, and succeeds him under Persian auspices ... ..	4	5—6
<b>Takht-i-Shah, the Naizar and</b>		
Seistán boundary. Desire of Persia to include — in her territory ... ..	70	80—81
<b>Taylor, Colonel.</b>		
Report by — regarding continuance of Persian occupation of Lash-Jowain ... ..	6	6
<b>Telegraph Line.</b>		
Establishment of a — between India and Kabul <i>via</i> Kuram suggested by Lord Salisbury ... ..	111	167
Importance of a — between Kabul and India ... ..	App. XX	cxviii
<b>Temple, Sir R.</b>		
Seistán question, the. Remarks by — on, ... ..	21	22—25
<b>Thomas, Mr. G.,</b>		
accompanies General Goldsmid to Seistán ... ..	32	33
<b>Thomson, Mr. Taylour.</b>		
Seistán. —'s summary of the position in regard to, ... ..	15	15—16
Seistán arbitration. Conversation at Teheran between — and the Sadr Azam regarding the award ... ..	53	60—61
Suggestion of — for intervention on behalf of Sirdar Yakub Khan ... ..	105	146
Yakub Khan, Sirdar, and —. Government of India object to communications between, on Kabul affairs ... ..	105	146
Yakub Khan's (Sirdar) imprisonment at Kabul. Account of, sent to — ... ..	103	144
<b>Thornton, Dr. T. H.</b>		
Opinion of — on the question of locating British officers at Herat and Kandahar ... ..	App. XVI	xciii
<b>Titles</b>		
of "Sadr-i-Azam," "Amin-ul-Mulk," and "Arvin-i-Kharija" conferred by Amir Shere Ali on Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, and Arsla Khan, Ghulzai, respectively ... ..	87	125



SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Treaty (188).</b>		
Afghanistan. Aide Memoire furnished to Sir L. Pelly for a secret ——— with, ...	App. XX	cxxiv
Afghanistan. Aide Memoire furnished to Sir L. Pelly for a ——— with, ...	App. XX	cxvi
Afghanistan. Proposed conditions of a ——— of alliance with, ...	App. XX	cxii—cxxiv
Cavagnari. Instructions to Major ——— in the event of a British Mission proceeding to Kabul to arrange the terms of peace ...	App. XLIII	celvi—lix
Conclusion of ——— dated 26th May 1879 ...	182	287
Negotiations which preceded the signing of the ——— ...	App. XLIV	celx—celxvii
Original ———, with alterations and final draft signed ...	App. XLIV	{ celxxiii— xxvii
Russia and Afghanistan. Report concerning a proposed ——— of alliance between, ...	App. XXII	cxixvi
Secret ——— with Afghanistan. Question of concluding a, ...	111	169
<b>— of Paris, 1857.</b>		
Inconvenience of the responsibilities imposed by the ——— upon the British Government ...	73	85
Seistan, Persian. Question of British intervention under the ——— to prevent Afghan aggressions on, ...	72	82—85
<b>Tribes.</b>		
Jehad against the British. Preparation of the ——— connected with Kabul for a, ...	136	216—218
Shere Ali Khan, Amir. ——— from Biluchistan to Swat tampered with by, ...	App. XXVII	clii
<b>—, Independent.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali Khan. Attempt of, to gain over the ——— between India and Kabul ...	App. XXIII	cxixv
<b>Turkey.</b>		
Afghanistan. Mission to Kabul of Haji Mahomed Hassan, a servant of the Sultan of ———	App. XXVIII	clxiii
Kabul. Desire of the Sultan of ——— to send an Envoy to, ...	141	235
<b>Turkish Consulate.</b>		
Peshawur. Proposed establishment of a ——— at, ...	141	235—236
Peshawur. Secretary of State's refusal to sanction the establishment of a ——— at, ...	142	237
<b>— Mission to Kabul.</b>		
Ahmed Effendi, a member of the ———, left at Peshawur on the Envoy's departure for Kabul	147	241
Ahmet Khulussi Effendi. Appointment of, as Turkish Envoy to Kabul ...	143	239
Ahmet Khulussi's official report to his Government on the proceedings of the ———	151	244—245
Advantages to British interests anticipated from a ——— ...	142	236
Amir's interview with the Envoy ...	147	242
Arrival and manner of reception in India of the ——— ...	145	240
Arrival and reception of the ——— at the Amir's Court... ..	147	241—242
Bokhara. Envoy's proposal for the extension of Afghan rule over, ...	148	242
Bradford (Major) entrusted with the arrangements for the reception in India of the ———	145	240
Bradford (Major). Instructions issued to, in regard to the reception in India of the ———	App. XXX	clxvi
Departure from India of the ——— ...	149	243
Deputation to the Akhund of Swat of two members of the ——— ...	146	240—241
Diabrowe (Colonel) placed in charge of the ——— on its arrival in India ...	145	240
Faithless conduct of Lall Shah, a member of the ——— ...	151	244
Instructions issued by the Ottoman Government to the Envoy. Copy of the, ...	App. XXIX	clxiv
Interviews of the Envoy with the Amir. Account of the, ...	App. XXXII	clxviii
Khedive's (the) opinion regarding the ——— ...	144	240
Names of members of the ——— ...	144	239
Persia. Envoy's proposal for the partition of, between Turkey and Afghanistan ...	148	242
Results attained by the ——— ...	148	242
Return to India of the ——— ...	148	242
Russian Government. Interrogations of the, in regard to the ——— ...	150	243
Secretary of State. Communications with the, regarding the proposed ——— ...	142	236—239
Sultan's acknowledgments for the manner in which the ——— was received in India ...	149	243
Syud Lall Shah, an Attaché of the ———. Antecedents of. His suspicious proceedings in India ...	App. XXXI	clxvii
<b>Turkistan.</b>		
Russia. Measures adopted by, in ——— in view of war with England declared to be stopped	173	275
<b>Turkomans.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali advised not to interfere with the ——— beyond his frontier ...	78	99
Tekke ———. Russian overtures to the, for a free passage through their country ...	78	99
<b>Ultimatum.</b>		
Amir's reply to the Viceroy's ——— ...	176	277—279

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Usman, Sheikh.</b>		
Expulsion from Kabul of —, a dismissed servant of the British Government, on suspicion of supplying news to that Government ... ..	138	220
<b>Viceroy.</b>		
Memorandum by — calling for expression of opinion on certain Kabul affairs ...	App. XXXIII	clxxv
Minute by — on Kabul affairs, the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia ... ..	Ap. XXXV	ccix
<b>Wakhan.</b>		
Afghan sovereignty over Badakshan and —. Russia's objection to the admission of, ...	74	88—89
Amir Shere Ali's annoyance at the deputation of Ibrahim Khan to — with a letter and presents from the Punjab Government for Mir Fatch Ali Shah ... ..	86	119—124
Deputation from India to Ibrahim Khan of — represented as one of the Amir's grievances against the British Government ... ..	126	194—196
Gordon, Colonel T. Courteous reception of, at — by Mir Fatch Ali Shah ... ..	86	119
<b>— Mir of.</b>		
The bestowal of presents on the — a cause of Amir Shere Ali's estrangement from the British Government ... ..	117	177
<b>War.</b>		
Admirable conduct of the British troops during the — ... ..	183	300
Declaration of — ... ..	170	266
Narrative of the — ... ..	183	289—300
Preparations for — and policy to be followed by the British Government ... ..	167	262
<b>Watson, Mr.</b>		
Memorandum by — regarding Seistán and Lash-Jowain submitted to British Minister at Teheran in 1864 ... ..	2	1—2
<b>Wood, Sir C.</b>		
Afghan States. Opinion of — as to the inexpediency of interfering in the internal affairs of the, ... ..	8	9
Seistán. Political status of. Opinion of — as to the, ... ..	8	9
<b>Wynne, Mr.</b>		
Seistán. History of the Province of, by —. General accuracy of, ... ..	App. VI	xxvi
<b>Yakub Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
Abdulla Jan, Sirdar. Measures taken by — consequent on the recognition of, as Heir-apparent ... ..	87	127
Account of the rebellious designs and proceedings of — at Herat ... ..	92	133—135
Amir Shere Ali's message to Lord Northbrook regarding —'s imprisonment ... ..	102	143—144
Arrest and imprisonment of — at Kabul. Detailed account of, ... ..	101	142
Arrival of — at Kabul ... ..	99	140—141
British Government willing to take charge of — on certain conditions ... ..	Ap. XX	cxvi
Cavagnari, Major P. L. N. Interview between — and, at Saled Sang ... ..	Ap. XLIV	ccxi
Conditions proposed by — to Amir Shere Ali Khan as those on which he would return to his allegiance ... ..	97	139
Desire to be independent at Herat ... ..	92	133
How — was persuaded to go to Kabul ... ..	98	140
Imprisonment of — at Kabul ... ..	100	141
Imprisonment of — attributed to the Amir's fear that he would transfer Herat to Persia... ..	101	142
Khorasan. The Prince Governor of, sends an agent to — ... ..	91	132
Khugianis. Letter addressed to the — intercepted while negotiations with the British Government were proceeding ... ..	180	284
Letter from — to the Viceroy, dated 21st February 1879 ... ..	180	282
Letter to — after release, and his reply ... ..	178	279—280
Letter to — from Major Cavagnari regarding conditions of peace in which he is addressed as "Amir." ... ..	180	283
Letters from — re-opening negotiations ... ..	179	280—281
Meshed, Prince Governor of, sends an Agent to — ... ..	91	132
Mir Afzul Khan, Sirdar. Conduct of, towards — ... ..	95	137
Mir Alum, Governor of Kain. Correspondence of — with, ... ..	91	131—132
Negotiations with — ... ..	180	282—285
Northbrook's (Lord) despatch to Secretary of State regarding imprisonment of — at Kabul ... ..	100	141
Northbrook's (Lord) interposition in favour of — a cause of Amir Shere Ali's estrangement from the British Government ... ..	117	177
Northbrook's (Lord) message regarding — imprisonment. Effect of, on the Amir and Kabul Durbar ... ..	102	142—144

SUBJECT.	Para.	Page.
<b>Yakub Khan, Sirdar.</b>		
Northbrook's (Lord) message to Amir Shere Ali regarding imprisonment of — at Kabul ...	100	141
Objection of Amir Shere Ali to the deputation of a British officer to Kabul connected with — ...	76	92—93
Overtures of — to Persia. Shah's Government repudiate political intrigue with him ...	91	131—132
Persian aid to — at Herat. Report regarding promise of, ...	103	144
Proposal of — that Furreh, Zamindawar, Girishk, and Kandahar should be made over to him in addition to Herat ...	90	131
Proposal of — to come in person to the British Camp and there arrange matters ...	181	285
Protest of Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzais, against imprisonment of — at Kabul.	101	142
Readiness of — to receive Major Cavagnari at Kabul to discuss the peace conditions ...	180	284
Rebelious proceedings of — at Herat ...	90	131
Refusal of — to accept the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent to the Amir ...	97	139
Refusal of — to return to Kabul. Account of his proceedings at Herat ...	96	138—139
Release of — ...	177	279
Reply of — to letter communicating the conditions of peace ...	180	282
Salisbury's (Lord) suggestion as to the deportation of — to India ...	111	167
summoned by the Amir to Kabul ...	94	135
Tcheran, British Minister at. Account of —'s imprisonment sent to, ...	103	144
Terms offered by the Amir to — ...	93	135
Thomson (Mr. Taylour) and —. Government of India object to communications between, on Kabul affairs ...	105	146
Thomson's (Mr. Taylour) suggestion for intervention on behalf of — ...	105	146
Viceroy's reply to —, dated 11th April 1879 ...	180	285
Visit of — to Kabul attributed to Lord Northbrook's instigation ...	100	141
Warns Sirdar Ayub Khan to place Herat in a state of defence against the Amir's troops ...	104	145
<b>Yarkund Mission.</b>		
Amir Shere Ali's objection to the return of — <i>via</i> Badakshan ...	85	118—119
True reason of the Amir's objection to the return <i>via</i> Kabul of the — ...	95	137
<b>Yar Mahomed Khan,</b>		
Chief of Herat fails to secure the allegiance of Mahomed Saleh Khan of Lash-Jowain. Sends an expedition against Herat. Seizes Lash-Jowain. His death ...	2	3

# PRÉCIS OF CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

1872-78.

## INTRODUCTION.

THE purpose of this précis is to continue the history of British relations with Afghanistan from the date of Messrs. Wyllie and Wynne's précis up to the commencement of hostilities in the current year. Mr. Wynne's précis terminates with the spring of the year 1872; and the last event of importance in the internal history of Afghanistan which it records is the rebellion of Sirdar Yakoob Khan. The Amir was reconciled to his son in September 1871, and appointed him Governor of Herat with the Mir Akhor and Abdulla Khan Nasiree as Naib and Deputy Naib. General Hafizulla Khan was named Commandant of the local army. The real duty of these officers was to watch and control the Sirdar whom the Amir distrusted. With regard to external matters, the Envoy from Bokhara to the Viceroy and the Sultan of Turkey had recently passed through Kabul. The question of the northern boundary of Afghanistan was under discussion, and the Russian expedition against Khiva, though imminent, had not yet taken place. On the west, the position of the Turkomans towards Russia, Persia, and Kabul foreshadowed trouble. And, finally, there were the complications with Persia arising out of the countenance shown to Yakoob Khan and out of those disputes in regard to Seistán which led to British arbitration. Such, briefly, was the state of affairs in and around Kabul at the period from which the present narrative begins.

## CHAPTER I.

THE SEISTÁN ARBITRATION. FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR BRITISH MEDIATION TO THE DELIVERY OF GENERAL GOLDSMID'S ARBITRAL OPINION.

**1. Preliminary remarks.**—The first portion of this chapter is a précis of a précis—or rather series of précis—compiled by Messrs. Wynne and Aitchison during the earlier stages of the Seistán arbitration. But these précis, while very voluminous, do not supply a continuous and unbroken history. In some cases, for instance, matters dealt with at considerable length in a previous account are repeated in a later one, so that the starting point of each narrative is not clear. Hence it seemed to me that an abridged account which should narrate the history of the Seistán arbitration from first to last, and, afterwards, describe the later political relations of that province, would not be a mere superfluity. Moreover, an account of the Seistán arbitration with its surrounding circumstances and of the consequences flowing from it could not possibly be omitted from a précis professing to deal with the chief events affecting Afghanistan politics between 1872 and 1878.

**2. Early history of the provinces of Seistan and Lash-Jowain.**—According to a memorandum, dated 15th December 1864, submitted by Mr. Watson to Mr. Alison, British Minister at Teheran, the province of Seistán,

\* Not further than Kandahar; and it finally revolted in 1718, Herat a few years later on. After a short period of anarchy, a Seistán Chief took possession of Herat. This was in the time of Shah Tahmasp, the last but one of the Sefavian dynasty.—(Ferrier's History of the Afghans, p. 37.)

as well as the whole\* of Afghanistan, formed part of the Persian dominions in the time of the Sefavian Kings. But Seistán was added to the new kingdom of Afghanistan in the year 1749 by Ahmed Shah Durani, and hence, according to Mr. Watson, that province forms an integral portion of Persia in no greater degree than the rest of Afghanistan.

Seistán remained under the sway of Ahmed Shah during the whole of that monarch's long reign, but towards the close of the life of his successor, Timur Shah, it came to be only nominally dependent upon Afghanistan. Since then it has continued to be independent both of Persia and of Afghanistan.\* From 1749 till 1796 the

\* A nominal dependence was maintained till 1709, when tribute was still being paid and a contingent furnished.

whole province of Khorasan was independent of Persia, but, in the latter year, Agba Mahomed Khan added it to his dominions. He did not, however, prosecute his conquests further in that direction, and Seistán continued to be separate from Persia during the whole of his reign. In 1810, during the reign of his successor, Futteh Ali Shah, Captain Christie travelled through Seistán, which was then under independent Chiefs. Long afterwards about the time of the English expedition into Afghanistan, the Persian Government turned its attention towards Seistán. It has from time to time endeavoured to win over to its views some of the leading Chiefs of the locality, and, in 1858, one of them obtained the assistance of two Persian regiments, by whose aid he was to rule in the Shah's name. In

† Sirdar Ali Khan of Sekoha.

the same year this Chief† was put to death, but since then the Persian Government has never allowed any long interval to elapse without re-asserting its claim to Seistán. It has recently said that it would view an invasion of that province by the Afghans in the same light in which it would regard an invasion of Khorasan, and it has declared its intention to vindicate the Shah's title to Seistán by an appeal to arms.

Mr. Watson's memorandum continues—

"The small province of Lash-Jowain lies to the north of Seistán, and has generally followed the fortunes of the larger principality. When Seistán belonged to Persia, Lash-Jowain was Persian, and it appears to have been added, with it, by Ahmed Shah to the new kingdom of Afghanistan. In 1810 the people of Jowain were under Mahomed Khan, Chief of a tribe of the Ghilzais, who resided at Durg—a fort within two miles of Jowain—and who maintained four hundred horse. The claims of Persia extend over Lash-Jowain, on the same foundation as those over Seistán, namely, that both provinces formed part of the kingdom of the Sefavians. Lash-Jowain, however, may more reasonably be laid claim to by the Afghans than by the Persians, as at one time, within the last thirty years, it paid tribute to Herat. At present it is an independent State. Its Chief, Ahmed Khan, wrote a letter last year, in which he styled himself the hereditary ruler of Lash-Jowain, but stated his readiness to join the army of the Amir of Kabul if Your Excellency should wish him to do so.

"I enclose a map of Persia and the adjacent countries, which is the only one I can find for sale at Teheran. It is copied from the map published by the late Sir Alexander Burnes, and, from the fact of its being recognized as correct by educated Persians, I would infer that thirty years ago,‡ when it was published, Persia had no pretensions to sovereignty over

‡ i.e., about 1834.

Seistán or Lash-Jowain, since neither of these provinces is included within the limits of that country in this map."

When Conolly arrived in Seistán in 1839, he found Lash in the possession of Mahomed Saleh Khan, commonly called Shah Pusund Khan, whose nephew, Gulzar Khan, was governing Jowain in his uncle's name. Seistán was divided between Mahomed Reza Khan of Sekoha and Ibrahim Khan of Chakánsur. The former declared himself the enemy of the Persians and still more so of the Heratees "who ruined him and his country." His chief jealousy and fear seemed to be of Shah Pusund Khan and Ibrahim Khan.

General Ferrier visited the province in 1845. He found§ that Kohendil

§ Ferrier's *Caravan Journeys*, p. 427.

Khan had brought under the rule of Kandahar part of Seistán as far as Rudbar, on the Helmund. The portion that lies between this and Ilamdar was an object of perpetual discord between Kohendil Khan and the nomadic Biluchis. The rest of Seistán was divided between Mahomed Reza Khan of Sekoha and Ali Khan of Chakánsur.

He remarks as follows regarding the territorial division between these two Chiefs:—

"The territory of Mahomed Reza Khan is comprised in the triangle marked out by the lake of Seistán to the north and west, and the Helmund river in the elbow, which it

Ferrier's *Caravan Journeys*, p. 417.

makes from Traku, as far as the junction with its first canal to the north, and at the southern point of the lake.

"Ali Khan is, after Mahomed Reza Khan, the most powerful Biluch Chief in Seistán; the territory which he governs is bordered on the north by the rapid stream of the Khuspas, which flows from the north-east of the lake almost as far as the Helmund in a southerly direction; to the west it is bounded by the first canal which, leaving that river, falls into the lake. Chakánsur, the capital of this small State, is an old fortress surrounded by mud walls, and containing between fifteen and eighteen hundred houses, a bazar, five public baths, two caravanserais, and a mosque."

This Ali Khan had, a few years before, murdered Dr. Forbes, who despising all warning had ventured within his reach.

Ferrier makes no mention of Ibrahim Khan, Ali's brother. On the other hand, his predecessor, Conolly, omits all notice of Ali, and, in the accounts of subsequent authorities, Ali Khan disappears altogether, and Ibrahim is alone mentioned as ruler of Chakánsur.

As regards Lash-Jowain, Ferrier writes—

"We arrived very early at Lash-Jowain, a fortress situated on the right bank of the Furrah-rood, and about seven or eight parasangs above the place at which it falls into the lake. We were received at the house of Salu (Saleh) Khan, an Afghan, of the tribe of Ishakzai, and Chief of this district. The Khan is more generally known by the name of Shah Pusund Khan—He-with-whom-the-King-is-pleased—a title which he received from Shah Kamran. This Sirdar, as I have already said, was at war with the Biluch Chief, Ali Khan of Chakánsur; but he had other difficulties to surmount. Lash had always been a dependency of the principality of Herat; nevertheless, Shah Pusund Khan refused to acknowledge the complete sovereignty of Yar Mahomed, and he was secretly encouraged in this rebellious spirit by the Persian Court, and Kohendil Khan, who, both one and the other, allied against the Chief of Herat, had the greatest interest in making the Chief of Lash independent, inasmuch as it furnished them with the means of mutual communication without being obliged to send their envoys or correspondence through Herat, where there was every chance of their being seized or examined. Besides this, the fort of Lash is the key to the position, and the road from Persia to Kandahar by the rivers; and Kohendil Khan, as well as Mahmud Shah, with that duplicity so common in Eastern nations, each thought to deceive the other and

\* "Shah Pusund Khan, from his position between Persia and Afghanistan, has always been possessed of much political influence. He was equally courted by the Court of Persia on one side, and the Chiefs of Kabal and Kandahar on the other. Nominally dependant on Herat, he was seldom trusted either by Shah Kamran or Yar Mahomed; but, from the moment the English came into the country, he studiously attached himself to their cause, doing good service on several occasions. One of his sons, Rasul Khan, always resided in Kandahar, in attendance on the Prince Governor, during our occupation; and this Chief was most useful as a medium of communication between the British authorities and the heads of the different Durani tribes."—[Editor of Ferrier's *Caravan Journeys*—H. D. SEYMOUR.]

obtain the support of Salu Khan for his own particular interest; but Salu had married his daughter to Mirdil Khan, the brother of the Kandahar Chief, and seemed, therefore, to be devoted to that personage: his eldest son, Rasul Khan, had also married a niece of Kohendil Khan.\* These circumstances, and the somewhat rebellious spirit shown by Salu Khan, were not agreeable to Yar Mahomed, who frequently menaced his disobedient and crafty vassal; but He-with-whom-the-King-is-pleased, while protesting his great devotion for the Chief of Herat,

always turned a deaf ear to his demands for tribute, and declined to pay, alleging as an excuse either that the crops were bad, the harvest was bad, or he was at war with a neighbour, or had some fort to build, &c."

In 1848, Mahomed Reza Khan died, leaving six sons—Lutf Ali, Taj Mahomed, Kohendil, and three others; and a brother, Ali Khan.

Lutf Ali† succeeded "as Chief of Seistán on his father's death; but his authority was

† Taj Mahomed's account in enclosure to Sir C. Alison's despatch to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 23rd December 1867.

disputed by his uncle, who, after unsuccessfully attempting to gain over the other Chiefs, retired to Kandahar and obtained assistance from Kohendil Khan. The latter sent between six and seven thousand men with Ali Khan to Seistán under Mirdil Khan, who succeeded in defeating and capturing Lutf Ali Khan. He was at once deprived of his sight, and Seistán was handed over to Ali Khan, while Chakánsur was given to Ibrahim Khan. The Afghan troops then withdrew. Yar Mahomed Khan, of Herat, hearing what had occurred, marched with nearly ten thousand men to Seistán to protect the sons of Mahomed Reza Khan with whom his family was connected by marriage. He reached Lash and Jowain, and took possession of these districts; but having, there, become dangerously ill, he returned to Afghanistan, and died on the way, two stages from Herat, in 1851. Ali Khan now remained for some years in possession of Seistán, and quite independent."

At length, this Ali Khan, being weary of the constant struggle between Kandahar and Herat for the mastery over his province, entered into communications with the Persian Government. The Sadr Azim, Mirza Agha Khan, invited him to Teheran, where he was received with high consideration. His pay was fixed at 4,000 tomans a year, with 3,000 more for Ibrahim Khan and



other subordinate Chiefs. The title of Hisam-ul-Mulk was conferred on him, and he was married to the daughter of one of the Kajar Princes. This happened in 1857-58.

**3. The Persian Government propose to send a military force to Seistan. Correspondence between Mr. Murray and the Sadr Azim on the subject.**—In the spring of the last mentioned year, the Persian Government commenced preparations for sending a military force with Ali Khan on his return to Seistán. Mr. Murray reported the fact to the English Foreign Office, and proposed to call upon the Persian Government for an explanation as soon as the troops moved out of Teheran. The subject also attracted the notice of the Government of India, who addressed Mr. Murray regarding it. Mr. Murray thereupon wrote to the Sadr Azim, and expressed a hope that the rumour of the intended expedition was incorrect, “as the occupation of Seistán, which is a part of Afghanistan, by Persian troops, would be a direct violation of the Treaty of Paris” which had only been concluded in March 1857.

On the 13th May the Sadr Azim replied—

“The Persian Ministers have always considered, and do now consider, that Seistán, *ab antiquo*, has formed an integral part of the Persian territory, and it is at the present time in the possession of the Persian Government, on whose part it is therefore not necessary that troops or soldiers should be sent, or a new occupation of the place effected.”

On the 15th May Mr. Murray rejoined—

“The British Government cannot admit the correctness of this view, which is indeed contradicted, not only by the political history of Seistán, but also by its geographical position, which is represented in every existing map, possessing any claim to authority, as forming part of Afghanistan. I am well aware of the nature of the evidence which the Persian Ministers propose to advance in support of their claims to include Seistán in Persian territory; but it is evidence which is no more admissible than that by which Lash and Jowain were claimed, and by which probably Kandahar itself might also be claimed. It is well known that Sirdar Ali Khan, the hereditary ruler of Seistán, when driven by his necessities to seek the aid of the Persian Government, was obliged, in return for the money and assistance afforded him, to hoist the Persian flag and to own himself the obedient servant of His Majesty the Shah. This took place several years ago; and now that Sirdar Ali Khan has been invited to Teheran, and has received the honor of a marriage with a Princess, he is entirely in the power of the Persian Government, from whom he obtained the promise, not only of pay, but supplies of arms, and also Persian troops to assist him in maintaining himself in Seistán. There is, therefore, no doubt whatever that he is ready to sign a paper declaring himself a subject and vassal, and his country a part of the territory of His Majesty the Shah. If such a paper is required of him, he must sign it, for he has no power to refuse; but such a paper would obviously have no weight whatever with the British Government, which well knows that Seistán, from the time of Shah Ahmed and his successors, formed part of the territory of the Afghan sovereign. In the time of Shah Kamran, its ruler became independent, and, although one of his successors may, in order to obtain assistance from Persia in the hour of need have declared himself a subject or servant of the Shah, the Persian Ministers well know that they have never levied the taxes or customs duties, or appointed and displaced Governors in Seistán, as they have done in all those provinces which really form a part of Persian territory. The British Government entertains no hostility whatever towards Sirdar Ali Khan, and, so far as I am informed, they have no objection to his being allied by marriage with the Persian Court, or to his being on terms of the closest friendship with the Persian Government; but, on the other hand, it is my duty to inform Your Highness that, if the Persian Government were to send troops into Seistán—a province which is much nearer to Kandahar, the centre of Afghanistan, and to the British frontier, than Herat itself—Her Majesty’s Government would consider such a step as being a direct violation of the Treaty of Persia.”

The result was that the Persian Government contented themselves with sending a small force of 300 sowars and two light field-pieces as an escort for the Kajar Princess whom Ali Khan had married and who returned with him to Seistán. But Mahomed Saleh Khan, the Commander of this escort, took with him the following instructions, which were communicated by Mr. Doria to Lord Malmesbury on the 27th October 1858:—

“From what has lately been reported to us, it appears that Sharif Khan and Ibrahim Khan (Seistán Chiefs hostile to Sirdar Ali Khan) had recently sent an agent, named Shere Khan, to Teheran to communicate confidentially with the English Mission and Minister, and that he had been furnished with a letter of recommendation to the authorities at Kandahar, desiring them to afford any assistance or support that might be demanded. Now, you will, on

receipt of this firman, lose no time in carrying out the instructions supplied to you by the late Sadr Azim, Mirza Agha Khan. You will send for horsemen and matchlockmen from Kain and the frontiers of Tun and Tabas, and give all the assistance that may be necessary to Sirdar Ali Khan; and you will be firm, and prevent any opposition being made by Ibrahim and Sharif Khan. If the troops and horsemen and matchlockmen from these places should be insufficient for the purpose, you will at once send information that such is the case, in order that instructions may be issued for reinforcements to be despatched from Khorasan."

#### 4. Murder of Ali Khan by his nephew Taj Mahomed. Correspondence on the subject between the British Minister at Teheran and the Persian Government.—Taj Mahomed, Ali Khan's nephew, has thus described what happened next:—

"Mahomed Saleh Khan, Kurd Bacha, was also accompanied by a Persian instructor, and had with him clothing for soldiers and the tools required for coining money. On reaching Seistán money was struck in the Shah's name, and a regiment raised and drilled by the Persian instructor. Meanwhile, the other Chiefs and the Seistán people were greatly dissatisfied with the cruelty

\* Mr. Doria, writing to Lord Malmesbury, 1st November 1858, said Taj Mahomed was leagued with the Governor of Kain.

The Amir Shere Ali, on the other hand, remarked, in January 1870, that "the Kabul authorities caused the death of Ali Khan in consequence of his being proved a well-wisher or partizan of the Persian Government."—[Kabul Agent, to Commissioner of Peshawur, 23rd January 1870.]

and injustice practised by Ali Khan, and they engaged Taj Mahomed Khan\* to put an end to this state of things, and to avenge himself for the inhuman treatment to which his two elder brothers had been exposed, by being both deprived of sight by order of Ali Khan. Taj Mahomed Khan accepted this task, and, having introduced himself at night into Ali Khan's room, where he was in bed with his wife, he attacked him with his sword. His uncle was awake, and attempted to make his escape; but he was cut down, and the Princess was slightly wounded in the arm."

In reply to Mr. Doria,† the Shah's Government expressed their intention of directing the Governors of Kain and Kerman to hold in readiness a number of troops to march on Seistán for the punishment of Taj Mahomed Khan and all concerned in Ali Khan's murder, unless the people of Seistán surrendered the murderer. Mr. Doria then wrote as follows:—

"After this unreserved declaration, I recalled to His Excellency's recollection that Her Majesty's Government considered Seistán as forming part of Afghanistan; that sending troops, therefore, into that province would be considered a direct and open infringement of the Treaty of Paris; that, although the late Sadr Azim had endeavoured to assert that Seistán was a province of Persia, his attempt had not altered the views of Her Majesty's Government on this subject; that the entire blame connected with the unfortunate connection of a Persian Princess with Sirdar Ali Khan rested with the late Sadr Azim; that evidently there was no intention of inflicting injury on Her Royal Highness, as she would otherwise have been killed when trying to save her husband's life. I urged His Excellency to weigh well the consequences which might ensue from such an imprudent step as sending troops to Seistán, which could not fail to be viewed with deep dissatisfaction by Her Majesty's Government. I repeated again and again to His Excellency whether it was not better to waive a *pretended* right to Seistán than to risk forfeiting the friendship of England; and having used every argument I could to induce His Excellency to prevent such a course, I finally begged of him to be the bearer of my representations to the Shah, and, with all respect and deference, to entreat His Majesty at least to postpone so decided a proceeding in a matter which might involve such serious results, until I could learn from Your Lordship the views of Her Majesty's Government."

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied—

"That the Persian Government had determined on sending a person to bring back the Princess, widow of Sirdar Ali Khan, and Mahomed Saleh Khan who accompanied her to Seistán; that should Taj Mahomed Khan allow these two persons to return, and should he treat them with respect on their departure; should Taj Mahomed submit, as Sirdar Ali Khan had done, to acknowledge himself a servant of the Shah, the Persian Government would then overlook his present culpability; but if, on the contrary, he should forcibly retain the Princess and Mahomed Saleh Khan, and behave disrespectfully to them, and should he refuse to obey the orders of Persia, then the Persian Government will certainly take steps to punish Taj Mahomed."

Mr. Doria rejoined as follows with the result that the Persian Government postponed their intention of sending troops from Kerman to Seistán:—

"I must now repeat to Your Excellency the opinion I have already stated in conversation, that sending any sort of troops into Seistán would cause Her Majesty's Government much displeasure. Mr. Murray long since urged upon the Persian Government the absence of all right on their part to send troops into that province, and stated that such interference was

in direct contravention of the Treaty of Paris. The late Sadr Azim also, after the reiterated representations of Mr. Murray, diminished the number of troops which he finally ordered to Seistán, and it is the very reprehensible policy of Mirza Agha Khan which has alone caused the present catastrophe and position of affairs in Seistán."

Taj Mahomed's own account of the settlement was that

"he (Taj Mahomed) offered to accept and fulfill all the engagements made by the late Khan if he was recognized as Chief of Seistán. This proposal was acceded to, and the Shah granted him the same pay and title conferred on Ali Khan. Taj Mahomed Khan sent his brother as a hostage to Teheran, and Ibrahim Khan and other Chiefs also sent their sons to reside at the Persian capital as a guarantee of their good faith."

## 5. Mr. Eastwick's memorandum,\* Lord Stanley's remarks thereon, and instructions to Mr. Doria.—

\* For this memorandum, see Appendix I.

When the papers were communicated to the India Office, Mr. Eastwick drew up a *précis* showing that Persia was not so undoubtedly in the wrong as had been hitherto held, in the assertion of her claim on Seistán. Lord Stanley endorsed this memorandum with the following remarks:—

"The general conclusions from the facts noted in the preceding memorandum appear to be, that Seistán has been for ages, and from a period even antecedent to the dawn of history down to the death of Nadir Shah in 1747, an integral portion of the Persian Empire; that it was colonized by Persians; and that while at least a moiety of the population is still Persian by descent, the whole of the inhabitants are allied to that country by various ties, such as similarity of manners, dress, &c.

"It further appears that Seistán can in no sense be included in Afghanistan, being inhabited by a different people, who are, for the most part, Shiáhs like the Persians, and not Súnis like the Afghans, who speak a different language from the Afghans, and who have never yielded more than a nominal obedience to the Afghan rulers, except to Ahmed Shah, and that only for a period so short as would not invalidate the claim of sovereignty on the part of Persia,† a claim based on the two titles recognized by international law, *viz.*, first occupancy and uninterrupted possession."

† From 1748 to 1773 Ahmed Shah and Timur Shah had a firm possession of Seistán to which no verbal pretensions even were raised by Persia till 1800—in fact, it was not till that date she held any portion of Khornsán Meshed, and in 1848-50 she had only just asserted her sovereignty over Bunpur and Ghain.

To the view thus formed, Lord Stanley gave practical expression by writing to the British Minister in Persia that

"there was reason to regret, with reference to the asserted claims of Persia to sovereignty over Seistán, that so much had already been advanced in opposition to those claims, and that he was of opinion, therefore, that, if the discussion of the subject should be forced upon the Mission pending further instructions from England, it would be equally just and politic to adopt a less decided tone than that used by Mr. Murray in his recent controversy with the Persian Government."

## 6. Correspondence of 1858 between Mr. Murray and the Sadr Azim regarding Lash-Jowain.—

In 1858 Colonel Taylor, who had been sent to Herat to ascertain whether the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris were being duly executed, reported that the Khutba was still read, and money coined at Herat in the name of the Shah. Also, that Lash-Jowain, which had been occupied by Persian troops when hostilities began, had not been evacuated. The Kabul Vakil on the 30th March 1858 reported a speech of Dost Mahomed on the same subject. He had said that Lash and Jowain, in the district of Furrah, in former times belonged to Herat; that

"on the death of the late Wazir, Yar Mahomed Khan, the late Kohendil Khan of Kandahar seized upon Furrah, Lash, and Jowain; and they remained dependent on Kandahar till the late invasion of the Persians into the province of Herat, when they availed themselves of the confusion into which the death of Kohendil Khan had thrown affairs at Kandahar, to appropriate Lash and Jowain, which up to this moment they hold, having put a Governor of the Kaiani tribe into the charge of them. The Amir considers that Lash and Jowain belong to him, but the British Government ought either to cause them to be made over to Kabul, or else to Herat."

An animated correspondence then arose between Mr. Murray,\* British Minister at Teheran, and the Sadr Azim. The latter disavowed the reading of the Khutba and the coining of money in the Shah's name, and declared that, if Sirdar Ahmed Khan continued the practice, he did so contrary to the desire of the Persian Government. He also promised that Lash and Jowain should be evacuated and made over to Ahmed Khan, grandson of Shah Pusund Khan. But he insisted in the strongest terms that Persia had an undoubted right to these places, and yielded them solely as a token of friendship to the British Government. He spoke of them as "the unquestionable territory of Persia," and, in a letter dated 29th March 1858, thus formulated his proofs :

"By the artfulness and the misrepresentation of interested parties, certain points have been rendered the subject of discussion on your side.

"The most important question is that of Lash and Jowain, and the Khutba and coinage of Herat. With regard to Lash and Jowain, the Persian Ministers always considered, and do now consider, these places as belonging to Kaianat and Seistan, the territory and property of the Persian Government; and no clearer evidence could be desired on this head than the fact of Shah Pusund Khan having been Governor there on the part of the Shah; of Rasul Khan, his son, having been sent to Teheran as a hostage; and also of the government of that place having been afterwards bestowed upon Sirdar Ahmed Khan in virtue of a Royal firman. Had the Persian Ministers considered that Lash and Jowain belonged to Afghanistan, they would before now have evacuated them in the same manner that they evacuated Herat and its dependencies, in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty, with the greatest promptitude and willingness. Besides the above arguments adduced in these letters, there are other proofs which, if examined with the eyes of justice, can leave no doubt whatever on the matter."

Mr. Murray used equally emphatic language in denying the claims of the Persian Government, and insisted that the evacuation of Lash and Jowain was in accordance with the plain and manifest stipulations of the Treaty which the Shah was bound to fulfil and which he had hitherto omitted to fulfil.

**7. Relations between Persia and Afghanistan in respect to Seistan and Lash-Jowain in 1862-63.**—In the middle of 1862, the dispute arose between Dost Mahomed and his nephew, Sultan Ahmed Khan, which led to the siege and capture of Herat and its annexation to Kabul. Much alarm was caused thereby to the Persian Government, who endeavoured to induce the British Government to mediate in the spirit of the Treaty of Paris between Dost Mahomed and his nephew. The correspondence on the subject is interesting, but for the purpose of this *précis* it is sufficient to note what passed with respect to Seistan and Lash and Jowain. In September 1862 there were rumours of an intended expedition by Dost Mahomed into Seistan to levy contributions for his army, a proceeding which the Persian Government were determined to prevent or avenge. The question then arose whether Lash, Jowain, and Seistan were Persian territory. Mr. Eastwick, who had been sent to Meshed to watch Dost Mahomed's proceedings, enquired whether "the two Provinces, Lash-Jowain and Seistan, are to be considered as Persian territory?"

"In a letter from the Sadr Azim, which forms an enclosure to Mr. Murray's despatch No. 51 of April 12th, 1858, to Lord Clarendon, Lash and Jowain are spoken of as belonging to Seistan—the territory and property of the Persian Government. Lash and Jowain have, however, been virtually independent ever since the time of Shah Pusund Khan, the grandfather of the present ruler. Shah Pusund Khan assisted at the murder of Futteh Khan, Dost Mahomed's eldest brother, and probably on account of this blood feud, Ahmed Khan, the present Chief of Lash and Jowain, is now a fugitive at Meshed. He has sent his nephew to the Shah to ask support, which, I hear, will probably be granted.

"The Persian claims to Seistan are founded on the fact that this province, from the most remote ages down to the death of Nadir Shah, was almost uninterruptedly a province of Persia. Since then it has been at times a dependency of Kabul and Kandahar, at other times of Herat and Persia. In 1834 *Kamran conquered Seistan*, but he himself acknowledged fealty to Persia. From 1853 Seistan has owned allegiance to Persia, and in 1858 Ali Khan went there as Governor on the part of the Shah and coined money in his name. Specimens of these coins are in the possession of Her Majesty's Government. The Seistani Chiefs received 4,000 piastres yearly from the Persian Government as pay, and a certain Gul Mahomed Beg, and another person, whose name I have not learned, are now in Meshed to receive arrears of pay and to ask whether the Shah will assist them against Dost Mahomed. It may be added that,

the two principal tribes of Seistán are Persians by descent, the Biluchis, who are utter barbarians, being modern immigrants. The true Seistánis are Shiahhs, and naturally cling to Persia rather than to the Afghans. Under these circumstances I request to be informed what steps I should take if Dost Mahomed invades Seistán. The question is urgent as the Amir has intimated his intention of occupying the Province as soon as Herat is taken."

Mr. Alison replied (19th September 1862)—

"With regard to Lash and Jowain, Her Majesty's Government are clearly of opinion that they are not Persian territory, and you will remember that, in fulfilment of the Treaty of Paris, Persia was obliged to evacuate these districts, and hand them over to Ahmed Khan, in whose hands they formerly were.

"Persia certainly claims Seistán as forming a part of her territory, but, according to all accounts, she does not exercise any authority over it."

On the 29th September, he wrote again to Mr. Eastwick—

"I have received no reply from England on the subject of Seistán. My own view of the question is, that, although Seistán may not be *bonâ fide* a Persian province, Persia persists in claiming it as such, and any interference with it or attack upon it, on the part of the Dost, might be reasonably viewed as a gratuitous attempt to pick a quarrel with Persia and force her into hostilities."

Mr. Alison (October 20th) informed Lord Russell that he had received a reply to a letter which he had written to Dost Mahomed, expressing a hope that no complications would arise calculated to give consistency to the apprehensions entertained by the Persians. Dost Mahomed's reply was, that he would undertake no movement of any kind which could become a cause of apprehension. Mr. Alison showed the letter to the Persian Ministers, who merely remarked on the royal style adopted by the Amir.

On the 18th December 1862 Mr. Eastwick reported the results of a long

\* The news was as follows; it was never confirmed:—  
"Intelligence has reached me from the Prince's camp that a number of horsemen had gone on a plundering excursion from Kahrez† to Dost Mahomed Khan's camp, and had carried off some cattle and several prisoners. Some horsemen had also come to the frontier of Kahrez from the Dost's camp, and had carried off 150 camels and ten or fifteen prisoners."

interview with the Shah, for which he had asked, because the danger of hostilities between Persia and Afghanistan seemed imminent. The Meshed Agent had reported that there had been already mutual infringement of territory,\* and the Amin-ud-dowla had said that

"his Government would never remain passive while that 'stinging hornet' was so near,—assailing, now their lips, and now their eyes. Short of war with England, whose friendship Persia highly prized, every effort would be made to remove Dost Mahomed from the Persian frontier."

At this interview the Shah observed that highly as he

"prized the friendship of the English Government, nevertheless so long as Persia had a soldier or a toman left, she would struggle to free herself from the Afghan incubus on the frontier of Khorasan."

In regard to Seistán he enquired—

"whether Mr. Eastwick had written to his Government on the subject, and whether the Government had expressed an opinion. He said that it was stated in a late despatch that Her Majesty's Government did not recognize the claims of Persia to Seistán. Seistán formed part of his dominions; that at all events it could not be said to be part of Afghanistan; that he had been told that it had been laid down in some European maps as a portion of the Afghan territory, but that he could not accept those maps as any proof whatever; and that, in a word, he should consider the invasion of Seistán by Dost Mahomed as a *casus belli* and oppose it by force."

Again in the summer of the following year (1863) it was rumoured that Dost Mahomed had ordered his son, Sirdar Mahomed Amin Khan, to proceed against Seistán, and that the expedition had only been relinquished in consequence of the Dost's death. The Persian Foreign Minister, Mirza Sayid Khan, expressed his conviction that the Afghans would, sooner or latter, renew the project and attempt to occupy Seistán. He added that the Persian Government considered that country to belong to the Persian dominions, of which it formed an integral part, and that they would not hesitate for a moment, should Afghan troops enter Seistán, to despatch a force against them. Mr. Alison observed that the sovereignty of Persia over Seistán had never been recognized by the British Government. Mirza Sayid replied that this was because there was no mention of Seistán in the Treaty with England. Persia would not forego her claims, but would maintain her right to Seistán even though hostilities with the Afghans should ensue.



During 1862-63, while the Dost was engaged in dealing with Herat, Persia was carrying on intrigues with the Seistán Chiefs. The following report by Mr. Taylour Thomson, dated 19th June 1863, furnishes some information on this head:—

“Kohendil Khan, a brother of Taj Mahomed\* Khan, who is the present ruler of Seistán, arrived in Teheran a short time ago.

\* Taj Mahomed's own account of this mission, and of the Persian authorities' attempts to get him to impede the siege of Herat, is as follows:—

“When Dost Mahomed Khan was besieging Herat, the Hisam-es-Sultani (Prince-Governor of Khorasan) wrote repeatedly to Taj Mahomed Khan to harass, as much as possible, the Kabul force, to cut off their supplies, and to allow them no repose. He declined to carry out the Prince's wishes, and even received an agent sent to him by Dost Mahomed Khan; but, when this was reported to the Persian Government, they despatched an agent selected by Ferokh Khan to prevent the Seistán Chief from coming to an understanding with the Afghan ruler. This agent brought presents and dresses of honor to Taj Mahomed Khan and the other Chiefs, and returned with assurances of his fidelity and devotion to the Shah.

“One of Taj Mahomed Khan's relatives having also been sent to Teheran, undertook to return to Seistán with Persian troops, and the Shah issued orders that the Kerni regiment should be despatched at once to that place; but Taj Mahomed Khan heard of the above arrangement in time to prevent its being carried out, and the Persian regiment was not allowed to move from Birjend, the Chief having explained that the arrival of Persian troops in Seistán would cause general alarm to spread amongst the population.”

It appears that his visit is in connection with the operations of Dost Mahomed Khan in Afghanistan, and it is probable that the line of conduct which the Chiefs of Seistán will shortly have to decide upon with respect to these proceedings will be very much influenced by the result of the communications which they are now holding with the Shah's Government.

“Since the murder of Ali Khan, the former Chief, several years ago, the Government of Seistán has been held by Taj Mahomed Khan, and during this period the Persian Government have continued, by affording him, from time to time, pecuniary aid, and by occasionally conferring dresses of honor upon the Chiefs, to exert a certain amount of influence indirectly over the principality. In return for these favors, the Seistán Chief had, I am informed, hoisted the Persian flag at the capital of Seistán;

but the Persian Government have never taken upon themselves any direct interference in the local government, nor have they exercised any real authority over that country. The proximity of the Kabul troops to the frontier of Seistán, and certain threats which have already been used by the Amir, have given rise to the belief that the place will shortly be annexed to Dost Mahomed Khan's possessions; and Taj Mahomed Khan has now sent his brother to Teheran in order that the nature of the connection now existing between Persia and the Seistán Chiefs may be more clearly defined, and that the material support, if any, which they may expect to receive from the Shah in case of an attack by the Dost, may be precisely ascertained. The Persian Ministers, who have treated Kohendil Khan with great kindness during his stay in this place, have given to him and his followers dresses of honor, and have granted a salary of 3,500 tomans to the Chief of Seistán, whom they have invited to visit Teheran. But, as far as I can learn, though they have been liberal in their promises of support to the Seistánis in the event of the Dost attempting to occupy their country, these promises have been of so vague and uncertain a character that it may be assumed that the object which they have in view at present, in their negotiations with the people of Seistán, is to encourage them to offer resistance to the Dost, without committing themselves to any formal engagement to support their cause by force of arms.”

**8. Views expressed by Her Majesty's Government on the Seistan question during the years 1861-63.**—The first extract to be made is from a despatch by Sir Charles Wood to the English Foreign Office. In view of the occurrences noted in the preceding paragraph Mr. Alison enquired whether Her Majesty's Government considered Seistán a Persian province. The India Office, to whom the question was referred, replied (September 1862) that Sir C. Wood did not

“see in the apprehensions of the Shah of Persia that Herat may fall to the besieging force of the Amir Dost Mahomed any reason for modifying the opinions which he has already expressed as to the inexpediency of interfering in the internal affairs of the Afghan States.”

With respect to the other statements in Mr. Alison's telegram, he considered that they were

“too vague to call for any action on the part of the British Government, under the terms of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paris; and, indeed, as regards Seistán, it does not appear from the records of this Office that the sovereignty of Persia over that disputed territory has ever been acknowledged by the British Government.”

The next extract is from a despatch by Lord Russell, dated 10th October 1862, to Mr. Alison. The Persian Minister to the Porte, then in London, had addressed the English Foreign Office an official note stating that

“as Dost Mahomed, not content with attacking Herat, required also the submission of Seistán, which is an integral part of Persia, the Shah now claims of Her Majesty's Govern-



ment the execution of the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857, which stipulates that 'in case of any violation of the Persian frontier by any of the States referred to above (*i.e.*, of Afghanistan), the Persian Government shall have the right, if due satisfaction is not given, to undertake military operations for the repression and punishment of the aggressors.'

"Lord Russell thereupon observed that as Her Majesty's Government do not recognize the sovereignty of Persia over Seistán, they cannot admit that the demand said to have been made by Dost Mahomed for the submission of Seistán constituted a case in which, under the 7th Article of the Treaty, they can be called upon to acquiesce in any military operations being undertaken by Persia against Afghanistan."

With No. 1 (Secret) of 18th March 1863, Sir C. Wood sent out fresh correspondence. The Persian Government had put certain fresh propositions before Mr. Eastwick at Teheran. Their tenor is summarized in the following reply, dated 11th March 1863, from the India Office, which had been consulted in the matter:—

"These propositions are three in number: the first request is, that the British Government should require Dost Mahomed to turn back from Herat 'leaving it to any one else, Persia cares not to whom, even to an imbecile and ill-disposed person like Saujid Mahomed, the son of Yar Mahomed.' With respect to this, I am directed to state that Sir Charles Wood is of opinion that so long as the operations of the Amir Dost Mahomed are confined to Afghan territory, the British Government is not called upon in any way to interfere. By the withdrawal of their agent from the Amir's camp, the Government of India have already indicated that they do not countenance the movement towards the Persian frontier; but, beyond this, Sir Charles Wood is not of opinion that it is incumbent on the British Government to take any steps of the kind indicated by the Persian Government.

"With respect to the second proposition, I am instructed to state that Sir Charles Wood is of opinion that it would not be expedient to add another Article to the Treaty of Paris 'guaranteeing to Persia the integrity of the frontier towards Afghanistan, as it at present stands.'

"The third proposition is, 'that Persia will be allowed now to make her preparations for war by levying troops and other suitable measures.' Upon this subject Sir Charles Wood can only observe that if Persia considers that her frontier is in danger, it does not appear to him that the British Government can properly object to her making internal preparations for its defence; but he thinks it might be as well to warn the Government of Persia that she must be careful not to suffer any aggressive movements into Afghan territory, or otherwise to provoke hostilities between the two countries. This would be beyond the case contemplated in Article VII of the Treaty of Paris."

On the 5th November 1863, Lord Russell wrote the important despatch giving permission to the Persians to assert their right to Seistán by force of arms. It was addressed to the Persian Minister in London and the terms were as follow:—

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter on the 20th ultimo, in which you call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the apprehended invasion of the territory of Seistán by the Afghans, and requesting that an assurance might be given to you that Her Majesty's Government would not permit any such invasion of Persian territory.

"I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government, being informed that the title to the territory of Seistán is disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline to interfere in the matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms."

At the time Lord Russell's despatch of November 1863 was written neither the Persian Minister in London nor his Government appear to have grasped the importance of the admission it conveyed. But in January 1864, Mr. Alison reported that the Persian Foreign Minister had informed him of the intention of the Shah's Government to send Mahomed Saleh Khan to Seistán, but that the Persian troops would not enter that province unless an aggressive movement were directed against it by the Afghans. The Persian Government was determined to resist any such movement, and they hoped that Shere Ali Khan, if he desired a further extension of his power and territory, would turn his attention to Bokhara and Turkistan in the north, instead of making any attempt to acquire possession of Seistán, which would only result in disastrous consequences to himself and his Government. Mr. Alison added—

"The Minister evinced some surprise that the Shah's Minister in London should have accepted in silence the communication respecting Seistán, enclosed in copy in Your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 25 of the 5th of November. Instructions had been forwarded to Mahmud Khan to reopen this question at the Foreign Office."

## 9. The Shah's memorandum of August 1865 regarding Seistan.—On the 28th August 1865\* the Shah personally handed to Mr. Alison

\* Mr. Alison, to Lord Russell, dated 20th August 1865. a memorandum on the subject of Seistán, which showed that His Majesty did not assent to the conclusion that the Persian title to Seistán was open to dispute. He held to the right of the Persian Government to appeal to British arbitration as provided by the Treaty of Paris and was by no means inclined to act upon the permission which Lord Russell's letter conveyed—

“Although the British Government consider Seistán as a disputed territory between Persia and Afghanistan, the Persian Government greatly regret that the British Government should have come to such a conclusion. Arguments in support of Persia's ownership of that country had lately been laid before the British Government; besides which, in order to remove any further doubt, Persia lost no time in notifying to that province that it belonged to her, and it is, in fact, clearly proved to be in her possession.

“But should the Afghans, now that they have got over the affair of Kandahar, attempt to meddle with Seistán, Persia will feel it her duty to consider such a proceeding just as if it were directed against Khorasan, or any other portion of her dominions, and will therefore be entitled to deal with it accordingly.

“A long time has not yet elapsed since Persia perceives, to her extreme joy, that the tissues of dispute have been cut asunder.

“If the British Government should state that their advice in endeavouring to restrain the ambitious aggressions of the Afghans would be fruitless, the faith which Persia has in the effect which such advice, firmly given, would produce on the minds of the Afghans, will still induce her to hope—nay, to feel certain—that such advice will be attended to.

“Should the British Government, therefore, also appreciate the present agreeable condition of things as regards that frontier, and the satisfactory state of their relations with Persia, and reciprocate the aversion felt by Persia to an opposite course, it would be highly desirable that they should not object to use their good offices with respect to the Afghans, so that through their friendly advice, Persia's hopes of maintaining Seistán in its present state may not be thwarted. The British Government would thus prevent a useless difficulty and endless complications.

“If England has really no interest in the suspicious and dangerous occurrences (in Afghanistan), and they will not affect her present or future policy, Persia will be at once relieved of all doubt, and will know what course to adopt.”

† From Mr. Alison, to the Viceroy, dated 21st August 1865.

On the 21st August, Mr. Alison telegraphed† as follows to the Viceroy:—

“The success of the Afghans at Kandahar has alarmed the King about Seistán. An early assurance, therefore, that you will dissuade Afghanistan from any aggression on that disputed territory, is desirable in every respect.”

‡ From Foreign Secretary, India, to Mr. Alison, dated 23rd August 1865.

Sir John Lawrence replied‡—

“So far as the Viceroy can judge, the Shah need be under no apprehension about Seistán. The Amir of Kabul has fully as much on his hands as he can manage in his own country.”

And in a subsequent despatch to the Secretary of State enclosing copy of the Shah's memorandum, Sir John expressed a similar opinion as to the absence of any design on the part of Shere Ali against Seistán.

## 10. Movements of Persian troops towards Seistan in 1865-67.—On the 26th October 1865,§

§ Mr. Alison, to Lord Clarendon, dated 10th January 1866. the Meshed correspondent wrote that, three days before, a regiment of cavalry, another of infantry, and two guns had started for Seistán by Kain, where they were to pick up four more regiments and four guns. These they were to take into the province, where they were to build a fortress.

Sir H. Green's account|| is that the Persian force (numbering 6,000 men with 12 guns) arrived in June 1866 under Saleh Mahomed Khan, Kurd Bacha, who commanded the escort which accompanied Ali Khan and his Kajar wife to Seistán in 1858. In July 1867 it was replaced by a force of 4,000 men with 12 guns under Mir Alum Khan of Kain.

|| To Government of India dated 13th November 1867.

In April 1866 the Governor of Kerman was also sent\* into Seistán, in

\* Mr. Alison, to Lord Clarendon, dated 7th May 1866

order (the Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Alison) to settle some differences between the Chief of that country (Ibrahim Khan?) and the Amir of Kain. But the Meshed correspondent (6th May) said he had come with six guns, four regiments, and 10,000 Kainis, whom he settled in the frontier, exacting revenue from the Afghan ryots.

"This Afghan frontier," he added, "was formerly under the power of Imam Khan, Afghan; but it has now come into the possession of the Kainis, and they have erected four large and strong forts in Seistán."

The news from Seistán was that the Amir of Kain had attacked Ibrahim Khan—

"who had been forced to evacuate the forts which he held on the left bank of the Helmund river, and had retired with his people to the right bank. The Persians had likewise crossed the Helmund, and had captured the fort of Nád Ali; and they now intended to attack Chakan-sur and other strongholds in Ibrahim Khan's possession."

Mr. Alison spoke on the subject to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said—

"That the Persian Ministers did not consider the Helmund to be their line of frontier in that direction. Seistán, he said, was divided into two districts—one, until lately, had been held by Taj Mahomed Khan, and the other by Ibrahim

From Sir C. Alison, to Lord Stanley, No. 107, dated 22nd October 1867.

Khan, Biluch. Both of these belonged to Persia, and were in no way connected with Afghanistan. And, as he was aware that Ibrahim Khan had for some time been refractory, it was not at all improbable, in the opinion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Amir of Kain might have advanced beyond the Helmund to restore order into that country."

Sir H. Green (9th December 1867) wrote that Ibrahim Khan had, as yet,

† Azam Khan's reply was that he was not sufficiently powerful to oppose the forces of Persia. He advised Ibrahim Khan to apply to some other power more able to afford him assistance. — (Sir H. Green, to Government of India, 9th January 1868.)

refused to pay allegiance to the Persians, and had applied to the *pro tem.* Amir of Kabul, Azam Khan, for assistance, but that this had been refused.†

The Persians had destroyed the fort of Sekoha, the capital in the time of Taj Mahomed, and many other small forts which might form centres of resistance, and were building a large fort themselves a little north of Sekoha.

The only tax levied by the Persians was said to be one head of cattle in every forty.

**11. Pretexts alleged for these movements.**—It is not all clear what precise circumstances led to the advance of Persian troops into Seistán. It was said that certain Afghan Chiefs intended to seize the opportunity of the Amir Shere Ali's temporary insanity to make a dash upon Seistán. It is more likely that the anarchy and disorder in Afghanistan tempted Persia to operate in Seistán. Another pretext assigned was that the Persians desired to retaliate upon Azad Khan of Kharan who had made a raid into Kain. The following account was given, in December 1867, to Mr. Thomson at Teheran by Taj Mahomed, who had been induced to visit the Shah at Teheran and then been detained as a political prisoner:—

"A quarrel took place between Ibrahim Khan, Biluch, and Taj Mahomed Khan, respecting some territory claimed by both, and

See enclosure of letter from Her Majesty's Minister in Persia, dated 23rd December 1867. (Political Proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 242-43, pages 5 and 6.)

shortly afterwards the people of Seistán made an incursion into the territory of Azad Khan, Biluch, whence they brought away a large amount of property. This was followed by an attack made

upon Kain in Persia by Azad Khan, who passed through a portion of Seistán to that place. Taj Mahomed Khan heard of this expedition, and had prepared his troops to intercept Azad Khan on his way back with his booty; but the latter was informed of this, and took another road. Intelligence of this reached the Sepah Salar, then Prime

† Who had been first sent into Seistán in 1858 as Commander of the Kajar Princess's escort, and who was again despatched towards Seistán early in 1864.

Minister of Persia, at the same time that the Persian Agent, Mahomed Saleh Khan,† arrived in Teheran from Seistán, somewhat dissatisfied with Taj Mahomed Khan's proceedings; and, he having been consulted in the

matter, it was decided to despatch troops to Seistán, and eight regiments were designated for this service. Taj Mahomed Khan's confidential agent, however, succeeded in explaining satisfactorily how the attack by Azad Khan had been made, and the part which the Seistán Chiefs had taken in the matter; and the Sepah Salar was persuaded to defer sending troops into Seistán, lest it should alarm the inhabitants and cause them to ally themselves with the Afghans. The Persian Minister was recommended, if he wished to occupy Seistán with Persian troops, to despatch some of his agents to the place to force the way by explaining to the Chiefs and people the reasons for their entering the Seistán territory; and this advice was followed. Mahomed Saleh Khan, Kurd Bacha, had this duty entrusted to him. He proceeded to Meshed with letters from the Sepah Salar to Taj Mahomed Khan, stating that the Persian Government proposed to despatch two regiments to Seistán, but that they had no other object in view than to support him against the Biluchis; that they had full confidence in him; and that the troops would be placed under his orders to act against Azad Khan and his people as he himself directed. Taj Mahomed Khan's brother, Kohendil Khan, was detained as a hostage in Teheran, though he was ostensibly treated as a guest; and Mahomed Saleh Khan, Kurd Bacha, meanwhile advanced to the frontier of Seistán

\* The Kernis are the tribe inhabiting the district of Turbet Ishak Khan, and this notice really means their tribal contingent. Similarly, the Ghazni regiment means the tribal contingent of the province of Ghazni.

with the Kerai regiment from Meshed and the Kaini\* regiment from Birjund. Thence he sent on a firman from the Shah and letters from the Sepah Salar explaining, as above, the object he had in view. Taj Mahomed Khan assented to his entering Seistán with the troops, but Ibrahim Khan declined to have anything to say to the Persians, and even withdrew from some forts which he occupied on the left bank of the Helmund to his own district on the left bank. The Persian officers did not interfere in any way with the Seistán people on their affairs at first, and whatever they required they paid for.

"Five regiments in all were marched into Seistán."

## 12. Ibrahim Khan seeks assistance from the British Government. Colonel Phayre's report.—On the 14th January 1869,

Political Proceedings for March 1869, No. 196.

Colonel Phayre reported that Ibrahim Khan had written to him, imploring British assistance against the Persians, who had already taken half his territory and were advancing day by day. Colonel Phayre learned from the Vakil who bore the letter that, within the last three or four years, Ibrahim Khan had been deprived by the Persians of the southern portion of his territory on the right bank of the Helmund, including the forts of Jalalabad, Jehanabad, and Nád Ali—the latter captured only a few months ago.

They then advanced along the Helmund to Hoseinabad, which was, Colonel Phayre showed,

"well selected, both for defence against the Seistán Biluch on the opposite bank, and for commanding the several lines of route that radiate from Seistán eastward, viz., that by Shorawak and the valley of the Lora, to the Pesbin valley and Quetta, and the kafila route to Nushki.

"The former of these two routes is well watered and supplied; the latter is desert, as described by Captain Christie in Pottinger's Travels in Biluchistan; but the difficulties are not insurmountable by a body of horse, if led with the determination of reaching the plains of Kutchi by Kelat and the Mulla Pass, thereby turning the Bolan altogether.

"Kafilas with wool and wheat frequently travel from Seistán to Nushki and Kharan at the present time.

"All the forts on or near the Helmund, between Hoseinabad and Deshtuk, have been captured, and either dismantled or occupied by detachments of Persian troops, according to their utility as links in the chain of rear communication.

"In short, the Persian is faithfully imitating the Russian mode of advance to the Oxus as well as the measures now under adoption by that Power to establish its river communication between Charjui and the Sea of Aral.

"Troops and material are transported from the north-western extremity of the lake from Persian territory into the Helmund, near Deshtuk, and thence up river to Hoseinabad.

"The boats used are at present of the rudest description, made of skins and mats. The Helmund is very deep throughout, and at Deshtuk 300 yards broad. It is usually crossed in rough rafts, or inflated skins. It will not take Persia long to remedy all this.

"The Biluch, on the other hand, having no means of navigating the lake, cannot interrupt the rear communication of their enemy. They are, in fact, driven into a desert tract

away from the Helmund. Ibrahim Khan's fort, however, of Chakansur is 120 miles north-north-west from Hoseinabad; and, being watered by the river Khash, he is better situated than some of his neighbours.

"The Wakil further states that only a few months ago the Persians commenced intriguing with a view to possessing themselves of Lash and Jowain, the important strongholds on the Furrah at the head of the lake; but that, on a representation made by Mir Shere Ali Khan to the Shah of Persia, to the effect that Sirdar Ahmed Khan, the Chief of Lash, was a feudatory of Kabul, and his territory a dependency of Herat, further attempts to gain possession of that strong position were abandoned."

Colonel Phayre further submitted—

"that, in a strategical sense, and with reference to the well-known ambition of Persia towards Afghanistan, her occupation of Hoseinabad is a flank movement of incalculable importance.

"By it, she completely turns Herat, Furrah, and Lash-Jowain—neutralizes them, in short, without endangering her rear communications.

"Politically speaking, she lays the axe at the root of Afghan neutrality and independence, because in Seistán she holds a more dominating position than her possession of Herat and Furrah would have afforded her.

"The occupation of Kheirabad, about 40 or 50 miles higher up the Helmund, during the present year, will greatly consolidate these well laid and ably executed plans; and there can be no doubt that such will take place, unless some powerful preventive be immediately interposed.

"The present information dispels at once the idea, so long prevalent, that impassable deserts interpose an insuperable barrier between Persia and Kelat. On the contrary, the facts under report show that from a base in Persian Khorasan, which is a highly productive country, a large army can advance by water for nearly 200 miles to Kheirabad, whence to Kandahar is only 150 miles, or the Bolan 230: both routes being well watered and supplied."

**13. Persian raid on Kandahar. Amir Shere Ali's representations in regard to Seistan.**—In the spring of 1869 the ex-Amir of Kabul, Azam Khan, and his nephew, Abdul Rahman, arrived at Rudbar on the Helmund, and there joined a large force of Seistáni horsemen favourable to Persian interests. This circumstance caused great excitement on the Biluchistan border, for it was believed that Persia, whose power in Seistán was now supreme, entertained aggressive designs upon Kelat. Mr. Alison communicated these rumours to the Shah, who denied all knowledge of, as well as participation in, the movements reported. About the same time, Sirdar Shere Ali Khan of Kandahar reported to the Amir that 3,000 Persian horse had raided in Kandahar territory and carried off 1,000 head of cattle and much property. He had addressed the Commandant, warning him that, unless restoration were made, trouble would ensue. He had thus secured partial restitution. At this moment the fugitive ex-Amir and Abdul Rahman had arrived on the scene, and induced the Commandant to restore the rest of the plunder, lest complications should ensue with the British Government, to whom, they said, the Amir Shere Ali had become subservient, and "had gone to make his bond to the Governor-General in Hindustan. This being so, Afghanistan had become a land of infidels, or out of the faith." The Amir Shere Ali thereupon represented the matter to the Government of India, and the Commissioner of Peshawur thus explained his object—

"Seistán was formerly included in Afghanistan, and for some time, owing to the rulers of Afghanistan having been unable to pay attention to that province, the Hakim of Seistán has acted independently. Now in consequence of Seistáni aggressions, the Amir desires, in event of Seistán being held to be separate from Persia in the Treaty executed between England and Persia, to recover that province and bring it under Afghanistan. The Amir will certainly introduce the subject on the occasion of his approaching interview with His Excellency the Viceroy."

The Government of India included mention of these aggressive movements in their despatch No. 178, dated 10th June 1869, on the general subject of Persia's encroachments to the eastward, and said—

"The Amir gives utterance to a very decided opinion that Seistán belongs to Afghanistan, and it appears to us possible that the Amir may attempt to put forward his claims to that tract of country whenever he may find a fitting opportunity."

Section 3 of despatch.



On the 12th June, Mr. Thomson wrote to the Viceroy, saying—

(1) that in the matter of the raid which, it was said, had lately been committed on Kandahar from Persian territory, the Shah's Government had written to the Amir of Kain, now Governor of Seistán—

“warning him to beware of doing anything which could give umbrage to the Afghans, or compromise the Persian Government in their relations with the Chief of that country;”

(2) that the Shah was made very uneasy by the news of the Viceroy's reception of Shere Ali at Ambala; that, though

“Shere Ali Khan had hitherto been a very good neighbour to Persia, and had on various occasions acted a friendly part in stopping the incursions of the Turkomans from the Herat line of frontier, it was almost certain that the reception given to him by the Viceroy, and the assistance in money and arms which he had lately obtained from the Government of India, would enable him, in a short time, to bring the whole of Afghanistan under his sway; and, knowing the character of the Afghan people, it was impossible for the Persian Government to overlook the probability that such an event might produce a marked change in his dealings with this country. The Shah would, therefore, feel greatly relieved if the Viceroy or Her Majesty's Government could give some assurance to the Persian Government, after the recent visit of Shere Ali Khan to Ambala, that he did not entertain any aggressive designs with regard to the Persian territory either in the province of Khorasan or in Seistán.”

Mr. Thomson added that

“the anxiety felt by the Persian Ministers was on account, not of the province of Khorasan, but of Seistán, where, of late years, they have obtained a position which, they fear, the Chief of Afghanistan may now be disposed to dispute.”

**14. Representations by Sirdar Afzal Khan, and instructions by the Amir Shere Ali.**—Towards the end of March 1869, Sirdar Afzal Khan, Governor of Furreh, wrote to Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Herat, narrating the hostile encroachments of Alum Khan, Amir of Kain and Persian Governor of Seistán; his attacks on Chakansur, which was clearly within Afghan territory; his raid of 1868 when he lifted 200 camels belonging to Kandaharis; his two recent raids when he lifted 800 and 400 camels more; and the probable loss of Ahmed Khan's forts in the Lash-Jowain country.

The Persian Government's attention was by telegram drawn to this. Mr. Alison (17th May) telegraphed, in reply, that no authority had been given for any raid of the kind, and that all knowledge of any such movement was denied.

Political A., Proceedings, June 1869, Nos. 368-69, page 4.

The Amir's instructions in the matter to Afzal Khan, of Furreh, were as follows:—

“Your views about the fort of Chakansur are quite correct, but Chakansur is a place only in a country, and the real question relates to all Seistán, which from of old belonged, and belongs, to the Afghans. You have to consider this. This garrison which holds Chakansur under orders of Alum Khan, holds a post inside Afghanistan. Seistán was, and is, ours, and we do not, and will not, give it up. You should discuss this with Amir Alum Khan, so that ostensibly terms should remain between you, but in such a manner as to prevent further aggression, and to guard against their getting any pretext out of what you say for announcing—‘Very good, Chakansur is yours, but Seistán ours.’ I am interesting myself in this question of territory, and am writing to the English Government. As you are not in such strength as you should be, temporize with Amir Alum Khan and preserve your ‘purdā.’ When my army is in order, we can then talk of this matter to the Governor of Meshed and Shah of Persia; for the Shah's family has, of old, behaved kindly to my family, and, by God's blessing, no one shall interfere with Afghan border, and they (Persians) will relinquish the tract under dispute.”

**15. Apprehensions by Persia arising out of the Ambala Durbar.** Mr. Thomson's summary of the position.—In January 1870, Mr. Thomson wrote to Lord Clarendon that the Persian Government feared an attack by the Afghans on Seistán—a movement which the Persians believed had been decided on by the Amir immediately after the Ambala Durbar. Persia announced to Mr. Thomson her firm resolve to resist all encroachment on her territory. Seistán was considered to form as much an integral part of that territory as Khorasan or Kerman, and any attempt at aggression by the Afghans in that quarter would lead to open hostilities.



Afghanistan might seize Seistán by a *coup de main*, as there was but a small Persian force in the province; but then this would be an act of open warfare, which would be resented either by opposition in Seistán, or by an attack on Herat, where the Afghans could be met on more advantageous terms.

"The claims (Mr. Thomson remarked) of the Persians and Afghans to the disputed territory of Seistán have been frequently brought forward and considered during the last ten years, and, in 1862, the question presented itself under circumstances very similar to those now anticipated by the Persian Minister. Dost Mahomed Khan then threatened to attack Seistán, and the Persian Government claimed of Her Majesty's Government the execution of the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857, which stipulates that, 'in case of any violation of the Persian frontier by any of the States referred to above (*i.e.*, of Afghanistan), the Persian Government shall have the right, if due satisfaction is not given, to undertake military operations for the repression and punishment of the aggression.' The decision of Her Majesty's Government, communicated to Mr. Alison in Lord Russell's despatch No. 80 of the 30th of October, was to the effect that, as they did not recognize the sovereignty of Persia over Seistán, they could not admit that the demand said to have been made by Dost Mahomed Khan for the submission of Seistán constituted a case in which, under the 7th Article of the Treaty, they could be called upon to acquiesce in any military operations being undertaken by Persia against Afghanistan.

"During the following year, in consequence of an apprehended invasion of the Seistán territory by the Afghans, the Persian Government again claimed that an assurance might be given that Her Majesty's Government would prevent any such invasion of Persian territory; and the Shah's Minister in London was informed by Lord Russell, in a despatch dated November 5th, 1863, that Her Majesty's Government, being advised that the title to the territory of Seistán was disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline to interfere in the matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms."

Knowing, therefore, that the Persian Minister was fully acquainted with the views of the English Government, as given in the two despatches above mentioned, Mr. Thomson thought that it was a sufficient reply to tell the Persian Minister what had been really said to Shere Ali at Ambala.

The Minister replied—

"That so many alarming reports were spread with regard to the alliance which the Afghans were supposed to have formed with England, that it was re-assuring to learn what the real attitude of Her Majesty's Government in India was towards that country; but he hoped that the British Government would recommend Shere Ali Khan to abstain from any hostile movement upon Seistán, as their advice would not, he believed, be disregarded by him, and it might obviate future complications with reference to Herat, and tend to promote a friendly understanding between Persia and the Court of Kabul."

At the end of March, the Shah personally made the following representation to Mr. Thomson. It will be observed that His Majesty so far abandoned the position taken up in his memorandum quoted in paragraph 9 of this précis, as to claim that Persia had full liberty to act upon the permission conveyed in Lord Russell's letter of November 1863. Nevertheless he desired again to appeal to the British Government to interpose and use their influence to restrain the Afghans:—

"He declared that Persia sincerely desired to maintain friendly relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, but that she was resolved to resist any aggression upon Seistán, which was as much Persian territory as Khorasan or Kerman. Any attempt made by the Afghans to occupy that province would lead to open hostilities, and the Persian Government would consider themselves fully justified in opposing such a movement by despatching troops to attack the Amir within the Herat territory. His Majesty argued that, in adopting this course, the Persian Government would only be acting in conformity with the decision communicated by Earl Russell to the Persian Minister in London in November 1863, when the latter was informed that, the title to Seistán being disputed between the Afghans and Persians, Her Majesty's Government would leave it to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms. His Majesty seems very desirous to know how the proposal to act in this manner would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government.

"I endeavoured to ascertain what had actually taken place in Seistán, and whether any collision had occurred between the Afghans and the Persian troops; but His Majesty had either not been fully informed by the Amir of Kain, the Persian Governor of Seistán, as to recent events in that quarter, or he did not feel disposed to enter further on the subject. He merely said that the last reports which had reached him from Seistán showed that the Amir of Kain had been attacked by Ibrahim Khan, the Biluch Chief, and that it was supposed this aggression had been instigated and abetted by the Afghan authorities at Furrah.

"I remarked that letters recently received from Meshed alluded to a raid having been successfully carried out by the Amir of Kain in the neighbourhood of Furrah and within the

Afghan territory, by which a considerable quantity of booty had been secured ; that application had been made for redress to the Prince-Governor of Khorasan, who had taken measures to have a portion of the property restored, and some of the plunderers given up ; and that, in consequence of that expedition, further hostilities had very recently taken place between the people of Furrah and the Persian troops in Seistán. Considering the moment favorable for calling His Majesty's attention to the late proceedings of the Persian authorities in Kerman, and the threatening attitude assumed by them along the Mekran line of frontier, I said that all military movements, either for hostile purposes or for intimidation, such as those attributed to the Amir of Kain, in Seistán, and to Ibrahim Khan of Bunpur, in connection with the Khan of Kelat's territory, could not be too strictly interdicted, as the assurances given by the Persian Ministers showed that they were not authorized by the Shah, and they might at any moment lead to complications of a very serious nature.

" His Majesty replied that orders had already been sent to Seistán to prevent any such movements taking place in future without express authority given from Teheran, and that fresh instructions would be again forwarded to the same effect.

" Matters, however, looked so threatening now on the Afghan frontier, that he feared an attack might be made on Seistán at any moment by Shere Ali Khan, and he desired, therefore, that I would at once forward a telegram to Your Lordship stating what his apprehensions were, and appealing to Her Majesty's Government to interpose and use their influence to restrain the Afghan Chief from invading or interfering with that territory. His Majesty hoped that Her Majesty's Government would accede to this request, and he felt convinced that any advice tendered to the Amir by them would not be disregarded by the ruler of Afghanistan."

**16. Proposals for submitting the Seistan question to the arbitration of the British Government.**—On the 19th March 1870, Mohsin Khan, the Persian representative in London, addressed Lord Clarendon regarding the designs of the Afghans on Seistán. He said that, after Lord Russell's letter of 5th November 1863, Persia had *re-taken* possession of that province, and had not ceased from that moment to consider it as forming an integral part of the *interior of Khorasan*. The Shah had firmly resolved to oppose Afghan aggression on Seistán, and he begged that Her Majesty's Government would warn the Afghans of the disastrous consequences which would follow hostilities on their part.

Lord Clarendon (25th March),\* in reply, said that Mr. Thomson had been

\* The proposal to submit the matter to arbitration arose earlier than this ; and was started by the Indian Office, as appears from the papers sent with Mr. Kaye's Secret letter No. 46, dated 24th June 1870.

Lord Clarendon, it appears therefrom, wrote to Mr. Thomson on the 24th February that Mohsin Khan had urged that the Indian Government should use its influence with Shere Ali to check his intended assertion of Afghan claims in Seistán, a province in which a Persian Governor was already established. The India Office then (21st February) said that if the Shah was willing to submit the matter to arbitration under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty, a communication would be made to the Governor-General of India, in order to procure Shere Ali's acquiescence.

Lord Russell's announcement that England would allow the question of sovereignty in the province to be decided by force of arms—

" les armes ont décidé a notre faveur, et depuis cinq ans le Seistán fait partie integrante de notre province du Khorasan, par consequent, il ne saurait relever de l'article VI de notre Traité de Paris."

Lord Clarendon replied that, until the nature of the Persian reply to the offer of British arbitration was known, Her Majesty's Government could not determine what course to pursue. The passage cited from Mohsin Khan's

told to offer British arbitration on the question of the sovereignty of Seistán under Article VI of the Treaty of 1857, and that, if Persia consented, the Viceroy of India would be asked to obtain Shere Ali's acquiescence.

On the 5th April, Mohsin Khan renewed his request that the British Government should intervene to restrain Shere Ali from acts of aggression on Seistán. He observed that after

letter appears to admit that, prior to the spring of 1865, Seistán was not an integral part of Persian territory. The reluctance to apply the provisions of Article VI† to the case should also be noted.

#### ARTICLE VI.

† His Majesty the Shah of Persia agrees to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat and the countries of Afghanistan, and never to demand from the Chiefs of Herat, or of the countries of Afghanistan, any marks of obedience, such as the coinage, or " Khootbeh," or tribute.

His Majesty further engages to abstain hereafter from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. His Majesty promises to recognise the independence of Herat and of the whole of Afghanistan, and never to attempt to interfere with the independence of those States.

In case of differences arising between the Government of Persia and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan, the Persian Government engages to refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to take up arms unless those friendly offices fail of effect.

The British Government, on their part, engage at all times to exert their influence with the States of Afghanistan, to prevent any cause of umbrage being given by them, or by any of them, to the Persian Government ; and the British Government, when appealed to by the Persian Government, in the event of difficulties arising, will use their best endeavours to compose such differences in a manner just and honourable to Persia.

**17. Persian Government accept conditional arbitration. Their memorandum dated 19th April 1870.**—On the 20th April, Lord Clarendon received a telegram from Mr. Thomson saying that

“ the Persian Government, although they considered that the question of Seistán was settled according to purport of Lord John Russell’s despatch, yet, having full reliance on the justice of the British Government, they are willing to make Her Majesty’s Ministers arbiters in the matter of the sovereignty and boundaries of Seistán, in order that nothing may occur to disturb tranquillity on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, provided that Lord John Russell’s despatch remains in full force. The despatch referred to is that of 5th November 1863, from Lord John Russell to the Persian Minister in London.”

In a letter 22nd April Mr. Thomson narrated the course of the negotiations which he had conducted since receiving Lord Clarendon’s letter dated 24th February.\* The Persians had been

\* See marginal note to preceding paragraph.

indisposed to agree to the proposed arbitration, or to admit that their title could in any way be called in question. They contended that the British Government having decided to recognize as owner the party that made good its title by taking possession, Persia had fulfilled this condition. She had exercised sovereign rights over the whole territory for the last ten years, and could not now be expected to place her title in doubt by referring the question to arbitration. At last Mr. Thomson secured the consent of the Persian Government to the terms mentioned in his telegram above cited, which transcribes *verbatim* a written statement handed to him by Mirza Saeed Khan. This written statement is referred to in the later correspondence as the Persian Memorandum of 19th April.

**18. Correspondence between the Government of India, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Alison, as to the precise basis on which the Persian Government had accepted arbitration.**—On the 27th April 1870 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy—

“ The Persian Government are willing to submit the question of Seistán sovereignty and boundary to British arbitration. Ascertain whether Kabul Amir agrees to this. It is desirable that he should do so.”

The Viceroy replied on the 14th May—

“ Amir will naturally expect that arbitrator of Seistán boundary be appointed by Indian Government, or, if there be two, that one at least should be an Indian officer of our selection. It is necessary that this be decided before we communicate with Amir.”

The question then arose—what was the meaning of the reference by the Persian Government to Lord Russell’s despatch dated 5th November 1863. This point had not been overlooked at home. It was discussed by Mr. Thomson, Lord Clarendon, and the Duke of Argyll, all of whom agreed that the practical bearing of the acceptance by the Persian Government was the same as if they had simply agreed to arbitration in accordance with the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paris. For that Article also provided that, if the friendly offices failed of effect, Persia might take up arms. But this interpretation did not commend itself to the Government of India, and upon receipt of the papers they telegraphed (26th May)—

“ Your despatch No. 26 of 22nd April. It appears to us, from Mr. Thomson’s telegram

† They added subsequently that Mr. Thomson’s letter dated 24th March confirmed their opinion. to Lord Clarendon of 19th April,† that Persian Government do not accept the arbitration of Her Majesty’s Government in the sense and on the basis suggested by you, and offered by Lord Clarendon in his letter to Mr. Thomson of February 24th.

“ You offer the Treaty of 1857 as basis. Persia appears to take as basis Lord Russell’s despatch of November 5th, 1863. This view confirmed by letter of Persian Minister in London of April 5th.

“ We think we cannot invite Amir to accept arbitration on any other basis except that laid down by you and offered by Lord Clarendon in Foreign Office letter of 24th February, i.e., Treaty of Paris.”

The Secretary of State replied—

"It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the acceptance by Persia of British arbitration in matter of Seistán is according to Mr. Thomson's telegram of 19th April, and that the reservation made is practically in conformity with provision of 6th Article of Treaty of 1857, which admits of Persia taking up arms in the event of friendly offices failing to have effect."

Not satisfied with this explanation, the Viceroy telegraphed to Mr. Alison asking him to explain what Persia meant by the proviso that Lord Russell's despatch remained in full force, while, at the same time, she referred the question both of sovereignty and boundary to arbitration? What was the effect of this proviso on Lord Clarendon's original proposal, and what did Persia really mean by it? Mr. Alison replied on the 20th June—

"Persia really means by the proviso that she possesses half of Seistán, and does not intend to submit that to arbitration; but that she will submit to arbitrate the other half, which she claims but does not possess."

\* From Viceroy, to Mr. Alison, dated 20th June 1870.

And, in answer to an inquiry\* as to the approximate limits of the half of Seistán which Persia refused to submit to arbitration, he replied †—

† From Mr. Alison, to the Viceroy, dated 23rd June 1870.

"The Persian Government claims Seistán territory up to the Hirmend (Helmund) river, including Sekoba; the other half comprise all territory on the other bank, including Chakansur, Nád Ali, and the territory under Ibrahim Khan, Biluchi."

The Persians (Mr. Alison reported to the Viceroy, 14th June) held that the principle laid down in Lord Russell's despatch conferred a moral sanction upon their possession of that part of Seistán which they held: though they disclaimed any intention of engaging in hostilities with Afghanistan on the strength of it. They thought it hard that they should submit to arbitration that which they actually possessed.

In a later letter of 18th June he reported to the Viceroy a communication which the Shah had made through the Foreign Minister:—

"Since sixty years Persia had acquired a moral ascendancy over Seistán, and since the last seven had, with much labor and expense, obtained possession of one-half of it. She had taken no measures to acquire possession over the other half bordering on the Afghan frontier, being 'unwilling to risk hostilities with that people, and give rise to complications which would cause trouble to the English Government. They were not, however, without hopes of getting possession of that also on some future day."

The Government of India then repeated to the Secretary of State the above cited telegraphic correspondence with Mr. Alison and added—

"We cannot propose to Amir to arbitrate on basis laid down by Persia, as Amir claims portion of Seistán which Persia excludes from arbitration." (Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 29th June.)

**19. Further reference to the Shah, Mr. Alison's report thereon, and instructions issued by Lord Granville.**—The action taken by the home authorities on this telegram from the Government of India was as follows. At the suggestion of the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Alison was desired (8th July) to ascertain whether the Shah's Government would accept arbitration on the basis described in the following draft:—

"Her Majesty's Government propose that Colonel Goldsmid should make every exertion to determine the rights and to reconcile the claims of the Persian and Afghan Governments in Seistán. He could ascertain, by enquiry on the spot, how far Persia is justified in assuming to have acquired a right under the operation of Lord Russell's letter to the half of Seistán south of the Helmund which she claims."

The Shah, however, pretended to regard this proposal as meaning that a British Commissioner should be sent to Seistán "to act conjointly with an officer of the Persian Government in defining the line of frontier in Seistán regarding that part which was, and that which was not, occupied by Persia." He desired to know, first, the name of the British officer whom it was proposed to employ, and who should, he said, visit Teheran first, and have a personal interview with himself.

Enclosure in Mr. Alison's letter No. 32, dated 20th July, to Lord Granville.

Enclosure in Mr. Alison's letter No. 32, dated 20th July, to Lord Granville.

Mr. Alison told the Persian Foreign Minister that Colonel Goldsmid would act on the part of England in the Seistán arbitration, and that he would come out if the Shah accepted the basis set forth in his (Mr. Alison's) memorandum of 9th July. The upshot was that Mr. Alison telegraphed as follows to Lord Granville on the 24th July:—

Enclosure in Mr. Alison's letter No. 32, dated 20th July, to Lord Granville.

"Persia agrees that an English and Persian Commissioner should proceed to Seistán to inspect and make a map of Persia's actual possessions, and return here with it. Great Britain would then arbitrate on the principle laid down in the Persian memorandum of April 19th.

"Said Commissioners would then proceed to map Persian possessions in Biluchistan and those of Kelat and boundaries, and return here when that question would be settled with the knowledge of the British Government."

On receipt of this, Lord Granville telegraphed on the 28th July to Mr. Alison—

"Colonel Goldsmid will proceed at once to Teheran. Persian Commissioner must be ready to set out with him for the Seistán frontier, when notice will have been given to the Afghan Commissioner to meet them. When the three are together, it will be for the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, respectively, to state and substantiate their claims, and if local enquiry is necessary, they may proceed to any point and take a map of any districts; the two Commissioners will then set forth the conclusions which they maintain, and Colonel Goldsmid having weighed evidence and arguments, will submit an arbitral opinion to the Persian and Afghan Governments."

**20. Despatches from the Government of India on the subject of the proposed arbitration.**—Immediately after issue of the telegram noted at the end of paragraph 18, the Government of India forwarded the following despatch No. 39, dated 1st July 1870, to the Secretary of State. The main facts and documents in their possession at the time it was written were, first, that the Persian Government was willing to submit to arbitration the question of Seistán sovereignty and boundary (Secretary of State's telegram, dated 27th April), secondly, copy of the written Persian memorandum, dated 19th April, materially qualifying that consent by the stipulation that Earl Russell's despatch should remain in full force, and, thirdly, Mr. Alison's admission that Persia only consented to arbitration regarding that portion of Seistán which she claimed but did not possess. The Government of India proposed that the Commissioners' investigation should extend over the whole of Seistán on the basis of ancient right and present possession leaving the final decision to be pronounced by Her Majesty's Government as arbiters:—

"It appears to us that much misunderstanding has arisen from the reference made in this matter to Earl Russell's letter. In reality, that letter conferred on Persia no right which she did not already possess under the Treaty of 1857. By Article VI of that Treaty, Persia engages, in the event of differences arising with Afghanistan, to refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to take up arms unless those friendly offices fail of effect. Earl Russell's letter, in declining to interfere in the dispute regarding Seistán, appears to us merely to remove the restriction placed by the Treaty upon recourse to arms. It permitted an appeal to arms under the provisions of the Treaty, and, in fact, authorized a state of war. During the weakness of Afghanistan, Persia took possession of a portion of Seistán under cover of that letter, and she now wishes to exclude that portion from arbitration. But, if Earl Russell's letter is to continue in force, we should be prevented from interfering were the Amir of Kabul now to avail himself of the permission therein given, and endeavour to recover by force of arms that portion of Seistán which Persia has occupied.

"It must be borne in mind that the Amir was not a party to the Treaty of Paris, and, seeing that he refers to it as having been concluded in 1860, we think it doubtful whether he has ever seen it, or has any definite knowledge of its provisions. But, whatever his information regarding the Treaty of 1857 may be, he has certainly no knowledge of the terms, or even the existence, of Earl Russell's letter, of which a copy appears to have been communicated to the Government of India for the first time in your Secret despatch No. 26, dated 22nd April last. It is not, therefore, to be expected that the Amir will acquiesce in the permanent occupation of the half of Seistán under the terms of a letter of which he has never heard. The proposal, therefore, is one which we do not feel it desirable to make to him. As we have already observed, the Amir distinctly claims that part of Seistán which the Persian Government refuse to submit to arbitration; and a reference to the various diaries, forwarded from our Agent in Kabul during the last eight months, will show that he is not prepared quietly to submit to the Persian occupation of it. In one of the latest communications we have received, it is stated that the Amir has hitherto abstained from taking his own measures only in the hope of the quarrel being amicably settled through our intervention. His



Highness,' it is stated, 'desires that if these complaints be adjusted by the English Government, well and good; otherwise, on receipt of a reply, or their advice, he will adopt measures for the disposal of Seistán matters, and the prevention of raids against the Afghans, as His Highness considers Seistán his property, and is not inclined to give it up.

"For these reasons, we are strongly of opinion that, if the disputes between Persia and Afghanistan regarding Seistán are to be referred to arbitration—a measure which we consider to be most desirable in the true interests of both Governments—it is essential that the question of the sovereignty of the entire province should be submitted for decision on grounds both of ancient right and of present possession. In considering the question of title, full weight must, of course, be given to the fact of present possession, the nature of the occupation, and the length of time during which it has continued; all of which are very material considerations, and are, under certain circumstances, sufficient to override claims drawn merely from ancient right. It is not for us, before the Commissioners have investigated and reported the facts of the case, to pronounce any opinion on the nature and effects of the occupation of any part of the country either by Afghanistan or by Persia. These are points which it will be for Her Majesty's Government, as arbiters, to decide when the facts are before them.

"On this understanding, we are prepared to invite the Amir to submit the case to the arbitration of Her Majesty's Government in the terms of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paris without proviso or reservation. Among the enclosures of this despatch will be found the draft of a letter which we propose to address to His Highness on the subject."

And in despatch No. 41, dated 7th July, the Government of India conveyed in the following words its views as to the ill-results to be apprehended from encroachments of Persia up the Helmund:—

"As observed in our despatch of 1st July, it will be for the Commissioners to lay the facts of the case fully before Her Majesty's Ministers, who, as arbiters, will decide the question of right and title between the disputants. We would here only draw special attention to the fact that the occupation of part of Seistán up to the Helmund by Persia during the last few years, appears to have been accomplished by way of stealthy advance and gradual encroachment during the troubles in Afghanistan, rather than by an open assertion of her right by force of arms.

"In a strategic point of view, the advance of Persia along the fertile valley of the Helmund is a far more formidable menace to Afghanistan than her advance upon Herat, which the British Government has spent so much blood and money to counteract, and which was finally checked by the Treaty of Paris of March 1857. If hostilities between Persia and Afghanistan were to be permitted, while we do not overlook the serious danger that would arise to Afghanistan from the machinations of disaffected subjects and refugees who would make common cause with Persia, we are fully persuaded that the Amir would strain every nerve to recover all that he has lost in Seistán, and might probably succeed in driving the Persians from the province. He is fully alive to the danger which threatens him from the position which Persia occupies on the Helmund. From the Kabul Diary for the 18th to 21st March 1870, Your Grace will observe that the Amir remarked to our Agent—'troops from Seistán *viâ* Helmund can come to Kandahar without any hill or other impediments. This fact is well ascertainable by the British authorities if they refer to (Afghanistan) maps.'

"The dangers to Afghanistan are well described in the extract from our Proceedings for March 1869, No. 196, which we quote in the margin. Persia will obtain for herself,

"In a strategical sense, and with reference to the well-known ambition of Persia towards Afghanistan, her occupation of Hosenabad is a flank movement of incalculable importance.

"By it she completely turns Herat, Furrâh, and Lash-Jowin—neutralizes them, in short, without endangering her rear communications.

"Politically speaking, she lays the axe at the root of Afghan neutrality and independence, because in Seistán she holds a more dominating position than her possession of Herat and Furrâh would have afforded her.

"The occupation of Kheirabad, about 40 or 50 miles higher up the Helmund during the present year, will greatly consolidate these well laid and ably executed plans; and there can be no doubt that such will take place, unless some powerful preventive be immediately interposed."

"The present information dispels at once the idea so long prevalent, that impassable deserts interpose an insuperable barrier between Persia and Kelat. On the contrary, the facts under report show that from a base in Persian Khorasan, which is a highly productive country, a large army can advance by water for nearly 200 miles to Kheirabad, whence to Kandahar is only 150 miles or the Bolan 230—both routes being well watered and supplied."

but, at best, a stream arbitrarily dividing the people on either bank, who are of the same race, language, and creed, and who are divided by no national or tribal distinctions.

"While we admit that the dispute between Persia and Afghanistan must be settled according to the rights and reasonable expectations of both parties, we are strongly of opinion that, when facts in support of right are at all doubtful, the policy which we have for so many years



pursued, of securing the independence of Afghanistan, and the provinces dependent on it, against the encroachments of Persia, should be allowed full weight in the consideration of the case. Whatever may be the result of arbitration in respect to the portion of Seistán which Persia has recently occupied, we think it would be most undesirable that Persia should be allowed to cross the Helmund at any point, and we consider it absolutely essential to the security of Afghanistan that, from the points where the river turns into the territories now in the possession of Afghanistan, the Amir's possession of both banks of the river should be maintained. Further than this, so far as consistent with the facts that may be elicited by the enquiries of the Commissioners, we would desire to re-assert and maintain our former policy regarding that part of Seistán up to the Helmund on which Persia has within the last few years encroached. This policy was clearly enunciated in Lord Malmesbury's despatch to Colonel Sheil, dated October 27th, 1852, when he announced the distinct determination of Her Majesty's Government not to allow 'any systematic attempt on the part of Persia to effect a change in the state of possession in the countries lying between the Persian frontier and the British territories in India.' It was repeated after the war of 1856, when Lord Cowley, then engaged in negotiating the treaty of peace, told the Persian Plenipotentiary that Her Majesty's Government were 'determined that Persia should not disturb the existing state of the tribes on the eastern frontier.' These declarations were clearly intended to bar the encroachments of Persia, not only on territory then undoubtedly belonging to the Afghans, but also on all territories and tribes to the eastward not at that time under Persian dominion, including Seistán, part of which is now in the Persian occupation, and the whole of which is claimed as an integral part of the Persian province of Khorasan."

**21. Remarks by Sir R. Temple and Lord Mayo on the Seistan question.**—On the 19th July 1870, Sir R. Temple recorded the following observations on two points arising out of the Seistán question which struck him as specially important. These were—(1) that strong British interests were involved in the matter; (2) that the claim of Persia to Seistán might be disputed with much effect. Lord Mayo's criticism of Sir R. Temple's remarks is given in the foot-note.

"Firstly, then, as regards the British interest in the case.

"The Seistán territory consists of two parts—one north of the Helmund, the other south of that river. It is not the northern part so much as the southern which is concerned in this discussion. Of the southern part the principal place is Sekoha. It is clear that Persia is at Sekoha in more or less force. This\* place is 270 miles from Kandahar. The line of march is capital for those regions lying along the valley of the Helmund, with villages at very frequent intervals. Further up the Helmund is Seinabad, also pertaining to Seistán

\* I have taken the following distances from Ferrier's map. They are not more than approximately correct.—(Sd.) R. T.

The Amir of Ghain (Kain) is, I believe, the nominal Governor of Seistán. So far, no regular troops have been despatched to his assistance. He has been able to take and hold all he has in this province without them. In this spring, however, two regiments of infantry were in Meshed, supposed to be *en route* to Sekoha. The officers of these regiments were doing all they could in offering large bribes (which, I believe, is the regular procedure in Persia to avoid bad quarters) to escape being sent there, as the climate has an infamous reputation. In consequence, late in the spring I believe orders had been received by these regiments to stand fast, as the Shah had determined to send back Taj Mahomed to govern the province under the Amir of Ghain. In this case it was hoped the Biluchis would cease to be troublesome.

It is said that the Amir of Ghain evades all summonses to Teheran. He is said also to be so powerful and popular, that, save by destroying him, it would be impossible for the Persian Government to punish him. He is said to have acted to a great extent of his own notion, and, I believe, against the wishes of the Persian Government. Nevertheless, he is decidedly in favor, as shown by the recent titles bestowed upon him and the great extension of his government and power.

When the Government of Herat first complained of Mir Alum's proceedings to Humza Mirza, the latter ordered the Mir to desist; he, however, refused to obey orders from the Prince, or any one save from the King himself; and there the matter rested.

On a subsequent occasion another report spread that Humza Mirza was going towards Merv, and that another Prince would be deputed for enquiry into the affairs of Ghain.

The accounts of two parties which have visited that part of the country found men's minds disturbed with a rumour of an advance from the side of Sekoha up the Helmund, and one party learned at Bakwa that a portion of Mir Alum's raiders came from Sekoha and along the desert intervening between the Helmund and the Khawh road.

They also heard of the collection of the tribal contingents along the Persian border. The positive denial given by the first party to the existence of any military occupation of Sekoha, or military movements towards Mekran and the territories of Kelat, is supported and explained by the second party.

All that Persia is now supposed to be doing is permitting the aggression of the frontier Chiefs—the Chiefs of Ghain, Bunpur, Duzzak, &c., with their tribal followings—upon their neighbours.

The actual extent of Mir Alum's occupation up the Helmund was not ascertained, or whether he really has possession of Seinabad or not. In October last it was concluded he had not, and it is improbable that, with all the troubles that have thickened on him since, he should have subsequently acquired such a possession.

Seinabad is completely without the limits of the district of Sekoha, and is hostile to Mir Alum Khan, and may be regarded, therefore, as within Garmsel, *i.e.*, a nominal dependency of Kandahar.

(apparently Hoseinabad), 70 miles from Sekoha, and 70 miles nearer to Kandahar. In other words, Hoseinabad is about 200 miles from Kandahar. The route from Hoseinabad to Kandahar is equally good as from Sekoha. It is clear that Persia has made attempts on Hoseinabad: whether she is in any force there, or in any possession, seems to be not so certain.

"In comparison with this I find that the distance from Herat to Kandahar by Furrah must be more than 350 miles, perhaps nearly 400; and the route is probably not so good as those routes which run by the Helmund. There is a somewhat shorter route from Herat to Kandahar by Shahguz Wazir and Girishk, but Farrier tried it and found it very bad.

"Hence it follows that, at either Sekoha or at Hoseinabad, Persia would be in a far more dominant position as regards Kandahar than she would be if she were at Herat.

"A similar remark applies as regards Quetta and Kelat and the British frontier in Sind. At Sekoha or at Hoseinabad, Persia would be nearer by 250 miles to Kelat and Sind than if she were at Herat. Indeed, Hoseinabad is a peculiarly favorable point for commanding the routes from Western Afghanistan to Sind.

"Further, Hoseinabad by the Kandahar route would be distant 500 miles, or a little more, from Kabul, and Sekoha would be distant 570. The route would be, of course, comparatively good.

"Now, the distance from Herat to Kabul by the straightest line would be 450 miles, and by any other of the several lines would be much more. Thus, on the whole, if Persia were established in force in southern Seistan, she would be, even as regards Kabul, in a position as good as, or even better than, if she were at Herat.

"But, if these topographical facts be at all correct, the bare statement of them suffices to show the strong interest which our British Government have in the matter.

---

Though our first party found the Chief of Seisnabad, Naib Ali Azam Khan, practically independent, it is certain that in 1846 the limit of Kandahar fell short of Seisnabad by some 20 miles; yet, on the whole, it may be assumed that the occupation of Seisnabad would be considered by all parties as an aggression on Shere Ali Khan, and it was everywhere distinctly denied to our party that any such had been committed or even contemplated; in fact, our party heard everywhere in Persia during the last spring that it did not occur to any one that the recent action in Sekoha could be construed into any aggression against Shere Ali himself, save at Meshed, where the British news-writer told our friends that Shere Ali's pretensions were very large and indefinite, viz., that he claimed Sekoha—a claim which practically might include Ghain and Birdjan; and, unless the Shah could restrain the Biluchis by force of arms, those districts would remain uninhabitable, and the roads from Meshed from the south-west impassable. In short, our party declares that, with the exception of the news-writer at Meshed, no one seemed to be aware of Shere Ali's claim to Seistan.

The Elyats, who live in great numbers all along the road from Turbut Ishak Khan to Seragun, some miles south of Tun, were the principal sufferers by the Jamshedi incursions, the last of which had happened only a few days before our party arrived, and had swept away all their cattle, but did not kill many people, and was not in sufficient strength to lay waste the villages.

The people of Tun and Birdjan complained that they could get no remedy for their losses by these raids from either the Prince of Meshed or Mir of Ghain. The latter probably recognized therein only the natural result of his own onslaught on the Afghan border.

For the marches between Tun and Birdjan, see *Caravan Journeys*, page 437, the notice in which are confirmed by our party. One of the party falling ill at the latter place, they stayed six days, and Ghain being only some 20 miles off, it was easy to learn something of the present state of Ghain and Seistan politics. It appears that in the constant interchange of injuries between the people of Furrah and those of Ghain, the Amir of Ghain, being the stronger, committed serious damage on the Furrah border, regarding which the Amir and his Governor made the remonstrances to the Governor of Meshed and the Persian Ambassador which have been before mentioned, and the result of which was that the Mir refrained from his attacks. Presently, however, and about the time that the Persian Ambassador returned through Ghain, reprisals were made on the Ghain border really by the people of Lash-Jowain, but of which Ahmed Khan succeeded in shifting the blame on to those of Furrah and Bukwa, whose habits are referred to by Ferrier (page 280, *Caravan Journeys*), and the Mir determined to inflict signal chastisement. In pursuance of this design, he collected his troops (about four months\* before the arrival of the party) and fell on the vicinity of Furrah, and then passing rapidly across, ravaged the whole plain of Bukwa, killing

\* This is about December last.

about 100 persons, and carrying off enormous flocks of sheep and other cattle; after this, he proceeded to Sekoha to quell the rebellious Biluchis there. On hearing this, the Governor of Herat let loose the Jamshedis, as before mentioned, while the Governor of Furrah, with Ahmed Khan of Lash-Jowain and Ibrahim Khan of Kuchansur, drew together to take their revenge, and fell suddenly on the district of Tun and on the outskirts of the districts between Ghain and Bundun; here they came across a number of camels proceeding from Sekoha to Ghain, which, on examination, proved to be laden with heads of Biluchis slain by Mir Alum in Sekoha.

Fired by this, they carried fire and sword up to the walls of Ghain, surprising near there a body of 500 of Mir Alum's tribal levies, 200 of whose heads they took home, together with immense booty.

This completely checked the Amir of Ghain, and, at the time the party were at Birdjan, he and the Chiefs of the Afghan border were preparing to carry out the orders of the Governors of Persia and Afghanistan for mutual restitution and reimbursement. This appears, however, to have hung fire; for, when the party were beyond Furrah on the road to Kandahar, they heard that an envoy from Persia had come to Herat, and had been passed on to Furrah with orders to take with him the Chiefs of the Afghan border on to Ghain, and then, with all the parties collected, to enforce the carrying out of the orders of the two Governments.

At the same time that the Afghan Chiefs attacked Ghain, Ibrahim Khan of Kuchansur also redoubled his efforts to harass Mir Alum Khan in Sekoha, with such success that eventually he has withdrawn himself from that quarter to Birdjan, sending in his place the Governor of "Tun," an able soldier, who before managed Sekoha with great success.

All this information, which is very interesting, must be received with a certain amount of caution. But I think it will be found to be in the main correct, and will show how little real authority either Persia or Kabul exercises over these districts.

(Sd.) M.

"It was to prevent Persia being established at Herat that, a few years ago, we went to war and spent considerable sums in subsidies, and deputed British officers to watch affairs.\*

"But if we were now to permit Persia to be established in southern Seistán, we should be permitting her to turn the very flank which we guarded at so much cost—to take in reverse the very position which we have so resolutely defended—to undo the very work which we have been perfecting and consolidating for years past. It would be as if, after so securely barring the main entrance, we were to let Persia come in by a side entrance.

"That Persia is fully alive to the importance of the situation, and that she is proceeding, indirectly, more or less under influential advice, who can doubt?† On the other hand, the Amir of Kabul has excellent reason for declaring that he will go to war sooner than give up Seistán. If Herat is the key to northern Afghanistan, equally is lower Seistán the key to southern Afghanistan.

"The British interest there is manifest. As we have always prevented Persia from establishing herself in Herat, we ought equally, if we can, to prevent her doing anything of the sort in Seistán.‡

"Greatly as hostilities between Afghanistan and Persia‡ are to be deprecated, still, as a matter of probability, the Amir of Kabul can make a good fight of it. It were better that he should do so, sooner than surrender his rights and position in Seistán. Indeed, he would have done so ere this, had it not been that by self-restraint he hopes to obtain the good offices of the British Government in settling the affair without resort to arms.

"Secondly, as regards our chance of disputing with effect the claims of Persia on Seistán.

"It seems clear that, at least by possession lasting over a century, the Afghanistan Government is the rightful owner of all Seistán. The title which, for this dispute, may be called the original title, is with Afghanistan. Now, how is this title at all sought to be invalidated? Why by counter-possession, and by that alone? What is the length and what the nature of that possession? Why apparently this, that in 1851 Persia began to interfere in Seistán; this interference was carried further in 1856, and further still in 1864, till by 1867 Persia got armed and forcible possession of southern Seistán? Since 1867 the last-named possession appears to have been maintained. If such be the facts, then the claim of Persia rests on possession of three years, and previous indirect or imperfect possession of less than ten years, with some five years' antecedent interference. Why, such counter-possession even in peaceful affairs would not suffice to invalidate an otherwise good title of the opposite party; and in political affairs I should regard it as wholly insufficient.

"The fact is, that for some time past Persia has been taking advantage of the internecine troubles of the Barakzai rulers of Kabul. And if the present representative of the Barakzais, Amir Shere Ali, feels himself strong enough, he might fairly strive, or even strike, to recover his own in Seistán.

\* I agree to all this, and consider that nothing could be more unfortunate for the peace of the East than that Persia should occupy both banks of the Helmund in any part, and, above all, should establish herself so far to the east as Hoscínabad.

† There is nothing to show that Persia is proceeding indirectly more or less under influential advice. It has been her traditional policy to push eastward, and she has never at any moment formally renounced her claims upon Seistán.

‡ Shere Ali has inaugurated a new system of government in Afghanistan. He has appointed civil and military governors in most of his provinces, the civil governors being men of good family and descendants of ancient rulers; the military governors, who have direct command of the troops, being generally creatures of his own, thoroughly devoted to his interests, but who are looked upon with much jealousy by the class from whom rulers in Afghanistan usually have been taken. Be this policy right or wrong, it is an experiment, and is accompanied with some danger.

Afghan-Turkistan is in a most unsettled state. I fear that the Naib, Alum Khan, has been committing many oppressions there, which have been countenanced by the Amir.

His son, Ibrahim Khan, though stupid, seems loyal, and evidently disapproves of the course taken by the Naib. The soldiers of the army of Turkistan are discontented from want of pay. I fear that the Amir is not leading that sort of life which is likely to increase the respect of his subjects; he is greatly feared, but not loved. He has consolidated his power over his wild dominions in a most extraordinary way, principally under the shadow of the influence acquired at Ambala.

A war with Persia would bring Abdul Rahman Khan upon the scene—behind him, might possibly appear Bokhara; behind her, *we know who*. As long as the question of his inheritance is left in abeyance, Yakoob, who is the ablest of his relations, cannot be thoroughly depended upon. I have little information as to the state of his treasury, but I suspect that, though he has saved a good deal of money, his coffers are not sufficiently full to enable him to undertake a war with such a Power as Persia. The revenue of a great part of his Empire is still only levied at the point of the bayonet. It would, therefore, be a miserable policy, for the sake of maintaining his supremacy over the swamps and deserts of Seistán that he should be allowed to go to war with a Power which, though militarily weak, contains among its statesmen the most skillful diplomatists in the East.

If we held the opinion strongly that Afghanistan is the rightful owner of all Seistán, and that nothing that has happened of late years has weakened her right thereto, we ought to decline arbitration altogether.

Looking to the whole circumstances of the case, to the Treaty of Paris (though it was drawn with scarcely any reference to Seistán), and to Lord Russell's letter, which complicates the matter exceedingly, it is impossible to blind ourselves to the fact that, with the tacit consent of the British Government, Persia, either by force of arms, by craft, or by an unopposed advance, has taken possession of a portion of the country.

Time is of no weight in considering the question of conquest. From the moment of conquest, all existing treaties are wiped out at the point of the sword. Whether such a conquest by Persia has been effected in any part of Seistán will be one of the main points for enquiry by the Commissioners, who are to inform Her Majesty's Government.

I am not therefore prepared at this moment to offer any opinion upon the exact position which Persia has a right to assume over any part of Seistán.

"If arbitrators on behalf of British and Afghan interests be appointed, they should be instructed as to the views entertained by the British authorities.\* They would, in the first place, dispute the claim of Persia to all and every part of Seistán; if not successful therein, they would, at all events, defeat her claim, whatever it be, to Seistán north of the Helmund, as nobody seems to say that Persia has possession there. Then they would controvert the sufficiency of Persian possession in the part south of the river; but if, on enquiry, the said possession were found to be too good to be successfully resisted, then, conceding (though with extreme reluctance) the Sekoh country, they would take their stand on Hoseinabad. The surrender of Hoseinabad should not be allowed under any circumstances that I can imagine being presented in this case.

"If,† in course of the enquiry, Persia represented to the arbitrators that she had been obliged to move upon Seistán by reason of aggressions or other misdeeds of Afghanistan, then such alleged grounds should be strictly investigated. I find it difficult to imagine what adequate provocation Afghanistan could have given.

"The fact of Persia alleging such grounds would rather go to show that she knew the original title to be with Afghanistan. Besides, in 1863-64 the Persian Government gave the British Minister an assurance that Persian troops should not enter Seistán unless the Amir of Kabul made a move on that province. In fact, the Amir has since that time refrained from such movement, which, indeed, he had otherwise ample justification for making.

"Lastly, I think that the Government of India should further press its views regarding Seistán on Her Majesty's Government.‡ The political and strategical importance of the position might be further enforced. If it be said that Mr. Eastwick, a good authority, took a favorable view of the claims of Persia, on the other hand I would adduce the vigorous remonstrances in the opposite sense made by Mr. Murray and Mr. Doria. If the view which Lord Stanley took in 1859-60 be urged as favorable to Persian claims, I would adduce the views declared by Lord Malmesbury in 1852, and by Lord Cowley in 1857, and announced to Persia as guiding British policy in this affair. If Lord Russell's despatch of 1863 be cited on the side of Persia, I should reply that this only leaves the contending parties to make good possession by force of arms—the very thing which Shere Ali is prepared to do with some chance of success,§ and which I should prefer to see him do rather than surrender Seistán, however much the alternative of appeal to arms is to be regretted. And I would add that the British Government is now specially justified in interposing with its good offices in settling an affair which must otherwise be left to settlement by force, inasmuch as it has, for years past, pursued the course of peaceful intervention: witness particularly the proceedings of Mr. Alison in 1862 and of the Government of India in 1865."

**22. The Persian assent is communicated to the Government of India. Further telegrams as to the scope of the arbitration and deputation of an Indian officer. Duke of Argyll's instructions to General Goldsmid.**—On the 17th August 1870 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy—

"Persian Government consent to meet Afghan Commissioner. They accept generally conditions proposed by Her Majesty's Government. Questions of possession and ancient right over Seistán to be investigated by Colonel Goldsmid. He will leave England for Teheran *via* St. Petersburg on August 27th, and will reach Teheran about September 24th. Thence he will telegraph the time and place of meeting of the Commission on the frontier. Make preparations accordingly for your Chief Officer and the Afghan Commissioner to meet him. Copy of my instructions to Colonel Goldsmid sent by mail of August 12th."

In reply (18th August), the Viceroy enquired whether the conditions proposed by Her Majesty's Government and accepted by Persia were those suggested in paragraph 6 of Government of India despatch dated 1st July 1870

\* The letter which will go home by next mail will express the opinions of the Government of India on these points.

† The points in this paragraph will form part of the enquiry.

‡ My own feelings are entirely in favor of the line taken by Mr. Murray and Mr. Doria, as against that weak and vacillating spirit which seems to have inspired our dealings with Persia in subsequent periods.

I regret very much the expressions used by Lord Stanley in 1862; and I do not believe that any British Minister, who was fully aware of the important bearing of this question upon our Indian Empire, would have committed himself to these opinions.

I attach very little importance in the East to nationalities. We find all over Asia the rulers of great States of different races and different creeds even from the people which they govern, and it would be a most dangerous and impracticable policy to attempt to lay down a definition of Asiatic boundaries on what may popularly be called a national point of view, namely, similarities of religion, language, or race.

§ I do not believe that Shere Ali is mad enough to go to war if he can help it. Therefore I cannot think he is prepared immediately to support his claims to Seistán by force of arms. There is nothing beyond some vague words of his which would justify us in forming that opinion, and some strong expressions used by Nur Mohamed at Ambala.

I therefore disagree with the remark that we can contemplate with any feeling but that of sincere alarm for the ultimate security of his dynasty, the occurrence of war between him and Persia. I believe it is not only our duty, but that it is also within our power, to avert from them the overwhelming danger.



(cited in the preceding paragraph), and whether the draft letter to the Amir referred to in paragraph 7 of that despatch was approved. Precise instructions were required on these points before the Amir could be communicated with.

On the 22nd August the Secretary of State replied—

“My telegram of 17th is in accordance with paragraph 6 of your despatch No. 39 of July 1st. Question of sovereignty over whole of Seistán to be investigated by Colonel Goldsmid, with reference to ancient right and present possession. Any letter to Amir in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of your letter of July 1st will be approved by Her Majesty's Government. Goldsmid's instructions are in accordance with these.”

Still it was not clear whether the British Government was to arbitrate on the basis of the Treaty of Paris, discarding Lord John Russell's letter of 5th November 1863. The Viceroy, therefore, telegraphed to the Secretary of State—

“We understood question of sovereignty of whole of Seistán is to be decided by arbitration of Her Majesty's Government, and that Persians do not now refuse, as they did in first instance, to subject country west of Helmund to same proceeding as country east of that river. Are we right?”

Moreover, when copy of Lord Granville's telegram to Mr. Alison, dated 28th July, arrived, it appeared that no room was left for any officer to be deputed by the Indian Government; consequently, on the 2nd September, the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State, saying—he presumed that there was no intention to interfere with the deputation of an Indian officer as proposed in the telegram of 19th May; also that Colonel Goldsmid was not to be final arbiter, but only to report facts for the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

The Secretary of State replied by telegram of 3rd September—

“Final decision will rest with Her Majesty's Government. Colonel Goldsmid will himself investigate present possession and ancient right in whole of Seistán, and map out boundary. He will use good offices according to treaty, and recommend mode of adjustment. It is fully understood that officer appointed by Viceroy will accompany Kabul Commissioner to meet Colonel Goldsmid.”

The instructions to General Goldsmid referred to in this paragraph will be found in Appendix II.

**23. Action taken by the Government of India.** Lord Mayo's letter to the Amir of Afghanistan, dated 8th September 1870, explaining the course which the proceedings would take.—Upon receipt of this telegram the Viceroy wrote (8th September) to the Amir, mentioning the fear of the Persians as regards the probable movements of the Afghans in 1861, and again in 1863, and their request for

“the friendly offices of the British Government to remove the causes of dispute between Persia and Afghanistan in regard to the province of Seistán. But,” the Viceroy said, “at that time Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to interfere in the affairs of those remote countries. Accordingly, on 5th November 1863, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed to the representative of the Persian Government a letter, of which I have the pleasure to send you a copy, in which he stated that, as the title to Seistán was disputed between Afghanistan and Persia, it should be left to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms. The Persian Government were bound by treaty not to take up arms against Afghanistan without first inviting the friendly offices of the British Government for the adjustment of the dispute. The effect of the above letter, by declining to interfere, was simply to withdraw this restriction and authorize an appeal to arms.”

The Persians had occupied a considerable portion of Seistán, and, indeed, claimed the whole province, as a consequence raids were being committed on both sides of the border. Now, however, the Viceroy said—

“The Persian Government have agreed to refer to arbitration the question of the sovereignty and boundaries of the whole of Seistán on both sides of the river Helmund under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty of Paris, of which I forward a copy for Your Highness' information. Accordingly, Major-General Goldsmid, a high officer of the British Government, has been deputed by Her Majesty's Ministers to conduct the necessary negotiations. He will proceed to Teheran, and thence, accompanied by a Commissioner appointed by His Majesty the Shah, he will make his way to the Seistán frontier, where it is proposed that he should be joined by a Commissioner appointed by Your Highness, who will be accompanied by a British officer to be selected by myself.

“It will be the duty of Major-General Goldsmid to examine the territory in dispute, to hear all that is advanced by the Commissioner of Your Highness on the one hand, and the Commissioner of the Shah on the other; and to take such evidence as he may require on the

spot, both as regards the ancient rights of the two States, and the action which has been taken by them respectively since 1863. Having thus acquired all the local information which he can obtain, Major-General Goldsmid will, in conjunction with the two Commissioners and my delegate, select some place, either in Seistán or in the adjoining territory, where the whole question can be fully discussed, and his judgment in respect to the matters in dispute will be formally delivered. Major-General Goldsmid's decision will be that of the British Government, and a copy of it will be delivered in writing to the Persian and Afghanistan Commissioners for the information of their respective Governments, whose acceptance thereof will be invited."

This last paragraph is not consistent with the condition for which the Government of India had expressly stipulated, *viz.*, that the final decision would rest with Her Majesty's Government.

**24. Selection of Colonel Pollock as representative of the Government of India and instruction as regards his functions.**—It will have been seen that the Secretary of State's telegram dated 3rd September removed the doubts which the Government of India had felt as to the appointment by the Viceroy of an Indian officer to accompany the Mission. Colonel Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, was the British officer selected to represent the Government of India. He was not to exercise co-ordinate authority with General Goldsmid. "His functions," the Government of India ruled, "are simply of a consultative character, but the sole power of arbitration is vested in Colonel Goldsmid. It will be Colonel Pollock's duty to assist him, as far as lies in his power, with facts, opinion, and advice; to acquaint him with the opinions and feelings of the Court of Kabul; and to explain to him the views and policy of the Government of India on the

To Secretary of State, No. 39, dated 1st July 1870.

" " " " 41, " 7th " "

Seistán question generally, and more particularly as set forth in the despatches noted in the margin.

"Colonel Pollock should carefully advise the Afghan Commissioner as to his proceedings, and, without assuming a position of partiality, should see generally that the views of the Kabul Government, whom the Commissioner represents, are fully and fairly explained.

"When Colonel Goldsmid has given his decision, Colonel Pollock should procure a copy of it, and forward it as quickly as he can for the information of His Excellency in Council. He should also, from time to time as occasion may offer, keep His Excellency in Council fully informed of the progress of negotiations, and take the earliest opportunity of reporting the views which the Kabul or Persian Government, or both, may express on the decision that may be arrived at.

"The present condition of the country through which Colonel Pollock may pass should be carefully noted, and any matters of interest, whether social, political, or physical, should be duly reported."

**25. Amir Shere Ali's reply to Lord Mayo's letter, dated 8th September and temporary postponement of the Seistan arbitration.**—On the 8th October 1870 the Amir replied thanking the Viceroy for the action taken by him in the matter, and saying that, owing to Sirdar Yakub Khan's rebellion, the settlement of the Seistán boundary must be delayed, but that he hoped soon to restore order, and would then write again. With regard to Lord Russell's despatch now communicated to him for the first time he remarked that

"no intimation whatever of the circumstance that the Persian Government made a representation, and the British authorities returned a reply on the 5th November 1863, regarding the Seistán dispute, was sent to the Afghan Government."

Accordingly, Mr. Alison was told that the Seistán arbitration could not be taken up at present.

**26. The Persian Government object to the deputation of an Afghan Commissioner and renew their contention as to the exclusion of a portion of Seistan from arbitration.**—On

No. 38, dated 25th July.

" 39, " 2nd August.

" 41, " 12th "

the 13th October 1870 the Government of India received copy of the despatches noted on the margin from Mr. Alison

to Lord Granville. The Persian Government, on hearing that an Afghan Commissioner was to accompany the Persian and English Commissioners to the



Seistán border, objected, saying that there had hitherto been no mention of such a Commissioner, and insisting that all they had consented to was

"that\* the British and Persian Commissioners should proceed to Seistán and inspect the present possessions of the Persian Government, should draw up a map of the same, define the same, ascertain what portion of Seistán had not yet come into Persia's possession, and state the same to the British and Persian Governments.

\* Memorandum, dated 4th August 1870, addressed by Mirza Sayid Khan to Mr. Alison. On the 24th July, he had addressed to Mr. Alison a memorandum to the same effect as regards the functions of the Commissioners.

"The Persian Government (they said), according to the despatch of Lord Russell, considers itself justified in considering that portion of Seistán which it has already possessed itself of, to be its own territorial property; and it will never agree to make over a single span of what it possesses at the present day to another party."

Mr. Alison replied on the 5th August—

"The argument founded on Earl Russell's despatch is left to the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government, but the objection made to the Afghan Commissioner is of a nature to create embarrassment. . . . Whatever may be the extent of Persia's possessions in Seistán, it is clear from the repeated appeals made to Great Britain, to restrain the aggressive attitude of the Afghans respecting them, that no settlement of the question can be effected unless both parties are heard in it. Indeed, Lord Clarendon in his communication dated the 24th of February last made the application to the Amir Shere Ali Khan dependent on the acceptance by Persia of the arbitration of Great Britain in the question of the sovereignty of Seistán, and it was only on the announcement made by Mr. Thomson, that the Persian Government submitted the question of the sovereignty and boundaries of Seistán to the arbitration of Her Majesty's Ministers, that the Viceroy of India was instructed to ascertain if the Amir would agree to this. It is true that the Persian Ministers explained, later, how far they were from meaning any such thing; but it is likewise clear that, if such an explanation had been conveyed in the first instance, no such communication could have been made to the Amir Shere Ali Khan. The Persian Ministers will thus understand how difficult it must be to throw His Highness over at this stage of the question, and how prejudicial also it may be to the interests of peace in the sequel; for, if the Amir were to resume his aggressive attitude in consequence of such treatment, the Shah's Government might not feel itself justified to call upon Her Majesty's Government once more to restrain him."

To this the Persian Ministry rejoined—

"With reference to the statement in the said memorandum, 'if such an explanation had been conveyed in the first instance, no such communication could have been made to the Amir Shere Ali Khan,' the Persian Government from the first in reply to Mr. Thomson, in every memorandum and explanation given, were consistent in relying upon Lord Russell's despatch, and now also can make no alteration in their last interpretation, except in consenting to the presence of an Afghan Commissioner in order to hear his opinion."

It appears, therefore, that up to August 1870 the Persian Government repudiated the understanding that they had ever agreed to submit the sovereignty and boundaries of the whole of Seistán to arbitration. They excluded that part of the province which, biding upon the permission given in Lord Russell's despatch, they had brought into possession.

**27. The Amir reopens the question of arbitration in regard to Seistán.**—On the 26th of February 1871 order having apparently been finally restored in Afghanistan, the Amir wrote to the Viceroy begging him to

"make arrangements for the settlement of Seistán affairs at any time he deemed proper. But he took care to add that the officer deputed by the British Government should be sent by the Biluchistan and Kandahar route."

General Goldsmid having recommended the postponement of the Seistán settlement till the ensuing cold season, the Viceroy replied to the Amir on the 28th April, saying that he had every reason to believe that

"before the commencement of the season of the year in which it is possible to travel in those countries, the preliminaries for the negotiations will be settled in a manner satisfactory to the Amir and to the Shah of Persia."

On the 11th of April the Viceroy telegraphed to Mr. Alison the Amir's desire that arrangements might be made for the Seistán settlement. And, with

"But I am more than ever convinced that no settlement, such as that of Seistán or Mekran, can be disposed of in the season, or perhaps this year, unless a basis of negotiation, added to a plan of operation, be agreed upon preliminarily by all Governments concerned."

reference to the marginally quoted remark made by General Goldsmid in a letter of 17th March 1871, regarding the difficulties experienced in the Mekran demarcation, he asked that officer to suggest "the basis

for the approaching negotiations regarding Seistán."

**28. Further correspondence regarding the basis of the arbitration.**—This question as to the precise basis of the arbitration was again pressed by the Government of India.

No. 24, dated 16th May 1871.

They brought it to the attention of the Secretary of State in the despatch cited in the margin pointing out

“the necessity, before commencing the settlement of the Seistán question, of coming to the most clear understanding with the Persian Government as to what shall be the basis of enquiry, what shall be the powers and duties of the Persian Commissioner, what representations are to be listened to by General Goldsmid, and what places are to be visited in the course of his investigations.” . . . “We trust,” Government said, “that Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may be moved to issue such instructions to the British Minister at Teheran as shall leave no doubt as to the terms and conditions on which the arbitration is to be undertaken, and shall prevent the repetition of the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the proceedings in Mekran.”

On various occasions during the month of August the Secretary of State was urged to reply to this despatch. At length, on the 24th August, the Duke of Argyll telegraphed that Mr. Alison had been instructed to come to a clear understanding with the Persian Government as to the basis of operations, especially on the points noted in the foregoing extract.

On the 15th August Mr. Alison enquired when the Amir of Kabul would be ready to enter upon Seistán arbitration, but the Government of India (telegram of 26th August) declined to communicate again with the Amir about Seistán, until the basis of arbitration had been definitely settled. They advised as the best arrangement that the Afghan and Persian Commissioners should, with General Goldsmid as arbitrator, visit the necessary places on the boundary; and that the two Commissioners should lay all needful information before General Goldsmid, whose decision should be final. They referred to paragraph 9 of Secretary of State’s instructions, August 9th, 1870 (*vide* Appendix II), to which the Amir had already agreed.

On 31st August Mr. Alison telegraphed that the Shah said it would be difficult to settle the Seistán question satisfactorily, unless General Goldsmid went to the spot first and came back with a map; and that he was afraid the Persians would not consent to arbitration.

The Government of India rejoined (1st September) very strongly deprecating any departure from the basis prescribed by the Duke of Argyll with concurrence of the Foreign Office in his instructions to General Goldsmid, dated 9th August 1870; the Amir had already consented, and it was very doubtful whether he would agree to any other basis; that the Persian interests would be as effectually secured thereby as by any other means; and that in the present condition of Afghanistan, any alteration of arrangements already approved by Her Majesty’s Government was extremely undesirable.

Mr. Alison, in a telegram of 2nd September, stated that no departure from the basis laid down in General Goldsmid’s instructions had been made, and that he would continue to press the arbitration to the best of his power.

\* And he had on the 13th July sent a written reply to the letters of 4th April and 16th and 26th May; he urged that, before anything was done, it should be definitely settled whether he was to be an arbitrator, or whether, as in the Mekran case, he was only to make a map and collect materials for the settlement of the matter at Teheran.

General Goldsmid, however, telegraphed on\* 1st September as follows:—

“Have consulted with Alison on Seistán arbitration question, ascertaining also views of Persian Government. My opinion is that the better plan would be to accept their own proposal, to inspect locality, making map and come to Teheran—a procedure which, in respect of the Mekran boundary, has virtually amounted to arbitration. They would, in such case, willingly receive an Afghan Commissioner with the other at Teheran. I, as exercising good offices of England, should propose settlement and no decision would of course be final until approved by the Amir. Were Alison to propose an unbending arbitration in the sense of my instructions, they might accept the procedure, but not the results.”

The Government of India, however, adhered to the terms of the Secretary of State’s instructions and deprecated any departure from them (telegram, 4th September).

The next steps in the matter are narrated in the following telegrams from and to Mr. Alison (dated 13th and 16th September). The illness of the Persian Foreign Minister postponed further communications :—

*From Mr. Alison.*

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs says that the intention of the Shah had not been clearly understood by Her Majesty's Government, and that a reference to his memoranda of 24th July and 4th August last would clear up the point. Arbitration in the sense now suggested by us was never contemplated by the King, and there were grave objections to such a course. That proposed by Persia, and to which she adheres, could not be attended with the slightest inconvenience. The Commissioners would proceed to the frontier, draw up their map, collect all necessary information, and then return to Teheran. The question would then either be settled here or referred to London for the decision of Her Majesty's Government. Teheran had, moreover, the advantage of being in telegraphic communication with England and India,

\* With reference to this, Mr. Alison was, by telegram of 16th September, told—"Desirable, if possible, not to have Mansum Khan as Commissioner. Do your best to get some other man nominated."

To this Mr. Alison replied by telegram of 16th September—"Our impression about Mansum is that, although he made himself disagreeable in Mekran through fear of responsibility, he made himself useful here by enlightening his Court on the real state of affairs there, and that Goldsmid would not at all object to have him for colleague. What shall I do?"

and both quarters could be apprized daily of the progress of the negotiation. The speedy and satisfactory manner in which the Perso-Kelat boundary question had been brought to a termination would, he hoped, have due weight in favor of the Seistán question being similarly settled at Teheran. The Minister expressed a hope that Her Majesty's Government would not make any further objection to this reasonable course, and that the Commissioners would be thus enabled to make at once the necessary preparations for their journey. Mirza\* Maasum Khan will again be the Persian Commissioner."

*From Government of India (Lord Mayo).*

"Yours of 13th. I understand arrangements to which Persia is willing to agree are following : Goldsmid with the Persian and Afghan Commissioners to proceed to Seistán. When three are together, it will be for Persian and Afghan Commissioners respectively to state and substantiate their claims, and, if local enquiry is necessary, Commissioners may proceed to any point and take map of any districts. The two Commissioners will then set forth the conclusions which they maintain, and Goldsmid, weighing evidence and arguments, will submit arbitral opinion to Persian and Afghan Governments. Commissioners will then proceed to Teheran, where acceptance of arbitral opinion will be awaited. Should either Government not agree, reference will be made to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose decision will be final, and to which both Governments will bind themselves beforehand to agree and abide by.

"This appears in accordance with your telegram, and with Shah's statement to you at interview on 23rd July 1870. If this be fully understood, no difficulty anticipated with Amir."

Eventually (4th October) Mr. Alison replied as follows :—

"The Persian Government will not depart from the position taken up on the strength of Earl Russell's despatch, dated 5th November 1863, that is to say, they will not consent that their actual possessions in Seistán should be discussed or disturbed, and they will agree only that our arbitration should have effect over those places which are not actually in their possession, our Commissioner reserving his final opinion until his return to Teheran. The Persian Government make no objection otherwise to Commissioners' meeting, discussing, inspecting necessary localities, hearing evidence, and drawing up maps."

**29. The Government of India represent the impossibility of asking the Amir to consent to arbitration on the limited terms accepted by Persia.**—Upon receipt of this telegram the Government of India reconsidered the situation. They felt it impossible to ask the Amir to consent to an arbitration by which he would gain nothing and might lose much, and which was so very different from what he had at first been asked to accept.

This difficulty was laid before Her Majesty's Government in the Viceroy's telegram of 16th October 1871, which urged that

"if all the circumstances were properly placed before the Persian Government by the Secretary of State, no serious objection ought to be taken, as Persian interests can in no way be endangered, the basis being ancient right and present possession. We," it was added, "hope the strongest efforts will be made to induce the Persian Government to accept the basis laid down in the instructions given on the 9th August 1870 by the Duke of Argyll to General Goldsmid,"

*viz.*, that General Goldsmid, as the delegate of the British Government, should enquire into the claims of the two parties to the whole of Seistán; should give an arbitral opinion in or near Seistán; should consider any objections, and, if he found it impossible to remove those objections and reconcile the two parties, should report the matter to his Government.

**30. The terms drawn up by Mr. Alison are finally accepted by Persia.**—Fortunately for the prospects of a settlement of the question a new view of the position forced itself upon the Persian Government. On the 5th October, the day after Mr. Alison had telegraphed the resolution of the Persian Government to abide by the advantage which Lord Russell's letter of 5th November 1863 had given to them, a conversation on the subject took place between Mr. Dickson, of Her Majesty's Legation in Teheran, and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Dickson remarked that Earl Russell's letter applied as much to Afghanistan as to Persia, so that Shere Ali had, according to it, as much right as Persia, unchecked by England, to seek redress by arms. At this observation the Persian Minister grew thoughtful, and said that such a contingency had not been contemplated. A week afterwards the Persian Minister sent a memorandum to Mr. Alison, representing that Amir Shere Ali had

\* As far as was known to the Government of India, the cause of this alarm was nothing but the return of the Afghan army from the neighbourhood of Herat to Furrak.

"marched\* a considerable force towards Seistán, and had brought it at that date within five stages of Seistán; by secret intercourse, and the holding out of promises, had induced

Ibrahim Khan, Biluch, a subject and servant of the Persian Government, to forsake it, and take service with himself, and, moreover, intended to raise a new city on the banks of the Helmund."

Mr. Alison replied

"that he was not at all surprised at what had taken place, as, ever since the departure of the King for Turkish Arabia, he (Mr. Alison) had had occasion to complain of repeated acts of aggression and plunder committed by the Persian Governor of Kain on Afghan territory, . . . and that he had telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government that Persia had refused their arbitration on the whole question of the disputed territories of Seistán."

The bearer of the Persian Minister's message then hinted that negotiations on that subject were not altogether closed, and enquired what real difference existed between the views entertained at Kabul and Teheran. Mr. Alison replied that, while Shere Ali Khan had frankly accepted the proposal of Her Majesty's Government for a pacific settlement of the whole question by arbitration, the Shah had declined such arbitration, and had taken up a position based upon a settlement of the territories in dispute by force of arms.

The Persian Government then announced their readiness to accept British arbitration, but as the message in which the consent was conveyed did not appear sufficiently explicit, Mr. Alison replied

"that it was useless for him to telegraph any communication to Her Majesty's Government on this subject, which did not convey a full and unconditional acceptance of their arbitration, and that he must be excused if he declined forwarding the present one."

At the request of the Persian Foreign Minister, therefore, Mr. Alison drafted the following memorandum, dated 22nd October 1871, the acceptance of which would, he thought, be regarded as satisfactory:—

"When the British, Persian, and Afghan Commissioners are all assembled together in Seistán, the Persian and Afghan Commissioners respectively will state and substantiate their claims. If local enquiry be necessary, the Commissioners will proceed to any point for that purpose, and make a map of any districts without let or hindrance. When the British

Commissioner considers that there is nothing further to be done on the spot, the Commissioners will then return to Teheran,\* where the question will be fully discussed with a view to its settlement, and the British Commissioner will also state his arbitral opinion.

Should the Persian or Afghan Governments not agree to the arbitral opinion of the British Commissioner, reference will then be made to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who, taking into due consideration the arguments put forward by Persia, will issue his final decision, both the Persian and Afghan Governments binding themselves beforehand to abide by the same."

The Shah then said

"It is correct; let telegram be accordingly sent to the Viceroy of India; the Persian Government is satisfied. But if, before the arrival in Seistán of the Persian and British Commissioners, a movement should be made upon Seistán by the Afghans, and that movement be of a hostile nature, Persia will then refuse to accept any arrangement, and, in accordance with the letter which Lord John Russell, formerly British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, gave to the Nasir-el-Mulk, will have recourse to her right."

This was communicated to the Viceroy of India, who, on the 26th October, telegraphed his acceptance, and thanked Mr. Alison for the successful manner in which he had concluded the preliminaries of the Seistán arbitration; at the same time he begged the Secretary of State to instruct General Goldsmid and Colonel Pollock to come out at once. By No. 2367P., dated 31st October, General Goldsmid was told that

"the instructions which had been already issued to him by Her Majesty's Secretary of State will hold good, except in so far as they are modified by the basis of arbitration to which the Persian Government has now definitely agreed,"

and was furnished with a copy of the despatches No. 39, dated 1st July, and No. 41, dated 7th July 1870, in which the Government of India had put the Secretary of State in possession of their views on the Seistán question.

**31. Letters to and from the Amir Shere Ali, dated 31st October, 13th November, 29th December 1871, and 14th January 1872.**—At the same time a letter was addressed to the Amir, acquainting him with the terms of the agreement with the Persian Government. He was told that

"the terms now finally arranged with the Persian Government are, in all essential respects, the same as those which I proposed to Your Highness in my letter of 8th September 1870, and which were accepted by Your Highness in your answer of 8th October 1870, and subsequent correspondence. They are such as, having regard to the identity of the interests of both Governments and the welfare of Afghanistan, I have communicated and suggested to Persia. I entertain the confident belief that the settlement of the Seistán question on the above basis will for ever put an end to those unhappy disputes which have so long disturbed the peace and interfered with the prosperity of Seistán. I now invite Your Highness, at the earliest possible date, formally to intimate to me in writing your acquiescence in the above terms, which, in accordance with my suggestions, have been definitely settled with His Majesty the Shah, and which I now offer for Your Highness' final acceptance, with reference to your last letter to me, dated 17th July 1871.

The nomination of General Goldsmid as British Commissioner was intimated, and the Amir was asked to select an intelligent and trustworthy officer as Commissioner on the part of Afghanistan, and to invest him with powers enabling him to give a final opinion in the discussion which, after all needful local enquiries had been made, would take place at Teheran.

As to Colonel Pollock's appointment and the route by which he should travel to Seistán the letter proceeded—

"I learned from my Agent's letter to Colonel Pollock, dated 27th February 1871, that Your Highness desired that Colonel Pollock should proceed to Seistán by Shikarpur, Biluchistan, and Kandahar, which you stated to be a very secure route and nearer and better than that of Kabul. I also understood that Your Highness would depute a Kabul official and an escort to Kandahar and Biluchistan border, and adopt measures for the security of transit. I shall be glad to learn whether Your Highness still prefers the adoption of this route, or whether you consider any other route preferable. I am desirous that my delegate on his way to Seistán should have an opportunity of a conference with Your Highness, and communicate personally with you on various matters connected with the welfare of Afghanistan. I hope, therefore, that whatever route Your Highness may select may be one which will admit of



that object being secured. It will also be necessary that Your Highness should make such arrangements as will secure the perfect safety and comfort of Colonel Pollock and his party, so long as they may be within Your Highness' dominions; and I trust Your Highness will intimate to me the arrangements which you propose to effect for this purpose.

"As Colonel Pollock is now on his way from England to enter on the duties which it is proposed to entrust to him in this matter, I hope Your Highness will lose no time in intimating to me your wishes on all the points above noted.

"My friend, as arrangements so satisfactory have been made for the amicable settlement of Seistán affairs, I trust Your Highness will issue stringent orders to your officers and subjects on the border to abstain absolutely from all aggressive or offensive operations, to remain quietly in their homes, pending the adjustment of the matters in dispute by peaceful arbitration, and to respect the decision that may hereafter be given: any disturbance on the frontier now, or during the progress of the negotiation, might have the effect of very seriously impeding the amicable arrangements which it is my object to complete."

The Amir replied by a kharita, dated 13th November 1871—(1) entirely agreeing to the arbitration of the Seistán dispute by the British authorities; (2) mentioning that he had appointed Syud Nur Mahomed Shah as his Agent with plenary powers; and (3) saying that he had repeated the previous orders to his officers on the border to abstain from such acts as might disturb peace; but (4) objecting to the arrangement that his Agent should go into the dominions of the aggressing party "in the hope of the settlement of the dispute."

To this kharita the Viceroy replied on the 29th December, saying—

"My friend, the satisfactory settlement of this long-standing dispute, which I trust will be effected within a few months, will, I doubt not, advance the happiness and prosperity of Your Highness' possessions on the Persian frontier, and bind more firmly than ever the bonds of friendship between Your Highness and the British Government.

"In discussing so intricate and difficult a question as the Seistán boundary, many points must necessarily arise, on which General Goldsmid, who is to give an arbitral opinion on the case, will require to consult his Government, and refer either to me or to Her Majesty's Ministers in London. It would be impossible to make such communications from Seistán, which it takes months for a letter to reach; and, on the other hand, it would not be desirable that the Commissioners should be so far removed from the scene of operations as even the nearest point in British territory, which is at least two months' journey from Seistán. Teheran is the nearest point to Seistán with which there is telegraphic communication; messages can pass both from London and Calcutta to Teheran in a few hours, so that any difficulties which arise can at once be referred for consideration and settled without delay. By this arrangement I am quite sure that Your Highness' interests will be better consulted than by any other that can be made, and, as Colonel Pollock will accompany your Commissioners, Your Highness may feel perfect confidence that he will be received and treated with the respect and dignity befitting the Government he represents. It will be my special care that this should be so, and the British Minister at Teheran will be addressed by me with this view.

"My friend, in the countries of Europe, when important international affairs are under discussion, it is usual for some place to be selected by the high powers concerned at which the questions under consideration can be finally settled. The selection is generally determined by considerations of convenience, and it is never considered an objection that the place fixed upon is situated within the territories of one of the parties interested, nor is such an arrangement ever looked upon as adding to the dignity of the one or detracting from that of the other.

"In the present instance, there is a high officer of the British Government appointed at Teheran, and, as I have already explained, communication can be made both with England and India in a few hours. No other place that I could choose would be so conveniently situated or offer so many advantages; and I trust that Your Highness will acquiesce in an arrangement which, under similar circumstances, in Europe would be unhesitatingly agreed to by the great Powers."

On the 14th January the Amir replied, expressing his confidence that his interests and honor would be duly guarded and promoted by the Viceroy. He had, therefore, yielded to the Viceroy's expressed wish that the Afghan Commissioner should proceed to Teheran, and had instructed Syud Nur Mahomed accordingly.

## 32. Departure of General Sir F. J. Goldsmid for Persia, and report of his early proceedings.—General Goldsmid, accompanied

by Colonel Pollock, Captain Euan Smith, and Mr. G. Thomas, left

From General Goldsmid, to Duke of Argyll, dated 15th January 1872.



England on the 10th November 1871, and reached Bombay on the 3rd December. After a short visit to the Viceroy (Lord Mayo) at Calcutta, he sailed for the Persian Gulf on the 11th December, and arrived at Bunder Abbas on the 21st. It had been arranged in Calcutta that General Goldsmid should proceed to Seistán by the route originally proposed, and meet the Persian Commissioner at Bam. That Colonel Pollock and Dr. Bellew, with the Afghan Commissioner, should advance through Kandahar and the Bolan, and meet General Goldsmid at Sekoha about the middle of February. The march from Bunder Abbas to Bam, where the party arrived on the 7th January, occupied sixteen days; on the following day General Goldsmid was visited by Mirza Maasum Khan, the Persian Commissioner, who had been waiting for him since the 24th December. At General Goldsmid's return visit, Maasum Khan spoke of the work at Seistán as of a comparatively simple nature, his orders being clear and defined. He would accompany the General wherever he thought fit to go, they would "*constater*" the condition of the country, and return to Teheran for discussion and decision. At Bam, General Goldsmid was joined by Major Lovett; and on the 12th, the whole party, accompanied by Mirza Maasum Khan, started for Seistán. In a telegram dated 15th January, General Goldsmid reported that in consequence of the defeat of Ibrahim Khan of Banpur by Biluchis, near Nasratabad on the route of the Mission, the Persians required an increased escort. He represented to them that to enter Seistán in force must be held to disprove possession.

On the 1st February, General Goldsmid reached Sekoha\* where the demeanour of the Persian Commissioner underwent a change—a circumstance which General Goldsmid attributed to the neighbourhood and influence of the Hashmut-ul-Mulk, the Amir of Kain. On the 4th February, the Mission left Sekoha for Chiling, and started thence on the 5th for Nasirabad or Shahr-i-Nao, the new capital of Persian Seistán. Before starting from Chiling, Maasum Khan informed General Goldsmid that the Amir of Kain had written to him strongly remonstrating against General Goldsmid's proceedings in pitching his flag in front of his tents. It was said that the people and especially their Mullas were so perturbed at this proceeding as to render a demonstration very probable. General Goldsmid replied that the Mission on which he was engaged was well known; that the flag was the sign of that Mission, and that one had been hoisted under similar circumstances in Biluchistan in the preceding year. He desired that the Hashmut-ul-Mulk might be informed of these facts, and observed that if he discontinued hoisting the flag which had hitherto been pitched everywhere, it might give rise to all kinds of surmises.

About a mile from Nasirabad the party were met by an "Istikbál" under command of Sharif Khan, Sirdar of Nhamis, who accompanied them to their allotted quarters in the fort, where they remained from the 6th to the 15th February, "if not under physical, at least under moral compulsion of no common kind."

### 33. Description of the Fort of Nasirabad.—The following is Major Lovett's description of Nasirabad:—

"The principal fort is a rectangular enclosure, 1,344 feet long by 1,012 feet wide, the long side running south-west by west. The walls are of mud béton work, 24 feet high, including a parapet-wall 8 feet high; the *terrepleine* is 5 feet wide. There are towers at each angle, and at intervals with flanking towers at each of the four gateways. Each tower is about 34 feet high, containing a small guard-room. Outside the walls there is a *chemin-de-nude* covered by an interior bank of earth with a retaining mud-wall, 10 feet, having a *banquette*, and pierced for musketry with semi-circular places of arms at intervals midway between the *enceinte* towers. Outside all, there is a wet ditch from 10 feet to 15 feet deep, about 20 feet wide at top, with sides sloping to an apex. To the south-east of this fort is an irregular outwork 1,800 feet long and 1,500 feet wide, with 21 towers on the north side, 15 on the east, and the same number on the south side. This outwork encloses the old town of Hoseinabad. The walls, built of mud béton, have a relief of about 17 feet. The towers are 24 feet high. Outside of this wall is a wet ditch of a similar profile to that surrounding the principal fort. The *deblai* has been thrown up against the mud-walls, forming a bank to protect them. At the

north-east and south-east corners of this outwork, a mud tower is being constructed of about 45 feet diameter suitable for mounting artillery. It is to be noted that there are two walled *enceintes*: the one designated the fort contains perhaps 250 houses; the other, old Hoseinabad, shows many plots of ground under cultivation, as well as dwelling-places. Both are, doubtless, Persian colonies, and it is said that some 20,000 immigrants from Persia have recently been attracted into Seistán generally, owing to famine and scarcity in their own country."

**34. Further correspondence about the flag question.**—On the 5th February Maasum Khan forwarded the following letter which he had received from the Amir of Kain on the subject of the flag:—

*Copy of a letter enclosed with the above from the HASHMUT-UL-MULK, to MIRZA MAASUM KHAN.*

"With regard to the matter of the flag. I first sent the Yawur Azad Khan to you, and spoke to you myself yesterday evening. This is the meaning. You are not acquainted with the qualities and disposition of the people of these parts; they are greatly terrified. His Excellency the General is not only an honored guest, but also the special envoy of the British Government. I am trying all I can: perhaps there may be some way to avoid giving him offence; but what can I do with these creatures who will not listen to reason—who understand nothing? I have myself received no orders concerning this matter. If, which God forbid, any improper occurrence should take place owing to these people, the General himself will be responsible. I repeat over again I have nothing to do with it. I know the disposition of this people to be very bad. You are the judge."

General Goldsmid thereupon asked Maasum Khan as Special Commissioner of the Persian Government to say whether he considered

"that this flag, which until now has been considered as a sign of the Mission of the English Commissioner and of his arbitration, will now be looked upon in any other light by the people of these parts? And if they do not consider it in this light, what can they possibly think of it?"

He added—

"I have not found it necessary to fly my flag here as yet, as I am occupying a house in the town; but I intend to move into tents, and it is my duty that I should display the sign of my mission in front of my tent, as long as I am associated with the Commissioner of another Government."

Maasum Khan's reply contained no distinct opinion of his own. He merely said—"The reasons for your not hoisting your flag are those set forth in the above-mentioned letter from the Amir; but I will not fail in doing all I can in this matter."

**35. Difficulty about an interview with the Amir of Kain.**—On the 6th February, Khan Baba Khan and Yawur Azad Khan called upon the General with civil messages from the Amir, and, on departure, the former was presented with a musical-box. He took it, but returned it shortly afterwards, with a letter expressing inability to accept a present which he had since discovered was not considered fitting for him. The style of the letter was not offensive; but General Goldsmid considered the incident to be more or less significant of the local popular feeling towards the Mission. There was no sign of a visit from the Amir himself, which General Goldsmid considered his due according to Persian etiquette, and the Persian Commissioner professed inability to induce the Amir to make the required concession. Nevertheless, the Amir made one or two advances; he despatched his aide-de-camp to express regret at the poorness of the accommodation he had provided—it appears that the Persian Commissioner had been much better treated—and afterwards sent a present of black partridges. Eventually it was decided that the Amir's son should call upon the General, who would then visit the Amir, on condition that the latter should return the General's call within a certain time. Events proceeded according to this arrangement until the time came for the return visit from the Amir. What then took place may be described in General Goldsmid's own words:—

"February 13.—For some inexplicable cause the Persian Commissioner again to-day wrote to me a formal proposal to make a tour with him through the actual present possessions of Persia, and prepare a map. I replied that this was what I wished to do, as evinced by my former letters. Indeed, it had been understood that we were to start on our tour this very afternoon. But new perplexities awaited us. The Hashmut-ul-Mulk was to call on me at

9 A.M. I had made all arrangements to receive him; and a message was brought from the citadel that Mir Alum Khan had a headache, and could not come before the afternoon. Added to this, it was communicated to us that the pistol presented to the Amir would be returned, as the latter had many of a similar description. The Governor's Mir Akhor had been the channel of information in imparting the circumstance to our Mir Akhor, so that there was tolerable ground for belief that the report was true. I confess to have felt irritated at even the supposition that such an insult was intended, and the more so as we had reason to suspect Maasum Khan at the bottom of it all. He was known to be constantly with the Amir, and even our Persian servants were fully convinced that a secret understanding had been arrived at between them, which would tell with ill effect on any honest endeavour to do justice in Seistán. At this crisis the Commissioner sent over to say he wished to see me. I was rather glad at the opportunity of renewing *viva voce* my complaints at the treatment experienced, and almost welcomed him when he appeared at our door. Our interview may have lasted nearly three hours. I used strong language, but felt certain I was right in attributing to him the active though secret agency in producing all these *contretemps*. I told him that whatever instructions he may have received from his Government, I could not believe he had been authorized to insult or offend me; and that he had, notwithstanding, succeeded in doing so. I looked to his acts, not to his written assurances, to which they were quite opposed. As usual, he made protestations of regard, and expressed regret at my assuming his conduct to be unfriendly and insincere. We had never done, and never intended, offence; but if I persisted in imputing it to him, what could he say in reply? While we were talking, the Amir's 'Mir Akhor' entered and addressed himself to the Commissioner. He said that his master was ill, but would come if absolutely necessary. As I had accepted the postponement of the Amir's visit until the afternoon, I thought it better not to disturb this arrangement. In the afternoon Mir Alum Khan called accordingly, having been preceded by Maasum Khan. The visit was not unsatisfactory, and the conversation touched on business as well as generalities. A letter from the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Amir was read out for information. It recited the objects of our mission, and instructed the Governor of Kain to afford the Shah's Commissioner every assistance. It struck me that the special aid contemplated, and to proclaim which the letter was produced for my benefit, was either that the officer addressed should accompany Maasum Khan on his tour, or be present with him at the sitting of the Commission; perhaps both. As an opinion from myself on this missive was evidently expected, I remarked that the Persian Commissioner had better send me an extract, asking for a reply, which I would duly give him after consideration. The Amir exhibited a letter, moreover, from Furrakh, mentioning that Colonel Pollock had arrived in Kandahar, but that they had no further news of his movements. As General Pollock did not reach Kandahar till the 9th, and the contents of this letter were communicated to me on the 13th, or only four days after, I hardly think that the intelligence meant more than that he was daily looked for. The style of the writer proved him to be a person in the interests of Persia, if not an actual *employé* of the Amir of Kain. It is some little relief to be able to place on record that this day, which had begun darkly, had a brighter close than we had anticipated. I hope to be acquitted of excessive pliancy towards my colleague in again listening to his advances; but the wishes of Government were to me a law counter to which I could not allow personal antipathies to run, and the survey of Seistán must become a *fait accompli*. We discussed new prospective plans before the Amir, and everything was finally arranged for our start on the 15th. Maasum Khan was to accompany me on a kind of light marching tour of inspection through Persian possessions. We were to map out the localities with the aid of our respective Engineers; and the Amir was to give us guides and escort, and to have bridges repaired and other facilities afforded to practical locomotion. No mention was now made of returning presents: the visit of the Governor had been duly repaid and acknowledged; and I accepted, on behalf of myself and party, the invitation from the Amir of Kain to join him in a shooting excursion, and at breakfast in tents on the following morning."

**36. General Goldsmid's tour from Nasirabad. Remonstrances by Maasum Khan.**—On the 15th February, the party left Nasirabad on the understanding that they were to visit and map out places in the present possession of Persia. They marched first through Bahramabad to Dashtak, a large walled village with about 2,000 inhabitants. A deputation of the inhabitants, led by the village headman, attended the camp, and delivered an address describing themselves as the loyal and contented subjects of the Shah of Persia. As Maasum Khan had preceded the Mission and already taken up his quarters in the town, General Goldsmid looked upon this manifesto on the part of the inhabitants as arranged for his benefit. They then marched from Dashtak along the banks of the Helmund canal (also known as the artificial Helmund) to Burj-i-Alum where they crossed the canal, and thence through Kala-i-Nao or Kala-i-Dost Mahomed, held by Sirdar Sharif Khan, to Kohak on the real Helmund.

"From Kala-i-Nao we marched nine miles to Kohak on the Helmund. Here it is that the Amir (of Kain) holds possession of his great bund or dam across the river, whereby the main


body of the water is turned to the westward. We observed two canals, a large and a small one, running at first and for a short distance parallel to each other, which thus carry off the waters from their natural bed; but it is the former which is of sufficient importance to have been considered by modern travellers the Helmund itself, and which might certainly be called the

Ferrier.

'artificial' Helmund. From a careful and minute survey made by Quarter-master-Serjeant Bower, I am enabled to state that, at this particular point, the river is 520 feet wide, with a channel of 12 feet deep, and that the bund itself is 720 feet long, 100 feet thick, and 12 feet deep, with an outlet of 60 feet in width. This outlet is a lower and less thoroughly constructed section of the work, and allows a sufficient volume of water to pass at ordinary times to supply the ancient bed or main channel which discharges its contents into the expanse called the Hamun, some miles further down. At certain seasons, such as melting of the mountain snows, the waters overflow the whole construction, but at the period of our visit the Helmund below the bund is easily fordable. Although the diversion of the stream into the heart of Seistán by the means described is nothing new, and dates from days long prior to late Persian interference with the country, I doubt whether so secure and substantial a work as that of the Amir of Kain, now five or six years old, had ever been carried out at this particular point. Yet is it perfectly simple and intelligible, being composed of horizontally thrown tamarisk branches more or less interlaced, overspread with earth, and strengthened by perpendicular stakes driven in closely or sparsely as occasion serves. The Amir seems to have profited rather by building on a groundwork supplied by his predecessors than by working out a new design."

From Kohak they marched to Daki Dali, also on the Helmund, and thence to Kamal Bunder, a walled village and fort held by Sirdar Kamal Khan, Sanjurani, a Biluch Chief in Persian pay, and who acknowledged himself a Persian subject.

On the 21st February they left Kamal Bunder for Chaburjak, a fort and village on the opposite bank of the river, belonging to Imam Khan, Sanjurani, fording the Helmund at a distance of two miles, where the water was barely up to the horses' girths. From the point of crossing to the halting-place the distance was about nine miles. The country traversed was dry and sandy, with here and there patches of green wheat: near Chaburjak especially cultivation was apparent. Here Maasum Khan expressed his regret that General Goldsmid should have any doubt as to "the complete sovereignty of Persia" over the places visited, General Goldsmid replied that "he could not acknowledge any state of possession on either side until he had seen the places with his own eyes or made full enquiries thereon." Not satisfied with this, however, Maasum Khan again wrote expressing "surprise and regret" that, after seeing what he had done General Goldsmid was still unable to "assume that the country up the Helmund was in actual possession of Persia." He thought it better, under the circumstances, that he should return to Nasirabad and await the arrival of the Afghan Commissioner. General Goldsmid replied that, in his opinion, it would be better to halt one day and then go on to Rudbar. In the course of the day, General Goldsmid was visited by Sirdar Imam Khan, said to be first cousin to Kamal Khan, and also to Ibrahim Khan of Chakansur. The family tree was shown to be as follows:—



Both Imam and Kumal Khan had shares in Rudbar. Imam Khan, in the course of conversation, and in the presence of the Yawur, made allusion to the Shah as his sovereign.

On the morning of the 24th February they marched to Kila-i-Fath, keeping on the right bank of the Helmund, and on the 25th again encamped at the Amir's Bund at Kohak—this time on the right bank of the river. Here they crossed the river and marched on the 27th February to Agha Jan, whence they passed again to the right bank to the fort of Nád Ali, held for the Persians by a son of Sirdar Sharif Khan, Nhami, and which they were not permitted to enter. On the 28th February they crossed the river again, and proceeded *viâ* Jehanabad to Tiflek, for a short period the capital of the last Sarbundi Chief. At Jehanabad they were peremptorily warned off and resolutely denied admission, the soldiers musket in hand shouting to them from the walls. From Tiflek the route lay through Zaidan; Kasimabad; Jelalabad, the old Kaiani capital, into which they were refused admittance; and Burj-i-Afghan to Banjar, about five miles from Nasirabad, which they reached on the 2nd March 1872.

**37. Arrival of General Pollock and Syud Nur Mahomed at Banjar.**—On the 8th March General Pollock and Dr. Bellew, together with the Afghan Commissioner, joined the camp. Syud Nur Mahomed, the Afghan Commissioner, pitched his tents at a short distance from those of the Mission. Owing to the treatment he and General Pollock had met with on their journey, he positively declined to make the first call either on the Persian Commissioner or the Amir of Kain. The result was no visits were paid.

On the Mission camp being pitched, General Goldsmid again hoisted his flag, which had not been used since leaving Chiling. Explanation was immediately asked for by Yawur Azad Khan on behalf of the inhabitants of Banjar, but the General referred him to the higher authorities. After this, the flag was not again lowered. General Goldsmid thus concluded his report:—

“After perusal of this report, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council will probably not be unprepared to learn that the local work of the Commission is on the eve of completion, and that I am about to proceed with my camp to Lash-Jowain and Meshed *en route* to Teheran. Major Lovett has already left to complete his survey by a hurried visit to Chakansur, and is to rejoin me at Lash. Major-General Pollock and Dr. Bellew with the Afghan Commissioner move in the same direction as myself. I have asked the Persian Commissioner to accompany me, should he find it practicable; but he professes to have made arrangements to go by the route of Neh and Bandan, which I had intended to take and would have done so had my duties been more simple and regular. A few words will suffice to summarize the circumstances under which the Commission has been broken up and adjourned to Teheran. General Pollock had scarcely arrived in camp when we agreed that all hope of a fair enquiry was vain, and the sooner we moved away from Seistán the better. The palpable and shameless attempts at stifling plain speech and rejecting honest evidence by convening the meeting of Commissioners at Nasirabad, a Persian military settlement, and the endeavours to get rid of all obnoxious witnesses who were in the Afghan Commissioner's camp by innuendoes of collision, had culminated into unmistakeable offensive expressions in the three letters numbered 87, 88, and 92. The first questioned the propriety of my pitching tents at a place only five miles from Persian head-quarters; when Maasum Khan must have well known that I had come thus near to Nasirabad against my own wishes and to meet *his* wishes as far as possible. The second held out a threat of consequences if I did not cause certain persons in the retinue of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to be summarily dismissed. The third answered my call for a statement of claims and evidence in support, by writing that ‘after receiving through me a list of the claims advanced by the Afghan Commissioner, . . . then, if necessary, he would also give me his statement.’ Though I might have waited to reply to all the three letters at once by an argument of triple strength, I trust that Government will consider my patience to have been sufficiently tried, when the first letter was made sufficient cause for our immediate departure.”

**38. Brief *ad interim* report by General Goldsmid to the Secretary of State.**—On the 18th

\* No. 5, dated Camp Lash-Jowain, 18th March 1872.

March\* General Goldsmid reported to the Duke of Argyll that the work in Seistán was over; but whether, or in what way, arbitration was to progress at Teheran, would depend on the orders



he might receive from the Government of India. He then summarized his proceedings since arrival at Sekoha including his tour from Nasirabad and added—

“As the Afghan Commissioner did not join us until the 8th March, or one month and eight days after our arrival in Seistán, I employed the interval in ascertaining, as accurately as possible, ‘the actual territory which Persia had acquired in Seistán’ since 1865, and generally in recent years, and in obtaining as correct as determined by actual possession at the present time.”

*Para. 7.—Instructions to Colonel Goldsmid, dated India Office, 9th August 1870.*

and detailed a map as practicable, on which to mark off, whenever required, ‘a line of frontier as determined by actual possession at the present time.’”

On returning to Nasirabad, where he was joined by General Pollock and the Afghan Commissioners, he called for—

“A statement of claims on either side, and of the mode in which it was proposed to ‘substantiate them.’ In this, as in every attempt to realize a meeting of Commis-

*Agreement made at Teheran, 22nd October 1871.*

sioners or friendly intercourse, I regret to state that failure has been the result. But when, in my opinion, ‘nothing further was to be done on the spot,’ that is, when I was convinced—and General Pollock shared the conviction—that no good could, but harm might, probably result from remaining longer in Seistán, I decided on ‘returning to Teheran,’ and notified my decision to the Persian Commissioner. Should no instructions be received to the contrary, the question can still be ‘discussed with a view to its settlement,’ and I shall be prepared to ‘pass an arbitral opinion.’ But I propose to await instructions on the facts already reported to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India before commencing any final discussion at the capital.

“Ere leaving Seistán, I informed the Persian Commissioner that I should go by Lash-Jowain, north of the former province, as I wished Major Lovett to complete his survey by passing through Chakansur to the north-east, rejoining my camp at Lash. But, as he expressed himself unable to accompany me, I am moving only with General Pollock and the Afghan Commissioner. We may possibly overtake Mirza Maasum Khan *en route*, but I hardly anticipate such a result.”

**39. Statement by the Afghan Commissioner of the Afghan case.**—The following is Dr. Bellew’s translation of the statement submitted to General Goldsmid by Syud Nur Mahomed, the Afghan Commissioner, shortly after his arrival at Banjâr:—

*Statement of Afghan Commissioner.*

“Statement regarding the boundary between the kingdoms of Afghanistan and Persia is as follows: It is well known that, after the death of Nadir Shah, three new Kings in one day became rulers of their countries, as under-mentioned, *viz.*, the Kujjurs in Persia, Ahmed Shah Abdal in Afghanistan, and the King of Bokhara in Turan.

“The boundary between the kingdoms of Afghanistan as in the possession of Ahmed Shah, with the kingdom of Persia, as in the possession of the Kujjur King, was fixed through Chinair and Puliab Reshumi in Khorasan. This is mentioned, because by such a boundary both Turbutain and Khabf and Ghain are thus included within the boundary of Afghanistan, and even now the King of Afghanistan does not forego his right to that border, nor withdraw

*Extract from telegram dated Teheran, the 23rd October 1871, from the British Minister, to the Viceroy, Simla.*

“When the British, Persian, and Afghan Commissioners are all assembled together in Seistán, the Persian and the Afghan Commissioners, respectively, will state and substantiate their claims. If local enquiry be necessary, the Commissioners will proceed to any point for that purpose, and make a map of any districts without let or hindrance. When the British Commissioner considers that there is nothing further to be done on the spot, the Commissioners will then return to Teheran, where the question will be fully discussed with a view to its settlement, and the British Commissioner will also state his arbitral opinion.”

*Extract from letter of instructions to Colonel Goldsmid, dated India Office, the 9th August 1870.*

“Para. 7.—It was therefore resolved that the first object of your Mission should be to ascertain the actual territory which Persia had acquired in Seistán since the receipt of Lord Russell’s letter. The Persian Government propose that you should proceed as soon as possible to Teheran, and thence, accompanied by a Persian Commissioner, you should make your way to some point on the Seistán frontier. There, you would be joined by the Commissioner of Shere Ali, who would be accompanied by a British officer. The precise point of meeting (whether on the Perso-Afghan frontier, at Herat, or Lash-Jowain, or in Seistán itself, at Sekoha, or Chakansur), I must leave it to you to determine in communication with the representative of the Government of India. Having thus met the Commissioner from the Afghan side, you will proceed to examine the territory in dispute . . . laying down, as nearly as you can upon a skeleton-map of the country, not only the line of frontier as determined by actual possession at the present time, but also the two lines of frontier which would have to be respectively assigned if the claims of either one party or the other were admitted to their full extent . . . Having thus acquired all the local information you can obtain—

“The sequel has been modified by transfer of the final discussion to Teheran.”

himself from all claim to it, but, inasmuch as the district of Seistán is now under consideration, these places will not be further referred to now. As regards Seistán, it has always been in the possession of the rulers of Afghanistan since the country first came into their possession, and its rulers and Chiefs have always paid allegiance and revenue, and given service, to the Kings of Afghanistan, and, when necessary, have furnished militia troops according to the custom of the Afghan Kings. And the proof of it is in the fact that Suliman, Kaini, tendered allegiance to Ahmed Shah and gave him his daughter in marriage, and furnished troops and paid revenue to him; and, in the time of his son, Timur Shah, Zuman Khan, Popalzai, was his Governor in Kain and Neh and Seistán; but, he having rebelled, Burkhodar Khan, Achukzai, was sent against him, and, after the fights of Maikhana and Kandurak, reduced him. Popular songs of these events are at the present day current in Seistán. Again, on the representations of Mir Alum Khan, Mirzai, Shah Mahomed visited Seistán and gave the daughter of Bahram Khan, Kaini, in marriage to his son Kamran; and then Mir Khan, father of Mahomed Reza Khan, and Mir Hashum Khan, Shahreki, and Sirdar Khan Jehan Khan, Biluch, with other Biluchis being in attendance on him, he conquered Kandahar. After this, all these Chiefs and their troops were present with Wazir Futteh Khan, Barakzai, in the affair of Kafir Kila, and fought against the Persians. Many Seistánis were here slaughtered. Further, when the Prince Kamran was defeated at Kabul by the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan and fled to Herat, Hazi Feroz-ud-din, coming from Kain, was joined by Shah Pusund Khan, Ishakzai, and the Seistán troops and Mahomed Khan of Neh, and captured Furreh. Yet once more, in Hijri 1252, Kamran reduced Seistán to subjection, it having revolted to Kandahar, and, giving the daughter of Mahomed Reza Khan to Syud Mahomed Khan in marriage, realized the revenues of the country, and appointed Mirza Hadi Khan and Shahbaz Khan, Biluch, in Kimmuk, and Mahomed Reza Khan in Sekoha, as Governors of the district. Since this time the agents and troops of the rulers of Kandahar or Herat annually went to Seistán and collected the revenues of that place from the father of Mahomed Reza Khan, and later from Mahomed Reza Khan and other Biluch people, in accordance with the agreement between them, such as the 2½, or 'cheylo-ék,' &c.

"At the time that Sirdar Kohndil Khan, from reverse of fortune, went from Kandahar towards Teheran, Mahomed Reza Khan, Seistání, tendered his service and submission as heretofore.

"At the time Shah Sujah-ul-Mulk was at Kandahar with the British army, Sirdar Syud Mahomed Khan, by way of Jowain, joining Sirdar Shah Pusund Khan, proceeded to Seistán and brought 800 kharwars of grain thence to Furreh for the troops there. Again, when Asaph-ud-dowla with an army marched from Meshed to Ghain, the Mir of Ghain, Asadulla Khan, considering himself and his country as appertaining to the Afghan kingdom, fled and took refuge in Seistán. By order of the Wazir of Herat, the Seistán army under Mahomed Reza Khan and the Wazir's officers fought the Persian troops at Neh and defeated them. A second army from Meshed under Mahomed Ali Khan, son of Asaph-ud-dowla, marched on Ghain, and the Mir of Ghain, going to Herat, represented the fact, and the Wazir of Herat gave him troops for their expulsion. The armies met at Sikilla, in Ghain, and a fight ensued. The Persians were defeated and returned to Meshed, and abandoned their projects on the country. The Wazir's officers, having given Ghain and Burjund to the charge of Asadulla Khan as Governor, returned to Herat. After this, when Sirdar Kohndil Khan left Teheran with the intention of conquering Kandahar, and arrived at Seistán, Mahomed Reza Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan, and other Biluch, acknowledging their submission as of old, performed the duties of their position during his stay in Seistán. After this, when he left Seistán for Kandahar, on the part of Mahomed Reza Khan, his son, Lutf Ali Khan, with the Sarbundi Chiefs and Ali Khan and Dost Mahomed, Biluch, with other Biluchis, and on the part of Mir Hashum Khan, Shahreki, his eldest son, Mir Mehdi Khan, and others up to about 1,500 horse and foot, accompanied him as troops as far as Kandahar, in accordance with the previously existing custom, and, after the capture of Kandahar, Ali Khan stayed there, and the lands of Muhtushim were given to him in jagir by Sirdar Kohndil Khan; and Dost Mahomed having got his leave, his brother, Sharif Khan, came to Kandahar and remained for some time in service with Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan. After this, in the year 1260, according to the order of Sirdar Kohndil Khan, Sirdar Mebrdil then proceeded to Seistán for the purpose of planning a new contract for payment of revenue. He made a new treaty and fresh contract with Mahomed Reza Khan, as is evident from a perusal of the conditions of the treaty. In this interval Mahomed Reza Khan died, and his son, Lutf Ali Khan, succeeded him. About 18 or 20 years have elapsed since, having deceived the Chiefs of Kandahar and turned from the ways of his father, he conspired with Mahomed Akhundzadeh, Alekozai, Governor of Furreh, under Yar Mahomed Khan, ruler of Herat, and forcibly captured and brought into his own possession Chakansur, and, having appointed the agents of Yar Mahomed Khan in the other towns of Seistán, gained dominion over the district. After this year, Mahomed Khan posted Surfuraz Khan, Ishakzai, in Sekoha, with Lutf Ali and Mustufa Khan, Ishakzai, in Burj Alum Khan and Sharif Khan. Killa Dost Mahomed Khan (known as Burj Alum Khan) was at this time razed to the ground, and the traces of its destruction are still visible. Besides this, he took eighty tomans cash and many head of cattle and ten kharwars of rice, and sent it all to Ibrahimabad on the backs of men. He also destroyed the fort of Kinnuck. At this time, Murdan Khan, Mirzai, was posted, with some Herat troops in Deshtuk; he married the daughter of Mahomed Ali Khan, Shahreki, whilst here. Mahomed Khan, Nurzai, was posted in Kimmuk, and other Herat officials were also posted in other parts of the district

for its security. Sirdar Kohndil Khan, learning this, was much displeased, and appointed Sirdar Mehrdil Khan, Mir Afzal Khan, and Sultan Ali Khan, accompanied by Ali Khan, well-equipped force to punish the offenders. Dost Mahomed Khan with his retinue came to Rudbar or Lundi to meet and join the force. Ibrahim came to Mulla Khan, and Emam Khan and Kumal Khan also came forward to meet the force; and, all with their men, joined the army, which then proceeded and took possession of the district of Seistán, and, by the aid of Dost Mahomed Khan and Rustum Khan, Sarbundi, having captured Sekoha, put out the eyes of Lutf Ali. Having done this, Sirdar Mehrdil Khan re-appointed Ali Khan, brother of Mahomed Reza Khan, to the rule of Seistán as Governor; he having agreed to accept the post, provided that Lutf Ali were deprived of sight, and not otherwise. Yar Mahomed Khan, becoming aware of these occurrences, at once marched with an army for the re-conquest of Seistán, but died on the way there. Sirdar Kohndil Khan, in retaliation, prepared an army for the capture of Herat. Ali Khan, Governor of Seistán, himself with 2,000 horse and foot, according to ancient custom, joined the Sirdar's army, and continued with it till the return from Herat. At the same time, Dost Mahomed Khan, Biluch, and Mahomed Ali, Shahbreki, having previously joined Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, were with him at Furrah.

"These events occurred at the very time that the Persian Government were in correspondence with Sirdar Kohndil Khan concerning Herat, and the Persian army had advanced as far as Ghorian to prevent his march upon it, and the Khan Nazim, with the militia levies under Sam Khan, entered Herat. During all this time, and till the conclusion of this expedition, the Seistán army was incorporated with that of Sirdar Kohndil Khan, and did good service. When Sirdar Kohndil Khan found he could not succeed against Herat, he accepted the terms of the Persian Government and returned to Kandahar, and on the way dismissed Ali Khan and the Seistán troops at Furrah. When Ali Khan arrived in Seistán, he sent grain by way of revenue to Furrah, and made it over to the son of Sirdar Mehrdil Khan.

"After another year, in the attack on the old city of Furrah, the troops of Ali Khan were in the army of the Kandahar Chiefs.

"After a while, Ali Khan ungratefully fancied that, if he could gain a footing with the Persian Government, he might free himself from the rule of Afghanistan, as Herat had done, and might become independent. It is about 17 years since, with this object in view, he has been in correspondence, through his envoys, with the Persian Government.

"Sirdar Kohndil Khan, for reasons of his own, sent his son, Sultan Ali, to Teheran, and he was there at the time that Sirdar Kohndil Khan marched his army into Seistán. When he arrived at Shahmalun on the Gurmseyl border, he sent forward his agent, Burkhoda Khan, Barakzai, to Seistán, and, not receiving a satisfactory answer from Ali Khan, he next sent forward to him Syud Nur Mahomed Shah\* and Ali Khan, recognizing the claims of Afghanistan, and, being hopeless in the direction of

\* Now Afghan Commissioner.

(Sd.) F. R. P.

Persia, at this time, having collected 1,000 kharwars of grain as the revenue of Seistán, delivered it to Burkhoda Khan and the Agent of the Syud. According to Kohndil Khan's orders, Ali Khan himself, through his own people, loaded this very grain in boats and conveyed it across the Hamune to Jowain.

"It is now 15 or 16 years that a message by Sirdar Kohndil Khan was received from the Persian Government in a friendly spirit, to the effect that the people of Seistán had plundered the property of merchants on the Huftad Rah, and if the rights of the injured could be settled by him, it would be a strengthening of the bonds of friendship. Kohndil Khan, out of deference to the Persian Government, appointed his son, Sultan Ali, to the Government of Seistán, and he, having arrived there, recovered most of the plundered property, and restored it to the Persian merchants, and made over a portion to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at the Killa Koh Fort as he was passing through on his way to Teheran as ambassador from Kohndil Khan, and the Syud took the property, with the people in charge of it, along with him, and in his own presence saw them made over to the care of the Governor of Kerman, Khan Baba Khan. After this, Sultan Ali Khan, having collected his own 'Cheyloék' in cattle and sheep, went to Kandahar. The treaty between Sirdar Kohndil Khan and the Persian Government not being to the satisfaction of the Sirdar, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah was delayed at Teheran, and in this interval the Sirdar died, and the Kandahar province was attached to the Kabul Government, whilst the Persian army, having besieged and captured Herat, made it over to Sultan Ahmed Khan and returned to Persia. At this time, the Kabul Government was not intent on the Seistán province, for in many parts of the country the revenues are not collected annually, but only every second or third year, as may be found most convenient. After a while, Ali Khan, being distrustful, went to Teheran. The King of Persia gave a lady of the royal family to him in marriage and eight hundred muskets, and Surtip Saleh Mahomed Khan, with 500 horsemen, escorted him to Seistán and remained there one month.

The Seistánis consulted with Taj Mahomed Khan, brother of Lutf Ali Khan, in respect to the promises of Ali Khan, that by Persian aid he would free the country from Afghan rule, and then be free, whereas he had brought Persian troops into the country and ruled it very oppressively, and their condition was now worse than before, and it was to be feared that he would proceed to greater lengths. The result was that Taj Mahomed, with

the following Sarbundi Chiefs, viz., Mahomed Khan, Agha Jan Khan, Mahomed Ali Khan, Mahomed Amin Khan (now a prisoner at Teheran), Mir Jaffir Khan, Yuzbashi Hossein, and others of the people having agreed to the measure, they rose and killed Ali Khan, and wounded his wife, the Princess.

"At this time, Sirdar Ahmed Khan, Ishakzai, was residing in a garden near Sekohia, and the Surtip fled to him for shelter and was saved from death. The Sirdar also forwarded the widow under escort of his own servant, Golab, to Persia. He took her as far as Neh Bundan, and the Sirdar took the Surtip along with his own train to Lash-Jowain, where he stayed a month while news was sent to Meshed, and he was ultimately summoned to Persia *via* Neh and Bundan, where he joined the widow of Ali Khan (the Persian Princess), and went on to Teheran. After this, the Seistánis made Taj Mahomed Khan their ruler, and he sent priests and Sayids to the King of Persia to explain that Ali Khan, being worthy of death, had been killed, but that he (Taj Mahomed) had no cause of quarrel with the King of Persia, and hoped he would not suffer any injury at his hands. The King, considering that he had no claims, took no steps in the matter aforesaid. He passed over the offence, and would take no further notice of the affair. Subsequent to this, Seistán remained independent under the rule of Taj Mahomed for some time. But when the late Amir, Dost Mahomed Khan, besieged and took Herat, the Persian Government, finding the opportunity favorable, again renewed amicable relations with the people of Seistán, who sent Kohndil Khan, brother of Taj Mahomed Khan, to Teheran. After the death of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan and the return of Amir Shere Ali Khan from Herat to Kabul, and the contest for the throne which followed with Sirdar Mahomed Afzal Khan, the Seistáni Kohndil Khan returned from Teheran accompanied by the former Surtip, Saleh Mahomed Khan. He distributed money amongst the Sarbundi Biluch with the object of removing the enmity existing between Sirdars Ibrahim Khan and Taj Mahomed Khan, and reconciling them; but as the Surtip did not succeed, he left and returned to Teheran. As soon as he left Seistán, Taj Mahomed Khan and Kohndil Khan despatched an agent, named Suhrab Beg, to Kandahar, complaining that the Governors of Afghanistan were negligent of the affairs of Seistán, and representing that the agents of the Persian Government were coming to the country, and would not leave, and saying—we have nothing to do with the Persian Government, and beg you will not abandon us. Owing to the internal troubles at that time distracting the Afghan Government, the Governors of the country had no time or means of sending an army to Seistán, or of aiding the country; but Ahmed Jan Khan, Kakur, was sent back with Suhrab Beg for the purpose of re-assuring the people and ascertaining the real state of affairs in Seistán, and he carried letters and khilluts with him.

"On the return of Suhrab Beg to Seistán, the Chief of that province, learning the state of anarchy prevailing at Kabul, and fearing the anger of the Persian Government, owing to the departure of the Surtip in an angry frame of mind, again sent Kohndil Khan to Teheran. The Persian Government detained him at Teheran. At this time the Amir's eldest son, Mahomed Ali Khan, and his own brother, Sirdar Mahomed Amin Khan, were killed in action; and in this same year Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan took possession of Turkistan, and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, having joined him, took Kabul. The Amir set out from Kandahar for the re-capture of Kabul, and the Persian Government, finding the opportunity a favorable one, sent an army under the Muzuffer-ud-doula to Seistán, and Taj Mahomed, on their arrival, was forwarded to Teheran. As long as the troubles and civil war lasted in Afghanistan, the Government was not able to turn its attention to the affairs of Seistán; but during the past three years that the Amir has regained his kingdom and restored order and peace, he has refrained from action in the affairs of Seistán, owing to the friendly representations of English Government in view to a diplomatic settlement of the question between the Governments of Persia and Afghanistan. It is for this reason that the Persian invaders of Seistán are now unopposed in their possession of the country. Further, the Persian authorities have oppressed and plundered the subjects of Afghanistan as far as was in their power, and now it behoves them to refund the property plundered from Afghan subjects and to retire from the Seistán country.

"Further, whatever proofs and arguments may be necessary will be advanced by word of mouth at the time of discussion with the Persian authorities on the several points above noted.

"*Addendum.*—With reference to the enquiry in the letters forwarded as to the means of substantiating the claims advanced—

"*First*, a perusal of the above will show that each sentence of it is proof of the claims advanced, for, from the histories of the country during the past century, all the above facts are proved.

"*Second*, the treaty of Mahomed Reza Khan, with his seal and those of other Chiefs, is forthcoming.

"*Third*, the daughter of Mahomed Reza Khan, who was married to Syud Mahomed Khan when Prince Kamran came to Seistán, is still alive.

"*Fourth*, the wife of Ali Khan, wife's sister of Kohndil Khan, Sirdar of Kandahar, and aunt of Sultan Ali, his son, was given to him in marriage when he was at Kandahar: she is now married to Sharif Khan, Biluch. Let Ali Khan's son be asked who his mother was, and why Sirdar Kohndil Khan gave her to his father.



" *Fifth*, Sirdar Mehrdil Khan blinded Lutf Ali Khan. He is still living; let him be asked who blinded him. It is well known he was seized and blinded in Sekoha.

" *Sixth*, the Burj Alum Khan, which Mustafa Khan destroyed, and realised the revenue. The marks of its destruction are apparent. Let the judges see it and enquire who destroyed it, and why. Mustafa Khan is now present; let him be questioned.

" *Seventh*, the wife of Murdan Khan; he married her while Governor at Deshtuk. She is a Shahreki. He is present, and ready to be questioned. Let his brother-in-law be asked where they gave their sister in marriage to Murdan Khan, and whether he was Governor of Deshtuk or not.

" *Eighth*, it is known to all the people that the King of Persia sent an army for the repulsion of Sirdar Kohndil Khan from Herat, and that, at that time, Ali Khan, with all the Seistán Chiefs and army, was in the Sirdar's army, and that they did good service at Herat. If Seistán had been in the possession of Persia, how comes it that its troops fought in the army of Kohndil Khan?

" *Ninth*, it is a strong point for my claim; for, had Seistán been in Persian possession how could the people kill Ali Khan and drive out the Princess and Surtip Saleh Mahomed from the country?

" *Tenth*, Sirdar Ahmed Khan and other Duranis, and Sirdar Ibrahim Khan and Shah Pusund Khan, Shahreki, and all the Biluch Chiefs, should be summoned and asked whether the above written statements be true or not.

" *Eleventh*, there remains Sharif Khan, Biluch, and the Sarbundis, and Shahrekis, and Kaianis. If, through fear and risk of life, they do not screen themselves by denial, they will all, one by one, testify and verify the several statements above made. Truly and with justice they have cause for fear, because soldiers are posted over their houses and prohibit them from coming out of their houses, and, through fear, they cannot even sell us any grain. Further, their sons are held in confinement,—some at Teheran and others here in Seistán,—and, after our departure, they dread lest they be killed or plundered. How, then, can they speak? Many people have been bought over with money besides. Since, then, the people cannot speak through fear of the judges' desire to distinguish the truth from falsehood, and the opposite side, too, consent to their arbitrations, let us be withdrawn from the country together with the Persian soldiers and officials, and let the English officials stay and go round from village to village and ask of all the people, and see who is the rightful owner. Further, besides these proofs, there are many others which will be advanced at the meeting and discussion.

" It is clear as noon day that, if a stranger forcibly enters the house of any one and wins over his servants, either by money or violence, they will remain silent when the master of the house returns, or, perhaps, they may avoid what is contrary to his rights, and the intruder will consider himself the master of the house. In such a case what can the judge do?

" Let him act accordingly."

**40. Informal memoranda on Seistan by General Goldsmid and General Pollock.**—In a demi-official letter dated 17th March 1872, General Goldsmid forwarded a memorandum which will be found in Appendix III as the substance of the report which, if a report were required at the moment, he should place before Government on the data and materials before him. At the same time, he proposed to postpone for the present the submission of a formal report. A memorandum and demi-official letter from General Pollock, dated 11th and 18th March, on the same subject are also given in the Appendix above cited.

**41. Further correspondence as to the basis of arbitration.** General Goldsmid instructed not to deliver arbitral opinion unless the Persian Government accepted ancient right as well as present possession as basis.—With his report No. 17, dated 11th March 1872, General Goldsmid forwarded copy of a lengthy correspondence between himself and Maasum Khan on various matters connected with the Mission. On the 8th March, he called upon the Persian Commissioner to submit, in accordance with the agreement, a written statement of the Persian claims, and also inform him of the manner in which he proposed to substantiate them. He added that a similar letter had been written to the Afghan Commissioner. On the 9th March, Maasum Khan replied—

"after I receive through you a list of the claims advanced by the Afghan Commissioner and a silencing answer has by the grace of God been given him, then, if it is necessary, I will also give you my statement."



General Goldsmid in reply noticed that Maasum Khan had now declined either to recognize his (General Goldsmid's) authority to appoint a place of meeting for the Commissioners or that he should act in accordance with the agreement of the 22nd October 1871. Accordingly, General Goldsmid would carry out his intention of starting at once for Teheran. This correspondence led the Government of India to doubt whether there was yet a perfect agreement with the Persian Government as to the basis of arbitration. Accordingly, they referred the British Chargé d'Affaires at Teheran to the correspondence in question, and enquired whether it was certain that the Persian Government understood the basis of arbitration as to all Seistán to be, not present possession only, but ancient right also. If there was no doubt on the subject, they asked him to deliver the following message to General Goldsmid :—

“ Proceed in accordance with Alison's memorandum, dated 22nd October 1871, considering both ancient right and present possession as to all Seistán ; state arbitral opinion to Persian Government and Afghan Commissioner.”

If, however, it was doubtful whether the Persian Government so understood the matter, report was to be made to the Government of India and the English Foreign Office, without communicating with the Persian Government.

On receiving Mr. Thomson's reply the Government of India despatched the following telegram (No. 1337P., dated 17th June 1872) to the Secretary of State :—

“ We doubted from Persian Commissioner's letters to Goldsmid whether Persian Government understood basis of arbitration to be, not present possession only, but also ancient right as to all Seistán, and asked Chargé d'Affaires if basis was clear. He replies that he can only ascertain with certainty by communicating with Persian Government, and that Goldsmid expects instructions from Home on 20th. Is Goldsmid to receive instructions from you or from us. We should instruct Goldsmid in accordance with Alison's memorandum of October 22nd to call on Persian Commissioner to state case, and, if it shows doubt as to basis, to refer to Chargé d'Affaires, and not to proceed to deliver arbitral opinion unless clear that the basis is ancient right, as well as present possession.

“ We give no instructions to Goldsmid till we hear from you.”

The Secretary of State replied (23rd June) that the Government of India should instruct General Goldsmid as to the basis of arbitration, leaving any diplomatic action that might be required at Teheran to the English Foreign Office. Thereupon General Goldsmid was instructed as follows (telegram No. 1390P., dated 24th June 1872) :—

“ Require the Persian Commissioner to state claims, then discuss question fully. If Persian Government understand basis to be ancient right as well as present possession in all Seistán, deliver arbitral opinion ; if not, refer to Secretary of State for instructions, informing me.”

General Goldsmid then applied through the British Legation at Teheran for a statement of the Persian claims, and on the 13th July reported by telegraph that he had received it, that a day had been fixed for discussion, and that he proposed to deliver his arbitral opinion on the 20th or 22nd July. The Government of India being desirous of placing beyond dispute the question of the manner in which the Persian Government understood the basis of arbitration, telegraphed as follows to General Goldsmid (No. 1342P., dated 15th July 1872) :—

“ Your telegram of 13th. As you state intention to proceed to give arbitral opinion, Viceroy concludes Persian Government understand basis to be that described in my telegram of 24th June.”

On the 16th July General Goldsmid replied :—I take for granted basis shown in telegram 24th June ; and case given in by Persia argues right as well as possession. But if, in progress of discussion, I find it otherwise understood, I shall withhold arbitral opinion, and await instructions from Viceroy.

Subsequently, General Goldsmid asked for instructions as to the course he should pursue if the question of claims in respect of past raids should be raised. He suggested that in the absence of sufficient data as to what had actually occurred, his main object should be to obtain peace for the future. The Government of India expressed their concurrence in this view (telegram dated 17th July).

**42. Arrival of the Mission at Teheran. Statement of the Persian case called for.**—The Mission reached Gulabek on the 4th June, and the members were in due course received by the Persian authorities. On the 25th June, General Goldsmid applied, as stated in the preceding paragraph, through the British Legation for a statement of the Persian claims. After some delay Mirza Syud Khan wrote the following letter dated 8th July to Mr. Thomson, enclosing in it the memorandum translated below containing a statement of the Persian case:—

“I beg respectfully to state that notwithstanding that Seistán has been of old, and is at present, in the unquestionable possession of Persia, and that no Afghan Governor has ever exercised authority there; that the British Mission has in its official letters admitted Persia’s sovereign right over Seistán; that the letter of Lord John Russell, formerly British Minister for Foreign Affairs, has on every occasion been quoted as a strong proof; that General Sir Frederick Goldsmid has in his numerous letters admitted (Persia’s right) on this question; that the other strong arguments adduced by Persia completely relieve her from the necessity of discussing the matter; that Seistán naturally and indisputably belongs to her; and that the sense of justice entertained by the British Legation will admit these facts—yet, out of respect for the communication made by the Legation, certain arguments which are at present considered necessary are set forth in a paper enclosed herein. I invite the Mission in its sense of fairness and impartiality to admit (the truth of these statements), and I renew to it the assurance of my respect.”

*Translation of statement of arguments in support of Persia’s sovereignty over Seistán, dated 1st Jamadi-ul-Awul 1288 (8th May 1872).*

“I.—According to the principles of every civilized State, ancient and newly-acquired possession and rights, such as Persia holds in Seistán, would virtually dispense with the necessity of her producing any sort of proof in support of her undoubted right over that country. In like manner, to prove her sovereignty over other districts in her possession, Persia need not adduce any other evidence beyond the fact of long standing and actual possession, and, for the same reason, no other States would admit of a discussion in regard to countries which it might similarly possess.

“II.—The 6th, 7th, and 8th Articles of the Treaty concluded between Persia and England in 1857, strongly proves that Seistán unquestionably belonged to Persia, and they only stipulate that the Afghans should be excluded from their subjection to Persia. In the 8th Article it is specially stated that ‘the Persian Government engages to set at liberty without ransom, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, all prisoners taken during the operations of the Persian troops in Afghanistan.’ Now, as in the Afghan war the Seistán force under the command of Mir Alum Khan, Governor of Kain, was despatched by the Persian Government and was present in the action against the Afghans, it evidently follows that the Afghans had had nothing to do with Seistán, nor have they now; and that it is a country whose position is clearly shown in the Treaty; according to Treaty observing powers, no claim could therefore alter its condition.

“III.—The remonstrances addressed in an official letter by Mr. Ellis,—an Agent of the British Government, and well versed in geography,—to Shah Kamran, against his having sent his Vazir, Yar Mahomed Khan, to attack and plunder Seistán, is a proof and a full admission on the part of the British Government of the sovereign rights of Persia.

“IV.—From olden times up to the present day, it has never occurred at any time, or in any history, that any Afghan’s name has been mentioned as the Governor of Seistán; so that, if any claim is preferred by the Afghans, it might now (on that ground) be entertained in the opinion of civilized and just Governments. But from the time of the Sefavian dynasty, the ancestors of Sirdar Ali Khan, who were natives of Sirbend and Silahor,—and the letters of the late Sirdar Ali Khan, which are now in the Foreign Office, support this statement,—were appointed by the Persian Government, and have administered the Government of Seistán. Both Persian and European histories show that Seistán belonged to Persia; and even since the Kaianian dynasty, so amply described in history, some of the great Persian Generals were natives of Seistán, and this is still the case.

“V.—The official letters of the British Legation, dated the 10th, 13th, and 25th Sefer 1288 (=1st, 4th, and 16th May 1871), respecting Yakub Khan, son of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, clearly show that Seistán is within the dominions of Persia; and the memorandum of the British Legation, dated the 10th Rebi-assani 1288 (=29th June 1871), manifestly admits this fact.

“VI.—The letter of the British Legation, dated the 24th Rejeb 1288 (=9th October 1871), complaining of the disturbance caused by the Seistán force at Furrab and Kushbek, is a sufficient proof in support of this case.

"VII.—General Sir F. Goldsmid, in his correspondence with Mirza Maasum Khan, the Persian Commissioner, after having witnessed the authority exercised by Mir Alum Khan, a Governor and servant of this State, the stability of his possessions and the troops garrisoned by him in Seistán, represents him in his letters dated the 9th, 22nd, and 29th Zihejjeh 1288, as the Amir of Kain and Seistán.

"VIII.—General Goldsmid claimed the horse of Abdulla Khan, a Persian subject, which was lost at Borhek on the other side of the Helmund, and, on the ground that the owner was accompanying him as his guide, requested the Persian authorities to endeavour to recover the horse or its value, and he also requested the Persian Commissioner to supply him with provisions at Kaleh Imaum Khan.

"IX.—In his letter to the Persian Commissioner of the 29th Zihejjeh, General Goldsmid asked him for an escort as far as the frontier of Lash and Jowain. The proofs thus briefly adduced entirely relieve the Persian Government from the trouble of entering into any discussion.

"X.—The official letter written by Lord John Russell, formerly British Minister for Foreign Affairs, under date the 5th November 1863, justly withholds any civilized and Treaty-observing State from reviving a discussion on the present possessions of Persia in Seistán, and excuses the Persian Government from entering into such a discussion.

"XI.—There is no similarity whatever between the language and customs of the Seistánis and those of the Afghans which might justify and strengthen the opinion that it would be possible to mistake a Seistání for an Afghan.

"XII.—If a neighbour can act in opposition to the 8th Article of the Treaty of 1857, Persia *à fortiori* can re-open certain questions which might, God forbid, destroy that Treaty.

"XIII.—The letter which Kohndil Khan wrote, when scarcity prevailed at Kandahar, requesting permission from the Persian Government for the transport of provisions from Seistán to Kandahar, is a sufficient proof that no question was entertained as to Persian sovereignty over Seistán, and, if any person should now raise a claim, it should not be listened to by any civilized Power.

"XIV.—The names of the Afghan tribes are all well known. When was one of them ever called Seistání, so that it might become possible to assert that the Seistánis were originally Afghan emigrants.

"XV.—Further arguments of this nature exist to such an extent that it would take long to write them; the clear rights of Persia based upon Treaty, its documentary evidence, and the ancient and new possessions it holds in Seistán, are such that, in the just opinion of every State, Persia must feel secure from any doubt being entertained on the question. Therefore the Persian Ministers, supported as they are by the foregoing proofs, consider the whole of Seistán as unquestionably belonging to this State, and as much in its possession as are Yezd, Kirman, and Khorasan. If at certain places in that quarter, owing to reasons which are not unknown to the British Legation, the Persian Government has temporarily refrained from exercising its authority, and has not yet put down certain refractory parties, this fact will never justify any doubt as to the sovereign rights of Persia over that country; for districts in a similar condition sometimes exist in a country, and this state of things also happens in the territories and among the subjects of great European Powers; but when a suitable opportunity offers, each one exercises his authority and power.

"From the well-known sense of justice which guides the British Government and its adherence to Treaties, confidence has always been felt, and its friendship and sincerity also afford a full assurance that it will never consent that these clearly established, unquestionable rights of Persia should, in consequence of unfounded representations, unhappily become a source of discussion."

#### **43. Suggestion that the Amir should, under certain circumstances, receive compensation from British Government.—**

A question having arisen whether the raids said to have been committed on the Afghans should be discussed before the arbitrators, Generals Pollock and Goldsmid, both advised that this course was impracticable. General Pollock asked the Government of India whether he should merely refer the Afghan Commissioner to the Government of India for further information on this point, or whether he might hold out the hope that, in the event of the Amir accepting the arbitral decision in a manner acceptable to the British Government, a lump sum would be paid to him towards compensation for these raids. The amount of the claim made on this account was preposterous, but General Pollock believed that two lakhs would go far to settle matters and conciliate the Amir, whose hands had certainly been restrained since the Ambala Durbar by the strongly expressed wish of the English Government against all retaliation. He was desired, in reply, not to mention the subject of money at present. It was

pointed out that the question of the raids was quite separate from the arbitration, and should, if possible, be settled by the good offices of the British Minister which Mr. Thomson was accordingly asked to use.

**44. Rejoinder by the Afghan Commissioner to the Persian statement.**—On the 16th July a meeting of the Commissioners was held at the house of Mirza Syud Khan, the Persian Foreign Minister, at which the original statements of the Afghan and Persian claims were exchanged. An attempt was then made to argue the points at issue, but owing to interruptions on both sides calm discussion was found impossible. It was, therefore, agreed that both parties should submit their counter-statements in writing, and the following is a translation of that presented by Syud Nur Mahomed :—

*"Reply No. 1.*—Whereas the Persian Government claims continuous (or permanent *stumrari*) possession of Seistán, it is as clear as daylight that prior to the Kajar dynasty, in the time of Kurim Khan, Zend, and his descendants, Seistán was held by Ahmed Shah and his successors up to the Mahomedzai (Barakzai) rule. Proofs: The Zend dynasty was followed by that of the Kajars. Torabaz Khan, deputed by Shah Zuman (Durani), came to Persia. The Persian king, Futtch Ali Shah, told him that he wanted to take from the Afghans, Herat, Balkh, Zumdawur, Kandahar, Bost, and Seistán. This proves that (at that time) Seistán was held by the Afghans; that the Persian king admitted this, with reference to my statement formerly put in, that the Seistán troops formed part of the army of the Afghan Wazir at the battle of Kafir Killa. Let history be consulted as to the correctness or otherwise of this statement. Moreover, the graves of Seistánis are still to be found in Turkistan,—graves of men of the Ulus (*Elati*) who had gone on service with Afghan kings. It is also known that Seistánis served the Afghans in Hindustan, and that, at the investment of Herat by Sirdar Kohndil Khan, all the Seistánis were with him; but all details of Seistán have already been submitted; it is unnecessary to repeat. If the Persian Government is to be guided by justice, how can they urge continuous sovereignty over Seistán?

"The newly-acquired sovereignty (*tusullut judid*) of the Persians in Seistán is attributable to the internal dissensions that have prevailed for some years recently in the family of the late Amir, and is in no way founded on right, as stated in former paper.

*"Reply No. 2.*—As regards the reference to paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of the Treaty between England and Persia, and to correspondence with English officials, all these will be noticed (or dealt with) collectively at the end of my statement. As to the statement that the Seistán troops assisted the Persians at the siege of Herat, it is well known that the several attacks by Persia on Herat were caused by internal dissensions in Afghanistan, and that on every such occasion there were Afghan officials and Afghan subjects in the Persian ranks. If the Seistán troops served Persia, it must have been agreeably to the wish of the son of Kohndil Khan.

*"Reply No. 3.*—In this plea, the Persians themselves admit that Wazir Yar Mahomed Khan went to Seistán, and they write that Mr. Ellis objected, enquiring why the Sirdar attacked Seistán. If Seistán had not belonged to the Sirdar, why should he have gone there? Why should Seistán be considered Persian, because Mr. Ellis called the Sirdar's proceeding an attack? And what Persian Governor was there in Seistán that the Sirdar could operate against him? And at what time did Shah Kamran give up Seistán, as might be supposed from Mr. Ellis' writing? On the contrary, Shah Kamran himself visited Seistán, appointed Governors and collected revenues, and always either Herat or Kandahar Governors collected the (Seistán) revenues.

"If any attacks on Seistán may have taken place, that was on account of the disputes and differences between the Herat and Kandahar rulers.

"Why should Mr. Ellis, without proof or enquiry, decide as to rights, and write as he did? Or for what reasons unknown to me did he act as he did? The Persians in one place admit that the Afghans held Seistán, and in another place, in contradiction of this, enquire 'at what time had the Afghans possession, and who were their Governors?'

*"Reply No. 4.*—Who were the Afghan Governors? This is met by the admission of the Shah that he told Shah Zuman's envoy or wakil that he meant to take Seistán (and other places) from the Afghans. It is also admitted in No. 3 that Wazir Yar Mahomed Khan when to Seistán, as stated in my answer to No. 3. Both 3 and 4 prove Afghan possession; why, then, allege that not a single Afghan Governor has ruled in Seistán? It is needless to urge this further, as in my former statement I gave details of the Governors of Seistán.

"As to the references to European histories, let these be consulted as to the reigns of Ahmed Shah and Timur Shah in Afghanistan, and of the Zend kings in Persia; and, after that, reigns of the Kajars (in Persia) and of the Sadozais and Mahomedzais in Afghanistan.

"Under which kingdom was Seistán in those reigns?

"Persian history, too, unless Persian writers have shut their eyes to the justice of the case, will also show to whom Seistán belonged.

"As to Ali Khan's letter being considered proof that his ancestors were rulers in Seistán Sulaiman Khan, Kaiani, ruled Seistán under or for Ahmed Shah, and Bahram Khan held it under or for the descendants of Ahmed Shah.

"Shah Mahomed appointed Mullik Mahomed, Kaiani, as Governor of Seistán, but under (*matukht*) Futteh Mahomed Khan Wazir (commonly known as Futteh Khan the great Wazir,—F. R. P.). Later, Mir Khan, Sarbundi, was appointed Governor of Seistán, and, in like manner, Mahomed Reza Khan was appointed Governor of Seistán by the Kandahar Sirdars, who held Mahomed Reza Khan's agreement. After this, the son of Bahram Khan, called Jelaludin Khan, took refuge or shelter at Herat with Shah Kamran, while the two sides, Herat and Kandahar, quarrelled about Seistán. Ali Khan was a servant and recipient of pay of Sirdar Kohndil Khan at Kandahar. After the dismissal of Lutf Ali Khan, son of Mahomed Reza Khan, Ali Khan was appointed Governor of Seistán, and for years held the post and paid revenue.

"On one occasion secretly, and to serve his own purposes, he opened communications with Persia—an account of that has already been given (in former statement).

"The Persians themselves admit, in No. 1 plea, that Ali Khan wrote to them, and yet they talk of *istumrari tusurruft*.

"In several places they have completely contradicted themselves (*lanakuz*), and their contradiction proves them in fault.

"Many such instances (as Ali Khan's) have occurred of Afghan Governors and subjects entering secretly into correspondence with Persia. Such correspondence occurs in many countries at periods of disorder.

"As to the agreement entered into by Sultan Ali Khan (son of Sirdar Kohndil Khan) with the Persians, that agreement can just as well be brought forward hereafter for the right to Kandahar as to Seistán. How can such agreements as this affect rights?

"As to what the Persians write of the Safavi dynasty, what has that dynasty to do with the present one, or with the present case?

"The Afghans conquered the Safavians, and took their capital, taking Kandahar and Seistán on their way to it. After that, Nadir Shah cleared Persia of the Afghans, and also unseated the Safavis; and after Nadir Shah the boundaries were altered, *e.g.*, those of Azerbaijan; and in the direction of Merve and Balkh, Biluchistan, Khorasan, and others.

"As regards the Kaianis, this has nothing to do with the matter in hand, for the Kaianis extended half over Asia, and they are only referred to here as it is as well to notice each of the Persian statements.

"But there is this to be said, that, after the breaking-up of the government of the Kaianis, and the country coming into the possession of the Mahamud, Persia had its own Subadar separately, and Khorasan its own Subadar. In the time of Sultan Mahamud of Ghazni, Seistán formed a portion of Ghazni; in the Ghor dynasty, Seistán formed a portion of Ghor; and in the time of Shahrukh (son of Timur Lang), Seistán formed a portion of Herat. This can be seen from history. After Nadir it remained with Afghanistan.

"*Reply No. 11.*—As to the statement that the language and habits of the Seistánis differ totally from that of the Afghans, which of the Badakhshanis, Usbeg-Turkistanis, or Hazarehs, or Seahposh Kafirs, or Kharani Biluchis, Julkhis, &c., &c., who are subjects of Afghanistan, are like the Afghans in speech or customs? Nor can any of these be called Afghans. And amongst the subjects of Persia there are numerous races having neither the language nor customs of Persians, nor being called Kajars. Let justice be done. To whom should Afghanistan surrender the subjects enumerated above, or to whom should Persia give up her subjects other than Kajars?

"*Reply No. 13.*—A paper of Kohndil Khan's is mentioned. I cannot admit this. If I saw it, I might then reply as regards it.

"*Reply No. 14.*—That no Afghans are called Seistánis. Why should they be any more than they should be called Hazarehs, Usbeks, &c.? But still they can rule over Hazarehjat, Turkistan, and Seistán, and thousands of Seistánis have been taken away in service to Kandahar, and reside there, and numerous Afghans reside in Seistán; notably many descendants of Afghan rulers reside in Seistán.

"In addition to these, Biluch Sirdars in numbers, in Afghan service, have been brought into Seistán by the Duranis, and granted jagirs; thousands of them are still there; no one calls any of them Duranis or Afghans, any more than all Persians are called Kajars.

"Regarding the numbers not replied to—numbers referring to treaties, correspondence, &c.—it is not necessary that I should reply to these, nor have I the necessary information."

**45. Counter-statement of the Persian Government.**—The circumstances which led to the submission of these counter-statements have



been explained in the preceding paragraph. The following rejoinder on the part of the Persian Government was submitted to General Goldsmid on the 8th August:—

*Translation of a memorandum by MIRZA SYUD KHAN, to the British Legation, dated Teheran, 2 Jem II, 1287 (corresponding to the 7th August 1872).*

“The sovereign rights of Persia to Seistán are based upon four arguments:—

“*First.*—Persia considers the province of Seistán as an inseparable portion of her territory. By this assertion she does not mean to say that Seistán had never fallen into foreign possession.

“Owing to various revolutions it is possible that Seistán, like most Persian provinces, may have been frequently deprived of Persian authority. But the fact, nevertheless, remains that Seistán, whether at the time that it was under Persian jurisdiction, or when it fell into foreign hands, always constituted a portion of the Persian territory; so even now be this province as at present in the possession of Persia, or be it without authority, or under a foreign yoke, it will still in either case form a portion of the Persian territory.

“From the earliest date recorded in the history of this country up to the present day, the pages of Persian history are full of the name of Seistán. This province has for a very long period been a portion of Persia; indeed it was one of the first that contributed to the foundation of the ancient kingdom of Persia, and to the preservation of its authority. If Persia should for a time have been dispossessed of Fars or Khorasan, such a fact would not justify the conclusion that those provinces do not belong to her. Seistán's ancient affinity to Persia places her in a similar position; for, even if she were not in the possession of Persia, the manifold ties of race, of religion, of territory, and of history existing between them, would (suffice to) render her an integral part of Persia; for the same reasons, Khorasan and Kirman are now also integral portions of Persia.

“*Second.*—Persia does not admit that a temporary authority exercised by any people over a foreign country confers upon them a sovereign right to such country. But if this important principle is not recognized, and the temporary authority of a State over a foreign country is considered sufficient to establish its sovereign right thereto, Persia will be more willing than any other State to adopt this law; for it would be more advantageous to her than to any other Power. But as it appears impossible that any neighbouring tribe of Persia will accept it, Persia has no hesitation in asserting that, even should the Afghans have for a time exercised authority over the province of Seistán, such a temporary occurrence does not give them a sovereign right to that country, and, in accordance with the principle above quoted, Seistán is, by nature and by inheritance, a portion of the Persian territory.

“*Third.*—Persia now exercises her authority in, and is in actual possession of, Seistán. This possession is not merely due to conquest; for, as has been explained, Seistán had been *ab antiquo* a part of Persia, and has for ages been in her undisputed possession. The same grounds on which she holds Khorasan and Kirman entitle her to the sovereignty of Seistán. If, perchance, the possession of Seistán by Persia was at one time uncertain and neglected now in virtue of her natural and inherited rights, and in virtue of the authority she actually exercises there, Persia's sovereignty over Seistán is firm and secure.

“*Fourth.*—The British Government, by an official document, dated November 5th, 1862, decided that the sovereignty of Seistán should be settled by force of arms; and being now in actual possession of that country, the question of Seistán has, in accordance with the decision of the British Government, been disposed of, and the province is now in the hands of Persia.

“Persia considers that she has by these four arguments proved her sovereign right to Seistán—

*First.*—She considers the province of Seistán to have formed from olden times a part of the Persian territory.

*Second.*—She does not admit that the temporary authority of a people over a foreign country gives them a sovereign right thereto.

*Third.*—She has now firm and secure possession of Seistán.

*Fourth.*—In addition to her natural rights to that country, she considers Seistán to belong to her by conquest, in accordance with the decision of the British Government.

“The Persian Government feels no doubt of the truth of these four arguments, and cannot entertain the idea that persons possessed of foresight, and acquainted with the history and condition of this country, should hesitate to admit the force thereof. Nevertheless, should the Agents of the British Government still entertain doubts of the correctness of these arguments, it is requested that they may state them. The Persian Government is ready to remove the same from their minds by adducing clear proofs, and to confirm these four arguments upon which are based the sovereign right of Persia over Seistán, by furnishing them with any evidence that may prove satisfactory to them.”

On receipt of this statement General Goldsmid telegraphed on the 8th August to the Government of India that the delay in obtaining it had been longer than he had expected, that one more meeting had been arranged, and

that he intended, unless otherwise instructed, to deliver his award two or three days afterwards on the basis approved by the Viceroy. The Government of India answered (10th August) that they understood no difficulty had arisen as to the basis of arbitration being ancient right and present possession in the whole of Seistán. On this understanding they approved General Goldsmid's proceedings and intentions.

**46. The Persian Government apologize for Mirza Maasum Khan's conduct. General Goldsmid explains his decision. Protests by both Commissioners.**—At the final meeting of the Seistán Mission on the 19th August 1872, the new Persian Commissioner, Mirza Malcom Khan (Nazim-ul-Mulk), said that he had an official message to deliver to General Goldsmid from the Sadr Azim, to the effect that the proceedings of Mirza Maasum Khan, the late Persian Commissioner in Seistán, had caused him great regret, that they were disavowed and disapproved by the Persian Government, and that Mirza Maasum Khan had in no way carried out the instructions given him to assist and show honor to General Goldsmid in every possible way. To mark its displeasure, the Persian Government had set aside Maasum Khan in the negotiations that had been carried on on the Seistán question, and had moreover ordered that he should be suspended from all official employment for the space of one year from the present date.

General Goldsmid begged Mirza Malcom Khan to thank the Sadr Azim for his message, and then proceeded to explain his decision on the Seistán question. The following extract from the General's letter No. 46, dated 21st August, to the Government of India shows how it was received :—

“As soon as the Persian and Afghan Commissioners had clearly understood the result of the decision, Mirza Malcom Khan said that, as the representative of the Persian Government, it was his duty to protest, formally and officially, against the decision as now given. Had the arbitrator's opinion consigned Seistán in its entirety to Persia, he would have gladly accepted the decision; but as he was instructed to accept no decision that deprived Persia of even an inch of Seistán territory, he entered this formal protest. The limits of ancient Seistán, he said, should be determined by the engineers; but General Goldsmid reminded him that the Seistán of ancient days differed widely from that of the present date, and that, indeed, there was doubt in the province itself as to what were the actual limits of present Seistán. Persia, replied the Persian Commissioner, must have the whole of the province as it existed in the time of the Sefavian monarchs, or none at all; no division could be made; let it be decided to whom Seistán actually belonged, and of what Seistán actually consisted, and then let a decision be given affecting the *whole province*. The Afghan Commissioner said that in that he quite agreed with him; let it be decided to whom the *whole* province really belonged: it was quite impossible that an Afghan and a Persian should live in the same house together. He then, in a less decided manner, said he could not accept the decision.

“In reply to a question from General Goldsmid, Mirza Malcom Khan said that, in using the word ‘protest,’ he meant that the Persian Government would appeal against the decision to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London.

“The Afghan Commissioner then brought forward the question of compensation to be paid by Persia for raids on Afghan territory, which, he said, amounted to 25 lakhs. The Persian Commissioner said that that question would be dealt with when it was properly brought in writing to the notice of the Persian Government; and that there was also a claim against the Afghans for raids committed by them on the Persian territory.

“Some conversation then ensued as to the effect of the frontier line determined by the decision just given, during which the Afghan Commissioner said that one village in Seistán Proper was worth the whole of the desert tracts which had been given to Afghanistan on the right bank of the Helmund.

“The Persian Commissioner was furnished with a French copy and the Afghan Commissioner with an English copy of the summary and decision that had been read out by General Goldsmid, and each Commissioner also received a map of the province with the frontier as decided by arbitral decision. It was also notified that a Persian translation of the arbitral decision would be forwarded to each Commissioner.

“The meeting shortly after separated; but, before going, Mirza Malcom Khan repeated his formal protest against the decision, adding that Persia reserved her rights over the whole province.”

**47. Action taken by the Government of India on receiving telegrams intimating delivery of the award.**—The delivery of the arbitral opinion and the manner in which it had been received were telegraphed by General Goldsmid to the Government of India. On the 20th August, General Pollock added the following telegram as to the attitude assumed by Syud Nur Mahomed, the Afghan Commissioner :—

“ Syud entirely in hands of Government; will accept arbitration for Amir, only putting in objection should Government think this necessary for Amir's dignity; but begs Amir may not be told result of arbitration till he, Syud, has seen you. Suggest your telegraphing to Minister here in spirit of your No. 2731, dated 21st December last, to impress on Persia necessity for taking no offensive action in Seistán pending result of Persian appeal.”

The Government of India thereupon instructed General Goldsmid that under Mr. Alison's memorandum, dated 22nd October 1871, the final decision would now rest with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and desired him to act accordingly. Mr. Thomson was informed that the Viceroy expected the Persian Government to restrain its local officers from altering the *status quo* pending decision of Her Majesty's Government. The following kharita was then addressed to the Amir explaining to him how the case stood :—

“ I have received information by telegraph from Teheran that, on the 19th of last month, Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid delivered his arbitral opinion in the matter which is in dispute between Your Highness' Government and that of His Majesty the Shah of Persia with regard to the sovereignty of Seistán.

“ A copy of General Goldsmid's award has not yet reached me, but I am informed that his award has been objected to. In accordance, therefore, with the terms agreed to, both by Your Highness and the Persian Government, the final decision of the matter will now rest with Her Majesty's Government in England.

“ Generals Goldsmid and Pollock have accordingly proceeded to England, and Your Highness' Commissioner is now on his way back to Kabul. He was to leave Teheran about the end of August, and may be expected to reach Bombay about the end of October. I have issued instructions to my officers to receive and treat him in his journey through India with the attention and honor due to his position as Your Highness' Commissioner.”

It will be convenient to enter here the Amir's reply to this letter. It was as follows (dated 14th October 1872) :—

“ Your Excellency's letter, dated the 11th September last, intimating, in addition to other matters, that the settlement of the Seistán question had been referred to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen, reached me on Tuesday, the 20th Rajub, and caused me great joy and gratification.

“ Since the prosperity and welfare of this Government has been always contemplated by the English Government, I therefore strongly hope that, by some means or other, the bud of desire of the heart of this friend may, by the agitation of the favor-scented gales of the British Government, become expanded and blooming, that is to say, that Seistán may be acquired according to the claim preferred.

“ I presume that a copy of General Goldsmid's decision has been received and perused by Your Excellency. If, out of friendship, and in order to satisfy my mind, information be conveyed of the subject of that decision, or an inkling of the same be given, it will be esteemed a great favor.”

**48. Condensed arbitral opinion delivered to the Commissioners.**—A full statement of General Goldsmid's decision will be found in Appendix V. The following statement is the condensed opinion which he actually delivered on the spot :—

“ The arbitral opinion which I am required to deliver has been formed after perusal of the several histories of Seistán, of more general note, after examination of much oral and written evidence, and after a stay of 41 days within the localities under dispute.

“ Naturally the more immediate argument with which I have to deal is contained in the statements authoritatively given in by the Persian Government (through their Foreign Office, or Mirza Malcom Khan) and Afghan Commissioner.

“ *Summary.*—I proceed to summarize my views on the whole question, and to place on record an arbitral opinion :

“ I.—Seistán was undoubtedly in ancient times part of Persia, and she appears to have been so especially under the Safavian kings. Also under Ahmed Shah, she formed

part of the Durani Empire. Further, she has not been recovered to Persia until a very recent date, and that only partially and under circumstances the nature of which materially affects the present enquiry :

" II.—Ancient association, together with the religion, language, and perhaps the habits of the people of Seistán Proper, render the annexation of that tract to Persia by no means a strange or an unnatural measure. But Persia has no valid claim to possess it on abstract rights, whether the country be taken from Afghanistan, or whether it be deprived of independence. The period referred to for former connection is too remote. A century of disconnection cannot fail to be a practical bar to validity.

" III.—The possession of the Afghans for the second half century may have been more nominal than real, and more spasmodic than sustained. It may have been asserted by raids and invasions, or mere temporary tenure; but it has nevertheless a certain number of facts in support, and these are most material in an enquiry of this nature.

" General principles and theories are always important, but they cannot produce facts; whereas facts have a more practical significance, for they support and establish general principles and theories.

" Neither ancient association nor natural sympathy are strong enough to nullify the force of circumstances, and circumstances show that Persia has exercised no interference in the internal administration of Seistán from the days of Nadir Shah until a very recent date.

" IV.—Geographically, Seistán is clearly part of Afghanistan, and the intrusion of Kain into that province is prejudicial to the delineation of a good natural frontier.

" It has been commonly considered part of Herat and Lash-Jowain, though its dependence on the Helmund for irrigation may cause it to be included by some in the general valley of that river. The Neh Bundan hills manifestly separate Seistán from Persia.

" I cannot but believe that such would have been found to be the status had an illustrative map accompanied the 6th Article of the Paris Treaty.

" V.—But while, in my opinion, Afghanistan has the advantage in claims on the score of an intermediate tenure, superseding that of Nadir or the Safavian kings, it cannot be denied that from year to year she has been relaxing her hold over Seistán; and this has been evinced in a marked manner since the death of Wazir Yar Mahomed.

" It would be absurd to contend that the second half century of Afghan connection with the province has been a period of continuous possession.

" That Seistán has now fallen into the hands of the Amir of Kain, can only be attributed to the helplessness of its independence and the personal action of its ruler. It was, for a time at least, out of the hands of Afghanistan. I do not admit that the manner in which Seistán was occupied by Persian troops corresponds with an appeal to arms such as contemplated by Lord Russell's letter quoted.

" There was no fair fighting at all.

" Nor can it be admitted that allegiance was obtained by the single means of military movement, or open procedure of any kind. On the other hand, I cannot see that the Afghans took any measures to counteract the proceedings of Persia when treating with Ali Khan, Taz Mahomed, or other Seistán Chiefs.

" VI.—As the Seistán of the present day is not the separate principality of the past, and it is essential to a due appreciation of claims that the parts in possession of either side should be intelligibly defined, I revert to a territorial division which has appeared to me convenient and appropriate.


" By this arrangement the rich tract of country which the Hamun on three of its sides and the Helmund on the fourth cause to resemble an island is designated 'Seistán Proper;' whereas the district of Chakansur and lands of the Helmund above the bund and Seistán Desert are known as 'Outer Seistán.' The first may be considered in absolute possession of Persia, and has a comparatively large and mixed population. The second is either without population, or inhabited chiefly by Biluchis, some of whom acknowledge Persian, some Afghan, sovereignty.

" The professions of Kumal Khan and Imam Khan do not, however, to my mind, prove a possession to Persia similar to that of Seistán Proper.


" Chakansur, on the right bank of the Helmund, is under the Afghans; but the fort of Nád Ali on the same bank has been lately taken by the Persians.

" VII.—I have to consider ancient right and present possession, and repeat briefly my opinion on both of these heads:

" That Seistán was incorporated in the Persia of ancient days; but the Afghanistan of Ahmed Shah, which also comprised Seistán, had not then come into existence; and it is impos-







sible to set aside the fact that this kingdom did exist, any more than that Ahmed Shah was an independent monarch. That the possession of Seistán obtained in recent days by Persia cannot affect the question of right as regards Afghanistan. If admitted at all, under the circumstances, it can only be subject to certain restrictions, and with reference to the people brought under her control.

*“Arbitral opinion.*—Weighing the merits of the cases either side as gathered from evidence of many kinds, and with special regard to the great advantages of a clearly-defined frontier, I submit an opinion that the tract which I have called ‘Seistán Proper’ should be hereafter included by a special boundary line within the limits of Persia, to be restored to independence under Persian protection, or governed by duly appointed Governors. This opinion is accompanied by the sincere and earnest hope that the Persian rule will be beneficial to a people whose normal state has been from time immemorial one of terror and suspense and suffering.

“But I am thoroughly convinced that, by the rules of justice and equity, if Persia be allowed to hold possession of a country which has fallen to her control, under such circumstances as those detailed, her possession should be circumscribed to the limits of her absolute possession in Seistán Proper, so far as consistent with geographical and political requirements.

“She should not possess land on the right of the Helmund.

“If, in a question of ancient right and present possession, a military occupation of six or seven years, and the previous action of a local Chief, be suffered to outweigh right and associations extending more or less over a whole century, and arbitration award the most coveted, populous, and richer part of the Seistán province, it is manifestly fair that some compensating benefit should accrue to the losing side.

“It appears, therefore, beyond doubt indispensable that Nád Ali should be evacuated by Persian garrisons, and the banks of the Helmund above the Kohuk Bund given up to Afghanistan. And this arrangement becomes doubly just and proper when the character of the inhabitants along the banks of the river is compared with that of the Seistánis of Sekoha, Deshtuk, and Seistán Proper.

“The main bed of the Helmund, therefore, below Kohuk should be the eastern boundary of Persian Seistán, and the line of frontier from Kohuk to the hills south of the Seistán Desert should be so drawn as to include within the Afghan limits all cultivation on both banks of the river, from the bund upwards.

“The Malik Seah Koh on the chain of hill separating the Seistán from the Kirman Desert appears a fitting point.

“North of Seistán the southern limit of the Naizar should be the frontier towards Lash-Jowain.

“Persia should not cross the Hamun in that direction. A line drawn from the Naizar to the Koh Seah Hill near Bundan would clearly define her possession. It is, moreover, to be well understood that no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmund.

“*P.S.*—A map, showing the boundaries claimed as well as those of proved possession, has been prepared to lay before the final meeting.

“A smaller map illustrating the country awarded by arbitral opinion will be given, with a copy of the said opinion, to each Commissioner.”

#### 49. Despatch from the Government of India to Secretary of State on the arbitration.—In

No. 30.P., dated Bombay, 18th November 1872.

forwarding the papers to the Secretary of State the Government of India expressed their opinion on the award in the following terms, leaving its confirmation to the decision of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs :—

“So far as we are in a position to form a judgment, the award seems to meet the fair and reasonable claims on both sides, and, so far as the interests of India are involved in the question, we shall be satisfied if the award is confirmed. If, however, through the diplomatic action of the Minister of Teheran, after the final decision of Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been given, the Persian Government could be induced to give some guarantee for the reduction or limitation of her armament in Seistán, we believe that a fruitful source of misunderstanding between the Persian and Afghan Governments would be removed. The Government of India can generally be in a position to influence the Amir in the matter; but the massing of Persian troops, and the erection of fortifications in Seistán, must naturally be looked upon by the Amir as a threat; and the establishment of cordial or even amicable relations between Persia and Afghanistan will, under such circumstances, be difficult.

"2. It will be for Her Majesty's Government to decide whether the final settlement of the boundary should be recorded in a Treaty. If such a Treaty be concluded, we would suggest that it should also contain stipulations by which the Persian and Afghan Governments bind themselves not to construct or maintain fortifications within the territories assigned to them respectively under the award, and to locate no greater military force therein than may be necessary for the ordinary administration of the country."

---

## APPENDICES TO CHAPTER I.

---

*Appendix No. I.—Mr. Eastwick's memorandum on the Persian claims to Seistán.*

*Appendix No. II.—Duke of Argyll's instructions, dated 9th August 1870, to General Goldsmid.*

*Appendix No. III.—Memoranda on Seistán by Generals Goldsmid and Pollock.*

*Appendix No. IV.—A report on Seistán by General Goldsmid, dated 22nd May 1872.*

*Appendix No. V.—Complete statement of General Goldsmid's arbitral opinion.*

## CHAPTER II.

### SEISTÁN ARBITRATION. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE DELIVERY OF GENERAL GOLDSMID'S ARBITRAL OPINION AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF LORD GRANVILLE'S FINAL DECISION. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE AFGHAN COMMISSIONER.

**50. Appeal lodged by the Afghan Commissioner against the award.**—On his return to India, the Afghan Commissioner met the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) at Bombay. He said that he had handed in a paper of objections, but had made no formal appeal at Teheran against the award. Lord Northbrook having expressed his willingness to receive and forward any statement which Syud Nur Mahomed might wish to make, the latter observed that he had prepared a written memorandum of the objections which he would send to the Foreign Secretary. Subsequently, Lord Northbrook advised the Secretary of State that until this memorandum had been received and considered, the final decision upon General Goldsmid's opinion should be suspended (telegram No. 79C.P., dated 25th November 1872). The following is a translation\* of the Syud's appeal:—

“This is to form an appeal to the British Government in regard to the rights of Afghanistan over Seistán.

“As representative of the Amir of Afghanistan, I beg to state that I cannot agree to the decision of General Goldsmid on the following grounds:—

“1. The claim of Afghanistan has not been fully met. Territory which, for the last 50 years, had passed from the Kajar rulers to the possession of those of Afghanistan and formed part of the latter country, is, by this decision, being restored to the former, to be incorporated as a part of Persia. The said territory belongs to Afghanistan as shown—*1stly*, by those uncontroverted proofs and arguments which were recorded, and given by me to the said officer at Seistán on the 29th Zilhijja 1288; *2ndly*, by the statement recorded and given in at Teheran on the 14th Jamadi-ul-awal, refuting the claim of Persia and establishing that of Afghanistan; *3rdly*, by the verbal arguments advanced by me in presence of the said officer to the agents of Persia on the 5th Jamadi-ul-sani; and, lastly, by historical and geographical proofs, and the result of enquiry recorded by that officer and generally admitted by people in Seistán.

“2. General Goldsmid records his views and convictions in certain paragraphs, and makes a disposition of territory in paragraph 6, and lays down in paragraph 7 that Seistán Proper, which had come recently under the possession of Persia, should be hereafter included by a special boundary within the limits of Persia, and form a part and parcel of that country, while the fort of Nad 'Ali, lying to the east of the Helmund, and which originally did not belong to Seistán, and had more recently been occupied by Persia, should, as a compensating benefit, be given up by that Government; also, that territory on both banks of the Helmund above the Kohuk Bund should be left with Afghanistan. My reply is, that this decision having made Seistán a part of Persia, is damaging to Afghanistan, and will form an actual ground for future disputes, because it removes the well-defined boundary which existed between the possessions of the two Governments over a distance covered by three or four days' journey over hills and deserts on the Persian side of which were situated successively Hinno, Bundan, Duroh, Kuzug up to Turbuttein, and on the side of Afghanistan, Seistán, Lash, and the Killa Kah up to Herat and Kusan; so that the Persians passing over those hills and deserts and possessing Seistán have actually become mixed up with, and entered the homesteads of the Afghans, rendering peace and security on both sides an impossibility. The result of this decision would be to remove the said well-defined boundary, and to give Persia a territory which, ever since the commencement of Afghan rule, belonged to, and was possessed by, Afghanistan.

“The district which is supposed to belong to Afghanistan has never, during late years, been considered by the Afghans as forming a part of Seistán. The territorial division of that part has been as follows:—

“The neighbourhood of Chakansur belongs to Khush territory, while that of Taraku and the Killa Put, &c., belongs to Rudbar. Gurum Sail and the headworks of the irrigation streams that water the lands of that district are situated in Rudbar itself and belong to Afghanistan, and were granted as service jagirs to the ancestors of the present Biluch possessors by the rulers of that country. The tract known as Seistán Proper was the property of, and possessed by, the Afghan kings. Some of the villages there are yet inhabited by

---

\* Sent home on 4th December 1872.

Afghans, while some others, possessed by the Chakansur Biluch, Ibrahim Khan, were granted as jagir to him by the same authorities. That all these lands should now be regarded as Persian is an impossibility.

" 3. The existence of the separating and well-defined boundary has, up to this time, prevented injury and loss on either side, and the subjects on either side could not mix. Persia, in passing this barrier and bringing itself in close contact with Afghanistan, has other and important objects in view, and all her past actions bear evidence in favor of this view. It is well known, and requires no proof, that she has always tried to profit by internal feuds in Afghanistan, and, encroaching by degrees, she ultimately, by the assistance of some of the contending parties in Afghanistan, has made several attempts to take possession of Herat, in which, however, she was defeated by the interference of the British Government. Baffled in this, she has attempted to carry out her cherished object by turning to Seistán, which appeared to her to offer a more favorable means of securing that object; and so it certainly does in some respects. Taking advantage of the disorders following the death of the late Amir, she took possession of the province, not by direct, but by deceitful, means. To show her power in the province, and to frighten the people there into submission, she carried off the property of the people on the borders amounting to nearly 25 lakhs, and has been intriguing, openly and secretly, with both the Afghan and Biluch population of the parts, giving open and secret subsidies to them.

" Those of the people who give in to Persia receive seed and other advances, and are encouraged to improve their holdings, while those who refuse to show their allegiance to Persia are tyrannized over with the view of forcing them to submit. How can life be endurable with an adverse Power thus keeping an idea before it, and trying to take every favorable opportunity of carrying it into execution? Without a separating boundary the thing is impossible, and Afghanistan cannot overlook the position, fraught, as it is, with ultimate danger and loss to herself.

" 4. General Goldsmid records in paragraph 5 that the rulers of Afghanistan have from year to year, latterly, neglected to uphold their authority in Seistán, and he has affirmed that the second half century of Afghan connection with Seistán has not been a period of continuous possession. General Goldsmid also asserts that, while Persia was making overtures to Ali Khan, Taj Mahomed Khan, and all the other Chiefs in Seistán, the Afghans did not take any measures to oppose and defeat those negotiations. With reference to this, I say that the above view of the General, so far from invalidating the claim of Afghanistan, actually supports it, because that view itself must show that Persia had no right of possession in Seistán. The negligence of the Afghans led to Mir Alum Khan, Kaime, obtaining by intrigue a footing in Seistán. Now I ask if it is justifiable for any person to get unlawfully into another's dwelling and call it his own, because that other, from being otherwise employed at the time, or from grounds of expediency, has neglected to guard against such intrusion? But my communication of 29th Zilhijja 1288 has replied to the charge of negligence and want of continued and uninterrupted possession of Afghanistan, showing that such possession, as required by Afghan usage, had been kept up. Also, it was shown to General Goldsmid, in verbal communication at Teheran on the 5th Jamadi-ul-sani, that eight years ago Ahmed Jan had gone into Seistán and collected revenue. It was also represented in my said communication of 29th Zilhijja that there is many a province of Afghanistan which has been for years together unvisited by a Revenue Collector. These provinces might as justifiably be taken possession of by intruders. Every State has its own peculiar usages and customs, and is at liberty to make such arrangements as it likes within its own territory.

" With regard to the overtures with Ali Khan, I have already remarked in the above communication of 29th Zilhijja that the said Ali Khan was killed and Shahzada Khanum wounded on that very ground; also, that the Persian General was expelled from Seistán; and that the Shah, sensible of his want of right, had thought it best for him to keep silence and make no further stir in the matter.

" The Persian officers were informed by me, in presence of General Goldsmid, in the personal interview on the 5th of Jamadi-ul-sani, that Ali Khan had been punished for this very offence and the Persian flag torn down. With these facts, what more was required to constitute an opposition on the part of the Afghans to the encroachments of Persia? As to overtures made by Persia to Taj Mahomed Khan and the other Chiefs, this point has also been noticed in my communication of 29th Zilhijja above referred to. This occurred when Afghanistan was in a troubled state, and the late Amir engaged in besieging Herat. Persian agents then found an opportunity of making overtures to the Seistán people. Later again, about seven or eight years ago, while feuds were distracting the Afghan ruler's family, Persia found opportunity to send Muzaffur-ud-dowla with troops to Seistán, of which she took possession and carried Taj Mahomed and other Chiefs as prisoners to Teheran. Such occurrences have often taken place in kingdoms during periods of temporary lax of authority. They cannot, however, militate against the rights of the kingdoms concerned. When, latterly, peace was restored to Afghanistan, the Amir's Government refrained from all hostilities against Persia, out of respect for the friendly advice of the British Government that the settlement of the question should be left to arbitration, and so the usurpation of Persia continued in Seistán, and Persia did as she liked, carrying off large amounts of property, as shown in paragraph 3.



"5. By General Goldsmid's decision the interests of Afghanistan are entirely overlooked, and she, therefore, can under no circumstances agree to its terms. The decision on many grounds adds to the power of Persia. Persia, in pursuance of her policy of aggrandizement, will be encouraged by this intrusion in Seistán to carry out hostile intentions against other parts of Afghanistan. It is therefore incumbent on the ruler of Afghanistan to anticipate Persia's designs and provide for them in time.

"6. As long as Persia holds a footing in Seistán, the object which the British Government had in view, *viz.*, the prevention of all dispute between the two Powers, remains unattained, because Persia has taken possession of Seistán with ulterior objects as detailed in paragraph 3.

"The decision under remark, moreover, leaves Afghanistan in a worse position in many respects:—

"1stly.—Because Persia formerly acted with secrecy and caution, and with uncertainty as to whether or not she could retain possession of her acquisitions. The decision has removed this doubt and uncertainty.

"2ndly.—The people of Seistán Proper have hitherto acknowledged dependence on Persia under compulsion, and the Biluch and Afghan population of the neighbourhood thought that Seistán was not ultimately to remain in her possession, while, now the latter have been disabused, the former will more than ever look to Persia. Ibrahim Khan, Biluch, disappointed in his expectations regarding his villages usurped by Persia, which are referred to in paragraph 2, will be compelled to fly in despair, and the other jagirdars on the frontier of Afghanistan will also be reduced to desperation. If Seistán Proper be allowed to remain with Persia, it will conduce neither to the security and well-being of the people, nor the integrity of the boundary in that direction. The parts of the province left to Afghanistan consist on three sides of waste lands hardly capable of reclamation. The country affords with difficulty a subsistence even for the scanty population that inhabits it. To admit the title of Persia over Seistán under circumstances so unfavorable to Afghanistan, cannot but be permanently disastrous to the latter.

"7. Being fully aware of the wish and anxiety of the British Government to remove all causes of trouble between the two Powers and secure prosperity to the people, I have considered it incumbent on myself to demonstrate how disastrous the arbitral decision will prove to Afghanistan and how favorable to Persia, and to lay before the Government all the bearings of the question. Independently of these considerations, there is no reason why any portion of Afghan territory should, without sufficient ground, be allowed to pass to Persia.

"The sincere friendship of the British Government leads me to hope that it will not allow Persia to gain possession of Seistán merely by asserting her right to it, unsupported by any proof, and in face of the unanswerable proofs and arguments which Afghanistan has adduced in respect of her right to the province, and of the damage certain to result from such a step. The British Government should enquire fully into the rights of the case, and the question should be determined after full consideration of all arguments based on historical and geographical grounds, as well as with regard to the peace, prosperity, and well-being of the people. It should be carefully weighed what arguments adverse to the claims of Afghanistan put forth by Persia in her paper of the 1st Jamadi-ul-awal 1289 have not been met and refuted."

**51. Memorandum of a conversation between the Viceroy and the Afghan Commissioner at Poona on the 25th November 1872. Compensation for losses incurred by Afghan subjects in Persian raids.**—Arrangements were also made for Syud Nur Mahomed to meet Lord Northbrook at Poona. He was received on the 25th November at an interview, at which, in addition to the Viceroy, Mr. Aitchison and Captain Henderson, Secretary and Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department, were present. The following is a memorandum of the conversation which ensued:—

"His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by informing the Commissioner that he had perused the papers submitted by him on the subject of the Seistán arbitration, and would forward to Her Majesty's Government the appeal the Commissioner had put in against the arbitral decision of General Goldsmid. His Excellency further observed that Her Majesty's Government would be requested by telegraph to delay the final award pending receipt of this appeal.

"The Commissioner then enquired what definite communication he would be at liberty to make to the Amir on the subject of the award. His Excellency replied that, as the Commissioner was aware, the final award would be given by Her Majesty's Government, and that the decision did not rest with the Government of India. His Excellency continued that, in his own opinion, it was probable that the decision of General Goldsmid would be upheld. The Commissioner next observed that he was not in possession of the grounds on which the Persian Government had appealed against General Goldsmid's arbitral opinion, for he possessed a copy of a letter written by the King of Persia himself, which shows that the Persian Government formally abandoned all claim to any territory in Seistán beyond that awarded by General Goldsmid.

"Even if the Amir should eventually accept the decision of the British Government on the Seistán question, the Commissioner continued that he nevertheless thought it his duty to state his grounds for objecting to General Goldsmid's award.

"His Excellency next remarked that the British Government considered the settlement of the Seistán question to be one of great importance. It was very desirable, when once the final award had been given, and the boundary between Persia and Afghanistan had been determined, that bygones should be bygones, and that no further subject of dispute should be allowed to remain between the two States. His Excellency continued that he understood that claims to a large amount had been advanced by Afghanistan against Persia on account of property plundered from Afghan subjects on the Seistán frontier. It would not be advisable, His Excellency observed, that, after the settlement of the boundary, any controversy should be continued with the Persian Government regarding these claims, nor was it probable that the compensation demanded on this account would be procurable from the Persian Government. It would probably, however, be necessary for the Amir to give some compensation to those who had been plundered; and the British Government, on the decision being finally accepted by both parties, would aid the Amir to some extent in satisfying these claims. The Commissioner enquired whether he would be placed in a position to make a definite statement on this subject. He observed that most of those whose property had been plundered were residents of Kandahar, and he enquired whether he could give them a definite promise of compensation. The Viceroy replied that it would rest with the Amir to make the necessary communications to the Kandahar claimants, but the Commissioner might certainly assure the Amir that he would receive assistance from His Excellency for the purpose of giving compensation for their losses. His Excellency continued that it must be distinctly understood that the British Government in no way took upon itself the responsibility of satisfying these claims, because, in the first place, it would not be possible to make the enquiries necessary to ascertain their correctness, and again because claims of this description, when not subjected to investigation, were generally exaggerated. The British Government would, however, distinctly promise to assist the Amir with a sum of five lakhs of Government Rupees towards paying compensation for the plundered property. The Commissioner replied that he quite understood the position of the British Government with regard to this question. The assistance promised in money, which would be devoted to the purpose indicated above, was an additional proof of the friendly feeling so often manifested by the British Government towards Afghanistan.

"On the Commissioner requesting instructions as to the precise language he would be empowered to hold to the Amir on the question, His Excellency observed that the conversation that passed at the present interview would be formally recorded, and a copy and translation furnished him for delivery to the Amir.

"At the close of the interview His Excellency observed that, from the reports of the British officers employed on the arbitration, His Excellency was well aware of the intelligence that the Commissioner had displayed, and of his exertions to represent the views of his sovereign and advance the interest of his country. His Excellency observed that he had heard with pleasure of the cordial relations that had existed between the Commissioner and General Pollock.

"His Excellency then desired the Commissioner to convey to the Amir his cordial acknowledgments for the courtesy and hospitality shown to General Pollock when passing through Afghanistan. As a slight return for this kindness, His Excellency requested the Commissioner to be the bearer of a few articles of European manufacture for the Amir's acceptance."

A letter (dated 25th November 1872) was then written to the Amir explaining that the Viceroy had deferred answering His Highness' letter dated 14th October 1872, pending the expected interview with Syud Nur Mahomed. The latter would furnish the Amir with a memorandum of the interview as above recorded, and was also the bearer of a few presents from the Viceroy to the Amir in return for the kindness and hospitality shown to General Pollock during his journey through Afghanistan.

The Secretary of State was then informed of what had passed and furnished with a copy of the memorandum (despatch No. 2C., dated 4th December 1872). The promise of compensation to the Amir for losses sustained by his subjects in the Persian raids was thus noticed:—

"Your Grace will perceive from the memorandum of a conversation held at Poona on the 25th November between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, the Afghan Commissioner, that, in the event of the acceptance by Persia and Afghanistan of the final decision of Her Majesty's Government regarding the Seistán boundary, by which decision indeed both parties are pledged by the conditions of the arbitration to abide, we deem it inexpedient that the controversy regarding the claims of Afghan subjects for plundered property should be further prosecuted. The postponement of compensation for losses sustained would only have the effect of leading to renewed disturbances. We have therefore deemed it preferable to give the Amir of Afghanistan material assistance to enable him to some extent to meet the claims of the sufferers. A promise has accordingly been made to him that, when the decision of Her Majesty's Government has been accepted by both parties, we will make him a gift of five lakhs of rupees for this purpose."

**52. Arrival of Syud Nur Mahomed at Kabul. Sentiments of the Amir and of the Kabul Durbar in regard to the arbitration.**—Syud Nur Mahomed arrived at Kabul on the 14th January 1873, having marched from Peshawur in seven days. The Amir received him in Durbar with great cordiality, and heard with pleasure the hospitable treatment which had been accorded to his representative by the British Government.

On the 15th January, the Amir sent for the Syud and the Mustaufi Habibulla, and held a private consultation with them. Subsequently the British Agent at Kabul, Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, furnished the following account of what passed at the meeting. The Secretary of State was duly informed of the Amir's views (telegram dated 27th January and despatch No. 18, dated 31st January):—

"Yesterday (the 15th) His Highness sent for Syud Nur Mahomed Shah and Mustaufi Habibulla Khan to attend at a strictly private audience, and spent the day in going over all the papers and in hearing all that the Syud had to say on the subject of the Seistán question. He told the Syud that the objections he had raised to the award of General Goldsmid were most just and proper, inasmuch as that the arbitrator having stated it as his opinion that the country of Seistán belongs of right to Afghanistan, it is difficult to see the propriety of dividing the country of Seistán, although he may have thought that the best way to set at rest the disputes of the contending parties was to make this division; it is very extraordinary that he should have come to such a conclusion.

"The separation and hostile feeling existing between Persia and Afghanistan are well known and patent, how then can the preservation of friendly relations be looked for when they are brought together in one country? Indeed further hatred and contention may be looked for leading to difficulties that the English Government will be unable to clear away. In fact, the co-existence of the two contending Powers in that country is impossible.

"Finally, it was decided that, in answering the murasila of His Excellency the Viceroy announcing that he had permitted Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to return, allusion should be made to the complications foreseen, so that the English Government may be able to weigh these considerations beforehand (literally 'before anything occurs,' which may mean before the decision of the appeal sent to England, or before the occurrence of troubles in Seistán), and that an answer on this matter may be sent speedily, so that the Amir may send to his plundered subjects of the Seistán frontier a reassuring intimation of the final settlement of the question."

The following is the text of the Amir's reply dated 20th January 1873, which was forwarded to the Secretary of State by the mail of the 7th February:—

"I have been much gratified by the receipt on the 20th Shawal (30th December) of Your Excellency's letter dated 25th November, intimating the departure of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah. The Syud has now arrived here, and, after communicating to me the friendly messages of which he was the bearer from Your Excellency and the British Government, has laid before me all the papers relating to the Seistán question from beginning to end, together with a report of the interview held at Poona, and has explained fully their contents, for which I entertain feelings of gratitude.

"Looking to the intimate union for good and evil between the two, I entertain no doubts as to the sentiments of favor and esteem entertained by the exalted British Government (towards this State). Nevertheless, the objections put forward by the Syud in support of his case against the decision of General Goldsmid relative to the impossibility of the co-existence on such an intermingled border of Persian and Afghan subjects, are extremely forcible and correct.

"It is evident that if this intermixture between the frontier territories of Persia and Afghanistan should come about at some time or other, such a flame of disturbance will certainly break out that it will be impossible to extinguish.

"It is also plain that General Goldsmid, after a personal inspection of the territory in dispute, and of the sunnuds produced in support of the Afghan claim, decided that Seistán is a portion of Afghanistan; but with the idea of removing all cause of future dispute between the Afghan and Persian Governments, he gave up to Persia a portion of Seistán Proper for this purely imaginary object.

"This view of his appears to me most extraordinary and short-sighted, because by such a course there is not, and will not, be any advantage, either present or prospective, to be secured to the British or Kabul Governments which are intimately connected for good or evil.

"For four years, the subjects of this State, restrained by the orders of their Government, have refrained from retaliation, and have patiently borne the daily raids of the Seistánis in expectation of an answer from the British Government. I, therefore, beg to trouble Your Excellency with a request that I may have early intimation of the settlement of the Seistán question, in order that I may be enabled to assure my subjects.

"I have been deeply gratified by the receipt of the presents sent to me by the hands of the Syud."

A later letter dated 20th January from the British Agent noticed the prevailing feeling at Kabul on the subject of the Seistán award. He wrote:—

"Since the arrival of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah and the announcement of the opinion and award of General Goldsmid in the Seistán arbitration question, though the Syud, dwelling on the kindness and consideration of the British Government, is diligent in reassuring and encouraging the Durbar officials, still it appears from the disposition and demeanour of all of them that none of them are contented with the award of General Goldsmid, and consider Seistán their own by right. They privately state that if from the Home Office a decree for Seistán is awarded in favor of Afghanistan, well and good, otherwise they will not give up their right to one rod of this territory so long as they can maintain it; that is to say, that they will contend to the utmost for the whole of Seistán, whether they may fail or succeed in this endeavour. All the border Chiefs frequently send letters to Kabul for permission to take reprisals or make retaliation, but the Durbar officials have prohibited them as yet from doing so."

In March 1873 the Amir wrote as follows urging the early announcement of the final decision on the Seistán Arbitration:—

"I am happy to receive Your Excellency's letter, dated 17th February, expressing your satisfaction at the preservation of peace on the Seistán border, in accordance with the course advised by the British Government, and containing other particulars.

"This Government adheres to the orders which have been repeatedly sent by it to Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan, Governor of Furrak, to watch and guard the border, and not to interfere with Seistán until the question is settled by the British Government.

"Very strict orders have now been also sent to the same effect. But seeing that the two Governments are identical, I beg to say that the sooner intimation is given of the Seistán affair being decided, the sooner the information would conduce to the comfort and advantage of the people of Afghanistan."

**53. Conversation at Teheran between Mr. Thomson and the Sadr Azim regarding the award. Remarks as to the presence of General Pollock at the arbitration.**—The Persian Government received General Goldsmid's award with as little satisfaction as

\* Mr. Thomson's No. 47, dated 21st August 1872, to the Amir had done. At an interview with Mr. Thomson\* on the 20th

August 1872 the Sadr Azim expressed his views in very decided language. He said that by the arbitration

"Persia was required to cede to the Afghans certain places now in her possession, and this was a great humiliation to the Shah and his Minister; but that the Persian Government further objected to this decision, because the question submitted for arbitration was the right to sovereignty over the whole of Seistán, and not over a portion of it only. The country south of what was called 'Seistán Proper,' he continued, was desert, and of no great value to either side; but there was no just reason for giving it to the Afghans, as had been done by making the line of frontier pass a long way to the south-west instead of following a straight line to the south in the direction of Jalk.

"The decision which had been come to was so contrary, he observed, to what the Persian Government had expected, that he had not yet ventured to submit it to the Shah, and he asked me if it would not be possible to make some alterations and carry the boundary from Rudbar southwards in a straight line to Jalk, giving Persia both sides of the Helmund River from Rudbar to the Bund, and also those places on the right bank which they now possessed.

"I replied that it was impossible for Sir F. Goldsmid to make any change in his decision which had been given after careful consideration of all that had been advanced on both sides, and that I thought the Persian Government, instead of being dissatisfied with this award, ought rather to congratulate themselves on having obtained what was generally admitted to be the important and valuable portion of Seistán.

"His Highness observed that he personally was most desirous to avoid making any needless difficulties, but that he was intimately acquainted with the Shah's views on this question, and that he could confidently affirm that His Majesty would never assent to an arrangement which only gave him up to the Helmund below the Bund, and therefore deprived him of some of his actual possessions, such as Nad Ali and Kala Fath on the right bank of the river. Moreover, he was himself delicately situated as regarded this matter, for he had entirely withdrawn the negotiation from the control of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his department, taking it altogether into his own hands, and he felt now that his position would be seriously compromised, as Mirza Saeed Khan would certainly endeavour to lay the whole blame upon him for having allowed these places to be taken from Persia.



"I said that I was somewhat surprised to hear these remarks with reference to the Shah and Mirza Saeed Khan, as at an audience which Mr. Alison had of the King on the 23rd July 1870, His Majesty had enquired whether some arrangement might not be come to on the principle of *uti possidetis*, and it was not pretended, as far as I was aware, that at that time Persia had acquired any possessions on the right bank of the Helmund. I did not think it likely, I added, that Mirza Saeed Khan would adopt the course His Highness seemed to anticipate, seeing that he himself already admitted that Persia did not possess in 1870 any territory on the right bank of the river; and she certainly ought not to have acquired it since having already engaged to refer the question to arbitration.

"To show that such was the case, I communicated to the Sadr Azim the reply given by Mirza Saeed Khan to Mr. Alison when the Persian Government was asked to define the limits of that half of Seistán which they claimed to possess. He stated then that 'the Persian

Mr. Alison's No. 28 of 1871.

Government claimed Seistán territory up to the Helmund River including Sikuhah, and that the other half comprised all territory on the other bank including Chakansur, Nad Ali, and the territory of Ibrahim Khan, Biluch.' I remarked further that Mirza Saeed Khan had suggested to me in April 1870, after consultation with the Shah, that the Seistán question should be solved by a distribution of territory, that on the west being given to Persia and the rest to Afghanistan.

"The Prime Minister said that he would allude to these points in submitting to the Shah his report on the result of the arbitration, and he took down the dates to which I had referred from my notes; but he believed that an appeal would have to be made to Her Majesty's Government against the present decision, though he would not say positively that this would be the case till he had communicated with the Shah.

"The impression conveyed to my mind by this interview was that the Persian Government would probably accept the decision given on the Seistán boundary question."

At another and previous interview\* with the Sadr Azim the latter alluded

\* Mr. Thomson to English Foreign Office, No. 48, dated 21st August 1872.

ed to the presence at Tcheran of General Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, who had accompanied the Afghan Commissioner from Kandahar to this country. He said that his Government felt serious misgivings about this arbitration, because the mere fact of an officer of General Pollock's rank and position being sent with the Afghan Agent could only be viewed as a distinct intimation that the Indian Government was in favor of the Afghan cause and opposed to the claims of Persia. He added that we had only to read the statement presented by the Afghan Commissioner to see that it was the composition of an European, and not an Asiatic.

After referring this communication to General Pollock, Mr. Thomson conveyed to the Sadr Azim the assurance given by General Pollock, that neither he nor Dr. Bellew, who had accompanied him from India, had afforded any assistance whatever to the Afghan Commissioner in drawing up his case.

This assurance did not produce much impression, as the Sadr Azim merely replied that he could not say who had written the document in question; but it certainly was not the Afghan Commissioner, for that person had been with him during the forenoon when he had questioned him respecting certain arguments which it contained, and had found that far from its being his composition he had not even yet understood it.

On the 17th September† Mr. Thomson reported that the action which the Persian Government would take upon Sir F. Goldsmid's opinion was still undecided owing to the prolonged absence of the Shah. The Sadr Azim himself was in favor of accepting at once the frontier laid down, but there was some difficulty in obtaining the Shah's assent to this measure. Mr. Thomson did not expect that any final decision of the question would be arrived at before the return of the Shah to the capital in the ensuing week.

When‡ the Shah arrived it was found that His Majesty objected on the following grounds to the proposed line of frontier:—

† Mr. Thomson's No. 74, dated 15th October 1872.

"(1.) Because it does not afford any facilities for checking Biluch incursions from the Afghan side of Persian territory.

"(2.) Because it transfers to the Afghans certain pasture lands belonging to the inhabitants of Persian Seistán, which are situated immediately to the south of Seistán Proper within the limits of a tract marked as desert in the map prepared by the Seistán Commissioners.



"(3.) Because it deprives Persia of an important district which might be made very productive by irrigation from the Hirmend (Helmund) river by means of canals leading from the Bund Kamal Khan. The district in question is situated near a place named Ramrud in Major Lovett's map, and it is described as having been the most fertile part of Seistán in former times."

It was on the third objection that chief stress was laid; the Shah insisted on referring the matter to Her Majesty's Government in the hope of securing a modification of General Goldsmid's decision. Persia would accept the Helmund river as the frontier of Persian Seistán, if it was agreed that the line, instead of being drawn from the Band-i-Amir (Kobak) to the south-west, should leave the river at the Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, and cross the desert southwards to a point somewhat further east than the hill marked Koh Malik Siab on the Seistán map.

Mr. Thomson explained to His Highness that the Persian Government must decide whether they would accept the award given by General Goldsmid, or appeal to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for a final decision.

In writing\* to the Secretary of State for India on the subject of Mr. Thomson's reports, the Government of India drew attention to the fact that General Pollock was not sent with the Afghan Commissioner until the proposal to send a British officer had been fully discussed, and until they had been informed† by the Duke of Argyll that it was quite understood by the Persian Government that an officer from India was to accompany the Afghan Commissioner.

\* Government of India, to Secretary of State, No. 7, dated 10th January 1873.

† See telegram from Secretary of State, to Viceroy, dated 3rd September 1870

**54. Measures taken by the Persian Government to maintain the existing condition of things in Seistan.**—After the delivery of the arbitral opinion Mr. Thomson requested the Persian Government to arrange for the maintenance of the *status quo* pending a final decision as to the course to be taken with reference to General Goldsmid's award. The Sadr Azim accordingly addressed the following letter, dated 1st September 1872, to the Amir of Kain :—

"The Commission for defining the frontiers of Seistán and Afghanistan having arrived at Teheran, General Goldsmid, after holding several meetings, and hearing the arguments adduced by both parties, has submitted his arbitral opinion.

"It being unnecessary to give at present the full details of the same in this letter, I will only inform you that the Persian Government has as yet neither accepted nor confirmed the said opinion, and it is probable that the question will be referred to London.

"My object in addressing you is this, that you are to retain, as formerly, all the possessions you have on both sides of the Helmund, such as the Forts of Nad Ali, Fath, &c., but you are to refrain from further expeditions on either bank of the Helmund. Your future conduct must be only to protect yourself against attack, and to abstain from aggressive movements, that is to say, should the Afghans, Biluch Chiefs, &c., intend interfering with your present possessions, you are to resist the same by force, and prevent them from making any aggression; but if they should not commit themselves in the manner I have just mentioned, you also, from the moment you receive this letter, are not to advance a single step. You are to wait for the settlement of the question between the Governments of England and Persia, and for fresh instructions. You are also to be, as far as possible, on friendly terms with the Afghans, and not give them any cause for complaint. Any delay in the settlement of the boundary question ought not to form a cause for abandoning friendly relations. for instance, it is now about 30 years that the frontier question has been the subject of discussion between the Turkish and Persian Governments; and although it is not yet terminated, yet the most friendly relations exist between the two Powers.

"The British Legation has assured the Persian Government that whilst the boundary question of Afghanistan and Seistán is discussed between Great Britain and Persia, no hostile action will be adopted by the Afghans. The British authorities have no doubt given the necessary advice, accompanied with full injunctions on this head, to Amir Shere Ali Khan. You are also implicitly to obey what I have written."

In consequence of a telegram from Lord Northbrook, dated 28th August, intimating that a body of Seistánis had entered Lash-Jowain and murdered the Afghan Governor, a further letter, dated 5th September, was sent of which the following is a translation. These instructions were sent under personal directions

from the Shah, who remarked that Persia having once given the British Government an assurance that friendly relations would be maintained with the Afghans nothing contrary thereto should be permitted :—

“ It has been notified at all times to you that the Persian Ministers do not approve that your proceedings with the Afghans should be based upon enmity and spite ; on the contrary, they have always urged you to be, as long as you can, on friendly terms with them. In your correspondence, where you bitterly complain of the Afghan inroads and raids, and of the way in which they harass our borders and subjects, you have also remarked that knowing the Persian Ministers to be desirous of your being on friendly relations with the Afghans, you had refrained from taking any notice of their wild and uncivilized proceedings. We also informed the British Legation of what you had declared, and reassured it on the subject. The Mission also promised to write to His Excellency the Viceroy of India, and request His Excellency to forbid the Afghan Government from all acts of transgression.

“ Mr. Thomson, Her Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, has recently, by virtue of a telegram received from His Excellency the Viceroy, stated that you had again sent horsemen to Lash and Jowain, that a fight took place, and that Samad Khan, brother to Sirdar Ahmed Khan, the Governor of Jowain, had been killed in the affray. This was represented to His Majesty the Shah by myself, who became very wrath at you for having made such promises to the Persian Ministers, and given them such assurances, while, on the other hand, such reports should have reached the Persian Government. I enclose copy of the royal autograph with which I have been honored on this subject for your admonition, and I have despatched Abbass Sultan of the Artillery Corps especially to come and investigate the case in a true manner, and report on it to the Persian Ministers.

“ Should there be any truth in the report now received, I have to inform you that you have acted very improperly. You must exert yourself to your utmost in arranging this business with Sirdar Ahmed Khan and close the blood-feud, so as to prevent the Afghans from making any complaint to His Excellency the Viceroy of India. But if there is no truth whatever in the above statement, and it is merely a calumny attributed to you by the Afghans, and they have made a false complaint against you, you must prove the same to the above-mentioned officer, so that he may return here and clear you from all blame in the matter.

“ I also add, that in future you must *most* decidedly place yourself on a friendly and cordial footing with the Afghans, and refrain from giving them any cause for complaint.”

**55. Appeal presented by the Persian Government to Her Majesty’s Government.**—Before the Afghan appeal transmitted by Lord Northbrook had reached England the Persian Minister in London in a letter to Lord Granville, dated 27th November 1872, submitted the following appeal, written at Teheran, on behalf of his Government. On the advice of the Duke of Argyll the final decision of Her Majesty’s Government was deferred pending arrival of the Afghan appeal notice of which had been received :—

M. LE MINISTRE,

TEHERAN, 29 Septembre 1872.

“ Le Commissaire Anglais a partagé le Sistan en deux parties, donnant l’une à la Perse, et l’autre à l’Afghanistan.

*Nous Soutenons.*

- “ 1. Que l’Afghanistan n’a aucun droit sur ce pays.
- “ 2. Que ce pays tout entier appartient à la Perse.
- “ 3. Que ce partage créant mille difficultés pour la Perse n’offre aucun avantage aux Afghans.

“ 4. Qu’enfin cette disposition anormale, en maintenant sur nos frontieres un trouble permanent, deviendrait un obstacle sérieux au retour de cette confiance mutuelle que nous cherchons avec tous nos moyens à rétablir entre la Perse et l’Angleterre.

“ D’après tous les documents historiques et même d’après l’avou du Commissaire Anglais, le Sistan a été de tout temps province essentiellement persane. C’est même une de nos provinces centrales qui ont le plus contribué à la formation de l’ancien Empire persane. Son nom qui retentit dans toute notre histoire est une de nos plus pures gloires nationales. La population, la langue, les mœurs, et la religion dominante sont entièrement persanes. L’Afghan y est tout à fait étranger, ou n’y voit ni une Colonie Afghan, ni le moindre établissement Afghan. S’il y a dans le pays des Sunnis, ce sont des Beluchs un minorité qui y sont venus au commencement de ce siècle, et qui, profondément hostiles aux Afghans, reconnaissent paisiblement la domination persane.

“ D’après les meilleurs raisonnements du Commissaire Anglais, l’Afghanistan n’a d’autre titre sur le Sistan qu’une prétendu occupation de 40 ans. Mais à quelle époque et comment a eu lieu cette occupation.

"Après la mort de Nadir Shah, un de ses serviteurs, son Maître des ceremonies, appelé Ahmed Khan, est parvenue à s'emparer du pouvoir en Afghanistan et à étendre sur une partie de notre Sistan une domination aussi obscure dans ces formes qu'injuste et condamnable dans son principe.

"Il y a à peu près un demi siècle que les descendants d'Achmed Khan sont chassés de l'Afghanistan, son Empire éphémère est déchiré en lambeaux, toute son œuvre est complètement détruite, et le Sistan dégagé de toute incursion étrangère se trouve possiblement rentré au sein de la mère patrie. Et malgré tous ces grands changements on vient nous dire ; il est vrai que le Sistan a été de tout temps une province essentiellement persane, et il est encore vrai que cette province se trouve depuis plusieurs années sous la domination persane, mais puis qu'il y a un siècle qu'Achmed Khan et ses descendants ont plus au moins dominé cette province pendant un intervalle de 40 ans, il est nécessaire que ce pays soit déchiré en deux et que la moitié soit livrée par la Perse aux Afghans qui n'y ont aucune relation locale, aucune communauté d'intérêts aucun moyen d'Administration. Et il est à remarquer que même dans cette période de 40 ans, marquée avec tant de confiance par le Commissaire Anglais la domination Afghan dans le Sistan n'a jamais eu un caractère formel.

"Au milieu de longs déchirements qui ont suivi la mort de Nadir Shah, le Sistan a pu être envahi par les Afghans à peu près comme tant d'autres provinces alors partagées et dominées par les Tribes de nos frontières.

"Mais en admettant même que la conquête Afghan ait été plus sérieuse, serait il permis d'affirmer que le souvenir d'une conquête de 40 ans, complètement effacé depuis un demi siècle, puisse contrebalancer le droit de la mère patrie sur une province qui a fait partie de son existence pendant plus de deux mille ans et qui se trouve aujourd'hui résignée à elle dans les conditions les plus paisibles.

"On nous dit que le renouvellement de la domination persane en Sistan n'a pas été réalisé dans des conditions voulues. Mais pour ou assurer que la conquête d'Achmed Khan ou plutôt l'envahissement d'un chef rebelle dans une de nos provinces ait été effectué dans des conditions plus légales que le renouvellement actuel de notre domination ? Malgré toutes ces considérations, si nous repoussons le partage qu'on nous propose, ce n'est pas seulement parce qu'il est contraire à nos droits, c'est seulement parce qu'un tel partage ne serait pas pratique. La partie qu'on nous laisse, quoique plus importante, dépend entièrement de celle qu'on veut donner aux Afghans. Un Chef Afghan, en détruisant un des barrages de Helmund, ferait périr tout le pays qu'on prétend nous laisser.

"On nous dit qu'une clause de traité défendrait aux Afghans de détruire les barrages qui seraient en leur possession. Mais peut on sérieusement croire qu'un Chef Afghan dans un moment d'émportement se laisse arrêter par l'existence d'une clause obscure qu'il ignorera ou qu'il ne comprendra jamais ?

"Le Sistan ne peut vivre qu'avec ses frontières naturelles de Roudbar, en remontant le (illegible), ses rives s'élèvent de manière qu'il devient impossible de détourner le fleuve de son lit actuel. Le Sistan doit donc nécessairement le dominer au moins jusqu'à Roudbar.

"Un autre but du partage proposé c'est que la ligne frontière partant de Kohuk, vers le Sud, détache de notre Sistan des pâturages indispensables et nos populations et tout à fait inutiles aux Afghans de ce côté là on nous élève des territoires ou était située notre ancienne et célèbre capitale de Sistan territoires qui sont liés par mille rapports avec la Perse tandis qu'ils sont tout à fait inutiles et inconnus aux Afghans.

"Pourquoi nous faire subir ainsi des humiliations et des pertes qui ne profitent à personne ?

"Les mêmes torts et les mêmes pertes du côté de Naizar (?) au Nord de Sistan. Là aussi on nous impose des sacrifices très sensibles pour nous et d'aucune utilité pour les Afghans.

"Mais la considération la plus sérieuse qui nous fait repousser l'idée d'un pareil partage, c'est que le pays qu'on veut nous enlever, est habité depuis Kohuk jusqu'au Roudbar par des Baloutches ces peuplades à demi sauvages ne vivaient depuis le commencement de ce siècle que par un pillage organisé contre tous les pays voisins, mais surtout dirigé contre nos provinces de l'Est.

"Leurs longues et continuelles déprédations qui ont ruiné nos contrées de Yazd et de Kirman, forment une des plus tristes pages de nos malheurs intérieurs. Ce brigandage historique n'a été arrêté que par l'affermissement de notre domination sur ces peuplades barbares ; si nous les abandonnons, ce serait livrer de nouveau nos provinces à leur déprédation traditionnelle.

"Les Afghans, qui n'ont jamais pu se défendre contre eux seraient tout à fait incapables de les dominer, et de notre côté le pays étant complètement découvert, il nous serait impossible de contenir leur brigandage. L'abandon de cette partie de notre territoire habitée par ces Baloutches ne serait pas seulement une perte et une humiliation pour nous, ce serait surtout une cruauté odieuse envers ces malheureux habitants. Leur antipathie pour les Afghans, l'attachement de leur Chefs pour le Gouvernement du Schah, et les différents rapports qui les lient à la Perse rendraient la domination Afghanne une source de persécution et de désordres qu'on devrait épargner au pays, si non par esprit d'humanité, au moins par une politique de pacification nécessaire.

"Nous comprenons très bien que les Afghans cherchent à posséder tout le Sistan, mais nous ne croyons pas qu'ils aient grande envie d'obtenir un (illegible) illusoire sur un territoire

étranger, extrêmement pauvre, qu'ils ne sauraient jamais gouverner et qui, en l'absence de notre domination redeviendrait nécessairement un foyer de brigandage aussi malheureux pour les Afghans que fatal pour la Perse. On voit que dans tout cet arrangement on s'est laissé conduire par cette vieille chimère de barrière entre la Perse et l'Empire Indien. On a voulu nous tenir le plus loin possible de Hermende, mais quel avantage stratégique pourrait offrir une (illegible) de lieues de territoire sans ressources et complètement decouvert? Notre politique actuelle plus éclairée connaît très bien et les dangers de notre position et la valeur de nos rapports avec l'Angleterre. Si les Anglais ne se trouvaient pas aux Indes nous aurions dû les y amener. Le meilleur arrangement entre nous et l'Inde Anglaise c'est le rétablissement d'une confiance mutuelle, si nous sommes depuis quel que temps fermement résolus à poursuivre ce but avec tous les sacrifices possibles. Ce serait un malheur pour nous, si au moment même où nous nous disposons à entrer largement dans cette voie, l'ancienne politique de méfiance venait faire à l'amour propre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Schah une nouvelle blessure plus profonde que toutes, les autres, car nous enlever un territoire qui de tous temps a fait partie essentielle de la Perse et qu'aujourd'hui nous tenons paisiblement sous notre domination légitime, et nous enlever ce territoire pour le donner aux Afghans, qui au guère encore était nos vassaux et que l'Angleterre a rendu aujourd'hui nos arrogants adversaires, c'est blesser, c'est fouler aux pieds les sentimens les plus intimes de la Perse. Pour réparer tout cela nous ne demandons à la justice d'Angleterre qu'une simple ratification de frontière indispensable pour nous et sans aucune conséquence pour les Afghans.

"Du côté du Nord nous voulons garder le Naizar (?) et vers le Sud Est conserver le Hermende jusqu'à Roudbar.

"Nous avons exposé sérieusement nos vues sur cette question. Nous attendons avec confiance la décision de cette haute sagesse Britannique que nous désirons tant rendre désormais moins sévère envers la Perse et plus confiante dans les nouveaux sentimens qui commencent à prevaloir chez nous.

"Je vous prie M. le Mons. de donner lecture de la présente dépêche à S. E. D'Granville et de lui en laisser copie s'il le desire.

"LE GENERAL MOHSIN KHAN.

"(Sd). HOUSSEIN."

**56. Decision of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Proposed Mission to Kabul.**—On the 7th March 1873 the Secretary of State telegraphed that General Goldsmid's decision had been confirmed by Lord Granville, but that the Persian Minister asserted strongly that his Government would not submit. Lord Granville's decision was conveyed in a letter to Mohsin Khan in answer to the Persian appeal extracted in the preceding paragraph. Its purport was that having carefully examined the award and fully considered the observations contained in the Persian appeal, and having, moreover, communicated with the Secretary of State for India, with the Government of India, and with his colleagues, Lord Granville had come to the conclusion that the award given by Sir F. Goldsmid was fair and just towards both parties, and could not be set aside. In answer to the appeal presented by the Persian Government with the object of obtaining a modification of the award, it was his duty to say that Her Majesty's Government accepted that award in its entirety, and would not allow themselves to doubt that it would now be acquiesced in by Persia and by Afghanistan.

In a letter, dated 28th February, to Mr. Thomson, Lord Granville recounted the manner in which General Mohsin Khan had received the decision of Her Majesty's Government sustaining the award. He wrote—

"The Persian Minister expressed great surprise and regret at this announcement. He accused the Indian Government of hostility towards Persia, and an inexplicable preference of Afghan interests to those of Persia. I replied that I could not allow such a charge to be made against the Indian Government. I believed them to be perfectly impartial in the matter; that it struck me, who had certainly no bias in the matter, that Sir F. Goldsmid's decision, which gave to Persia all that was valuable in the disputed territory, was more in favor of Persia than Afghanistan, and this was the view which the Afghans had represented in the strongest manner.

"The Persian Minister admitted that the fertile district was given to Persia, but said that it was no use, as the Persian Government would have no control over the adjoining country peopled with hostile tribes, over whom the Amir of Kabul would exercise no practical control, and who would be a perpetual danger to the tranquillity of the cultivated lands.

"He said the decision of Her Majesty's Government was one which he did not believe his Government would accept, although he had no instructions to say so, and that they would probably try some other arbitration on the matter.

"'Until you find one entirely in your favor,' I rejoined. The Persian Minister said that was not his meaning, but the matter concerned the honour of Persia, and he believed our deci-

sion would not be accepted. I answered that after all that had passed, I could not conceal from him that the repudiation of the report of Sir F. Goldsmid and of my decision was a very serious matter.

"The Persian Minister will doubtless report to his Government what passed between us on this occasion, and it will be proper that you should also state that, having duly considered the protest made by the Persian and by the Afghan Governments against the line of boundary in Seistán, laid down by Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid in his award, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that such line is consistent with the existing circumstances of the case, and is fair to both the parties concerned."

**57. Action taken by the Government of India on hearing of the confirmation of the award. Proposal to depute Mr. Macnabb to Kabul.**—On receiving the Secretary of State's telegram, Lord Northbrook desired the Punjab Government to arrange a meeting between the Amir and Mr. Macnabb, Commissioner of Peshawur, at which the Seistán settlement, as confirmed by Lord Granville, and other matters, could be explained. These orders were carried out, but Mr. Macnabb doubted the Amir being anxious for the meeting. On the 21st March the Viceroy addressed the following kharita to the Amir:—

"With reference to Your Highness' letter, dated 13th November 1871, Your Highness will remember that the Commissioner of Peshawur\* subsequently expressed a hope on the part of my predecessor that when the Seistán boundary settlement was over, you would be able to arrange for an interview with an officer of my Government, who would explain the details and lay before Your Highness some considerations affecting the welfare of Afghanistan.

"Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having confirmed General Goldsmid's award, I have deputed Mr. Donald Macnabb, Commissioner of Peshawur, an officer of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence, to explain to Your Highness the details of the boundary, and to place before you certain papers relating to the final settlement of the question. Mr. Macnabb will also explain to Your Highness the negotiations which have now been satisfactorily concluded with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, whereby the Russian Government have agreed to recognize and respect the integrity and independence of the territories now in Your Highness' possession.

"Whatever Mr. Macnabb may tell Your Highness on these two important questions, consider as coming from myself."

In a letter to the Punjab Government of the same date, the Government of India inclosed copy of the record of the interview between Syud Nur Mahomed, and desired that the British officer deputed to Kabul should take with him the five lakhs promised to the Amir as compensation for his subjects' losses. At the same time they promised to reconsider the amount of the contribution if the Punjab Government should think that a further payment would be of material political advantage in strengthening the Amir's position with respect to his own subjects in Seistán and removing effectually any grounds for misunderstanding with Persia.

The Amir was to be informed of the steps taken by the Shah to preserve order and of the assurances given that the Amir's possessions would be respected. Further he was to be thanked in the name of the Viceroy for the orders which he had issued to the Governor of Furrâh. He was also to be told that it was only by strict adherence on both sides to the terms of General Goldsmid's decision that the recurrence of complications between the two Governments could for the future be avoided, and that so long as he adhered to the policy which he had hitherto so wisely pursued of carefully abstaining from interference with the portion of Seistán in Persian possession, His Excellency in Council would use all his influence to secure an adherence on the part of Persia to a similar policy in accordance with the assurances given by His Majesty the Shah.

On hearing from the British Agent of the intentions of Government the Amir told him that he would reply, after deliberation, to the proposal to send Mr. Macnabb to Kabul. Subsequently, he asked what further matters besides the Seistán award the British officer would communicate. The Agent then told him that General Goldsmid's arbitral opinion had been confirmed, and that the British officer would inform him of the result of the negotiations between



the British and Russian Governments regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan.

**58. The Amir's views as to the proposed deputation of Mr. Macnabb.**—With his letter No. 67C., dated 5th April 1873, the Commissioner of Peshawur forwarded the two subjoined letters received from the British Agent at Kabul. The letter marked A replies to the intimation conveyed to the Amir of the desire of Government that a British officer should personally explain to him the details of the decision of the Seistán question. Though written by the Agent, it was prepared under orders from the Amir. The letter marked B furnishes the details of a lengthened discussion by the Durbar of the proposal to depute a British officer to Kabul. In the Commissioner's opinion it had undoubtedly been written at the request of the Durbar with the object of bringing indirectly before Government the anxieties and expectations which agitated the minds of all. At the same time the style and purport of some of the observations could hardly have been known to and approved by the Amir. The letter was transcribed in the hand-writing of the Agency Moonshee, Baktiar Khan, and signed by Atta Mahomed, the Agent.

### A.

*Translation of Kabul Agent's letter, dated 31st March 1873, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur Division.*

"The Amir, after perusing your letter to me of the 23rd March, received by me on the 27th March, and after consultation with the officers of his Durbar, said: If it is the wish of the British Government that one of their officers should proceed to Kabul to explain the details of the decision, it would be a cause of satisfaction to my mind if I were first informed

\* Agar faisála-i-mazkúr basb-i-hausala-o-tákat báshad, fa howál murád wa illa munáfi takat-o-hausala fn daulat-i-khuda-dád búdá báshad.

in general terms what decision has been arrived at, that I might reflect on it.\* If this decision is in accordance with my sentiments, good and well. Should it be out of my power to carry out the conditions of the

decision, I will explain the circumstances to the Government. If the coming of the Sahib, in addition to Seistán matters, concerns the prosperity, consolidation, and other arrangements of the affairs and frontiers of the whole kingdom that God has given me, I should wish to be kindly informed of this beforehand.

"This letter is sent after perusal by His Highness the Amir."

### B.

*Translation of a letter from the Agent at Kabul, dated 31st March 1873, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.*

"After receipt of your letter of the 23rd March, there was consultation among the officers of the Durbar for three days as to whether the deputation of an English officer was merely to explain the decision of the Seistán boundary question, or whether he would be entrusted with the communication of some important information concerning the frontiers of Afghanistan. There was lengthened discussion on this point. Some said it had been mentioned in the marrasilas of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir, that on the conclusion of the Seistán decision a Sahib should be sent to Kabul with a view to the advantages of the State. And though nothing was yet known of what the advantage referred to was to consist in, many of the Durbaris indulged in extravagant hopes, in the belief that the Sahib would be sent, not alone to explain the decision of the Seistán boundary, but because of the near approach of the Russians, and their obvious tendency of their policy, which is to extend their power in Asia; he may be sent to arrange for the strengthening of Afghanistan, and the determination of its limits, as the boundaries of Afghanistan may be termed the frontiers of Hindustan, and there is no possibility of establishing the frontiers of Afghanistan firmly without the intervention of the English Government; and that strength cannot be established without assistance in the munitions of war and large sums of money before any emergency actually arises. If the coming of the Sahib is only with reference to the Seistán question, and not for the lasting advantage of Afghanistan, it will be a great injury to the Afghan Government, as there exists in some quarters a great respect and consideration for the Afghan Government derived from its association with that of England, which will disappear if the support of England is withheld, especially the neighbouring countries will note any falling off in the interests taken by England in the welfare of Afghanistan. The facts of the case as regards Seistán are these, that at this time had it not been for the constant restraint of the servants of this Government, in accordance with the wishes of the English Government, there would

not have been the slightest difficulty in taking advantage of the disturbances in Seistán and the disposition of its people to occupy the whole as the Persians did. In fact, if the people in that direction were allowed to act, and the Turkomans stirred into action, it would be easy to take not Seistán alone but Meshed also; and, as Meshed could so easily be brought under the power of Afghanistan, it would not be difficult to put Afghanistan in a position of superiority to Persia. But what can be done when, because of their desire to preserve the good-will of England, the officers of Afghanistan have made no move. If the Government of England has upheld General Goldsmid's decision of the Seistán boundary, it will be a cause of great injury, both apparent and real, as in the first place Ibrahim Khan and Mahomed Sharif Khan and others who have lands both in Seistán Proper and in Outer Seistán will be disheartened, and the lot of those who are at the same time subjects of both the Persian and the Afghan Governments will be a hard one, and as it will be unavoidably necessary for both Powers to keep a certain number of troops on their respective borders, it will be difficult to avoid small misunderstandings, and collisions which will one day lead to serious disturbances. It will be impossible to demarcate the line drawn by General Goldsmid through the uninhabited country without great expense.

"Again, when increasing the numbers of the Afghan army, who hoped that the English Government would help us with arms and money, and give us a hint, either secretly or openly, to advance our frontiers in the Seistán direction. Had we not expected this, our original forces were sufficient for our country as it existed. If we should now reduce this newly-raised army, all those evils which are to be dreaded at some distant day would come on us at once in consequence of our weakness. One reflection arising from the Seistán decision is, that as the British Government, though considering Seistán to belong of right to Afghanistan, has divided that country between Persia and Afghanistan, in order to avoid dispute, it may be that one day the Government of Bokhara, acting under Russian instigation, may lay claim to a portion of Balkh, on the ground that it is part of Turkistan, and the English Government may, in order to prevent an open rupture, agree to the cession of Maimena or Badakshan or any other province, and in this way Afghanistan may become dismembered. It is to be remembered that whenever the Russians, either in the current year or the next, take possession of Merv, only 12 marches will separate them from Herat, and there are no mountain ranges or other obstacles on the road. Undoubtedly, as soon as they have established themselves in Merv, the Russians will begin to enter into negotiations of friendship, trade, and political relations with the Kabul Government, either openly or secretly, and we shall be placed in a most difficult position on account of our alliance with England in dealing with the questions brought forward by Russia, so that extreme emergencies will arise with which we shall be unable to cope. From all that appears in the English papers about the preparations for the advance of a Russian army, and all that the merchants tell us of the intention of Russia to open up Western Asia, it is clear the day will come when the Ruler of Afghanistan will either have to agree to all that Russia proposes, or to abandon his country, as neither are the Afghans able to contend with and check the Russians, nor is there any hope of an English army being sent into Afghanistan to protect it. Nor has the English Government as yet fixed on any place or provision in Hindustan or Europe to which the nobles of Afghanistan may retire if driven from their own country. Taking all these matters into consideration, it would seem to be advisable that an Agent should be sent to ascertain first of all the views of the English Government on the Seistán boundary, and all other questions affecting the interests of Afghanistan. Some of the councillors advised that before sending an envoy to Hindustan a written explanation of the Seistán decision should be solicited. If the decision is one that is acceptable to the Kabul Government, and no injury to Afghanistan is to be dreaded from it, and if the British officer be empowered to make communications indicative of the care of the British Government for the firm establishment of all the boundaries of Afghanistan, and such intention of the British Government be communicated to us by letter, it will be advisable to make arrangements for the reception of the officer deputed to Kabul; and if the result of the interview with him be not satisfactory on all points, it will then be necessary to send an envoy to Hindustan. If the English officer is to be sent simply to explain the Seistán boundary decision, that could be done by written communication, and there is no necessity for a Sahib to undertake the trouble of the journey on this account, indeed that would be a distinct loss to the Afghan Government. There are only two results to be expected, either the decision will be pleasing to the Kabul Government, or it will be displeasing. If it is displeasing to the Kabul Government, and that Government seeing injury to its own interests in the proposed arrangements should have any objection to urge, the British Government would certainly be annoyed, and it would become generally known that there was a feeling of dissatisfaction between the two Governments; and if the decision is accepted, the ancient rights of Afghanistan must be abandoned. If the decision be communicated by letter, an answer can be sent by letter after mature consideration such as shall best conform to the interests of both countries.

"In fine, after lengthened arguments between the Amir and all his advisers, it was resolved to draw out a draft of an answer to your letter to me, and to give it to me with the request that I would transmit a copy of it you. I have, therefore, copied it word for word, and have sent it to you separately as representing the answer given by His Highness the Amir to the communication made by me to His Highness under your instructions. The real wish of the Amir is that he should first be informed by letter of the points on which the British Government wish to make communications to him through the medium of one of their officers deputed to Kabul, so that we may weigh the matter in his mind and give a suitable answer."

**59. The Ameer's alternative proposal that he should depute an Envoy to India.**—On the 4th April the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote two letters to the Agent at Kabul. In one, he specified the two subjects which the Government of India desired should be fully explained to the Amir by the proposed British Envoy. In the other, the Agent was desired to ascertain the Amir's wishes in respect to the Viceroy's offer of Enfield rifles for his troops. At first, the Amir expressed his intention of deliberating over both letters. Eventually he sent, through the Agent, the following replies marked C and D. In the first of them the Agent intimates His Highness' readiness to receive the British Envoy, but proposes, as an alternative which the Amir preferred, that an Envoy from Kabul should come to India to discuss the political questions under consideration of the two Governments. The second letter adduces further considerations in support of the alternative proposal.

## C.

*Translation of letter, dated 14th April 1873, from the Agent at Kabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.*

"After mastering the contents of your letter to me, dated 4th instant, which was received by me on the 9th idem, and after consulting with his Durbar officials, the Amir remarked as follows :—

"As the interests of this Government, which God has given me, and those of the British Government, are virtually in all conditions identical, the meeting of a British officer deputed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India with me will afford me much gratification. As regards the Seistán question, full information about the confirmation of the award of Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid has reached me, and I have gleaned information about the ancient boundary of Northern Afghanistan from the marrasilas of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 24th June 1870, 1st May 1872, and 9th September 1872, and the marra-sila of Von Kaufmann, Russian Governor-General at Tashkend. As for the recently defined boundary of Northern Afghanistan, whatever views the British Government, may have entertained about it, great anxiety weighs on me day and night, and I am not in any moment relieved from it, that the juxtaposition of boundaries with Russia will involve difficulty in making provision for the security of the borders in the interests of both Governments. Under the circumstances, I consider it advisable that one of my Agents should first wait on His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to ascertain the real views of the British Government in both of these two matters, and other major or minor border affairs satisfactorily, and to represent my views about the interests of both Governments carefully and in detail, in order that, on receipt of full information about the views of the British Government, these matters may be satisfactorily settled after deep consideration and the most careful deliberation on their probable consequences. However, if the British Government prefer to depute an English officer to me, notwithstanding their cognizance of my views on the considerations above mentioned, and my anxious precautionary reflections, or consider it desirable to do so after granting a meeting to my Agent, bearing the representations he will make on my part and acquainting him with the views of the British Government, I have no objections to either course. Information should be kindly sent to me as to which of these views has been approved of by the British Government, in order that I may make arrangements accordingly."

"This letter has been submitted after perusal by the Amir."

## D.

*Translation of letter, dated 14th April 1873, from the Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.*

"In reply to your letter to me of 4th instant, which reached me on the 9th idem, on the subject of the proposed deputation of a British officer to Kabul, I beg to submit the observations made by the Amir in the Persian language under a separate letter after perusal by His Highness. After the receipt of your letter under reply, the Amir held a private Council for some days with his Durbar officials. Some said that the decision in the Seistán question is the same which is contained in the award of Major-General Goldsmid, there is no necessity of illustrating it further. They, moreover, said that regard should be paid to the fact that if an English officer deputed by the British Government presses it on them to accept this decision, and they refuse to do so in the interests of the Government, such direct refusal at a personal interview will undoubtedly weaken the friendly relations existing between the two Governments. Further, that if the said British officer makes any communications in the form of advice or instructions regarding the internal affairs of Afghanistan about Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan and other Sirdars or Chiefs, it will clearly be most injurious to their interests. In addition to these representations, they stated that if the deputation of an English officer is

intended for the discussion of some important matter of decision of boundaries, the settlement of such a question is hardly possible without the conference of the Amir with His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. His Highness remarked that, though in reality the settlement of border affairs is impossible without such conference, he will see about it when a wish for it is intimated to him by the British Government; that at present it is advisable that Syud Nur Mahomed Shah should be deputed as an agent to wait on His Excellency the Viceroy to make and hear communications about boundary affairs, and that the British Government may send their Agent either before the departure of His Highness' Envoy, or depute him in company with him on his return from India."

The Government of India decided to accept the Amir's offer to send an Agent of his own in lieu of receiving one from the British Government.

Foreign Department No. 763P., dated 25th April 1873.

They observed that in proposing Mr. Macnabb's visit they had been actuated by the desire of communicating to the Amir the earliest possible authentic information regarding the Seistán boundary settlement, and the progress and conclusion of the communications which had taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia, on the subject of the extent of His Highness' dominions.

As the Amir had intimated that full information about the confirmation of General Goldsmid's award had reached him, and that he had gathered information on the other subjects from various documents, the Government of India were quite prepared to meet the Amir's wishes and postpone further official communication to His Highness, until his Agent had had an opportunity of seeing the Viceroy.

On the arrival of the Kabul Agent at Peshawur all necessary arrangements were to be made for his journey to Simla with comfort, and for his honorable reception and treatment on the way.

**60. Arrival of the Kabul Envoy at Simla. Acceptance of Lord Granville's decision by Persia. Proposal to modify boundary south-west of Kohak Bund.**—On the 25th June 1873 the Viceroy telegraphed that the Afghan Envoy had reached Simla, and enquired whether the Shah had accepted Lord Granville's decision. On the 26th the Secretary of State replied as follows:—

"Your telegram of the 25th. There is likelihood that Seistán arbitration will be accepted wholly in principle, the only objection being a point of detail regarding the line defining the frontier south-west of Kohak Bund. Persians complain they are pushed too far west. The difference seems unimportant, provided both banks of the river above Kohak remain with Afghanistan. A large tract of neutral desert intervenes between this cultivated belt and Persia Proper. Inform me how far this would be assented to by Amir, as action may be perhaps taken before Shah's departure to secure definite adjustment."

The Viceroy answered deprecating very strongly any departure from the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and added that satisfactory arrangements with the Amir depended upon complete and speedy acceptance by the Shah. On the 1st July the Secretary of State answered—

"Your telegram of the 28th June. No departure contemplated from strict wording of Goldsmid's award, 4th paragraph from end, but that award is consistent with alteration of particular line, provided it leaves Afghanistan all cultivated land on both banks of the river from bund upwards. Such alteration is no departure from award, and ought not to be treated as such."

The Viceroy again urged in the strongest manner absolute adherence to the arbitral opinion of which the map formed a part. If any change were made, Lord Northbrook declined to answer for the peaceful conduct of the Amir. On the 6th July the Secretary of State answered as follows:—

"Shah fears inroads on Seistán frontier from inability of Afghanistan to restrain marauders. Hence his anxiety that boundary be modified. This done, and district south-west of Kohak Bund reported as ceded to Persia, Shah proposes to cede to Afghanistan fertile territory of more than equal value elsewhere. Granville declines to re-open arbitration, and recommends Shah at once formally to accept award, but Granville added that Her Majesty's Ministers will direct Governor-General to impress upon Amir importance of relieving Persia from apprehensions it now feels by restraining tribes whose marauding habits have given rise to them from molesting Persian territory; and if Amir should express doubt of his power to restrain tribes, and if Shah would authorize Her Majesty's Ministers to suggest interchange of territory as method by which obligations of Amir and security of Persian frontier could

be most effectually provided for, Her Majesty's Ministers would exert influence with Amir (to) induce him to consent to such expedient, and would thenceforth use their utmost endeavours to bring any negotiations between the two countries to satisfactory conclusion."

The Viceroy promised to do his best, but intimated that the Shah's acceptance in the first instance was indispensable. On the 16th July the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Shah had accepted the decision of the English Government without modification. Subsequently the papers which formed the basis of the above telegrams were forwarded from the India Office (No. 138, dated 18th July 1873). I extract from them the portions of Lord Granville's despatch which conveys the suggestion that if the Shah accepted the decision, other means might be devised for attaining the object His Majesty had in view of securing the peace of the Persian frontier. I have also taken out Syud Hosein's reply to Lord Granville; the last two paragraphs of which are important—

*Extract from LORD GRANVILLE'S letter to Persian Minister in London.*

"But although the question at issue in the arbitration may be thus resolved, there is no reason why the apprehensions felt by the Shah as to the effect of the award on the peace of the neighbouring Persian districts may not be met, and Her Majesty's Government will readily use their good offices to this end.

"It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the object may be attained either by inducing the Amir to keep in order the marauding tribes, and to prevent them from disturbing the tranquillity of their Persian neighbours, or by an interchange of territory such as has been suggested. Her Majesty's Government will readily direct the Governor-General of India to impress upon the Amir the importance of relieving the Government of Persia from the apprehensions which it now feels by restraining the tribes whose marauding propensities have given rise to them from molesting Persian territory; and if the Amir should express any hesitation, founded on a doubt of his means of doing so, of his power effectually to keep the tribes in order, and if the Shah would authorize Her Majesty's Government in that case to suggest an interchange of territory as the means by which the obligations of the Amir on the one hand, and the security of the Persian frontier, could be most effectually provided for, Her Majesty's Government would exert their influence with the Amir to induce him to consent to such an expedient, and would thereafter contribute by their good offices to bring any negotiation between the two countries to an honorable and satisfactory conclusion."

*From SYUD HOSEIN, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received 16th July 1873.*

"En réponse à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 3 de ce mois, je viens, par ordre de S. M. I. le Schah, mon auguste maître, et par son autorisation, vous informer que, dans la question de Sistan, il a accepté votre arbitrage et celui du votre Gouvernement, qu'il a confié entre vos mains ses intérêts dans ce pays et qu'il vous a expliqué avec évidence les préjudices qui, suivant l'avis émis par le Général Goldsmith seront causés à la Perse par ce partage.

"S. M. et le soussigné ont eu la plaisir de répéter à V. S. que dans le cas où le présent partage serait accepté, les Provinces de Yezd, de Kerman et de Tabas persan, seraient livrées au brigandage des Beloudjes et ils lui ont spécialement exprimé le désir en le priant d'arranger ce partage de manière que les brigands Beloudjes ne puissent plus exercer, comme dans le temps passé, leur vol et leur massacre dans ces trois provinces.

"Aujourd'hui V. S. nous dit qu'après avoir émis son arbitrage, il est impossible de porter des changements dans ce partage, mais que le Gouvernement anglais emploiera toute son influence afin que l'Emir de l'Afghanistan prenne toutes les mesures nécessaires dans le but d'empêcher le renouvellement des incursions incessantes des Beloudjes sur le territoire Persan.

"Le désir de S. M. I. le Schah mon auguste souverain, étant uniquement à être avant tout, agréable au Gouvernement anglais et convaincu qu'en faisant plaisir à votre Gouvernement, il en sera grandement favorisé dans l'avenir il a bien voulu accepter et approuver votre arbitrage; mais pour garantir le territoire Persan contre le vol et le pillage des Beloudjes, il compte toujours sur la promesse du Gouvernement de la grande Bretagne et il ne peut pas se fier aux promesses de l'Emir de l'Afghanistan. Il dépend donc de votre Gouvernement d'exiger de l'Emir de l'Afghanistan toute espèce de sécurité à cet égard; il est indispensable d'ajouter qu'il faudrait commencer à mettre à exécution ce partage ainsi que la délimitation des frontières que trois mois après notre retour à Tehran.

"En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de V. S. j'aime à espérer que V. E. trouvera dans cette décision de S. M. une nouvelle preuve de son incessant désir à raffermir de plus en plus les liens de l'amitié qui existent déjà entre nous deux Gouvernements."

**61. Memorandum of a conversation between Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, the Kabul Envoy, and the Foreign Secretary, dated 1st July 1873.**—This and the succeeding paragraphs deal with the



negotiations between the Government of India and the Envoy from Kabul, Syud Nur Mahomed. The discussions are of such importance as to render any attempt to condense them inadvisable. Other matters besides Seistán affairs were brought under review; the parts of the record which relate to them will be found in their proper place in later chapters of this précis—

“And first as regards Seistán, the Envoy said that the Amir was well aware of the deep interest that has always been shown by the British Government in the well-being of Afghanistan. This solicitude had been frequently evinced in the most marked manner, and notably so in regard to the differences between Persia and Afghanistan as to the right of those countries to Herat. Such being the case, however, and, keeping in mind the fact that the question of the Seistán boundary was of even greater importance as regards both English and Afghan interests than that of the possession of Herat, the Amir was unable to understand what advantage accrued to Afghanistan by the arbitral decision of General Goldsmid in regard to that boundary. There was doubtless some advantage to be expected from that decision, and the Amir wished to understand clearly what that advantage was. The numerous and forcible objections to that decision entertained by the Amir were well known to the British Government, having been fully explained in the previous correspondence and discussions, and the Envoy considered it unnecessary to repeat them. He quoted Lord Russell’s letter of 1863, which, he said, gave the Persians liberty to appeal to arms in order to enforce their claims against Seistán, and complained that, on the other hand, Government had restrained the Afghans from enforcing *their* claims by the sword. As a deduction from this last statement, the Envoy contended that what Afghanistan had demanded from the British Government was not an arbitration of the respective claims of Persia and Afghanistan, but they had demanded intervention and justice against Persian aggression.

“The Secretary explained that Government had not entered into the arbitration of their own motion, but at the solicitation of both Persia and Afghanistan; that the consent of both parties to abide by the decision was obtained before the arbitration was proceeded with; and that, pending the arbitration, both parties, and not Afghanistan only, had been urged to abstain from hostilities. Having thus assumed the office of arbitrator, Government was bound to act impartially in the matter, and endeavour to arrive at a just decision without showing favor to either party. They accordingly despatched a Special Commissioner to Seistán, who, after a protracted and careful enquiry, directed especially with reference to ancient right and present possession of both Persia and Afghanistan, submitted for the approval of Her Majesty’s Government his arbitral opinion on the case. This arbitral opinion had been carefully considered by Her Majesty’s Government, who, after due deliberation, had upheld the award of General Goldsmid as being just to both parties.

“The Envoy questioned—1st, whether the Amir had ever invited a settlement of the case by the British Government; and, 2ndly, whether he had ever intimated his readiness to abide by the arbitral award.

“The various passages bearing on these two points in the correspondence with the Amir regarding the Seistán arbitration were then read and translated to the Envoy, who finally admitted the first point, though he appeared still to entertain doubts as regards the second, pending production of the original correspondence on the subject. But on the passages in Lord Mayo’s letter to the Amir of 31st October 1871, and the Amir’s reply of 13th November 1871 (29th Shaban 1288 H.), being again translated to him, he said it was quite unnecessary to produce the original papers; that the decision had been given, and the Amir had no other resource but to accept it, though, if he had the power of exercising his own option, he would rather appeal to arms against Persia than accept the decision.

“The mistake made by Mr. Macnabb in having erroneously intimated to the Amir that the arbitral decision had been accepted by Persia, was then explained to the Envoy, who expressed surprise at the announcement, which, he said, altered considerably the nature of the communications he had intended to make. Had Persia accepted the decision, it would have been his duty to mention the conditions on which the Amir was prepared to do the same; but such not being the case, any representations on the subject would be premature. Now that Persia had not yet intimated her acceptance of the decision, and by her delay seemed unwilling to accept it, the Envoy suggested that the best course was to leave both parties to fight it out.

“The Secretary observed that there had been a telegraphic correspondence on the subject of the acceptance of the award by Persia, and that the earliest intelligence of the result of the communications would be made to the Envoy. The Envoy then remarked that the settlement of other matters depended so much on the adjustment of the Seistán question, which in Afghanistan was considered the most important of all, and what he had to say about Seistán depended so much on whether or not Persia accepted the award, that he thought it would be unadvisable to have any further official discussions till the decision of Persia is known.”

## 62. Memorandum of a conversation between the Kabul Envoy and Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd July 1873.

“The Secretary informed the Envoy that a telegraphic message had been received from London to the effect that Persia had unreservedly accepted the decision of Her Majesty’s

Government on the Seistán question. His Excellency the Viceroy expected that there would be similarly on the part of the Amir no hesitation in accepting that decision.

"The Envoy replied that there would naturally be no difficulties raised by Persia, who had received every advantage by the decision. As regards the Amir's sentiments on the subject, when, through the present Envoy, the Afghan loss by raids in Seistán was represented to be ten lakhs of rupees and the British Government had offered five lakhs, the Amir had made no remark, and had induced his subjects to acquiesce. The Amir was of opinion that justice had not been done to his claims as regards Seistán, and the whole of Afghanistan was perplexed to discover the reason that had induced the British Government to sever from their country the district handed over to Persia. The Amir was unable to acknowledge in so many words that the district which had passed out of his possession by General Goldsmid's award was no longer his territory, but His Highness would raise no objection to the arrangement which the British Government, acting doubtless in the interests of Afghanistan, had made. This acquiescence, however, was conditional on the Persian Government abstaining from all interference with the territories of Afghanistan, and all intrigues by means of written or verbal communications with Afghan subjects within those limits. In the event of such intrigues or interference taking place, the Amir should be empowered promptly, and in any way he thinks best, to repel them, and also, the agreement being thus at an end, to recover what he can of the country given over to Persia. The Envoy represented that his reason for bringing forward the above stipulation was that the Persians had by intrigue alone, and not by open force, obtained possession of that portion of Seistán which had been allotted to them.

"The Envoy continued that he had at Poona, on his return from Seistán, submitted two papers in which were detailed the dangers that might be apprehended to Afghanistan by the decision of Her Majesty's Government. At that time the Envoy had not seen the Amir, and he now wished to make some further representations on this head. In the first place, it was certain that, unless forts were built at three different places, sufficient garrisons posted therein, colonies of Afghans planted in various parts, and canals excavated for the irrigation of the lands of those colonies, there would be continual apprehension of dangers that might one day culminate in a very serious disturbance. The resources of His Highness the Amir were not sufficient to enable him to carry out the above measures, which for some years would entail a considerable annual expenditure.

"The Envoy next proceeded to detail the various causes that would necessitate the employment of the measures above described. These were as follow :—

"(1.) The people of Seistán are principally Biluchis, and the remainder are under Biluch influence. In former days they enjoyed lands under the Afghan Government, and on return rendered service and paid some revenue. They had, however, never been brought under entire subjugation, and, during the disturbances in Afghanistan, had passed quite out of control. They were frequently concerned in raids, and especially since the Persian occupation of Seistán Proper had brought their frontier conterminous with the Biluch country.

"(2.) On the southern side of Taraku and Kob-i-Seah, the country is inhabited by the pure Biluchis of Kedj, Mekran, &c., who were under the merely nominal control of the Khan of Kelat. The outrages committed on caravans in the Kelat country in the immediate proximity of the capital itself, are a matter of notoriety. Hence, what is likely to be the state of the outlying districts which immediately adjoin the Afghan border?

"(3.) A portion of the countries bordering on Bum and Nermashir, which belong to Mekran, were, by a recent arbitration of General Goldsmid, given to Persia, but no real control over those countries is exercised by that Power. The Biluch tribes are now under various jurisdictions, and will be engaged in endless disputes, just as in Seistán recently the so-called Biluch subjects of Persia and also those of Kelat all joined in the disturbance.

"(4.) Again, if the Persian Government, or its subject tribes, commit aggressions on Afghanistan, the Persians will profess ignorance and disclaim all responsibility. If, on the other hand, these raid in Persian territory, it will be said by the Persians that the aggressors are Afghan subjects. It is highly probable that some of the Biluch subjects of Afghanistan will enter into the designs of Persia and thus disturbances will arise.

"For the above reasons, the Envoy represented that, unless the measures already detailed should be adopted, it will be impossible to provide for the security of the frontier.

"The Secretary then observed that, from the statements made by the Envoy, he understood that whatever may be the opinion as to the advantages or disadvantages of the boundary defined, the decision of the British Government would be unreservedly respected by Afghanistan, and that the Amir engages distinctly not to interfere with the country on the Persian side of the frontier without the advice of the British Government, to whom he will refer all misunderstandings and disputes.

"The Envoy replied that such was his meaning; but he added that the Amir expected the assistance of the British Government in carrying out the contemplated measures for the security of the frontier.

"The Secretary replied that, as regards the specific request preferred for assistance in carrying out these projects, it would, together with the representations made in connection with the northern frontier of Afghanistan, be submitted for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy, by whom all representations made by His Highness the Amir would, in accordance

with the promise made in Lord Mayo's letter of the 31st March 1869, 'always be treated with consideration and respect.'

"Next, as regards the anticipations expressed by the Envoy of interference from Persia, and the desire of the Amir to recognize Seistán, the Secretary explained to the Envoy the provisions in Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty of 1857 with Persia, relating to the adjustment of differences between Afghanistan and Persia, and stated that no course could be countenanced which was inconsistent with these provisions.

"In conclusion, the Secretary enquired if it would be possible, now that both Powers had declared their readiness to abide by the decision of the British Government, to negotiate for such a modification by exchanges or any other means of the boundary now defined as might obviate some of the objections and difficulties anticipated.

"The Envoy replied that no such arrangement was possible, and he proceeded to show on a map that no modification could be devised that would prove acceptable to both parties."

**63. Memorandum of an interview between Lord Northbrook and the Kabul Envoy at Government House, Simla, dated 30th July 1873.**—The first subject discussed at this interview was that of the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, particulars of which will be found recorded in a separate memorandum. When the Envoy had intimated that he had no further remarks to offer on that subject, the conversation turned on the question of the Seistán arbitration—

"His Excellency the Viceroy observed that the Persian Government having accepted the arbitral decision in the case of Her Majesty's Government, it now remained for the latter to receive a formal intimation that the decision is likewise accepted by the Amir of Afghanistan.

"The Envoy replied that he could state most distinctly that, whatever opinion the Amir might hold as to the question of right, he formally, but with considerable reluctance, and notwithstanding the objections urged against the award on the part of Afghanistan, announced that the boundary laid down by General Goldsmid would be scrupulously respected, and that no aggressions would be permitted on the countries situated on the Persian side of the border.

"In making this announcement, the Envoy observed that, in the event of aggression by Persia, the Amir of Afghanistan would have the right to take such measures as he considered fitting to repel and punish the aggressors. To this the Viceroy stated that he had no objections on the understanding that the exercise of that right is not to be made a pretext for the annexation to Afghanistan of any portion of the Persian dominions, and that any military force which may cross the frontier for the above purpose shall retire to its own territory, as soon as its object is accomplished; and that this condition was made on account of the existence of a similar stipulation in the Treaty of Paris between England and Persia, regarding the violation of the Persian frontier by Afghanistan.

"His Excellency continued that the assurance given by the Envoy on the part of his master was sufficient. The question being now finally decided, His Excellency observed that the British Government wished to see friendly relations established between Persia and Afghanistan, and enquired whether the Envoy could suggest any measures for bringing about more cordial relations with regard to Seistán. The Envoy replied that, as far as abstention from aggression goes, no offence would be given to Persia, and that the frontier officers would communicate freely with each other. Friendship, if it is to be established, is of slow growth, but still it was quite possible that in course of time the relations between Persia and Afghanistan might become friendly, if circumstances should be favorable."

**64. Memorandum of conversations between Kabul Envoy and Foreign Secretary, dated 31st July and 1st August 1873.**—At the interview of the 30th of July His Excellency the Viceroy requested the Envoy to discuss with Mr. Aitchison the following subjects:—

(1) The location in certain towns of Afghanistan of British officers as representatives of their Government.

(2) The expectations of the Amir with regard to the present assistance to be rendered to Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening that country against foreign aggression.

(3) The measures that should be taken for strengthening the Seistán frontier, and the expectations of the Amir in connection therewith.

The following extract deals with Seistán :—

"Next, with respect to the measures necessary for the defence of the Seistán frontier, the Envoy said that he was not in a position to do more than give a very rough estimate of the expenditure required. He had already mentioned the necessity for planting a colony at Taraku, and garrisoning that place, as well as Nad Ali, Killa Fath. For the irrigation of the lands destined to support that colony and the garrisons, it would be necessary to excavate three canals leading from the Helmund to Taraku, Killa Fath, and towards Chakánsur. These would cost, say, ten lakhs. Then, again, the Taraku colonists would have to be paid their expenses to the colony, and for some time be supported by the Amir: they would also require advances to build houses, and to purchase agricultural implements and seed-grain. Altogether, perhaps, the measures necessary for the proper defence of the Seistán frontier would cost probably some 30 or 40 lakhs.

"The Secretary explained to the Envoy that, of course, the British Government could not undertake to find the amount necessary for carrying out these measures. With reference also to the proposed excavation of canals, he reminded the Envoy that, by the arbitration, no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmund.

"The Envoy, however, remarked, with reference to this point, that the water for 20 such canals could be spared from the Helmund without decreasing the supply derived by Persia.

"The Secretary then proceeded to say that Government were unable to share the apprehensions of aggression entertained by the Amir, and would not encourage him to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency. At the same time, they were desirous to see the Amir strong, and were inclined to give him any reasonable assistance with this object. He invited the Envoy to state specifically his views in regard to the amount of assistance expected by the Amir. After considerable discussion the Secretary informed the Envoy that Government was prepared to give the Amir, in addition to the arms which he had asked for, a present of ten lakhs in cash; this amount to include the five lakhs promised in Poona for indemnifying the sufferers from the Seistán raids. Five thousand stand of Enfield rifles would be given at once, and the remaining arms, including five thousand Sniders, would be ordered from England.

"The Envoy expressed an opinion that the Amir would not be satisfied with a present of ten lakhs, which was so much below his expectations. Being pressed to state what amount would fulfil those expectations he named 20 lakhs, adding at the same time that he had no authority for naming this figure, which was his own idea of the amount required.

"The Secretary could hold out no hope of this amount being granted, but added that he would submit the matter for the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy.

"On the 1st August the Secretary informed the Envoy that he had taken the orders of the Viceroy on the question of the pecuniary assistance to Afghanistan, and that His Excellency had expressed inability to offer a larger sum than 15 lakhs in all, including the value of the arms to be presented to the Amir. The question had been considered by His Excellency in a spirit of the utmost friendliness towards Afghanistan, and looking both to the necessities of that country and the condition of the Indian finances, it was not considered necessary to fix a higher amount.

"The Envoy was then informed, in reply to his enquiries that five lakhs of the ten was to be considered as a contribution towards the amount to be paid to the Seistán sufferers, and another five lakhs was to be considered as a contribution towards the general expenses of the Amir, which the Amir might, if he thought fit, expend in arrangements for the settlement of Seistán, or otherwise as he thought best. It was probable that the value of the arms would be about four lakhs, and any balance, therefore, that might remain from the other five lakhs would be sent to Afghanistan with the arms. If the Envoy considered it advisable, orders would be at once given to have ten lakhs ready at Peshawur to be forwarded to Kabul."

**65. Kharita from Lord Northbrook to the Amir, dated 6th September 1873.**—On the Envoy's departure from Simla he took with him the subjoined letter from Lord Northbrook on the Seistán arbitration and its results. The permission given to the Amir to repel aggression from the Persian side on the same conditions assigned to Persia by Article VII of the Treaty of Paris is important :—

"Since the arrival of Your Highness' Envoy and Plenipotentiary, I have received official intimation that, in deference to the advice of Her Majesty's Government, the Persian Government have, notwithstanding considerable objections, at length unreservedly accepted the decision of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the question of the Seistán

boundary. On behalf of Your Highness, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah has now also, in deference to the British Government, formally, but with considerable reluctance, announced that, notwithstanding the objections urged against the award on the part of Afghanistan, the boundary laid down by General Goldsmid will be scrupulously respected, and that no aggressions will be permitted on the countries situated on the Persian side of the border.

"In making this announcement, your Envoy observed that, in the event of aggression by Persia, the Amir of Afghanistan would have the right to take such measures as he considered fitting to repel and punish the aggressors. To this I have no objections, on the understanding that the exercise of that right is not to be made a pretext for the annexation to Afghanistan of any portion of the Persian dominions, and that any military force which may cross the frontier for the above purpose shall retire to its own territory as soon as its object is accomplished. This condition is made on account of the existence of a similar stipulation in the Treaty of Paris between England and Persia, regarding the violation of the Persian frontier by Afghanistan.

"The evidence produced at Teheran, both on the Afghan and Persian side, on which the decision of Her Majesty's Government was based, has been already communicated to Your Highness by Syud Nur Mahomed Shah. I abstain, therefore, from any reference to it. For Your Highness' information, however, I enclose a Persian translation of the award delivered by General Goldsmid, and confirmed by Her Majesty's Government, and copy of a map showing the boundaries finally decided on by Her Majesty's Government as ultimate arbitrator.

"I confidently trust that the settlement of this long-pending question will prove a material source of strength to Your Highness' Government. It is with much satisfaction that I have heard of the stringent instructions issued by Your Highness to the Afghan local officials, warning them against aggression or interference on the Persian side of the border. Adherence to the policy which Your Highness has so wisely adopted will afford the best guarantee for the security of your possessions in Seistan; and, so long as there is no deviation on the part of Afghanistan from that policy, the British Government will use all their influence to secure an adherence on the part of Persia to a similar course of conduct in accordance with the assurances given by His Majesty the Shah.

"It is highly desirable that Your Highness should impress on your officers in Seistan the necessity of cultivating friendly relations with the Persian officials on the frontier, so that both sides may co-operate cordially in the common object of securing the peace of that distracted country.

"I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness' sincere friend."

## **66. Despatch to the Secretary of State summarizing the result of the discussions with the Envoy in regard to Seistan.—**

At Simla, the Kabul Envoy had raised a question regarding the passage

"It is, moreover, to be well understood that no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmund."

in General Goldsmid's award which is quoted in the margin. He had requested that the stipulation should be understood as applying only to new

works, and not (1) to canals already in existence and operation, and (2) to such old or disused canals as might be put in proper repair. He was informed by Mr. Aitchison (Foreign Department No. 2038P., dated 6th September 1873) that, as the question affected the interpretation to be put upon Lord Granville's final decision, the Viceroy would refer it to England and communicate the answer to the Amir when received. The following letter (No. 74, dated 15th September 1873) was then addressed to the Secretary of State. After the usual commencement it proceeded:—

"The Envoy, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, having been the Special Commissioner on behalf of Afghanistan during the progress of General Goldsmid's enquiries in Seistan, there was no necessity to enter into any explanation regarding the boundary, with all the details of which he is intimately acquainted. On the part of His Highness the Amir, the Envoy has formally announced that the boundary laid down will be scrupulously respected, and that no aggression will be permitted on the countries situated on the Persian side of the border. It was not without reluctance on the Envoy's part, and after prolonged discussions regarding the conditions under which the arbitration was undertaken, that this acceptance was elicited; but we have every reason to believe that the engagement will be strictly carried out, and that no cause of offence will be given to Persia by the Amir, who has hitherto shown himself amenable to the advice of the British Government in the matter.

"3. After the Amir's unreserved acceptance of the decision of Her Majesty's Government had been formally communicated, the Envoy was asked, in accordance with the suggestions contained in Your Grace's telegram of the 6th July, whether it would be possible to



negotiate for such a modification, by exchange or any other means, of the boundary laid down as might be acceptable to both parties. The Envoy, however, intimated that no such arrangement was, in his opinion, possible.

"4. From the paper, which forms enclosure No. 7 of the present despatch, it will be observed that the Envoy has sought an explanation of the concluding passage in General Goldsmid's award which prohibits either party from carrying on works calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmund. The Envoy expressed his apprehensions lest the construction of irrigation works by Afghanistan might be taken advantage of to create difficulties with the Biluch Chiefs in Seistán, whose allegiance to the Amir is somewhat unstable. Among the measures which the Amir desires to carry out for the purpose of strengthening his Seistán frontier, are the establishment of a considerable Afghan colony at Taraku,\* and the location at Nád Ali

\* *Vide* General Goldsmid's map. and other points of bodies of troops sufficient to repress raids from either side of the frontier. For the support of these colonies, His Highness intends to construct new, or repair existing, channels leading from the Helmund, and the Envoy feared that the stipulation enjoined by General Goldsmid might possibly be advanced as an objection to the execution of these works. In our opinion the clause referred to in the award cannot be understood as applying either to existing canals or to such old and disused canals as the Afghan Government may wish to put in proper repair; nor would it interfere with the excavation of new canals, provided the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the Persian side is not diminished. If Her Majesty's Government concur in this view, we would suggest that an explanation may be given which we can communicate to the Amir.

"5. It has been brought to notice by the Envoy that the sons of Kamal Khan and Sharif Khan, both of whom belong to the country now awarded to Afghanistan, have been for some time, and are still, under detention at Teheran. He has requested that Her Majesty's Government will exert their influence to obtain the release of these *detenus*, and we support the request, which we trust will be complied with by the Persian Government when the matter is represented to them.

"6. In conclusion, the Envoy has begged that the Persian Government may be strongly urged to abstain from all communications with the Biluch Chiefs within the territories now declared to belong to the Amir of Afghanistan. He has promised that communications made to the Governor of Furráh will receive every possible attention. We are of opinion that the course indicated by the Envoy should be urged on the Persian Government as tending to remove possible grounds of future misunderstanding."

Eventually Her Majesty's Government took steps to bring before the Persian Government the question of the political status of the Biluch Chiefs in Seistán and of the release of the sons of Sharif Khan and Kamal Khan. The Kabul Envoy had told Major Henderson that Sharif Khan possessed land in Afghanistan, but enquiries instituted by Mr. Thomson did not support this statement. These showed not only that Sharif Khan possessed no landed property on the Afghan side of the Seistán frontier as recently settled; but further, that Sharifabad, the property of the Sirdar, was marked upon the map of Seistán showing the Persian frontier proposed by General Goldsmid as being in Persian territory.

In a despatch dated 29th December 1874, Mr. Thomson reported to Lord Derby that Dost Mahomed Khan, brother to Sharif Khan, and Sarferaz Khan, son of Ibrahim Khan, had been summoned on the 27th November by the Persian Foreign Minister, and told that the allowances which they received from the Persian Government would cease from that date, and that they were at liberty to leave Teheran when they pleased, and to proceed to any place they might select, whether in Persia or across the Afghan border. The Sirdars had called on Mr. Thomson, and stated their intention to join their relatives in Afghanistan. On receiving this information the Government of India addressed the Punjab Government (No. 809P., dated 4th March 1875), requesting that the Amir of Afghanistan might be informed of the correspondence and of the result of the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government.

**67. Reply of the Amir to Lord Northbrook's letter dated 6th September and rejoinder from the Viceroy.**—On the 13th November 1873 the Amir replied to the Viceroy's letters sent by the hand of Syud Nur Mahomed. The tone of the letter†

† The Persian version of this letter will be found in Appendix XII.—T. C. P.

was objectionable and highly sarcastic. It will be

convenient to cite it here *in extenso* as well as Lord Northbrook's reply, although the other matters dealt with in it are taken up in a later chapter of this précis—

'Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Kabul to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated Kabul, 21st Ramzan, 1290 A. H., corresponding with 13th November 1873.

"Be it known to Your Excellency that at this happy time, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah arrived here and delivered to me your welcome letters. As these letters contained intelligence of Your Excellency's good health, the perusal of their contents afforded me much pleasure. I am deeply thankful for the honor, respect, and kind attention with which Your Excellency and the officers of the British Government, out of regard to the relations of amity subsisting between the two Governments, treated my Envoy. God be praised that the bud of welfare of both the States continues expanded. I entertain a hope that the relations of friendship and amity between the two great Governments may become stronger day by day.

"All that has been written regarding the northern boundary I have fully understood, and I offer up my grateful thanks to the Almighty that peace and tranquillity have, praise be to God, been established in all States in perpetuity, and that doubts and disputes have on every side been removed; and that such security has been established in all countries that no aggressions will take place, nor will any Power raise discussions or disputes with another within the dominions of that Power; and that the use of inimical expressions has been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence, and that peace and tranquillity have been secured to the whole world.

"In respect to the brief mention that Your Excellency has made of the Seistán question, Your Excellency has observed that 'to this I have no objections, on the understanding that the exercise of that right is not to be made a pretext for the annexation to Afghanistan of any portion of the Persian dominions, and that any military force which may cross the frontier for the above purpose shall retire to its own territory as soon as its object is accomplished. This condition is made on account of the existence of a similar stipulation in the Treaty of Paris between England and Persia regarding the violation of the Persian frontier by Afghanistan.'

"Your Excellency! if the Seistán matter had been decided in accordance with the 6th Article of the Treaty concluded at Paris, there would have been nothing further to be said. Your Excellency has observed that it is advisable that I should issue stringent orders to my boundary officers to refrain from interference on the Persian border. From the commencement to this day I have, out of regard for the British Government, issued stringent instructions to these officers on the subject. Now again I issue strict orders to my officers on the frontier, warning them to abstain, as before, from interference on the Persian border.

"The friendly declaration of Your Excellency to the effect that you will maintain towards myself the same policy which was followed by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo has been the cause of much gratification to me. My friend! under this circumstance of the case it was not necessary to hold all those conversations with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Simla. The understanding arrived at in Ambala is quite sufficient. As long as the beneficent Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England continues firm and constant in its friendship, I shall also, please God, remain firm in my sincere friendship, as on the occasion of my meeting at Ambala with Lord Mayo, whose writing I hold in my possession, as also a document from Lord Lawrence. Of this friendship Your Excellency may rest assured.

"Mr. Macnabb, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawur Division, wrote through the British Agent at Kabul to the effect that Colonel Baker wishes permission to come to Hindustan from Teheran through Kabul. Your Excellency! my Envoy, at interviews and conversations with Your Excellency, explained the many objections that exist to men like Colonel Baker and others travelling in Afghanistan. I, therefore, do not think it necessary to allude to the subject further.

"I hope Your Excellency will consider me as your sincere friend, and will continue to gratify me with friendly letters containing accounts of your good health."

The following is Lord Northbrook's reply, dated 23rd January 1874:—

"Your Highness' letter of 21st Ramzan, 1290 A.H., corresponding with 13th November 1873, has been received and considered by me with the attention due to the importance of its contents. I fully reciprocate the hope expressed by Your Highness that the relations of friendship between the two Governments may become stronger day by day.

"The intimation made to me that Your Highness has fully understood all that has been written regarding the northern boundary, and that, as regards Seistán, you have again issued strict orders to your officers on the frontier, warning them to abstain, as before, from interference on the Persian border, is a cause of satisfaction to me.

"There are, however, some matters referred to in my letter of 6th September 1873, and the papers attached thereto, on which I have not been favored with an expression of Your Highness' views. There are others in regard to which I judge from Your Highness' reply that the views of the British Government have, perhaps, not been fully understood. My friend! considering it due to our established friendship that I should withhold no manifestation of the friendly interest which the British Government takes in Your Highness and the pros-

perity of Afghanistan, or of my personal desire to see Your Highness' Government strengthened and your dominions transmitted to your descendants in their integrity, I was perfectly unreserved and explicit in my communications with Your Highness' Envoy, and I cannot expect to make matters plainer by explanations beyond the terms of my previous letter to Your Highness, which were designedly framed by me with the view of drawing the cords of friendship still closer, and of giving Your Highness assurances of support even more explicit than those contained in the auspicious writings of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to which Your Highness has referred.

"It is not always easy for friends who are far removed from each other to adjust the details of important questions affecting their common welfare by means of letters. Your Highness will, therefore, probably agree with me that it will be preferable to postpone the further discussion of the matters now under consideration till some more convenient opportunity."

**68. Final letter from the Secretary of State on the subject of the Seistan arbitration.**—On the 28th November 1873 the Secretary of State acknowledged the various letters from the Government of India on the subject of the Seistan arbitration. He noticed that the Shah of Persia had accepted unconditionally the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and that the Amir of Kabul, through his Envoy, had formally announced that the boundary laid down by General Goldsmid would be scrupulously respected, and that no aggression on the part of Afghanistan would be permitted on the countries situated on the Persian side of the border. Her Majesty's Government had full faith in the sincerity with which the Governments of the two countries had so far accepted the arbitration of Sir F. Goldsmid, and they confidently left it to the Viceroy so to watch the progress of events as to prevent, if possible, any re-opening of the questions involved in the international adjudication.

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER II.

---

*Appendix No. VI.—Further report by General Goldsmid on the political aspects of his arbitral decision.*

*Appendix No. VII.—Account of the formation of the Kaini, Sarbandi, and other Chiefs.*

*Appendix No. VIII.—General Pollock's final report.*

### CHAPTER III.

#### FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE ON SEISTÁN AFFAIRS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF LORD GRANVILLE'S DECISION.

**69. Question of constructing irrigation works on the Helmund.**—Mr. Aitchison's reply to Syud Nur Mahomed on the question of constructing irrigation works on the Helmund and the promise of the Government of India to refer the matter to Her Majesty's Government has been noted in paragraph 66. The Secretary of State consulted General Goldsmid, who expressed his concurrence in the interpretation assigned by the Government of India in paragraph 4 of their despatch dated 15th September 1873. He drew attention to one or more memoranda, which he had submitted during the year, showing that the true spirit of the arbitration was to keep the Afghans as much as possible to the neighbourhood of the Helmund above Kohak, so as to leave a large space of politically useful desert between them and the Persians.

This interpretation was then accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and the Punjab Government were desired to inform the Amir of this result.

**70. Application by Persia for a rectification of the Seistan boundary by including the Naizar and Takht-i-Shah in Persian territory.**—The Secretary of State (No. 18, dated 17th July 1874) forwarded, for consideration of the Government of India, a memorandum submitted by the Persian Minister to Lord Derby raising further objections to the line demarcated by Sir F. Goldsmid. Lord Salisbury observed that the main object of the arbitration was to lay down as definite and unmistakable a boundary as possible, in order to prevent any cause of future misunderstanding between Persia and Afghanistan. The river Helmund above the Bund-i-Kohak seemed generally to meet the requirements of the case. In order, however, to prevent any encroachment on the district of Lash-Jowain, the whole course of the river up to its mouth had not been adopted as a boundary, but a line was carried off westwards, whereby the tract of reeds called the "Naizar" was constituted the northern line of demarcation. There were difficulties which had prevented any local investigation of this portion of the line by Sir Frederick Goldsmid; but that officer was of opinion that, while the Naizar generally should be adhered to as the northern boundary of Persian Seistán, if it could be proved that any pasture lands had been detached, by the adoption of this boundary, from the Persian villages of Jelalabad, Jehanabad, &c., there would be no objection to such lands remaining in possession of the latter power, provided there was no departure from the spirit of the arbitration, an important stipulation of which was that the river Helmund should in no case be crossed.

In Lord Salisbury's opinion the present demand of Persia appeared, on the face of it, reasonable.

The following is the Persian memorandum, together with Sir F. Goldsmid's Minute thereon :—

*Mémoire Londres, le 24 Juin 1874.*

"Au moment où l'arbitrage du Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique déterminait la frontière de la Perse du côté de l'Afghanistan, les positions topographiques n'étant pas suffisamment connues, il s'est produit dans le partage du Sistán quelques confusions involontaires qui ont bouleversé toutes les conditions vitales de provinces limitrophes.

"Ainsi, par la nouvelle ligne de démarcation, le district de Jelalabad est laissé à la Perse, tandis que le Neyzar et Takhteschah, qui contiennent les pâturages et les moyens indispensables de l'existence de ce district, sont détachés de leur centre naturel pour être abandonnés aux Afghans qui n'en ont aucun besoin et qu'en aucun cas ne peuvent tirer la moindre utilité d'une pareille possession.

"Dans ces contrées isolées où les populations vivent principalement par leurs bestiaux, un tel partage doit nécessairement amener l'abandon et la ruine des territoires ainsi déchirés.

"Comme un pareil résultat n'a jamais pu entrer dans les calculs du Commissaire anglais, et qu'au contraire le vice de ce partage a été tout simplement l'effet accidentel des informations incomplètes : et comme la possession nominale de ce Neyzar et Takhteschah ne peut jamais donner aucun avantage aux Afghans, qui en ignoreront même l'existence, le Gouvernement S. M. B. s'empresse de prévenir la ruine d'une de nos provinces en consentant tout simplement à une légère rectification de frontière qui sauverait nos populations sans porter la moindre atteinte à aucun intérêt étranger.

"Cette rectification consisterait à prendre la nouvelle ligne de démarcation qui suit le cours du Hirmend et au lieu de la briser du côté du Neyzar, de la prolonger sur tout le cours où le lit principal du Hirmend de manière à faire rentrer sur le territoire persan, le Neyzar et Takhteschah.

"Le Gouvernement de S. M. I. le Schah uniquement pour montrer la valeur qu'il attache à l'amitié de l'Angleterre, a consenti à abandonner aux Afghans la moitié de Seistán qu'il tenait en sa possession et à démembrer ainsi une grande province qui l'histoire, la géographie, et tout la littérature orientale proclament être un des centres les plus glorieux et les plus incontestables de la nationalité persane.

"En présence d'un si douloureux sacrifice que la Perse s'est imposé dans le seul but de se conformer aux convenances de la politique anglaise S. M. I. le Schah ne doute point que le Gouvernement de S. M. B. de son côté ne se hâte de réparer, au moins, une simple erreur topographique si nuisible à nous et si indifférente aux autres."

General Goldsmid's opinion was as follows. He quoted from the arbitration the decision "North of Seistán the southern limit of the Naizar should be the frontier towards Lash-Jowain. Persia should not cross the Hamun in that direction," and observed—

"It would certainly not be contrary to the spirit of the arbitration to allow Persia the benefit of any reeds or cultivation within the Naizar *which fairly belong to the places* assigned to her, such as Jelalabad, Jehanabad, &c., provided they do not equally belong to places *north* of the Naizar and on the western side of the Helmund. Therefore, if there be no counter-claim in this respect, I think this point might be conceded. But under no circumstances should the line of the 'Naizar,' or broad 'bed or reeds,' be transgressed; as all territory *to its north* must be held to belong to Lash-Jowain. The line might remain as drawn on Lieutenant Lovett's map, on the understanding that the southern limit of the Naizar, specified in the arbitration, does necessarily exclude reeds or cultivation which properly belong to Jelalabad and adjacent villages west of the main bed of the Helmund, and already assigned to Persia; there being, moreover, no places north of the said Naizar to which they could with equal reason and propriety be given."

The Government of India replied by telegraph deprecating any modification whatsoever of the Seistán award finally accepted by Persia and Afghanistan, as being likely to bring about very serious complications. Having in view the correspondence relative to the acceptance of the award by the Amir of Kabul, they could not make to His Highness any proposal for modification. In their despatch, No. 56, dated 25th August 1874, they added—

"General Goldsmid's arbitral award expressly declares that 'north of Seistán the southern limit of the Naizar should be the frontier towards Lash-Jowain.' The language of the award, and the map which was attached to it, leave no doubt as to the exclusion of the Naizar from the portion of Seistán awarded to Persia. If thereby any Persian villages have suffered loss, it is owing entirely to the proceedings of the Persian Commissioner, who left Seistán before the investigation was completed.

"We are of opinion that if the award be re-opened in the interest of Persia, we shall be placed in a very false position towards the Amir of Afghanistan, who accepted the decision with great reluctance, and is not likely to agree to any further concession to Persia, however apparently insignificant."

**71. Rumoured Afghan aggressions on Seistan and proceedings of Sharif Khan.**—On the 23rd March 1875, Mr. Thomson telegraphed that the Persian Government had just received intelligence from Seistán that the Amir of Afghanistan had sent a large force with Sharif Khan to assist the latter in recovering his rights in Seistán. As Persia had no political relations with the Afghan Government, the only means of learning the truth of this statement was by enquiry through the Governor-General at Kabul. The Sadr Azam added that Persia would rigidly fulfil her Treaty engagements with England regarding Afghanistan; but that, if the report were true, his Government must despatch a large army to the Afghan frontier with Sirdar Ayub Khan and other Afghan refugees. If untrue, the Governor-General of Seistán would be called to account for transmitting false intelligence of this gravity.



On the 27th March the Government of India replied that there was no reason to think that the Amir would act contrary to the assurances which he had given in respect to Seistán, and that there was no information of any troops having proceeded to the frontier other than those sent to Herat. Enquiry would, however, be made. The Punjab Government were

Foreign Department No. 59C.P., dated 27th March 1875. then asked to institute enquiries through the British Agent at Kabul,

who was to explain that the Government of India had no reason to suppose that His Highness had in any way departed from the assurances he had given that he would adhere to the Seistán award; but that the only means of ascertaining what was going on in these remote districts was by requesting information from His Highness, and that it was desirable to remove the apprehensions which were evidently entertained by the Persian Government.

On the 16th April the Punjab Government telegraphed that the Amir had told the British Agent that no Kabul troops had yet gone to Seistán, but that the question of sending troops had been discussed in Durbar. Nevertheless, the assurance given by Nur Mahomed at Simla would not be departed from.

The substance of this reply was conveyed to the Secretary of State and Mr. Thomson, and by him to the Persian Government. The Sadr Azam observed that the information re-assured them of the loyalty of the British Government towards Persia in respect of the relations of the Afghans towards Seistán "lesquels nous ne connaissons aucunement."

## **72. Apprehensions entertained during 1876-77 by the Persian Government of an attack on Seistan from Herat. Question of British intervention under the Treaty of Paris.—**

On 20th October 1876 Mr. Thomson telegraphed that the Persian Government had represented officially that military preparations on an extensive scale were being made by the Afghan authorities at Herat, and had again requested him to ascertain through Her Majesty's Government of India the object with which these unusual proceedings in proximity to the Persian frontier were being carried on.

On the 23rd October the Viceroy replied that the Afghan Government had long been engaged in putting its military resources into order and strengthening Herat, but that in his belief there was no ground for apprehension that it had aggressive designs against Persia.

On the 8th March 1877 Malcom Khan, the Persian Minister in London, addressed a note to Lord Derby in which he observed that his Government had telegraphed to him that the Amir Shere Ali had assembled a large force in Herat and was continuing warlike preparations, which caused uneasiness to the Persian Government; consequently they desired to know whether Her Majesty's Government could give any explanation. Persia could not remain indifferent to Shere Ali's proceedings, but before adopting active measures the Shah was anxious to know whether the explanation of the British Government would be of a character to assure Persia against the dangers which threatened the frontier bordering on Afghanistan.

To this representation Lord Derby, having consulted the India Office, replied that the reports received from the Viceroy of India showed that the Afghan Government had for some time past been engaged in putting their military resources in order, and in strengthening Herat, but that they had not made any preparations which would give grounds for apprehending that aggressive designs were entertained against Persia.

The British Agent at Kabul had reported in January 1877 that the Governor of Herat, with the view of preventing depredations by the Turkomans either in Herat, or in Persia, through Herat territory, had sent 2,000 sowars to Ghorian, but that the object of this movement had been explained at the time to an agent of the Persian Governor then at Herat.

Her Majesty's Government had no further precise information as to the object of the preparations which had been in progress at Herat, but they had

no reason to suppose that they were in any way directed against Persia. The movement of sowars to Ghorian appeared to be sufficiently explained by the disturbed state of the frontier, and with the information at present available they would strongly deprecate any unusual movement of Persian troops in the direction of the Herat frontier as unnecessary, and calculated, by increasing the agitation then prevailing in that quarter, to produce the very results which it was designed to obviate.

The Persian Minister in reply to this communication verbally informed Lord Derby that his Government had received further intelligence confirmatory of the menacing preparations which the Amir of Kabul was reported to be making at Herat, and that great anxiety was felt at Teheran on the subject.

The Persian Government were willing to accept the advice of the English Government not to march their troops towards the Herat frontier, but if an Afghan invasion should result, or any injury be done to Persia, they would look to Her Majesty's Government as responsible, and would expect from them redress and guarantees for the future.

In answer to an enquiry from Lord Salisbury as to the sense in which Lord Derby understood this declaration by Malcom Khan, as to the responsibility which the Shah would attach to Her Majesty's Government, Lord Tenterden replied (Foreign Office, dated 5th May 1877)—

"that His Lordship can put no interpretation on these words other than that the Persian Government wish to intimate that if they expose their frontier by not sending troops there on the advice of Her Majesty's Government, and the result should be disastrous, they would consider the English Government responsible for having given such advice."

On the 10th December 1877, Mr. T. Thomson telegraphed that a partisan of the Persian Government at Kabul had sent information that the Amir was preparing for a military expedition in the spring against Seistán, a communication which had caused the Persian Government some uneasiness. On the 29th December he telegraphed again as follows:—

"With reference to my telegram, December 10th, I have received further communication from Persian Government, stating that Amir of Kabul has assembled twenty regiments of foot and horse, with fifty guns at Herat, with the intention, they fear, of attacking Persian Seistán. They ask either for an assurance from us on this head, or to be informed if our intervention under 6th clause of Treaty can be counted upon. Papers are sent by post."

This telegram was based in the following official note presented to Mr. Thomson by the Persian Foreign Minister, and which contained the substance of observations made by the Shah to Mr. Thomson at a private audience:—

"It is not unknown to Your Excellency that the Persian Government, at the urgent instance of the British Government, relinquished their ancient rights with respect to Afghanistan, and agreed to recognize the independence of that country in a Treaty signed with your Government. They have, however, refrained, in deference to the understood wish of the English Government, from holding any independent political relations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, and when any question has arisen (with that country) they have referred the matter to the British Legation in Teheran.

"Apart from the clause respecting Afghanistan which is inserted in the Treaty, the British Government has repeatedly, both verbally and in writing, given assurances to the Persian Government that no undesirable movement, of a nature injurious to Persia or her interests, would be undertaken by the Ruler of Afghanistan; and the Persian Government, considering that assurance as sufficient, were free from anxiety. In order, also, to give rise to no doubts of any kind in the minds of the British authorities in India, to prove that they held to their word and engagement, and to show that they entertained no desire with reference to Afghanistan other than the wish to satisfy the British Government, they have not maintained a sufficient force on their frontier in the direction of Afghanistan.

"But, on the other hand, it has been reported to us—and the intelligence has now been confirmed—that a force of sixteen regiments of foot and four regiments of horse, with fifty guns, has been, without any existing necessity, assembled, and is now held in readiness near the Persian frontier, and that at a place, too, of such strength as Herat; and, as I stated to Your Excellency some days ago, we have further been informed that the intention is, early in spring, to make a hostile attack upon that portion of Seistán which belongs to Persia.

"Should such a movement take place when we are not prepared with the means of repelling it, the British Government will understand, and it will be manifest to the world, that the misfortune will have been brought about, not by the heedlessness of the Persian Government, but in consequence of the reliance which has been placed in the assurance given to them by the English Government.

"And now, in order that we may know what it is incumbent upon us to do for the future, by command of His Majesty the Shah, I am directed to request Your Excellency to bring the matter as speedily as possible to the knowledge of the British Government, in order that they may give a complete assurance to Persia in respect to Afghan aggression, or that they may state clearly and distinctly that they cannot interfere, now or hereafter, between Persia and Afghanistan, so that the Persian Government may understand the nature of the duty which devolves upon them for the future, and take steps for that duty not being neglected or overlooked.

"I hope that you will make known to me as soon as possible, and without any ambiguity whatever, or vagueness of expression, the views and opinion of your Government in this matter."

On receiving Mr. Thomson's telegram the Viceroy replied that he had referred the enquiries of the Persian Government to Her Majesty's Government, and that he had no information tending to confirm the report received by the Persian Government.

To the Secretary of State, Lord Lytton telegraphed on the 24th January as follows, having first repeated Mr. Thomson's message and his own reply :—

"It appears to us that, in the event of actual aggression by Afghanistan, Persia is authorized by Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris to repel it; and that, in the event of differences between the two countries, if Persia appeals to us, Her Majesty's Government is bound, by Article 6 of same Treaty, to offer and exert its good offices for the friendly settlement of such differences, but not bound to resort to force on behalf of Persian interests if its good offices are unsuccessful. If instructed by Your Lordship so to do, the Government of India will, of course, be ready to address to the Amir remonstrance or advice, in accordance with Article 6 of Treaty, on subject of Persia's above-mentioned complaint. But Her Majesty's Government is well aware that there is not the slightest probability of such remonstrance and advice being obeyed by the Amir, over whom the Government of India has at present no influence.

"We are of opinion that this should be made known to the Persian Government if it presses its demand for our intervention, from which we are not justified in anticipating any practical result. We have at present no reason, however, to believe that the Amir has on foot any hostile designs against Persia. But the intelligence we at present receive is, as you know, imperfect."

On the 16th February the Secretary of State telegraphed the action taken on the Viceroy's telegram dated 24th January. Mr. Thomson had been instructed by telegraph to inform the Persian Government that, while doubting the reality of the danger of Afghan aggression towards Seistán, Her Majesty's Government, if appealed to by the Shah under Article 6 of the Treaty of Paris, would use their good offices with the Amir to dissuade him from hostile measures.

Subsequently the following despatch, amplifying the telegram of the 16th February, was received. After the usual commencement it proceeded—

"Her Majesty's Government concur in the view taken by Your Excellency in Council of their obligations under the Treaty of 4th March 1857 between Great Britain and Persia. They consider that the British Government, if appealed to by Persia, is bound to interpose its good offices with the Amir of Kabul to deter him from aggression on Persian territory, but that it is not bound to use force on behalf of Persian interests in the contingency of its intervention being unsuccessful.

"Her Majesty's Government do not conceal from themselves that, under present circumstances, it is possible that their advice may be disregarded by the Amir; but they do not think that this result should be assumed as certain, or that it is expedient to make its probability a ground of refusal to fulfil their clear obligation towards Persia. Such a refusal might be construed to entirely release the Persian Government from the restrictions placed upon its freedom of action by the Treaty of Paris. In the event of hostilities ensuing and the result being favorable to Persia, it would be difficult to hold the Shah bound by the stringent provisions of the latter part of Article VII of the Treaty, if the British Government had refused to even attempt to carry out the stipulations of Article VI.

"Under these circumstances, as I have already informed Your Excellency by telegraph, Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran has been directed to inform the Persian Government that, while doubting the reality of the danger of Afghan aggression on Seistán which is apprehended by Persia, Her Majesty's Government, if appealed to by that of the Shah under Article VI of the Treaty of Paris, will be ready to use their good offices with the Amir of Kabul to dissuade him from hostile measures. In the event of an appeal being made by Persia, I will furnish Your Excellency with such instructions as may be requisite."

Subsequently, Lord Derby asked Lord Salisbury (Foreign Office, dated 23rd February 1878) whether it would be desirable to instruct Mr. Thomson to give to the Persian Government any, and if so what, further assurances than those contained in the telegraphic instructions already sent to him on the subject.

Lord Salisbury replied that in his opinion it was impossible at present to offer to the Persian Government any further assurances. On the one hand, it would be difficult for Her Majesty's Government at any time, or under any circumstances, to state positively, and as beyond doubt, that the Ruler of Afghanistan had no intention of making aggression on Persia; on the other hand, they could not legitimately be called upon to assume that any remonstrances which they might address to the Amir would be disregarded by him. By intimating to the Persian Government their readiness, if appealed to under Article VI of the Treaty of Paris, to use their good offices with the Amir in order to dissuade him from aggression on Persian territory, Her Majesty's Government had manifested their intention to fulfil their obligations towards Persia. It remained for the Persian Government to make the appeal. Pending the result of the communication which Her Majesty's Government would then address to the Amir, it was of course open to the Persian Government to adopt such precautionary measures as might be necessary.

**73. Application by the Persian Government for the removal of Sirdar Sharif Khan from Kila-i-Fath.**—In April 1878 the Persian Foreign Minister brought the alleged arrival of Sirdar Sharif Khan at Kila-i-Fath to Mr. Thomson's notice. It was said that many unruly persons had assembled on the frontier, that public order had been disturbed, and that trouble might ensue. Mr. Thomson was asked to consider the matter, and give his opinion as to the best means of securing tranquillity and the removal of Sharif Khan. Mr. Thomson referred the Persian Government to the circumstances of a similar complaint made in December 1875, to which the Government of India had replied that, without further evidence that the Sirdar had abused his position to promote disturbances in the adjacent Persian districts, they did not feel justified in addressing the Amir of Afghanistan on the subject. He promised, however, to communicate again with the Viceroy on the subject, and, in reply, the Government of India entirely concurred with the answer which he had given to the Persian Government. They thought that the letter of the Persian Foreign Minister did not show sufficient cause why the Government of India should as yet take action. That letter established, at the most, no more than a probability of difficulties ensuing from the Sirdar's presence on the border, but the mere apprehension of trouble upon a border always exposed to disturbance did not supply an adequate motive for appealing to a Treaty.

The Government of India also reported the matter to the Secretary of State (Foreign Department No. 84, dated 16th September 1878), and after recapitulating the facts of the case and their answer to Mr. Thomson, drew attention, as follows, to the peculiar obligation imposed by the Treaty of Paris upon the British Government:—

"We take this opportunity of observing that the position occupied by Her Majesty's Government, under the Treaty of 1857 between England and Persia, involves responsibilities of a somewhat inconvenient nature. By Article 6 the British Government engage at all times to exert their influence with the States of Afghanistan to prevent any cause of umbrage being given by them, or by any of them, to the Persian Government. On either side of the frontier between the dominions of the Amir of Kabul and the Shah of Persia, the country is very imperfectly under the control of its rulers; the border line separates two mutually jealous and unfriendly powers between whom dissensions have been frequent; and we have no recognized political agency whatever in the vicinity. To prevent umbrage being given, under such circumstances, by Afghanistan to Persia, implies, we submit, that the State which we have undertaken to restrain is assumed to be very much more under our effective influence than it has been hitherto. And we anticipate that if at any time the British Government are summoned to act upon this engagement, the previous acquisition of some real and permanent influence over the Afghan States will be found to be a necessary condition of fulfilling it."

---

#### APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III.

---

*Appendix No. IX.—Report, dated 1st March 1875, by Captain the Hon'ble G. C. Napier, on the present situation in Seistán, with reference to the late arbitration.*

## CHAPTER IV.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE AMIR REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF AFGHANISTAN. OTHER MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH THE KABUL ENVOY AT SIMLA IN JULY 1873.

**74. Brief notice of the later correspondence between the British and Russian Governments regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan.**—It will have been seen from paragraphs 57 *et seq.* of this précis that the Government of India desired to depute Mr. Macnabb, not only to announce the confirmation by Lord Granville of General Goldsmid's arbitral opinion on the Seistán affair, but also to communicate the result of the negotiations between the British and Russian Governments regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan. And the Amir, in submitting his alternative proposal that an Envoy from Kabul should visit India, accepted these two subjects with other minor matters as affording material for serious discussion. This précis is not intended to embrace an account of the voluminous discussions which commenced in 1868-69 with Lord Clarendon's proposal for the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and which should be scrupulously respected by both powers. Suffice it to say here that in a despatch, dated 1st-13th November 1871, to Count Brunnov, the Russian Ambassador in London, Prince Gortschakoff, summarized the result of those discussions as follows:—

“ V. E. a été tenue exactement au courant des pourparlers auxquels les affaires de l'Asie Centrale ont donné lieu, entre le Cabinet Impérial et le Gouv. de S. M. B.

“ Elle n'ignore pas qu'à la suite des explications que nous avons eu avec M. Forsyth, il avait été convenu en principe:—

“ Que l'on considèrerait les territoires se trouvant actuellement en la possession effective de Shir Ali Khan comme formant les limites de l'Afghanistan.

“ Que cet Emir ne chercherait à exercer aucune influence ni aucune immixtion au delà de ces limites et que le Gouvernement Anglais appliquerait tous ses soins à le détourner de toute tentative d'aggression.

“ Que de son côté le Gouvernement Impérial emploierait toute son influence afin d'empêcher l'Emir de Boukhara de porter aucune atteinte au territoire afghan.

“ Ces principes avaient reçu la pleine adhésion du Cabinet de Londres et du Gouverneur-General des Indes.

“ Au mois de Mai\* 1870, M. l'Ambassadeur de S. M. B. nous avait communiqué une dépêche de Lord Mayo\* qui, tout en exprimant cette adhésion développait les principes posés, dans une direction qui nous a

paru s'écarter sensiblement de la pensée sur laquelle on était tombé d'accord.

“ Je joins ici copie de cette dépêche, V. E. y relevera la nuance importante établie par Lord Mayo. Le § 4 de sa dépêche constate la principe établie quant aux limites reconnues du territoire afghan, c. à d. toutes les provinces possédées actuellement par Shir Ali Khan.

“ Le § 6 témoigne sa satisfaction de voir la politique de la Russie coïncider aussi parfaitement avec celle du Gouverneur-Général des Indes sanctionnée par le Gouvernement Britannique.

“ Au § 7 il adhère pleinement à l'idée que pour développer cette politique pacifique, le Gouvernement de Russie et le Gouvernement Anglais prennent des mesures pour constater les limites des territoires qui reconnaissent la souveraineté de Dost Mahomed Khan et sont actuellement en la possession de Shir Ali Khan.

“ Au § 8 il se réfère à un telegramme annonçant que si Shir Ali Khan montre une disposition quelconque à étendre ses territoires au delà des limites possédées par Dost Mahomed Khan, le Gouvernement des Indes lui adressera des remontrances. Il ajouta que les possessions de l'Emir actuels au Nord et au N. O. semblaient coïncider à peu près exactement avec celles de son père, et il conclut qu'en conséquence les limites du Royaume de Dost Mahomed Khan peuvent être au général adoptées comme les limites destinées à séparer le Royaume de l'Afghanistan des autres États de l'Asie Centrale au N. et au N. O.

“ Ainsi dans la même dépêche le point de départ de l'*uti possidetis* actuel de Shir Ali Khan conduit, par une transition insensible, à l'adoption de l'état de possession de Dost Mahomed Khan comme limite naturelle de l'Afghanistan.

“ Cette nuance importante marque la différence qui sépare notre point de vue de celui de Lord Mayo.”—[*Secret, April 1872, No. 26.*]

The remainder of the despatch explained why the Russian Government had so long delayed the official submission of their views upon the position



taken up in Lord Mayo's letter dated 20th May 1870. A principal reason was the want of exact information regarding the countries under discussion. General Kaufmann had been directed to collect as many facts as possible bearing upon the political situation of the territories in question, and the result of his researches was still awaited.

The next paper to be read is the despatch from the Government of India, No. 21, dated 5th April 1872,\* which is too long to be inserted here. It formed the basis of Lord Granville's despatch No. 197, dated 17th October 1872, in which he desired the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to communicate to the Russian Government the following definite statement of the conclusions at which Her Majesty's Government had arrived :—

\* *Vide Secret Proceedings*, April 1872, No. 31.

"In the opinion, then, of Her Majesty's Government the right of the Amir of Cabul (Shere Ali) to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus as far down as Khoja Saleh is fully established, and they believe, and have so stated to him through the Indian Government, that he would have a right to defend those territories if invaded.

"On the other hand, Her Majesty's authorities in India have declared their determination to remonstrate strongly with the Amir should he evince any disposition to overstep those limits of his kingdom.

"Hitherto the Amir has proved most amenable to the advice offered to him by the Indian Government, and has cordially accepted the peaceful policy which they have recommended him to adopt, because the Indian Government have been able to accompany their advice with an assurance that the territorial integrity of Afghanistan would in like manner be respected by those powers beyond his frontiers which are amenable to the influence of Russia.

"The policy thus happily inaugurated has produced the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace in countries where it has long been unknown.

"Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government, by an explicit recognition of the right of the Amir of Cabul to those territories which he now claims, which Bokhara admits to be his, and which all evidence as yet produced shows to be in his actual and effectual possession, to assist the British Government in perpetuating, as far as it is in human power to do so, the peace and prosperity of those regions, and in removing for ever by such means all cause of uneasiness and jealousy between England and Russia in regard to their respective policies in Asia. For Your Excellency's more complete information I state the territories and boundaries, which Her Majesty's Government consider as *fully* belonging to the Amir of Cabul (*viz.*):—

"(1.) Badukshan with its dependent district of Wakhan from the Sarikul (Wood's Lake) on the east to the junction of the Kokcha River with the Oxus (or Penjah) *on the west; the stream of the Oxus thus†* forming the northern boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire length.

† Owing to a clerical error the words in italics were omitted from the copy of the despatch.

Rawlinson's *Russia and England in the East*, page 310. — (Sd.) T. C. P.

"(2.) Afghan Turkestan comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus from the junction of the Kokcha River to the post of Khoja Saleh inclusive, on the high road from Bokhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Amir on the left bank of the Oxus below Khoja Saleh.

"(3.) The internal districts of Akcha, Siripool, Maimena, Shibbergan, and Andkoi, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turkomans.

"(4.) The Western Afghan frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian province of Khorassan is well known and need not here be defined."

In replying to this despatch (Prince Gortschakoff to Count Brunnow, dated 7th December 1872), the Russian Government wrote as follows :—

"V. E. a déjà reçue copie de la dépêche de Lord Granville du 17 Octobre que Lord Loftus nous a communiqué sous l'ordre de son Gouvernement.

"Elle a trait aux affaires de l'Asie centrale.

"Avant d'y répondre, il est nécessaire de rappeler la marche de nos pour-parler avec le Cabt. anglais sur cette question.

"Les deux Gouvernements étaient animés d'un égal désir de prévenir entre eux tout sujet de dissentiment dans cette partie de l'Asie. Ils voulaient tous deux y établir un ordre de choses qui y assurait la paix et consoliderait leurs relations d'amitié et de bonne intelligence.

"A cet effet ils étaient tombés d'accord sur l'opportunité de laisser subsister entre leurs possessions respectives une certaine zone intermédiaire qui les préserverait d'un contact immédiat.

"L'Afghanistan ayant paru devoir remplir ces conditions, il avait été convenu que les deux Gouvernements emploieraient l'influence, dont ils disposent sur les états placés dans leur voisinage afin d'empêcher toute collision et tout empiètement en deça ou delà de cette zone intermédiaire.

" Il s'agissait seulement d'en tracer la limite précise pour que l'entente des deux Cabinets fût aussi complète en pratique qu'elle l'était en principe.

" Là des doutes s'élevaient. Le fondateur de l'Etat Afghan, Dost Mahomed Khan, avait laissé après lui une confusion qui ne permettait pas de prendre pour base l'extension territoriale acquise à de certains moments pendant son règne par l'Afghanistan.

" On était en conséquence convenu de s'entendre aux territoires qui auraient, j'adit reconnu l'autorité de Dost Mahomed et se trouveraient encore aujourd'hui en la possession effective de Sher Ali.

" Il restait à constater cet état de possessions avec l'exactitude désirable.

" A cet effet il était nécessaire d'avoir des données locales positives qui manqueraient aux deux Gouvernements à l'égard de ces contrées lointaines et imparfaitement connues.

" Il fût convenu que le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan serait chargé de profiter de sa résidence à proximité et de ces relations avec les Khanates voisins pour faire recueillir tous les renseignements qui pouvaient éclaircir la question et permettre aux deux Gouvernements de se former une opinion pratique en pleine connaissance de cause. C'est, M. le Comte, ainsi que V. E. s'en souviendra, le point où en étaient arrivés nos pourparlers avec le Cabinet anglais.

" Conformément à ces décisions M. l'Aide-de-Camp Général de Kauffmann avait pris les mesures possibles pour procéder à cette investigation préalable; mais la difficulté des distances, l'extrême complications des points à élucider, le manque des sources authentiques et l'impossibilité d'une enquête directe, ne lui ont pas permis de remplir cette tâche avec la promptitude que nous aurions désirer non moins que le Gouvernement de S. M. B. De là les retards que signale la dépêche de Lord Granville.

" Toutefois nous avons déjà fait observer que ces retards provenaient de l'attention sérieuse vouée par le Cabinet Impérial à cette affaire. Il eut été facile de se borner à des notions recueillies à la légère et qui plus tard seraient devenues la source de malentendus. Nous avons préféré étudier consciencieusement la question, puis qu'il s'agissait de donner une base solide et durable à l'organisation politique de l'Asie Centrale et aux bonnes et amicales relations que sur cette base, les deux Gouvernements avaient en vue d'établir entre eux pour le présent et pour l'avenir.

" Au commencement du mois d'Octobre dernier le Ministère Impérial avait été dans le cas d'annoncer à Lord Loftus et à V. E. que le conseiller d'état actuel Strouve, chargé de ces investigations, venait enfin d'arriver à St. Pétersbourg et qu'aussitôt que les matériaux rassemblés par lui auraient été élaborés, le résultat en serait communiqué au Cabinet de Londres. C'est pendant que ce travail se poursuivait que nous avons reçu connaissance de la dépêche de Lord Granville qui nous a fait connaître l'opinion à la quelle le Gouvernement de S. M. B. a cru devoir s'arrêter sur les points en discussion.

" Le Cabinet Impérial, maintenant dans l'esprit de l'accord établi en principe entre les deux Gouvernements, ne se croit pas moins en devoir de transmettre au Gouvernement de S. M. B. les renseignements accueillis sur les lieux par ordre de M. le Gouverneur Général de Turkestan et d'exposer en toute franchise les conclusions qui lui paraissent en découler.

" Les unes et les autres sont consignées dans l'office ci-joint en copie que M. l'A. D. C. Gén : de Kauffmann vient de m'adresser et dans le mémoire qui y suit d'annexe.\*

\* *Vide Appendix No. X.*

" La question qu'il s'agissait de résoudre avait deux aspects.

" 1. Constater l'état de possession effectif actuel, autant qu'il est possible de l'établir dans ces contrées.

" 2. Rechercher en se basant sur ce *statu quo*, la meilleure de limitation à tracer afin de répondre au but des pourparlers actuels : c. à. d. d'écarter dans la mesure du possible les causes de conflits et d'empêchements mutuels entre les Khanates voisins et, par conséquent, de garantir entre eux, autant que faire se peut l'état de paix que de part et d'autre les deux Gouvernements devraient désormais s'attacher, à faire respecter par tous les moyens d'influence dont ils disposent. Dans ces deux ordres d'idées, il résulte de l'étude qui a été faite.

" 1. Qu'au Nord, l'Amou Daria constitue en effet la frontière normale de l'Afghanistan à partir de son confluent avec le Koukcha jusqu'au point de Khodja Saleh. Sous ce rapport nos données sont d'accord avec l'opinion du Gouvernement de S. M. B. et la frontière dont il s'agit semble d'autant plus rationnelle qu'elle n'offre pas matière à contestation de la part des riverains de l'Amou Daria.

" 2. Au Nord Est les données de fait que nous avons recueillies assignent le confluent de cette rivière avec la Koukcha comme la limite des territoires sur lesquels Sher Ali Khan exerce une souveraineté effective incontestable. Au delà de cette limite, et notamment à l'égard du Badakshan et du Vakhan, il a été impossible de saisir les traces d'une semblable souveraineté.

L'ensemble des inspirations présente au contraire de nombreux indices qui doivent faire insister ces contrées comme indépendantes. Dans la communication du Gouvernement de S. M. B. qui nous a été faite au mois de Novembre dernier, on sait que d'après le témoignage de Major Montgomerie, l'Emir de Kabul a une autorité considérable " dans le Badakshan, et que les Afghans ont aidé Mahomed Shah à renverser l'Emir ou chef de ce pays Jehandir Shah " mais ces faits eux mêmes semblent indiquer l'indépendance réelle du Badakshan plutôt que sa sujétion effective à l'Emir de Kabul. Les informations recueillies par M. Strouve et consignées dans son Mémoire, confirment cette

† *Sic in original.*

conclusion. Elles mentionnent, il est vrai, des interventions de l'Emir Afghan dans les querelles intérieures du Badakshan et des tentatives pour faire payer son assistance par un espèce de tribut, mais on ne rencontre point les signes qui, en Asie, accompagnent l'exercice de la souveraineté, c'est à dire la présence dans le pays d'officiers afghans et d'employés pour collationner l'impôt. Les Chefs du Badakshan se sont considérés et ont été considérés par leurs voisins comme des Chefs indépendants.

" Il résulte de là qu'on peut tout au plus admettre que l'Emir de Caboul a cherché à diverses reprises à faire entrer le Badakshan sous sa domination, qu'il a exercé plusieurs fois dans les affaires de ce pays, à la faveur de discordes intestines, une ingérence basée sur le voisinage et la supériorité de ces forces, mais qu'il est impossible d'en déduire l'existence d'une autorité souveraine effective et incontestée.

" Quant au Vakhan, ce pays paraît être resté jusqu'à présent encore plus en dehors de toute action directe des Chefs de l'Afghanistan.

" 3. Il reste à examiner si, dans cet état de choses, et vu le but que nous poursuivons en commencer, c. à d. l'établissement dans ces contrées d'une paix solide sous la garantie des deux gouvernements, il convient de reconnaître à l'Emir de Caboul les droits qu'il revendique sur le Badakshan et le Vakhan, et de faire entrer ces deux pays dans la délimitation territoriale de l'Afghanistan. Tel n'est pas l'avis de M. l'A. D. C, Génl : de Kauffmann et le Cabinet Impérial arrive aux mêmes conclusions.

" Dans l'état actuel des choses, il n'existe pas de conflits entre le Badakshan et ses voisins. Le Bokhara n'a aucune prétention sur ce pays. Les deux états sont d'ailleurs trop faibles, trop absorbés par leur propre affaires pour se chercher querelle.

" L'Angleterre et la Russie n'auraient donc à s'employer que pour maintenir cet état de paix aussi bien entre ces Khanates qu'entre l'Afghanistan et le Badakshan, et cette tâche ne semblerait pas au dessus de leurs moyens. Il en serait tout autrement le jour où l'Emir de Kabul étendrait son autorité sur le Badakshan et le Vakhan. Il se trouverait en contact immédiat avec le Kashgar, le Kokand, et la Bokhara dont il est réposé aujourd'hui par ces deux pays. Il serait des lois bien plus difficile d'éviter des conflits provenant soit de son ambition et du sentiment de sa force, soit de la jalousie de ses voisins.

" Ce serait fonder sur une base bien précaire la paix qu'il s'agit d'établir dans ces contrées et compromettre la garantie que les deux Gouvernements seraient appelés à y donner. Cette combinaison nous semblerait, par conséquent, aller directement contre le but qu'ils poursuivent en commencer.

" Il nous paraîtrait beaucoup plus conforme à ce but de laisser subsister l'état actuel des choses. Le Badakshan et le Vakhan formeraient ainsi une barrière interposée entre les états du Nord et ceux du Sud de l'Asie Centrale, et cette barrière fortifiée par l'action combinée que l'Angleterre et la Russie sont en mesure d'exercer sur ceux de ces états accessibles à leur influence empêcherait efficacement tout contact dangereux et assurerait à notre avis, dans la mesure du possible, la paix de ces contrées.

" 4. Quant aux limites à reconnaître à l'Afghanistan, à partir de Khodja Saleh, nos informations signalent également des doutes sur les faits\* de la possession effective par l'Emir de Kabul des villes d'Axtchi, Siripoul, Maimané, Chibirgan et Ankoï, qu'il s'agit de faire entrer dans les limites reconnues de l'Afghanistan.

" Toutefois, ces pays étant séparés du Bokhara par des déserts, leur annexion au territoire afghan n'établirait pas les contacts dangereux que nous avons signalés du côté Nord Est. Elle ne présenterait, par conséquent, pas les mêmes inconvénients.

" Si le Gouv't de S. M. B. persiste dans son opinion quant à l'opportunité de comprendre ces localités dans les limites du territoire afghan, nous n'insisterons pas sur le principe posé : c. à d. de ne reconnaître comme faisant partie de l'Afghanistan que les territoires ayant été sous la domination de Dost Mahomed Khan et se trouvant aujourd'hui sous l'autorité effective de Sher Ali Khan.

" Par déférence pour les vues du Gouv't. de S. M. B., le Cabinet Impérial serait disposé à adhérer pour cette partie des frontières au tracé indiqué dans la dépêche de Lord Granville.

" Tel est, M. le Comte, le résumé des conclusions que nous croyons pouvoir tirer des données qui nous possédons.

" Veuillez placer les plans sous les yeux de M. le Principal Secrétaire de l'État de S. M. B. En les communiquant à S. E. notre intention n'est pas seulement de dégager notre promesse. Nous croyons répondre à la pensée qui a présidé dès le début à l'échange amical d'idées établies entre les deux Gouvernements en cherchant à résoudre de la manière la plus rationnelle une question qui les intéresse également."

In their rejoinder, dated 25th January 1873, the British Government adhered to the conclusions expressed in Lord Granville's despatch, dated 17th October. They noticed that one objection taken by the Russian Government against the admission of Badakshan and Wakhan as being under the sovereignty of Shere Ali rested on an apprehension, lest the incorporation of these provinces with the remainder of Afghanistan should tend to disturb the peace of Central Asia, and operate as an encouragement to the Amir to extend his possessions at the expense of the neighbouring countries. In answer, they

pointed out that the recommendations made to the Amir by the Indian Government in favour of his adopting a policy of abstention from aggression had been highly successful. They would again impress upon him in the strongest terms the advantages which were given him in the recognition by Great Britain and Russia of the boundaries which he claimed and of the consequent obligation upon his part to abstain from any aggression, and they would continue to exercise their influence in this same direction. If, however, Badakshan and Wakhan, which they considered the Amir justly to deem to be part of his territories, were to be assumed by England or Russia, or by one or either of them, to be wholly independent of his authority, the Amir might be tempted to assert his claims by arms. In this case Bokhara might seek an opportunity of acquiring districts too weak of themselves to resist the Afghan State. The peace of Central Asia would then be disturbed, and occasion given for questions between Great Britain and Russia, which it was on every account desirable to avoid.

They, therefore, earnestly hoped that the Imperial Government, weighing these considerations dispassionately, would agree with them that the best course to be pursued would be that both powers should concur in recognizing Shere Ali's claims, as stated in Lord Granville's despatch of 17th October, and by so doing put an end to the wild speculations, so calculated to disturb the minds of Asiatic races, that there was some marked disagreement between England and Russia on which they might build hopes of carrying out their border feuds for purposes of self-aggrandizement.

**75. Final reply of the Russian Government accepting the conclusions of Her Majesty's Government. Question as to the nature of the "influence" to be exercised by the English Government over Shere Ali.**—The Russian Government in a despatch, dated 19th-31st January 1873, (Prince Gortchakoff to Count Brunnow) answered as follows:—

"Lord A. Loftus m'a communiqué la réponse du Principal Sec. d'Etat de S. M. B. à notre dépêche sur l'Asie Centrale, sous la date du 7-19 Décembre.

"Je joins ci-pui une copie de cette pièce. Nous voyons avec satisfaction que le Cabinet anglais continue à poursuivre, dans ces parages, le même but que nous—celui d'y assurer la paix et autant que possible la tranquillité.

"La divergence de nos vues consistait dans les frontières assignées aux domaines Shir Ali.

"Le Cabinet anglais y fait entrer le Badakshan et le Vakhan qui, à nos yeux, poussaient d'une certaine indépendance. Vu la difficulté de constater, dans toute ses nuances la réalité dans ces parages lointains et le plus de facilité qu'a le Gouvernement britannique de recueillir des données précises et surtout, vu le désir de ne point donner à cette question de détail plus d'importance qu'elle ne comporte, nous ne refusons pas d'admettre la ligne de démarcation anglaise.

"Nous sommes d'autant plus portés à cet acte de courtoisie que le Gouvernement anglais s'engage à user de toute son influence sur Shir Ali pour le maintenir dans une attitude pacifique et insister sur l'abandon de sa part de toute agression ou conquête ultérieure. Cette influence est incontestable. Elle repose non seulement sur l'ascendant matériel et moral de l'Angleterre, mais aussi sur les subsidés dont Shir Ali lui a l'obligation. Nous pouvons, dès lors, y voir une garantie réelle pour la conservation de la paix.

"V. E. voudra bien faire cette déclaration à M. le Principal Sec. d'Etat de S. M. B. et lui remettre une copie de cette dépêche. Lord Granville y verra, nous en sommes convaincus, une nouvelle preuve du prix que notre auguste Maître attache à entretenir et à consolider les meilleurs relations avec le Gouvernement de S. M. la Reine Victoria."

The upshot, therefore, was that the Russian Government not only accepted the conclusion that both Badakshan and Wakhan formed part of Shere Ali's dominions, but also the boundaries of those dominions as described in Lord Granville's despatch dated 17th October 1872. They seized upon the expression in the British despatch, dated 25th January 1873, that the English Government would "continue to exercise their influence in the same direction," and amplified it, as shewn in the penultimate paragraph of Prince Gortschakoff's despatch, into a substantial guarantee for the preservation of peace. A later opportunity was, however, taken to define the precise meaning and extent of the influence which the British Government had bound themselves to exercise. In April 1873 the question came under discussion in the House of

Commons, and a speech made by Mr. Gladstone on the subject was interpreted to convey a declaration "that England had entered into no engagement towards Russia, and that Russia had consequently entered into no engagement towards England, and that as the British Government declared that no engagement existed on their part, it was evident that no restraint had been imposed on Russia, and that both parties were free to act as they might think fit." Accordingly a despatch, dated 7th May 1873, was written to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg explaining what Mr. Gladstone had said, and what was the nature of the influence which the British Government considered themselves bound to employ. From this despatch I take the following extract:—

"Mr. Gladstone, however, by no means repudiated the existence of any engagement between the two countries; but, on the contrary, maintained it while defining its character. Though controverting the interpretation which in some quarters it had been attempted to give to the nature of the engagement entered into on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and denying that it implied a guarantee for the future conduct of the Amir of Afghanistan, Mr. Gladstone said that what England had undertaken to do was to impress on the Amir, in the strongest terms, his obligation, in consideration of the recognition by Russia of the boundaries of his territory, himself to refrain from any aggression, and had further undertaken to continue to exercise her influence over the Amir in this direction. The engagement, Mr. Gladstone said, referred solely to the moral influence necessarily possessed in the East by England and by Russia, the latter declaring that the Russian Emperor looked on Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia could be called upon to exercise her influence, and England engaging to exercise her influence there for pacific purposes. Your Excellency will be careful, therefore, on all suitable occasions, to disabuse those who may seek to make light of this engagement of the false impressions which they have received, and more especially you will point out that there was nothing in Mr. Gladstone's language on the occasion in question to justify that impression."

Subsequently in a conversation on the 14th May with Lord A. Loftus, Prince Gortschakoff charged him to inform Her Majesty's Government that

"nothing was changed as regards the disposition of the Imperial Government, or the engagements taken by them in the late negotiations between the two Governments; and he admitted that the engagements taken by Her Majesty's Government merely implied the exercise of a moral influence on the Amir of Afghanistan."

**76. Communications between the Government of India and Shere Ali on the subject of the understanding with Russia as to the boundaries of his dominions. Shere Ali's views. Despatch to Secretary of State.**—The correspondence noticed in the preceding paragraphs makes it sufficiently clear that the explanations to be given to the Amir regarding the negotiations between the British and Russian Governments on the subject of the northern frontier of Afghanistan would include—

(1) the description of the boundaries of Afghanistan as given in Lord Granville's despatch dated 17th October 1872;

(2) the obligation which, in the opinion of the British Government, rested upon him to abstain from aggression beyond his frontiers;

(3) the respective positions which the British and Russian Governments would henceforward occupy towards Afghanistan.

I now proceed to notice the action taken by the Government of India upon receiving from the Secretary of State copy of the Russian despatch, dated 19th-31st January 1873, extracted in the preceding paragraph. On the 22nd March they addressed the following letter to the Punjab Government, enclosing at the same time a translation for delivery to the Amir:—

"Under the instructions of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council I have addressed you in a separate letter of yesterday's date, No. 534P., on the subject of the settlement of the Seistán boundary.

"2. His Excellency in Council is desirous to take advantage of the interview between the Amir and Mr. Macnabb to make His Highness fully acquainted with the progress and conclusion of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia, on the subject of the extent of His Highness' dominions.

\* Dated 24th June 1870.

" 1st May 1872.

" 7th September 1872.

His Highness has already received several letters\* from the Viceroy, in which His Excellency conveyed to him the assurances given by the Russian Government that they recognized,



as belonging to Afghanistan, all the territories then in His Highness' possession. Assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Russian Government towards His Highness have been given to the Amir by the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend. His Highness is also aware that ever since his meeting with the Viceroy at Ambala and the deputation of Mr. Forsyth to St. Petersburg the question, how these assurances could best be given effect to, has formed the subject of correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia.

"3. His Excellency in Council has now to announce to His Highness that the Government of Russia has accepted the views of the British Government and engaged to recognize the Amir's territories as they are described in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October 1872. I enclose, for communication to the Amir, copies, with Persian translations, of the latest and most important portions of the correspondence on the subject. Having now received the official pledges of the Russian Government to recognize the Amir's possessions, His Excellency in Council trusts that His Highness will be enabled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal government.

"4. In accordance with the advice given to him by Lord Mayo, the Amir has more than once expressed his determination to abstain from interference in the affairs of States and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and has issued stringent instructions to his frontier officers to commit no aggressions on neighbouring powers. Her Majesty's Government have therefore felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon His Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations to tempt him to entertain any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the country described in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October 1872. The Russian Government have, as His Highness was informed in Lord Mayo's letter of 24th June 1870, undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory."

To the Secretary of State they wrote as follows\* :—

\* No. 33, dated 28th March 1873.

"We have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Grace's Secret despatch, No. 13, dated 7th February, communicating a copy of Prince Gortschakoff's despatch dated 19th-31st January 1873, in which the Russian Government intimate their acceptance of the Afghan boundary, as defined in Lord Granville's despatch to Lord Loftus, dated October 17th, 1872.

"Enclosed is a copy of a letter † which we have caused to be addressed to the Punjab Government on the subject. Your Grace will perceive that we have not failed to counsel His Highness Amir Shere Ali to persevere in the peaceful policy which, in accordance with the advice formerly given him by Lord Mayo, he has adopted and has enjoined the Governor of his Turkestan frontier to observe. So far as our advice and influence will avail we shall be ever ready to exert them for this end. We understand that the result of the late correspondence is that the Russian Government have agreed to co-operate with us in our endeavours to establish and maintain peace in Central Asia by impressing a similar policy on those States and tribes beyond the limits of Afghanistan which come within the sphere of Russian influence or control. Relying, therefore, on the friendly assurances again given by Prince Gortschakoff in his despatch of 19th-31st January 1873, that peace and tranquillity in Central Asia are the objects which Russia in common with England continues to pursue, we look with confidence to the fulfilment of the promises given by the Russian Government in 1869, to which we have so often referred in former despatches. ‡ We confidently expect that while on the one hand our good offices are exerted to dissuade the Amir from aggression, Russia, on the other hand, will similarly use her good offices to restrain the States of Central Asia within her good influence from transgressing their proper limits.

† See particularly despatch, No. 27, dated 20th May 1870.

"Prince Gortschakoff, as Your Grace is aware, assured§ Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty the Emperor considers extension of territory to be extension of weakness; and His Majesty has himself stated that there is no intention of extending the Russian dominions.

§ Mr. Kaye's Secret despatches of 17th September and 26th November 1869.

"It is with much satisfaction then that we learn from the enclosures of your despatch, No. 7, dated 17th January 1873, that in his recent mission to London, Count Schouvaloff gave Her Majesty's Government 'the most decided and positive assurances that not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva.' In our despatch, No. 28, dated 26th May 1871, we addressed Your Grace on this subject, and we accept the renewed assurances given by Count Schouvaloff as evidence that the policy of the Russian Government on this question has undergone no change, and that the Government of His Imperial Majesty will approve of no course of action calculated to revive the uneasiness in regard to Central Asian affairs which the frank and amicable discussions of the last three years have done so much to allay."

It may be observed here that in Mr. Macnabb's opinion the reason why the Amir objected to the deputation of a British officer to Kabul, was lest the

British Government should urge upon him a complete reconciliation with Sirdar Yakub Khan, and the recognition of that Chief as heir-apparent. Consequently Mr. Macnabb was authorized to take such steps as he thought advisable to reassure the Amir and satisfy him that the succession question would not be raised. He addressed the British Agent at Kabul to this effect, and the latter informed Syud Nur Mahomed of the purport of Mr. Macnabb's communication. The correspondence between the Government of India and the Amir on the subject of the boundaries of Afghanistan is so interlaced with that regarding the Seistán arbitration that I must beg any person desirous of following closely the course of these communications to refer back to paragraph 57 *et seq.* of this précis. In paragraphs 58 and 59 four letters are quoted which contain statements of the Amir's views upon the important questions before him. I now annex three later letters marked E, F, and G, of which E more than any of the others throws light upon the views entertained by the Amir as to the effect upon Afghanistan of the encroachments of Russia towards his frontiers and the defensive action which the British Government should undertake on his behalf:—

### E.

*“ Translation of letter, dated 5th May 1873, from the Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.*

“ Information regarding the observations made by the Kabul authorities before was submitted with my letter\* of 14th April 1873 to you. For the last few days discussions are going on between the Amir and his principal Durbar officials, and on some occasions His Highness in a friendly manner makes some remarks to me. These observations which His Highness makes are as follows:—

“ After giving all the details of the state of affairs in Afghanistan at the Ambala Conference, I exonerated myself from the responsibility of making arrangements for the security of the Afghan border. Should an opportunity occur for a special meeting between me and a representative of the British Government, I will recapitulate the circumstances which I mentioned before in the above-mentioned Conference†. It is manifest that His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has clearly written in his *murasilla* that Mr. Forsyth, Commissioner, has decided the question about the boundary of Afghanistan with the Russian authorities at St. Petersburg. The Russian Governor-General also wrote to me in his *murasilla* in clear terms that the Russian Government will not interfere with the dominions which are at present in my possession. I am at a loss to surmise what great difficulty has given rise to the deliberations which have taken place the second time between the British and the Russian Governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan. It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety, which I feel on account of the Russians, will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. Should the British Government desire that I should at once organise the Afghan troops, and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favorable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. No person has attained his object in this world immediately. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens. It is rather advisable that the British Government for its own and my satisfaction should set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may retire there with my family and children, and find both accommodation and maintenance there; and after this reassurance I will work with zeal and high spirit day and night for the security of the border of Afghanistan, which is in truth the border of India. Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merv Shahjehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merv Shahjehan, the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghees in Herat, and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, *viz.*, from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British Government, with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English

† For an account of the discussions at the Ambala Durbar between Lord Mayo and the Amir, and between British officials and Syud Nur Mahomed, *vide* Appendix XI.

Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal. Koshad Khan, Chief of Merv Shahjehan, has sent his son to me undoubtedly for this reason, that should the people of that territory be unable to oppose the Russians, the Afghan Government may not prevent them from seeking shelter in Badghcees. It is well known that if, in the event of the Turkomans being overcome by the Russians, they wish to come to Badghcees, the Russians will not withhold themselves from going in pursuit of them. The Russians can be opposed merely by the means above noted. Besides this, as the British Government has approved of the cession of the fertile territory of Seistán proper to the Persian Government, this decision will one day cause so much injury to Afghanistan that it will not be surprising if its effects will at the end spread as far as India, as there is a straight road from Merv Shahjehan to India *via* Seistán. There will therefore be no person throughout this road to oppose the Russians as far as the border of India. The injury which will be caused to Afghanistan by the recent decision of the Seistán question is more clear than the light of the sun, and I cannot therefore in my opinion accomplish the provisions of this decision. The British Government should take my views and reflections into most careful consideration, and be kind enough to sympathise with Afghanistan, otherwise I have not at all received any peace of mind whereon I can place perfect reliance and remain quiet or free from anxiety. Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporising for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation.'

"As I have no authority to give any answer to the Amir in such most important matters, I could not but remain silent. His Highness, in concurrence with the opinion of the Kabul authorities, desires that the British Government should commence forthwith to organise the Afghan troops, to send from time to time large amounts of money with great number of guns and magazine stores, in order that His Highness may steadily be able in a few years to satisfactorily strengthen the Afghan kingdom."

#### F.

*"Translation of letter, dated 15th May 1873, from the Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division."*

"The Amir has appointed Syud Nur Mahomed Shah as his Envoy to wait on His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, but the Syud is making efforts for this end, that His Highness should accept the decision of the British Government in the Seistán question and permit him to announce His Highness' approval (when honored by a meeting in Simla). One day protracted discussion and deliberations took place between the Amir and the Syud in conference on this matter. The Amir remarked that the Syud should first carefully ascertain the real views of the British Government in the Seistán and the northern Afghan border matters, and should then either forward these views in detail to him in letters, or represent them verbally to him on his return to Kabul, after which His Highness will act according as seems advisable to him. Nur Mahomed Shah desires that the Amir, after accepting the award of the British Government in the Seistán question, should authorize him to intimate his intention of abiding by it to His Excellency the Viceroy, and thus dispose of this question finally, after which he will make such representations to His Excellency about the northern boundary of Afghanistan as appear advisable. The Mustaufi Hubibullah Khan backs the suggestions of the Syud in this matter, but His Highness the Amir has not yet arrived at any conclusion."

#### G.

*"Translation of letter, dated 26th May 1873, from the Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division."*

"The Amir instructed Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at the time of his receiving permission to start from Kabul to make representations on the same points about the Seistán question and the northern Afghan boundary, which have been reported by me in my letters of 31st March, 14th April, and 15th May 1873. Protracted discussion took place for a few days between the Amir and the Syud, in which the latter requested His Highness to accept the decision of the British Government in the Seistán question, and at the conclusion of this conversation the Amir remarked as follows :—

" 'In consideration of the friendship existing between me and the British Government, I will remain now as quiet, so long as Mir Alum Khan of Kain abstains from causing injury, as I remained in former years, when he frequently injured the subjects of my kingdom. I can hardly arrange for the security of that part of Seistán which has been decreed to me by the English Government without the assistance of that Government. As regards the Northern Afghan boundary, as the interests of the British and the Afghan Governments are identical, whatever arrangements have taken place between the British and the Russian Governments in this matter must of course be advantageous to the Afghan Government. However, as the Russians are at present rapidly advancing in Central Asia, and do not limit their forward movement to any place, you should carefully represent all points concerning the interests of the British and the Afghan Governments, and about the security of our border to the British Government, who can then act as they think best. Any other point which you consider beneficial to these two Governments at the proposed meeting I give you authority to settle it.

“In the case of the murderers of Major Macdonald and those who helped them, the Amir has given full authority to the Syud for its disposal, that is to say, that he ordered him to settle this affair finally as he may consider advisable at the proposed meeting. In private conference His Highness observed to him, that at the time of this occurrence Nowroz Khan had not received information about it, and he neither harboured the criminals nor neglected to attempt to apprehend them; and that His Highness has ascertained that on account of enmity existing between Nowroz Khan and Bahram Khan, if Nowroz can find an opportunity he will not fail to try to kill Bahram Khan under the pretence of punishment for this crime, and with a view to gaining my approbation. If, notwithstanding these points, continued His Highness, any coercive measures are adopted against Nowroz Khan for the satisfaction of the British Government, all the border Chiefs will become discouraged, and undoubtedly His Highness' reputation will suffer. Nevertheless, merely for the satisfaction of the British Government, said His Highness, Nowroz Khan will be removed from the office of Chiefship for a time as a warning to others, if the British Government consider this punishment advisable.

“In short, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah having received the Amir's permission to depart on the afternoon of Friday, the 23rd May 1873, reached Butkhak, whence he will start by regular stages to India.”

**77. Discussions with the Kabul Envoy on the result of the negotiations with Russia and on the effect of the understanding arrived at in respect to Afghanistan.**—The decision of the Government of India to receive an Envoy from the Amir in lieu of deputation Mr. Macnabb to Kabul and the arrival of Syud Nur Mahomed at Simla have already been noticed; and in paragraph 61 of this précis it was said that the communications with the Envoy concerning other than Seistan matters would be noted in the proper place. It will facilitate the comprehension of those communications if the telegraphic correspondence regarding them which passed between Lord Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll is first set out. On the 27th June (No. 1414P.) Lord Northbrook telegraphed—

“Despatch goes by next mail summing up Central Asian correspondence with Russia, in conciliatory spirit, in accord with Gladstone's speech on Eastwick's motion, and quoting paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Secret letter of June 3rd, 1869, No. 177.

“We think it for interests of peace that Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and we say in paragraph 18: ‘Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Amir by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Amir continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.’

“I propose to inform Kabul Envoy of sense of this paragraph.”

The Duke of Argyll replied (telegram dated 1st July 1873) that

“he did not object to the general sense of the paragraph which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Amir of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectation. He already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give.”

These two telegrams should be read in conjunction with the interview of the 12th July given on page 96. The next telegram from Lord Northbrook is dated 24th July, and it should be read with the memoranda of the interviews, dated 19th and 20th July, between Mr. Aitchison and Syud Nur Mahomed. The message (No. 1671P.) was as follows:—

“Amir of Kabul alarmed at Russian progress; dissatisfied with general assurances, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose to assure him if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops if necessary to repel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly.”

The Duke of Argyll's reply containing the decision of Her Majesty's Government was communicated in the following telegram dated 26th July, and should be compared with the account of the interview between Lord Northbrook and the Envoy which took place on the 30th July:—

“Cabinet think you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it. But you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favor of Afghanistan if he abides by our advice in external affairs.”

**78. Text of the memoranda of the interviews between Lord Northbrook and the Envoy, and Mr. Aitchison and the Envoy.**—The following are the memoranda of the several conversations between the Envoy and Lord Northbrook, and the Envoy and Mr. Aitchison which bear on the question under immediate consideration. Two earlier interviews took place on the 23rd and 27th June, but the only matter dealt with was the recent murder of Major Macdonald at Michni, which will be noticed hereafter. A copy of the memoranda of the conversations with Lord Northbrook, dated respectively 12th and 30th July, were given to the Envoy before his departure. They were accompanied by Persian translations which had been submitted to the Envoy for perusal and remarks before being approved by Lord Northbrook :—

## I.

"Memorandum of a conversation between SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH and the Foreign Secretary, on Tuesday, the 1st July 1873.

"The Secretary observed that, as the Envoy was aware, it had been the intention of Government to send an officer to Kabul to explain the Seistán and Oxus boundaries, and to make certain representations to His Highness the Amir on matters connected with Afghanistan. On intimation of this intention having been received by the Amir, His Highness expressed a wish first to depute an officer of his own, in order to explain his views on the subjects which the British Government wished to discuss.

"The Secretary, therefore, invited the Envoy to state fully what he was authorized to say.

"The Envoy replied that he had been authorized to discuss the following subjects :—

"(1.) The question of the Seistán boundary.

"(2.) That of the northern boundaries of Afghanistan.

"(3.) Certain matters connected with the welfare of Afghanistan."

He then took up the question of the Seistán boundary, and his remarks have been recorded *in extenso* in paragraph 61 of this précis. No other subject was discussed at the meeting of the 1st July.

## II.

"Memorandum of a conversation between His Excellency the Viceroy and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, the Kabul Envoy, held at Government House, Simla, on Saturday, the 12th July 1873.

*Present :*

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

THE KABUL ENVOY.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR. AITCHISON.

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, CAPTAIN BARING.

*Interpreter.*

CAPTAIN HENDERSON, UNDER-SECRETARY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

"His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by observing to the Envoy that the result of the recent correspondence that had taken place between the British and Russian Governments regarding the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, was considered by the British Government to be highly advantageous to His Highness the Amir.

"Here the Envoy remarked that he had only received on the previous day a translation in Persian of the papers connected with that correspondence; there had not therefore been sufficient time for him to consider the subject fully, and he proposed to reserve an expression of his sentiments on the subject of that correspondence until he had attentively considered the matter and discussed with the Foreign Secretary certain points which were not clear to him.

"His Excellency the Viceroy approved of this course, and, observing that it was not intended in the present conversation to touch on the details of the communications with Russia, continued that the British Government considered the result of those communications to be advantageous to the Amir for the following reasons :—

"The Russian Government had given positive and repeated assurances to the effect that they considered Afghanistan 'completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence,' and had stated that 'no intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into its intentions.' These assurances, however, left the boundaries of the Amir's possessions undefined, and so long as they remained so there was the possibility of differences as to the precise territories to which the assurances applied. Russia had now accepted the definition of the northern and western boundaries proposed by the British Government, who became thus a party to the settlement and interested in maintaining the integrity of the frontier. The British Government would be prepared to use their best endeavours to maintain the frontier intact so long as the Amir or the Ruler of



Afghanistan follows their advice as regards his external relations, and abstains from encroachment and aggression on his neighbours. If, for example, trouble should arise and the boundary in question were violated by neighbouring countries, or by any tribes under Russian influence, the natural course would be for the Amir to refer to the British Government, and every effort would be made by that Government to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

"His Excellency wished it to be clearly understood by the Envoy that the influence proposed to be exercised by the British Government referred to the external relations of Afghanistan alone, and that no interference was contemplated in the internal affairs of that kingdom. The Amir, continued His Excellency, must be well aware that, occupying as Afghanistan does an intervening position between the British and Russian dominions, it was important for the interests of India that she should be both a strong and an independent State.

"His Excellency the Viceroy observed that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would of course be conditional on the Amir following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression.

"When His Excellency had concluded the above remarks, the Envoy observed that the Amir, as well as the people of Afghanistan, were fully aware that the influence of the British Government would be exercised solely in the interests of Afghanistan, and that no interference in the internal affairs of that kingdom was to be anticipated.

"The rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia had, he said, aroused the gravest apprehensions in the minds of the people of Afghanistan. Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government. The Envoy continued that he fully appreciated the nature of the communications that had been made to him at the present conference, but he wished to reserve any further discussion of the subject for a future occasion.

"His Excellency expressed his approval of this course, and the interview then terminated."

#### MEMORANDUM.

*"This conversation is referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it, with translation, was attached to that letter. A further copy was given to the Envoy under cover of letter, No. 1857 P., dated 18th August 1873."*

(Sd.) C. U. AITCHISON.

### III.

"Memorandum of conversations between the Foreign Secretary and Kabul Envoy on the 19th and 20th July 1873.

"THE Envoy was requested to state specifically the various points on which he wanted information or an explanation. His remarks, with the Secretary's replies, are given below:—

"1. The Envoy drew attention to the passage marginally quoted, in Earl Granville's despatch of the 17th October 1872, and observed that the object of the correspondence between Russia and England being to secure '*peace and tranquillity*,' he would wish it to be distinctly stated that the expression referred merely to external relations and not to the internal affairs of Afghanistan. That, for instance, the absence of security of life and property in Afghanistan itself would not be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy wished it to be clearly understood that the condition of affairs alluded to by the expression in question should be held to be, *first*, that the countries on both sides of the recognized frontier should abstain from interference with each other either in the way of actual aggression or by proceedings liable to cause each other annoyance; *secondly*, that the Afghans should be allowed to follow their own laws and customs in their own territories; *thirdly*, that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier should be free from interference.

"*Answer.*—The Secretary replied that in his opinion the expression alluded to embraced all these things and had no reference to the internal condition of the countries on both sides of the border. In all communications, however, that may take place with Russian officials or subjects, the Secretary added that it would be advisable for the Amir so to frame his communications and proceedings as to promote mutual trust and confidence.

"2. Alluding to a further passage\* in the same despatch from Earl Granville, the Envoy observed that His Lordship used the word claims, which is not applicable to an assertion of rights over territory of which the Amir has actual possession, and further went on to say that Bokhara admits these claims. In the event of Bokhara or

\* Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government by an explicit recognition of the right of the Amir of Kabul to the territories which he now claims, which Bokhara herself admits to be his, &c.

any other country questioning the right of the Amir at any future time, the Envoy wished it to be understood that the settlement of the boundary is final, and that any future objection which might be made to it should not afford an opening for a reconsideration of the question.

*“Answer.”*—The territories referred to were now recognized by England and Russia as being in the actual possession of the Amir of Afghanistan. The admission of Bokhara as to the claim was quoted as evidence in the Amir’s favor, and as strengthening his case. Now that the boundary has been actually accepted by Russia, no objections on the part of Bokhara or any other country can be entertained.

“3. The Envoy observed that the recent correspondence between the English and Russian Governments regarding the northern boundaries of Afghanistan contained no assurances on the part of Russia against aggression on Afghanistan.

*“Answer.”*—The recent correspondence referred to related only to the particular question as to what territories actually belonged to Afghanistan. The Russian assurances as to non-aggression have already been fully quoted in the letters from Lord Mayo to the Amir, and are, moreover, contained in the letters which are printed at length in the collection of papers laid before Parliament, a complete copy of which would be furnished to the Envoy if he wished it.

“4. The Envoy continued that whatever assurances the Russians might give the Amir would rely only on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He proceeded to explain the dangers which were apprehended by Afghanistan in consequence of the rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia. In a year or two, he said, it was certain they would take possession of Merv, whereupon the Turkoman tribes would take refuge

\* The north-west district of Afghanistan watered by the River Moorghab and its tributaries.

in the district of Badghees\* and the neighbourhood of Herat. When in Afghan territory the Turkomans, who know no other avocation but that of plunder, would certainly not forsake their predatory habits and would thus afford the Russians an excuse for calling on the Amir to restrain them. No proper control can be exercised by the Amir on these wandering tribes, and a demand would then be made by Russia to allow a force to be cantoned in Badghees for the purpose of controlling them. Again, the Russians will certainly advance beyond Bokhara and establish cantonments in Kerki, Charjoee, and other places near the Afghan frontier; and their next step will be to call upon the Kabul Government to enter into engagements for facilitating trade, and for the establishment of a Russian mission and agents as in other countries. It would be impossible for the Amir to accede to these requests, compliance with which would certainly lead to complications and troubles. In view then of these apprehended dangers, the Envoy said it was the expectation of the people of Afghanistan that the British Government will attentively consider their situation and suggest what reply should be made to the overtures of Russia, and at the same time that the British Government will state definitely what assistance would be given to Afghanistan in such an emergency.

*“Answer.”*—With regard to the fear of Russian interference with Afghanistan, the explicit assurances already given should quiet the Amir’s apprehensions. The other matters referred to are all events in the unknown future and may never occur. In regard to them, therefore, no general directions could be laid down. If any of them were to occur, the advice to be given and the action to be taken would very much depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The best preventive which the Secretary could suggest against the apprehended dangers was that there should be at the Court of the Amir a British officer of high standing, and in the full confidence of the Government of India, who could advise His Highness as to the circumstance of each case, and give advice with regard to the action which, in cases of emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of India could be communicated with. With regard to the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, the Envoy would learn from the printed papers that Prince Gortschakoff had expressed an opinion, that while he saw no objection to English officers going to Kabul, he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so.

“5. The Envoy said that the Russians have annexed territories close up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the Amir, believing the attitude they have assumed to be threatening to the peace of his territories, expects that the British Government will render him large present assistance in money and arms so as to enable him to strengthen his frontier. This request of His Highness is grounded, moreover, on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo.

*“Answer.”*—The Secretary replied, that, in the absence of instructions from His Excellency the Viceroy, he was unable to reply to the specific request preferred by the Envoy. Lord Mayo, in his letter to the Amir, dated 31st March 1869, had said:—

“‘It is my wish, therefore, that Your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure Your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect.’

“Any requests preferred by the Envoy would, therefore, certainly be treated with consideration and respect by His Excellency the Viceroy, but the Secretary was not in a position to state what view would be taken of this particular request.

“6. The Envoy next observed that, in Lord Granville’s letter of the 17th October 1872, His Lordship had said, with reference to the territories within the boundary now accepted, that the Amir ‘would have a right to defend these territories if invaded.’ This recognition of the

Amir's right to defend his territories appeared, said the Envoy, to be qualified by what the Viceroy said in the course of the conversation of the 12th July with regard to the necessity for a reference to the Government of India in case of invasion. The Envoy, therefore, asked for an explicit explanation as to whether, in the event of a sudden invasion, the Amir would be authorized to repel it at once.

*Answer.*—Hostilities seldom, if ever, break out without some misunderstanding, which before resort is had to arms, is generally the subject of explanation. If such misunderstanding were to arise, it would certainly be the duty of the Amir to seek the advice of the British Government; but if, during the course of negotiations, or at any other time, an actual invasion of His Highness' territories were to take place, the Amir would assuredly be at liberty to adopt such lawful measures as might be necessary for repelling it at once.

"7. The Envoy asked that a written assurance might be given to him to the effect that if Russia or any State of Turkistan or elsewhere under Russian influence should commit an aggression on the Amir's territories, or should otherwise annoy the Amir, the British Government would consider such aggressor an enemy, and that they would promise to afford to the Amir promptly such assistance in money and arms as might be required until the danger should be past or invasion repelled. Also, that if the Amir should be unable to cope single-handed with the invader, that the British Government should promptly despatch a force to his assistance by whatever route the Amir might require the same, the said force to be employed against the invader and to return to British territory when the invasion was repelled. No return for the assistance above mentioned to be required by the British Government from Afghanistan. Such assistance to be rendered solely out of friendship to Afghanistan, and with the view of protecting the integrity of the frontier, so that the existing friendship of both countries should be maintained.

*Answer.*—The Secretary replied that he felt sure the British Government would never agree to assert in general terms that any one interfering with Afghanistan would be declared an enemy. Government must hold itself quite free to decide what the circumstances of each case might require. In regard to the question of assistance to Afghanistan he was unable to add anything to the expressions used by His Excellency the Viceroy, by whom alone further explanation on the subject could be afforded to the Envoy. Doubtless, added the Secretary, much would depend upon two considerations, *viz.*, (1st) that the Amir should fully and unreservedly have accepted and acted upon the advice of the British Government in his foreign relations; and (2ndly) the circumstances and extent of the invasion or interference. If assistance were given by the British Government it would doubtless be such as, in their opinion, would be sufficient to meet the circumstances of the case.

"8. The Envoy represented that, in the conversation of the 12th July with His Excellency the Viceroy, invasion or aggression on the part of the Turkomans, Khiva, Bokhara, and other countries under Russian influence had been alluded to, but Russia had not been specifically mentioned.

*Answer.*—There seems no objection to specify the case of an invasion by Russia in the paper to be eventually given to the Envoy.

"9. The Envoy read out a letter just received from Kabul, stating that the son of Koshad Khan of Merv had presented himself before the Amir on the part of all the Turkomans and represented that the Russians had sent a message to the Tekkah tribe to say that the Turkomans were an independent people and had no recognized head, and all that they (the Russians) required of them was an unmolested passage for their troops, in return for which they would undertake to leave the tribes alone. The Turkomans had replied that they considered the Amir of Afghanistan as their head, and through the son of Koshad Khan they now professed their allegiance to the Amir, and asked his advice as to whether they should attack the Russians or allow them a free passage. The Turkoman Envoy required an early answer, and the Amir was therefore desirous of ascertaining the views of the British Government before replying to him.

*Answer.*—The Secretary replied that the matter would be submitted for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy. The country of the Turkomans lies beyond the recognized limits of Afghanistan. The Russians have a just and legitimate quarrel with the Khan of Khiva, to punish whom their troops were marching through the Tekkah country. If the Amir thinks it necessary to give them advice, it should be to the effect that the Turkomans should allow an unmolested passage to the Russians, and in no way whatever interfere with their operations. The Russian expedition to Khiva, however, was probably by this time over, and the circumstances were probably passed and gone under which the letter referred to had been written. It would be advisable for the Amir to abstain as far as possible from interference in the affairs of the Turkomans beyond his frontier and to disclaim the proffered allegiance. While maintaining with them relations of peace, he should on no account assist the Turkomans, or in any way countenance them in opposing the Russians.

"The Envoy then said (in answer to the Secretary's question) that he had no other explanations to ask or representations to make on the question of the boundary and the general relations between the British Government and Afghanistan. In regard to Seistán, he wished for further time to consider the matter. Accordingly Tuesday, the 22nd, was fixed as the date for discussing Seistán matters."\*

\* See paragraph 62, page 72.

#### IV.

"Memorandum of interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Kabul Envoy, held at Government House, Simla, on Wednesday, the 30th July 1873.

*Present :*

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

THE KABUL ENVOY.

C. U. AITCHISON, ESQ., C.S.I., FOREIGN SECRETARY.

*Interpreter.*

CAPTAIN HENDERSON, UNDER-SECRETARY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

"His Excellency the Viceroy observed that at the previous interview held on the 12th July, when the result of the recent correspondence between the British and Russian Governments, regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan, had been explained to the Envoy, he had expressed a wish to reserve any remarks until he had fully considered the subject and discussed certain points with the Foreign Secretary. His Excellency the Viceroy observed that he had been made acquainted with the communications that had passed with the Foreign Secretary, and now invited the Envoy to state briefly the points for consideration.

"The Envoy said that on perusal of the correspondence between the Russian and English Governments, translations of which had been furnished to him, he had noted two points which might give rise to question in Afghanistan, and which it would be advisable to explain in the paper containing the result of the present communications of which he would be the bearer to the Amir. These points were as follows :—

"(a.) From the passage marginally quoted occurring in Earl Granville's despatch of the 17th October 1872, it appeared that the object of the correspondence between the English and Russian Governments was to secure peace and tranquillity in Central Asia. If at any time fault should be found with the internal condition of Afghanistan by a Foreign power, and if it should be asserted that these terms 'peace and tranquillity' are not appropriate to it, there was room for apprehension that this might be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy, therefore, wished it to be clearly explained that the Afghan Government should be allowed to follow its own laws and customs in its own territories; that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier should be free from interference; and that the expression alluded to had no reference to the internal condition of these countries.

"His Excellency the Viceroy replied that there could be no doubt whatever that the words 'peace and tranquillity' referred to the external relations of the countries concerned, and that the absence of these conditions in the internal economy of those countries could not in any way invalidate the arrangement. His Excellency had no doubt that in the letter to the Amir, of which the Envoy would be the bearer, this point would be satisfactorily disposed of. At the same time, His Excellency observed that if any Russian subjects or other foreigners entering Afghanistan were subjected to molestation and denied protection through any fault of the Government of Afghanistan, it would be the duty of the Amir to give redress and compensation in accordance with the usage of nations. His Excellency could say nothing which could give countenance to any neglect on the part of Afghanistan of the ordinary duties of every Government in respect to matters of this kind.

"The Envoy thereupon remarked that as there were so many objections to the merchants of such great powers entering Afghanistan, and Afghanistan was unable to control their movements, the above conditions could apply only to such merchants as may enter Afghanistan with the Amir's permission given after due consideration. These would receive the same protection as other merchants have received up to the present day. His Excellency replied that his remarks had reference to merchants entering with the permission of the Amir.

"(b.) The second point to which the Envoy alluded was the confirmation by Bokhara of the claims of Afghanistan, mention of which is made in the same despatch from Lord Granville.\* The Envoy was apprehensive that at some future time Bokhara might under pressure be induced to deny this confirmation and thus afford a ground for re-opening the question. The remedy against such a contingency would be a declaration that the arrangement arrived at is final, and that no further negotiation on the subject would take place.

"His Excellency the Viceroy replied that no subsequent denial by Bokhara could in any way affect the arrangement between the English and Russian Governments, and that this would be declared in the letter to be given to the Envoy.

"The Envoy next alluded to the absence of any distinct assurances on the part of Russia in the recent correspondence that no aggression would be made on Afghanistan.

"To this the Viceroy replied that the latter part of the correspondence between England and Russia was confined to the specific subject of the actual northern boundary of Afghanistan,



and that such assurances would, therefore, have been out of place. As they had, however, been repeatedly given by Russia before, and also in the commencement of the correspondence, they would be embodied in the final letter to the Amir.

"Next the Envoy proceeded to state that whatever assurances were given by Russia, the Amir and people of Afghanistan would rely only on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He had explained in detail to the Secretary the precise grounds for the apprehensions entertained by Afghanistan, and it was therefore unnecessary to enlarge on the subject. Assistance was solicited by Afghanistan for two reasons: First, it was the expectation of the Amir that the British Government would aid him with money and arms so that he might be enabled to strengthen his frontier against any possible future aggression. This request, said the Envoy, was based partly on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, on the strength of which the Amir had been induced to raise a large body of troops for the defence of his territories.

"With respect to these promises the Envoy appeared to be under the impression that the British Government are pledged to comply with any request for assistance preferred by the Amir. He professed unwillingness to press this point, but His Excellency the Viceroy deemed it desirable to refer to the correspondence in order to remove any incorrect impressions that he might entertain with regard to the promises of the British Government. After hearing the passages in the correspondence bearing on the subject, the Viceroy enquired of the Envoy whether he still held that the British Government are bound to comply with every request preferred by the Amir. The Envoy replied to the extent that may be proper. Such being the case, His Excellency observed, that it was desirable that no doubt should exist on the subject, and that it must be distinctly understood that the British Government are to be the judges of the propriety of any request preferred by the Amir. His Excellency proceeded to say that Lord Mayo had assured the Amir that any representation he might make would 'always be treated with consideration and respect;' and His Excellency was quite prepared to maintain the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and to entertain in similar spirit the request now preferred. His Excellency said that the British Government were far from sharing the apprehensions entertained by the Amir of dangers from without, for they considered that the result of the recent correspondence between England and Russia was to strengthen very materially the position of Afghanistan; but that, apart from these considerations, it was the policy of the British Government to see Afghanistan powerful. The request for present assistance would, therefore, be complied with to the extent which the British Government might consider appropriate to the present necessities of Afghanistan, and His Excellency invited the Envoy to see the Foreign Secretary again on the subject.

"Proceeding in the next place to the question of the assistance to be given to Afghanistan in case of actual aggression from without, the Envoy observed that at the previous interview His Excellency had said that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. His Excellency had also said that such assistance would of course be conditional on the Amir following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Now the Amir in expectation of the assistance of the British Government, had up to the present time followed the advice of the Viceroy as regards abstinence from aggression, and in the event of assistance being given would continue to follow that policy. The Envoy continued that he had at an interview with the Secretary brought forward many arguments with regard to the proffered assistance, showing how it would fail to convey sufficient reassurance. In the event of assistance being given to Afghanistan by the British Government, it should be in the form of a promise to assist that country with money and arms according to the circumstances of the case in the event of invasion, and if the Amir should be unable to cope single-handed with an invader and should prefer a request for troops, the British Government should promise to despatch troops to his aid and withdraw them when the necessity for their employment is over.

"His Excellency the Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Amir's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Amir, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Amir as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories, but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event should those endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Amir that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also in case of necessity aid him with troops. The British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent: moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. The Envoy said that both in conversation with the Foreign Secretary and at the present interview he had explained his views on the subject, and objections on certain points, and the matter would now be laid before the Amir for his consideration.



"Two points in connection with the promised assurance were then brought forward by the Envoy. He requested in the first place that, in the event of any aggression on the Amir's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an enemy.

"His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the Amir as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British Government.

"Next the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Amir.

"To this His Excellency replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia.

"The Envoy then asked what reply should be given by the Amir to the request which the Turkomans had preferred for advice as to the attitude they should assume to the Russians, who had demanded a passage for their troops through the Turkoman territory.

"His Excellency replied that the advice given by the Foreign Secretary was correct. These Turkomans were robbers and kidnappers, and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia. The Amir would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course friendly answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the Amir should in no way make himself responsible for them or countenance their lawless proceedings or in any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops.

"The Envoy concurring in the wisdom of this course, said he would let the Foreign Secretary see the letter he proposed to send to the Amir.

"The Envoy having intimated that there were no further points connected with the northern boundaries of Afghanistan which he wished to discuss, the conversation turned on Seistán matters. Particulars will be found recorded in a separate memorandum."

#### MEMORANDUM.

*"This conversation is referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Amir, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it, with translation, was attached to that letter. A further copy was given to the Envoy under cover of letter, No. 1857P., dated 18th August 1873."*

(Sd.) C. U. AITCHISON.

#### V.

Memorandum of conversations between the Kabul Envoy and Foreign Secretary on the 31st July and 1st August 1873.

"At the interview of the 30th of July His Excellency the Viceroy requested the Envoy to discuss with Mr. Aitchison the following subjects:—

\* See paragraphs 16 and 22, Government of India Secret despatch, No. 213, dated 1st July 1869.  
[S. I., 1869, No. 66.]  
(Sd.) T. C. P.

"(1.) The location in certain towns of Afghanistan of British officers as representatives of their Government.\*

"(2.) The expectations of the Amir with regard to the present assistance to be rendered to Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening that country against foreign aggression.

"(3.) The measures that should be taken for strengthening the Seistán frontier, and the expectations of the Amir in connection therewith.

"As regards the first, the Envoy observed, that without enquiring what are the motives of the British Government in desiring to locate their representatives in Afghanistan, he would, if required, state plainly what were his views on the subject. As the question had not previously been alluded to before his departure from Kabul, he had received no instructions on the subject, and could therefore only speak in his private capacity.

"The Secretary observed here, that before going any further, it would be as well that the Envoy should clearly understand what is the object of the British Government in wishing to locate their representatives in Afghanistan. In the first place, there is absolutely no intention whatever of exercising any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, though, of course, if consulted, the British representative would be always ready to offer his advice to the Amir. The first object in view was to obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan. In the recent correspondence regarding Seistán, for example, very contradictory accounts regarding occurrences in that province were received from Persia and Afghanistan. It is very important, looking to the responsibilities which England has now undertaken, that accurate information should be obtained by the British Government, and in

many cases a British officer on the spot could settle differences which might otherwise give rise to serious complications and difficulties. Again, neither the British nor Russian Governments of Afghanistan. This was exemplified only the other day when a question arose regarding the Mir of Shignan. It is therefore very desirable that a British officer should visit those boundaries, so that Government may be in a position to reply authoritatively to any reference that may arise on the subject. It must also, added the Secretary, be obvious that if a British officer of high rank, and well acquainted with the views and policy of the British Government, was deputed to Kabul, the Amir would be able, in the event of any emergency arising, and when a reference to India was impossible, to consult the officer, and feel assured that he was not acting in opposition to the wishes of the British Government.

"The Envoy replied that he understood the object of the British Government, and, personally, was well aware of the advantages that would accrue to Afghanistan from the presence of their representatives. Speaking, however, as a friend, and in the interests both of his own and the British Government, he could not recommend that a specific request should be preferred to the Amir for British officers to be stationed at certain given places. His reasons were the following :—*First*, the Afghans are deplorably ignorant, and entertain an idea that the deputation of British agents is always a precursor to annexation. *Secondly*, many proceedings of the Amir are such as would be disapproved by the British Government. Those who encourage the Amir in these would be only too ready to suggest to him that a British Agent would interfere to put a stop to such proceedings. *Thirdly*, there is a strong party at Kabul composed of the members of Dost Mahomed Khan's family, and of others in the confidence of the Amir, who are strongly opposed to His Highness entering into intimate relations with the British Government, which would have the effect of strengthening the Amir's hands in the administration of his country. The opportunity of these men is of course during a weak administration and in unsettled times.

"Under the circumstances above mentioned, therefore, the Envoy was of opinion that to prefer a specific request to the Amir would give rise to mistrust and misapprehension. He would, therefore, recommend that in a separate letter, of which he would be the bearer, it should be suggested to the Amir that, in view of the arrangements recently completed, it would be highly desirable that a British officer should inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. That this officer would proceed from Kandahar to the eastern extremity of the northern frontier, and, returning *via* Kabul, would communicate with the Amir regarding frontier matters. This officer might, when at Kabul, have an opportunity of ascertaining the sentiments of the Amir with regard to the location of representatives, and might perhaps find that all difficulty had been removed. If necessary, however, the British Government might, on the return of such an officer to India, again depute the same or another officer to confer with the Amir regarding the results of the examination of the frontier. The visits of these officers would familiarise the Amir and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually the desired object might thus be attained.

"The Secretary replied that the plan suggested by the Envoy appeared highly judicious, and he continued that the approaching deputation of a mission to Yarkand afforded a favourable opportunity for carrying out the suggestion. It had previously been in contemplation by Government to direct Mr. Forsyth to return to India *via* Badakshan and Kabul, provided, of course, that the Amir had no objection to the measure.

"The Envoy observed that as Mr. Forsyth's arrival in Afghanistan would probably not be for 18 months or two years, it would be advisable for the British Government in their own interests to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the recent boundary negotiations to suggest that an officer should proceed at once *via* Kandahar to visit the eastern and northern frontier returning by Kabul.

"The Secretary then enquired whether, in the event of Mr. Forsyth's Mission returning *via* Badakshan, the Amir would be able to make the necessary arrangements for supplies, &c., in the north-east extremity of his territories. To this the Envoy replied that in the absence of any precise information regarding that portion of Afghanistan he could give no specific assurance, but there would be plenty of time before the return of the mission to make all necessary enquiries.

"The Secretary then suggested that the Amir might be asked to allow a British officer to proceed to that portion of the frontier *via* Kabul, in anticipation of the arrival of the Mission in order to make the necessary arrangements for them.

"On the whole, the Envoy thought it better that his previous suggestion of an officer going round by Kandahar should be carried out. If, on arrival at Kabul, this officer found that the Amir entertained no objection to the location of an Envoy there or elsewhere, there would of course be equally no objection to the mission returning *via* Badakshan. On the other hand, if there were difficulties about the appointment of an Envoy, it would still be open to Government to allude to the return of the Yarkand Mission *via* Badakshan. He would suggest that in that case the Amir should be addressed on this subject in such a manner as neither to imply the possibility of refusal of permission, nor, on the other hand, as if the mission would take that route without permission. At the same time the advantages of defining the Yarkand frontier in prolongation of that of Afghanistan should be pointed out to the Amir.

"The Envoy professed himself anxious and willing, both in the interest of his own country and of the British Government, to secure compliance with the wishes of the latter in this respect. He would, after ascertaining the sentiments of the Amir, communicate, if required, with or without the recognizance of the Vakil at Kabul.

"The next point discussed was that of the assistance to be given to the Amir, and first with respect to the arms asked for by His Highness, the Envoy repeated the request contained in the Kabul Diaries, that the British Government should supply the Amir with 20,000 stand of arms, and he laid particular stress on 5,000 Sniders being included in the number. As regards pecuniary assistance, the Envoy was unable to name any specific sum, and he could only say that the Amir entertained hopes of being very largely assisted in this respect."

**79. Final letter to the Amir, dated 6th September 1873, summing up the result of the conferences with Syud Nur Mahomed. Despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 15th September.**—The following is the text of the letter from Lord Northbrook to the Amir explanatory of the conclusions arrived at in respect to the other matters besides the Seistán arbitration discussed at the various conferences with Syud Nur Mahomed. It should be read with the letter of the same date extracted in paragraph 65 of this précis :—

"To HIS HIGHNESS AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

"1. The object which I had in view in recently proposing to depute a British officer to Kabul was to explain to Your Highness the result of certain correspondence that had taken place between the British and Russian Governments with regard to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and also the details of the settlement of the Seistán boundary. I have now discussed both subjects at length with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, the Envoy and Plenipotentiary deputed to me by Your Highness, who has fulfilled his duties with zeal and intelligence.

"2. In the letters marginally noted the assurances of the Russian Government were conveyed to Your Highness that they had no intention of extending the Russian boundary further south, and that they recognized as belonging to Afghanistan all the territories then in Your Highness' possession. Prince Gortschakoff has further intimated to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State that the Emperor of Russia 'looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence,' and that 'no intervention or interference whatsoever opposed to the independence of Afghanistan enters into his intentions.' These assurances, however, left the territories then in Your Highness' possession undetermined, and so long as the boundaries of Afghanistan remained undefined, there existed the possibility of difference as to the precise extent of territory to which the assurances applied. The object of the latter part of the correspondence between the British and Russian Governments was to remove the possibility of doubt or misunderstanding by declaring definitely what territories are recognized as belonging to Afghanistan, and it is now my pleasing task to inform Your Highness that the Government of Russia has finally accepted the views of the British Government, and has engaged to recognize the limits of Your Highness' territories as they are described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872, a translation of which, as well as a translated extract from the Russian reply, is herewith enclosed for Your Highness' information.

"3. It has been a source of much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that Your Highness has more than once expressed your determination, in accordance with the advice given by the late Earl of Mayo, to abstain from all interference in the affairs of States and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon Your Highness the importance of maintaining these peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations whatever to lead to any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the limits described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872. On the other hand, the Russian Government have undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghanistan as above described.

"4. Your Highness will see that the correspondence on the subject of the boundaries relates only to the external relations of Afghanistan; and I entertain a confident hope that, by the conclusion arrived at, the important object referred to in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October, *viz.*, the maintenance of peace and tranquillity between the States of Central Asia in their external relations, will be attained, and that in future no aggressions will be made from either side of the boundary now fixed.

"5. The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan, and to remove apprehension of dangers from without. The boundaries of Your Highness' dominions to which the letters refer have now been definitely settled in a manner which precludes any re-opening

of the matter by Bokhara or any other power, or any further question or discussion on the subject between Your Highness and your neighbours in those quarters. To this settlement the British Government are a party, and they are consequently even more interested than before in the maintenance of the integrity of Your Highness' frontier. I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon Your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is, in my opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity.

"6. I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to Your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that Your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that having received the foregoing assurances, Your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal government. The British Government desires to see Your Highness' country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards Your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to Your Highness the assurance given you at the Ambala Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the government of Your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honors of which you are the lawful possessor.

"7. There are some details connected with the recent negotiations and other matters on which explanation has been given to Your Highness' Envoy, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, in a separate memorandum.

"8. On the subject of the Seistán boundary, I have addressed Your Highness in a separate letter.

"9. I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness' sincere friend."

The following is the memorandum referred to in paragraph 7 of the foregoing letter to the Amir:—

"Memorandum of certain points which will be laid before the Amir by the Envoy.

"The Envoy has explained the views entertained in Afghanistan regarding the advance of the Russians towards the frontier of that country, and the probable establishment by them of cantonments in Kirkee, Charjooee, and other places near the frontier; also regarding the probable entry of the Turkomans into the Badghees District, and he expressed a fear lest the Kabul Government should be called upon by Russia for political objects to enter into arrangements for the establishment of a Russian Mission and Agents in various parts, or to comply with other demands. He represented that the establishment in Afghanistan of a Mission on the part of so great a Power presents many difficulties and is indeed impossible. As regards other matters also many difficulties might arise, and he enquired in the unprovided condition of Afghanistan what answer could then be given to such demands.

"With regard to the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, the Envoy was informed that Prince Gortschakoff has officially intimated that, while he saw no objection to English officers going to Kabul, he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian agents should not do so. In the event of any such request being made, the advice of the British Government should be at once sought. If in this or any other matter the Amir should seek the advice of the British Government, such advice would be given him as the circumstances of the case might require.

"As before explained, the British Government are far from entertaining apprehensions of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. It is, on the contrary, their decided belief that the effect of the recent arrangements has been to render the occurrence of such a contingency more remote than ever. Under these circumstances, therefore, they could not encourage the Amir to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency.

"At the same time they are desirous to see the Amir strong and his rule firmly established, and to maintain their policy in regard to strengthening His Highness. For this object they are prepared to give him any reasonable assistance. A request has been preferred by the Amir for 20,000 stand of arms, viz., 5,000 Sniders and the remainder Enfields, with proportionate Snider ammunition and accoutrements. There is not at present in India a sufficient reserve supply of Sniders for the use of the British troops, and it is further impossible to spare at present more than 5,000 Enfields. This number will be at once placed at the disposal of the Amir for removal whenever desired. The remainder have been ordered from England, and will be forwarded as soon as received.

"The British Government have considered in a spirit of the utmost friendliness the representations made by the Envoy regarding the condition of Afghanistan. At an interview with His Excellency the Viceroy, the Envoy was requested to see the Foreign Secretary on the subject, and accordingly the Foreign Secretary intimated that His Excellency had directed him to offer the Amir a gift of ten lakhs of rupees, inclusive of the value of the arms, in addition to the five lakhs promised last year as a contribution towards the amount to be paid as compen-

sation to His Highness' subjects who have suffered by the raids from Seistán, making fifteen lakhs in all. Accordingly ten lakhs in cash, *viz.*, the five lakhs promised for compensation to the sufferers and five lakhs more, will now be placed at the disposal of the Amir, and the remaining five lakhs will be reserved for the arms. Immediate instructions will be issued to have the ten lakhs in readiness at Peshawur for removal whenever desired, and after the price of the arms has been ascertained the balance of the remaining five lakhs, if any balance should remain, will be forwarded to Kabul with the arms.

"Looking to the responsibilities that have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Afghanistan, and looking also to the imperfect information which they possess regarding the border in respect to which these responsibilities have been incurred, it is considered highly desirable that a British officer of rank, accompanied by a competent staff, should proceed to examine thoroughly the northern and north-western boundary as far as its eastern extremity: it would be advisable that this officer should also visit the Seistán boundary, proceeding thither *via* Kandahar, and eventually returning by way of Kabul, when he would have an opportunity of conferring with the Amir regarding the condition of the border, and could lay before His Highness any views he may have formed regarding the measures necessary for the security of the entire frontier. His Highness would thus be enabled, in communication with the British Government, to devise such measures as, after consultation with this officer, might be deemed best fitted for the defence of Afghanistan. As already intimated, the British Government do not anticipate any danger to Afghanistan from without. Still cases might arise in which from imperfect information the interests of Afghanistan might suffer. The very great importance, therefore, of the British Government both in India and England, being in possession of such accurate information as will enable them to reply promptly and authoritatively to any reference or question that may be raised on the subject is so obvious that it is unnecessary to dwell further on this point. On receipt of a reply on this subject, early arrangements will be made for the deputation of an officer, and details will be arranged in communication with His Highness' Government.

"It is also desirable that, if possible, the Amir should arrange for a regular *dák via* Badakshan to communicate with Mr. Forsyth's mission while in Yarkand.

(Sd.) C. U. ATTCHISON."

To the Secretary of State the Government of India wrote as follows (No. 75, dated 15th September 1873):—

"In continuation of our Secret despatch, No. 60, dated 30th June last, and with reference

To Secretary of State, dated 27th June 1873.	to the telegraphic correspondence marginally noted,
From " " 1st July "	we have the honor to forward, for the information
To " " 24th " "	of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the
From " " 26th " "	papers specified in the accompanying Abstract of
	Contents, connected with the communications that

have recently taken place with the Envoy of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan and the general policy of the British Government towards that country.

"2. There was little difficulty in explaining to the Envoy the result of the recent correspondence with Russia regarding the northern boundaries of Afghanistan. He appeared to appreciate correctly the nature of the arrangement concluded with Russia, but sought for an explanation on certain minor points which have been satisfactorily cleared up in the final letter from the Viceroy to the Amir.

"3. From conversations with the Envoy we are led to believe that the Kabul Durbar had interpreted the friendly assurances of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to mean that the British Government had bound themselves to comply with any request preferred by the Amir. It was necessary, therefore, in the first place, to remove any incorrect impressions on this score, and, in repeating to the Amir the assurances given to him at the Ambala Durbar, we have given the Envoy distinctly to understand that, while the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo will be maintained, the British Government reserve to themselves the right of judging as to the propriety of any request preferred by the Amir.

"4. In the course of the discussions the Envoy stated that he had been instructed to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective; the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, and the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a foreign power. Though believing, as the Envoy was distinctly informed, that the result of the recent arrangement with Russia has been to remove further than before the possibility of foreign aggression on Afghanistan, we were of opinion that the time had arrived for affording the Amir present assistance in accordance with our settled policy. As Your Grace was informed in our despatch, No. 2C., dated 4th December last, we had promised the Amir five lakhs of rupees to assist him in adjusting the claims of his subjects who had suffered from raids in Seistán, and we have now decided on presenting His Highness with an additional sum of five lakhs of rupees and with 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles for which he had applied previous to the Envoy's arrival, as reported in our despatch, No. 57, dated 28th March last.



"5. The question of the policy to be pursued in case of actual or threatened aggression on Afghanistan was the subject of considerable discussion with the Envoy. After receipt of Your Grace's telegram of the 1st July, the Envoy was informed at the interview of the 12th

\* See No. 6 of Abstract of Contents. idem\* that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would afford the Amir material assistance in repelling an invader, but that such assistance would be conditional, on the Amir following the advice of the British Government, and having himself

† No. 7 of Abstract of Contents. abstained from aggression. Further and more definite explanations were given on this subject in the conversation with the Envoy of 30th July†, to which we beg to refer Your Grace.

"6. A copy and translation of these conversations were annexed to the letter which the Viceroy has addressed to the Amir. But as the subject is one of great importance, and the Envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we considered it advisable to postpone the settlement of it to a more favorable opportunity, when we trust the matter may be discussed with the Amir in person.

"7. From the separate memorandum‡ of the several points which the Envoy is to lay before the Amir, Your Grace will observe that we have suggested the expediency of deputing a British officer to examine the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Kabul, Herat, and possibly also Kandahar, would for many reasons be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary."

## 80. Previous correspondence relating to the gift of arms bestowed on the Amir after the visit of the Kabul Envoy.—It

will be convenient to explain here the course of events which led the Government of India to accede to the Amir's application for a gift of 20,000 stand of arms to include 5,000 Sniders.§

In a letter to the Commissioner of Peshawur, dated 30th January 1873, the British Agent at Kabul wrote that the Durbar officials had been discussing a proposal to purchase Sniders and other munitions of war direct from London merchants through the agency of the British Government, as it was impossible for the manufacturers at Kabul to supply what was required.

On the 1st February 1873, the Amir addressed a letter to the Viceroy, of which the following is the substance:—

"Alluding to the friendship that exists between the two Governments, the Amir goes on to say that he has raised a large force of newly-organized troops for the protection of his country, and although he has in working order establishments for the manufacture of Snider rifles, &c., still they cannot turn out a sufficient number of arms to meet the urgent requirements of his troops." The letter continues—"I have continually heard from Syud Nur Mahomed Shah and from the merchants of other countries that the Governments of other countries are in the habit of purchasing for their own use from English merchants and manufacturers Snider rifles and other implements of war. It is manifest that the defence of the frontiers of this kingdom is identical with the defence of the frontier of the British possessions. Having therefore consulted the officers of my Government, and keeping in view the unity for good and evil that subsists between the two Governments, I shall esteem it a great favor if the British Government will cause to be supplied on payment from the manufacturers, for the use of the newly-raised troops, 15,000 three-grooved rifles and 5,000 five-grooved Sniders with ammunition for the latter. It is my earnest hope that through the kindness of the British Government I may always be permitted in future to purchase such supplies of warlike material as may from time to time be required. I beg that I may be favored with information as to the price of the 20,000 rifles and ammunition alluded to, in order that arrangements may be made for transmitting the amount."

At the same time Hassan Ali Khan, the Amir's Commander-in-Chief, wrote direct to Messrs. Grisselich & Co., enquiring at what cost they could supply the rifles abovenamed. This letter was forwarded to the Commissioner

of Peshawur to be posted, and was submitted by him to the Government of India for orders. In the Commissioner's opinion the Amir would give up the idea of purchasing Sniders if Government would make him a present of ordinary two-groove rifles with a proportion of Enfields. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab advised that ordinary rifles should be given and permission to purchase breech-loaders withheld. The Government of India replied (to the Punjab Government)—

Political A., March 1873, No. 373.

"His Excellency in Council considers that ordinary Enfield rifles would probably be more suitable for the Amir's troops than Sniders. At present not more than 5,000 Enfields can be spared from the Government Magazines, but if these would be acceptable to His Highness, the Viceroy will be glad to present them to him with 200 rounds of ammunition for each. An intimation of the Amir's wishes, however, will be awaited before the 5,000 Enfields are actually despatched. If His Highness finds these weapons after trial to be suitable to his troops, and, on further consideration, desires to purchase 15,000 more, His Excellency in Council will procure them for him from England."

It has been mentioned in paragraph 59 of this précis that on the 4th April the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote to the British Agent at Kabul desiring him to ascertain the views of the Amir in respect to the proffered gift of Enfields. In a letter, dated the 14th April 1873, the British Agent submitted the following reply:—

"After reading your letter to me, dated 4th April 1873, which was received by me on 9th idem, on the subject of rifles, the Amir observed as follows:—

"No doubt the nation which God has given me should be thankful to the British Government for their sympathy and cordiality, but it is as clear as daylight that both the nobles and common people of Afghanistan are armed with guns, and always accustomed to the use of rifles. A factory for the manufacture of Snider guns has been started in this country, but as the workmen had not sufficient skill, the Snider and other guns cannot be prepared so speedily as to be available for the whole of the Afghan troops in a short period. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has expressed his wish to send 5,000 Enfield rifles; this offer, though it is a proof of the kindness and favorable consideration of the British Government, will not meet the requirements of the army of this kingdom. Consequently, as intimated before, it is necessary that small arms to the number of 15,000 three-grooved rifles and 5,000 Snider guns should be procured at any price at which it may be possible to procure them.' This letter is forwarded after perusal by His Highness the Amir."

Secret, September 1873, No. 122.

The matter was then reserved for consideration upon the arrival of the Kabul Envoy at Simla, and the discussions which took place, and the final settlement arrived at, are recorded on pages 75, 104, and 105 of this précis.

## 81. Delay in the supply of these arms, and consequent suspicion on the part of the Kabul Durbar.—

Measures were taken in the Military Department for the supply of 5,000 Enfield rifles with accoutrements, and the Secretary of State was asked to forward, with the least possible delay, 10,000 three-grooved Enfield rifles and 5,000 Sniders, both with accoutrements complete. Various circumstances prevented early compliance with this indent, and, as shown in the following extracts from Kabul Diaries, the delay elicited much churlish and unfriendly comment from the Kabul Durbar:—

(i)

"Deliberations are going on between the Amir and the Sadr-i-Azam as to why information about the despatch of the rifles offered by the British Government which reached Calcutta long ago has not yet been sent to the Kabul Government, and they propose that a communication should be sent by the latter after the 'Eed' festival in this matter."

Secret, December 1874, No. 45.

(ii)

"The Amir observes for the last few days to the members of his Durbar that in substitution for the five lakhs of rupees fixed for the loss sustained by the people of Furrak, &c., the British Government, at the instance of the Kabul Government, agreed to give 20 thousand rifles, of which five thousand have reached Kabul and the other 15 thousand rifles arrived at Calcutta long ago, but no communication has been received at Kabul, and that His Highness is unable to understand the real

Secret, June 1875, No. 9.

intention of the British Government now. Some of the members said that it would be advantageous, should the Sadr-i-Azim send a reminder to the British Government, but others advised His Highness to wait and see whether or not a letter would be received as to the despatch of these rifles. Discussions on this subject have not yet been brought to a conclusion."

(iii)

"The Members of the Durbar frequently observe as follows:—

"The British Government agreed to give 20,000 rifles in substitution of five lakhs of rupees on account of compensation for the loss sustained by the people of Furrak. Of these rifles 5,000 have reached Kabul, and as for the other 15,000, though they arrived at Calcutta long ago, no information has been sent by the British Government as to whether or not they will be sent to Kabul. It is advisable that a communication be sent in this matter to the British Government through the British Agent, and a reply solicited."

(iv)

"After consulting with the other members, the Sadr-i-Azim observed to-day in Durbar to the Agent as follows by way of message for (British Government).

"Five thousand rifles and their ammunition have reached Kabul. Our 15,000 rifles and ammunition are still due. Long ago information of their arrival at Calcutta was sent to us by the British Government, but no reply has been received to our communication relating to the amount of carriage, &c., required for these arms. It is desirable that the Agency Office should ask the British Government to give a reply in this matter, and be kind enough to state the date of the despatch of the rifles (from Calcutta) and the amount of carriage necessary for bringing them (to Kabul) so that arrangements may be made for conveying them (to Kabul).

"The above paragraph has been written at the request of the Sadr-i-Azim, who wants a reply in this matter.

"The Durbar authorities enquired from the Agent whether or not any reply had been received from the British Government to their recent reminder about the 15,000 rifles, and the Agent said that no reply had been received. They observed privately from time to time as follows:—

"When the British Government earnestly desires the prosperity of Afghanistan, why has so much delay been made in this matter? No State matter has occurred which may be considered to tend to prevent (the fulfilment of) this object. These guns were offered in lieu of the sum of money awarded for the loss sustained by the people of Furrak."

At length, on the 23rd April 1875, the Government of India desired that the Kabul authorities should be informed that the 15,000 stand of arms were ready at Peshawur at the Amir's disposal. The arms comprised 5,000 Sniders and 10,000 muzzle-loading Enfields with all accoutrements complete, and a large supply of ball cartridge. The total value of the gift, according to a schedule submitted by the Inspector-General of Ordnance, was Rupees 5,86,631-12-10.

The Amir had asked for new Enfields from England, and he was dissatisfied on finding that old ones had been sent him. It happened in this wise. New Enfields had been ordered from the Secretary of State, who replied that they would cost more than Sniders. It was then decided in the Military Department to order Sniders from the Secretary of State, which would be supplied to the British Native troops, while the Enfields thus set free were made available for the Amir. No remonstrance was received from His Highness, and no correspondence passed.

**82. The murder of Major Macdonald at Michni by Bahram Khan. Opinion of the Punjab Government as to the course to be pursued.**—It was stated in paragraph 78 of this précis that two interviews took place on the 23rd and 27th June, respectively, between the Envoy and Mr. Aitchison and Lord Northbrook, at which the circumstances of Major Macdonald's murder at Michni were discussed. It will be convenient to summarize here the main facts of this outrage.

The Michni Fort is situated in the village of that name, and is distant about fifteen miles to the north of Peshawur. It was erected in 1851-52 by Sir Colin Campbell as a protection against Mohmund raids, and commands an important ferry over the Kabul river. On the 21st March 1873, Major

Macdonald, the Commandant of the Fort, was walking with Captain Clifford, of the 16th Bengal Cavalry, on the banks of the river about a mile from the fort. They were suddenly attacked by half a dozen armed men under Bahram Khan, half-brother of the Mohmund Chief, Nowroz Khan of Lalpoorah. Major Macdonald was shot through the thigh and then killed by a sword-cut which fractured his skull. The Commissioner of Peshawur in reporting the outrage asked permission to inform the Amir, in case the circumstances were proved, that the British Government insisted on the murderers being given up, and his proposal was approved. He subsequently telegraphed that the murder appeared to have no political significance, and that he had made no communication to the Amir. Information of the murder was, however, furnished to the Kabul authorities by the Native British Agent, acting under instructions from the Commissioner of Peshawur, with the result that stringent orders were immediately issued by the Amir to Shah Murad Khan, Governor of Jelalabad, and to Nowroz Khan, directing the confiscation of the forts belonging to Bahram Khan and his brother Inayet-ullah, and the arrest of all persons concerned in the murder whenever found within Kabul territory. Ultimately the Punjab Government submitted a report summing up the results of the enquiries made, with their recommendations as to the course to be pursued. The Lieutenant-Governor considered it established—

“1.—That Bahram Khan for some time entertained the design of taking the life of an English officer, and had talked of his intention some days previous to the murder.

“2.—That his design must have been known to the inhabitants of the Mohmund villages, both within and without the British border, that, nevertheless, no one, so far as is known, represented the circumstances either to Major Macdonald himself or to the civil authorities.

“3.—That though the villagers of the Mohmund hamlet of Sirra appertaining to the village of Bela in British territory, on hearing shots fired turned out with sufficient promptness, and were probably the means of saving the life of Captain Clifford, and preventing the assassins from carrying off the murdered officer's head and robbing his body of valuables, yet notwithstanding they made no serious attempt to wound or capture the murderers.

“4.—That the villagers of Dhah Shah, Manour Kheb, Phai Khan, and Hyder Khan (Mohmund villages beyond the border) allowed the murderers to pass through their lands and even hospitably entertained them.”

Mr. Davies was further satisfied that Nowroz Khan, the Mohmund Chief of Lalpoorah, though in possession of the facts of the case early on the morning of the 22nd March, nevertheless made no real attempt to arrest the murderers, who took their road leisurely for two or three days through the Mohmund country, boasting as they went of what they had done.

The Commissioner of Peshawur, Mr. Macnabb, proposed to punish the Mohmund villages within British territory by raising their present favorable assessment from Rupees 1,396 per annum to Rupees 5,000. This would be virtually a punishment inflicted on the tribe, for so complete is the community of interest in this clan that every family resident on either side the border would feel the punishment.

The Lieutenant-Governor concurred in this proposal. A favorable assessment had been allowed to these border villages as a means of securing the good behaviour of the tribe, and it appeared to His Honor to be right and expedient to mark the displeasure of the British Government at the misconduct of the villagers on the present occasion by increasing the assessment to a sum which, though considerably in excess of the present demand, was not more than half the amount demandable at ordinary rates.

Mr. Macnabb further advised that a demand should be made on the Amir for the deposition of Nowroz Khan. The Lieutenant-Governor held that inasmuch as Nowroz Khan had had ample time to arrest Bahram Khan and his followers during their progress through his Chiefship, had he been willing to do so, the penalty of deposition had been fully incurred, and that under so great and open a provocation the British Government could not wisely abstain from demanding his removal. The time and manner of the demand required some further consideration, for while the Amir had no real regard for, or confidence in, Nowroz Khan, who was a staunch partisan of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, the demand for his removal might still produce some embarrassment and possibly irritate the Amir.

All things considered, Mr. Davies recommended that, as within a very short time a representative from the Amir would arrive at Peshawur in reference to the Scistán award, the best plan would be for the Commissioner to endeavour to ascertain from him, so far as he could, the precise state of the Amir's mind upon the subject, which must have been canvassed at Kabul, and regarding which the Envoy might possibly have instructions.

If it should appear that the Amir would readily depose Nowroz Khan, and was trying, as some unauthenticated reports alleged, to get him into his power, it might be well to wait awhile before pressing for the deposition of the Mohmund Chief. If, on the other hand, it turned out that the Amir was averse, for whatever reason, from meddling with Nowroz Khan, a communication commenting on the evidence might then be made to His Highness, to be followed up, in the event of Nowroz Khan still failing to apprehend the murderers, and of the Amir still evading compliance with the wishes of the British Government, by a direct demand for the deposition of Nowroz Khan, accompanied by remarks making the gravity of the situation clear and unmistakable.

If the Amir should then persist in holding out against the adoption of the course proposed, the adoption of ulterior measures would, perhaps, be required without his co-operation. Considering that Saadat Khan, the father of Nowroz, was in 1863 deposed on the demand of the British Government for a like offence, it was probable that the Amir was prepared for such a representation, and was little likely to resist it if firmly made. Meanwhile, every opportunity would have been previously given to His Highness to initiate himself the action desired by the British Government.

It was considered by those best competent to form an opinion, that His Highness had not the power to effect the capture of Bahram Khan and his followers so long as the Shinwarees or other tribes beyond His Highness' control gave them shelter.

On the 13th May 1873 the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote to the British Agent on the subject of Major Macdonald's murder and received the following reply, dated 19th May :—

"I showed your letter to me, dated 13th May 1873, which I received on the 18th idem, on the subject of the murder of Major Macdonald, Commandant of the Michni Fort, to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, in compliance with your instructions, and he represented its contents to the Amir, who, in a thoughtful state, observed as follows :—'No negligence has occurred on my part in issuing orders for the apprehension of assassins in this case, nor will such be the case hereafter. I have written several times to Nowroz Khan and the Governor of Jelalabad that as soon as the absconded criminals in this case are captured they should be killed. The British Government has now considered the duty of settling this case as a matter of primary importance, in the proposed discussions on various subjects. In reality under friendly relations there is no difference in the settlement of any matter either first or last. It was advisable that on Syud Nur Mahomed Shah's being honored with a meeting, communications should have been made on this subject, which is a private affair. After the settlement of other State matters, the departure of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah was before proposed *via* Kuram, but he should now go through Lalpoorah to Peshawur after careful enquiry in this case. On Thursday or Friday, *viz.*, 22nd or 23rd of May 1873, he should start from Kabul, and on arrival near Peshawur he should report the date on which he will reach that city to the Commissioner and Superintendent beforehand.'"

**83. Conversations with the Envoy regarding Major Macdonald's murder.**—The case had reached this stage when the Envoy arrived at Simla, and, as already mentioned, its circumstances formed the subject of the first conversation between him and the British authorities. The following memoranda narrate what passed :—

#### I.

"Memorandum of an interview between SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH and the Foreign Secretary, held on Monday, the 23rd June 1873.

"The matter discussed at this interview was that of the murder of Major Macdonald, late Commandant of the Fort at Michni, and the conversation turned first on the actual facts connected with the murder. On this subject the Envoy said that during his recent visit to Lalpoorah and the neighbourhood he had been unable to gather any additional information to



that which had already been laid before Government by the Commissioner of Peshawur. As regards the guilt of Bahram Khan, the Envoy said that, setting aside everything else, the mere facts of the murder having been committed by three of his retainers was sufficient to attach to Bahram the responsibility for the deed, whether he was concerned in it directly or not, or whether or not he was present on the occasion. These men, he said, could not have committed the deed without the consent of Bahram. The names of the persons who are supposed either to have committed the murder or to have been present on the occasion were read out to the Syud who appeared to recognize the names, but said he could not be sure of them in the absence of his own memoranda which he had omitted to bring with him.

"The substance of the evidence before the Government of India regarding the movements of Bahram after the murder was then carefully translated to the Envoy who took notes of the same.

"The Envoy then said that there was no necessity to enter minutely upon the evidence, as the Amir was quite prepared to award to the perpetrators and all directly or indirectly concerned in the murder such punishment as the British Government might deem appropriate. The Secretary explained that it was not within the province of the British Government to suggest to the Amir what punishment should be awarded. It was sufficient for them to lay before the Amir the evidence against all persons implicated in the murder and leave the Amir, as a friend of the British Government, to exact a sufficient reparation from them to mark his sense of the atrocity of the crime and to satisfy the demands of justice.

"The Envoy replied that even without any expression of the wishes of the British Government, the Amir would feel himself compelled to inflict suitable punishment, not only as a reparation for the deed, but also in order to deter others from committing similar crimes. Syud Nur Mahomed then proceeded to detail the punishments which the Amir was willing to inflict:—

"1st.—As regards Bahram Khan, that whenever and wherever found his life should be forfeited, and that his property of every kind should be at once confiscated, and no efforts spared to secure his capture.

"2nd.—As regards others directly concerned in the deed, that their property should be confiscated and themselves seized and executed whenever found.

"3rd.—As regards the various villages and places where Bahram made any stay after committing the murder, that severe punishment according to the circumstances of each should be inflicted on the inhabitants of all the places after full enquiry had been made as to the degree of culpability attaching to them.

"A more prolonged discussion took place with regard to the degree of guilt attaching to Nowroz Khan for his failure to arrest Bahram. The evidence bearing on this subject was read out to the Envoy whose attention was directed to the following points:—

"1st.—That the written order to arrest Bahram did not reach Gutta Goodur Ferry till the 24th, whereas Hubeboolla of Shubkudder in British territory had received a letter from Nowroz regarding the murder on the afternoon of the 23rd.

"2nd.—That a messenger named Doezei had been sent from Lalpoorah to give Bahram warning, which fact was attested by two independent witnesses.

"3rd.—That Bahram was alleged to have sent Nowroz a message from Mooltan Koruna asking permission to enter Lalpoorah, and received a reply to the effect that he had better keep out of the way.

"The Envoy observed that a careful comparison of the written documents and a fuller personal enquiry would be necessary before these points could be fully established. He added that if the fact of Bahram having sent a message to Lalpoorah and received a reply to keep out of the way were satisfactorily proved, the Amir would have no resource left but to inflict the punishment of death on Nowroz Khan.

"On the whole the Envoy seemed to incline to his evidently previously formed conclusion that Nowroz was not guilty of any laches in allowing the escape of Bahram. Notwithstanding this, he said that the Amir was prepared to inflict, and Nowroz to suffer, such punishment as the British Government might deem fitting. He appealed to the history of Saadat Khan in proof of the willingness of the Amir to carry out the wishes of the British Government, but requested permission to represent the difficulties in the way of taking any severe measures against Nowroz. If he were removed from the Chiefship and the appointment still left in his family, the inheritors would be the two young sons of the late Khan, Sultan Mahomed: these were young boys and would be quite unable to control the Mohmunds so that in a short time the Passes would be closed. On the other hand, to deprive the family altogether of the Chiefship would be to arouse the resentment of Sirdar Yakub Khan, who would consider the measure as a blow aimed at himself through Nowroz.

"The Envoy again represented the willingness of the Amir on the face of these difficulties to inflict upon Nowroz such punishment as the British Government might specify. The Foreign Secretary repeated what he had previously said that it was not for the British Government but for the Amir to specify the punishment. Syud Nur Mahomed then suggested that the nature of the proposed punishment should before infliction be submitted by the Amir for the approval of the British Government. The Secretary replied that His Excellency the Viceroy would probably see no objection to this course.

"One other point connected with the conduct of Nowroz was mentioned to the Envoy, and this was the fact of his having appointed to the command of a post so near the British frontier a man like Bahram whose hostility to the English was notorious. The Envoy admitted that this was wrong, but urged that Bahram was a man of so little note that his hostility was considered a matter of little consequence.

"Regarding the motives for the deed, the Envoy was unable to form an opinion; he had heard the same causes assigned as those which have been reported to Government, but placed no faith in these reports. He did not believe that Bahram had committed the deed with the object of getting away from Sadeen Thannah, where he got a regular living from ferry dues and other sources instead of leading the precarious life he had hitherto been compelled to lead.

"In the course of the conversation the Envoy expressed his disbelief that the British villages had been in any way implicated in the murder, and as regards seizing Bahram, he said they simply did not dare to do it."

## II.

"Memorandum of an interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, Envoy from His Highness the Amir of Kabul, held at Government House, Simla, on Friday, the 27th June 1873.

### *Present :*

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, LORD NORTHBROOK.  
THE ENVOY, SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH.  
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR. AITCHISON.  
PRIVATE SECRETARY, CAPTAIN E. BARING.

### *Interpreter.*

CAPTAIN HENDERSON, UNDER-SECRETARY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

"His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by observing that he had been made acquainted with the substance of the conversation that had passed between the Envoy and the Foreign Secretary on the 23rd instant on the subject of the murder of Major Macdonald, late Commandant of the Michni Fort. His Excellency observed that the Government had been deeply impressed with the gravity of the occurrence, and, therefore, expressed a hope that the Amir would visit with severe punishment, according to degree of guilt of each, all those who had been directly or indirectly concerned in the murder, or who had in any way concealed or assisted those concerned, or who had shown a laxness in securing such persons. Such punishment would be a public manifestation of the Amir's friendship to the British Government, and would prevent the recurrence on the frontier of similar outrages. His Excellency expressed gratification at the assurances which the Envoy was authorized by the Amir to convey, with reference to the punishment of all those who were in any way concerned, either directly or indirectly, in the deed. These assurances, His Excellency observed, were in accordance with the well-known friendship existing between the Amir and the British Government.

"The Envoy said that, as regards the punishment of murder, the Amir was ordinarily guided by the Muhammadan law; but in circumstances like the present it was necessary, both from political and other considerations, to act independently of that law in the punishment of the offenders, and His Highness had therefore issued repeated orders for the capture of Bahram and the others concerned in the murder. The Envoy continued that it was his master's desire to comply entirely with the wishes of the British Government in this matter as far as practicable, in order that no differences might arise on the question, and he proceeded to particularize the punishment proposed in each case. As regards Bahram Khan, the Envoy observed that it had been alleged in his favor that he was not actually on the spot when the deed was committed, but had arrived there subsequently. Whether this were true or not, it was impossible that the crime could have been perpetrated without his knowledge. No doubt was entertained as to his culpability and the responsibility attaching to him; and the Amir was determined to visit him with death if he ever came within reach. As it was, his landed possession and property of every kind had been confiscated, and he himself had fled a homeless exile from his country and family, and was in fact suffering a penalty worse than death itself. Bahram indeed, continued the Envoy, may be counted as a dead man; he was at present in the country of the Akhoond of Swat, dependent on the precarious hospitality of strangers, and there was little doubt that sooner or later he would wander within reach of the Amir's arm, and whenever and wherever this may occur his life would be forfeited. The same punishment, said the Envoy, would be visited by the Amir on every one of Bahram's followers who were concerned in the murder. The property of all of them who were Kabul subjects, and possessed property in Afghanistan, had been confiscated, and every one of them, whether Kabul subject or otherwise, be at once put to death if they ever set foot in Kabul territory. At present it was supposed that they were all in Swat with Bahram.

"At the preliminary interview with the Foreign Secretary, the movements of Bahram Khan, subsequent to the murder, as ascertained in the course of the judicial inquiry conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, had been detailed to the Envoy, who now observed that to prevent the possible occurrence in the future of a similar atrocity in the neighbourhood of the frontier it was His Highness the Amir's intention to make a severe example of the

inhabitants of all those villages and places under the Kabul Government or Nowroz Khan, where Bahram was ascertained to have made any stay. After an inquiry into the circumstances of each case, such punishment would be inflicted as might appear appropriate to the degree of guilt attaching to each village. The entire villages, for instance, which had given shelter to Bahram for a whole night, would be punished according to the degree of their guilt, and the house or houses of any person who had sheltered Bahram, or in which he had passed a night, would be razed to the ground as a warning for the future to all Afghans against sheltering a fugitive who had been guilty of so atrocious an outrage against the British Government. These punishments would be inflicted on the Envoy's return to Afghanistan, and would be carried out by Nowroz Khan himself, who would be required to visit the villages in person for that purpose.

"The question of Nowroz Khan's connection with the deed was next discussed. His Excellency the Viceroy observed that no suspicion was entertained of Nowroz Khan's complicity in, or cognizance of, the deed prior to its occurrence. But the British Government found fault with his conduct in two particulars:—

"1st.—In having appointed to a post so near their frontier a man like Bahram, whose reckless character and determined hostility to the British Government was notorious.

"2nd.—In having failed to use his best efforts to secure Bahram after the deed had been committed.

"The Envoy freely admitted Nowroz's guilt as regards the first charge, and continued that at the preliminary conversation with the Foreign Secretary, he had been informed of the grounds on which Nowroz was considered to have shown slackness in effecting the capture of Bahram. If one statement then repeated to him were proved to be true, the Amir would have no resource but to visit Nowroz with the severest penalty. This was the statement to the effect that Bahram had sent and asked permission to enter Lalpoorah, and had been informed by Nowroz that he had better keep out of the way. If, however, he were asked to state frankly his own opinion, formed after inquiries at Lalpoorah, the Envoy said that he did not think Nowroz had shown any want of effort to capture Bahram. But if a contrary opinion were held by the British Government, the Amir was quite prepared to visit him with such punishment as they might consider appropriate to the offence.

"His Excellency the Viceroy observed that it was not considered by the British Government expedient or necessary to make further detailed inquiries into the circumstances of Nowroz Khan's conduct as regards Bahram. After a full consideration of the evidence before them, derived from various and independent sources, they had been compelled to arrive at the conclusion that Nowroz had not used such efforts as became an officer in his position of trust and a servant of a Sovereign in friendly alliance with the British Government. The nature of the punishment to be awarded to him for this offence would be left to the Amir, in the expectation that it would be such as to mark His Highness' sense of the gravity of his offence.

"The Envoy wished to be informed as to the precise nature and degree of punishment that would be considered satisfactory by the British Government, and expressed a fear lest any punishment proposed should seem to them to fall short of the requirements of the case. He also pointed out the difficulty in the way of the removal of Nowroz Khan from his post, and he finally submitted the following proposal, *viz.*, that Nowroz Khan should be punished in the first place by a pecuniary fine, which might be levied from him in cash, or might take the form of a reduction of his rent-free holding. In addition to the above, that he should be suspended from his appointment for a certain period, and only allowed to resume its duties after realization of the above fine, and after public intercession being made in his favor by officers of the Kabul Court.

"His Excellency the Viceroy replied that he was well aware of the difficulties in the case, but that the punishments proposed both as regards Nowroz Khan and all the individuals concerned in the murder were considered satisfactory, and the readiness of the Amir to accede to the wishes of the British Government in the matter would serve to strengthen the ties of friendship existing between that Government and His Highness the Amir.

"In conclusion, His Excellency the Viceroy inquired, with reference to the punishments above detailed, whether any disturbance was likely to be caused by the infliction which would necessitate the strengthening of the British frontier force. The Envoy replied that the punishments in question would be inflicted outside British territory; it was quite unnecessary to strengthen the British frontier force. The Viceroy next inquired whether there would be any objection to publishing the substance of the present conversation for the satisfaction of the British public. The Envoy deprecated any publication of the communications that had passed on the subject until after his arrival at Kabul, to which place he would take Nowroz Khan with him."

**84. Communication to the Amir and the Punjab Government of the proposals for the punishment of Bahram Khan and Nowroz Khan. Action taken by the Amir, and final correspondence with Lord Northbrook.**—These conversations were reported by the Envoy to the Amir, and the following extract from the Kabul diary, dated 14th July, shows that while Shere Ali expressed no opinion

on the propriety of the terms, he was well satisfied with the treatment accorded to his Envoy:—

“The Amir lately received a letter, dated 8th Jamadi-ul-awul (= 4th July 1873), from his Envoy, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, to the following effect:—

“After being honored with an interview with His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the case of Bahram Khan, murderer of Major Macdonald, was thus decided with the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, that in consequence of Nowroz Khan, Chief of Lalpoorah, having neglected to apprehend the murderer, he should be removed from the Chiefship, and a fine, either in cash or from the income of his jaghire, should be levied; that the houses of those persons who gave refuge to Bahram Khan should be destroyed; that after some time, at the recommendation of some men of good family, Your Highness should restore him (Nowroz Khan) to his Chiefship; and that the assignment of this punishment should not be made known until my return to Kabul. The Seistan question was not settled on the 9th Jamadi-ul-awul, as the conference was closed for that day. The honor which is shown to me in the Durbar of His Excellency the Viceroy I am unable to describe. I will represent the account of all private meetings and other matters verbally when I wait on Your Highness.’

“The Amir expressed himself highly gratified with the kindness of the British Government which has been shown to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah.”

Ultimately the following letter, dated 6th September 1873, was addressed by Lord Northbrook to the Amir. The separate memorandum referred to is cited at pp. 102-104 of this précis, but it contains no reference to the Michni affair:—

“Your Highness was informed through the Commissioner of Peshawur that the first subject to be discussed with your Envoy, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, would be that of the murder of Major Macdonald, late Commandant of the Michni Fort, and the punishment of all who were in any way concerned in that crime either before or subsequent to its occurrence.

“The result of the communications with Your Highness’ Envoy will be found embodied in a separate memorandum of which he is the bearer. It remains only for me to express my gratification at the assurances given on behalf of Your Highness by Syud Nur Mahomed Shah of Your Highness’ determination to visit with the severest punishment, in proportion to their guilt, the actual perpetrators of, and accomplices in, that atrocious crime, as well as all those who gave shelter to the criminals or failed to exert themselves as they ought to have done to secure their apprehension.

“These assurances will undoubtedly tend to strengthen the ties of amity and friendship existing between the two Governments, and the infliction of the punishments specified by Your Highness’ Envoy cannot fail to have a good effect on the peace and security of the frontier.

“I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness’ sincere friend, &c.”

The Punjab Government were furnished\* with a copy of the memoranda of conversations extracted in paragraph 83, and were desired to arrange with Syud Nur Mahomed for the publication of the annexed proclamation offering rewards for the capture of Bahram Khan and the other persons concerned in the murder.

Bela Momundan.	Sarkhanna.	in British territory, a fine equivalent to one year’s revenue at full rates of assessment was ordered to be imposed on the villages named in the margin. The revenue of these villages was accordingly raised for one year from Rupees 1,396 to
Pujari Bala.	Sheghali Bala.	
Pujari Payan.	Sheghali Payan.	
Jogni.	Sher Kelai.	
Dang Lakhtha.	Killa Shahbeg.	
Dheri Kelai.	Nilawi.	
Zorwandi.	Wazir Kelai.	

Rupees 10,651. The hamlet of Sirra was exempted from fine, in consideration of the assistance afforded to Major Macdonald and Captain Clifford, which had enabled the latter officer to escape. The levy of the fines was to be announced simultaneously with the execution of the measures about to be taken by the Amir for the punishment of the villages in Afghan territory, the inhabitants of which had given shelter to Bahram Khan, and the Commissioner of Peshawur was directed to communicate with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah with the view of ensuring concurrent action.

#### PROCLAMATION.

“Whereas Major H. Macdonald, of the Bengal Staff Corps, late Commandant of the Fort of Michni, was murdered on the 21st March 1873, at a spot within British territory about a mile from the said fort; and

"Whereas there is good reason to believe that the said murder was instigated by one Bahram Khan, son of Saadut Khan and half-brother of Nowroz Khan of Lalpoorah, the said Bahram being then in command of the post of Sadeen Thanna in the dominions of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, and having since fled to the neighbourhood of Bajour and Swat in independent territory :

"It is hereby announced that a reward of Rupees 10,000 will be paid to any person or persons who may apprehend the said Bahram Khan and deliver him into safe custody in British territory, or who may give such information as shall lead to the apprehension of the said Bahram Khan in British territory.

"It is further announced that a reward of Rupees 2,000 will be paid to any person or persons who shall apprehend and deliver into safe custody in British territory, or shall give such information as shall lead to the apprehension in British territory of each of the under-mentioned persons who formed part of the garrison of the said post of Sadeen Thanna, and who are believed to have been concerned in the said murder :—

Name.	Parentage.	Caste.	Residence.
Tor ... ..	Ganderai ...	Kukuzai ...	Hazarkas, Ningrahar, Jelalabad.
Gholamgool ...	Yargool ...	Ditto ...	Hazarkas, Ningrahar, Jelalabad.
Kamakai ... ..	Kashmiri ...	Halmizni Mohmund	Shilman, Lalpoorah, and Gundao.
Syud <i>alias</i> Gool Syud ...	Khan Gool ...	Shinwarree ...	Bourroh, Ningrahar.
Sahibia ... ..	Gholam ...	Ditto ...	Siahchee Shinwarree.
Sahibzada ... ..	Momin ...	Syud ...	Ditto.
Nawab ... ..	Ursulla or Faizulla	Dilazak ...	Ditto.
Golab, also called Ghilzai	Shahab ...	Ghilzai ...	Ditto.

On the 11th September the Amir publicly announced to Nowroz Khan that he had been deposed from the Governorship of Lalpoorah at the suggestion of the British Government. The suspension was, however, removed on the 18th October, on which date Nowroz Khan was pardoned and permitted to return to Lalpoorah. Nowroz notified his intention of collecting from his tribe the Rupees 5,000 which he had paid as a fine.

Subsequently, on the 13th November 1873, the Amir acknowledged the Viceroy's letter cited above, dated 6th September 1873, and wrote as follows :—

"All that Your Excellency instructed the said Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to communicate to me regarding Major Macdonald has been fully conveyed to me. The investigation and punishment connected with the general question have been concluded, but investigation into details and the attending punishment have been delayed in consequence of the detention of Nowroz Khan at Kabul. I beg to assure Your Excellency that a minute investigation will now be made on the subject."

To this Lord Northbrook replied on the 21st January 1874—

"I have derived satisfaction from the assurances given to me by Your Highness in that letter that a minute investigation will be made into the circumstances of the case, and I trust that when the enquiries are completed Your Highness will, at your earliest convenience, communicate to me the results thereof and the punishments inflicted by Your Highness on all concerned. This I shall esteem to be a renewed and public manifestation of the well-known friendship existing between Your Highness and the British Government."

The following letters complete the correspondence with the Amir on the subject :—

"From His Highness the AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated 28th Sufur, 1291 A.H. = 16th April 1874.

"At an auspicious and favorable time Your Excellency's welcome letter, dated 21st January 1874, reached me and disclosed the secrets of union and friendship. All that has been written by Your Excellency's friendly pen in respect to the punishment of the criminals concerned in the murder of Major Macdonald has imprinted itself on my heart.

"I have previously informed Your Excellency that an investigation connected with the general question had been concluded, and that an enquiry into the details of the affair remained yet to be made. A detailed investigation has now been made and punishment has been inflicted. The houses and dwellings of those persons who afforded a refuge to Bahram and his followers in their flight and gave them shelter for a night have without exception been burnt



down to the ground. In regard to other persons, some have been fined and others imprisoned for a time. In respect to Bahram himself and his accomplices, no punishment has yet been inflicted upon them for the reasons mentioned in the last conversation between Your Excellency and my Envoy.

"As regards Nowroz Khan, notwithstanding that he had no knowledge of the event and manifested no slackness in the matter, yet, agreeably to Your Excellency's desire, adequate punishment has been inflicted upon him by removing him from his office as Governor of Lalpoorah, and imposing upon him a fine. On the recommendation of the officers of this Government, he was afterwards permitted to resume his duties. With a view to satisfy Your Excellency, severer punishments have been inflicted, and stricter enquiries have been made, in connection with Major Macdonald's murder than those mentioned in the conversation, and to which Your Excellency consented."

---

"From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to His HIGHNESS the AMIR SHEER ALI KHAN, dated 14th May 1874.

"I have received through the Commissioner of Peshawur Your Highness' friendly letter, dated the 28th of Sufur, 1291 A.H., corresponding with the 16th April 1874, detailing the punishments that have been inflicted on those persons who are known to have afforded shelter to the murderers of the late Major Macdonald or who were otherwise connected with the crime.

"The punishments awarded by Your Highness afford an additional manifestation of the friendship that exists between Your Highness and the British Government.

"I am aware of the difficulties alluded to by Your Highness in regard to the punishment of Bahram Khan and his accomplices, but I feel assured that should they venture into Your Highness' territory, they will, in conformity with the assurances communicated by your Envoy, meet with the punishment due to the heinous nature of their crime.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to acknowledge the readiness with which Your Highness recently met the wishes of the British Government in regard to the despatch of a letter *via* Badakshan to the address of Mr. Forsyth, Her Majesty's Envoy and Plenipotentiary to Yarkund.

"I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness' sincere friend."

It may be mentioned here that Bahram Khan was never caught. The latest notice of him is contained in the annexed extract from a Peshawur news-letter, dated 13th July 1877:—

"Bahram Khan, son of Saadat Khan, Mohmund, of Lalpoorah, murderer of Major Macdonald, Commanding the Michni Fort, has addressed a petition to the Amir from Nazian, Ilaka Shinwari Sarga Khel, offering his services as a Ghazi in the approaching jahād. A reply has been sent him by the Amir that he should abide by the instructions which will be conveyed to him through Alijah Shahmard Khan, Governor of Jelalabad."

## 85. Proposed visit of Colonel V. Baker to Afghanistan. Correspondence regarding Mr. Forsyth's contemplated return to India from Yarkund via Badakshan.\*—On the 19th September

\* *Vide* also Henvey's Central Asia 1873, the Commissioner of Peshawur forwarded Précis, paragraph 241, *et seq.* to the British Agent at Kabul a letter proposing that Colonel V. Baker should be allowed to pass through Afghanistan on his way from Teheran to India. The Kabul Envoy when at Simla had said that Colonel Baker might be allowed to come *via* Kandahar, and after the Syud's return to Kabul the British Agent, having invited his attention once or twice to the subject, was told that a reply would be given after consultation with the Amir. At length in the Kabul diary, dated 31st October-3rd November, it was reported that in a conference held by the Amir the following observations were made:—

"The murder of Major Macdonald, Commandant of the Michni Fort, took place accidentally, and, though six or seven months have elapsed, the Afghan Government still experiences the trouble of carrying out the orders passed from time to time in this case. It should, therefore, be taken into consideration, that if any injury is caused to Colonel Baker in his journey through Afghanistan on account of the barbarous character of the people, what objections the British Government will raise against the Afghan Government. Under these circumstances it is advisable that Colonel Baker should not be allowed to travel through Afghanistan, and that the British Government should be requested not to send communications in future about such matters."

These remarks showed that it would be useless for Colonel Baker to attempt to come to India by the route contemplated, and the British Minister at Teheran was requested to inform that officer that it was undesirable that he should enter Afghanistan. Then came the Amir's letter,\* dated 13th November 1873, with its curt and discourteous reference to the undesirability of Colonel Baker "and others" travelling in Afghanistan—a remark which was held to dispose of the suggestion that Sir D. Forsyth should return from Yarkund *viâ* Badakshan.

\* *Ide* paragraph 67, *ante*.

With regard to this matter, *viz.*, Sir D. Forsyth's proposal to return to India *viâ* the Pamir, Badakshan, and Kabul, the facts are briefly as follow:—On the 1st January 1874 he despatched Ibrahim Khan from Kashgar to Kabul with letters for the Amir Shere Ali, Syud Nur Mahomed, and the British Agent, in order to ascertain whether there were any objections to his visit to Afghanistan. He expected Ibrahim Khan back by May, by which time he hoped to receive instructions from the Government of India. Ibrahim Khan arrived at Kabul on the 18th February, and was summoned without delay before the Durbar to present his letters. The Amir remarked that Yarkund was a long way from the British possessions and close to those of Russia; he was unable to see what advantage would result from bringing himself into communication with the Amir of Kashgar. He declined to give any decision upon the proposed

† A copy of the Persian version of this letter will be found in Appendix XII.

return of the Yarkund Mission *viâ* Badakshan until after careful deliberation. At length on the 10th April he wrote † to Lord Northbrook as follows:—

"Be it known that I received on the 28th Zilhij Your Excellency's friendly letter, ‡ dated 23rd January 1874, which was written in reply to my communication of the 21st Rumzan, 1290 A.H., and was gratified to receive accounts of your health and welfare.

‡ *Ide* paragraph 67, *ante*.

"With regard to the statement in the letter under reply, to the effect that I had omitted to indicate my sentiments on the subject of your letter, My Lord! my opinion is identical with that which my Envoy represented and explained both verbally and in writing at Simla, on which occasion he neither kept back nor concealed anything. Notwithstanding that my sentiments are identical with those which were fully set forth in my letter of the 1st Rumzan, *viz.*, that the arrangements made by Lord Lawrence and by Lord Mayo at the Ambala conference are sufficient, and that there is no need to repeat all this discussion.

"What Your Excellency has been pleased to indite with friendly pen, to the effect that looking to the established friendship, the prosperity, welfare, and consolidation of my State is an object of consideration, and that in verbal and written communications with my Envoy at Simla there had been no concealment and no matter kept back.

"It is full certain that the members of the exalted British Government, looking to the union of the two great States, will ever, and do ever, consider and regard the prosperity, welfare, and consolidation of my kingdom because the exalted greatness of the kingdom of Her Majesty the Queen is more apparent than the sun and more plain than yesterday.§ Looking to the requirements of friendship and amity, my Envoy with a truthful and pure heart made all those verbal and written representations at Simla and explained fully what was in his mind without any reserve.

§ The construction here is obscure, and the connection between this sentence and the following paragraph not at all clear.

"As to the sentiments of regret expressed by Your Excellency, the fact is this, that I also experience regret and uneasiness for this reason, that the people of Afghanistan are rude mountaineers unendowed with knowledge and wisdom. Accordingly, it is my endeavour day and night to teach these people wisdom, knowledge, and excellence, and I fervently hope that by degrees that even Afghanistan will share in the acquirement of knowledge and wisdom.

"Your Excellency! Since Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, especially the former possessed an intimate knowledge of Afghanistan and its frontiers, and Your Excellency also must certainly have acquired the same knowledge, I therefore am desirous that Your Excellency after full and careful consideration of the approval expressed by Her Majesty the Queen, the 'Sunnud' of Lord Lawrence and the decision of Lord Mayo will remain firm and constant in order that Afghanistan and its territories may be maintained inviolate and secure.

"A letter has recently been received by the hands of Ibrahim Khan, attached to the Yarkund Mission, from Mr. T. D. Forsyth, C.B. An exact copy of that letter and the reply is herewith forwarded. It is certain that Mr. Forsyth has not been informed of the objections of Afghanistan and the conversation which took place between Your Excellency and my Envoy. Your Excellency will certainly (now) inform Mr. Forsyth."

The Amir's reply to Mr. Forsyth was to the effect that the latter could not be aware of the nature of the communications between His Excellency the Viceroy and Syud Nur Mahomed, but that doubtless he would be informed of them.

In a letter, dated 11th April 1874, to the Commissioner of Peshawur, the British Agent at Kabul thus explained the circumstances connected with the Amir's letters to the Viceroy and Mr. Forsyth:—

"After two days' private discussion replies to the murasillas received from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth were written in the Kabul Durbar. The murasilla to the address of the Viceroy was sent to the Agency Office and the other to Mr. Forsyth having been made over to Ibrahim Khan of the Yarkund Mission, a 'Rukksatana' of four hundred rupees of Kabul currency cash, one Kashmiri shawl, and an embroidered broadcloth chogha were assigned to him. Unless any impediment presents itself, he (Ibrahim Khan) will return to Mr. Forsyth *via* Balkh and Badakshan in company with Mirza Abdul Hadi Khan, Agent of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Balkh, to-morrow or the day after to-morrow. The views of the Kabul Government will become known to you by the contents of the murasilla to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy and the enclosed copy of the second murasilla.\* The Sadr-i-Azem observed to me privately as follows:—

"As regards Herat matters if, through misfortune ('Na-Saadat Mandi'), Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan fails to arrive at a right conclusion (literally straight road, 'rah-i-rast'), the Kabul Government will be constrained to send troops against Herat. In such case the Kabul authorities do not consider it advisable that Mr. Forsyth should return to India *via* Kabul, especially because when Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan took flight from Kabul he put off his uniform outside the city, and with a view to collecting short-sighted people ('Kotab-Andesh') he gave out that Amir on his return from India after the Ambala conference had abandoned the Mahomedan religion, and that he (the Sirdar) intended to wage religious war against His Highness with the aid of the Mussulmans of the country. If, therefore, Mr. Forsyth should come to this kingdom at a time when it is proposed that troops should proceed to Herat, the Sirdar will undoubtedly make ignorant people believe his former statement, and will thus find an opportunity to support his designs for raising disturbances, and the Kabul authorities will feel great anxiety lest any injury shall befall Mr. Forsyth.

"The Amir then desired me to insert his observations in Persian in this letter as follows:—

"While replies were being written to the murasillas received from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth, the members of the Durbar observed that it would be proper if it were written (to British Government) that the statements made by Mirakhor Ahmed Khan, Mulla Yahaya and Khalifa Abdul Rahman, who have lately arrived from Herat, confirm the representation of the Kabul Envoy made before His Excellency the Viceroy at Simla about the obstacles (in the way of a safe journey) of Afghanistan, but that it is not advisable to make mention either colloquially or in writing of such matters from which no advantage can be derived.

"The Amir has written a friendly murasilla to Dr. Bellew and the Sadr-i-Azam, one to Mr. Forsyth, to the effect that the views of the Kabul Durbar will become known to him from the Amir's murasilla.

"I have submitted a letter to Mr. Forsyth to the following effect:—

"Ibrahim Khan, Inspector, has been permitted to-day by the Amir to return to you *via* Balkh and Badakshan. The views of the Kabul Government will be known to you from the Amir's murasilla which he bears, and he will give accounts of the state of affairs in this country. I am extremely sorry that I have not been able to fulfil my wish of having an interview with you at Kabul on account of the unsatisfactory state of the affairs of this kingdom. May God make you successful in your mission."

**86. Annoyance of the Amir at the deputation of Ibrahim Khan to Wakhan.**—This chapter may be fitly closed with a brief account of the circumstances under which Ibrahim Khan was sent to the Mir of Wakhan with presents from the Government of India. When Mr. Forsyth's mission started on its return journey to India, Colonel T. Gordon made a detour to the Pamir and Wakhan. The Mir, Futteh Ali Shah, received him at Killa Punja with a courtesy and attention which the Government of India considered to deserve reward. Accordingly they instructed† the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to send to Futteh Ali Shah, with the permission of the Amir of Kabul, a letter of thanks accompanied by appropriate presents. They suggested Ibrahim Khan as a suitable messenger, and desired that he should travel *via* Kabul to Punja and deliver to the Amir a letter (enclosed) from the Viceroy. The Lieutenant-Governor was also asked to write to the Amir and send him a copy of the letter to be written to the Mir of Wakhan.

† Foreign Department, No. 1690P., dated 3rd August 1874.

The following is the text of the Viceroy's letter, dated 3rd August 1874, to the Amir:—

“To—His HIGHNESS AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

“Your Highness is aware that on the return to India of the Yarkund Mission, Sir T. D. Forsyth deputed Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and some other officers to explore the Pamir, and that they proceeded as far as Punja, in Wakhan, where they were most kindly and hospitably received by Futteh Ali Shah, the Mir of that place.

“My friend! I have desired the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, with Your Highness' permission, to send Mir Futteh Ali Shah a letter of thanks and a few presents in acknowledgment of the attention which my officers received from him. As Ibrahim Khan, who was the bearer of a letter to Your Highness from Sir T. D. Forsyth when at Kashgar, is acquainted with the road, the presents and letter from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab have been sent in his charge. He is also the bearer of this letter from myself to Your Highness, and I trust that Your Highness will afford him every facility for his journey.

“I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness' sincere friend.”

On the 15th August the Commissioner of Peshawur (Sir R. Pollock) addressed a letter to Shah Mard Khan, Governor of Jelalabad, informing him that Ibrahim Khan was proceeding *via* Jelalabad, under the orders of the Government of India and the Punjab Government, in charge of letters from the Viceroy and Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governor, and of certain presents for the Mir of Wakhan. As there would be delay in obtaining the necessary orders from Kabul, he asked Shah Mard Khan to furnish a suitable escort in anticipation to meet Ibrahim Khan at the British border and convey him to Kabul. A similar letter was sent to the British Agent at Kabul with instructions to inform the Amir.

On the 2nd September the Lieutenant-Governor telegraphed that on learning from the Commissioner of Peshawur of Ibrahim Khan's contemplated journey to Wakhan, the Sadr-i-Azam had observed to the British Agent at Kabul that this proceeding would be injurious to the Amir. He asked that Ibrahim Khan might be detained at Peshawur pending a report to the Amir. The Punjab Government accordingly detained Ibrahim Khan and enquired whether an explanatory letter should be sent to Kabul in advance. The Government of India directed that Ibrahim Khan should proceed without delay, and that the Sadr-i-Azam should be advised that any objection to Ibrahim Khan's visit to Wakhan would prejudice the Amir in the eyes of the Viceroy. As will appear hereafter, the Government of India, when sending these orders, were not aware of the manner in which their instructions, dated 3rd August, had been carried out. At this juncture the British Agent's reply to the Commissioner of Peshawur's letter, dated 15th August, was received. It was as follows:—

“Translation of letter from the Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 27th August 1874.

“The contents of your letter, dated 15th August 1874, to my address, were communicated to the Sadr-i-Azam on 25th idem, and his observations were submitted to you on the said date by express dāk. I now beg to state that yesterday the Sadr-i-Azim called on me in my house, and said that he had brought to me a draft of reply to the letter in question after bringing it to the notice of the Amir, and that I should communicate it to you with a petition from me. I therefore beg to submit every word (of the above draft) at his instance as follows:—

“As regards the deputation of the Khan Bahadoor Ibrahim Khan, Inspector, with presents to the Mir of Wakhan (it is customary that) when in any kingdom a border officer or the Chief (Malik) of a border tribe entertains a guest (of a foreign State), his hospitality is (considered) on the part of his King and not on his own part. What authority do border officers possess to speak on their own part with or treat with hospitality any person (of a different kingdom) without the permission of the Commissioners (“Amanai” plural of “Amin”) of their King. Injunctions were sent by the Kabul Government to the Turkistan authorities that should any of the servants of the British Government arrive at that place from the Yarkund Mission for the purpose of taking any letters (to Kabul) or for any other object, they should treat them with great honor. When hospitality is on the part of the Government, it appears suitable that the guest should give something as a present to his entertainer at the time and place of entertainment. If, however, nothing is given at the time and place of entertainment, and after the return of the guest to his country, his Government deputed an Agent with presents and murasillas to (his entertainer) a border officer of another kingdom, who is the small Chief of a small tribe, and the said Agent passing through the head-quarters of that kingdom

goes to that Chief, this policy is against the customs and usages of the world. This custom is in particular unusual in this kingdom. The policy suiting (the customs of) the world appears to be that the Government of India should have written to the Government of Afghanistan in friendship that they thank the above border officer (for the above hospitality), perhaps this Government would have shown kindness to that border officer, inasmuch as on the part of this kingdom he treated the servants of the British Government with honor and hospitality in a satisfactory manner.'"

On hearing by telegraph of the gist of this reply, the Government of India directed the Sadr-i-Azim to be informed that the objections taken were premature, inasmuch as the Amir had not yet received the Viceroy's letter, of which Ibrahim Khan was the bearer. If the refusal were persisted in, very serious notice would be taken. For the present no arms or money were to be given to the Amir. Meantime Ibrahim Khan, starting from Peshawur about the 18th September, arrived at Kabul on the 26th. The account of the proceedings at Kabul is given in the annexed letter from the British Agent, dated 28th September:—

"The Amir had promised (as previously reported) to give a reply to your letter, dated 8th instant, to my address, after consultation (with his advisers). In the meantime in my presence the Amir received a letter on 25th September 1874 from his Dāk Moonshee at Jelalabad, reporting the arrival of Khan Bahadoor Ibrahim Khan, Inspector at that place, and his departure thence to Kabul the next day. The Amir in an uneasy manner enquired from me (as to how Ibrahim Khan had arrived at Jelalabad without permission), and, as I had received no information about it, I said that I knew nothing. The next morning Ibrahim Khan arrived at Kabul and reached my house. I at once waited on the Amir and reported his (Ibrahim Khan's) arrival, when His Highness observed—'Notwithstanding that reasonable (maqul) excuses have been made, the British Government not having shown any attention (riayat) to them, has sent Ibrahim Khan to this country without my information. Had accidentally any injury befallen him on the road, it would have tended to the blame of both Governments, though under the plea of ignorance the authorities of this Government were free (of responsibility). I will give replies to the murasillas after perusal.' In the afternoon I sent my Moonshee, Abdoola Khan, with Ibrahim Khan to the Sadr-i-Azim with the murasillas (which Ibrahim Khan had brought), who after allowing Ibrahim Khan to return (to me) presented the murasillas to the Amir. After their perusal His Highness observed—'In these murasillas the departure of Ibrahim Khan depends on my permission; but without my knowledge, and notwithstanding that excuses have been made by this Government, he has been sent to this country. This is an extraordinary mode of seeking permission (istamzaj) from the Government which God has given me.' In short, the Amir and all the Durbar authorities expressed themselves greatly annoyed ('dik' lit. vexed) in this matter, but after lengthy discussions and councils, the Amir remarked—'Though the English authorities have sent Ibrahim Khan without my consent, without paying regard to such action being utterly injurious to this Government, still through respect to the friendship which exists between the two Governments, it does not appear advisable that he should be sent back (to India).'

"By the grace of God and the good fortune of the (British) Government\* permission has been obtained for Ibrahim Khan to proceed (to Wakhan). Yesterday he was taken to wait on the Amir, and His Highness accepted the box containing a six-barrelled pistol presented by him, and having received him in a kind manner asked after the health of yourself, His Excellency the Viceroy, and His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Mirza Abdool Hadi Khan, the trusted Agent of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, was then called in and directed to take Ibrahim Khan honorably and hospitably to Wakhan and to bring him back to Kabul.

"Ibrahim Khan will proceed to-morrow *viâ* the Hindoo Koosh. Councils are being held as to whether replies to the above murasillas should be sent now or on return of Ibrahim Khan."

Subsequently the Punjab Government forwarded † the Amir's replies, dated 8th October, to the letters from the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor. They ran as follows:—

\* I would draw attention to the tone of the Agent, which I consider quite inappropriate, not to say disrespectful. (Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK, Commissioner.

† From Punjab, No. 196C., dated 15th October 1874.

"Translation of a letter from the Amir of Kabul to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 8th October 1874.

"Your Excellency's letter was delivered by Ibrahim Khan on the 27th September, and its contents have revealed the secrets of friendship and amity.

"Your Excellency wrote to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to depute Ibrahim Khan, with my permission, to convey a letter of thanks and certain presents to Mir Futteh Ali Shah in consideration of his hospitable reception of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon accorded by him with the permission of this State, the gift of God. I have replied to His Honor fully on this subject, and Your Excellency will understand it from my letter addressed to His Honor."



" Translation of a letter from the Amir of Kabul to the Hon'ble Sir R. H. DAVIES, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, dated 8th October 1874.

" Mahomed Ibrahim Khan delivered on the 27th of September the letters from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Your Honor. As these letters informed me of the good health of His Excellency the Viceroy and yourself, they have made me happy.

" As regards the conveyance of the letter and presents for Mir Futteh Ali Shah, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote in his letter that Your Honor would despatch Ibrahim Khan with my permission; and Your Honor in your own letter also wrote that under the orders of the Viceroy Ibrahim Khan would be sent with my permission to convey certain presents to Mir Futteh Ali Shah in consideration of the hospitable reception given by him to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon. Ere this, the objections, with their reasons, against the conveyance of the letter and presents to Mir Futteh Ali Shah were fully stated to the Agent located here. Now that Ibrahim Khan has been deputed without my permission to convey the letter and presents to Mir Futteh Ali Shah, a subject of this State, notwithstanding the objections which had been urged, the circumstance shows a disregard of the rules by which the relations between the two States are regulated, and militates against the custom of this country. But in consideration of the amity and friendship existing between the two States I have not considered it proper to stop Ibrahim Khan."

These letters from the Amir raised the question as to the practice whereby the visits of British officials to Kabul was regulated; whether permission was always sought, and the grant of it awaited before the official started, and whether the practice, whatever it was, depended upon custom or upon any arrangement with the Amir. The Punjab Government were asked to furnish

Foreign Department No. 35C.P., dated 29th October 1874.

information on these points, and also to submit all the correspondence which had passed between the Commissioner of Peshawur and the British Agent on the subject of Ibrahim Khan's deputation. When this correspondence was received it showed that

Punjab, No. 2026, dated 5th December 1874.

the first instructions sent by the Punjab Government to the Commissioner of Peshawur, and on which that officer acted, omitted to state that it was only with the Amir's permission that the letter and presents were to be sent on to the Mir. Moreover, the Commissioner's letter of the 15th August to the British Agent was so worded as to make it appear that Ibrahim Khan was proceeding in charge of letters from the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor, and with certain presents for the Mir. The fact that the Viceroy's letter was for the Amir was not stated, and although the omission was subsequently perceived and to a certain extent remedied by Sir R. Pollock's letter of the 8th September to the British Agent, the mischief had been done and the Amir's susceptibilities roused, not without cause. With regard to the question of the custom regulating the visits of British

\* Demi-official from Commissioner of Peshawur (Sir R. Pollock) to Under-Secretary, Foreign Department, dated 14th April 1874.

officials to Kabul, it appeared that etiquette required that warning should be given and permission sought before sending up an Agent.\* In his letter, dated 23rd November 1874, Sir R. Pollock somewhat modified this statement of the custom. He wrote—

" I would remark that, although ostensibly 'permission' is sought for our Agents to enter Afghanistan, it is obvious that no permission is really needed, while our relations with the Afghan Government are good. Notice is really sent as a polite mode of calling on His Highness to have our messengers met on the frontier and safely escorted through a country where 'safe conduct' is something more than a mere formality."

The opinion of the Punjab Government was as follows:—

" The Amir, however, can, in the opinion of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor, find no reasonable complaint on the breach of it in this instance after having been informed in the Commissioner's letter of the 8th September to the Agent that the bearer of the letter from His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor to the Mir of Wakhan was also the bearer of a letter to His Highness from His Excellency the Viceroy."

A consideration of all these circumstances necessarily modified the opinion of the Government of India as to the Amir's conduct, and ultimately the following letters were sent to the Punjab Government and to His Highness:—

" No. 2841P., dated Fort William, 23rd December 1874 (Confidential).

" From—C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

" To—T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

" I am directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge receipt of your confidential letter, No. 2026, dated 5th December 1874.

"His Excellency in Council considers it very unfortunate that the essential point in the instructions conveyed in my letter of 3rd August, *viz.*, that the letter of thanks and presents from the Lieutenant-Governor to the Mir of Wakhan were to be sent with the permission of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, was not in the first instance communicated to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

"In consequence of this omission the first communications with the Kabul authorities as to Ibrahim Khan's journey did not allude either to the permission of the Amir, or to the fact that Ibrahim Khan was the bearer of a letter from the Viceroy to His Highness. Under these circumstances, His Excellency in Council is not surprised at the irritation shown by the Amir.

"Had His Excellency in Council been aware of this omission, he would certainly not have telegraphed to you in the strong terms used in my messages of the 3rd and 5th September.

"The error was subsequently rectified. Ibrahim Khan was allowed to go to Wakhan and has returned safely. And although the mistake that was made might, after receipt of the Commissioner's second message of 8th September and the delivery of the Viceroy's letter to the Amir, have been referred to somewhat less ungraciously and more correctly than is done in the Amir's letter of 8th October to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, still, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, great allowance must be made for the impression that was first produced on the Amir's mind that we were, without reference to him, about to open communication with the Mir of Wakhan, and an expression of regret for the misunderstanding that occurred is due to His Highness.

"I am accordingly instructed to enclose a letter of explanation from the Viceroy to the Amir, and to request that it may be forwarded to His Highness without delay in the usual manner. A copy is enclosed for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor."

"Khureeta, dated 23rd December 1874.

"From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

"To—His HIGHNESS AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul.

"I have received Your Highness' friendly letter of 8th October last, and thank Your Highness for having, in accordance with the request which I made in my letter of 3rd August, given permission to Ibrahim Khan to proceed to Wakhan with a letter of thanks and some presents to Mir Futteh Ali Shah in acknowledgment of the attention which, under Your Highness' instructions to him, my officers had received at his hands.

"With reference to what Your Highness has written to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, I have to express to Your Highness my regret that, owing to some misunderstanding, Your Highness was led to suppose that Ibrahim Khan had been sent as the bearer of a letter and presents from myself to the Mir of Wakhan without Your Highness' permission. Such was never my intention, as Your Highness would learn from the second message sent from the Commissioner of Peshawur and from my letter to Your Highness of which Ibrahim Khan was the bearer."

The following letter was also addressed to the Amir by the Lieutenant-Governor:—

"Translation of a letter from His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, &c., to His HIGHNESS AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Afghanistan, dated 2nd January 1875.

"Referring to former letters, I have to express my regret that when it was decided to depute Khan Bahadoor Ibrahim Khan with the presents to Wakhan, Your Highness' permission was inadvertently omitted to be awaited before the departure of the said Ibrahim Khan from Peshawur. Considering our friendship and unity, this mistake is one which should not be taken notice of."

The following replies were sent by the Amir:—

"Khureeta, dated Friday, 25th Moharram-ul-Haram 1292.

"From—His Highness the Amir of Kabul,

"To—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

"Your friendly letter dated 23rd December 1874 arrived at a most fortunate time and explained the secrets of your friendship. I have thoroughly understood its meaning, and as it contained an assurance of your health, it brought me unbounded joy.

"I praise and thank God that the bonds of friendship and affection between the two high Governments are as usual fixed and firm, and that the members of the high English Government also have regarded and still do regard the welfare and prosperity of my Government with an eye friendly to both the high Governments. (I trust that you will always make me happy by accounts of your health.)"

"Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Kabul, to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

"Acknowledges receipt of letter dated 2nd January 1875, and states that His Highness was glad to learn of His Honor's good health. God be praised that friendly relations exist as before between the two States, and the authorities of the British Government, regarding the two States identical, constantly desire the prosperity and consolidation of my Government."

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER IV.

*Appendix No. X.—General Kaufmann's report, dated 29th November 1872, to Prince Labanoff, regarding the frontiers of Afghanistan and Bokhara, and the affairs of the independent States on the Upper Oxus.*

*Appendix No. XI.—Conversations and interviews at Ambala in 1869 between Lord Mayo and Shere Ali, and between British and Afghan officials.*

*Appendix No. XII.—Persian text of letters—*

i—*From the Amir Shere Ali to Lord Northbrook, dated 13th November 1873.*

ii—*From the Amir Shere Ali to Lord Northbrook, dated 10th April 1874.*

iii—*From the Amir Shere Ali to the Shah of Persia, dated January-February 1874.*

## CHAPTER V.

FROM THE NOMINATION OF ABDULLA JAN AS HEIR-APPARENT TO YAKUB KHAN'S IMPRISONMENT AT KABUL, AND SIRDAR AYUB KHAN'S REBELLION AND FLIGHT—NOVEMBER 1873 TO MARCH 1875.

**87. The nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent. Description of the ceremony observed on the occasion of his public recognition. Acquiescence of principal tribes and Chiefs.**—Early in November 1873 the Amir took counsel with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, Mustaufi Hubibulla Khan, Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, and Mirza Mahomed Hossein Khan as to the advisability of declaring Sirdar Abdulla Jan Heir-apparent. Subsequently, Sirdar Ibrahim Khan and other principal Sirdars, Khans, leading merchants, and persons of position and influence were called together; the Amir's views were explained, and their opinion asked. They unanimously pronounced a blessing on Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent, and wished the Amir joy. Amongst others, the British Agent offered his congratulations.

The coming Id was fixed for the public announcement of Sirdar Abdulla Jan's selection and for the usual congratulatory ceremonies. On the same occasion various titles were to be bestowed, *viz.*, on Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, that of Sadr-i-Azam, or "Tol Ikhtiar, *i.e.*, Prime Minister;" on Mustaufi Hubibulla Khan, that of Amin-ul-Mulk, or "Kor Amin, *i.e.*, Home Minister;" on Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, that of Amin-i-Kharija, or "Foreign Minister." Meanwhile, the nomination of Abdulla Jan was being recognized by numerous Chiefs and leading personages.

The question was discussed whether the Amir should pass the winter at Kandahar. Syud Nur Mahomed supported the measure, because it would enable the Amir to keep Yakub Khan in check, supposing the Sirdar should attempt to raise disturbances in consequence of Abdulla Jan's nomination. The Mustaufi, however, advised that Yakub should be allowed an opportunity of recognizing Abdulla Jan; the Sirdar could do nothing in the winter, and if he proved hostile, measures could be taken against him in the spring. Moreover, if disorder broke out in Kabul during the Amir's absence, the local authorities were not strong enough to quell it. This advice prevailed.

At length, the 22nd November 1873, the day of the Id-ul-Fitar, which had been fixed as the day of Abdulla Jan's public recognition, arrived. From early morning the Sirdars, Chiefs, merchants, and other persons of rank and position, and indeed the whole population of Kabul, assembled to witness the spectacle. All the available troops were drawn up in front of the Tuppeh Maranjan. At 10 A.M., after the Id prayers and the "Kutba" had been read, Hafiz Moulvi Mahomed Amin, Peshawuree, mounting the pulpit, delivered an oration regarding Sirdar Abdulla Jan's appointment and read the Amir's Sunnud and the document presented by the Chiefs, &c., bearing their seals, and acknowledging the Sirdar as the Amir's successor. On conclusion of the Moulvi's speech the Amir rose, and, standing, presented the "Koran" and the sword conferred on him by his father, Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, to Sirdar Abdulla Jan, placing with his own hands the Koran on his son's neck and fastening the sword-belt round his loins. He then addressed him—"These two precious articles were given me at Herat by your venerated grandfather in the last stage of his life. I now intrust them to you with perfect confidence and as tokens of a paternal blessing. You should regard them as the foundation of your fortunes, and pray that by their aid you may be successful in all mundane undertakings." The Amir next read a Kutba for the Sirdar's worldly prosperity, and, taking his seat on the pulpit, received the congratulations of his subjects. Afterwards a review was held and a dole of money and food distributed. All the Chiefs and the British Agent waited on Sirdar Abdulla Jan to congratulate him.

The following is an abstract translation of the Sunnud given by the Amir to Abdulla Jan :—

“Unlimited praise is due to God, who is the permanent ruler of the kingdom of divinity and who has adorned the heads of his noble Chiefs with illustrious crowns, and great benediction is due to his Prophet Mahomed. ‘Obey God and the Prophet and the rulers appointed by them. He who obeys God and the Prophet will enjoy great happiness.’ After giving thanks to our Almighty God and the Prophet, let it be known to the Chiefs, nobles, and other subjects of Afghanistan that the ‘Ayat’ says ‘glory is to him who made the earth.’ Undoubtedly the world is made by God, and he appoints rulers in it as he pleases among his creatures : ‘these rulers are to be honored,’ ‘and they impress upon us, that when a man is appointed a ruler he should act with justice.’ ‘Certainly God loves him like a friend who distributes justice.’ By the grace of God I have also received the gift of a country from him. Since my father, the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, made me assume the reins of the government of Afghanistan in compliance with the ‘Hadis,’—‘guard your subjects as you will be amenable for their interests’—no time has been lost, and no neglect has taken place in giving stability to the Mahomedan religion, in enforcing the Mahomedan law, in showing respect and kindness to Syuds, Moollas, and the members of good families, and in securing peace and comfort for the subjects of this kingdom. As by the grace and aid of God the Government of Afghanistan has now attained full power and dignity, I have resolved in the present and future interests of all this kingdom to appoint as the Prophet and his Caliphs did, and according to universal custom, Sirdar Abdulla Jan, my Heir-apparent. The marks of intelligence, acuteness, rectitude, and thrift are observable on his auspicious brow. In consultation with, and at the instance of, the elders of this kingdom, members of high families, and Chiefs, therefore, I adorn him with a khillut in recognition of this selection, and appoint him my Heir-apparent and successor in order that after my death the reins of this government may be rightfully assumed by him. In compliance with what God has said he will make every effort for the security of peace, and the comfort of the people, the protection of the frontier, and the general improvement of the kingdom. None of my other children, relations, &c., will have any right to interfere with his administration. ‘God is witness to all promises.’ I therefore command the natives and residents of this kingdom publicly to consider Sirdar Abdulla Jan my Heir-apparent and ruler of Afghanistan and its dependencies after my death, and not to deviate from his orders or infringe his instructions. In accordance with the ‘Ayat,’—‘obey God and the Prophet, and the ruler appointed by them,’ and the ‘Hadis’—‘hear, obey your Governor, even if he is a negro.’ The orders of the Sirdar should be carried out cheerfully, and no deviation should be made from his instructions.”

In return the Chiefs and people of the State presented a document signifying their acceptance of Abdulla Jan as successor designate to the Amir. Its purport was as follows :—

“God deserves extreme praise, because He is the ruler of the kingdom of deity, and exalts the heads of his nobles in this world with crowns of dignity. ‘Obey God and the Prophet, and those invested with authority by them,’ says the ‘Ayat.’ In like manner the Prophet deserves the greatest blessing, because he is the rightful Governor of the kingdom of prophecy, and because the ‘Ayat’ says, ‘he who obeys God and the Prophet will be rewarded with great happiness.’

“After thanksgiving to God and blessing the Prophet, the chief object of the execution and presentation of this document is this, that as it is most incumbent on us, the followers of the Mahomedan religion, to obey the divine sayings and the orders of the Mahomedan Law, as says the ‘Ayat’—‘obey God and the Prophet, and those invested with authority by them,’ and the sacred ‘Hadis’—‘hear, obey your Governor, even if he is a bald-headed negro,’ and as it is therefore necessary to obey our ruler, the Amir Shere Ali Khan has at present appointed Sirdar Abdulla Jan as his Heir-apparent and successor after his death at the instance of, and in consultation with us, the Chiefs, elders, and the subjects of his kingdom, and has made over, after his death, the reins of the authority of protecting the rights and privileges of all the people of Afghanistan and its dependencies to the Sirdar. This selection will in every way tend to our peace and comfort, and it has been made in pursuance of the usage adopted by the Prophet and his Caliphs. Every sovereign in this world appoints a successor for the administration of his kingdom and the tranquillity of his subjects. Under these circumstances we all, the Government servants, Moollas, Syuds, Chiefs, and other subjects of this kingdom, cheerfully accept, in compliance with the ‘Ayats’ in the ‘Koran’ and the ‘Hadises’ of the Prophet, the selection of Sirdar Abdulla Jan made by the Amir Shere Ali Khan, and promise to consider him his successor after his death. God is our witness that we shall act according to the ‘Ayat.’ There is no doubt that God gives a place in paradise to the orthodox in reward for humiliation and uprightness, as well as to those who are killed in the execution of his commands; the Old and the New Testaments and the ‘Koran’ give evidence to this fact. ‘He who relies on his promise, God expresses his gratification towards him as well as towards those who obey their rulers.’ We shall not in any way refuse or decline to act against this ‘Ayat,’ and if we do so, we shall incur God’s anger and be worthy of being punished under the ‘Ayat.’ ‘Certainly those who accept you (*viz.*, Mahomed), accept God. God’s hand is above all hands, he who disbelieves this sins against God, and he who believes in this will receive a good reward,’ and under the ‘Hadis’ he who obeys me,



obeys God, and he who rebels against me, rebels against God. 'He who obeys his Amir or Governor, obeys me, and he who rebels against his Amir, rebels against me.' We therefore execute this legal agreement, cheerfully accepting the above-noted selection, and pray that God and the Prophet may approve of it."

On Thursday, the 4th December, Sirdar Shums-ud-din Khan, a first cousin of the Amir Shere Ali, gave a great feast in honor of Abdulla Jan's nomination. At the same time he presented a copy of the Koran, on a blank page of which he and his son had subscribed an oath of fealty to the Amir and the Heir-apparent.

Subsequently, the Chiefs and elders of the Ghilzai tribe presented the Amir with an unanimous address to the following effect:—

"Since the commencement of the Dooranee rule we have been adherents of the Barukzai tribe, even during the Sadozai rule we considered Wuzeer Futteh Khan our elder and patron. When the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan assumed the reins of government, we became the partizans of the late Wuzeer Mahomed Akbar Khan and Your Highness. None of us has acquired the position and *abilities* for the ranks of Hishmut-ood-dowla or Wuzeer-i-Dawal Kharjee, though Your Highness has granted these titles most graciously to Ismutoolla Khan and Arsla Khan, Ghilzai Chiefs. In recognition of this great kindness, in addition to the agreement formerly given by us, we present a new agreement that we swear by God and the Prophet that we as well as our children and relations will always be the well-wishers of Your Highness and your Heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdulla Jan. The agreement bearing the seals of these Chiefs and elders was read out in a public Durbar, and the Amir most kindly observed to them—'May God give you success for the completion of this good intention; I hope that the Afghan Government will attain more power in consequence of the partizanship of such elders as you with its rulers.'"

The Chiefs of the Kohistan Hills followed suit, to the Amir's great satisfaction, and further asked that one of their Chiefs might be appointed to represent the tribe at Kabul. Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Turkestan, sent a gift of 1,000 gold tillas, and directed the Mirs of his province to follow his example. The Akhund of Swat said he would join the name of the Sirdar to that of the Amir in his prayers.

Rumours were, however, current of the dissatisfaction felt by the Amir's other sons. Yakub Khan was said to have placed all his father's adherents in restraint, and to have commenced fortifying Herat and to be organizing his troops. Ibrahim Khan was anxious to go to Mecca; a prolonged stay in Kabul after his supersession by Abdulla Jan was disagreeable and irksome to him.

**88. The Amir informs the Government of India of his selection of Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent. Lord Northbrook's reply. Despatch to the Secretary of State.**—There was some delay on the part of the Amir in communicating to the Government of India his choice of Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent. At length in a letter, dated 30th November 1873, he wrote as follows to Lord Northbrook:—

"Be it known that the recent sudden illness with which we were seized caused general consternation and anxiety, so much so that certain of the chief personages of the State and officers of the Government assembled together, and after mutual consultation made a unanimous representation to the effect that, in accordance with the approved custom of ancient kings, and for the purpose of securing the welfare of the subjects of this kingdom, it was absolutely essential to appoint an heir and successor to the throne.

"On hearing these representations from the said officers of the State, we ordered the matter to be referred for consultation and deliberation, and a few days before the auspicious occurrence of the Id-ul-Fitar all the nobles of exalted rank, the chief and leading men of Afghanistan, after careful deliberation cast the dice of this auspicious fate in the name of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, whose stature of ability they judged would best befit the regal robes of sovereignty after our removal from this world.

"Accordingly, on Sunday, the 1st Shawul, being the opening day of the festival, we honored and exalted Sirdar Abdulla Jan with the title of Heir-apparent agreeably to the sincere desire of all classes of our subjects, and all the followers of Islam opened their lips in prayer for our son, and stretching forth their hands in acknowledgment of his selection recognized him as their absolute sovereign, ruler over all the territories of Afghanistan, &c., and master of the entire country and army of this Government. They submitted moreover a formal document recognizing the Sirdar as Heir-apparent and sovereign.

"Since there has always existed a firm and constant friendship between this State and the British Government, it has been deemed fitting to afford information of this matter, which has been approved by all classes in the State, and accordingly the present letter has been written."

On receipt of this letter the question arose as to the terms in which it should be acknowledged. The records of the Foreign Department were searched for precedents. In the case of Sirdar Ghulam Hyder, Shere Ali's elder brother, no formal recognition appeared to have been accorded. And when Shere Ali became Heir-apparent, no spontaneous intimation of his appointment had been conveyed to the Viceroy. What happened was this. On Sirdar Ghulam Hyder's death at Kabul, on the 2nd July 1858, the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote a letter of condolence to Dost Mahomed. The Amir in his reply to the Commissioner, announced that Shere Ali had been appointed Heir-apparent and entrusted with the entire management of the affairs of Afghanistan. It was suggested that a khillut might be sent to Shere Ali, but Sir J. Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, advised against the proposal, and recommended a simple acknowledgment of the Amir's notification, with an expression of hope that the new Heir-apparent would, under the tuition of his father, learn to conduct the Government with the same wisdom and success. Eventually the following letter was sent to the Punjab Government :—

"With regard to the intimation conveyed to Colonel Edwardes privately by Nawab Foujdar Khan, that the Amir would be pleased if Government sent a khillut of congratulation to Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, the Governor-General remarks that it would be a very marked and unusual proceeding to present a khillut to Shere Ali Khan, the newly-nominated Heir-apparent to the throne of Afghanistan, especially as on the nomination of Ghulam Hyder Khan to that dignity no khillut was given.

"It seems to His Lordship that the Amir should have communicated the intelligence of the death of Ghulam Hyder Khan and the nomination of Shere Ali Khan as Heir-apparent in a letter from himself to the Governor-General, and not having done so, he cannot expect to receive from His Lordship direct any expression of condolence on the one event or congratulation on the other.

"The Governor-General authorizes you, therefore, to answer the communication in question in the sense suggested by Colonel Edwardes, namely, 'simply to acknowledge the Amir's notification, with an expression of a hope that the new Heir-apparent would, under the tuition of his father, learn to conduct the government with the same wisdom and success.'"

In April 1864\* Major H. James, Commissioner of Peshawur, announced the arrival of Sirdar Mahomed Rufeek Khan on an embassy from Shere Ali for the purpose of strengthening the existing alliance. One of the requests which he was instructed to prefer was that the Amir's eldest son, Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, might be styled in correspondence the Heir-apparent (Wali Abad). As this style had been adopted during the late Amir's lifetime, first towards Sirdar Ghulam Hyder Khan, and after his death, towards Shere Ali, Major James had replied that he foresaw no difficulty on this point. The Government of India entirely approved Major James' proceedings, and acceded to the Amir's request that his eldest son should be addressed by the title in question in all future correspondence.

On the 21st January 1874, after consideration of the correspondence summarized above, Lord Northbrook replied to the Amir, using language as similar as possible to that of 1858. He wrote :—

"I have received Your Highness' friendly letter of 9th Shawul A. H. 1290, corresponding with 30th November 1873, and trust that Your Highness has completely recovered from the illness which afflicted you. I pray that Your Highness may still enjoy many years of life and good health during which the cords of friendship may be drawn yet closer, and that Sirdar Abdulla Jan, whom, with a view to the welfare of your kingdom, you have appointed to be Heir-apparent, may, under Your Highness' tuition, learn to conduct the government with the same wisdom and success.

"Consider me always as Your Highness' friend and sincerely desirous of the prosperity of your kingdom.

"I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness' sincere friend."

Secret, 23rd January 1874, No. 4.

To the Secretary of State the Government of India wrote as follows :—

"From the Kabul Diaries and the letters of our Kabul Agent, which have been separately forwarded,† more particularly the Agent's letter of 24th November, and the diary from 4th to 8th December 1873, Your Grace will have learned that the installation of the Sirdar as Heir-apparent was carried out with great ceremony and rejoicing, and that most of the principal Governors and Sirdars of the country have offered their congratulations to the Amir on this event either in person or by deputy.

\* See Secret despatches No. 91, dated 26th December 1873, and No. 2, dated 9th January 1874.

† See Secret despatches No. 91, dated 26th December 1873, and No. 2, dated 9th January 1874.

"How far this may be taken as an indication of the real state of feeling in Afghanistan, and of acquiescence in the supersession of Yakub Khan, to whom the Amir is mainly indebted for the recovery of his throne, remains to be seen. It would be rash at present to hazard a conjecture. Meanwhile, Yakub Khan himself has sent no congratulations, and, if reports be true, he has placed the adherents of the Amir and Sirdar Abdulla Jan at Herat under restraint, and is strengthening the defences of the town and fort. Several influential Sirdars, and among them Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, the Governor of Kabul, are reported to be dissatisfied with the nomination of Abdulla Jan. The Amir himself and the officers of his Court are evidently anxious as to the attitude which Sirdar Yakub Khan may assume, and various proposals for his removal from the Government of Herat, and for attacking him from Furrak, &c., have been discussed in the State Council. At one time it was proposed that the Amir himself should go to Kandahar for the winter, with a view to check him should he attempt a movement; but this project was overruled.

"It seems to us very doubtful whether Sirdar Yakub Khan will quietly acquiesce in the nomination of his younger brother. But he is reported to have no funds, and it seems improbable that he will attempt any movement at present until circumstances be more favorable for the assertion of his rights.

"The Amir has taken this important step, which is very likely to have a marked effect on the course of events in Afghanistan, without reference to the British Government, a circumstance which we consider fortunate. We could not have approved of the measure had we been previously consulted, nor could we have hoped to influence the Amir's choice in the matter. In the reply to the Amir no opinion as to the wisdom of the step which has been taken by

\* See letter to the Honorable the Court of Directors, No. 51, dated Allahabad, 31st October 1858, Abstract of Contents, No. 7.

the Amir has been expressed, and the letter has been designedly couched as nearly as circumstances admit in the same language as that in which\* in 1858 the Punjab Government were instructed to reply to the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan, intimating the selection of Shere Ali as Heir-apparent in supersession of his elder brother Mahomed Afzul Khan."

**89. Communications addressed by the Amir to Russia, Bokhara, and Persia on the subject of Abdulla Jan's nomination.**—About this time (end of January 1874) the Amir, when replying to a letter from General Kaufmann, announcing the Russian conquest of Khiva, took advantage of the occasion to write a separate letter (annexed) announcing Abdulla Jan's nomination. A letter to the same effect was sent to the Amir of Bokhara:—

Abstract translation of the second letter from the Amir to Russian Governor-General of Tashkend.

"In accordance with the custom of former kings, for the benefit of all the people of Afghanistan, on the 1st of Shawal, in consultation with all the elders of this kingdom on the occasion of the holy Id-ul-Fitar festival, I granted the title of my Heir-apparent to my son, Sirdar Abdulla Jan, in order that after my death he may become the ruler of the whole of this kingdom and undertake the heavy burden of its administration. All the Mussalmans, the followers of the Prophet, prayed for the success of the Sirdar and cheerfully accepted his nomination, and have recognised him as their ruler and master of all the countries of Afghanistan after my death. As friendship exists between this Government and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, I have considered it advisable to send information of this nomination to you. I hope you will always consider me as a well-wisher of your health."

A long time elapsed without any answer being received. Eventually Eshan Khwaja Buzurg, Samarcandi, brought the following reply, dated 12th July 1878, from General Kaufmann; he appears to have been received with scant ceremony. A house was assigned him, but no official was sent to meet him, and he had to give up his letter to the Sadr-i-Azam. The letter was as follows:—

"After titles, compliments, &c.,—By order of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, I stopped for about one-half year at St. Petersburg to settle some matters of this country (*viz.*, Russian Turkistan). Now by command of him (the Emperor) I have returned to Tashkend, and consider it advisable (*lit.*, a friendly trouble) to inform Your Highness of my arrival. During my sojourn at St. Petersburg I was gratified with the receipt of two friendly communications from you. In one of these *murrasilas* you mentioned the appointment of one of your sons, Sirdar Abdulla Khan, as your Heir-apparent. I hope that the chain of friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan will in future increase and become firm, owing to the recent alliance between the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England. This (alliance) has tended to the fulfilment of the best wishes of the two families, and I doubt

The alliance referred to was the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh with the Czar's daughter.

not that this alliance of the two powers will be an omen (*lit.*, a mark or sign) for those countries (the people of) which under the protection of the Emperor of Russia and the Queen

of England live in great peace and comfort. May God save you for the sake of your dignity and the comfort of (your) people! And may you live long and enjoy happiness!"

The question was discussed in the Kabul Durbar whether a communication should also be sent to the Shah of Persia. Syud Nur Mahomed observed that the Government of India had hinted to him the advisability of friendship between the Afghan and the Persian Governments; and he suggested that an intimation of Abdulla Jan's nomination would afford an excellent opportunity for a renewal of intercourse with the Persian Government. On the other hand, if Persia should take no notice of the intimation, or answer it discourteously, a slight would be put upon the Afghan Government. It was thought, however, that the British Minister at Teheran might use his influence to prevent such a *contre-temps* if the fact of the letter having been sent was brought to his knowledge. On hearing of the discussion the Government of India desired that the Amir might be informed of their readiness to move the British Minister at Teheran to use his influence to secure a suitable reply to the Amir's letter, and

To Punjab, No. 389 P., dated 11th February 1874. a telegram was immediately despatched to Teheran with this object.

Eventually, in the Kabul diary, dated 27th-29th January 1874, it was reported that the following letter, addressed to the Shah, announcing the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as the Amir's Heir-apparent, had been sent to Seistán in charge of Mahomed Hussun Khan. And the Sumsam-ul-Mulk, the Persian Governor of Seistán, was asked to arrange for the safe transmission of this letter to Teheran:—

Translation of letter from the Amir to the Shah of Persia, announcing nomination of Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent.

"As by the grace of God the servants of this Government and the authorities of your kingdom have the honor of being Mussalmans and the followers of the Prophet, it is necessary to send to each other information of all important matters. I, therefore, have the honor to state that the nobles and elders of this Government lately observed that, in accordance with the custom of former rulers, it is incumbent on every ruler to select and nominate his Heir-apparent. I held a council of elders, and at the instance of all the Chiefs and other persons at large in Afghanistan, it was resolved that after my death Sirdar Abdulla Jan, my son, should be the ruler of this kingdom. On the 1st of Shawal, on the occasion of the sacred Id festival, this Sirdar was nominated as my Heir-apparent from amongst my other sons and grandsons to undertake the important duties and the heavy burden of the administration of this kingdom after my death. The Chiefs, elders, the Government servants and other persons at large prayed for his success and cheerfully accepted his nomination. Thanks be to God that this nomination has been considered to tend to the protection and comfort of the people of Afghanistan. As information about this nomination has been sent to several States, a brief letter about it is submitted to Your Majesty also."

The Shah sent no answer to this letter, a circumstance which gave rise to certain reports injurious to British prestige. Count Dubsky, the Austrian representative at Teheran, in reviewing (in June 1874) the position and policy of Great Britain in respect to the Central Asian question, cited the omission to reply to this letter as an instance of the decline of British influence. He said that when the British Minister had purposed to deliver the Amir's letter to the Shah, the Persian Foreign Minister had rejected the proposal saying "Je ne savais par que vous fussiez également accrédité chez nous en qualité d' Envoyé Afghan." Mr. Thomson, however, gave a categorical denial to this story. He said that he had arranged with the Persian Foreign Minister that the reply to the Amir's letter should be jointly considered with a view to settle what complimentary phrases and titles should be used by the Shah. The Persian Government, however, took umbrage at the manner in which the Amir had forwarded his letter through the Persian Governor of Seistán, and informed Mr. Thomson that there was no occasion to hurry the reply to it. Count Dubsky further asserted that Persia had consulted Russia as to the nature of the reply to be sent to the Amir. Mr. Thomson, however, received from the Persian Foreign Minister the most positive assurances that no such advice had been sought. The only step taken had been to furnish the Persian representative at each Foreign Court with a copy of the Amir's letter. The upshot, however, was that the Shah did not answer the Amir's letter.



**90. Further accounts of Sirdar Yakub's dissatisfaction and apprehensions regarding his designs. The Sirdar's proposal that Furrah, Zamindawar, Girishk, and Kandahar be made over to him.**—Meanwhile, the accounts of Yakub Khan's proceedings continued unsatisfactory. He had not answered the Amir's letter intimating the nomination of Abdulla, and was said to have told the leading personages of Herat that they were not to accept the Amir's selection except with his own approval. The local festivities at Herat ordered by the Amir in honor of the occasion were delayed for three days, and some of the Chiefs in order to propitiate Yakub declined to participate in them. It was said that Yakub had written to his father-in-law, Sirdar Yahya Khan, saying that in the spring he would either deprive Abdulla Jan of his new position or lose his own life in the attempt. In the diary of the 12th January 1874 a messenger from Mir Afzul Khan, Governor of Furrah, and grandfather of Abdulla Jan, was said to have brought a message to the Amir expressing alarm at Yakub's designs. He pointed out the defenceless condition of Furrah and Kandahar and surrounding country, and the probability of their falling an easy prey to Yakub should he attack them. Upon this the Amir observed in Durbar: "It appears to me that some ill-wishers at Kabul and Kandahar are instigating Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. I am standing alert on both feet, and as soon as any disturbances are raised by the Sirdar I will not hesitate to kill all persons known to be rebels, as they do not desist from exciting dissension in my own family." The Kabul Diary of the 6th-9th February 1874 contained the purport of further letters sent to the Amir by Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan. They were to the effect that Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan had deputed the Mirakhor Ahmed Khan and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, Commandant of the Herat troops, to the Amir with a petition accepting the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as the Amir's Heir-apparent, and praying that as Herat was the acknowledged key of the kingdom, while the revenue of the province was insufficient to pay the expense of maintaining the necessary troops for its protection, the provinces of Furrah, Zamindawar, Girishk, and Kandahar might be made over to him. The Amir observed that the Sirdar did not desist from entertaining evil designs; that unless proper measures were adopted against him the kingdom would not enjoy peace; and that Yakub's real object in sending the Mirakhor and Sirdar Abdulla Khan to Kabul without permission was to get them out of the way. In private the Amir consulted with the Mustaufi on the advisability of sending troops against Yakub Khan, and proposed to lead an expedition himself, leaving Abdulla Jan and the Mustaufi at Kabul. The latter, however, advised that the Amir should keep his intentions quiet for the present and await the arrival of the Mirakhor and Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, so as to ascertain from them more precisely Yakub Khan's designs and the means at his disposal for carrying them out. At the same time secret arrangements for an expedition might be commenced. The advice was accepted.

About this time Bahadoor Khan, a leading supporter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, endeavoured to obtain permission to leave Kabul on the pretext that he would be able either to induce the Sirdar to desist from further evil designs or to bring him to Kabul. His offer was politely declined.

On the 13th February news arrived that Mirakhor Ahmed Khan and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, in company with Mulla Yahya and some other Mullas of Herat, had left for Kabul.

**91. Sirdar Yakub Khan's overtures to Persia. Political intrigue with Yakub denied by the Persian Foreign Minister.**—As Yakub Khan's alleged traitorous relations with Persia were advanced as a pretext for the rigorous measures adopted towards him on his arrival at Kabul in November 1874, it may be as well to notice here, briefly, the communications, so far as they are known, between the Sirdar and the Persian authorities.

During 1872 friendly correspondence passed between Yakub and Mir Alum, Governor of Kain, on the subject of depredations by Seistânis in Herat territory. Mir Alum sent some small presents which were at first accepted, but afterwards returned under orders from the Amir, who viewed the entire



proceedings with suspicion, and rebuked Yakub for exchanging friendly letters with the Persian authorities. In the autumn of the same year the Prince Governor of Meshed sent an Agent, Haji Azad Khan, to Herat to discuss measures for ensuring the tranquillity of the border. Yakub communicated freely with the Amir regarding the negotiations with the Agent, and the hospitality and courtesy to be shown to him. He appears to have acted under the Amir's instructions throughout, and about the end of September the Agent returned to Meshed.

In the spring of 1874, another Persian Agent, Mirza Mahomed Ali, arrived at Herat. He had been sent by the Prince Governor of Khorasan to remonstrate against Turkomans being allowed passage through Herat in their forays into Persian territory. He remained some time at Herat, and the good treatment he received from Yakub gave rise to rumours of a secret understanding with Persia. No information affording ground for any definite conclusions was ever received; although the Amir was reported to be annoyed, because Yakub's communications on the subject were not as prompt or as full as they might have been. The matter was also brought to the notice of the British Minister at Teheran, and received his careful attention. Mr. Thomson thought that the Mirza's prolonged stay afforded, in the existing condition of affairs in Afghanistan, reasonable ground for suspicion, he was nevertheless disposed to credit the assurance of the Persian Foreign Minister that no political intrigues were on foot.

However, Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Turkistan, reported (13th-16th March) to the Amir that a confidential friend had sent him news from Herat to the following effect:—

“Some time ago Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan sent an agent in a most private manner to the Governor of Meshed, with a message that he has not gone back from his agreement about his being an ally of the Persian Government; that the Persian Government has promised to pay always regard to him; that at present his father, the Amir, has nominated one of his younger sons as his Heir-apparent, and has thus devised to ruin him (Yakub Khan), and that he, therefore, desires that whatever interest the Persian Government wishes to take in his protection may be brought to light, otherwise his ruin will be detrimental to the peace of the Persian border. The Governor of Meshed sent an agent to him, in consultation with the Persian authorities, with a message that should an enemy beyond the Afghan border have attempted to interfere with him, they should not have under any circumstance declined to help him, but that as the present dispute is between him and his father, they cannot give him aid, as such a course would undoubtedly tend to their being reproached by Foreign States, and that he should therefore endeavour to come to a compromise with his father. Though this reply should have cooled the courage of the Sirdar, he does not yet desist from entertaining designs for raising disturbances.”

The Amir was highly gratified with this answer on the part of the Persian Government. Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan also reported much to the same effect of the result of Sirdar Yakub's negotiations with Persia, and added that, although the Sirdar had not as yet broken ground in any direction, he had made every preparation.

The following account of the antecedents of Mirza Mahomed Ali, the Persian Agent, was received from Captain Napier (No. 12, dated 7th September 1874):—

“The Agent, by name Mirza Mahomed Ali, son of Mirza Kutkhoda, or headman of Birjand (town), now a man of 50 or 60 years of age, has been all his life attached to the family of the Amirs of Kain, and for the last 10 or 15 years has held the post of Mustaufi, or head Collector of Mir Alum Khan, the present Chief and Governor of that district. For a short time previous to this he was Naib Governor in the ‘Belooch’ (subdivision) of Khusf Tubbus district. Excepting this he has held no post directly under the Persian Government, but is nevertheless a man of considerable local influence and well known on both sides of the border. He has several times visited Herat and Kandahar, and is acquainted with the principal men of those places. His duties as Head Collector requiring his presence yearly at Meshed, he became well known to successive Governors and to permanent Government officials. On one occasion only he visited Teheran, having been sent by the Amir of Kain to make some complaint against the Hissam-us-Sultanat, then Governor-General of Khorasan. This was some three or four years ago, and he does not appear since to have had any communication with officials there.

“Two or three months before his deputation to Herat, *i.e.*, about a year ago, Mirza Mahomed Ali left Kain with his family in consequence of a quarrel with his master, and took up his residence in Meshed. While here he was selected by the Governor-General by advice of one Syud Sarwur, a commercial Agent of Sirdar Yakub Khan, and of the Governor of

Subzwar, also a Herati, to proceed to Herat, and request the Sirdar's interference in the matter of the assistance rendered by the Afghan border villagers to the Turkomans in their depredations in Persian territory. He was selected in preference to one Mir Masum Khan at first nominated on account of his knowledge of the politics of the border. On his return from Herat he was appointed 'Mustaufi' of Seistan, where he now is. His family remain in Meshed.

"The late Deputy's employments and experience appear thus to have been purely provincial; his presence in Meshed accidental, and his selection due to his special qualification for the business on which he was (ostensibly) sent. On the 1st January 1874 he left Meshed with a small number of followers. At Herat he was well received, an allowance of 5 tomans (Rupees 20) per diem was made for his entertainment, and on departure he received a horse and the presents customary to a man of his rank. Neither more nor less than the respect due appears to have been paid him. While at Herat news of the Khaff raid was received, and the Deputy is said to have been successful in inducing the Sirdar to suspend retaliatory measures, and to have brought about by his exertions the settlement subsequently made. Of the fact that he was so employed I have had satisfactory proof, but his long stay of two months at Herat needs explanation, and this I have been unable to get.

"The negotiations regarding the return of the property stolen from the Afghans, though they necessitated the sending of an Afghan Agent to Meshed, could not have taken so long, and it is probable that the Deputy was detained by Sirdar Yakub Khan for reasons of his own connected with his disputes with his father.

"I have found that the presence of the Persian 'Elchi' at Herat was known to all the travellers from that place whom I met on the road, and all agreed that he was there on account of some Turkoman raids. It was also hinted that he was charged with offers of assistance, but his presence in Herat at that particular time would naturally give rise to such conjectures. I have also satisfied myself from independent Afghan evidence that for some time previously the Turkomans had found shelter and assistance in the Afghan border villages, and have learnt that there was a precedent for the deputation of such an Agent, the Hissam-us-Sultanat having twice sent an official on a similar mission."

[*Political A.*, November 1874, No. 326.]

**92. Arrival at Kabul of the Mirakhor and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri. Their account of Yakub's designs and proceedings.**—On the evening of the 21st March 1874 Mirakhor Ahmed Khan and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, waited on the Amir, but the conversation was confined to ordinary courtesies. Subsequently, on the 22nd and 23rd March,

Kabul Diary, 24th-26th March.

the Amir discussed Herat affairs privately with the Mirakhor, who intimated that Sirdar Yakub Khan wished to obtain the government of Herat *en permanence* and to be relieved by a perpetual Sunnud from all dependence on the Kabul Durbar. He advised the Amir to ascertain all he could from Mulla Yahya about Yakub's ambitious designs and then deliberate upon the policy to be followed. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, expressed the opinion that Yakub was hostile to the Amir, and should be treated as an enemy and not as a son, and that he had only been prevented from imprisoning himself (Sirdar Abdulla) and the Mirakhor by the advice of Khan Aka Jamshedi. From the Mirakhor's friends other information was extracted to the effect that Yakub Khan was preparing for hostilities. That he had declined to celebrate in a becoming manner the announcement of Abdulla Jan's nomination, and had only been prevented from advancing against Kandahar by the Mirakhor's solicitations. That he had arrogantly asserted his own claims and those of his brother Ayub to Herat and Kandahar, Furrah and Girisk, saying that the territories of Kabul and Turkistan with their ample revenue were enough for Abdulla Jan. On hearing of these sayings and proceedings of Yakub Khan, the Amir observed to his private counsellors:—

"I have not announced any intention to take away Herat from Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, but in support of his designs to raise disturbances he has made preparations (for a march), and makes arrogant observations which are greatly insulting to me. I therefore request your opinions on the following three courses, in order that I may act on the one of them which may be considered the best:—

"(1.) On what grounds should the kingdom which is now governed by one ruler be deliberately ('deedah-o-danistah') divided between so many rulers; what would be the advantage of this, assuming that in spite of the Sirdar's arrogance and disobedience I am ready to do what he asks?

"(2.) What officer should command the troops, if troops be sent against Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan?

"(3.) If it be necessary that I should proceed myself to Herat, what objections are there in the way of my doing so?"

The general opinion was that the Mirakhor should be sent back to Herat to re-assure Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan and bring him to Kabul by his tact and influence, and that the Sirdar after having fully submitted to the Amir, should be retained with a suitable coadjutor in the government of Herat.

Another account of Yakub's proceedings at Herat, after the news of Abdulla Jan's nomination had reached him, said to have been given by the Mirakhor to a confidential friend, was to the following effect:—

Kabul Diary from the 27th-30th  
March 1874.

"Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan had determined to raise disturbances before Sirdar Abdulla Jan was nominated the Amir's Heir-apparent. When he received information of this nomination he kept it secret from me for three days, and having summoned his friends held a Council with them, and after calling his father-in-law, Khan Aka, the Jamshedi Chief, through an agent, and other Chiefs and the cavalry troops to Herat, hastily asked them as to whether or not they would accept the above-mentioned selection. They said that they would side with him in its acceptance or refusal. The Sirdar then summoned me at the public Durbar and questioned me as to what was my opinion in this matter. I replied that, agreeably to the circumstances of the time, the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan considered it advisable to select the late Wazir Mahomed Akbar Khan as his Heir-apparent in spite of there being elder sons, and none of the latter ventured to question this. That under similar circumstances his (Syud Yakub Khan's) father, who is now the Amir, was nominated as Amir Dost Mahomed Khan's Heir-apparent; that the Amir must have now considered it advisable to appoint his younger son as his Heir-apparent on political grounds; that the interference of youths in the undertakings of elders tends to make clear the folly of the former; and that in order to gain the good-will of his father, he (Yakub Khan) should announce the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Khan in compliance with the Amir's orders by salutes of guns and by illuminations. The Sirdar said that he had not money sufficient for the expenses of *fêtes*, &c., and I told him that I would collect money for this purpose. Then at the instance of his agent, Abdul Tahir Khan, he observed that no course remained open to him but to lose his life in this matter, because in his opinion materials were being collected for his destruction; that I should request the Amir to grant a Sunnud allowing the Herat territory to remain in his possession (in perpetuity), and to grant the country as far as the Kandahar border to his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan, and thus relieve them from subjugation to the Kabul Durbar. On my representing to him as an adviser that his observations were arrogant, and asking him as to what he would do if his father, who has sixty infantry regiments in addition to cavalry troops, should send twenty infantry regiments against him *via* Turkistan, Kandahar, and Hazarajat, there being only six infantry regiments and two thousand sowars in Herat, he said that if he should find himself unable to oppose them, he would take flight. I then asked the Chiefs who attended the Durbar and who are natives of Herat, as to what were their intentions, as their Sirdar had considered flight his last resource, but they gave no reply and remained silent. After considerable discussion, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan sent me to the Amir with some Mullas of Herat. Khan Aka Jamshedi and the other Chiefs told me that they were servants of the Amir; that they would not act against His Highness; and that they were merely temporizing with the Sirdar. Now that I have given an account of this matter to the Amir, His Highness intends to send troops against Herat, but the deliberations on this point have not been concluded, nor has any officer been appointed to command the troops. Troops will undoubtedly be sent against Herat, and if they be placed under the command of a gallant and experienced officer, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan will not be able to stand against them, even his own troops will separate from him. In reality Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan is a rebel and will not submit to the Amir. After making representations in this matter to the Amir, some of the members of the Durbar proposed to appoint Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan as Governor of Kandahar, Futteh Khan, the present Governor of Kandahar, as his Naib, Sirdar Shere Ali Khan as Governor of Girishk and commandant of the troops who may be sent to Herat, but Mustaufi Hubibulla Khan said that because Sirdar Shere Ali Khan had been formerly Governor of Kandahar, Girishk, and Zamindawar, he would not consider the Government of Girishk sufficient now and would not act with zeal in the Herat expedition. The Amir observed that the views of the Mustaufi were correct, and directed the members of his Durbar to give replies to his questions (mentioned in the diary of 26th March 1874) after careful consideration. These members are of opinion that Mirakhor Ahmed Khan should be sent back to Herat to try to reassure Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan and bring him to Kabul; that should the latter not desist from his evil designs, the Mirakhor should try to stir up dissension between him and his troops, in order that the troops who may be sent from Kabul may easily gain over their Herat brethren."

There can be no doubt that the Mirakhor did all in his power to impress on the Amir the hostility of Yakub Khan and the danger of allowing the Sirdar to mature his plans. His view was that if the Sirdar were not quickly

suppressed, there would be civil war in Afghanistan. Other counsellors were averse from extreme measures against Yakub, who might in adversity prove himself a pillar of strength; they suggested his being entrusted with the subjection of a difficult province such as Maimana.

**93. Arrival of Mulla Yahya at Kabul.**—On Thursday, the 2nd April, Mulla Yahya arrived at Kabul from Herat. In due course he waited on the Amir and spoke favorably of Yakub Khan, reminding the Amir that the Sirdar was his son.

The Amir, however, replied: "If in the opinion of wise persons a son has to show respect to his father, the Sirdar should comply with the orders which I may give, but, should the father have to be respectful to the son, I ought to fulfil his wishes. You should give me a reply after careful consideration."

It does not appear that Mulla Yahya and his companion, Khalifa Abdul Rahman, were very communicative regarding Sirdar Yakub's intentions. At length the Amir sent for them and addressed them as follows:—

Kabul Diary, 14th–16th April 1878.

"As Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan desires that the government of Herat should be granted to him (in perpetuity), you should return to him and tell him that through paternal pity I will forgive his former faults and uphold his authority in Herat on this condition that, after accepting the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as my Heir-apparent, he waits on me at Kabul, within one month, leaving his brother at Herat to act for him. If in one month I receive information about his preparations for starting to Kabul, well and good, otherwise I shall be constrained to depute some troops against Herat. I cannot enter on any other engagement than this, and Sirdar Mahomed Yakub should consider it advantageous to him."

**94. Final decision as to the terms to be offered to Sirdar Yakub. Return of the Mirakhor accompanied by Shahghassi Sheredil Khan to Herat.**—Shortly afterwards it was decided that Mirakhor Ahmed Khan and Shahghassi Sheredil Khan should return to Herat with the two Mullas and endeavour to persuade Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to come to Kabul. If they failed, then, as soon as public opinion admitted of the measure, an expedition would be sent against the Sirdar; meanwhile active steps were to be postponed for two months, military arrangements being however carried on in secret. The Mirakhor asked the Amir on what promise he should bring the Sirdar to Kabul; His Highness observed that he would make no promise; that the Sirdar should be told clearly that if he came to Kabul in compliance with His Highness' firman and made no excuse or hesitation, the Amir would treat him with suitable indulgence, and that if he refused to return to Kabul, troops would soon attack Herat.

Before their departure, the Mirakhor and Shahghassi Sheredil Khan waited on Sirdar Yakub's mother, and suggested that she should furnish them with a letter urging the Sirdar to come to Kabul.

She wrote, at their instance, to the Sirdar to the effect that he could expect to derive neither religious nor even secular advantage from becoming King of the whole world if his father was dissatisfied with him and his mother separated from him, and that he should therefore return to Kabul with the Mirakhor without any anxiety. She did not, however, really wish that the Sirdar should come to Kabul.

The Shahghassi was loud in protestations of his determination to bring the Sirdar to Kabul; if the latter refused, he, the Shahghassi, would incite all his own adherents to turn against the Sirdar and so coerce him; he would not return alive to Kabul without the Sirdar. On the 14th May the Mirakhor and the Shahghassi with the Mullas left for Herat.

**95. Visit of Extra Assistant Commissioner Ghulam Ahmed to Kabul in May 1874. Sir R. Pollock's observations on the feelings of the Amir towards the British Government.**—In March 1874 Sir R. Pollock returned to his appointment at Peshawur after



an absence of three years. He submitted a proposal, which met with the approval of Government, that he should send Ghulam Ahmed, an Extra Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab, to Kabul with presents from himself for the Amir and Syud Nur Mahomed. The opportunity would be a good one to collect information as to the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Ghulam Ahmed reached Kabul early in May, remained there 18 days, and returned to Peshawur in the beginning of June. His memorandum of this visit, which is replete with interesting information, and to the probable accuracy of which Sir R. Pollock bore testimony, will be found in Appendix XIV. In submitting it for the information of Government, Sir R. Pollock (letter dated 6th July 1874) offered the following opinions founded on enquiries made during the period which had elapsed since rejoining his appointment in the preceding March. He wrote:—

“I found that a strong impression certainly existed at Peshawur, and apparently at Kabul also, that the relations between our Government and that of His Highness were less satisfactory than they had recently been and less so than they had been after His Highness’ visit to Ambala.

“Some were ready to attribute such change to the Amir’s dissatisfaction with the result of the Seistán arbitration; others gave as a reason the choice of a successor by the Amir, that successor being believed to be other than the choice that the Government of India would have cordially accepted as best calculated to promote the interests both of His Highness and his allies.

“After noting the above as the two reasons principally mentioned, other minor ones which have occasionally been expressed may be given, such as : 1st.—The recent forward movements of Russia which were beyond doubt such as to disturb the mind of the Amir and make him even more anxious than before to obtain a distinct and definite announcement of the part England would be prepared to take in the event of Russia failing herself to respect the Afghan boundary, or encouraging aggression on the part of others, which she has many ways of doing. 2nd.—The free and intemperate comments in Indian newspapers on the Amir’s policy of setting aside his most deserving and capable son in favor of a younger son of no proved ability or merit. 3rd.—The disappointment caused by the indefiniteness of the assistance afforded by our Government to the Amir in arms and money.

“To deal with the general question first, I am glad to be able to report my conviction that no unfavourable change whatever has occurred in the disposition of His Highness, that he leans as much as ever on this Government, and that I can find no symptoms whatever of an inclination on his part or on the part of those about him to seek assistance from any other quarter; on the contrary, it would appear that he looks with increasing distrust and suspicion on his northern neighbours, while Persia, his only other neighbour worth writing of, is his natural enemy, and even assuming, which is assuming a great deal, the ‘Shia’ and ‘Suni’ would be willing to unite against a common enemy, Persia is generally believed to be completely overawed by Russia.

“All recent reports, including the one herewith submitted, seem to me to show that Afghanistan, weak as it is, and badly administered as it is, judged by any civilized standard is, as regards its internal management, in a stronger position than it has ever been since the death of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, while as regards its resources, it is certainly better off than under the Dost.

“The succession question is the great difficulty of the day, and one of His Highness’ own creation. I have been at great pains to collect information from as many sources as possible as to the real state of the question. For many weeks after my return the accounts I received led me to suspect that the real relations between His Highness and Sirdar Yakub Khan were more friendly than the accounts given in the diaries would have led me to suppose, that there was no real intention on the part of Amir to proceed against Herat, and that the Sirdar’s alleged contumacy was more or less invented in view to cover or justify His Highness’ refusal to allow the Yarkund Mission to return *via* Budukshan and Kabul.

“This view of the case was strongly urged by several persons at Peshawur who had good means of knowing the truth, who gave their information quite independently of one another, and who at first sight appeared to have no object in misrepresenting the facts of the case.

“Gradually, however, I found reason to believe that one common interest actuated these people; they looked and hoped for a rupture between our Government and His Highness, and were ready to promote this in the hope of employment in the event of any forward movement from Peshawur.

“I have now little or no doubt but that the breach between father and son is too serious to admit of any real reconciliation, and that His Highness is bent upon the destruction of Sirdar Yakub Khan, unless the latter should tender his absolute and unqualified submission and acceptance of His Highness’ choice of a successor, and no one believes that the Sirdar will give way.

“One reason urged by those who would have it believed that a secret understanding exists between Sirdar Yakub Khan and His Highness is that had not this been the case the Sirdar



would never, after his successful occupation of Herat, have waited on his father at Kabul, putting himself entirely in his power, and that His Highness would never have pardoned his previous misconduct, and allowed him to return as Governor of the most important fortress in Afghanistan.

"The answer to which I take to be that Sirdar Yakub Khan in visiting Kabul knew that he left behind him in charge of Herat a well affected force, under the command of his younger brother, Sirdar Ayoob Khan, who was entirely devoted to him, so that the detention at Kabul or the execution or blinding of Sirdar Yakub Khan when he had put himself completely in his father's power would not only have been an extremely unpopular measure throughout the kingdom, but would have had the immediate effect of throwing the whole province of Herat into open rebellion.

"Had the Amir felt sufficiently powerful to do so he would doubtless have replaced Sirdar Yakub Khan at Herat by some more subservient and reliable Governor.

"To return to the present position of affairs, it has certainly been very unfortunate for Sirdar Yakub Khan that at this juncture the Governorship of Furrak should be held by Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan, father of the Amir's favourite wife, and consequently grandfather of the heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdulla Khan, in whose interest, and doubtless with the approbation of the Amir, he distorts and exaggerates every act of Sirdar Yakub Khan that can be construed into disloyalty. That he does so misrepresent facts will, I think, be clearly seen from the recent diaries.

"In Kabul itself the Amir seems more free from anxiety than usual, and to devote himself almost entirely to the reorganization and improvement of his army. He has no national debt. The revenues are said to more than suffice for the annual charges, and there can be no doubt but that with better management the receipts might be largely increased without additional taxation and by merely turning into the Government Treasury the enormous sums now enjoyed by the Provincial Governors.

"From Afghan Turkistan alone it would appear that a large additional revenue could be obtained if an upright Governor could be appointed there: at present His Highness seems content to lose a large amount of revenue from that quarter and to retain a Governor who, while making a purse for himself, is in all other respects true to his master. Any Barukzai Sirdar sent to succeed him would be equally ready to make away with the revenue, and might in addition seek to become an independent Prince.

"So far as the internal management of the country is concerned, the Amir appears to have acted wisely as to the tribes from which he has lately drawn recruits. In the event of a collision with Sirdar Yakub Khan none of these would sympathize with the Sirdar, and the latter could not, I believe, maintain a protracted resistance should the Kabul troops move against him. Perhaps his best chance would be to take the initiative, attacking Furrak, and, if successful, thence rapidly advancing on Girishk and Kandahar before reinforcements could reach these places, but I have at no time experienced greater difficulty than at present in procuring reliable information of what is happening or likely to happen in Afghanistan. Most of the official reports of the British Agent, almost all, are sent subject to the approval of His Highness, and accounts from any other quarter have always to be received with greatest suspicion.

"His Highness the Amir views with great jealousy all reports on the state of affairs in his kingdom, and resents keenly the free comments of the British Indian Press on his policy, especially as regards Sirdar Yakub Khan. It will be seen from Ghulam Ahmed's statement that he has at last forbidden the reading out of any such comments. On the return journey from Ambala to Peshawar in 1869 I remember well how he urged on me the prohibition by Government of such comments, with what difficulty I got him to understand that Government never interfered in such matters, and how he ended by saying 'well, let them write what they please about others, only make them leave me alone.'

"On the question of the return of the Yarkund Mission *via* Kabul, I am inclined to believe from all I have heard that the refusal to allow this proceeded chiefly from a reason not hinted at in Ghulam Ahmed's narrative, or in any of the diaries. I think that if the Amir and his Court could have felt sure that there was nothing behind the request for this permission, it might have been granted, and that what really prompted the refusal was a lurking suspicion that our Envoy once at the capital might, under authority of our Government, re-open the question of British Agents in Afghanistan. This is hardly more than speculation, but I think I have very probably given the real reason for the refusal, though others doubtless existed and were indirectly referred to in the conversations with Ghulam Ahmed.

"The delay that has occurred in His Highness availing himself of the liberal Government grant still lying at Kohat is accounted for in the narrative. It would be easier to accept the explanation if the money had since been removed to His Highness' treasury, and it will be easier for those who were present at the conversations with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah on his return from the Seistan Arbitration, and who have access to the notes of those conversations, to form a just conclusion as to the motives which actuated His Highness the Amir and the Kabul Durbar in this matter. I gather from Ghulam Ahmed that although nothing was said openly or directly by His Highness or his officials to the effect that they were disappointed in the amount of the treasure, hints to that effect were not wanting. Looking to the national character and history, this is not to be wondered at. I recently

asked Ibrahim Khan on his return from Kabul what His Highness' policy was, and after several remarks as to the Amir's friendly feeling he summed up by saying that his only 'policy' was to 'get two lakhs for every one Government used to pay to the Dost.' "

**96. Arrival of the Mirakhor and Shahghassi Sherdil Khan at Herat. Their reception by Yakub Khan and deputation of Abdul Tahir to Kabul.**—After the departure of these officers the reports of Yakub Khan's threatening attitude continued. Afzul Khan wrote in great trepidation from Kandahar, asserting that Yakub would be satisfied with nothing less than the death of the Amir and Abdulla; that the people and soldiers of Herat had attached themselves to him, and that the Turkomans were also favorably disposed to his cause; that it was hopeless to expect that the mission of the Mirakhor and the Shahghassi would succeed. The Amir replied that if the

Kabul Diary, 19th-22nd June.

Mirakhor failed, active measures would be taken against Yakub, and that if Sirdar Afzul felt a want of troops, he might apply to the Governor of Girishk for aid.

It was also reported that Yakub Khan had received money from Persia—a statement which the Amir discredited, believing that Yakub had given it currency to increase his own influence. Presently a letter came from the Mirakhor saying that he had halted at Shahbad, three stages from Herat, where

Kabul Diary, 3rd-6th July.

Yakub had ordered him to remain for three days. On the 4th July, however, the Amir received a letter from the Sirdar himself, intimating the arrival at Herat of the Mirakhor and his colleague on the 1st June. In a few days another letter came from Yakub. No letter, however, was received either from the Mirakhor or the Shahghassi, a

Kabul Diary, 14th-16th July 1874.

circumstance which gave rise to anxiety. About the 15th July Abdul Tahir Khan, the most trusted Agent of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, arrived at Kabul, after a rapid journey from Herat, and delivered a letter to the Amir from the Sirdar, and one from Shahghassi Sherdil Khan and Mirakhor Ahmed Khan.

The letter from these two officers was to the effect that on their arrival at Herat, the Sirdar promised first to give a reply to their representations after some consideration, but afterwards in consultation with his advisers he sent Abdul Tahir Khan to Kabul. Also that as the observations of the Sirdar were vague and unnecessarily lengthy, they had not considered it advisable to bring them to His Highness' notice. The letter which these officers carried from the Amir to the Sirdar contained a sentence to the effect that God and the Prophet are satisfied with those sons who obey the orders of their fathers, and that consequently he (the Sirdar) should return to Kabul from Herat. In reply to this the Sirdar wrote that God says:—"Should your soul be unable to endure excessive affliction (or trouble) do not endure it" (meaning that he would not return to Kabul). Abdul Tahir Khan excused the Sirdar much for not returning to Kabul, who, he said, was in every other way obedient to His Highness.

A servant of Abdul Tahir's stated that the Mirakhor and the Shahghassi

Kabul Diary, 21st-23rd July 1874.

were closely watched at Herat, and prevented from seeing or communicating with any of the inhabitants of the city. The Sirdar was collecting and storing all the grain of the country ready for use if he marched from Herat, or for destruction if troops from Kabul marched against him. The members of the Durbar cross-questioned Abdul Tahir, but having failed to elicit anything, the Amir summoned him to a private interview, and after some friendly and some menacing ("sard-o-garm") observations, said "should the Sirdar not desist in any way from his evil designs, all of you, Barakzais, who are his servants, should separate from him and return to Kabul. This course will undoubtedly be advantageous to you, and the Sirdar finding himself single-handed (literally destitute of wings and feathers) will lose his courage, and will of necessity submit to me (literally dress himself in the robes of obedience and allegiance). Should you not separate from him, I shall be obliged myself to march with troops against Herat, and on arrival at Kandahar will so severely employ swords in killing the Barakzais that even their names will become unknown for ever in Afghanistan."

Abdul Tahir Khan replied that on his return to Herat he would consult with the Barakzai Chiefs to induce the Sirdar to return to Kabul, and that should the Sirdar refuse to do so, he and the other Barakzai Chiefs would wait on the Amir at Kabul.

At length the Amir dismissed Abdul Tahir with these parting words:—

Kabul Diary, 24th–27th July 1874. “Should Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan be guided by God to gain his father’s good-will, and after desisting from his ill intentions return to Kabul, well and good; otherwise, I will expel all the Peshawuri Sirdars and others who are his adherents with their families from Kabul to Herat, and he will have to pay their allowances. After this, arrangements will be made for sending troops to punish the Sirdar and all his partizans.”

On the 24th July Abdul Tahir, accompanied by Mahomed Nasim Khan, the Amir’s chief orderly, left for Herat *via* Hazara. After their departure, the Amir held a Durbar at which he warned the Peshawuri Sirdars that unless Yakub Khan returned to Kabul, they and their children would be sent to Herat and severe measures adopted for the punishment of the Sirdar and his partizans. The Peshawuri Sirdars were much alarmed.

Meanwhile, Sirdar Afzul Khan, the Mirakhor, and the Shahghassi continued their reports of Yakub’s evil designs; they said Abdul Tahir had been sent to Kabul merely to gain time and delay an expedition from Kabul until the approach of winter should render an advance impracticable.

On the 1st August the son of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, arrived from Herat and said that Yakub looked much to the Persian Government, which probably gave him secret encouragement.

**97. Abdul Tahir and the Shahghassi return to Kabul with statement of Yakub Khan’s conditions.**—On the 5th September the British Agent wrote that Mahomed Nasim Khan had just arrived from Kabul with the news that Abdul Tahir and the Shahghassi were shortly expected with a letter from the Sirdar to the Amir. It was said that Yakub was ready to come to Kabul on condition that Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, waited on him at Herat with a promise that his terms were agreed to.

On the 6th September Abdul Tahir and the Shahghassi arrived at Kabul and delivered to the Amir a letter from Yakub Khan, which stipulated—

1st.—That no steps detrimental to the Sirdar’s interests should be taken.

2nd.—That the territory of Herat should continue to remain under his authority.

3rd.—That his (the Sirdar’s) adherents should never be ill-treated, as he had not ill-treated the Amir’s adherents.

4th.—During the Amir’s life, Yakub would obey his orders, but he would not in any way accept the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent. The Sirdar further wrote—“Should the Amir accept these conditions, His Highness should write them on a copy of the Koran, and attest the said writing by his seal. Then the Koran should be sent to me by hand of Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, and I will wait on the Amir.” The Amir was much annoyed with this letter and observed—“If he does not accept the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as my Heir-apparent, how can he accept allegiance or submission to me. The more I put a veil (on his faults) through farsightedness and through fear lest people should attach reproach to me, the more he (the Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan) deviates not from his haughtiness and adheres to his evil designs.”

Mahomed Nasim Khan spoke privately to the Amir of Yakub’s arrogance. The Sirdar boasted that not one of the Amir’s officers dare stand against him in battle, and that he would raise disturbances throughout the kingdom.

Kabul Diary, 8th–10th September 1874.

Abdul Tahir Khan presented a copy of the "Koran" to the Amir, in which Yakub had written the above conditions and attested them by his seal.

He then urged the Amir to accept the conditions, and to depute Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan to bring the Sirdar to Kabul.

The Amir remarked—"When the Sirdar does not accept the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as my Heir-apparent, how can I send Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan to him." The Amir then asked Asmatulla Khan and Arsla Khan whether they would go to Herat. They replied that if the Amir would accept the conditions, they would go, otherwise there was no use in their doing so.

**98. Departure of Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzais, and Abdul Tahir for Herat.**—Frequent councils were held as to the course to be taken, the prevailing opinion being that the Amir should accept Yakub's conditions and confirm the Sirdar in the government of Herat as soon as he had acknowledged Abdulla Jan's nomination. The Amir, though

Diary, 11th-14th September. apparently not inclined to make any promise about Herat, was supposed to be in a more yielding humour. At length on the 17th September the two Ghilzai Chiefs and Abdul Tahir, accompanied by Mahomed Nasim Khan, left Kabul for Herat. The Amir, however, would make no promise about retaining Yakub in the government of Herat, though he observed that if the Sirdar recognized Abdulla Jan's nomination, there was no person who would make a better Governor. It was reported that the Amir had accepted Yakub's four conditions, but no positive information of his having done so was ever received. Abdul Tahir Khan was secretly assured that if he succeeded in bringing the Sirdar to a right conclusion, it would be greatly to his advantage. Abdul Tahir Khan promised to fulfil His Highness' wishes. The Shahghassi, however, was not permitted to return to Herat, possibly because Abdul Tahir hinted that while ostensibly the Sirdar and the Shahghassi did not trust one another, in reality they were on good terms, and that Yakub had given him secretly a valuable khillut.

Kabul Diary, 15th-17th September 1874. The events at Herat on the arrival of these Chiefs were not communicated to the Government of India until after receipt of the news of Yakub's imprisonment at Kabul. According to the Kabul Diary, dated 3rd-5th November 1874, Yakub Khan told Asmatulla Khan and Arsla Khan that if they would swear that the following four conditions would be agreed to, he would accompany them to Kabul, *viz.*—

1st.—That Herat should remain in his hands.

2nd.—That the Amir should not detain him more than ten days in Kabul.

3rd.—That he should be excused from visiting the Heir-apparent, and from shaking hands with him.

4th.—That he should be allowed to bring back any of his adherents to Herat without hindrance.

Asmatulla Khan and Arsla Khan complied, and wrote down their conditions in a Koran.

**99. Yakub Khan comes to Kabul. His reception by the Amir.**—In a letter, dated 24th October, the British Agent reported the arrival of a runner from Herat, saying that as he left Sirdar Yakub Khan had just issued from the Khushk gate of Herat *en route* for Kabul. That he was accompanied by a few followers, and might be expected at Kabul about the 5th November. The Amir was delighted at this news.

Presently Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan wrote that the Sirdar would arrive on the 1st November 1874; the Bagh-i-Shahi in the Bala Hissar was assigned for his residence, and secret councils held as to the policy which would be followed

Kabul Diary, 27th-29th October 1874.

towards him. The Sirdar's adherents began to grow anxious. It was resolved that he should be welcomed with due honor and courtesy; trays of sweetmeats were sent to him on the part of the Amir, and at Deh Bori he was met by a deputation headed by Sirdar Ibrahim Khan and all the members of the Durbar except the Mustaufi and Syud Nur Mahomed. On arrival he immediately paid his respects to the Amir, who received him with kindness and accepted his presents.

**100. News of Yakub Khan's imprisonment conveyed to the Government of India. Lord Northbrook's message to the Amir and despatch to the Secretary of State.**—On the 16th November the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur telegraphed that on the 8th November the Amir had placed Yakub Khan in custody. This intelligence was immediately communicated to the Secretary of State, and the Deputy Commissioner was desired to report at once any information which had reached him as to the reason for Yakub's arrest. He replied on the same day (16th November) that no reasons were yet known.

On the 17th November \* the Government of India telegraphed the following instructions to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur :—

\* Foreign Department telegram, No. 2470P., dated 17th November 1874.

"Instruct Agent at Kabul to deliver following message to Amir. Message begins—

"The Viceroy has been informed that Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan came to Kabul under a safe conduct from the Amir, and that notwithstanding the safe conduct he has been placed in custody by His Highness. The Viceroy, as a friend and well-wisher to the Amir, hopes this report is untrue, and desires strongly to urge His Highness to observe the conditions under which the Sirdar has come to Kabul. By so doing the Amir will maintain his good name and the friendship of the British Government. The Viceroy would be glad to receive early assurances to this effect, and to be correctly informed of what has taken place. Message ends.

"Translate carefully message which Agent should read, having no discretion to vary terms thereof.

"If before despatch of message from Peshawur further information should arrive, telegraph it at once and detain message pending instructions."

This message was despatched to Kabul by a special runner on the 18th November, and on the same day Lord Northbrook repeated it to the Secretary of State. It is scarcely necessary to observe that there was no truth in a current rumour that Yakub had visited Kabul at Lord Northbrook's instigation.

On the 20th November the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State in the following despatch (No. 70), which explains the reasons which led them to address the Amir in the manner described in the telegram just cited :—

"We have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the enclosed documents relative to the visit of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Kabul and the arrest of the Sirdar by His Highness the Amir.

"The conditions on which Sirdar Yakub Khan is understood to have visited his father

† Yakub's visit attributed to poverty; stipulated that he should not be detained more than ten days; should retain Herat Government; be excused waiting on or seeing Heir-apparent; and be allowed to take back his adherents with him. All these points were conceded by Amir's Agents, Asmutulla and Arsla, Ghilzais.—*(Telegram from Commissioner of Peshawur, dated 12th November.)*

‡ See Kabul Agent's letter, dated 24th October, and diaries of the 30th October to 6th November 1874.

are reported in the telegram † from the Commissioner of Peshawur, dated the 12th instant, and in the Kabul Diary of 3rd to 5th November. As our Agent at Kabul had reported‡ that the Amir was much gratified at the visit of his son and had received him with kindness, we were unprepared for the intelligence we received on the 16th that Yakub Khan had been placed by the Amir in custody a few days after his arrival.

"We have not as yet been informed of the reason for the arrest. But considering our relations with the Amir, our declared desire to see a firm and merciful administration established in every province of Afghanistan, and peace and tranquillity secured within the Amir's borders, considering the assistance we have given to His Highness in money and arms to enable him to strengthen his position, considering also the previous fortunes of Yakub Khan, and the fact that a temporary reconciliation between him and his father was effected through the influence of the Government of India in 1871, and bearing in mind the position of the Sirdar, we have deemed it right, although it is neither our desire nor our intention to interfere

§ No. 11 of enclosures. actively in the internal dissensions of Afghanistan, to address a message§ to the Amir through our Agent, which we trust will prevent him from committing himself to any course calculated to disturb the peace of his kingdom, and to produce complications in his relations with the British Government."



**101. Detailed account of Yakub's arrest and imprisonment.**—The Kabul Diary of the 6th-10th November gave a full narrative of the circumstances of Yakub's arrest and imprisonment. The pretext alleged for the measure was the Amir's fear that Yakub would make over Herat to Persia; the Commissioner of Peshawur, however, considered that Yakub's imprisonment had been deliberately decided on prior to his arrival. The narrative is of sufficient interest and importance to merit its repetition here *in extenso*; the protest by the Ghilzai Chiefs, and the answer it received from the Amir, will be noticed.

"The circumstances of the confinement of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, reported in Kabul Diary, 6th-10th November the Agent's letter of 9th November 1874, are as follow:—  
1874. The day before yesterday in early evening the Amir observed in a public Durbar held in the Tawela as follows to the Sirdar:—

"'I am unable to understand whether you are my son, servant, or enemy; give me a full reply.' Then repeating all the unsuitable actions of the Sirdar one by one from the commencement, His Highness said—'At the time of your flight from Kabul, you wrote this

\* The Amir referred to a letter written about August 1870. epistle\* in your own handwriting to me; see its insolent tone. Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, Governor of

Herat, his son and his adherents, have been killed by you, the city of Herat has been plundered. Sirdar Mahomed Uslum Khan (my half-brother) and the Commander-in-Chief, Feramorz Khan, have been murdered in consequence of (your misbehaviour). I need not describe the ruin which has been caused to the people by reason of your misconduct, it is as evident as daylight. If you wish now to return to Herat, I permit you to do so. You can go *viâ* Hazarajat; I am coming with troops *viâ* Kandahar, and after the settlement of Herat matters I will act as I may choose. Should you like to remain at Kabul, let me have a clear reply.' In short, the Amir made some angry and enraged observations for some time and the Sirdar gave no reply, but when he was pressed by the Amir and the members of the Durbar, he said that he was willing to remain at Kabul, on which His Highness remarked—'In consequence of your habit of taking flight I do not consider it advisable to set you at liberty. You should remain under surveillance in my own private serai pending the improvement of your conduct and your senses.' The Commander-in-Chief at once took the Sirdar, under orders, to the serai and made him prisoner. Ismutulla Khan and Arsla Khan, Ghilzai Chiefs, petitioned the Amir that as they had brought the Sirdar from Herat after many reassurances, all his faults should be pardoned, but His Highness observed—'This matter is one of my private ones, you are my servants, you have no privilege to interfere with such important matters, remain silent, parents possess full authority at all times over their children.'"

According to a later diary the annoyance of the Ghilzai Chiefs had not abated. Asmatulla Khan had sent his family to Lughman without asking leave, and was less regular in his attendance at Durbar. The Amir noticed their displeasure and observed:—†

† Kabul Diary, 22nd-24th December 1874.

"Why did they enter into engagements with the Sirdar without my permission? Who gave them authority to become his security and bring him to Kabul? I did not allow them to enter into conditions with the Sirdar."

**102. Effect produced on the Amir and Kabul Durbar by Lord Northbrook's message. The Amir's verbal reply.**—On the 23rd November the British Agent wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawur that he had that day communicated to the Amir the Viceroy's message in respect to Yakub Khan. The Amir ordered all persons in the public Durbar to leave, and having himself perused the letter with deep consideration, informed only Syud Nur Mahomed Shah and Arsla Khan, Ghilzai, of its contents. He then observed that a Persian translation of the letter should be furnished to him, and that he would give a reply in this "private matter" after full deliberation.

On seeing the Persian translation His Highness was visibly annoyed. British Agent's letter, dated 23rd November 1874. A council was then held in a private apartment with the Sadr-i-Azam and the Foreign Minister (Arsla Khan). The substance of the consultation was reported as follows:—

"In all religions a father possesses full authority over his children, that is to say, that he can do in their behalf as he may choose. Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan's frequent evil actions are well known and manifest; they need not be described. I am unable to understand (lit. am surprised) as to what intentions the British Government entertains towards this Government which God has given me."

No reply was, however, sent, and on the British Agent reminding the Amir, the latter merely answered that he would reply after deliberation. The chief

members of the Durbar criticized the action of the Government of India unfavourably. They said—

“We are unable to understand (lit. it is a matter of great surprise and astonishment) for what reason the British Government interferes with an affair between father and son. The British Government observes that the fulfilment of the conditions of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan would tend to the renown of the Amir and the continuance of friendship between His Highness and the English Government. We feel anxiety as to how mention will be made of this affair of the son and the father between high authorities (meaning Amir and British Government), because the Amir considers, in his opinion, such mentions unsuitable.”\*

\* Letter from British Agent, dated 26th November.

Later letters, dated 30th November and 3rd December, showed the matter to be still under discussion. Some advised that the release of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan would be most detrimental to the Kabul Government, and that a full explanation of his proceedings and character should be submitted to the British Government through the British Agent. Others suggested that a brief propitiatory (*mulaim*) reply should be given. Others that nothing should be done pending information from the Mirakhor as to the fidelity of the people of Herat towards the Amir. It was evident, however, that the general opinion was against Yakub's release. The common feeling among the Court officials was illustrated in greater detail in the following letter dated 14th December from the British Agent to the Commissioner of Peshawur:—

“After reading your letter of 18th November 1874 to me, in the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, the chief members of the Durbar observed privately as follows in surprise:—

“‘We do not understand as to what judgment is given in all religions against a son who having rebelled against his father resolves to ruin him. We need not describe the misbehaviour of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, such as the writing of an (insolent) epistle to the Amir at the time of his departure from Herat; causing ruination to people from Kabul to Herat; killing Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, his son, and some other Chiefs; plundering the city of Herat, murdering the Commander-in-Chief (Feramorz Khan); making the Chiefs and people at large in the neighbourhood of Herat uneasy, and disobeying the orders of the Amir. All these faults are as evident as daylight. When the Sirdar was unable to deal with the people of Herat, and he returned to Kabul, it was not advisable to send him back as Governor of Herat, but the Amir through paternal affection, notwithstanding the above serious faults, sent him to that territory, under the impression that probably he would keep in view His Highness' fresh kindness, and in repentance of previous misbehaviour would in future not deviate from submission to His Highness. However, the Sirdar, owing to his evil disposition, and by reason of associating with mean people, did not desist from his rebellious designs, and contrary to the interests of the Government entered into negotiations with the Persian Envoy without the permission of the Amir, and though His Highness made enquiry, he did not inform him of the real object of the deputation of the Envoy. Now the Amir has kept him under surveillance in his chief apartment (lit. has given him a place). The real object is to bring the Sirdar to a right conclusion, to show kindness to him again, and to relieve the people of Afghanistan from apprehension as to the security of the border. Taking into consideration the conduct of the Sirdar, the Kabul Government recently felt anxiety lest he should make an officer of a foreign State (Persia) take action against the interests of this Government and throw all the people of Afghanistan into serious danger; otherwise, it is evident that a father never becomes an ill-wisher of his son. Fathers always wish that their children may turn out best of all in the world, in all virtues, and gain a name for their family. Should by any accident private disputes occur between father and son, it is advisable that other people should put a veil on them (“chashmposhi”). It is not heard that there is any room (for claim) for the fulfilment of conditions and stipulations between son and father. The British Government has sent a communication in this private affair between the son and the father, and we do not understand as to what is their real object as regards the interests of Afghanistan. The Amir will have to endure a heavy injury to State and private matters in the release of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan.’”

No letter had been written to the Amir by Lord Northbrook, nor did His Highness write one in reply. A message had been delivered to him by the British Agent, and the Amir's answer was communicated through the same channel. The reply was given in the form of remarks to the British Agent, who repeated them to the Commissioner of Peshawur in the following letter:—

Translation of a letter from the Agent at Kabul, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 14th December 1874.

“To-day, in reply to your letter of 18th November 1874 to me, in the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, the Amir observed as follows:—

“‘In reality the recommendation of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India is based on friendship and well-wishing. There is no necessity for describing the

misbehaviour and misconduct which has frequently come to light on the part of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. There can be no doubt that they (acts) are not hidden from His Excellency. I feel shame in repeating them. Mention before a father of the evil actions of his son undoubtedly tends to increase the father's shame. Sincere intelligent friends owing to their sound judgment and farsightedness do not like under any circumstances to put their faithful friends to such shame. Should Government's guidance be serviceable to him (the son) what difficulty is there in enabling him to regain good fortune ("saadat")? As regards the friendship existing between the two Governments (*viz.*, the English and Afghan Governments), by the help and grace of God it is being confirmed and consolidated every day and every minute. Neither on the part of the British Government nor on the part of the Afghan Government does any unsuitable action occur against (or opposed to) the purport of former written or verbal communications which might tend to any sort of displeasure or annoyance to His Excellency. By the grace of God in future also the friendship existing between the two Governments will continue to increase."

The Government of India reported the Amir's observations to the Secretary of State, but considered it inadvisable to interfere any further in the matter.

**103. Communication of state of affairs to the British Minister at Teheran.**—The enquiries made by Mr. Taylour Thomson in respect to the proceedings at Herat of the Persian Agent, Mirza Mahomed Ali, have been noticed in paragraph 91. The connection of Persia with the affairs of Herat rendered expedient the transmission to Mr. Thomson of a statement of the situation. Accordingly, in a despatch, No. 2748, dated 12th December, the Government of India explained to that officer the information which had reached them regarding Yakub Khan's imprisonment. They drew attention to the pretext put forward in justification of the Sirdar's removal

\* From British Agent, dated 9th November 1874. from Herat, *viz.*, lest\* he should openly or secretly sell that province to Persia or Russia. Also, to a report said to have originated with the Sirdar's confidential adherents that the Persian Agent had intimated to Yakub the readiness of the Persian Government to give as much money and munitions of war as he required, if he proved his allegiance towards the Shah by reading the "Kutba" and striking coin in his name, and that if the Sirdar needed troops, his request would not be declined. Care was taken to keep Mr. Thomson informed of the course of events according as intelligence reached the Government of India.

**104. The Mustaufi and Mirakhor march against Herat. Flight of Sirdar Ayub Khan to Persia and fall of Herat.**—Immediately after Yakub's arrest the Amir addressed the following letter to Ayub Khan warning him to remain faithful, and intimating the appointment of the Mirakhor as Civil Governor of Herat:—

"Your elder brother has been imprisoned in consequence of his unbecoming actions. You should continue to remain at Herat. Mirakhor Ahmed Khan is the full Civil Governor, and, pending further orders, Shahghassi Sherdil Khan will be your Naib in the military administration. You should remain in a re-assured ('ba khater jama') manner at Herat. Should you in any way use your hands and feet (against me), you will at the end ('akhar kar') be cut into two pieces with a saw." Letters have also been sent to Civil and Military Officers and Chiefs to the effect that, pending the improvement of his conduct and character, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan has been imprisoned. Should he arrive at a right conclusion, some arrangements (other than the grant of Herat) will be made for his subsistence. "You are all my servants, and you should occupy yourselves in your duties; you should consider Mirakhor Ahmed Khan as full Governor and not deviate from his orders. After a few days I will come myself in that direction on circuit."

The departure of the Amir himself to Kandahar was decided, after much discussion, to be unadvisable. It was, however, resolved that Mustaufi Hubibulla Khan and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, and General Daud Shah should proceed with a considerable body of troops to support the Mirakhor, whose hot temper might, it was feared, create difficulties. Full power was given to the Mustaufi to deal with the situation at Herat as he might think fit. His general instructions were to appoint either the Mirakhor or Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, Governor of Herat, and to deport Ayub Khan and Yakub Khan's adherents to Kabul.

Kabul Diary, 17th-19th November 1874.

The Sirdar's own opinion as to the manner in which the Heratees would behave in the crisis may be noticed here. In reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Hossein Ali Khan, he said—

"As regards Herat matters, though the people was highly satisfied with me, I always felt uneasy ('be-aram') as it is difficult to deal with them. As they are displeased with you (meaning the Amir and his adherents), and as your Agents will hardly adopt a kind and conciliatory policy towards them, I am afraid lest they should seek to gain their object by inviting Sirdar Shahnawaz Khan, eldest son of the late Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan, Governor of Herat, who is at present in Teheran, or some other person, and thus the Herat territory should go out of our hands for nothing ('muft')."

Presently, disquieting news arrived from Herat. Ayub Khan, who had at first been much depressed on hearing of Yakub's arrest, was said to be bestirring himself. Yakub had written desiring him to undertake active operations and to place Herat in a state of defence. Shalghassi Sherdil Khan and Din Mahomed Khan, who were five marches in advance of the Mirakhor, were taken prisoners at a distance of six koss from Herat by Mahomed Zaman Khan, Allkozai, brother-in-law of Yakub Khan, and Abdulla Khan, Barakzai, one of Ayub's adherents. The Amir, however, did not appear to be alarmed. He told the Mirakhor that Herat was disorganized, and could not offer much resistance. Nevertheless the Mustaufi was ordered to hasten his preparations, and the Mirakhor was enjoined to conciliate the local Chiefs and do nothing precipitately.

It was reported that Mir Alum Khan of Kain was reviewing his troops and enlisting recruits, a circumstance which indicated a possibility of his making a demonstration in aid of Ayub. Indeed, the fear lest Persia should be tempted to interpose was the main cause why so large a force—reported to number 12,000 men—was sent against Herat. Both the Mirakhor and the Mustaufi submitted reports that their troops were amply sufficient to take the place, and as they approached Herat there were evident signs of a collapse. Khan Aka Jamshidi, who had before refused to join Ayub Khan, now acted openly against him. Ayub Khan, General Fakir Mahomed Khan, and Sirdar Mahomed Hassan Khan, Governor of Sebzwar, then fled across the Persian border to Khaff, and Herat was occupied, as had been anticipated, without any fighting.

In due course the Mustaufi submitted a report of his proceedings to the Amir. He had sent Ayub Khan's tutor, Bahram Khan, Barakzai, with re-assuring letters to the Sirdar, and had occupied the fort of Herat in strength. The Amir commented on this report as follows:—

"Though apparently the Province of Herat is the frontier of Afghanistan, in reality in the opinion of wise and far-sighted persons it is the key (lit. centre) of Central Asia. The Governments in Central Asia have always, from ancient times, considered Herat more important than other countries. Under these circumstances such efforts should be made for the occupation of the fort and the consolidation of the Government of Herat as may be advantageous should difficulties arise. This consolidation and occupation will one day be most advantageous to the interests of Afghanistan. Arrangements should be made for strengthening the fort, and a strong detachment of the best Afghan troops posted in it. It is probable that after avoiding the unnecessary expenses at present incurred in Herat, the income of Herat, Furreh, and Tehura will be sufficient for the pay of Herat troops. Besides this, the troops will enjoy comfort as grain supplies are cheap and grass is abundant. Even at present the Kabul troops and those

\* Meaning that the defence of Herat before in Herat are not insufficient.\* However the number seems already sufficiently provided for. of troops that should be posted in Herat will be fixed on receipt of a full report from the Mustaufi."

The re-assuring letters did not produce the desired results. Ayub ridiculed the idea of his trusting himself to his father's mercy. He wrote to the Amir:—

Kabul Diary from the 16th to the 18th March, inclusive.

"Though Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan is older than I am, he through mental derangement rejected my advice against his going from Herat to Kabul, and he went to Kabul. The result of his going is evident. My brain has not yet suffered, but when it is deranged I shall come to Kabul and by choice sit alongside my elder brother. At present I have taken refuge in the Persian territory. Should I be able to live comfortably here, well and good, otherwise I will go to Turkey."

General Fakir Mahomed Khan and other of Yakub and Ayub's adherents were equally scornful in their letters to the Shahghassi Sherdil Khan. They said—

"You are not more trustworthy than Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai Chiefs, in the Kabul Government, so that we may rely on you. The result of the agreement of these Chiefs is what has been shown to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. Had you been real well-wishers of the Amir, the disaffection between His Highness and his son would not have so far increased. We were the chief servants of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, and through loyalty towards him we share his brother's pleasures and affliction."

These letters were forwarded from Herat to the Amir, who was much annoyed with their contents and tone.

**105. Mr. Tylour Thomson's suggestion for intervention on behalf of Yakub is disapproved by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government.**—On the 18th January 1875, Mr. Tylour Thomson communicated to the Government of India the following telegram which he had sent to Lord Derby :—

"Sirdar Yakub has expressed, through one of his principal partisans\* at Herat, a desire to enter into communication with me, with the view, no doubt, of obtaining the friendly intervention of Her Majesty's Government. He states that his reason for seeking this channel is the fear that any attempt at direct communication from Kabul would not fail to be discovered. I propose (if approved of) replying that Her Majesty's Government are sincerely desirous that civil dissension in Afghanistan should cease, and that I shall be happy to learn from his friends how this may be most readily attained."

The Government of India immediately (19th January) telegraphed to the Secretary of State strongly objecting to any communications between Mr. Thomson and Yakub on Kabul affairs, and advising that Mr. Thomson's proposed answer to Herat should not be approved. Mr. Thomson was also informed by Lord Northbrook of the opinion of the Government of India that any correspondence between him and Yakub or his adherents would be objectionable and embarrassing. These views were explained in detail in the following despatch :—

No. 5, dated Fort William, 22nd January 1875.

From—Government of India,

To—Secretary of State for India.

"We have the honor to forward copies of the telegraphic correspondence noted on the margin, from which Your Lordship will observe that in our opinion it would be objectionable and embarrassing if Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran were permitted to enter into any communication with Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan or his adherents for the purpose of endeavouring to effect a cessation of civil discord in Afghanistan."

"2. It appears to us that the reply which Mr. Thomson proposed to send to the communication made to him would either have no significance, or would mean that the Government of India are prepared to enter into communication with His Highness the Amir of Kabul regarding his differences with Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, and to tender their good offices to effect an amicable settlement.

"3. We do not apprehend that our good offices, if tendered, would be accepted by His Highness. On the contrary, we have reason to suppose, from the views which the Amir is known to entertain on the question of the succession, and from the terms† in which our communication respecting the arrest of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan was acknowledged, that His Highness would regard any action of the kind as an interference in the internal and domestic affairs of his country and would decline our offer. In such an event we should have abandoned the policy of non-interference in the internal concerns of Afghanistan which we have hitherto resolved to maintain, without securing the object immediately in view.

"4. On the other hand, if His Highness the Amir should be willing to accept our intervention between himself and his son, the only plan appearing to afford a reasonable prospect of settling the present differences in Afghanistan would be, that Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan should be restored to the Governorship of Herat, and that on the death of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, Sirdar Yakub Khan should retain Herat and its dependencies, while Sirdar Abdoola Jan, the heir-apparent, would succeed to the rest of the kingdom. But the separation of Herat from Afghanistan would undoubtedly render interference on the part of Russia or Persia with Herat far more easy than is now the case, if indeed it would not actually

† *I* vide enclosure of our despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 2, dated 1st January 1875.



invite such interference. It would be contrary to the interests of India that we should take any course which would be likely to produce such a result.

"5. If, however, it be held that notwithstanding the possible risk of injury to the interests of this country, the Government of India ought not to shrink from tendering their good offices to settle the internal disturbances of Afghanistan, we have still to consider what reasonable prospect there would be of the successful issue of any arrangement which might be made through our means.

"6. Looking to the past history of Afghanistan, as well as to the character of more recent transactions in that country, we find it difficult to convince ourselves that any engagements which might be entered into under our auspices would be observed longer than might be for the advantage of the parties concerned. In the event of the death of the present Amir it appears in the highest degree probable, that whatever previous engagements for the partition of Afghanistan might have been concluded, a civil war would ensue. The success of any arrangement that we might recommend and inaugurate would therefore be more than doubtful.

"7. It should further be considered that if a temporary settlement should be made under our auspices, the Government of India would not occupy the same position as it has hitherto done. The condition of education and of public opinion in Central Asia is not sufficiently advanced to admit of a general understanding in the minds of the people that the use by a nation of good offices, for the purpose of settling a dispute, entails no obligation to enforce the arrangement, if it should be broken by one of the parties concerned. If, then, we made no attempt to enforce the arrangement, we should be humiliated; and if we interfered by force of arms, it would be a repetition of the mistake which led to the Afghan war.

"8. To resume our argument, we think that the tender of the good offices of this Government would in all probability be declined, and that no such tender should be made, because its acceptance would neither be to the interests of India, nor be likely to result in a permanent settlement of the differences between the Amir and his son. We are, further, convinced that even if circumstances should so change as to make it desirable that we should use our good offices on this matter, no communications should be carried on between the British Minister at Teheran and Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. Such correspondence could not fail to arouse suspicions in the mind of the Amir that the British Government were interfering in the interests of his son, and so to weaken our influence at Kabul."

Her Majesty's Government fully concurred with the opinion expressed by the Government of India, and Mr. Thomson was directed to abstain from making any communication to Yakub Khan.

**106. Dissatisfaction of Sirdar Ayub Khan with the manner of his reception by the Persian authorities. Proposal to place him under British protection negatived.**—Intimation of the occupation of Herat and Ayub's flight having been given to the Secretary of State and the British Minister at Teheran, the latter replied on the 12th February that orders had been sent by the Persian Government to the Governor-General of Khorasan that the political refugees must forthwith repair either to Meshed or leave the country. On the question being raised whether the Persian Government should be requested to remove these political refugees further from Afghanistan than Meshed, the Government of India advised no

\* Telegram, No. 617P., dated 18th February 1875. interference of the kind unless the Amir asked for the good offices of the British Government.\*

On the 27th February Mr. Tylour Thomson telegraphed the substance of a report received from the British Agent at Meshed. It was to the effect that the reception of Ayub Khan and his followers by the Persian authorities at Meshed had not been such as they had expected, both as regards their public reception and the manner in which their necessities had been provided for. The Afghan officials in possession of Herat had invited Ayub to return there, and had asked the Persian authorities to induce him to do so. The invitation had been rejected. Mahomed Hassan Khan had said to the British Agent—"Ayub will not return to Afghanistan unless Yakub be released. If this is not granted, and Persia retains Ayub, it will cause a war between the two Governments; and should Persia not retain him, he will be obliged to seek refuge in Russia." He further said—"I wish to place Ayub under British protection, but as we have no assurances that that protection will be granted, will you report this circumstance to British Minister and obtain speedy reply."

The Government of India, in reply to Mr. Thomson, declined to offer British protection to Ayub, who had been in arms against his father, their ally. In order to obviate risk of quarrel between the two countries, Ayub should be prevented from making use of his refuge in Persia to cause disturbances in Afghanistan.

Telegram, No. 766P., dated 1st March 1875.

Another letter from the Meshed Agent reported that Ayub Khan having threatened the life of General Fakir Mahomed, the latter had taken asylum in the shrine. The Persian Government ordered Ayub Khan to be informed that he had no authority over Afghan refugees while in Persian territory; that he was simply a guest, and that if he persisted in threatening their lives, it might be necessary to cause him to quit the country.

Telegram, dated 11th March 1875.

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER V.

*Report, dated 2nd April 1875, by Captain the Hon'ble G. Napier, on the Perso-Afghan Border, with memorandum on political situation in Herat in autumn of 1874. This report will be found in a bound volume of Captain Napier's Journals and Reports printed at the India Office, London.*

*Appendix No. XIII.—Account of Herat by Resaldar Daud Khan (1872).*

*Appendix No. XIV.—Narrative by Extra Assistant Commissioner, Ghulam Ahmed, of his visit to Kabul in May 1874.*

*Appendix No. XV.—F. B.'s memorandum, dated 29th September 1874, comparing present and past conditions of Kabul, with note by Sir T. D. Forsyth.*

## CHAPTER VI.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—JANUARY 1875—FEBRUARY 1876. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMIR PRIOR TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE—FEBRUARY TO DECEMBER 1876.

---

**107. Lord Salisbury's instructions in respect to the appointment of an English officer as British Agent at Herat.**—In Appendix XI attached to this précis will be found an account of certain conversations which took place at the Ambala Durbar between Lord Mayo and Shere Ali and between Syud Nur Mahomed and various British officials. At an interview with Major (then Captain) Grey, Syud Nur Mahomed explained that if the British Government were ready to acknowledge and support Shere Ali and any heir whom he might select, there was nothing to which the Amir would not accede. The Amir was open to any proposition that might be deemed desirable for the security of the northern border of Afghanistan, and considered that, though Russian aggression was not imminent, precautions might properly be taken. He was ready to construct forts either on his own part or under British superintendence and to admit European garrisons if ever desired. He would gladly see an Engineer or Agent in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere except actually in Kabul. At another conversation on the 1st April 1869, at which Messrs. Seton-Karr, Thornton, Pollock, Girdlestone, and Grey were present, the Minister was more reserved on the subject of the immediate appointment of Agents. He added, however, that the day might come when "the Russ" would arrive and the Amir would be glad not only of British officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them. Subsequently, at a secret council held at Lahore on the 17th March 1869, the Amir was reported to have expressed himself as follows:—

"Should the British authorities propose that a European Agent be stationed at Kabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such arrangements, but the people of Kabul are turbulent and mischievous. Should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Amir, my father, on this very consideration, refused to have a European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Kandahar, or Balkh, or Herat, there would be no objection. Such an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments; for instance, at the present time the people of Lower Seistán have commenced encroachments on the Kandahar boundaries. Lower Seistán was formerly always attached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by Persia only since a short time. We are not aware what agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistán. If there should be a European Agent on the border, he would be possessed of the necessary information, and would be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to territories beyond the borders."

The result of the arrangements agreed to at Ambala was thus summed up in paragraphs 16 and 22 of Foreign Department Secret despatch, No. 213, dated 1st July 1869—

"16. The policy that we have endeavoured to establish may be termed an intermediate one, that is to say, that while we distinctly intimated to the Amir that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; that no Treaty would be entered into, obliging us under *every* circumstance to recognize him and his descendants Rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were prepared by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence, of friendly disposition, of respect for his character and interest in his fortunes, to give all the moral support in our power; and that, in addition, we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so."

\* \* \* \* \*

"22. The position of affairs at the close of the conferences may, in the Viceroy's words, confidentially addressed to Your Grace, be summed up as follows:—

"1stly.—What the Amir is not to have.

"No treaty; no fixed subsidy; no European troops, officers, or Residents; no dynastic pledges.

"2ndly.—What he is to have.

"Warm countenance and support; discouragement of his rivals; such material assistance as we may consider absolutely necessary for his immediate wants; constant and friendly communication through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our Native Agents in Afghanistan; he on his part undertaking to do all he can to maintain peace on our frontier, and to comply with all our wishes on matters connected with trade."

The subject of the location in certain towns of Afghanistan of English officers as representatives of the British Government was also discussed between Mr. Aitchison and Syud Nur Mahomed on the occasion of the latter's visit to

\* *Fide ante page 102, and memorandum on page 103.*

Simla in 1873.\* No conclusive arrangement could be arrived at, because the Envoy declared himself to be without instructions on the subject. But after Mr. Aitchison had explained what were the objects which the British Government hoped to attain by the deputation of English officers to reside in the Amir's dominions, the Syud advised against any specific request being preferred on the subject. He recommended that a separate letter should be written, which he would deliver, suggesting the desirability of the inspection of the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan by a British officer. On this officer's return another might be deputed to consult with the Amir regarding the results of the examination of the frontier. The Amir and his people would thus become familiarized with the presence of English officers, and the path be cleared for the appointment of a permanent representative. This suggestion was agreed to, but, as has been shown in Chapter IV of this précis, the expected results were not achieved; and the coldness which marked the subsequent relations of the Amir with the Government of India precluded the subject being again broached. The question therefore rested on its former unsettled basis, when in the beginning of 1875 the Secretary of State addressed the following despatch to the Government of India, directing, for reasons given, that early measures should be taken to procure the assent of the Amir to the establishment of a British Agency, first, at Herat, and afterwards at Kandahar. Kabul was excluded in consequence of the difficulties interposed by the fanatic violence of the people:—

No. 2, dated India Office, London, 22nd January 1875.

From—Secretary of State for India,  
To—Government of India.

"Her Majesty's Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia, and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. Though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in those regions, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution.

"2. In considering the questions of policy which arise from time to time, Her Majesty's advisers cannot but be struck with the comparative scantiness of the information which it is in Your Excellency's power to supply. For knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers, they are compelled to rely mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reaches them through the Foreign Office.

"3. Your Excellency maintains a Native Agent at Kabul. I am informed that he is a man of intelligence and respectability. But it appears to be very doubtful whether he is in a condition to furnish you with any facts which it is not the Amir's wish that you should receive. Even if you could rely upon the perfect frankness of his communications, it is not likely that any Native Agent would possess a sufficient insight into the policy of western nations to collect the information you require. One of the principal qualifications for this function is the neutrality of feeling in respect to religious and national controversies which only a European can possess. Of the value of the Kabul diaries different opinions are expressed. It is obvious that they are very meagre, and doubts have been thrown upon their fidelity.

"4. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that more exact and constant information is necessary to the conduct of a circumspect policy at the present juncture. The disposition of the people in various parts of Afghanistan, the designs and intrigues of its Chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its frontier, the influence which foreign powers may possibly be exerting within and without its borders, are matters of which a proper account can only be rendered to you by an English Agent residing in the country. There are many details, moreover, a knowledge of which it is material that the military authorities should possess, and with respect to which it is not to be expected that a Native Agent would be either able or willing to collect for you trustworthy information.

"5. I have, therefore, to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Amir to the establishment of

a British Agency at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Kandahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Kabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.

"6. The Amir has more than once, in former years, expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is, therefore, not probable that if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now. But if he should do so, Your Excellency will doubtless point out to him that the interest which Her Majesty feels in the integrity of Afghanistan makes it essential that she should be able to receive, from the observations of her own officers, warnings of any danger that may threaten it.

"7. I have dwelt upon the importance of an English Agency at Herat exclusively for the sake of the information an English officer might collect. But it will have other material though more indirect results. It will be an indication of English solicitude for the safety of our allies, and may so tend to discourage counsels dangerous to the peace of Asia."

**108. Discussion on Lord Salisbury's proposal, and reply of the Government of India explaining the situation and dissenting from the policy of Her Majesty's Government.**—The Government of India had no record showing that the Amir had ever expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an European Agent at Herat. Nor did they agree that His Highness would only object to the proposal if his intentions had ceased to be loyal. They anticipated that he would object, and that his objections might not proceed from improper motives. This view of the case was represented to the Secretary of State, with an inquiry whether any discretion was left to the Government of India as to the selection of a suitable time and opportunity for carrying out the instructions, adding that existing circumstances appeared to be very unsuitable for taking the initiative. The Secretary of State (Lord Salisbury) replied that a delay of three or four months would be covered by the instructions in the despatch, but that a longer delay must be specially explained. Events in Europe rendered Russian activity more probable. With regard to the expression of the Amir's views in respect to the location of an English Resident at Herat, the Government of India were referred to the papers included in Appendix XI of this précis. Major Grey, whose original memorandum of 1869 will be found in the Appendix cited, was thereupon asked to submit his recollection on the point under consideration. He wrote on the 29th March (*vide* Appendix No. XVI) that the Amir did freely consent to the appointment of European British officers in Balk, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul; and again in a demi-official letter, dated 19th April, that the Amir "agreed to the deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased, and his only stipulation regarding British Envoys was that they should not reside at Kabul." The Punjab Government were then called upon for an

To Punjab, No. 48 C.P., dated 25th March 1875. opinion on the following questions, after consultation with such officers as might be considered competent to advise concerning them:—

1st.—Whether the Amir of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place.

2nd.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

3rd.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence now received from the British Agent at Kabul, and if not, whether he can suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence.

The officers consulted are named on the margin, and extracts from the opinions of some of them will be found in Appendix No. XVI. After fully considering the views of these experienced officials, the Government of India ultimately addressed the Secretary of State as follows:—

Sir H. Davies.		Genl. R. Taylor.
Dr. T. Thornton.		Col. A. Munro.
Sir R. Pollock.		Capt. Cavignari.

No. 19, dated Simla, 7th June 1875.

From—Government of India,  
To—Secretary of State for India.

"We have the honor to reply to Your Lordship's Secret despatch, No. 2, dated the 22nd January 1875, on the subject of the deputation of British Agents to Herat and Kandahar.

"2. In the despatch under acknowledgment it was stated—1st, that though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty, the aspect of affairs on the



frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution; *2nd*, that Her Majesty's Government are compelled mainly to rely upon the indirect intelligence received through the English Foreign Office for a knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers, as the Native Agent of the Government of India at Kabul does not, and cannot be expected to, furnish the full and trustworthy information which is required; *3rd*, that the Amir of Kabul, having more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of a British Agent at Herat, would probably raise no serious objection to the proposed arrangement if his intentions are still loyal.

"3. We were accordingly instructed to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Amir to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. The adoption of a similar arrangement at Kandahar was indicated as a desirable measure to be taken hereafter, but having regard to the fanatical violence of the people, the establishment of a British Agency at Kabul was not suggested.

"4. By telegram from the Viceroy despatched on the 18th February 1875, Your Lordship was informed that in our judgment the time and circumstances appeared unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter; that nothing was traceable among the records of the Government of India showing that the Amir had ever expressed his readiness to agree to the presence of a British Agent at Herat; that His Highness might have objections to such an arrangement, and yet that those objections might not indicate disloyal intentions on his part towards the British Government. We therefore enquired whether the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were to be carried out at once, or whether a discretion was left to the Government of India with respect to time and opportunity.

"5. In answer to the above enquiry we received Your Lordship's telegram despatched on the 23rd February 1875, by which we were informed that a delay of three or four months would be within the discretion contemplated by the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, but that for any further delay our reasons should be stated. We were also referred to certain papers in support of the statement that the Amir had expressed his readiness to accept a British Agent at Herat, and we were directed to ascertain the fact from Sir Richard Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, Mr. Thornton, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, and Mr. Girdlestone, Resident in Nipal.

"6. The Viceroy had arranged to be at Delhi towards the end of March, and it was therefore deemed desirable that further consideration of the subject should be postponed until His Excellency should have had the opportunity of conferring personally with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and with some of the officers whose names have been mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The conference took place on the 23rd March 1875, and on the 24th Your Lordship was informed by telegraph that the opinions of the officers of the Punjab were adverse to the proposal that the Amir should be pressed to accept a British officer as Agent at Herat. We added that the views of those officers who had been consulted would be considered at Simla, and the opinion of the Government of India would then be communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

"7. We at once addressed the Government of the Punjab for the purpose of obtaining the recorded opinions of the Lieutenant-Governor and such experienced officers of the Punjab as His Honor might consider competent to advise on the subject. The following points were indicated as those to which attention should be directed:—

"*First*.—Whether the Amir of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place.

"*Second*.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

"*Third*.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor was satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence received from the British Agent at Kabul, and if not, whether His Honor could suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence.

"8. Mr. Girdlestone, Resident in Nipal, was also asked whether he could call to mind the authority from which the information recorded in his note of the 26th March 1869 was derived, that the Amir was prepared, if requested, to allow European Agents at Kandahar, Herat, and Balkh.

"9. The replies to our enquiries have been received. They are enumerated in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, and they form the basis of the opinions which we now submit for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

"10. Before entering upon the question whether, at the present time and under existing circumstances, it would be politic to request the assent of the Amir of Kabul to the residence of British officers within his dominions, we desire to notice the two other points mentioned in the despatch of 22nd January 1875, namely, *first*, the value of the intelligence at present received through our Native Agent at Kabul, and, *second*, the statement that the Amir has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to allow the presence of an European Agent at Herat.

"11. As regards the first of these two points, we are of opinion that the value of the reports which we received from our Agent at Kabul has been under-estimated, and we have no recollection of important intelligence relating to Afghan affairs having been communicated to us from Teheran, or from England, through the Foreign Office. Information respecting the

condition of the Turkistan frontier of Afghanistan will probably be obtained with greater promptness and accuracy through Persia than through Afghanistan.

" 12. It is no doubt true that the position of the Native Agent at Kabul compels him to be cautious in communicating news to the British Government. As observed by Sir Richard Pollock, 'any native who took a perfectly independent tone at Kabul and made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government without reference to the wishes of the Amir all information that he believed to be correct would very shortly find his position at Kabul unbearable.' We think, moreover, that in endeavouring to keep on friendly terms with the Amir, the Agent does no more than common prudence would dictate, and that he shows a right judgment in omitting to report every idle rumour that may come to his hearing.

" 13. We have no reason, however, to believe that information of importance has been withheld, or that the intelligence reported in the Kabul diaries has been subjected to the approval of the Amir, and we would refer as illustrations of our meaning to the two diaries numbered 12 and 13 in the Abstract of Contents. In both these diaries there are allusions to the conduct of the Governor of Afghan Turkistan, and in the diary for the period from the 4th to 6th May 1875 it is mentioned that two adherents of Sirlar Mahomed Yakub Khan had been blown from guns. We think that these and other particulars contained in the diaries are not pieces of intelligence which the Amir of Kabul would be desirous of bringing to the knowledge of the British Government.

" 14. On the whole, we are of opinion that, making due allowances for the position of our Agent at Kabul, the information which he supplies is fairly full and accurate. In this conclusion we are supported generally by the views of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and his most experienced officers. There are doubts indeed as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given, but we think that a retrospect of the series of diaries relating to recent events at Herat will prove that the value of the information is not destroyed by such defects. The correctness of our Agent's reports has been corroborated by confidential information which we obtain from time to time from Afghanistan.

" 15. On the second point mentioned in the 10th paragraph of this despatch, namely, that the Amir had more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of a British Agent at Herat, we invite special attention to the memorandum of Secret records in the Punjab Office, which is appended to Mr. Thornton's note of the 21st April 1875. It will be observed that the person on whose authority the statement respecting the intentions of the Amir in some measure depended, has since affirmed that, so far as he could ascertain at Ambala in 1869, it was the belief of the Afghan councillors that the Amir had never agreed to the location of British officers in Afghanistan.

" 16. Sir Richard Pollock and Mr. Thornton, from whom the information recorded in Mr. Girdlestone's note of the 26th March 1869 was supposed to have been derived, are not under the impression that the disposition of the Amir was such as was described in Mr. Girdlestone's note. Mr. Girdlestone's information was not obtained from the Amir himself. No admission on the part of the Amir of his readiness to receive (European) British Agents in Afghanistan is to be found in any document that passed between the Government of India and the Amir. The subject was not mentioned at the official interviews between Nur Mahomed Shah and the Foreign Secretary on the 1st and 3rd of April 1869, when the question of the mission of Native Agents alone was discussed. It was not alluded to by Lord Mayo in his conferences with the Amir; nor was the future establishment of British Agents in Afghanistan reported to the Secretary of State as one of the results of the Ambala conferences.

" 17. On the contrary, we find that in the despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, No. 213, dated 1st July 1869—a despatch written for the purpose of

Paragraph 16. explaining some doubts which had been expressed by the Duke of Argyll as to the policy of the negotiations with the Amir—  
it was said: 'We distinctly intimated to the Amir ..... that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities,' and 'the position' at the close of the conferences may, in the Viceroy's words confi-

Paragraph 20. dentially addressed Your Grace, be summed up as follows:—

" '1st. What the Amir is not to have: No treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers or Residents.'

" 18. On the other hand, Captain Grey, who was in confidential communication with the Amir and his Minister, Nur Mahomed Shah, at Ambala, has stated in his letter dated 29th March 1875 that 'the Amir *did* freely consent to the appointment of European British officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul.' But it will be observed that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has expressed strong doubts as to whether the meaning of the Amir may not have been misapprehended. Sir Robert Davies believes that while the Amir may have been ready to acquiesce in the appointment of mere news-writers, His Highness was never prepared to accede to the appointment of Political Agents within his dominions.

" 19. On the whole, however, we think that either the Amir himself or his Minister, Nur Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Kabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Amir at the Ambala conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is,

upon obtaining the recognition, in a treaty with the British Government, of his son Abdulla Jan as his successor. Such a formal recognition His Highness was anxious to secure, but Lord Mayo for obvious reasons declined to entertain the proposal.

"20. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, the absence of any formal record of the alleged admission, its entirely private and confidential nature, and the uncertainty as to its scope and intention, we consider that we should not be justified in founding any representation to the Amir regarding the mission of a British Agent to Herat upon the assumption that he had, when at Ambala, expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrangement; nor do we think that, in forming an opinion upon the Amir's reception of any such proposal at the present time, we could fairly attach any importance to the communications which were made to Captain Grey at Ambala in 1869. Of any previous or subsequent acceptance of such a proposal by the Amir we can find no trace.

"21. We now proceed to consider the question whether, putting aside the supposition that the Amir has on previous occasions assented to the proposal, it would be wise and politic to urge upon him the establishment of a British Agency at Herat or Kandabar. And here we invite attention to the opinions of the able and experienced officers whose letters accompany this despatch.

"22. If the concurrence of all those who may be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Amir is of any value, we must be prepared to find him most unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat. On this the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Richard Pollock, Major-General Reynell Taylor, Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavaguarì, are all agreed, and their views are confirmed—

"*First.*—By those of Nawab Foujdar Khan and Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan, who have successively served as British Agents at Kabul, and who have means of knowing the present sentiments of the Amir.

"*Second.*—By the opinion of Nur Mahomed Shah, the Kabul Envoy, who, when at Simla in 1873, advised the Foreign Secretary that a specific request should not be preferred to the Amir for British officers to be stationed within the Afghan dominions.

"*Third.*—By the recent acts of the Amir in objecting to permit Sir T. D. Forsyth to traverse Balkh on his return journey from Yarkund, and in discouraging\* Colonel Baker from returning to India from Teheran *via* Kabul.

\* *Vide* enclosure of our despatch, No. 7, dated 23rd January 1874.

"23. Assuming that the Amir would object to the location of a British Agent at Herat, we are not of opinion that his objection would imply that his intentions have ceased to be loyal towards the British Government. It is true that such an objection, if raised by an European power, or even by some Asiatic rulers, although it might be justifiable by the principles of international law, would evince a disposition but little removed from actual hostility; but the motives of the Amir cannot, in our opinion, fairly be judged by this standard.

"24. There can be no reasonable doubt that there still exists a strong party among the Sirdars of Afghanistan opposed to the measure. Although the time which has elapsed since the Afghan war appears to us to be long on account of the succession of Governors-General of India and the importance of the events that have intervened, there are many persons now living in Afghanistan who were engaged in that war, and whose memory of what took place is probably the more lively from the narrow limits of their thoughts and actions. Those who have had the most intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan have always expressed their opinion that the establishment of complete confidence between the Afghans and British must be a work of time, and this opinion will be found repeated in the enclosures of this despatch.

"25. We consider that the reluctance of the Amir to consent to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan is attributable mainly to the adverse feeling entertained by an influential party in that country to the measure and to the consequent unpopularity he would incur by consenting to it. His position in Afghanistan is not so secure that he can afford to neglect any strong feeling among an important section of his subjects. He may also be influenced by the possibility of the safety of the officers employed being endangered by the acts of fanatics. This danger was hinted† at by both the Sadr-i-Azem and the Amir at the time when Sir T. D. Forsyth's return through Afghanistan was discussed in the Kabul Durbar. It was for these reasons that we thought the Amir's refusal to allow Sir T. D. Forsyth to return through Afghanistan might reasonably be explained without assuming that it was prompted by an unfriendly feeling towards the British Government, and we accordingly abstained from pressing him upon the subject.

† *Vide* enclosure of our despatch, No. 26, dated 1st May 1874.

"26. Besides the above reasons, there is probably also the apprehension that the permanent location of British officers in Afghanistan would bring to light proceedings which would be condemned by our standard of right and wrong, and might find their way into the public press, of which the Amir feels a great dread. We may again refer to the diaries accompanying this despatch as containing illustrations in point. That such apprehensions are not confined to the Amir of Kabul is evident from the strong feeling which has been expressed by the Maharaja of Kashmir against the appointment of a permanent Resident at His Highness' Court.

"27. We have thought it to be our duty to state in what particulars our information as to the condition of Afghanistan and the sentiments of the Amir towards the British Government leads us to differ from some of the opinions entertained by Her Majesty's Government. At

the same time we agree with Her Majesty's Government that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkistan, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat. The appointment, it is true, would be attended with some risks, and the usefulness of the measure would depend on the discretion of the Agent who might be selected. But if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Amir and the Afghan officials, we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement. Under such circumstances, the Agent would be in a position, not only to procure valuable information, but probably also to exert his influence with some hope of success in the interests of peace by preventing collisions between the subjects of powers beyond the frontier and the subjects of Afghanistan. His presence at Herat would also, to some extent, be a check on any movements threatening to Afghanistan.

"28. But, for the attainment of these ends, it is in our opinion essential that the proposed arrangements should have the cordial consent of the Amir. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that, if we were to press the question on the Amir at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance.

"29. If the Amir should give an unwilling consent, the officers whom we have consulted are agreed that no advantage would be derived from the presence of a British Agent at Herat. The case is forcibly stated in the 33rd paragraph of Major-General Taylor's letter, dated 17th April 1875, and the obstacles which would render the acquisition of valuable information impossible under such circumstances are described in paragraph 3 of Sir Richard Pollock's letter of 30th March. Moreover, if the Amir should represent the risk to which our Agent might be exposed from the acts of fanatics or persons opposed to the presence of our officers in Afghanistan and an outrage on the person of the Agent were attempted, we should be subjected to a humiliation for which under the circumstances we might not be justified in holding the Afghan Government responsible, and for which therefore it would be extremely difficult to obtain satisfaction.

"30. If the Amir should refuse, his refusal would impair the influence of the Government of India in Afghanistan. It must either be accepted without any change being made in our present policy towards Afghanistan, in which case the Amir would be encouraged to act upon other occasions without regard to the wishes of the British Government, or we must treat it as a proof of unfriendly feeling on his part, modify our present policy, retire from our attitude of sympathy, and withdraw our assurances of support. If we are correct in believing that the refusal would not show the intentions of the Amir to be disloyal, it would afford no sufficient justification for a change of policy which might throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia upon the first favorable opportunity. We may also observe that the refusal would weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in any future negotiations with Russia when questions might be raised as to the real value of British influence in Afghanistan.

"31. After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the Amir and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to Your Lordship by telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Amir, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favorable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now. In the meantime we shall neglect no opportunity of obtaining full information respecting events in Afghanistan by such means as may from time to time present themselves.

"32. It may not be out of place to add some observations upon our present relations with Afghanistan.

"33. It is difficult to appreciate the feelings which influence the conduct of the Amir Shere Ali, subject as he is to the risk of a revolution at home and apprehensive of attack from abroad. He cannot be expected to comprehend the language of European diplomacy, and his Ministers are imperfectly educated, of limited experience, and doubtful integrity. We believe, however, that he understands that the British Government have no designs of encroaching upon Afghanistan, that he feels that the interests of British India and his own are identical, that he is seriously alarmed at the progress of Russia, and that his main reliance is placed upon British support. His language after the return of his Envoy, Nur Mahomed Shah, from Simla in 1873, was certainly far from satisfactory, but we are disposed to attribute it either to his impression that we were so anxious for his support that by assuming an attitude of dissatisfaction he might obtain further assistance from us; or to his disappointment that we did not give him the distinct pledge he asked that the British Government would protect him under all circumstances against external attack, coupled, perhaps, with his discontent at the result of the Seistan arbitration.

"34. Sir Richard Pollock, whose intimate acquaintance with Nur Mahomed Shah, gives him the best means of forming a correct judgment of the Simla negotiations, and who on his return to Peshawur in the beginning of 1874 obtained confidential information as to the sentiments of the Amir, stated his conviction that no unfavorable change whatever had occurred in the disposition of His Highness, that he leaned as much as ever on the British Government, and that he (Sir Richard Pollock) could find no symptoms whatever of an incli-



nation on the part of the Amir, or on the part of those about him, to seek assistance from any other quarter. On the contrary (Sir Richard Pollock adds) it would appear that he looks with increasing distrust and suspicion on his northern neighbours, while Persia, his only other neighbour worth writing of, is his natural enemy.' Similar information has been received by us from other sources. We attach but little value to the vague rumours which have reached us from time to time that communications unknown to the British Government have passed between the Amir and Russian officers, or that Russian Agents have penetrated Afghanistan. It must not be forgotten that such rumours are frequent in regard to those countries. Similar rumours prevailed with respect to our own communications with Bokhara, and are current even now as to our dealings with the Turkoman tribes, without any foundation in fact.

"35. Since the Ambala conferences the Amir has never shown any disposition to neglect our advice as to the external relations of Afghanistan. He accepted fully, although with great reluctance, the decision of the British Government in the Seistán arbitration, and we have no reason to doubt that he intends loyally to abide by it.

"36. This being so, and if we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Amir towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed,—which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favorable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed—which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Ambala conferences—and which we have since steadily pursued—are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan; that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Amir from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that the old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of free intercourse between European British subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time when our motives are better understood. Their attainment would be hastened by a further advance of Russia in Turkistan, or by any other danger that may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan.

"37. Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before\* stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier.

"38. We think that these would be the measures best calculated to avert any dangers that may ensue from a Russian advance to Merv, and that they should be adopted when the necessity for them arises. The observations addressed on this subject† by the Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff appear to us to indicate the policy which should be pursued by the Government of India, and we have before stated our opinion that the more clearly Russia is given to understand the position which we have assumed towards Afghanistan the greater will be the probability of the maintenance of peace. To anticipate the Russian occupation of Merv by any active measures or specific treaty engagements would, in our opinion, be more likely to prejudice than to advance the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire.

"39. We attach great importance to the moral and material advantages which are derived from maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan; and we would impress upon Her Majesty's Government our conviction that such relations will best be secured by a steady adherence to the patient and conciliatory policy which has been pursued by the Government of India for many years towards Afghanistan; and by making every reasonable allowance for the difficulties of the Amir, even if he should be reluctant to accede to the views which we may entertain as to the measures which may be advisable equally for his own interests and for those of British India.

"40. In making these observations we by no means desire to imply that we are willing to concede any caprice of the Ruler of Afghanistan, and to grant everything that may be asked of us without requiring any return. Neither in the Ambala conferences, nor in the Simla negotiations of 1873, were nearly all the demands of the Amir complied with; and recently when we had reason to suppose that he intended to demur to our reasonable request that Ibrahim Khan should pass through Afghanistan with a communication from us to the Mir of Wakhan, we insisted upon a compliance with our wishes. We should adopt the same course again under similar circumstances."

**109. Further instructions from Her Majesty's Government.**—There was no great delay in answering the communication from the Government of India cited in the foregoing paragraph. In the annexed despatch,

\* Despatch No. 56, Secret, dated 8th September 1874.

† *Fide* enclosure of despatch from Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, dated 9th April 1875, No. 57, Secret.



No. 34, dated 19th November, Lord Salisbury conveyed the further instructions of Her Majesty's Government. The importance of the subject demands that the despatches to and from the Secretary of State and the Government of India in regard to the policy to be pursued towards the Amir of Afghanistan should be given at length, and it would be foreign to the purposes of the present compilation to comment on their contents. It is sufficient—in order to maintain the continuity of the narrative—to observe that after discussing the situation from the point of view in which it was regarded by the Government of India, Lord Salisbury intimated the decision of Her Majesty's Government that, as a first step towards the improvement of existing relations with the Amir, an immediate attempt should be made to induce him to receive a temporary embassy at Kabul. The object of the mission would be to assure him of the earnest desire entertained by the British Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack, and to explain the measures which were deemed necessary for securing his independence—the chief of these being the location of British officers upon the Amir's frontier to watch the course of events :—

Secret, No. 34, dated India Office, London, 19th November 1875.

From—Secretary of State for India,

To—Government of India.

"I have carefully considered your letter of 7th June, and the papers accompanying it, with respect to the establishment of a British Mission in Afghanistan.

"2. I do not gather that in Your Excellency's mind, or in that of the able officers whose communications are appended to the despatch, any doubt exists as to the insufficiency of the information which you now receive from that country. The baldness and extreme scantiness of the diaries hardly require to be established by testimony, and it appears, from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock, that only such information as the Amir approves of is contained in them. It would seem further, that, in the opinion of Sir R. Pollock, intelligence from Afghanistan was never so hard to obtain as it is now. Still less are the present arrangements efficient for the purpose of obtaining intelligent reports upon Central Asian affairs generally, or any trustworthy estimate of the course they may be expected to take; or for exercising any influence, in case of emergency, on the minds of the Amir or his nobles.

"3. Your Excellency does not doubt that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Central Asia, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat, and you anticipate great advantage from the arrangement, if the officer should be a man of sound judgment and possessing the full confidence of the Amir. The only point which you raise for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government is whether the advantages are such as to justify efforts being made for obtaining the concurrence of the Amir, which would be attended with difficulty, and would not be certain of success.

"4. The question has been clothed with an importance it never possessed before by the recent advances of Russia, which have placed her outermost posts in some places almost on the frontier of Afghanistan, in others upon roads which lead to it by easy and well supplied marches.

"5. As the proximity of Russia to Afghanistan becomes closer and more established, the danger which is to be feared, whatever its extent may be, will probably take one of three forms. Russia may, by terror or corruption, obtain a mastery over the Amir which will detach him from English interests, and leave to her choice the moment for penetrating to any portion of the country. Or, secondly, if she fails to shake his loyalty, his hold on power may be destroyed by international disorder, and Russia, by establishing her influence over the Chiefs who may become dominant, may secure the same advantages as would have resulted from the adhesion of the Amir himself. Or, thirdly, if both the Amir and his Sirdars remain insensible to the suggestions of the Russian Agents, they may by some imprudence come into collision with the frontier forces of that Empire, and afford a pretext for the exaction of some territorial penalty.

"6. The general tendency of the information you have furnished to me is to the effect that no apprehension of the first alternative need be felt. Your Excellency and your most experienced officers appear to be convinced that the Amir's dislike of the presence of any British representative in his dominions does not furnish ground for inferences unfavourable to his loyalty. But, whatever confidence present circumstances may justify you in entertaining, the well-known peculiarities of the Afghan character forbid the omission of such a contingency from any computation of the probable result of a close neighbourhood between Russia and Afghanistan.

"7. The second and third alternatives appear, unfortunately, from the papers you have forwarded, to be still less beyond the range of probability. The fiscal corruption to which the Kabul diaries bear testimony seems, according to the Kandahar diaries, to have produced the natural result of excessive taxation, and consequent discontent. Captain Cavagnari speaks to

an amount of oppression in the province of Balkh, which may probably lead to a revolt on the first favourable opportunity; and Gholam Hossein anticipates the breaking out of serious disturbances before long, in consequence of the irritation of the Ghilzee Sirdars. Even, therefore, if the Amir's loyalty could be counted on for an indefinite period, a field would still be left for foreign intrigue, dangerous alike to the Amir's power and to the interests of Great Britain.

"8. The military operations lately undertaken by the Amir, which appear to have been resolved upon before any information was communicated to your Government, suggest that the contingency of collision between his forces and those of Russia, or of the allies of Russia, must not be left out of account. Territorial boundaries in those countries are vague and ill recorded, and the Amir has never shown any disposition to seek peace by abating a doubtful claim. He may think himself bound to assert supposed rights which may trench on the claims of Russia or of her allies; and steps may be taken which, in the judgment of the frontier commanders, may render a movement in advance necessary to the honour of Russia before your Government has had the opportunity of interposing either remonstrance or restraint.

"9. The chance that any of these opportunities would be offered for the establishment of a dominant Russian influence in Afghanistan would be materially diminished, if not wholly neutralised, by the presence of a British officer in that country. The evils to which I have referred would lose their formidable character, if warnings could be given to your Government, or advice tendered to the Amir, in good time. They could only grow to dangerous proportions if their first commencement were hidden from your knowledge.

"10. I do not desire, by the observations which I have made, to convey to Your Excellency the impression that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Russian Government have any intention of violating the frontier of Afghanistan. The restraining force exercised from St. Petersburg may not have been altogether effectual in its results; and it may depend in the future upon fortunate circumstances, which an accident may terminate. Still, it is undoubtedly true that the recent advances in Central Asia have been rather forced upon the Government of St. Petersburg than originated by them, and that their efforts, at present, are sincerely directed to the prevention of any movement which may give just umbrage to the British Government. But the very fact that the measures of the frontier authorities do not always faithfully represent the ideas of the distant Government on whose behalf they act, make me more anxious that Your Excellency should possess some channel of speedy and accurate information from the regions in which this dangerous policy is pursued. The case is quite conceivable, in which Her Majesty's Government may be able, by early diplomatic action, to arrest proceedings on the frontier which a few weeks, or even days, later will have passed beyond the power even of the Government of St. Petersburg to control.

"11. On all these grounds, Her Majesty's Government continue to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan. I do not gather that Your Excellency is inclined to differ from this judgment. But, in your opinion, the moment for giving effect to it will not arrive until the advance of Russia is further developed, and its forces have occupied Merv. In this opinion it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur. If ever the Russians should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the time would possibly have passed by when representations to the Amir could be made with any useful result; for the influence of your Government at Kabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared. The Amir has watched the steady progress of the Russian arms, scarcely impeded by such resistance as the Governments of his own race and creed have been able to offer. He has warned the British Government that one advance would follow another, and his prediction, disregarded when made, has been shown by the issue to be true. If, in spite of all promises given, and confidence expressed, to the contrary, the Russian arms should advance to Merv, the Amir will conclude, until at least the contrary has been established, that no power exists which is able to stay their progress. He will then be hardly induced to consent to an arrangement which may cause him to lose favour in the eyes of the neighbour whom he esteems to be the strongest.

"12. I gather from your letter under reply, that the principal objection felt by you to an immediate effort to obtain the consent of the Amir to a British Agency in Afghanistan, is the fear that the effort would be vain. You apprehend that a refusal might lower the estimation of British power among the Afghans, and that England might be placed in an embarrassing position whenever it might hereafter be desirable to persuade the Russian Government of the existence of a real British influence at Kabul.

"13. That a refusal would illustrate the feebleness of our influence with the Amir cannot be doubted; but I apprehend little evil from this disclosure. It is not likely that either the Afghan Sirdars or the Russian Ministry are misinformed as to the true state of the case, or that any useful purpose would be served by keeping up, even if it were possible, an appearance of influence which does not correspond with the reality.

"14. But I am not convinced that the Amir's present disinclination indicates that his concurrence will be ultimately refused. He has had no opportunity of forming a more enlightened judgment. He has no assistance from any European mind in interpreting the events which have recently taken place in Central Asia. In judging of the probable course and the relative importance of the two European powers upon whom the destiny of his country depends, he can only reason by his Asiatic experience and the counsels of a singularly prejudiced Durbar, and he is little able either to measure the gravity of the danger which threatens

him, or to discern his best chance of safety. It is premature to abandon all hope of leading him to form a juster estimate of his position. Indian diplomatists, by superior intellect and force of character, have, in their intercourse with Native Princes, often triumphed over more stubborn prejudices. The serious peril to which his independence is exposed, the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions unless it can watch through the eyes of its own officers the course of events upon his frontiers, will, if these topics are enforced in personal intercourse by an Agent of competent ability, probably outweigh in the Amir's mind any rancour surviving from the events of thirty-five years ago, or any dissatisfaction with the issue of the Seistan arbitration.

"15. The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations with the Amir upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for Your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create. The public will naturally conclude that the events which have recently taken place in Central Asia will not be passed over in the communications your Envoy is instructed to convey. But to make them the avowed subject of negotiations might be interpreted by the Russian Government as a distrust of their assurances which events have hardly justified, and would have the further inconvenience of giving an unnecessary publicity to the particular design you have in view.

"16. I have therefore to instruct you, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, without any delay that you can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Kabul; and to press the reception of this mission very earnestly upon the Amir. The character you will give to it, and the amount of escort, if any, that it will require, I must leave entirely to your judgment. The Envoy whom you may select will be instructed to confer with the Amir personally upon the recent events in Central Asia; to assure him of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack; and, at the same time, to point out to him the extreme difficulty which will attend any effort on your part to ensure this end, unless you are permitted to place your own officers upon the frontier to watch the course of events. In these communications he will not depart from the amicable tone in which your intercourse with the Amir up to this time has been conducted. On the contrary, he will not forget that one of the chief objects of his mission is to leave in the Amir's mind an undoubting impression of the friendly feeling of Her Majesty's Government. But, maintaining this tone, it will be the Envoy's duty earnestly to press upon the Amir the risk he would run if he should impede the course of action which the British Government think necessary for securing his independence.

"17. I request that you will furnish me with an early report of the measures you have taken to carry out the instructions of this despatch."

**110. Rejoinder of the Government of India.**—To this despatch the Government of India transmitted the following reply:—

No. 10, dated Fort William, 28th January 1876.

From—Government of India,  
To—Secretary of State for India.

"We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's Secret despatch, No. 34, dated the 19th of November 1875, in which, after reviewing our despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June last, and conveying to us the views of Her Majesty's Government on the important questions of policy discussed in that despatch and in previous correspondence, you instruct us, without any delay that we can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Kabul and to press the reception of the mission very earnestly upon the Amir; the object of the mission being to urge upon His Highness the desirability of stationing British officers upon the frontier of Afghanistan.

"2. Before explaining the reasons which make it necessary for us to ask for further instructions on the subject of the proposed mission, we desire to observe, with reference to the remarks contained in the earlier paragraphs of the despatch, that the views and opinions set forth in our despatch of the 7th of June appear to have been misapprehended in several important particulars.

"3. In paragraph 2 it is stated that we appear to entertain no doubt as to the insufficiency of the information at present received from Afghanistan; that the diaries of our Agent in Kabul are bald and extremely scanty; and that it appears from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock that only such information as the Amir approves of is contained in them. With reference to these remarks we would explain that in paragraphs 11 to 14 of our despatch of the 7th of June, we stated our opinion that, though there might be doubts as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given by our Agent at Kabul, the value of the information was not destroyed by such defects; that while the position of the Agent compelled him to

be cautious in communicating news to the British Government, we had no reason to believe that information of importance was withheld; that on the contrary the information supplied was fairly full and accurate; and that the diaries contained internal evidence that the intelligence reported in them was not submitted to the Amir for his approval. The opinion which we then expressed was based upon our own experience confirmed by the views entertained by Sir Henry Davies, Sir R. Pollock, Colonel Munro, and Nawab Foujdar Khan.

"4. The information we have since obtained confirms us in these opinions. It is true that Sir R. Pollock, writing in July 1874, stated that he had at no time experienced greater difficulty in procuring reliable intelligence regarding Afghan affairs, but he now informs us that he has every reason to be satisfied with the fullness and accuracy of the intelligence at

\* On one important occasion the Agent's letter was certainly submitted to the Amir. But the Agent himself reported the fact. See enclosures, Nos. 4 and 7 of our despatch No. 46, dated 22nd May 1873.

† See for example the following diaries:—

22nd to 24th	June	1875.
6th to 8th	July	"
27th to 29th	"	"
3rd to 5th	Aug.	"
10th to 12th	"	"
17th to 19th	"	"
21st to 23rd	Sept.	"
24th to 27th	"	"
23rd to 25th	Nov.	"
3rd to 6th	Dec.	"

present furnished by our Agent; and a perusal of the recent diaries is sufficient in our opinion to establish the improbability of the statement (for which indeed we have never seen any evidence advanced\*) that the Agent withholds information in deference to the wishes of the Amir. As a matter of fact, we are not aware that any event of importance which it would have been the Agent's duty to report has not been promptly communicated to us. The diaries received since our despatch of the 7th of June was written abound in matter which it is impossible to believe the Amir ever saw, or would wish to be reported† to the British Government.

"5. It would also appear from paragraphs 3 and 12 of Your Lordship's despatch, that our opinions with respect to the negotiations proposed by Your Lordship with a view to the establishment of a British officer at Herat as expressed in our despatch of the 7th of June have been imperfectly apprehended. Our object was to inform Your Lordship that there was an entire concurrence of opinion among all those who could be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Amir that he is most unwilling to receive British officers as residents in Afghanistan; that his reluctance is consistent with his loyal adherence to the interests of the British Government; and that such being the case we considered it would be a grave error to urge upon him the establishment of a British Agency at Herat or Kandahar at the present time, because it would be a deviation from the patient and conciliatory policy which had hitherto guided our relations with Afghanistan. We expressed an opinion, indeed, that 'having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkistan, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat,' and that 'if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Amir and the Afghan officials we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement.' But we considered that these advantages were contingent upon a condition of things which did not exist. We did not discuss the question whether the advantages to be expected from the proposed measure were 'such as to justify efforts being made for obtaining the concurrence of the Amir;' because in our judgment the advantages to be gained from the presence of British officers on the Afghan frontier depended entirely upon the cordial concurrence of the Amir, and would not be secured by his reluctant assent after pressure put upon him by us. We gave at considerable length our reasons for thinking that the Amir's cordial consent could not be obtained, and we said that 'if we were to press the question on the Amir at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance.' In either case we pointed out the serious objections to the scheme, and we added:—'After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the Amir, and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to Your Lordship by telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Amir or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favorable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now.'

"6. We have deemed it necessary to enter at some length on these explanations, because, from the tenor of the despatch under reply, we gather that Her Majesty's Government have concluded that the measure we are now instructed to carry out would present itself to us in a more favourable light than that in which we really regard it.

"7. Having made these preliminary observations, we proceed to explain the steps we have taken in order to comply with the instructions contained in Your Lordship's despatch. Immediately after we received it we summoned Sir R. Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, to Calcutta to confer personally with us on the subject. The Viceroy also placed himself in private and confidential communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The result of our deliberations is that we are convinced that, if a mission is to be sent to Kabul, the



most advisable course would be to state frankly and fully to the Amir the real purpose of the mission, and to invite him to enter cordially into those closer relations with the British Government which the mission is to endeavour to establish. The Amir and his advisers are shrewd enough to understand that only matters of grave political importance could induce us to send a special mission to His Highness' Court. If the mission were ostensibly directed to objects of minor political importance, the Amir and his officials would be incredulous. He might then decline to discuss the weightier questions brought forward by our Envoy, and in all probability his confidence in us would be shaken; especially as the proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Amir at the Ambala conferences of 1869. A reference to the correspondence forwarded with our despatch, No. 46, dated 22nd May 1873, will show that the Amir is not likely to welcome any mission we may send unless its objects are fully and clearly explained to him beforehand.

"8. If notwithstanding the views expressed in this despatch Her Majesty's Government determine that a mission shall be sent, the Amir should in our opinion be informed in a letter from the Viceroy that the present condition of affairs in Central Asia makes it expedient that the relations between the British Government and Afghanistan should be placed on a more definite footing than at present; that, while we have no proposals to make deviating in any way from the policy, which has hitherto guided and will continue to guide us, of complete abstention from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, we are desirous of arriving at a clearer understanding as to the arrangements necessary for obtaining full information of events on and beyond the frontiers of Afghanistan, so that the British Government may be able to avert by a timely exercise of friendly influence any danger which may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan; and that for this purpose direct personal conference with His Highness is necessary. We would then suggest to the Amir either that he should come to Peshawur to meet the new Viceroy in person at some early and convenient time to be hereafter arranged, or, if His Highness preferred it, that we should send a mission to such place as he might consider most convenient, to explain our views. It might be advisable to give the Amir these alternatives, which were suggested by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, because it would be more difficult for him to refuse both proposals, and if he were not disposed for the personal interview he might more readily accept the mission.

"9. On the whole, however, we doubt whether the Amir would exhibit less reluctance now to receive a special Envoy than he did in 1873, when we proposed to send the Commissioner of Peshawur to Kabul to explain the result of the Seistan arbitration and the assurances given by Russia in respect to the boundaries of Afghanistan and the integrity of the Amir's territories.

"10. As the steps which we believe to be the best for commencing negotiations with the Amir differ from the suggestions contained in Your Lordship's despatch in the important particular that the nature of the business would be indicated in the first instance, instead of the mission being ostensibly directed to some object of minor importance, we should have thought it necessary, upon this point alone, to ask for instructions before making any communication to the Amir. But, apart from the procedure to be adopted, we shall have to instruct the Envoy who will be charged with the negotiations upon several subjects regarding which it seems to us to be necessary that we should receive some further explanation of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

"11. The correspondence which has taken place with the Amir of late, and the experience derived from the communications held with Syud Nur Mahomed at Simla in 1873, satisfy us, and our opinion is entirely shared by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Sir Richard Pollock, that at least two important questions will be raised by the Amir if he entertains the proposal that British Residents should be placed at Herat and Kandahar.

"Those questions are—

"1st.—Whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give unconditional assurances of their determination to protect the territories of Afghanistan against any external attack.

"2nd.—If the Amir should apply for assistance for the purpose of fortifying Herat and improving his army, to what extent his demands should be complied with.

"12. Both these questions are of great importance. Your Lordship will doubtless have read the observations made by the Amir in May 1873 and the communications which took place with Syud Nur Mahomed later in the same year on the subject of the protection of Afghanistan. It then appeared that nothing short of a full and unconditional promise of protection against foreign attack would have been satisfactory to the Amir; consequently in the Viceroy's letter to His Highness of the 6th of September 1873, the question was deliberately reserved for future consideration. We had no authority then, nor have we received authority since, from Her Majesty's Government to give to the Amir any such unconditional guarantee,

and we are of opinion that there are grave objections against binding the British Government by such an obligation. We are precluded by law from entering into a treaty of this nature without the express command of Her Majesty's Government, and unless such a treaty is accompanied by reciprocal engagements on the part of the Amir which seem to us to be inapplicable to the present condition of affairs.



"13. The Amir will in our opinion, judging from the whole tenor of his communications and from the language used by Syud Nur Mahomed in 1873, expect some large pecuniary assistance in aid of the protection of Afghanistan, if the contemplated negotiations are opened. The Syud studiously avoided making any definite official demand, but the sum of £100,000 which, bearing in mind the dissatisfaction felt by the Amir at the result of the Seistan arbitration, we then offered to put at his disposal, was evidently considerably below his expectations. Your Lordship is aware that up to the present time the Amir has not taken advantage of the offer. The reason may be either that he was disappointed at its amount, or that, having objected to the return through Afghanistan of Sir Douglas Forsyth's mission to Kashgar, he was reluctant to accept the gift. However this may be, his conduct affords no encouragement to the successful accomplishment of the objects of the proposed mission. His objections to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan are clearly very strong, and his expectations of pecuniary aid are very high.

"14. In our opinion it would be impolitic to expend large sums of money for the purpose of strengthening the position of Afghanistan. Considering the insecure basis upon which the Government of a country like Afghanistan rests, it is impossible to foresee the use to which the fortifications far from our own base of operations which would be improved and the troops who would be raised and equipped, at our expense might at some future time be applied. We concur in the objections expressed by Lord Lawrence\* in the despatch of the 4th of January 1869 to the imposition of heavy charges upon the revenues of India for such purposes.

"15. Sufficient has been said to show the difficulty of the two questions which we have discussed and the necessity we are under of asking for further instructions with regard to them. But besides these questions it is our duty to urge upon Your Lordship the difficulty we feel in framing directions to the Envoy as to the arguments which he is to use when pressing upon the Amir the advisability of accepting British Residents in Afghanistan.

"16. In Your Lordship's despatch under reply, an opinion is expressed to the effect that the Amir's independence is exposed to 'serious peril,' and the possibility of diminishing or neutralizing that peril by the personal influence of a British Agent in Afghanistan, and by timely information of the course of events on the Afghan frontier is the consideration which Her Majesty's Government desire to press upon the Amir.

"17. The dangers to the independence of Afghanistan may be considered as possible from two different causes—from the future action of the Russian Government or of Russian officers on the one hand, and from the action of the Amir and the Sirdars or people of Afghanistan on the other.

"18. We are in possession of no information which indicates an intention or desire on the part of the Russian Government to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan. In the correspondence forwarded to us with Your Lordship's Secret despatch No. 32, dated 19th November last, there has been a frank interchange of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government on the subject of their policy in Central Asia, and Her Majesty's Government have intimated that 'they have now received with the most sincere

† i.e., 'the further extension of Russian territory towards the Afghan borders.'

satisfaction the assurances conveyed in Prince Gortchakoff's despatch as to the enlightened conviction of His Imperial Majesty that such extension, † either on the side of Bokhara, Krasnovodsk, or of the Attrek, is contrary to Russian interests, and that formal orders have been given that all future action in those regions is to be strictly confined to the defence of existing limits and the protection of property and commerce from pillage and brigandage.'

"19. In this satisfaction we fully share. As Her Majesty's Government are aware, we have always held that the wisest course to pursue is to explain fully to Russia the importance to British interests of the complete independence of Afghanistan, and to make it clearly understood that Great Britain could not look with indifference on any measures tending to impair or interfere with that independence. We therefore view with peculiar gratification the clear exposition of the policy of Her Majesty's Government as set forth in the Foreign Office Memorandum of the 11th of May 1875. At the same time we fully appreciate the force of the considerations referred to in the 10th paragraph of Your Lordship's despatch which render it conceivable that circumstances may occur, as they have occurred before, to draw the Russian Government into a line of action contrary to their real intentions and wishes.

---

\* "We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

"Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal Chiefs and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

" 20. At present however we are in possession of no information which leads us to look upon Russian interference in Afghanistan as a probable or near contingency, or to anticipate that the Russian Government will deviate from the policy of non-extension so recently declared. The Amir has always watched the progress of the Russian power with alarm, and has at times been greatly agitated by the possibility of the Russian occupation of Merv and

\* Telegram to Secretary of State of the immediate contact of the Russian and Afghan dominions. 24th July, and reply of 26th July 1873. But we have been informed \* that Her Majesty's Government did not at all share his alarm and considered that there was no cause for it. The Amir was

† Enclosure No. 13 of our despatch accordingly told † that the result of the communications No. 75, dated 15th September 1873. between the British and the Russian Governments regarding the boundaries of his dominions has been materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan and to remove apprehension of danger from without, and he was counselled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal government. Apparently these communications have tended to remove the feelings of alarm which were undoubtedly felt by the Amir when he first heard the rumour of a Russian expedition to Merv. In October 1873 he is reported to have written to his agent at Bokhara as follows: 'It is evident that the British Government has defined the Afghan boundary with the Russian and Persian Governments, and that even if the Russians take possession of Sarakhs and Merv Shahjehan, it is not to be apprehended with regard to the communications made between the Russian and the British Governments on the subject of the definition of the Afghan boundary, that they will attempt any advance into the Afghan border.' If representations of an opposite tenor are now to be made, the Amir will expect to be fully informed of the grounds for them.

" 21. Moreover the assurances given to the Amir that a good understanding exists between England and Russia on Central Asian affairs and that his dominions are secure from Russian attack, have in our opinion had a salutary effect in inducing him to adhere to the policy of peace which he has hitherto pursued towards his neighbours. It is manifestly important to avoid anything which might lead him to doubt the correctness of the assurances repeatedly and advisedly given him, or might have the effect of unsettling his mind and of weakening the influence which we have for many years successfully exercised at Kabul in the interests of peace; collision between the Amir and the frontier tribes or with the allies of Russia, which we consider under present circumstances to be unlikely, would become probable; and the understanding arrived at with Russia regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan and the independence of the Amir's territories would be imperilled. Language which indicates a change of policy fraught with consequences so grave to Afghanistan and to British interests in Central Asia ought not in our opinion to be used unless there be a material change in existing circumstances, and we are not aware that any such change has occurred.

" 22. We do not share to the full extent the apprehensions expressed in paragraphs 6 to 8 of Your Lordship's despatch. Of course it is impossible to predict with confidence what turn affairs may take among a people like the Afghans. But so far as circumstances enable us to form a forecast, we have no reason at present to anticipate the occurrence of a collision between Russia and Afghanistan from any of the causes mentioned. Those officers of our Government who are best acquainted with the affairs of Afghanistan, and the character of the Amir and his people consider that the hypothesis that the Amir may be intimidated or corrupted by Russia (even supposing there was any probability of such an attempt being made) is opposed to his personal character and to the feelings and traditions of his race, and that any attempt to intrigue with factions in Afghanistan opposed to the Amir would defeat itself and afford the Amir the strongest motive for at once disclosing to us such proceedings. Whatever may be the discontent created in Afghanistan by taxation, conscription and other unpopular measures, there can be no question that the power of Amir Sher Ali Khan has been consolidated throughout Afghanistan in a manner unknown since the days of Dost Mahomed, and that the officers entrusted with the administration have shown extraordinary loyalty and devotion to the Amir's cause. It was probably the knowledge of the Amir's strength that kept the people aloof from Yakub Khan in spite of his popularity. At all events Herat fell to the Amir without a blow. The rebellion in Lalpoora in the extreme east was soon extinguished. The disturbances in Budukshan in the north were speedily suppressed. Nowhere has intrigue or rebellion been able to make head in the Amir's dominions. Even the Char Eimak and the Hazara tribes are learning to appreciate the advantages of a firm rule.

23. We by no means overlook the contingency referred to in paragraph 8 of the despatch under reply, but we think that Her Majesty's Government scarcely do justice to the Amir and his unqualified acceptance hitherto of our advice in his dealings with his neighbours. The military operations referred to are probably the expedition to Maimana. As observed in our despatch No. 31, dated 26th July 1875, Maimana forms an integral part of the Afghan dominions. The reduction of the Chief of Maimana to obedience is therefore a domestic affair

‡ See the diaries for 26th to 28th January 1875.

"	"	15th to 17th June	"
"	"	22nd to 24th "	"
"	"	29th June to 5th July	"
"	"	20th to 23rd August	"
"	"	28th to 30th September	"
"	"	1st to 4th October	"
"	"	5th to 7th "	"

with which it is contrary to our policy to interfere, and on which we should not ordinarily expect the Amir to communicate with us. As a matter of fact however the operations were not resolved upon before information was communicated to us. We were kept acquainted‡ with the whole course of the discussions in the Durbar previous to the despatch of the troops and have been since regularly informed of the progress of the expedition.

"24. But what we wish specially to repeat is that from the date of the Ambala Durbar to the present time, the Amir has unreservedly accepted and acted upon our advice to maintain a peaceful attitude towards his neighbours. We have no reason to believe that his views are changed. On the contrary, so late as September \* last, when the Amir received news of the disturbances in Kokand and heard rumours of a general rising against the Russians, he wrote to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan 'that he must make endeavours to obtain as much information as possible in this matter, but that he should be careful lest any person in his territory should act against the Russians, and that he should exercise such restraint over his people that no act contrary to the friendship existing between Afghanistan and Russia may take place.

\* See diary from 14th to 16th September 1875.

ances in Kokand and heard rumours of a general rising against the Russians, he wrote to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan 'that he must make endeavours to obtain as much information as possible in this matter, but that he should be careful lest any person in his territory should act against the Russians, and that he should exercise such restraint over his people that no act contrary to the friendship existing between Afghanistan and Russia may take place.

"25. The observations which we have hitherto made apply to the manner in which the instructions contained in Your Lordship's despatch could in our opinion best be carried into effect, and to the further instructions which appear to us to be necessary before the proposed negotiations can be commenced. But the matter is, in our own judgment and in that of all those whom we have been able to consult, of such grave importance that we feel it to be our duty to add some further remarks for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government in the hope that the whole question may still be reconsidered.

"26. It is in the highest degree improbable that the Amir will yield a hearty consent to the location of British officers in Afghanistan which the mission is intended to accomplish; and to place our officers on the Amir's frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most impolitic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the personal risk to which under such circumstances the Agents would be exposed and the serious political consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies under the pretext of guarding them or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed; and though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the Agents would be checked on every hand and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat in 1839 when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lumsden when he went to Kandahar in 1857 as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy.

"27. A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view. We already see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has been pursued since 1869 in the consolidation of the Amir's power and the establishment of a strong government on our frontier. The Amir's not unnatural dread of our interference in his internal affairs and the difficulties of his position

† Paragraphs 24 to 26 and 33 to 36.

as described in our despatch† of the 7th of June last, combined perhaps with the conviction that if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come we must in our own interest help him, may have induced him to assume a colder attitude towards us than we should desire. But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other powers. We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord

‡ Minute of 6th of February 1857.

§ Minute of 3rd of October 1867.

Despatch to Secretary of State, Jan. 4th, 1869.

|| Despatch to Secretary of State, July 1st, 1869.

Canning,‡ Lord Lawrence,§ and Lord Mayo,|| which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Amir on a

satisfactory footing; and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in Your Lordship's despatch."

**III. Secret instructions of February 1876 for the despatch of a temporary mission to Kabul with the object of establishing permanent English Agencies in the Amir's territories.**—Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 19th November 1875 cited in paragraph 109 was followed by a further despatch dated 28th February 1876 brought out by Lord Lytton himself—who had succeeded the Earl of Northbrook as Viceroy and Governor-General of India—and which contained the instructions of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Afghanistan and Kelat.

The text of this despatch was as follows:—

"The tranquillity of the British power in India is so far dependent on its relations with the trans-frontier States, that Her Majesty's Government cannot view without anxiety the present unsatisfactory condition of those relations.

"This anxiety is increased by the advance which the Russian forces in Central Asia have made in recent years, and which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg seems powerless to restrain.

"Whilst watching the progress of events which have now placed the outposts of Russia, at some points almost immediately upon the frontier of Afghanistan, at others in command of

roads whereby that frontier may be easily approached, the Government of India has apparently failed to find, for the increased security of its own frontier, pacific pledges in the friendship of the Amir, and the confidence of his Sirdars.

"The increasing weakness and uncertainty of British influence in Afghanistan constitutes a prospective peril to British interests; the deplorable interruption of it in Kelat inflicts upon them an immediate inconvenience, by involving the cessation of all effective control over the turbulent and predatory habits of the Trans-Indus tribes.

"Guided by these considerations, Her Majesty's Government have commended to the consideration of the Governor-General of India in Council arrangements for promoting unity of purpose and consistency of conduct in the administration of the Sind frontier. They have also instructed the Viceroy to find an early occasion for sending to Kabul a temporary mission, ostensibly directed to some object of no great political importance, but furnished with such confidential instructions as may, perhaps, enable it to overcome the Amir's apparent reluctance to the establishment of permanent British Agencies in Afghanistan, by convincing His Highness that the Government of India is not coldly indifferent to the fears he has so frequently urged upon its attention; that it is willing to afford him material support in the defence of his territories from any actual and unprovoked external aggression, but that it cannot practically avert, or provide for, such a contingency without timely and unrestricted permission to place its own Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they may best watch the course of events.

"It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the present moment is favorable for the execution of this last-mentioned instruction. The Queen's assumption of the Imperial title in relation to Her Majesty's Indian subjects, feudatories, and allies, will now, for the first time, conspicuously transfer to Her Indian dominion, in form as well as in fact, the supreme authority of the Mogul Empire. It will, therefore, be one of your earliest duties to notify to the Amir of Afghanistan and the Khan of Kelat your assumption of the Viceregal office, under conditions which may be reasonably expected to exercise a favorable influence over the imagination of those whose confidence in the power you represent is no inconsiderable guarantee for its stability.

"A special mission, having for this purpose a twofold destination, might, perhaps, be advantageously despatched from Jacobabad, up the Bolan Pass, to Quetta, where the Khan could be invited to meet and receive it. After delivering your letter to the Khan, the mission might proceed to Kandahar, and thence, under an escort furnished by the Amir, continue its journey to Kabul. From Kabul it would return to India, either through the Koorum Valley or the Khyber Pass, according to circumstances.

"Her Majesty's Government, however, only suggest this plan to your consideration, with due reference to the circumstances of the moment as they arise. You may possibly find it advisable, on your arrival at Calcutta, to communicate indirectly with the Amir through your Commissioner at Peshawur. This officer might privately inform Sher Ali of your intention to send a complimentary letter to him, as well as to the Khan of Kelat, and ascertain the route by which it would be most agreeable to His Highness that the mission charged with the delivery of that letter should approach his capital. If the Amir expresses any preference for the northern route, the mission could proceed directly to Kabul by the Khyber Pass, returning to India through Kandahar and Kelat.

"The ostensible function of such a mission would, in either case, be one of compliment and courtesy, and the Amir's friendly reception of it might, in the first instance, be taken for granted. But you will, of course, be careful not to expose the dignity of your Government to the affront of a publicly rejected courtesy; and, should the Amir express to the Commissioner of Peshawur an insurmountable objection to the reception of the proposed mission, you will, perhaps, deem it expedient to limit its destination to Kelat. In that case, you may have to reconsider your whole line of policy as regards Afghanistan; but you will, at least, be enabled to do this with diminished uncertainty as to the personal sentiments, or political tendencies, which determine the value now set by Shere Ali upon the friendship and support of the Government of India.

"With respect to Kelat,\* it will be the object of any mission you may send to that country to recover for the Government of India the dominant and advantageous position secured to it by the important Treaty of 1854. Her Majesty's Government do not desire to fetter your discretion in the selection of any means that may appear to you immediately available for the attainment of the object they have at heart. By promptly establishing with the Khan of Kelat such relations as may serve to restore tranquillity along an important portion of your frontier, and secure unobstructed access to Quetta, in case of emergency through the Bolan Pass, you will materially strengthen the position of your Government in any subsequent negotiations with the Amir of Afghanistan. But, in any case, the proposed mission, during its passage through the territories of the Khan, may be expected to collect much information that could afterwards be used with advantage in your administrative reorganization of the Sind frontier.

"The other circumstances which may, and probably will, determine the issue of negotiations with Shere Ali, demand more careful consideration. To invite the confidence of the Amir will be the primary purpose of your Agent; to secure that confidence must be the ultimate

\* For the policy pursued in respect to Kelat, *vide* Chapter III, Plowden's C. A. précis.



object of your Government. But to invite confidence is to authorize the frank utterance of hopes which it may be impossible to satisfy, and fears which it may be dangerous to confirm. Whether these hopes and fears be reasonable, or the reverse, their open avowal is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, preferable to their concealment.

"It is necessary, however, that you should be prepared for demands or inquiries which cannot be altogether unanticipated in the course of confidential intercourse with the Amir. In the conduct of such intercourse you will be, above all things, careful to avoid evasions and ambiguities calculated to leave upon the mind of a Prince whom temperament has made suspicious, and events mistrustful, any legitimate doubt as to the plenitude of your power, or the firmness of your policy. In dealing with such a character, the tone to be most avoided is that of cold timidity; and the attitude which should be consistently maintained must be suggestive of cordial, but conscious, superiority.

"The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly power has, at all times, been the object of British policy. The attainment of this object is now to be considered with due reference to the situation created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian arms in Central Asia towards the northern frontiers of British India.

"Her Majesty's Government cannot view with complete indifference the probable influence of that situation upon the uncertain character of an Oriental Chief, whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought, within a steadily narrowing circle, between the conflicting pressures of two Great Military Empires, one of which expostulates and remains passive, whilst the other apologizes and continues to move forward.

"It is well known that not only the English newspapers, but also all works published in England upon Indian questions, are rapidly translated for the information of the Amir, and carefully studied by His Highness.

"Sentiments of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of Russia in Central Asia find frequent expression through the English Press, in language which, if taken by Shere Ali for a revelation of the mind of the English Government, must have long been accumulating in his mind impressions unfavorable to its confidence in British power. Whether the passivity of that power, in presence of a situation thus unofficially discussed with disquietude, be attributed by the Amir to connivance with the political designs, or fear of the military force, of his Russian neighbours,—the inference, although erroneous, is, in either case, prejudicial to our influence in Afghanistan.

"The Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James has been officially informed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan are—

"1st.—To secure that State against aggression.

"2nd.—To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country by giving such moral and material support to the Amir, without interfering in the internal affairs of his country, as may enable Her Majesty's Government to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival candidates for power among his own family, or the Mirs of the different provinces.'

"Her Majesty's Government would not, therefore, view with indifference any attempt on the part of Russia to compete with British influence in Afghanistan; nor could the Amir's reception of a British Agent (whatever be the official rank or function of that Agent) in any part of the dominions belonging to His Highness, afford, for his subsequent reception of a Russian Agent similarly accredited, any pretext to which the Government of Her Majesty would not be entitled to object as incompatible with the assurances spontaneously offered to it by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

"You will bear in mind these facts when framing secret instructions for your mission to Kabul. It is desirable that the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view should, in the course of friendly discussion, assume the character of favors which you are not unwilling to confer, rather than of concessions which you are anxious to obtain. All overtures should, therefore, be left as far as practicable to the Amir himself, but no overtures that can be reasonably anticipated on his part should find you unprepared to deal with them.

"To demands which you have no intention of conceding, your Agent will oppose a frank and firm refusal. You will instruct him to prevent such demands from becoming subjects of discussion. Others which, under certain conditions, you may be willing to entertain, he will undertake to refer to your Government, with such favorable assurances as may induce the Amir to recognize the advantage of facilitating, by compliance with your wishes, the fulfilment of his own.

"If the language and demeanour of the Amir be such as to promise no satisfactory result of the negotiations thus opened, His Highness should be distinctly reminded that he is isolating himself, at his own peril, from the friendship and protection it is his interest to seek and deserve.

"The requests which may be made by Shere Ali in connection with his reception of permanent British Agents in Afghanistan will probably raise the question of granting to His Highness—

"1st.—A fixed and augmented subsidy.



"2nd.—A more decided recognition than has yet been accorded by the Government of India to the order of succession established by him in favor of his younger son, Abdulla Jan.

"3rd.—An explicit pledge, by treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of foreign aggression.

"The first of these questions is of secondary magnitude. You will probably deem it inexpedient to commit your Government to any permanent pecuniary obligation on behalf of a neighbour whose conduct and character have hitherto proved uncertain. On the other hand, you may possibly find it worth while to increase, from time to time, the amount of pecuniary assistance which, up to the present moment, the Amir has been receiving. But your decision on this point can only be determined by circumstances which have not arisen, and considerations which must be left to your appreciation of such circumstances.

"With regard to the recognition of Abdulla Jan, whose selection as legitimate successor to the throne of his father has been made with much solemnity by Shere Ali, and ostensibly acquiesced in by the most influential of the Afghan Chiefs, Her Majesty's Government, in considering this question, have before them the solemn and deliberate declaration made, in 1869, by Lord Northbrook's predecessor to the present Amir, *viz.*, that 'the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and Your Highness have been lately more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Kabul, and rekindle civil war; and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of Your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honors of which you are the lawful possessor.'

"The Government of India having, in 1869, made that declaration, which was approved by Her Majesty's advisers, have not based upon it any positive measures; while to the Amir, who had received that declaration under circumstances of some solemnity and parade, it appears to have conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favor.

"It is not surprising that these conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous formula should have occasioned mutual disappointment to His Highness and the Government of India.

"Her Majesty's Government do not desire to renounce their traditional policy of abstention from all unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; but the frank recognition of a *de facto* order in the succession established by a *de facto* Government to the throne of a foreign State, does not, in their opinion, imply or necessitate any intervention in the internal affairs of that State.

"The order of succession in Afghanistan has always been dictated by the incumbent of the throne, though it has generally been disputed by each aspirant to the vacated position of that incumbent.

"Her Majesty's Government are not the interpreters of Afghan law and custom, and, by not protesting against the nomination as heir-apparent of Abdulla Jan, they have virtually, though tacitly, recognized its legality. Should the official affirmation of that recognition, in a form agreeable to the feelings of Shere Ali, appear to you necessary for the re-establishment of relations with the Amir on a satisfactory basis, various modes of giving it will suggest themselves to you.

"The Amir may be reasonably supposed to have good reasons, as regards his personal interests, for mistrusting the character and ambition of his second son, Yakub Khan, who is now a prisoner at Kabul.

"Arrangements connected with the recognition of Abdulla as the heir, selected and proclaimed by his father, to the throne of the Amir, might, perhaps, be proposed for enabling the Indian Government to undertake the safe, but friendly, custody of Yakub within its own dominions. It is not improbable that such arrangements would be convenient to the Amir, nor impossible that they should be made welcome to Yakub himself, as a security for the prolongation of his existence.

"In that case, you would be careful to combine vigilant custody at some well-chosen place of detention, with friendly, flattering, and honorable treatment of so important a hostage; and you would place the son of the Amir in charge of some intelligent officer instructed to lose no opportunity of obtaining over his mind an ascendancy favorable to the future interests of your Government.

"Such an arrangement, however, would be impossible without the assent of the Amir, and unadvisable without the acquiescence of Yakub Khan, whose protest against it might bequeath to your Government the hostility of those Sirdars who secretly sympathize with his aspirations.

"Other combinations are open to your adoption. You may not improbably find reason to anticipate that your recognition of Abdulla will, of itself, suffice to annihilate the reported influence of his elder brother.

"The late Amir, Dost Mahomed, was probably one of the most powerful of Afghan potentates, but there is good reason to believe that his influence over the imagination of his

subjects was materially strengthened, and permanently maintained, during the latter years of his lifetime by the importance they ascribed to a few written words of recognition and support on the part of the Government of India.

"It may, therefore, be not unreasonably anticipated that the prospective authority of Abdulla Jan will be considerably augmented by your recognition of his title as heir-apparent; and you may possibly find it in your power to induce Yakub Khan to take the oath of allegiance to the established order of succession thus recognized by your Government, on conditions which the Amir may consider reasonable.

"You may also find it in your power to bring about a reconciliation between the Amir and his nephew, Abdul Rahman Khan, who is now a refugee of Samarkand, under Russian protection.

"The order of succession established by Shere Ali would derive increased solidity from the support of this powerful malcontent, whose adhesion to it might, perhaps, be secured through the friendly assistance of your Government.

"Any of these arrangements might strengthen the position of the Government of India in Afghanistan, by securing its influence over the present Ruler of that country, and exhausting some of the sources of the political and social confusion which his death is now likely to occasion. But you will fully understand that, in adverting to them, I am only suggesting points to which your consideration should be directed, and am in no way limiting your discretion with respect to them.

"It remains to consider the question of giving to the Amir a definite assurance of material support in case of external aggression upon those territories over which Her Majesty's Government has publicly recognized and officially maintained his right of sovereignty.

"With or without any such assurance, England would be impelled by her own interests to assist His Highness in repelling the invasion of his territory by a foreign power. It is, therefore, on all accounts desirable that the Government of India should have at its disposal adequate means for the prevention of a catastrophe which may yet be averted by prudence, and the fulfilment of an obligation which, should it ever arise, could not be evaded with honor. The want of such means constitutes the weakness of the present situation.

"In the year 1873, Lord Northbrook gave to the Envoy of the Amir the personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon the territories of His Highness which the British Government had failed to avert by negotiation, that Government would be prepared 'to assure the Amir that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with troops.'

"The terms of this declaration, however, although sufficient to justify reproaches on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which it referred, he should be left unsupported by the British Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. The Amir, in fact, appears to have remained under a resentful impression that his Envoy had been trifled with, and his attitude towards the Government of India has ever since been characterized by ambiguity and reserve.

"If, therefore, Shere Ali be frank with your Envoy, he will probably renew to him the demand addressed in 1873, through his own Envoy, to Lord Northbrook—that, in the event of any aggression of the Amir's territories, the British Government should distinctly state that it regards the aggressor as its enemy; and secondly, that the contingency of an aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Amir.'

"To answer this renewed demand in terms identical with those of the answer formerly given to it, would prejudice, instead of improve, your relations with the Amir, by the evasion of an invited confidence.

"Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, prepared to sanction and support any more definite declaration which may, in your judgment, secure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material support to the Amir, and it must be distinctly understood that only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation arise.

"In the next place, they cannot secure the integrity of the Amir's dominions, unless His Highness be willing to afford them every reasonable facility for such precautionary measures as they may deem requisite. These precautionary measures by no means involve the establishment of British garrisons in any part of Afghanistan—nor do Her Majesty's Government entertain the slightest desire to quarter British soldiers upon Afghan soil; but they must have, for their own Agents, undisputed access to its frontier positions. They must also have adequate means of confidentially conferring with the Amir upon all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognize a community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the Amir must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorized to enter them.

"Her Majesty's Government are also of opinion that the establishment, if possible, of a telegraph from some point on the Indian frontier to Kabul, *via* the Koorun Valley, is an object deserving of your consideration; and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of a

properly accredited Afghan Envoy is much to be desired, as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of counter-obligations on the part of the Amir, and the uninterrupted facility of your confidential relations with His Highness. Subject to these general conditions, Her Majesty's Government can see no objection to your compliance with any reasonable demand on the part of Shere Ali for more assured support and protection, such as pecuniary assistance, the advice of British officers in the improvement of his military organization, or a promise—not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed—of adequate aid against actual and unprovoked attack by any foreign power.

“Such a promise personally given to the Amir will probably satisfy His Highness, if the terms of it be unequivocal. But Her Majesty's Government do not wish to fetter your discretion in considering the advantages of secret treaty on the basis above indicated.

“The conduct of Shere Ali has more than once been characterized by so significant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the Government of India, that the irretrievable alienation of his confidence in the sincerity and power of that Government is a contingency which cannot be dismissed as impossible.

“Should such a fear be confirmed by the result of the proposed negotiation, no time must be lost in reconsidering, from a new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan.

“On the other hand, the success of those efforts (which, if they be made at all, cannot be safely delayed) will be pregnant with results so advantageous to the British power in India, that Her Majesty's Government willingly leave to the exercise of your judgment every reasonable freedom in carrying out the present instructions.”

**112. Initiatory measures undertaken for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Despatch of a Native Agent to Kabul bearing a letter to the Amir from the Commissioner of Peshawur.**—It has been seen that the plan suggested by Her Majesty's Government as affording a suitable opening for the renewal of friendly relations with the Amir and thereby effecting a favorable change in the existing position of affairs was the deputation of a friendly mission to Kabul, charged with some complimentary errand, and at the same time entrusted with the duty of inviting the Amir's confidence with the object of placing the general relations of the British Government with His Highness on a clearer, firmer, and more satisfactory footing than heretofore.

As suggested in Lord Salisbury's despatch, the announcement of Her Majesty's new title of Empress of India, as well as the accession of a new Viceroy to office, furnished a favorable opportunity for giving effect to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. But the existing relations between Shere Ali and the Government of India also rendered it clearly expedient to take some preliminary measure to ascertain the manner in which friendly advances were likely to be met. Otherwise the mission might be openly rejected at the outset, and the British Government subjected to a public affront. Accordingly, it was decided, before advancing open proposals for a mission, to depute a Native Agent with a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir, informing His Highness of the friendly intentions of the British Government, and so enabling him to make the requisite preparations to receive the Envoy. The Native Agent selected was Rissaldar-Major Khanan Khan, Aide-de-Camp to the Viceroy.

The Commissioner of Peshawur, Sir R. Pollock, was then directed to meet the Viceroy at Ambala on the 24th April, where the views of Her Majesty's Government and the necessities of the situation were explained to him. At the same time the annexed draft letter, to be signed by the Commissioner and to be delivered to the Amir by the hands of Khanan Khan, was given to Sir Richard :—

“I avail myself of this propitious moment to acquaint you that His Excellency Lord Lytton has assumed the Viceroyalty of India, in succession to Lord Northbrook, who left Calcutta for England on 15th of April last.

“Informed of His Excellency's arrival in India, I lost no time in waiting on him; and in the course of a lengthened interview with which I was honored by His Excellency, the present Viceroy enquired very cordially after Your Highness' health and welfare, and those of His Highness Abdulla Jan; intimating his intention of deputing to Your Highness, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, his friend Sir Lewis Pelly, who has accompanied His Excellency from England, and who will return so soon as his interviews with Your Highness are completed. Sir Lewis Pelly will be accompanied by Dr. Bellew and Major St. John for

the purpose of delivering to Your Highness in person a khureeta, informing Your Highness of His Excellency's accession to office, and formally announcing to Your Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles in respect to Her Empire of India.

"I feel sure that Your Highness will fully reciprocate the friendly feelings by which the Viceroy's intention is prompted; and I beg the favor of an intimation of the place at which it would be most convenient to Your Highness to receive His Excellency's Envoy.

"Sir Lewis Pelly, who is honored by the new Viceroy with His Excellency's fullest confidence, will be able to discuss with Your Highness matters of common interest to the two Governments."

Immediately after his interview with the Viceroy, Sir R. Pollock left for Peshawur to make arrangements for the safe conduct of the Ressaldar. These having been completed, Khanan Khan, after some unforeseen delay, left Ambala on the 2nd of May, furnished with instructions from Sir Lewis Pelly, whom the Viceroy had selected as his Envoy in the contemplated mission. Khanan Khan reached Peshawur on the 5th idem, and at once left for Kabul with the letter from the Commissioner to the Amir, cited above.

### 113. The Amir's reply declining the proposed mission. Letter from the British Agent at Kabul explaining the situation.—At this juncture a letter\* of some interest on Kabul matters was

\* The letter will be found in Appendix No. XVII. received from Agha Sahib, a pensioner of the British Government, whose share in Kabul politics in the days of the Amir Dost Mahomed is well known. This letter, written spontaneously and in ignorance of the departure of Khanan Khan for Kabul, furnished an apparently accurate account of the attitude of the Durbar up to the beginning of May, and confirmed the existing fears as to the precarious footing of British relations with Shere Ali.

Altogether the Government of India were not unprepared for a telegram received at Simla after the Ressaldar's arrival at Kabul, to the effect that his mission would probably be unsuccessful. On the 23rd May, Khanan Khan started on his return journey to Peshawur bearing a letter from the Amir to Sir R. Pollock, rejecting the mission. This letter, together with one written by the British Agent at Kabul, which explained the situation more fully, reached the Government of India on the 5th of June. The Amir's own letter was involved and vague. It intimated that the political relations of the two countries had been fully discussed at Simla in 1873, and in subsequent correspondence; if, however, any matters were under consideration in furtherance of the interests of Afghanistan this should be said. An Agent from Kabul could then be deputed to learn their bearing and scope and communicate the same to the Amir, who would, after due deliberation, furnish his opinion in writing. The letter from the British Agent was more explicit. It showed that the Kabul Durbar admitted as it were the compliment to Afghanistan in deputing an English Agent to Kabul. There were, however, serious dangers in the way. A fanatic might murder the Agent, and the punishment upon which the British Government would be sure to insist, as in the case of Nowroz Khan, might embarrass the relations of the Amir with his subjects. Then the Agent would probably raise questions of State policy, and if the Amir was unable to agree with his views, troubles and complications ending in a breach of friendship might ensue. Moreover, if the British Government had an Agent, the Russians would want one too. The manner in which a Russian Agent might force himself into the country and the impossibility of turning him back was curiously verified by subsequent events. The text of the letters was as follows:—

Dated 22nd May 1876.

From—Amir of Kabul,

To—Commissioner of Peshawur.

[*Literal text.*]

"The friend, emblem of sincerity and friendship, the friend, foundation of affection and candour, the kindest of friends, Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur Division, may his favors increase, and the desire of an agreeable meeting increase.

"After writing the customary expressions of affection, and calling to mind the requisite expressions of unity, makes known to the heart full of sincerity (friendship) that the letter full of kindness, dated 5th May in the year 1876 of Jesus, was brought to the clear (brilliant) consideration of the suppliant at the Sublime Throne (of God). It is hoped that what you wrote of your interview full of pleasure with His Noble Excellency of exalted titles the Viceroy and Governor-General Lord Lytton, and the succession to the illustrious office of Viceroy and Governor-General of the Empire of Hind, and the requisites of the road and the intention of the visit of Sir Lewis Pelly and Dr. Bellew and Major St. John at some place, and the intimation of the glad tidings of Her Majesty the Great Queen, who has become entitled with the title of Shahinshahi Sultanat-i-Hind, has become fixed in the heart of this friend.

"Kind friend, by hearing the good news of the Shahinshahi (office of Shahinshah) of Her Majesty the Great Queen, in view of the friendship and union of the two Exalted Governments, much joy and pleasure and happiness were produced in the penetrating heart. Consequently the firm hope is this, that from the most excellent title of Shahinshah of Her Majesty the Great Queen repose and security in all that belongs to the affairs of the servants of God, for they are the created subjects of the Creator, more than in former times, will be experienced in reality (as a matter of fact). And also the arrival of His Noble Excellence of exalted titles Lord Lytton, Governor-General of the Empire of Hind, has produced complete satisfaction, and it is expected that the friendship and union of the two Exalted Governments, more than in past times, will be fixed and secured.

"And in the particular of the coming of the Sahels for the purpose of certain (some) matters of the two Governments is this—that the Agent of this friend formerly personally held political parleys at the station of Simla; those subjects, full of advisability for the exaltation and permanence of friendly and political relations, having been considered sufficient and efficient, were entered in two letters, dated Thursday, the 21st of the month of Ramzan the Sacred in the year 1290 of the Flight of the Prophet, and dated Friday, the 22nd of the month of Safar the Victorious in the year 1291 of the Flight of the Prophet, and need not be repeated now.

"Please God the most High, the friendship and the union of the God-given State of Afghanistan in relation to the State of high courage (lofty authority), the Majestic Government of England, will remain strong and firm as usual. At this time, if there be any new parleys for the purpose of freshening and benefiting the God-given State of Afghanistan entertained in the thoughts, then let it be hinted, so that a confidential Agent of this friend, arriving in that place, and being presented with the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government, should reveal them to the suppliant at the Divine Throne, in order that the matters weighed by a minute and exact investigation may be committed to the pen of affectionate writing.

"It is hoped that in the future you will occasionally gladden the friend by news of the health of your constitution, tempered with affection. Dated Monday, 27th Rabi Sani in the year 1293 of the Flight of the Prophet, the blessing of God upon him and his family and peace."

---

Dated 22nd May 1876.

From—British Agent, Kabul,  
To—Commissioner of Peshawur.

"Salutation to my cherisher. May his prestige endure. Submits that in the matter of the answer to your bountiful honor's letter, written 5th May 1876, there has been a consultation for three or four days continuously in the private assembly of His Highness the Amir. The members of the assembly, in this consultation, said that although the coming of a European Agent of the English Government would be altogether an access of freshness and advantage to the State of Afghanistan, still, by reason of regard to the barbarity and ignorance of the diverse tribes of Afghanistan, there is profound cause of fear.

"In the first place is this—that to maintain the safety of the gentlemen (Sahels) is difficult, because some people are such that, by reason of their own ignorance, putting forward the name of 'religious enmity' (Ghaza), they will become perpetrators of injury, and other people are such that, simply with the idea of an ultimate injury to the special family of His Highness the Amir, they will purposely consider the infliction of injury upon the Sahels as of the first importance.

"Under these circumstances, should by any means injury occur to them in this country of Afghanistan, then there would, without fail, occur a difference in the friendship of the English Government and of the Government of Afghanistan; and the occurrence of that difference (or opposition) in the friendship of the two Governments would be, under every condition, injurious to all the people of Afghanistan. As, in illustration of this, is apparent, the affair (case) of the murder of Major Macdonald (Makdala) at Michni, and the hard treatment in respect of it of Nauroz Khan, in which, notwithstanding the innocence of Nauroz Khan, merely out of deference to the English Government, Nauroz Khan was for a while suspended from the Khani (or local rule), with the punishment of a heavy fine, and several persons were severely punished.



"In the second place is this—that, if the Envoy of the English Government should put forward any such weighty matter of State that its entertainment by His Highness the Amir, in view of the demands of the time, should prove difficult, and he should verbally reject it, then, too, will (would) occur a breach in the friendship of the two Governments. And then, for the sake of removing that breach (injury), it will be necessary for both Governments to endure troubles. It was by reason of these very objects (considerations) at the time of making the first treaty between the English Government and the State of Kabul, His Highness the late Amir objected to the coming of an English Envoy of European race. Moreover, from that time to this, whatever occasions have presented themselves for the coming of Sahebs, the Kabul Government has always objected to them from farsightedness. Now, too, the coming of Sahebs, in view of the state of affairs, is not advisable.

"To us especially the point of chief regard is this—that, if simply, for the sake of seeking the good-will of the English Government, we consent to the coming of a European Agent, and for his safety, let's suppose, perfect arrangements are made, then this great difficulty arises, that the coming and going of the Sahebs cannot be kept concealed anyhow from the Russian Government, which on my northern border (frontier) is conterminous (joined) with the frontier of the English Government.

"The people of the Russian Government are extremely fearless. If any man of theirs by way of Envoy, or in the name of speaking about some other matter of State, should suddenly enter the territory of Afghanistan, then it would be impossible by any means to stop him. In other words, their way, too, would be opened; and in the opening of the road there is good neither to the State of Kabul nor of the English Government. Consequently in this matter it is better that the coming and going of the Sahebs should, according to the former (old) custom, remain closed (prohibited); and, first, that some confidential Agent of ours going to the English Government, and there becoming acquainted with the State requirements (objects sought), should inform us of what is in the mind of the English Government; and the Kabul Government, considering the subject in its own place, give answer to the English Government regarding those objects, whether written or verbal.

"And if our man, in conversation there, agree to, or refuse, any point, then by all pretexts His Highness the Amir can arrange for its settlement. But if in his presence it devolves on His Highness the Amir to summarily accept or reject some State demand, this becomes a very hard matter, and its ultimate issue will not turn out well.

"In short, the letter regarding the impropriety of the coming of the Sahebs having been written in your bountiful honor's name and closed, was this day given to Alijah Khanan Khan by the Kabul Durbar at the time of his dismissal. And 800 rupees in cash with one chogha and one Kashmiri shawl were given to the above-named Alijah by the Kabul Government by way of dismissal gift.

"Mulla Mahomed Nasim Khan, Kabuli, has been appointed to accompany the above-named Alijah from Kabul by Jellalabad to the Kabul frontier. The Alijah will start from Kabul to-morrow for Peshawar."

**114. Measures taken by the Government of India on receipt of the Amir's reply. Further letter to the Amir and instructions to the British Agent at Kabul.**—The result of an attentive consideration of these letters was to convince the Government of India that the reasons given by the Amir for declining the mission were insufficient, and could neither be accepted with dignity by the British Government, nor be passed over in silence. Nevertheless, a *locus penitentiae* was still to be left to His Highness, and the Commissioner of Peshawar was accordingly directed to address the Amir again in general terms, and to instruct the British Agent at Kabul to explain the situation to him in detail. It was pointed out to Nawab Atta Mahomed that the fears expressed by the Amir for the safety of the members of the mission could scarcely be serious, because the Government of India had intimated their readiness to depute their Envoy to any place most convenient to His Highness. The alarm lest impracticable proposals should be advanced was also groundless; but as long as the Amir persisted in rejecting opportunities for exchanging views and explanations so long would he be liable to misunderstand the friendly motives by which the British Government were actuated. Their object and desire was to treat Afghanistan as a State the interests of which were identical with those of England, and by no means to interfere with its political independence. But the community of interests could only be maintained if the Amir showed himself a loyal friend and ally. In answer to the excuse that the coming of a British mission would force the Amir to receive a Russian one, His Highness was reminded of the written pledge of the Russian Government to abstain from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. If after these explanations the Amir was willing to receive the British

mission, Sir Lewis Pelly would wait on His Highness at any place the latter might appoint, and if in consequence of these discussions a suitable understanding was arrived at, the Viceroy would himself be prepared to meet the Amir at Peshawur in the coming November. The Amir's offer to send an Agent to find out what objects were sought was firmly but courteously declined as derogatory to the dignity of the British Government and as in other respects wholly inadequate. Finally, a warning was conveyed as to the peril of persisting in the rejection of the friendly overtures of the British Government and of pursuing a policy of isolation. The English draft of the Commissioner's letter to the Amir was couched in the following terms. It was dated 8th July :—

From—Commissioner of Peshawur,  
To—Amir of Kabul.

"I have received Your Highness' letter of the 22nd May, and informed His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of its contents.

"In intimating to Your Highness his intention of deputing his confidential Envoy, Sir Lewis Pelly, to wait upon Your Highness, at such place as Your Highness should appoint, for the purpose of announcing his accession to office, and the addition which the Great Queen of England has made to Her Sovereign titles, the Viceroy was actuated by the most true friendship for Your Highness. His Excellency considered that the proposed complimentary and friendly mission would not only be acceptable to Your Highness, as following the course adopted between all civilised Courts, but that it would also afford a desirable opportunity of improving the existing relations between the two Governments, by means of frank communication on matters of common interest.

"The reluctance evinced by Your Highness to the reception of this friendly mission is, therefore, much to be regretted.

"But by a letter which I have received from the British Agent at Your Highness' Court, I am induced to believe that Your Highness' advisers, in counselling you not to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, may have been influenced by a misconception of the objects of His Excellency, or may not have fully considered the light in which such a refusal might be regarded by the British Government. I have, therefore, in accordance with the Viceroy's instructions, explained at length to the British Agent the views of His Excellency on the relations between the two Governments, and on the causes to which he attributes the reluctance of Your Highness to receive the mission. These views the Agent has been instructed to communicate to Your Highness.

"Your Highness has indeed suggested that it would answer all purposes were you to depute a confidential Agent to learn from the Viceroy the views of the British Government. My friend! the Viceroy cannot receive an Agent from Your Highness, when you have declined to receive His Excellency's trusted friend and Envoy. The British Agent at the Court of Your Highness will explain to you the reasons which make it impossible for the Viceroy to accept such a proposal.

"It is the Viceroy's sincere desire not merely to maintain, but also materially to strengthen, the bonds of friendship and confidence between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, so that the interests of Your Highness, as the Sovereign of a friendly and independent frontier State, may be effectually guaranteed against all cause for future anxiety. But the support of the British Government cannot be effectual unless it is based on reciprocal confidence and a clear recognition of the means requisite for the protection of mutual interests.

"I am to repeat that, in proposing to send a friendly mission to Your Highness, the Viceroy has been actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with Your Highness to reciprocate for the continuance, on closer terms than heretofore, of amicable relations between the two Governments, in view of common interests, more particularly affecting Afghanistan, and the personal welfare of Your Highness and your dynasty. It will, for this reason, cause the Viceroy sincere regret, if Your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to you, should render nugatory the friendly intentions of His Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British Government."

The instructions sent at the same time to the British Agent at Kabul and which have been summarized above were as follow :—

"Your letter of the 22nd May has duly come to hand, and I have submitted it to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.

"The unsatisfactory and inadequate reasons which, according to your above-mentioned letter, would appear to have induced the advisers of the Amir to persuade His Highness not to receive a friendly and complimentary mission from the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, have caused His Excellency profound surprise.

"Your letter states, in the first place, that 'to assure the safety of the Sahebs is difficult,' on account of religious and political enmities which the Amir is powerless to control.

"The Viceroy and Governor-General cannot suppose this objection to be serious, more especially as, in my former communication, it was intimated to the Amir that His Excellency was prepared to send his Envoy to any place of meeting where it would be most convenient to His Highness to receive him.

"In the second place, your letter specifies, as one of the reasons for declining to receive the Viceroy's confidential Envoy, that His Highness' advisers are not without a fear lest the Envoy should address to the Amir demands incompatible with the interests of His Highness, which demands it might be impossible to comply with, and embarrassing to reject.

"You are to inform the Amir that this fear is quite groundless. It can only have been derived from idle reports, or mischievous misrepresentations, by which His Highness will always be liable to be led into grievous error as to the intentions of the British Government, so long as he declines to avail himself of the opportunities afforded him for entering into frank and open communication with it.

"The Amir has, on previous occasions, expressed to the British Government the anxiety caused him by circumstances which did not, on those occasions, appear to the British Government so serious as to require any immediate measures on its part for the protection of His Highness. But some time has now elapsed since any interchange of opinions has taken place on this subject between the two Governments. The Viceroy would, therefore, have been glad to afford the Amir a timely opportunity of making known his views in regard to the interests of Afghanistan under existing circumstances; and His Highness will incur a grave responsibility if he deliberately rejects the opportunity thus offered him.

"The Amir has already received from this Government substantial proofs of friendly interests in his welfare which I need not now enumerate, and His Highness must be aware that the British Government cannot be indifferent to any circumstance, or contingency, likely to affect the condition of a State so close upon the frontier of British India as the State of Afghanistan. The Viceroy will, therefore, regard the interests of Afghanistan as identical with those of the British Government so long as the Amir proves himself to be its loyal friend and ally. In that case the Amir need certainly have no fear of any desire on the part of His Excellency to interfere with the political independence, or commercial freedom, of Afghanistan; whilst he may as confidently reckon upon the Viceroy's willingness to consider, in the most frank and friendly spirit, the best means of giving practical effect to any precautions, which His Highness may desire to suggest, for the increased security of his dominions and his dynasty.

"But you will explain to the Amir how impossible it is for the British Government to maintain this community of interests with the Government of His Highness, or to protect the independence and integrity of his State, under conditions incompatible with the ordinary intercourse between friendly Courts.

"The Viceroy is, moreover, surprised by the statement in your letter that the Amir would be obliged to receive Russian Sahebs if he received the British mission intended to be sent by His Excellency.

"As the responsible Representative of the Queen of England and Empress of India, the Viceroy cannot consider this excuse a valid one.

"The Amir must be aware that the British Government, acting on behalf of His Highness' wishes and interests, has obtained from the Government of the Czar written pledges not to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Afghanistan.

"The reception of a British Envoy cannot, therefore, necessitate the reception of a Russian one; for, in refusing to receive a Russian Envoy, His Highness would only be acting in conformity with the policy thus solemnly agreed upon.

"The Viceroy is willing to believe that, in declining to receive the Envoy of the British Government, the Amir may not, perhaps, have fully weighed all the considerations set forth in this letter, or realized their grave import.

"If, on further reflection, His Highness should recognize the expediency of learning the true nature of His Excellency's views and dispositions in regard to matters which materially concern the interests of His Highness, Sir Lewis Pelly will still be authorized to wait upon the Amir at such place as he may appoint; and, should the interviews consequent on this meeting lead to a more cordial and reliable understanding between the two Governments, the Viceroy will be happy to meet the Amir in person at Peshawur in November next, if His Highness should so desire.

"But you are, at the same time, to inform His Highness that, having due regard to all the circumstances of the present situation, and considering the friendliness and sincerity of the Viceroy's intentions, as well as the apparent mistrust with which your letter represents them to have been received by the Kabul Durbar, His Excellency is obliged to decline, as derogatory to the dignity of the British Government, and otherwise wholly inadequate, the alternative proposal of His Highness in regard to the deputation, on his part, of an Agent in view to becoming acquainted with what you designate 'the objects sought' by the British Government.

"If the Amir, after deliberately weighing all the considerations now commended to his serious attention, still declines to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, the responsibility of the result will rest entirely on the Government of Afghanistan, which will have thereby isolated itself from the alliance of that Power which is most disposed, and best able, to befriend it.

"You are hereby directed to communicate His Excellency's views to the Amir, and to prepare a careful and complete statement of all that passes at your interviews, and of the decision of the Kabul Durbar, for transmission to me.

"You will, at the same time, hold yourself in readiness to come to Peshawur without delay, should your presence be required by His Excellency."

These letters were duly despatched to Kabul by Sir R. Pollock on the 8th of July; and, in order that every legitimate means should be used to convince the Amir of the friendly intentions of the British Government, Dr. Bellew wrote by the same post a private letter to His Highness, which, it was hoped, might have a good and reassuring effect on the Amir's mind on account of the reliance hitherto reposed by His Highness on the friendship of that officer.

### 115. Local opinion at Kabul as to the political situation. Effect produced by Sir R. Pollock's second letter; the Amir's rejoinder.—

While the Government of India were deliberating as to the course to be pursued in respect to the Amir's refusal to receive Sir L. Pelly,

the diaries \* received from Kabul exhibited

the Amir as under some nervous misapprehension regarding the safety of his position, and as entertaining misgivings in respect to the real intentions of the British Government. At a Durbar held in honor of Akhoond Mulla Mashk-i-Alam of Ghazni, a spiritual guide of great influence among the Ghilzais, the Amir made a speech describing his situation, between the great Governments of England and Russia, as full of apprehension. And he ended by exhorting the Mulla to warn the people that they must bestir themselves, and be on the alert against the evil day. The result of the Mulla's exhortations was that a rumour prevailed through the city that a jihad would be proclaimed, and there was much excitement in consequence. The Amir then summoned the Mulla to his presence and explained away his previous instructions. He had only intended that the people should be encouraged to pay increased taxes and to enlist freely in the army. The Mulla declared that he had fully understood the Amir's meaning, but that his own teachings had been misinterpreted by the ignorant people of Kabul, and he seized upon the example of the want of understanding of the people as showing how unwise it would be for the Amir to accept a British Mission.

On the 17th July Sir R. Pollock's letter, extracted in the foregoing paragraph, was delivered to the Amir in person by the British Agent in the presence of three of the Kabul Ministers. Shere Ali was deeply troubled in mind on realizing its full import and the nature of the communication

addressed to the British Agent. Frequent secret discussions were held during July

and August by the members of the Kabul Durbar, who were desired by the Amir to submit their opinion as to the course to be pursued. Some advised that the tribal Chiefs and the Akhoond of Swat should be consulted before a reply was sent; others that the British Agent at Kabul should proceed to Simla to represent the Amir's view and ascertain the aims and wishes of the British Government. Others that if the British Government agreed to receive an agent from Kabul, and if the discussions with him showed the British Government to be really desirous of promoting the welfare of Afghanistan, then a British Envoy might come to Kabul for a time; or that representatives of both countries should meet on the frontier and exchange views; after which a definite policy might be matured. Notwithstanding all the deliberations the Durbar appeared unable to arrive at any definite decision on the proper course to be followed, and a long time passed without any reply being sent to the Commissioner.

According to a letter from Kabul,† dated 28th July, affairs in Afghanistan

were generally in an unsatisfactory condition, and the Amir in a perplexed

and wavering mood. Russian Agents, who had recently arrived with

letters‡ from General Kauffmann, were apparently attempting to intrigue with

His Highness; thus increasing the critical aspect of the situation.

At length, however, on the 3rd September, *i.e.*, after a delay of upwards of six weeks, the Amir replied to Sir R. Pollock's letter; a separate communication, dated 4th September, was sent by the British Agent. His Highness made no allusion to the proposed complimentary mission beyond stating that he fully understood the communications which he and the British Agent had received. He repeated his wish that the British Government should receive in India an Agent of the Kabul Government, and then suggested as alternative courses, either that representatives from the two States should hold a conference on the border, or that the British Government should summon their Agent from Kabul (he being intimately acquainted with all His Highness' wishes), learn from him the whole state of affairs, and send him back to the Amir with a full statement of the views of the British Government. The British Agent's letter merely mentioned in addition that Sir R. Pollock's letter had formed the subject of frequent deliberations in the Amir's private Durbar, and that the Kabul Agent appointed to meet Sir L. Pelly would certainly be Syud Nur Mahomed.

The text of the Amir's letter was as follows:—

Dated 14th Shaban = 3rd September 1876.

From—Amir of Kabul,

To—Commissioner of Peshawur.

“Your letter of 8th July concerning certain matters was duly received by me, and was an occasion of pleasure to me. I understood its purport. I also arrived at a clear comprehension of the meaning of the letter addressed by you to the Agent. I have already made a friendly representation of my wish that, in accordance with the custom observed in past years, and with existing cordial relations, my Envoy might be received by the British Government for the better understanding of the objects of both States.

“Now, though I still retain the same wish, nevertheless, in consideration of the views of the British Government, expressed in your letter to the Vakeel, I have come to this conclusion that, if an Envoy of the British Government and a selected trusted representative of this Government should meet on the frontier to explain mutually the views and wishes of their respective Governments, it would be a very advantageous arrangement; or should that course not approve itself to the British authorities, then, that the British Agent at Kabul, who has long been intimately acquainted with all my wishes, should be summoned to his own Government, and expound the whole state of affairs, and, having fully understood the desires and projects of the British Government, should return back to me, and explain them all to me in private; after which I should be the better able to decide what course it is incumbent on me to adopt in the interests of my country.”

**116. The Government of India decide to summon British Agent at Kabul to Simla.**—The Government of India decided to adopt the third course suggested, *viz.*, to summon the British Agent to Kabul, and to hear from him how matters stood. The following letter was accordingly written to the Amir by the Commissioner, expressing regret that no allusion whatever should have been made in His Highness' letter to the reception of the proposed mission, and intimating the determination at which the Government of India had arrived, subject to the proviso that the British Agent should come to India fully instructed as to the Amir's views, and able to explain them, confidentially, in detail. The letter was sent to the British Agent for delivery to the Amir, and the former was told that as soon as he should have fully understood all the Amir's views, he was to proceed to Simla as rapidly as possible:—

Dated 16th September 1876.

From—Commissioner of Peshawur (Mr. D. Macnabb),

To—Amir of Kabul.

“The *murasilla* from Your Highness, dated 14th Shaban, to the address of Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, arrived after that gentleman had taken his departure for England on leave for three months. Judging that the letter was on State affairs, I opened and read it, and communicated the purport of it to His Excellency the Viceroy. In reply, I have this day received the orders of His Excellency to the following effect, *viz.*, that the Viceroy, having considered the subject of the communication from Your Highness, regrets that Your Highness has left the question of the reception of a complimentary mission in obscurity. But, with regard to the proposals contained in Your Highness' letter, His Excellency, animated by the most friendly and cordial sentiments towards Your Highness, is pleased to express his willingness to receive the British Agent immediately, on condition that Your Highness should your-



self explain to him fully and confidentially your views, so that the Agent, on having the honour of waiting on the Viceroy, should be able to explain them confidentially in detail, as proposed in Your Highness' letter. In that case, in the same manner, the Agent will be frankly informed as to the views of the British Government, and, returning to Kabul, will expound them to Your Highness.

"This also I am to represent to Your Highness, that on the 10th October the Viceroy will leave Simla for a tour through Kashmir and along the Northern and Western Frontiers, and will pursue his journey to Bombay and Delhi, where he will hold an Imperial Assemblage for the proclamation of the title of Empress of India recently assumed by Her Majesty the Queen of England. On this account it is important that the Agent should start immediately, so as to reach Simla before the 10th of October."

## 117. Interview between the British Agent and Sir L. Pelly, accompanied by Colonel O. T. Burne and Major Grey.—Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan arrived at Simla on the 7th October, and

\* This conversation will be found in Appendix No. XIX (I).

† Major (then Captain) Grey acted as Interpreter during the Conference at Ambala in 1869 between the late Lord Mayo and Shere Ali.

on the same day was received by Sir Lewis Pelly, with whom he had a long conversation\* in the presence of Colonel Burne and Major Grey.†

The Nawab's attitude was at first somewhat reserved; he avoided all questions as to the Amir's wishes or requests by observing that "he had none." His manner was that of a man who did not make the interests of the British Government his first consideration and who knew more than he cared all at once to reveal. As the conversation proceeded, he became more communicative, and eventually gave a clear exposition of the past and present aspect of affairs at Kabul. His observations tended to confirm the conclusions that had already been independently arrived at, in regard to the causes and effects of the unsatisfactory state of the relations of the British Government with Shere Ali, and the necessity for placing them on an improved footing.

The Amir's estrangement and annoyance were mainly due, in the Agent's opinion, to the following causes: (1) the unfavourable award in the Seistan arbitration; (2) the ill-success of Syud Nur Mahomed's mission in 1873; (3) the interposition by Lord Northbrook's Government on behalf of Yakub Khan; (4) the recent proceedings in Kelat; (5) the transmission of presents to the Mir of Wakhan; and (6) the feeling of His Highness that our policy was exclusively directed to the furtherance of British interests in disregard of those of Afghanistan.

In 1873, the desire of the Amir's heart had been to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the British Government, but His Highness had been disgusted to find that while we desired to exercise paramount influence in Kabul, we were not prepared to commit ourselves to any definite course of action in his favour. The objections at present entertained by His Highness to the reception of a mission were that, judging from the experience of the past, no practical results would ensue; that owing to local fanaticism the Envoy might be placed in serious jeopardy; that the present "temporary" mission might gradually merge into the establishment of a permanent Resident as at the courts of Native Chiefs in India; that the Russians would insist on permission to depute a similar mission; that the Amir's relations with Yakub Khan were as precarious as ever; and that His Highness feared lest the British Envoy should bring his influence to bear in favour of the Sirdar's release. The Nawab furnished many interesting details in regard to Kabul affairs, which are duly recorded in the memorandum in Appendix No. XIX.

## 118. Interviews between His Excellency the Viceroy and the British Agent. Instructions as to communications with the Amir and letter from the Viceroy to His Highness.—A few days after the interview with Sir L. Pelly, the Nawab was received by His Excellency the Viceroy. His Excellency took pains to impress on him for the Amir's information the sympathy which the Government of India felt for His Highness in all his present difficulties,

A memorandum of this interview, including a note by Sir L. Pelly, will be found in Appendix No. XIX (II) and (III).

the Government of India felt for His Highness in all his present difficulties,

the gravity and imminence of the dangers which surrounded him, and the impossibility of his maintaining an attitude of pretended independence, or misplaced distrust of the British Government. To prove that it was no imaginary danger to which Afghanistan was exposed, His Excellency communicated to the Agent in detail the proposals made to him in February 1876 by the Russian Ambassador in London, having for their aim and object the disintegration of Afghanistan, and the overthrow of the Mahomedan power in Asia; he read out extracts on this subject, which had subsequently appeared in the Russian *Golos*, and explained how easy it was for the British Government thus to change its policy, if it was forced by the Amir to do so, and to crush an intriguing and mistrustful neighbour. He then compared the relative strength of the Russian and English armies within certain distances of Kabul, and explained how, if the Amir remained friendly, the military power of Great Britain could encircle him as a ring of iron, and if he were hostile, could break him like a reed. The Viceroy said he had indignantly rejected the proposals urged by the Russian Ambassador, and now frankly offered Shere Ali, in the name of the British Government, an alliance which was not only definite to all time, but which would tend to make him stronger, and more secure, on his throne than even his father, Dost Mahomed, should he as frankly respond, and show his willingness, once and for all, to reciprocate the friendship of the British Government, and justify his inclusion in the category of civilized States.

The Viceroy explained in detail to Nawab Atta Mahomed the concessions he was prepared, on behalf of the British Government, to give Shere Ali, and the conditions on which alone he would give them. Of these last the essential condition was the permission to maintain British Agents on the Afghan frontier, who would thus be able to keep the British Government informed of passing events. It would be impossible to undertake the responsibility of protecting a frontier which the British Government was unable to look after by means of its own officers. The concessions and conditions are given in full detail in Appendix No. XIX (II).

The Agent dined on the evening of the 11th of October at Government House in company with the Yarkund Envoy and others. He expressed himself more freely than before on Kabul politics, and continued to lay much stress on the Amir's mistrust of the real intentions of the British Government, more especially since His Highness had read Sir H. Rawlinson's book, which had been sent to him from London, laying down, according to his apprehension, a scheme of aggression on Afghanistan, in which the occupation of Herat and other portion of his territory, by a British force, formed a large part.

The second interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Nawab took place on the 13th October. The explanations of the policy of the British Government given at the previous interview were repeated, and the conditions on which the Indian Government would consent to support the dynasty of Shere Ali, or his heir-apparent, again carefully detailed. It was specially impressed on the Agent that the Viceroy only assented to the Amir's proposal that representatives of both Governments should meet on the frontier and discuss matters on the following conditions, *viz.*, (1) the location of British officers on the Afghan frontier; (2) the display of friendship and confidence on the part of the Amir. Unless these were fully accepted by His Highness, it was needless for the Amir to send down his Envoy. Finally, Nawab Atta Mahomed was dismissed with clear written instructions, in the shape of an *Aide Memoire*, on which he was to base his communications to the Amir. The Viceroy further gave him a friendly and complimentary letter to the Amir, reaffirming the views of the British Government in regard to him, and conveying to His Highness an invitation to the Delhi Assemblage on the 1st of January 1877.

Simultaneously, friendly letters were written by Captain Grey and Sir Lewis Pelly to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, who was said by the Agent to have assumed a very unfriendly attitude towards the British Government, although formerly one of the strongest advocates of the English alliance.

A memorandum of this conversation with copy of the *Aide Memoire* will be found in Appendix No. XIX (IV) and (V).

The following is the text of the Viceroy's letter to the Amir :—

Dated Simla, 11th October 1876.

From—Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

To—His HIGHNESS AMIR SHEER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

"On my arrival in India, I instructed my Commissioner at Peshawur to intimate to Your Highness my friendly desire of deputing a special and temporary mission to your Court at Kabul for the purpose of announcing to Your Highness, in the most complimentary manner, the formal assumption of the title of 'Empress of India' by Her Majesty the Queen, as well as my own assumption of the Viceroyalty of India.

"It would also have been agreeable to me, and, I believe, satisfactory to Your Highness, had my confidential Envoy been permitted to proceed to your capital, and had his arrival followed by frank communications, tending to render the relations between the British Government and that of Your Highness of a cordial character.

"Your Highness did not respond to my friendly offer; and a perusal of Your Highness' reply, as well as of some previous correspondence which I found on record, induced me to infer that Your Highness was under a misapprehension as to my real intentions.

"I, therefore, directed the Commissioner again to address Your Highness, and from your reply I learned that it would be agreeable to Your Highness, either that the British Agent at Kabul should first come to Simla for the purpose of personally explaining to me the views of Your Highness, or that my Envoy should meet your Minister on the frontier.

"Accordingly, the British Agent has now waited on me with full particulars, and I have enabled and desired him to convey to Your Highness, in the most friendly manner, an unreserved and sincere explanation of my own views.

"Your Highness will thus be assured by the Agent that I shall be prepared to comply with the wishes which you announced through your Agent at Simla in 1873, and to which you have adhered in more recent communications.

"Reciprocally, Your Highness will, I doubt not, be prepared to enable the British Government to undertake the weighty obligations it will incur on your behalf, by agreeing to the arrangements which will be submitted to you by the Agent, who conveys this letter, and, in the absence of which, the British Government could not practically fulfil those obligations.

"Should Your Highness still desire to enter into a treaty engagement on the basis above referred to, I shall be happy, in compliance with Your Highness' suggestion, to instruct my trusted friend, Sir Lewis Pelly, to hold himself in readiness to meet Your Highness' Minister immediately at Peshawur, or elsewhere, for the discussion of details, and the embodiment of our respective wishes in a definite form, to be approved and ratified by Your Highness and myself.

"I have instructed the Agent to present to Your Highness, together with this letter, an invitation from myself, as the Representative of Her Majesty, to the great ceremonial which I am about to hold at Delhi, on the 1st of January next, for the proclamation of Her Majesty's Imperial title. To this great ceremony I have also invited the Governors of the French and Portuguese Possessions in India, and those Kings and Princes in whom Her Majesty gladly recognises the Sovereign allies and neighbours of Her Indian Empire.

"Trusting that I may have the high satisfaction of receiving Your Highness also as an illustrious guest of the British Government on that occasion, I shall much appreciate so auspicious an opportunity for exchanging with Your Highness the ratifications of the above-mentioned treaty, and for renewing to you the assurance of my personal regard, as well as the friendly interest taken by my Government in the security of Your Highness' throne and the prosperity of your dominions.

"I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness."

The following is the formal invitation to be present at the Delhi Assemblage which the Agent was instructed to deliver to His Highness :—

Dated Simla, 11th October 1876.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

To—His HIGHNESS AMIR SHEER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

"I have the pleasure to send herewith a copy of a Proclamation issued by me on the 18th August, from which Your Highness will perceive that it is my intention to hold at Delhi, on the 1st January 1877, an Imperial Assemblage for the purpose of proclaiming to the Princes and people of India the new title of 'Empress of India' assumed by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and the gracious sentiments which have induced Her Majesty to assume it.

"The occasion will be one of high importance to the British Empire. It cannot fail also to be regarded with deep interest and sympathy by Her Majesty's allies. The presence of Your Highness at the Assemblage will not only add splendour and fame to the ceremony, but will also testify before the world to those feelings of cordial friendship by which the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan are bound together.

"I, therefore, hereby invite Your Highness to be present at Delhi on the approaching auspicious occasion as the guest of the British Government, and beg you will accept in this my first communication an assurance of my anxious desire to maintain and strengthen the friendship between the State of Afghanistan and the British Government."

**119. The British Agent's return to Kabul. Ad interim arrangements pending expected arrival of the Amir's Envoy.**—Nawab Atta Mahomed left Simla on the 14th October and was expected to reach Kabul about the end of the month. He lost some days in making a *détour* to Murree to pay his respects to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and to endeavour to arrange for returning to Kabul *viâ* the Kurum Valley. Meanwhile the necessary measures were taken in anticipation of a possible meeting at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and Syud Nur Mahomed. A letter\* from Bakhtiar Khan, the

\* *Vide* Appendix XXI.

British Moonshee at Kabul, seemed to indicate a decided unwillingness on the part of the Amir to break with the British Government. It was, therefore, hoped that the coming of the Amir's Envoy would be hastened, and that his negotiations with Sir Lewis Pelly might be concluded in time to enable the Viceroy in person to ratify the new Treaty with the Amir on the latter's visit to the Imperial Assemblage to be held at Delhi on the 1st January 1877, to which he had been invited. Sir Lewis Pelly was accordingly directed to proceed to the neighbourhood of Peshawur and await there the Amir's answer to the Viceroy's messages. The instructions given to Sir Lewis will be found in Appendix XX (Nos. I and II, with enclosures).

The British Agent reached Kabul on the 1st November, but many influences operated to prevent the speedy reply for which the Government of India hoped. The Amir himself was suspicious and discontented; there was much sickness at Kabul; both the Amir and Syud Nur Mahomed were ill; and the party in Kabul opposed to English interests and favourable to Russian intrigue appeared to carry great weight. The result was that many weeks passed which bore fruit only in indecisive discussions in the Kabul Durbar. At length the Amir decided to depute Syud Nur Mahomed to Peshawur to meet Sir Lewis, and His Excellency the Viceroy, in the belief that this decision implied acceptance of the preliminary basis which had been stipulated, ordered Sir Lewis Pelly to proceed to that city. The prospect of a meeting with the Amir at Delhi and the ratification there of the contemplated Treaty had to be abandoned. The Syud was to have left Kabul on the 31st December, but did not actually start until the 2nd January, and was expected at Peshawur about the end of the month, a rate of travelling only partially explicable by the state of his health—seven or eight days being the ordinary period of transit.

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER VI.

*Appendix No. XVI.—Opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (Sir R. H. Davies) and other Punjab officers on the question of locating English Residents at Herat or Kandahar, &c. (March–April 1875.)*

*Appendix No. XVII.—Letter, dated Delhi, 21st May 1876, from Agha Saheb, to Lieut.-Col. O. T. Burne.*

*Appendix No. XVIII.—*

i—*Extract from Kabul Diary from the 30th June to the 3rd July 1876, inclusive.*

ii—*Letters, &c., showing proceedings at Kabul after delivery to the Amir of Sir R. Pollock's letter, dated 8th July.*

iii—*Further letter from Agha Saheb to Colonel O. T. Burne, enclosing following extract from letter, dated 20th July, from Kabul.*

iv—*Russian Native Agents at Kabul.*

*Appendix No. XIX.—Interviews at Simla in October 1876 with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul.*

i—*Summary of conversation with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Kabul, held at Simla on the 7th October 1876.*

ii—*Memorandum of an interview at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul, on 10th October 1876.*

iii—*Memorandum by Sir Lewis Pelly, dated Simla, 11th October 1876.*

iv—*Memorandum of the second interview at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul, on the 13th October 1876, after consultation in Council in regard to certain points connected with its purport.*

v—*Aide Memoire for the British Agent at Kabul.*

*Appendix No. XX.—Instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly.*

i—*Letter, dated Mushobra, 17th October 1876, from Mr. T. H. Thornton, Officiating Foreign Secretary, to Sir Lewis Pelly.*

ii—*Letter, dated Mushobra, near Simla, 17th October 1876, from His Excellency the Viceroy, to Sir Lewis Pelly, with enclosures, viz., (A) Aide Memoire for a Treaty, (B) Aide Memoire for Secret Agreements.*

*Appendix No. XXI.—Translation of a letter from Moonshee Bakhtiar Khan, dated Kabul, 12th October 1876.*

*Appendix No. XXII.—Information as to proceedings at Kabul after return of the British Agent in October—November 1876.*

*Appendix No. XXIII.—Memorandum by Mahomed Hyat Khan, Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, regarding Kabul policy, dated Lahore, 19th November 1876.*



## CHAPTER VII.

THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE AND CONNECTED PROCEEDINGS. THE AMIR'S PREPARATIONS FOR A JEHAD—JANUARY–OCTOBER 1877.

**120. Arrival of the Kabul Envoy at Peshawur. Informal interview between him and Dr. Bellew.**—Syud Nur Mahomed, accompanied by the Mirakhor Ahmed Khan, reached Peshawur on the 27th January 1877. He was met by Sir Lewis Pelly, with whose arrangements for his reception and entertainment the Envoy expressed himself much pleased. But he remarked to Dr. Bellew, “formerly when I came here my heart was light and free from care; this time I am come full of fear and anxiety.”

On the 28th January Dr. Bellew paid him a complimentary visit, and in the course of conversation expressed a hope that matters would end satisfactorily. The Envoy replied,—

“I reckon you as our friend, and I know that the Amir esteems you as such, and often speaks of you in terms of commendation, but it is different with your Government. The Amir now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust.”

Dr. Bellew answered regretting this opinion. The disposition of the British Government towards that of the Amir was of a most friendly character, and from all that he (Dr. Bellew) could gather as a private individual, its most earnest desire was to see the Amir's Government strong and prosperous, and consolidated on a firm basis. The Envoy rejoined with some animation and with marked earnestness and gravity,—

“This is what you say. But the promises of your Government are of one sort and their acts of another. Now listen to me. I tell you what I know. It is twenty-two years since the Government of the Amir made a treaty with John Lawrence Sahib, and it has not from that time to this diverged from it. At that time the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan refused to consent to the residence of British officers in his country, because he knew the lawless character of his people, and how they had killed Englishmen in the streets of Kabul at the time of Shah Shuja's overthrow. Well, his explanation was accepted and friendship continued, and then after a time the Amir (Shere Ali Khan) came down and met Lord Mayo. Again the question of British officers was advanced and on the same grounds objected to. After this you came with Pollock Sahib to Seistán. You will recollect that on one occasion he spoke in praise of Yakub Khan, and I immediately warned him that if he desired to secure the Amir's confidence, he would never mention the name of Yakub Khan again. Well, when I returned from Teheran I met Lord Northbrook and discussed various matters at Simla, where the question of British officers coming to Afghanistan was again mooted. Now, why all this pressing to send British officers to Afghanistan, when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of the Amir, and his suspicion is confirmed by the arbitrary acts of your Government, and he is now convinced that to allow British officers to reside in his country will be to relinquish his own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on the Afghan people will be attached to his name, and he would sooner perish than submit to this. The British nation is great and powerful, and the Afghan people cannot resist its power, but the people are self-willed and independent, and prize their honor above life. Now, I will tell you what has turned the Amir's confidence from your Government (Sirkar). In Lord Mayo's time his confidence was perfect, and he agreed to refer all overtures and correspondence received from Russians to Lord Mayo, and to send back such replies as the British Government might desire, and he did so in perfect good faith. But what came to pass in the time of Lord Northbrook? I will now tell you. Lord Northbrook wrote to the Amir on behalf of Yakub Khan, who was in prison at Kabul, to send him back to Herat, and said that if he were reinstated there, the friendship between the Amir's and the British Government would remain intact. Now the Amir was angry and resented this interference with his home Government, and since he has not sent Yakub Khan back to Herat, he considers the friendship between the two Governments is no longer intact. Then, again, after the mission to Yarkand returned, Lord Northbrook sent a man called Ibrahim Khan with presents to the Mir of Wakhan by way of acknowledging his attention to the British officers who visited that part of the country. But no reference was made to the Amir, nor was his permission asked before dealing direct with one of his responsible Governors. Now, when I came here I did not send for your Arbabs to come out and meet me at the frontier. You did this yourselves, and I appreciate the honor; but if I had summoned them, it would have been a breach of propriety. So was the other case. This act threw the entire Durbar into alarm for the security of their authority, and now that it is again requested that British officers be

allowed to reside in the country, the Amir and all his people object, knowing that they will lose their own authority. Again, Grey Sahib wrote me a letter recently, referring to my acquiescence, when at Simla, to the coming of British officers to Kabul. It was as much as an order for my death. It was laid before the Durbar, and I was at once pointed out as the encourager of your Government in this design. I have said all this to you in private, but there are other things I will say in the presence of the Mirakhor. Then after that I will go into all particulars *seriatim* in private with Pelly Sahib, either at his house or when out driving, or elsewhere. But matters have now come to a crisis, and the situation is a most grave one. This is the last opportunity for settlement, and God only knows the future."

**121. First meeting between Sir L. Pelly and the Envoy.—**  
The first meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and Syud Nur Mahomed took place on the 30th January; the other persons present were the Mirakhor, the British Agent, Nawab Atta Mahomed, Dr. Bellew, and Munshi Mahomed Baqir, the Envoy's Secretary. The following is a memorandum of the conversation:—

First meeting between SIR LEWIS PELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED on 30th January 1877.

"Sir Lewis Pelly opened the discussion, after compliments, by observing that His Highness the Amir had addressed \* two letters to His Excellency the Viceroy, in one of which His Highness stated that he had deputed Syud Nur Mahomed Shah as his Envoy to the British Government, and that he would make known His Highness' wishes; whilst in the other letter it was written that the Envoy above named would explain the reasons of His Highness' inability to take part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

"On this the Kabul Envoy said that with reference to the Amir's inability to take part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, he would speak afterwards; but with reference to the first letter, he would observe that there was no mention of any wishes on the part of the Amir; the letter merely stated that the Amir's Envoy would make known the state of affairs. In the first instance, the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote to the Amir that Sir Lewis Pelly had been nominated as Envoy to His Highness, but the Amir expressed his wish to send Syud Nur Mahomed Shah down instead. The desire to send a British officer originated with the British Government. It devolves on the British Government to make known its wishes.

"Sir Lewis Pelly observed that on the arrival of the Viceroy in India there were two matters which rendered it desirable that he should make a friendly communication to the Amir, *viz.*, the assumption by Her Majesty the Queen of the title of Empress of India, and the assumption by His Excellency of the office of Viceroy and Governor-General of India. And His Excellency the Viceroy had considered that this communication would be most pleasantly made by sending a special Mission to His Highness' Court, thereby affording also an opportunity of discussing other important matters of State, and of removing any misapprehensions which might have occurred between the two Governments.

"The Kabul Envoy here interposed with some energy and warmth, saying,—

"'Was the misapprehension (the Persian expression used was "*nahumwaree*," unevenness) on our part or on that of both sides? Further, when did the misapprehension occur—before the arrival of the Viceroy, or after? If before his arrival, then what is it? And if after, then also what is it? For we have had no communication, and no misunderstanding has occurred since his arrival.'

"In reply, Sir Lewis Pelly observed that when the Viceroy arrived in India he perceived that some misunderstanding existed between the two Governments, and it was in part to clear up this misunderstanding and make known the good wishes and friendship of the British Government that the Viceroy desired to depute Sir Lewis Pelly as his Envoy to the Amir. But when the Viceroy learned that the Amir preferred, in the first instance, to depute Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to India, or that the British Agent at Kabul should proceed to the Viceroy's Court in order to ascertain how matters really stood, His Excellency summoned the British Agent from Kabul, and having heard all he had to say, again despatched him to Kabul with a friendly letter addressed to the Amir, and with an '*Aide Memoire*' of what he might assure His Highness that the Viceroy was prepared to do for him, provided the Amir rendered this aid possible by consenting to certain essential conditions, and with instructions to explain them fully to His Highness the Amir. The Viceroy also intimated through his Agent that, should the Amir so wish, His Excellency would depute Sir Lewis Pelly to meet Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Peshawur or elsewhere and there negotiate. The Viceroy having subsequently learned through his Agent that the Amir accepted his *sine quâ non* to opening negotiations, and had deputed his Minister Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to negotiate at Peshawur, has deputed Sir Lewis Pelly to meet Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at Peshawur with the most friendly object of re-establishing the relations of the two Governments on a firm, and reliable, and lasting basis.

"Accordingly, added Sir Lewis Pelly, His Excellency the Viceroy has concluded, from a perusal of the letter sent to His Excellency by his Agent at Kabul, with the cognizance of the Amir, and from the fact of the Amir's Envoy having come to Peshawur, that the Amir has accepted the *sine quâ non* condition that British officers may reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purpose of their watching exterior events, and of informing their own Government as well as that of the Amir of the state of affairs beyond the frontiers. The acceptance of the principle that British officers may reside in Afghanistan is absolutely necessary as a preliminary to the commencement of negotiations. This point being granted, other details can be discussed and settled hereafter. But unless the principle of British officers residing on the Afghan frontiers, and of informing the British Government of events passing on or beyond those frontiers, be conceded, it is impossible for the British Government to take upon itself the formal responsibility of assisting the Amir to defend his country from the attacks of external foes.

"Syud Nur Mahomed Shah desired more than once to interrupt and defer this point to a later period of the negotiation. But Sir Lewis Pelly begged that he might repeat that the Viceroy understands from the letter of His Excellency's Agent at Kabul, and from the arrival of His Highness' Envoy at Peshawur, that the principle of the residence of British officers on the Afghan frontiers has been accepted and agreed to by the Amir.

"Sir Lewis Pelly then, and at the desire of the Kabul Envoy, reiterated the above condition, in order that it might be perfectly understood word for word, so that nothing might remain obscure. And Sir Lewis Pelly added that he desired to speak on this and all other matters with the greatest frankness and sincerity, and in the most friendly manner, so that all questions might be thoroughly understood by both sides, and leave no room for its being subsequently said by either side that such and such words were not so understood at the time.

"On this particular condition, however, Sir Lewis Pelly said he had no discretionary powers. His instructions from the Viceroy were categorical as to the admission of the principle that British officers should be permitted to reside permanently on the frontiers of Afghanistan, and that until he is clearly informed that the Amir accepts this principle, Sir Lewis Pelly could not otherwise even commence negotiations, although the settlement of the details by which the arrangement would be carried out might form a subject of full and free discussion. It was far from being the wish or intention of the Viceroy unnecessarily to embarrass the Amir.

"The Kabul Envoy made no direct reply to this, but for some time busied himself in perusing the notes made by his Secretary, and then, after a few unimportant remarks in Pushtoo, referred again to the word 'misapprehension,' which had been translated *nâhamwârî*, and observed—

"In the commencement of the conversation Sir Lewis Pelly said that Syud Nur Mahomed Shah had been deputed to meet Sir Lewis Pelly to clear up some misapprehension. What was this misapprehension? Be pleased to inform me, in order that I may be prepared to discuss the point."

"Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he was not sure whether the precise word *nâhamwârî* was in the Viceroy's communications. But he would look at them again and inform the Kabul Envoy at the next meeting. Meanwhile Sir Lewis Pelly was bound by the exact words of the Viceroy's letter."

At this point the Mirakhor, who had twice fallen asleep during the discussion, begged permission to proceed to say his prayers, and the meeting closed. The hour for the next meeting was fixed at 3 P.M. on the following day, Wednesday, 31st January 1877. Syud Nur Mahomed observed—premissing that he was speaking as a private individual,—

"Your Government is a powerful and great one; ours is a small and weak one; we have long been on terms of friendship, and the Amir now clings to the skirt of the British Government, and till his hand be cut off he will not relax his hold of it.

"Whatever be the issue of our negotiations, personally I shall always entertain the sentiments of brotherhood with you (Sir Lewis Pelly) in remembrance of your kindness to me at Bushir, which I have often mentioned in Durbar. However this business may be decided, our wish is only for friendship with the British Government."

Sir Lewis Pelly did not entertain very much doubt of being able to bring Syud Nur Mahomed to an agreement. But he questioned the Syud's power to carry the Kabul Durbar with him. The Mirakhor appeared to send separate communications to the Amir and probably represented the anti-English party in Kabul; at any rate the Envoy seemed to fear and mistrust his views and actions.

**122. Second meeting between Sir L. Pelly and the Envoy.—**  
The second meeting, which had been fixed for the 31st January, was postponed,

owing to the Envoy's illness, to the 1st February. The same persons were present as on the previous occasion. The following is a memorandum of what took place:—

*Vide* Sir L. Pelly's letter, dated 1st February. Appendix XXV.

Second meeting between SIR LEWIS PELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH on 1st February 1877.

"Sir Lewis Pelly began by observing, in reference to Syud Nur Mahomed Shah's question put at the close of the last conference, that the word *náhamidúrl* appeared to him to represent the meaning he desired to convey.

"Syud Nur Mahomed Shah asked the meaning of the word *náhamidúrl*, and was informed that it meant 'unevenness,' but that if another expression were desired, the word *fahmi na sawáb*, or misapprehension, would do.

"Sir Lewis Pelly referred the Envoy to the Viceroy's letter dated 11th October, and to the *Aide Memoire* given by the Viceroy to the British Agent for the information of the Amir. The *Aide Memoire* was then read by the British Agent.

"The Envoy remarked that the *Aide Memoire* stated the apprehension and anxiety to be on the Viceroy's part.

"Sir Lewis Pelly then caused the *Aide Memoire* to be again read, and pointed out that the object expressed was to 'relieve his (the Amir's) mind from many apprehensions as to my (the Viceroy's) intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my (the Viceroy's) assumption of the Government of India, and by a policy which His Highness had considered to be neither hot nor cold.'

"The Envoy asked what apprehensions (*andesha*), as the Amir has had none? He has never committed any act contrary to correspondence which has had place between the two Governments, and has therefore given no cause to awaken anxiety on the part of the British Government.

"The Syud then remarked parenthetically that he hoped Sir Lewis Pelly would not suppose that he wished to give unnecessary trouble in asking this question. Sir Lewis Pelly replied: 'By no means. We shall never arrive at a really satisfactory understanding concerning the future until we have thoroughly understood and cleared up the past.' Sir Lewis Pelly continued that he would endeavour to explain some among the apprehensions (*andesha*), and which appeared to have been consequent upon certain wishes and requests made known by the Amir at the conference with Lord Mayo at Ambala in 1869, and at the interviews of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah himself at Simla in 1873, and in a communication received through the British Agent at Kabul in May 1873.

"The Envoy asked Sir Lewis Pelly to specify the wishes and requests to which he alluded. Sir Lewis Pelly then caused the following extract from the Note of the interview which had taken place between Lord Mayo and the Amir on the 29th March 1869 to be translated to the Envoy:—

*Extract.*

"To this the Amir replied that the friendship with his father was a "dry friendship" and one sided; he seemed unwilling, though pressed on the subject, to give any more distinct or decided expression to his feelings and wishes, though his Minister at last explained that they were, first, guarantee of the Amir and his family against all comers, whilst in actual possession of the throne; second, such present assistance in money and arms as could be given.

\* \* \* \* \* At length, after some hesitation and conversation in Pushtoo with his Minister, Nur Mahomed, he declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognize and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal successors in blood *mun wa outadi mun*,\* and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis.

He explained again and at some length that to acknowledge the ruler *pro tem.* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognize him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his or his descendants' part should vitiate all engagements on ours.'

"The Envoy begged the favour of Sir Lewis Pelly causing translations of all the documents he had referred to being made for his (the Envoy's) perusal, and that the further discussion of the Amir's requests and apprehensions might be deferred pending the preparation of those translations.

"The Envoy having observed that it was necessary in these discussions to proceed link by link of the chain, otherwise confusion would ensue, begged that the meeting might now terminate for to-day."

This conference, like the former one, began and ended in verbal discussions, and it was apparent that the Envoy's policy was one of delay. Nevertheless, the utmost pains were taken to reassure Nur Mahomed, to impress upon him that the policy of the British Government was one of friendship, and that its desire was to protect the Amir from foreign aggression or internal intrigue

if only His Highness would meet its advances in the trustful spirit he had evinced at Ambala. The preliminary condition about Agents was not a hostile ultimatum, though its acceptance was essential to any fresh concessions from the British Government.

### 123. Third and fourth meetings on 5th and 6th February.

—The translations asked for by the Envoy on the meeting of the 1st February having been furnished, the latter desired that the 5th February might be fixed for the next formal interview. By this time he would have perused his own papers and be in a position to reply to Sir L. Pelly's observations.

\* *Vide* Appendix XXV. Sir L. Pelly's demi-official, dated 3rd February.

This\* was agreed to and the third conference took place accordingly on the 5th February, the same persons being present as on the previous occasions. The fourth meeting was held on the following day, the 6th February. No definite conclusion was arrived at, but at the close of the fourth meeting the Envoy asked to be allowed two or three days in which to state what the Amir had desired him to

† *Vide* Appendix XXV. Sir L. Pelly's telegrams, dated 5th and 6th, and demi-official, dated 6th February, and His Excellency's telegrams of same date. Also letter from Kabul, dated 24th January.

submit; afterwards he would give a clear answer as to the recognition of the principle of the residence of British officers in Afghanistan.† The discussions at these two meetings are recorded in the following memoranda:—

Third meeting between SIR LEWIS PELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH at 11 A.M., 5th February 1877.

"The Afghan Envoy stated, in his note of the first conference, he finds that the *andesha* (anxiety) was prior to the arrival of the present Viceroy.

"The Envoy proceeded to say that he does not consider the present Viceroy as distinct from his predecessor.

"‘I confidently believe,’ he said, ‘the present Viceroy will acknowledge in their exactitude all the conditions and agreements that the English Government have made with the Afghan Government, and every agreement which the present Viceroy makes with the Afghan Government after any length of time, every Viceroy who shall succeed him will recognize the agreements of this Viceroy as well as of those who have preceded him. But if this Viceroy should make an agreement and a successor should say I am not bound to it?’

"Sir Lewis Pelly replied with reference to the old Treaty. The Envoy here interrupted, and said all Sir Lewis Pelly was about to say would come afterwards, and wanted a yes or no. Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that, with the permission of the Envoy, he would make his own remarks in the manner which might appear to him to be proper.

"As regards the old Treaty, Sir Lewis Pelly repeated—It appears that it gave no satisfaction to the Amir, who had repeatedly requested an agreement of a more specific and detailed character.

"The Viceroy has now recently offered to the Amir a Treaty of a more specific and intimate character, *viz.*, a Treaty of defensive and offensive alliance, and one tending to strengthen and secure his dynasty and power by the public recognition and support of the British Government, provided the Amir should agree to the conditions which are absolutely necessary as a means towards enabling the Viceroy to carry out the heavy obligations he would undertake under such an instrument.

"These conditions were long ago explained to the Amir by the Agent, and the Amir took two months to deliberate, after which he accepted the condition preliminary to negotiation and deputed his Envoy with full powers. The Viceroy now confidently expects a prompt and definite reply to his proposal of a defensive and offensive alliance.

"The Envoy asked whether all the agreements and treaties from the time of Sir John Lawrence and the late Amir up to the time of Lord Northbrook and the present Amir are invalid and annulled.

"Sir Lewis Pelly replied that he had no authority to annul any Treaty, but to propose to revise and supplement the Treaty of 1855 in the manner proposed by the Viceroy in his communication to the Amir and accepted by the Amir through the British Agent.

"The Kabul Envoy repeated the above to assure himself that he had perfectly understood it, and then said—‘Supposing the present Viceroy makes a Treaty with us, and twenty years after he has gone, another Viceroy says he wishes to revise and supplement it, what are we to do?’

"Sir Lewis Pelly replied—‘If one party to a Treaty expresses, as the Amir has done, dissatisfaction with its provisions, and requests the other party to the Instrument to give formal assent to certain desired additions to the Instrument, and should the party to the Treaty



accede to the proposed additions or modifications, it is right, and in accordance with international practice, that the Treaty should be revised and supplemented.'

"The Envoy replied—'The first proposition was that Sir Lewis Pelly desired to remove certain anxiety from the mind of the Amir. If there should come any anxiety in the mind of the Amir, it is owing to transgression of previous agreements; and our opinion is the same as that which from the time of the late Amir and Lord Lawrence to the time of the Ambala Durbar and till the arrival of the present Viceroy has always been mentioned in our past correspondence. And we are firmly of those opinions now. Therefore how can we consent to the addition of such hard conditions, the performance of which in Afghanistan will be impossible, as we can show by many proofs?'

"Sir Lewis Pelly asked whether the Envoy intended him to understand that the Amir declines to admit the principle of the condition that British officers should be permitted to reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purpose of watching events beyond those frontiers and of reporting to the Amir and the British Government. Sir Lewis Pelly added that he would beg the favour of the Envoy's affording a well-considered reply, since if that principle were not admitted, he (Sir Lewis Pelly) would be unable to open negotiation for the proposed Treaty of Alliance.

"The Envoy replied—'If the Amir saw the welfare of both sides in such a difficult matter, and consented to it, where would be the necessity of all this talking? Therefore now, after mentioning the considerations as to the inadvisability of this matter, I will discuss the proposals for the settlement of the conditions in this very particular of the residence of British officers, without entering upon other matters in regard to the Treaty, in so clear and friendly a manner that it may be thoroughly understood by both sides, and this in order that no doubt may remain in the mind of either party. With respect to the extracts from the records of the meeting at Ambala, which you have given me, I desire to comment upon them that they may all be made clear, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, in the course of the friendship of the two Governments, in any matter which may hereafter become the cause of regret.'

"Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he would be most happy, and was most desirous, to discuss all the details of the proposed Treaty, but that before doing so he must be explicitly assured that the above-mentioned principle is accepted. On this point Sir Lewis Pelly had no discretionary power. He trusted, therefore, that the Envoy would not impute to him any want of courtesy or disinclination to negotiate if he again requested the favour of the Envoy's distinctly informing him whether the Amir adheres to his assurance that the above-mentioned principle is admitted, or whether His Highness now withdraws from that assurance. And Sir Lewis Pelly again explained that the reason for the Viceroy declaring the admission of this principle to be a *sine quâ non* to the opening of negotiations is that he cannot formally take on himself the weighty obligations incidental to assisting the Amir to protect his frontier against foreign aggression, except the Amir is prepared to allow him the means by which alone he can satisfactorily observe, and become informed of, events passing on and beyond his frontiers.

"Sir Lewis Pelly added—'It being of course distinctly understood that these officers will be expressly prohibited from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan.'

"The Kabul Envoy replied—'I have nothing to say as to the consideration of the Treaty, but my object for present consideration is this, *viz.*, that I may explain to you the true facts of past circumstances in reference to this subject, and what is the desire of the Amir, and also what are the views of the whole Afghan people, who withdraw from this proposal, I beg you first to listen to what I say and to consider it well. I will explain why they withdraw from this proposal, so that you may understand it, and no doubt may remain on the subject.'

"Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he would be glad to hear him.

"The Kabul Envoy then said—'The meeting between the Amir and Sir D. Macleod took place at Lahore, and not at Ambala. But what you have stated that the Amir said is not so; because the Amir expressed no wish for any Government matter, and his coming was merely to make known his friendship, in order that might it be known to everybody that "at the time of revolution in Afghanistan the British Government did not ask after my welfare, but that I, at the first opportunity, came down; that in accordance with former friendship and past agreement and correspondence I might show that I was constant and firm." And this was known to the British Agent at that time, as was written to Lord Lawrence. Again, at Lahore Sir D. Macleod desired an interview, and it was at his desire the meeting took place. Whatever was advanced was advanced by Sir D. Macleod, and the Amir only replied to him. And now it is said the Amir made the first advance.

"Again, regarding the letter not satisfying his friends in Afghanistan, and by his returning without its alteration, they would consider he had gained nothing by his journey. I beg to observe that these words did not occur in that interview. Yes; the word *dushmani* (enmity) did occur, and I will explain in this meeting how it came to be mentioned. But what is written in the extract—"this is not possible, and he (the Amir) allowed it to pass, but said that if he did so and so according to our decision, he hoped the Queen would be informed that his wish was still such"—is not correct. This also was not said on that day. The copy of the written record of that day's interview is here; let it be examined and ascertained how

the fact stood, see paragraph 5, *viz.*, who asked the question and what was the reply? But the paragraph about *dushmani* (enmity) is correct, for the Amir said—"Let the enemies and friends of both sides be equally considered enemies and friends." It will be seen in paragraph 5 of the record.

"But in the Simla discussion with Lord Northbrook the word *dushmani* (enmity) was omitted in official papers, and the Amir also was pleased with this. When I come to mention the discussion at Simla, I will more carefully explain this matter, and it will also be borne out by the papers of the Amir."

"In reply, Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that there appeared to be a difference between the Afghan and the English records of the proceedings at the Ambala Conference. He could only go upon the records on which he was instructed; but in regard to the letter of Sir D. Macleod, Sir Lewis Pelly believed that, although the interview may have taken place at Lahore, it was reported from Ambala, as the letter is dated from that place.

"The Kabul Envoy remarked on this—"I do not say there has been any alteration of the writing; but whatever I have said, or may say, in these meetings, I will produce in support the authority of your own Government for you. If you have received other instructions, what do I know?"

"The Kabul Envoy continued—"The interview between the Amir and Lord Mayo also was owing to a privately expressed wish on the part of Lord Mayo. Grey Sahib came to me (Syud Nur Mahomed Shah), and said that Lord Mayo expressed his wish to speak with the Amir in private. The Amir consented to his wish, and they had a meeting. Therefore I now ask according to your own records of that meeting, and not according to my own account of it. According to your statement the Amir said this. What did Lord Mayo say in reply to the Amir to produce an anxiety (*undesha*) in the mind of the Amir on his return to his own country? What was the result of that meeting that the Viceroy should now wish to remove anxiety from the mind of the Amir? Some of the translated papers you have given me are correct and are remembered by me."

"Sir Lewis Pelly replied that apparently the anxiety was caused in the Amir's mind through the British Government deeming that it was not then necessary to formulate all the Amir's wishes in a Treaty.

"The Kabul Envoy replied—"I hope our friendship will always remain strong and lasting on both sides in accordance with the old agreements; but if such very serious discussions are to arise in the path of friendship at any time upon doubtful expressions, it gives room for much regret and despair.

"I also desire to state that at Ambala, after the interview between Lord Mayo and the Amir, a written paper was drawn up and given to the Amir. These words, which you have written as from the Amir, should appear in that document. Let it be referred to, for the question was then settled by it. Since then there has been no reference to the subject. Let that paper be consulted, for from it the matter will be well ascertained and understood, and it is incumbent to act upon its terms, and not to permit any transgression of them; and if they are transgressed, it will be a cause of great regret to us. Further, in my opinion the Amir returned from Ambala without anxiety."

"Sir Lewis Pelly begged to be informed what written paper the Kabul Envoy referred to, and whether he could bring a copy or give its date.

"The Kabul Envoy said he would produce a copy of it at the next meeting if possible, and, if not, would at all events indicate its date."

Fourth meeting between SIR LEWIS PELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH at noon of the 6th February 1877.

"The Kabul Envoy began by saying he would give Sir Lewis Pelly a copy of the convention\* (*wasica*) made between Lord Mayo and the Amir at Ambala; and if he would observe, by way of precaution, there should be some slight difference in the copy, it would not be of any important kind. The Kabul Envoy then read the above letter, and Sir Lewis Pelly begged he might be favoured with a copy of it.

"To this the Kabul Envoy replied he would give him a copy when this discussion was disposed of, and he entered into discussion of details.

"Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he was at present awaiting a reply to a telegram which he had last evening addressed to the Viceroy, and that in the meantime he would not press for an explanation of the discussion to which the Kabul Envoy referred. Sir Lewis Pelly would only remark *en passant* that, had the Amir not still retained anxiety in his mind after the conclusion of the Ambala Conference, it is improbable that he would have addressed to Lord Northbrook, through the British Agent, his letter of 1873, and have deputed Syud Nur Mahomed Shah himself to the Conference which ensued on the Amir's letter.

"The Kabul Envoy replied that whenever you do press for a discussion, it will be well. My desire is that I may make clear these matters with the greatest pleasure to you that no doubt may remain in the mind of either party. In my making these explanations to you, all these particulars will be in their proper places made known to you. After you have well weighed them, let me know whatever is your opinion.

\* The dictionary renders *wasica*=convention. But Syud Ahmed states that *wasica*, as currently used in these regions, means a document.—L. P.

"Before separating, some friendly conversation took place, which the Envoy requested might not be put in the Record of Proceedings. Finally the Envoy explained, in reference to his statement of yesterday, that he did not intend by it either to reject or accept the Agency clause; that he begged to be allowed two or three more days in which to state what the Amir had directed him to submit, and that he would then give a definite answer to the question of Agency."

**124. The Envoy's continued ill-health. Unofficial communications between him and Dr. Bellew and Sir Lewis Pelly.—**

On the 7th February the Envoy was too unwell for business; Dr. Bellew visited him, and his memorandum of the conversation which ensued will be found in Appendix XXV.\* With regard to the future conduct of business, it was arranged that the Envoy should review the past relations of the two countries, and that Sir Lewis Pelly would then reply. Afterwards the Envoy would submit his answer to the proposals made to him. It was understood that the two points which Syud Nur Mahomed would endeavour to maintain were, first, that in 1873 the British Government and not the Amir advanced proposals; secondly, that the location of British Agents on the Afghan frontier would be prejudicial to both Governments. Upon this point the following instructions, dated 10th February, were sent to Sir Lewis Pelly:—

"Pray do all in your power to prevent written protest against accuracy of conversations of 1869 and 1873, or declaration against reception of British Agents. Envoy should be informed that though cordially willing to hear all he has to say for information of Viceroy, who has always desired frank statement of Amir's real feelings, you cannot enter into any controversy or exchange of written statements on past events. The object of present negotiation is not to dispute about the past but to improve the future. I fully appreciate your difficulty, however, in controlling the Envoy's language. Envoy's object may be either to clear himself with Amir or establish a pretext for inconvenient demands. If Amir finally refuses to receive British Agents either on frontier or at Kabul, where an intelligent officer would have prevented the alleged causes of his present resentment, our position will be as follows: Treaty of 1855, which binds him to join us in war with any other Power, but contains no such reciprocal engagements on our part, will remain in force so far as we are concerned. Nor shall we interfere with his jurisdiction wherever we have already recognized it. But we shall distinctly decline to support him or his dynasty in any troubles, internal or external, and shall consequently continue to strengthen our frontier without further reference to him, in order to provide against probability of Afghanistan falling under dominant Russian influence. It is for Amir to consider whether this result of present negotiation will be advantageous to his interests when it becomes generally known.

"If Envoy asks explanation of proceedings in Kelat, refer to me before definitely replying."

In the evening of the 7th the Envoy drove with Sir Lewis Pelly and observed

See Amir's letter in Appendix XXIV. The Syud's meaning probably was that he would explain the reason of the Amir's inability to accept the invitation.

that the Amir's proceedings in respect to the supposed *jehad* had been much exaggerated, and that he would be able to explain why His Highness had sent no reply to the Viceroy's invitation to the Delhi Assemblage. It was reported at Peshawur that the Envoy had come with the object of asking for explanations of the Kurum and Quetta movements.

**125. Fifth and Sixth meetings on the 8th and 10th February.—**

At the fifth meeting the Mirakhor was not present. The Envoy commenced his recapitulation of the history of the relations between Shere Ali and the British Government, which he desired might be listened to without interruption. His first point was that his own deputation to Simla in 1873 originated with the British Government and not with the Amir, and that the proposals then made were advanced by the British Government. He then learned from what Lord Northbrook said to him that there was a possibility of Russian aggression upon Afghanistan, a circumstance which led him to doubt the validity of Lord Mayo's assurance given in June 1870. Further, that in the event of such aggression it was probable that England would assist Afghanistan, but the nature of the assistance was left obscure both in Lord Northbrook's writings and sayings. The meeting was not a prolonged one, as the Envoy's ailment caused him considerable inconvenience. On the 10th the conference met again, the Mirakhor being present. The Envoy continued his narrative,

and commenced by referring to his several conversations with Mr. Aitchison and Lord Northbrook in 1873. He had insisted, he said, that if there was any need at all for Afghanistan to look for assistance to England against Russia, that the nature of the assistance to be rendered should be clear and definite; and he dwelt on the ambiguous reply which had been made to him and to the Amir. He next alluded to Lord Northbrook's answer in respect to the Amir's refusal to allow Colonel Baker and others to travel through Afghanistan, apparently inferring that Lord Northbrook had accepted the Amir's explanation as sufficient and satisfactory. He then referred to Lord Northbrook's letter when intimating to the Amir his resignation of the office of Viceroy, and argued that its terms showed that when Lord Northbrook left the relations of the two Governments were friendly as heretofore. He added that there were other causes of the Amir's annoyance which he would mention. He then cited the omission of the British Government to answer a petition from the Biluchistan Chiefs forwarded by the Amir and Lord Northbrook's letter interposing in behalf of Yakub Khan. The following is the official record of what passed:—

Fifth meeting between SIR LEWIS PELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, at noon of the 8th February 1877.

*Present:*

SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., *Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.*  
 SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, *Envoy of the Amir of Kabul.*  
 DR. H. W. BELLEW, C.S.I., *Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.*  
 NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, *British Agent at the Court of Kabul.*  
 MUNSHI MAHOMED BAQIE, *Secretary to the Kabul Envoy.*

"Syud Nur Mahomed Shah opened the discussion by stating that he wished to make a detailed statement of his case on the part of the Amir, and begged that he might be heard throughout without reply from Sir Lewis Pelly until he had finished what he had to say, which he desired might be taken down in writing.

"Sir Lewis Pelly observed that he would gladly accede to the request of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah and hear what he had to say.

"On this, without further remarks, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah said—

"In respect to the paper of the British Agent in 1873, with an extract from which I have been furnished by Sir Lewis Pelly, I am not well informed regarding it. I do not know whether the Amir actually did so speak word for word; but I may say in respect to the perfect candour of the Amir's heart towards the British Government, which he then had, and still has, that in all his conversations with the British Agent he explained the state of affairs in his usual friendly manner.

"Again, with respect to the terms of the letters (*wasica*) of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, who wrote—"Always write and communicate with the British Government in regard to matters between the two Governments without fear." If the whole of that letter be here quoted, it will lead to delay. I therefore refer to the letter of the 12th of October 1868, in which Lord Lawrence wrote—"The consent and approval of Her Majesty the Queen of England has been accorded to this letter after mature reflection and deliberation." Therefore, in order to reassure the authorities of the British Government, lest they should think the Amir does not respect those promises, and, in his own opinion, considers these promises of the British Government as worthless, I may state that if the authorities of the British Government have a regard for their own promises and act upon them with sincerity, in accordance with the customary friendship which was formerly, and is now, observed between the two Governments, there is no ground for any anxiety.

"I will also mention the reason for this in a friendly manner, after the settlement of the question now before us, should the decision turn upon details; otherwise not.

"Again, in regard to the meetings I had with Lord Northbrook and the Foreign Secretary at Simla, as mentioned in the paper furnished to me by Sir Lewis Pelly, I beg to observe that so many discussions were held in that place that not a single subject was left out; but if all those discussions were to be gone over and explained now, it would so lengthen what I have to say that I should fail in my object. I will therefore speak of them in a summary manner.

"In the first place, I would ask whether my going there was by the desire of the Amir, or by the desire of Lord Northbrook. Again, out of all the discussions which took place there repeatedly, and in which not a single subject escaped mention, I am now only furnished with an extract, in which the hand and foot are concealed and something from the waist is made known; or in other words, one paragraph of its many paragraphs is brought forward and so on.

"First, as to what it is alleged that I said there. The subject alluded to was there discussed and decided and finally settled, and not a shred of the various questions discussed was allowed to remain unconsidered. So it should be now.



“Then in respect to the word “wishes.” It was not that the Amir deputed me of his own wish. It was in this wise :—The British Government, in the first instance, wrote to the British Agent to inform the Amir that “in these days certain matters are appearing in the newspapers. They are not to be relied upon. The object of my writing is that the former Viceroy had written to you on a certain date, saying that the communications addressed by the British Government to the Russian Government continued in force.”

“In the next place, in letters written to the British Agent on the 23rd and 26th of March 1873 by the British Government, it was stated that an officer of rank would proceed to Kabul in order to explain to the Amir the final settlement of the Seistán question. The Kabul authorities gave their reply to these letters through the British Agent. In summary, it was to the effect that “the circumstances of the final settlement are not known to us. We wish to be informed of the nature of the settlement, and if it be in accordance with the views and power of this God-granted Government, then so much the better. But if not, and it be contrary to the views and power of this Government, then the state of our affairs will be notified to the English Government. And if the coming of the above-mentioned officer be for some other matter connected with the welfare of Afghanistan, let us be informed of it.”

“In reply to this the British Agent received a letter, dated 12th October 1873. In that letter it was stated that “the purpose of the sincere friend is this, that a British officer should be deputed for two objects, *viz.*, the intimation of the final decision of the Seistán question, and also of certain matters connected with the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, in order that he may explain certain communications which have passed between the two exalted Governments of England and Russia, and regarding which the Viceroy previously wrote.”

“When the Amir perceived that Lord Northbrook was very persistent, the Amir communicated his views, in conformity with his customary friendship, to the British Agent. In brief, they were to the effect that “having perused the letters of the Viceroy of India, dated 24th June 1870 and 1st May 1872 and 9th May 1872, and also the letters of General Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, concerning the former arrangements made for the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, and which are now before me, it seems, in my opinion, suitable that the Governor-General of India should, in the first instance, honor my Agent with an interview, in order that he may learn the nature of the new communications regarding the frontiers referred to, and ascertain the views of the British Government; and, after having thoroughly understood these, he should return to me, in order that I may consider how they may be gradually carried out.”

“On the receipt of this communication by the Viceroy of India, the Viceroy, in the spirit of the agreement which existed between the two Governments, asked that an official of the Amir's might be deputed to him. The Amir accordingly deputed me (Syud Nur Mahomed Shah) as his Envoy to the British Government. Lord Northbrook on the conclusion of the discussion on the 30th August 1873, said to me (Syud Nur Mahomed Shah)—“I have asked for you to be deputed from a wish of my own.” This fact will be seen by reference to the discussion. The “wishes,” therefore, “on whose part were they?” And as to other wishes also, it will be seen from the discussions by whom they were expressed,—I refer to the discussion of 12th July 1873 at Simla. Ascertain from whose side the desire for the discussion originated. In that discussion I received from Lord Northbrook reassurances as to the absence of aggression on the part of the Russians, and also on the part of those tribes which are under the influence of the Russians, and at the same time I ascertained that there was a possibility of aggression. This threw a doubt upon the letter of 24th June 1870 from Lord Mayo, which, in the matter of confirming the communication of General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkistan, stated—“There is a perfect assurance; do not on your part bring any doubt upon it.” And so also with other promises from that side of the north, the detail of which here is not necessary, because you can consult those papers in which the explanation is recorded.

“In that meeting Lord Northbrook of himself observed without my asking him—“It is necessary that the Amir be informed that since the country of Afghanistan is situated between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous that the Government of Afghanistan should be strong and independent.” He also said of his own accord without my expressing any wish on the subject—“In regard to invasion of the Afghan frontier by a foreign enemy, it is probable that in such case the English would assist the Ruler of Afghanistan in repelling such aggressors.” But the nature of this assistance was left obscure both in his writings and sayings. When I saw that Lord Northbrook was, without any expression of views on my part, very persistent in this particular matter, I said, owing to his persistence, that the people of Afghanistan did not place so much reliance on the promises of Russia as they did upon the assistance of the British Government. I said also that I could not speak further on the subject with him, nor could I say all that was in my mind, until I had considered the matter and talked it over with the Foreign Secretary. This concluded our interview. The reason I had for not discussing this subject with Lord Northbrook was that I did not consider it suitable to do so orally without previous conversation with the Foreign Secretary.”

“At this point Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, who had evidently been somewhat inconvenienced by his ailment during the latter part of his statement, paused, and, expressing himself unable to continue the topic, begged that the conference might be adjourned to Saturday.”



Sixth meeting between SIR LEWIS PELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, at noon of the 10th February 1877.

*Present :*

SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., *Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.*  
 SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, *Envoy of the Amir of Kabul.*  
 DR. H. W. BELLEW, C.S.I., *Secretary and Interpreter to Sir L. Pelly.*  
 NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, *British Agent at the Court of Kabul.*  
 MIRAKHOR AHMED KHAN, *Deputed by the Amir of Kabul.*  
 MUNSHI MAHOMED BAQIR, *Secretary to the Kabul Envoy.*

"The Envoy opened the proceedings with the continuation of the statement of his case on the part of the Amir at the point where he left off on the previous meeting. He proceeded to say that he had several meetings with the Foreign Secretary and the Under-Secretary between the 12th and 19th of July with many arguments, and observed that if he went into them all again on this occasion, it would greatly lengthen what he had to say. 'The summary of it,' he said, 'is this: There is no need for this assistance. The previous promises and pledges between the two parties are sufficient. They, however, said the matter which was discussed between us should be written. But I told them that if they considered that such want of assistance did exist, the people of Afghanistan would not be satisfied with such indefinite promises, and I adduced many arguments in proof. On the contrary, I said that the promises and the writings of the previous Viceroys on this matter would be vitiated and invalidated.

"The translated paper given to me by Sir Lewis Pelly is correct; but I even said more than it contained, for I said besides—"Let all this be entered in the letter from Lord Northbrook to the Amir."

"Subsequent to this, in a second interview with Lord Northbrook on the 30th of the same month, owing to the persistence with which he referred to the matter, I represented that "the sort of assistance that you mention would not satisfy the people of Afghanistan. I have spoken on this subject with many proofs to the Secretary, and if the British Government should make any promise, let it be in the terms that I have proposed to the Foreign Secretary." I also repeated the same in brief to Lord Northbrook, and my reasons for mentioning the subject in brief to Lord Northbrook were these, *viz.*, that in the commencement of the conversation of that day he told me that although he was informed word for word of what I had said to the Foreign Secretary, he wished them to be repeated in brief by me to himself.

"Again, as to the present assistance for the future, and for strengthening the frontiers. Since I mentioned in our meeting of Thursday last what Lord Northbrook had said at our first interview of 12th July regarding Afghanistan being a "buffer" between the two Governments, there is no necessity to repeat it. Also, considering the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo with the same views and arguments, and which I mentioned on Thursday in connection with the letter of the British Agent, there is no need to refer to them again.

"In respect to the point that the people of Afghanistan would not be satisfied with such a sort of promise, there was much difference of opinion, and the discussion continued for a month.

"At last, on the 30th of August of that year, I had a third interview with Lord Northbrook, in which all the subjects were thoroughly discussed, and so nothing was left unconsidered. You can consult the facts of that interview from the records of your own Offices.

"After that, on the 3rd or 4th of September, I had some conversation with the Secretary, which brought the discussion to a close.

"As regards the word "enmity," it is correct. But the Viceroy said that such expressions are not used in State papers. I also being pleased at the non-usage of such expressions in State papers, said nothing.

"As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, who said—"It is necessary that the Amir should be informed that since the country of Afghanistan is a 'buffer' between the territories of the English and Russian Governments it is therefore advantageous for Hindustan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent." Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that "even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it." After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance.

"After all these lengthy discussions Lord Northbrook, on the 6th of September 1873, gave me a letter to the address of the Amir. In reply to this letter, the Amir wrote in detail concerning its several points. Two of the sentences in this letter were to the following effect:—

"1st.—"What you have written concerning the northern frontier with your pearl-studded pen has been understood by this friend in its exactitude. This humble supplicant at the Divine Throne renders his thanks to God, and expresses his gratitude that, praised be God the

Almighty, lasting peace and tranquillity are established in all Governments, and doubts and oppositions from all sides have been removed; and such security has been attained in all kingdoms that no one will transgress his own frontiers, and nobody will dispute or discuss with anybody within their own limits, and the word 'enmity' no longer is used in State papers and documents, and tranquillity and security are enjoyed by all nations at large.

"2nd.—"That which that kind friend had penned with the pen charged with friendship to the effect that the course which was pursued towards this friend by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo would continue to be observed on the part of that side. This expression is the cause of many rejoicings. My kind friend! after those discussions which took place at Simla with Sayadat Panah Syud Nur Mahomed Shah there was no necessity for these discussions. That very arrangement and agreement at Ambala is sufficient; so long as from the side of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Great Queen of England, the foundation of friendship shall remain intact and stable. Please God Almighty from the side of this supplicant at the Divine Throne also the foundation of friendship and union will remain strong and firm as at the time of the interview at Ambala, where I met Lord Mayo, whose authority is in my hand, as also the document of Lord Lawrence, which is in my possession."

"Again, regarding the letter of Mr. Macnabb to the address of the British Agent, asking permission for Colonel Baker, who was proceeding from Teheran to India, to be allowed to pass through Afghanistan, the Amir wrote to Lord Northbrook in reply—"In the matter of the passage of such men as Colonel Baker and others through the limits of Afghanistan, since the Envoy of this party at the time of the interview and conference on all these subjects with that kind Sahib explained the matter in detail, to the effect that in the Afghanistan limits there were many objections, therefore for this reason there is no need for repetition."

"The above-mentioned Lord Sahib wrote in reply that "the difficulties which that kind friend experiences in the case of European guests travelling in Afghanistan are apparent to this friend. He is unable to extend the same hospitality to the servants of Her Exalted Majesty the Great Queen as this friend accords to the servants and subjects of that kind friend in Hindustan."

"Again, at the time of his departure, Lord Northbrook sent a communication to the Amir, the substance of which I will now repeat from memory. If there should be some slight difference in the wording, let it not be a matter of blame. In brief, its substance was to this effect—"I am going, and I leave with the friendship remaining on the same firm footing as before, and my successor will also maintain the same course."

"Therefore, till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook that previous course continued to be observed. From the discussions then that have taken place in these meetings at Peshawur what anxiety can there be in the mind of the Amir that you should now remove it?"

"The Kabul Envoy here observed that he had now concluded what he desired to say, and that there was no grievance in the mind of the Amir in respect to the matters referred to by Sir Lewis Pelly, but that discontent had really found place in the Amir's mind in connection with other questions; and if Sir Lewis Pelly would permit him to enumerate the causes of this discontent in a friendly, unofficial way, and without provoking controversy by a reply, he (the Envoy) would do so.

"Sir Lewis Pelly expressed his readiness to hear whatever the Kabul Envoy might have to say, and begged to inform him that it was the desire of the Viceroy to learn all the causes of anxiety that there may be in the mind of the Amir.

"The Kabul Envoy then proceeded to say that 'if any anxiety have already come into the mind of the Amir, or should hereafter come, it will be from other causes. I will, therefore, owing to friendship and expectation of favour, mention some of them.

"The first cause is this:—At the end of the year 1869, or in the beginning of the following year, all the Chiefs of Biluchistan, having been honored by an interview with the Amir at Kabul, presented a petition, the purport of which was to this effect—"Owing to the claims of State which you have upon us, be pleased to settle the affairs amongst ourselves." The Amir, owing to his consideration of the requirements of certain State matters at the time, sent that petition through your Agent to the English Government, but since then no answer has been received by the Amir in regard to it from the English Government.

"The second cause is this:—In regard to the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan it was written in a communication from Lord Mayo that "if efforts and endeavours should appear on the part of domestic rivals in order to disturb the position of that kind friend in the Government of Kabul, and again kindle the fire of civil war, this circumstance will certainly be the cause of the severe displeasure of the English Government; and further, from time to time, they will adopt such means and measures in this matter as may be deemed advisable under the circumstances of the time." Moreover, I told Commissioner Pollock Sahib in the journey to Scistan that "if you value the friendship of the Amir, do not say anything in this matter." Of course he will have written to his own Government.

"Again, Mr. Macnabb in 1873 wrote to the British Agent—"Inform the Amir that on the part of the British Government nothing will be said to the Amir."

“Further, in the interview at Simla, one day the conversation between Lord Northbrook and myself turned accidentally on this subject. Lord Northbrook said to me orally—“In the matter of Yakub Khan, I have no concern that I should say why and wherefore, or do so and do so. In such matters if the Amir should ask my advice, I will advise him according to my knowledge; whether he act upon that or not, it does not matter to me, because the Amir will do what he considers advisable for his own welfare.”

“Consequently when the Amir, for State reasons of expediency, prohibited Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan from returning to Herat, and imprisoned him, the English Government, in place of severe displeasure and efforts and endeavours, in order that the foundation of the government of the Amir should be strong, and in spite of the declaration of the above-mentioned Lord Sahib that “I have no concern in this matter,” wrote to the British Agent through Ommaney Sahib, the Deputy Commissioner, who said—“A telegram has arrived from the Foreign Secretary to Government of India. Be so good as to inform His Highness the Amir that the Viceroy urgently desires the observance of those conditions on which Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan came, and that they should be fulfilled. In this case the good name of the Amir and the friendship of the British Government will remain intact, and the Viceroy will be glad if he is re-assured as soon as possible in regard to the above-mentioned circumstances, and that he also be informed of the real state of the case.”

“Now I will put the question—Is this, or is it not, an interference in the affairs of the Afghan Government tending to diminish its independence?”

“Again, that which you have written by way of note furnished to me in this present conference, to the effect that “we will bind ourselves in writing that, should any disturbance arise within Afghanistan, the English Government, supporting the Amir, will suppress the internal disturbance.” Now, since Lord Mayo has already given a writing in this matter, what necessity is there for its repetition? Let that document be acted upon. It is sufficient, and if that should not be sufficient, in what manner can the present writing suffice?”

“At this point the Kabul Envoy, expressing himself fatigued by the day’s exertions, begged that the meeting might be adjourned, and observed that he hoped to finish all he had to say in putting forward the statement of his friendly and unofficial explanations at the next conference.”

**126. Seventh meeting of the Conference on the 12th February.**—At this meeting the Envoy concluded his recapitulation of the Amir’s grievances against the British Government. The two additional instances cited as having caused special annoyance and disappointment were (1) the deputation of Ibrahim Khan to Wakhan, which has been described in paragraph 86 of this Précis, and (2) the Seistán arbitration which has been fully dealt with in Chapters I, II, and III. He then proceeded to argue strongly against the proposal to establish English Agents in Afghanistan, pointing out that the Afghan Government had persistently opposed this from the days of Dost Mahomed; that evil things had happened to the English officers located in Kabul in the time of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, that the difficulty of protecting such Agents was excessive, and that reproach and trouble would infallibly attach to the Amir if harm befell them. This meeting took place in the presence of the same persons as on the previous occasions; the following is the official record of the Envoy’s statement:—

Seventh meeting between SIR LEWIS FELLY and SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, at noon of the 12th February 1877.

“After interchange of the usual complimentary greetings, the Kabul Envoy requested permission to continue his friendly and unofficial statement of miscellaneous anxieties which had heretofore arisen in the mind of the Amir.

“The Envoy then said the third cause of anxiety was this: ‘In the matter of Ibrahim Khan going with a letter and presents from the English Government to the Mir of Wakhan for the reason that the said Mir had hospitably entertained Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and other officers. In the first instance, intimation was received by the British Agent at Kabul that he should obtain the permission of the Amir for his coming. The Kabul authorities expressed many objections in the matter to the Agent, the detail of which objections you can ascertain from the records of the Agent, and part of them is to this effect, *viz.*, that this course is contrary to the observance of the rule and customs of the two exalted Governments, and it is not even the usage of this country. This matter was yet under consideration, and no final answer was received from the English Government, when the above-named Ibrahim Khan came to Kabul without the permission of the Amir.

“Now I beg you to observe this—When a servant of the Amir’s Government, by the permission of that Government, performs an act of hospitality, and employs some local Malik (Chief) of theirs on the spot on that duty, and then a letter from the Viceroy, or the Lieutenant-

Governor of Lahore, is sent with presents to that local Malik, it raises a doubt in the minds of the people as to what may have been said to that local Malik, the Mir of Wakhan. Many speculations on this subject are already current amongst the people of Afghanistan, and in this matter particularly they now say—On one occasion a Sahib came by permission for one or two days to the frontier, and even then there was so much wilfulness (*israri*=obstinacy) that a letter with presents was sent to the Malik of that place by the Viceroy of India. If they be permitted to reside on our frontiers, in the course of time what may not occur? And how shall we provide against such a difficulty? For in this matter of Wakhan they have directly interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan.

“The fourth cause was in the matter of the Seistán question, the decision of which is known, and consequently needs no repetition; for, if I entered into its explanation, it would greatly prolong the business; but if there be a necessity for its explanation I will refer to it after the special subject now before us is disposed of, shall I consider it advisable at the time; otherwise I will not.

“Now, if there be cause for anxiety (*andesha*) in such matters as those referred to, there is much more in the proposal which is now under discussion, for its adoption in Afghanistan is very difficult, and its result will be remorse (*pashemani*); because, referring to the former state of affairs at the time that the late Amir and Lord Lawrence met at this very Peshawur and concluded a Treaty, this very question which we are now discussing was mooted between them. Had its entertainment been possible, it would have been at that time acceded to, for the above-mentioned Lord was very well acquainted with the circumstances of Afghanistan, and its good and evil were clearly known to him. The late Amir himself explained in detail to Lord Lawrence that the entertainment of this proposal was impossible, and that it could not be carried out at his hands. And Lord Lawrence consequently settled and decided the point, and, for the sake of maintaining the mutual friendship, omitted the proposal from the written Treaty. Let this be considered, and let no proposal be brought forward between us which may abrogate that Treaty and other assurances.

“Again, Lord Lawrence, at the time of his departure from India in 1863, wrote a letter to the Amir, which explains and bears testimony to that Treaty. It was written—If you do not give up from your hands this manner of friendship which you now have with the English Government, that Government has now necessity to employ an equalizing influence (*tasarrufi adila*) in Kabul, and friendship will be firm throughout Afghanistan in the former manner.

“It was also written—Your sincere friend has adopted the course which is now made current in relation to the affairs of Afghanistan advisedly, and after mature reflection and consideration, and Her Exalted Majesty the Great Queen of England has approved and consented to it. That kind friend (the Amir) will have ascertained from the nature of his own action in the Treaty and compact with the English Government that there is no fear of change in the course mentioned, nor of interference by the English Government in the internal affairs of that dominion (Kabul), or in the administration of that kind friend (the Amir).

“It was also written—Let it be considered certain that if that kind friend (the Amir), in order to benefit by the Treaty and compact with the English Government, do not deviate from the former course, there will never be any mistake in his administration.

“There were also other things written in that letter which I need not adduce. You can peruse the letter and ascertain what they are. But it is our earnest hope that in conformity with that letter no change be now made.

“With respect to the letters and other successive communications from Lord Mayo, it was especially stated in one letter—Whatever wish of your own you may put before this Government will meet with attention and respect. Lord Mayo, in conformity with the former friendship, most thoroughly maintained and strengthened the friendship in accordance with the customary usage.

“Now our wish is that, in accordance with the writings of Lord Mayo, you will act in conformity with the former assurances. Let not such matters come between us as will make us suspicious of State affairs (Government deeds) and scatter away former assurances, especially a matter the performance (*mustiar*) of which is impossible.

“As to the state of affairs from the time Lord Northbrook came to India till the time he left India. Although there were discussions on the subject, still he left the friendship without change in conformity with the conduct of his predecessors, and in conformity with the preceding usage. As I have already mentioned, all these circumstances here, in Peshawur, there is no need to repeat them.

“I beg the favour of your consideration of the true facts of the state of affairs in Afghanistan with justice and impartiality. The condition of the Afghan people is perfectly well known to the authorities of the English Government. There is no need therefore for a detailed mention of them. I will only allude to some of them briefly.

“In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply-rooted in their hearts, that if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be reassured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from

their minds, for they adduce many proofs in support of them, the mention of which now would greatly prolong this discussion.

“Therefore, since the opinions of the people of Afghanistan are such, the protection of the Englishmen in the midst of those hill tribes is difficult, nay impossible, because the whole army and the subjects of the Government are of these mountain people.

“It is necessary to view the subject with justice. It is known what were the acts of the Afghan people at the time the army of your Government was in that country, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was with you, and I need not therefore relate them. What deeds did they do in the very bazar of Kandahar and Kabul? One of them was hanged for an act perpetrated by him. A few days later another committed the same act. This state of affairs continued for three years, and was not stopped.

“But besides this there are some people who, out of hostility to the Amir, would secretly kill some Sahib in order to mar the friendship of two Governments. Was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Amir’s army murdered by these people in the very midst of twenty thousand of his troops?

“Now the Amir would have to protect the Sahibs with his army; but if he could not protect the life of his own Commander-in-Chief, then in what manner could he protect the life of any other person?

“Again, if at any time a disturbance or revolution should occur in Afghanistan, the Sahibs would be certainly destroyed; and this is a point which needs no explanation, for it is well known; because in times of disturbance in Afghanistan, from the days of Timur Shah to the present day, very many of the noblest men of Afghanistan itself have perished, and many of their greatest Chiefs and leaders have been murdered. Were I to enter into details on this subject, it would greatly lengthen my discourse. But if you should so desire, I will relate to you the circumstances under which each one of them was killed.

“Therefore, in case that, from some cause or other, the Sahibs should be killed, where would the consequence lead to? Eternal reproach and bitterness against Afghanistan would be the result, and their friendship with the English Government being destroyed would be exchanged for enmity.

“Let it be remembered that one English Sahib on this frontier of Peshawur was murdered between the frontiers of two Governments, and notwithstanding the enquiries made in accordance with the approval of Lord Northbrook, as was admitted by him in the discussion at Simla, and who subsequently wrote to the Amir expressing his satisfaction thereon, the final issue has been the defection of Nouroz Khan, who, having robbed a kafilā, has taken to flight. This enquiry put the Amir to great expense, and was attended with the loss of many lives, and the only result has been the closure of the road up to the present time, owing to the resentment of the people.

“Now, what would be the consequences should such an occurrence happen on those far distant frontiers, the inhabitants of which comprise people of all sorts of tribes?

“Therefore, what would be the advantage if the Amir should comply with such a proposal, in which there is both loss of reputation and injury to Afghanistan, as well as bitterness of feeling, besides alienation of the two Governments either now or hereafter? Under the previous arrangement, up to the present nothing has occurred contrary to friendship, in conformity with the terms of writings and documents.

“And what advantage is there that the Amir should now knowingly make such an arrangement, the result of which would be enmity and regret to the two Governments and alienation of the friendship between them? If he now undertake this difficult task, and it be impossible to carry it out, you will be the first to say why did you enter into an arrangement which it is impossible to perform? And what will all people and the nations on the face of the earth say? And, further, since with all the treaties and documents of the British Government which he has in his hand no blame can be attached to the Amir, any alteration now will impose a load of blame on him which will be both injurious to Afghanistan and reprehensible also. Now blame is the worst of all things in any matter. Why, therefore, should the English Government, notwithstanding the friendship which the Amir so much expects from them, be disposed to impose such a load of blame upon so sincere a friend?

“In the first day’s conference, in the outset of the conversation you proposed to remove any anxieties that might be in the mind of the Amir. Now will this remove the anxiety from the mind of the Amir, or will it raise a fresh anxiety, not only in the mind of the Amir but in the minds of all the people of Afghanistan? Therefore I now expect from the great civilized English Government that they will well weigh the several arguments I have adduced in conversations and discussions and quotations I have made from papers and documents, as well as what I have said on the head of the customary usage and the impracticability of this proposal owing to the views of the people of Afghanistan and the actual condition of their country, in order they may arrive at just and correct opinion as to who has the right on his side and what is best. And I beg that the English Government will not raise a question which will abrogate the former treaties and agreements and the past usage in order that the friendship should continue strong on the same footing as hitherto.”



## 127. Eighth meeting on 15th February. Sir L. Pelly's reply on the whole case.—

See telegram from Sir L. Pelly, dated 14th February, and His Excellency's reply, dated 15th February. Appendix XXV.

The time had now arrived for Sir L. Pelly to answer the Envoy. The instructions conveyed to him were to point out to Syud Nur Mahomed in firm language that if the Amir refused to receive English Agents either at Kabul or on the frontier, that the British Government would be compelled to fall back upon the Treaty of 1855 which bound the Amir to join the British Government against its enemies, but contained no reciprocal engagement binding upon the British Government; that the Amir's jurisdiction would be respected in those parts in which it had been already recognized; but that the British Government would distinctly decline to support him or his dynasty in any troubles, external or internal, and would take its own measures to strengthen the British frontier without further reference to the Amir, who must clearly understand that he could not get either treaty, subsidy, or dynastic recognition without an appreciable equivalent on his part. At the same time Sir L. Pelly was desired to be careful not to break off negotiations pending further written instructions. If the Envoy should definitely and unconditionally reject the proposal in respect to British Agents, or if he should propose any other conditions in lieu, Sir L. Pelly was to say that he had no instructions to discuss the situation, and must refer the matter to the Viceroy for orders, and meanwhile suspend negotiations. He was to tell the Envoy that in his (Sir L. Pelly's) opinion there was no likelihood of the British Government agreeing to negotiate on any other basis than that already defined, and that the Amir had probably missed an opportunity, which could never recur, of greatly strengthening his own position. The following memorandum describes the manner in which Sir L. Pelly carried out these instructions:—

Eighth meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah at noon of the 15th February 1877.

### *Present:*

SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., *Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.*

SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, *Envoy of the Amir of Kabul.*

DR. H. W. BELLEW, C.S.I., *Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.*

NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, *British Agent at the Court of Kabul.*

MIRAKHOR AHMED KHAN, *Deputed by the Amir of Kabul.*

MUNSHI MAHOMED BAQIR, *Secretary to the Kabul Envoy.*

“Sir Lewis Pelly commenced by saying—I assure the Envoy of the close attention I have paid to all he has been so good as to state, and that what has fallen from his lips appears to me to strengthen a conviction at which the Viceroy has long ago deliberately arrived, *viz.*, of the necessity which existed for frank, confidential, and personal explanations between the two Governments in view to removing misapprehensions concerning the past and as to the nature of the Viceroy's own intentions for the future. An opportunity for these explanations has happily now been found in our present meeting, and I would premise that the motive of the Viceroy in desiring, by means of this conference, to arrive at a satisfactory understanding is not to interfere in Afghanistan, but to avert the danger of future interference by others; and Sir Lewis Pelly continued—In handing to the Envoy some extracts from the records of the Government of India, my object was not to enter into controversy concerning the past, but to prove to the Amir the careful consideration which the Viceroy has accorded to the wishes of His Highness (as recorded in those extracts) for a formal and permanent alliance of a defensive, offensive and dynastic character. It is clear to the Viceroy that one of the causes which has led to a diminution of the confidence and satisfaction evinced by the Amir on the occasion of his visiting the late Lord Mayo at Ambala is to be found in the fact that the British Government both then and subsequently in 1873 deemed it premature and otherwise inexpedient to comply with the above-mentioned wishes of the Amir, and declined to commit itself to any engagement. Another cause of mutual misapprehension has been the want of frequent, cordial, and confidential communications between the two Governments. The Envoy's recapitulation of the Amir's real grievances and anxieties, and of what has happened in past times, shows that His Highness has for years been more or less estranged from the British Indian Government, on grounds which have only recently come to the knowledge of the present Viceroy, and which would probably have been prevented by a better knowledge of the Amir's feelings. It is in the opinion of the Viceroy certain that, had an intelligent British officer been in direct personal communication with the Amir, many of the alleged causes of His Highness' grievances, and consequent resentment, could not have taken place. Referring further to the Amir's real grievances, which the Envoy

had alluded to in a friendly and unofficial manner and had properly explained to be apart from the subject of the proposed negotiation, I felt no hesitation in declaring myself quite willing to listen to the Envoy's enumeration of these, because I am aware that the Viceroy has always wished to be thoroughly informed of His Highness' real views, desires, and requests on all matters affecting their common interests.

"Again, I acceded to the Envoy's request that his statement of grievances might be made *ex parte* and without reply, not through lack of argument and other opposing matter for a reply, but I refrain from controversy upon past affairs.

"Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded—The Viceroy having given every practicable consideration to the circumstances of the past relations between the two Governments, and having carefully studied the position of the Amir in relation to the existing political situation in Central Asia—a situation which shows that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan and the consolidation of the Amir's rule may ere long be imperilled—deems it equitable, and for the common interests of both Governments, that he should inform the Amir of his willingness to accord him (the Amir) open and active support against his danger of interference from without.

"The Viceroy further desires that this concession should be unaccompanied by any demands on his part whatsoever, or by any conditions other than such as are reasonable in themselves, or plainly necessary, to enable him to fulfil the obligations which he would undertake in ratifying a Treaty of the contemplated character. That among these conditions is one which is so obviously essential to the proposed undertaking that it would be futile to open negotiations except this condition should be agreed upon as a preliminary, *viz.*, the admission on the part of the Amir of the principle that the British Government shall be allowed to station British Agents on the frontiers which this Government undertakes to aid in defending; for it is manifest that the Viceroy could not pretend to protect those frontiers except he should be enabled to collect, through his own responsible Agents, timely intelligence of what might be passing on or beyond them, and so prepare himself for meeting contingencies, and for explaining to Her Majesty's Government from independent, unprejudiced, and official sources, the facts of any alleged aggression, and the necessity which existed for repelling the same.

"In insisting, however, on the admission of this principle as a *sine quâ non* to the opening of negotiation, the Viceroy has no wish or intention unnecessarily to embarrass the Amir in the exercise of it, and would therefore leave the settlement of the details for giving effect to this principle to be arranged in the present conference.

"As regards the Treaty of 1855. The Envoy has declared that the Amir holds it to be still valid and adheres to its terms. The Viceroy also admits this Treaty to be still in force, and on his part will, in the absence of a revised Treaty, observe its terms. But I would remind the Envoy that the first article of this Treaty provides for perpetual friendship, which between States implies good neighbourhood, and that the third and last article of the same Treaty binds the Government of the Amir to join the British Government in war with any other Power, but does not, in any manner or degree, bind the British Government to aid the Amir against his enemies whether foreign or domestic. Finally, said Sir Lewis Pelly: The Viceroy is now offering to enter into the proposed formal public engagement, concedes what he believes the Amir to have heretofore wished or requested, and evidences, to the utmost of his power, his sincere desire for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan. It now rests with the Amir, through you, His Highness' Envoy Plenipotentiary, either to meet the Viceroy in the trusting spirit he displayed at Ambala in 1869, and accord to the Viceroy the means of affording the Government of Afghanistan open and active support, or else to reject the advantages offered.

"But in the most-friendly manner I beg the Envoy to understand that if the Amir reject all we offer and all we ask, and no basis of negotiation is left, the Viceroy, while observing the terms of the Treaty of 1855,\* will decline to support the Amir and his dynasty in any troubles, internal or external, and their unknown consequences, and will continue to strengthen the frontier of British India without further reference to the Amir, in order to provide against probable contingencies.

"As the question now immediately under discussion relates only to the admission of the principle that British Agents shall be permitted to reside on the Afghanistan frontiers, my remarks have been confined to this subject taken in connection with the question of frontier defence. But I need not assure the Envoy that should this principle be admitted, I shall be happy to discuss, in the most friendly and fair manner, the details of a formal agreement, under which the British Government would bind itself not only to a defensive-offensive alliance, but to the public recognition of the Amir's heir, and to affording His Highness support against factious disturbance within.

"Sir Lewis Pelly here concluded his remarks. On this the Kabul Envoy observed that he did not understand what was meant by strengthening the frontier of India without further reference to the Amir.

"Sir Lewis Pelly said in reply—The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the frontier of British India and providing for the safety and repose of that empire; and this without communication with the Amir.

"The Kabul Envoy on this asked—In regard to the strengthening of the frontier of British India, without reference to the Amir which you have alluded to, I would ask—Does this mean within the territories of the Amir and Afghanistan, or otherwise?

"I have already stated, Sir Lewis Pelly replied, that the object of the present conference is not to interfere with Afghanistan.

"I have also stated that the Viceroy will observe the terms of the Treaty of 1855, even if the proposed negotiation do not have place.

"I now repeat that the Viceroy has no intention of interfering with the jurisdiction of the Amir in any territory where we have recognized that jurisdiction. The Kabul Envoy here remarked that he would give his definite answer on the Agency clause on Monday, 19th instant. The meeting then enclosed."

**128. Ninth and last meeting of Conference on 19th February.**—At this meeting the Envoy had promised to submit a definite answer on the question whether or no the Amir had accepted the principle of permitting English Agents to reside within Afghanistan—or rather, inasmuch as the Amir had, in sending his Envoy to Peshawur, accepted this principle, the question now was whether His Highness meant to adhere to, or withdraw from, his agreement. The Envoy's statement on this question was tedious and desultory, but he described the residence of English Agents in Afghanistan as impossible, and laid stress on Article 7 of the Convention of 1857 as showing that Lord Lawrence had pledged himself to have a Native and not an European Agent at Kabul. In other words, he rejected the principle the acceptance of which had been laid down as not only essential to further negotiations, but as a necessary preliminary to the conference with Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. Sir Lewis Pelly answered in accordance with the instructions summarized in paragraph 127; he promised to submit the Envoy's representation to the Viceroy for orders, but warned him that there was little probability of the British Government altering the stipulated basis for negotiation which the Envoy had rejected; meanwhile, all further discussion must be suspended.

Ninth meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, at noon of the 19th February 1877.

*Present :*

SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., *Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.*

SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, *Envoy of the Amir of Kabul.*

DR. H. W. BELLEW, C.S.I., *Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.*

NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, *British Agent at the Court of Kabul.*

MIRAKHOB AHMED KHAN, *Deputed by Amir of Kabul.*

MUNSHI MAHOMED BAQIR, *Secretary to Kabul Envoy.*

"Sir Lewis Pelly commenced by saying that in accordance with the arrangement made between the Kabul Envoy and himself on the 5th instant, the Kabul Envoy had made his statement concerning the past, and Sir Lewis Pelly had offered his remarks thereon. Sir Lewis Pelly would now, in accordance with the above-mentioned arrangement, request the favor of the Kabul Envoy affording him a definite reply as to whether the Amir still adheres to, or withdraws from, the assurance given to the Viceroy by His Highness, to the effect that he agrees to the principle of British Agents being allowed to reside on the Afghan frontiers in view to the protection of those frontiers, by observing and reporting the events that may have place on or beyond those frontiers.

"The Kabul Envoy here said that in accordance with what he said on Monday to the effect that had the Amir seen any advantage to the two sides from this difficult proposal and consented to it, there would have been no necessity for all this discussion, but that he would to-day in this meeting finish all he had to say on the matter, and give his definite reply to the question put by Sir Lewis Pelly; but if it were not considered so by Sir Lewis Pelly, he was present to hear what he might have to say. He then proceeded to say :

"I beg to state that since it is the hearty desire of both sides that the misunderstandings connected with past matters, and also connected with the explanation of the wishes of His Excellency the Viceroy should be removed, it affords room for hope and pleasure, because the true state of affairs being understood by both sides, will be based upon the firmness of the old friendship. His Excellency the Viceroy especially should be well informed as to the true state of affairs in Afghanistan, and he should kindly pay attention to them as to what degree and of what kind his power is in a matter which is impossible.

“ ‘As to the matter of the past, I have explained them in these meetings of some days past. There is no need for repetition. It is a matter which has been disposed of. It will be for both sides to act on that footing. And as to the future, that also I have explained with sundry quotations during the seven conferences of the month of Mohurram 1294 H. (corresponding with 17th January to 16th February 1877). You will through them have been informed of the state of the case. Notwithstanding that the explanation of the condition of Afghanistan was made, especially in the conference of the 27th of that month (corresponding with 12th February 1877), it will be again clearly and confidentially made known in the contents of these following paragraphs.

“ ‘I beg to state that it was the cordial desire of His Highness the Amir that in these friendly and confidential conferences at Peshawur the discussion together should be with sincerity of purpose, so that in accordance with the tenor of past writings no doubt should remain on any matter on either side. And its object was this, that the usual friendship should remain firm on the former footing.

“ ‘As to what has been written in the matter of non-interference in Afghanistan, it is certain that the British Government will never in any manner interfere in such manner as to cause any anxiety in the mind of His Highness the Amir, or his successor, or to shake the independence of Afghanistan.

“ ‘As to the matter of removing the danger of future interference by others. In this matter the Government of Afghanistan is rendered without want by the successive writings of Lord Mayo and of Von Kauffmann, the Russian Governor-General in Tashkend, who wrote in the first letter, and this is a summary of one of its paragraphs, *viz.*, “there will be lasting peace and friendship between us and you. I have no intention to interfere or meddle with the government of the Afghans.” Further, Lord Mayo repeatedly gave a general confirmation to his papers, especially this first paper of his, which he expressly and wholly confirmed; and His Highness the Amir forwarded his reply to it in accordance with the advice of the above-named Lord.

“ ‘Lord Northbrook also confirmed those papers, and in accordance with the writings of Lord Granville and Prince Gortchakoff, which he gave me at Simla, thoroughly reassured me upon them. On the 6th September 1873 he wrote to His Highness the Amir, and the following is an extract from that letter:—“The Russian Government has expressed that it considers all the territories in the possession of that kind friend to be the property of Afghanistan; and Prince Gortchakoff has expressed to the Prime Minister of Her Majesty the Queen that the Emperor of Russia does not consider Afghanistan to be amongst those territories in which the counsel of the Russian Government would have effect.” And this also, “no kind of interference and meddling which can be the cause of injury to the independence of Afghanistan is even thought of.”

“ ‘Lord Northbrook also wrote—“The Government of Russia has asserted that it has accepted the boundaries of the territories of that kind friend such as they were specified in the letter of Lord Granville, dated 17th October 1872.” He also wrote to the effect that the Amir should rest assured of peace and prosperity, and that he need fear no kind of aggression, or interference, in the territories mentioned in the aforesaid letter of Lord Granville. “The Russian Government,” he wrote, “has taken upon itself the responsibility of restraining the tribes which are under the influence of its counsel from aggression upon the territories of that kind friend, such as their limits were defined in the aforementioned letter of Lord Granville.”

“ ‘Lord Northbrook also wrote to the effect that the Amir should adopt the chief object mentioned in the letter of Lord Granville. And that chief object was this, that in the States of Central Asia, as regards relations with him, peace and tranquillity should subsist between them, and that in future there should be no aggression from one side of the specified frontier to the other. He also wrote to the effect that the result of correspondence which had passed between the Governments of Russia and England was to strengthen Afghanistan, and to remove all fears and dangers which were apprehended from without; and he assured the Amir that he need have no misgivings as to external danger to his territories, and could, with leisure and security, devote himself to the internal advancement and organization of his territories.

“ ‘Therefore the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan have the most perfect confidence that there can be no deviation from the tenor of these writings, which have been briefly mentioned, in respect to the peace and tranquillity and lasting friendship of the States, in accordance with the reply of His Highness the Amir to the letter of Lord Northbrook of the 6th September 1873. If there should be a want of confidence in the substance of these successive writings approved by Governments, or the probability of a causeless want of confidence in them becoming a reason for displeasure to the Governments, what propriety is there in this? It is far from the welfare of States if there should be the possibility of objection to the promises made by such religious Governments and such Ministers and Viceroys. If the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan were, without cause, to think there was the probability of objection to the Treaties and Agreements they have in their hands, it would undoubtedly be contrary to confidence and amity and friendship.

“ ‘As on the first day of our conference the discussion commenced with the subject of the misapprehensions in the mind of the Amir prior to the arrival of the present Viceroy, and extracts were quoted in support thereof from the records of the meeting at Ambala and con-



versations at Lahore and Simla, it is necessary that I (should) now explain the matter. In the conferences of the 8th and 10th of February I explained this matter with proofs in support of my words, and disposed of the wishes of the Amir. Those same arguments are now applicable and need not be repeated.

“As to what was said in respect to the probability of the misapprehension of the Amir not having occurred had the Viceroy had better knowledge of the views of His Highness. From my statements of the 10th and 12th February it is clear that whatever has occurred has been with knowledge, and not without knowledge. My object in these statements was this, that the authorities of the British Government should not show such inattention in the formalities of friendship to the rights of the Amir; and, in conclusion, I explained the grounds of anxiety in such a difficult matter as the question now under discussion, the carrying out of which in Afghanistan is impossible and embarrassing. My object is this, that you should not throw such new causes for anxiety, not only into the mind of the Amir, but upon the whole of Afghanistan.

“As to what was said in reference to the external danger, I beg to observe that danger is of two kinds, internal and external; the internal danger owing to the residence of English officers on the frontiers is apparent, and admits of no doubt. Matters would fall out in accordance with my description of the state of affairs in Afghanistan in the conference of the 12th February. Therefore consider what will be the beginning, and what the end, of such a measure. As to external danger, as I have already shown to-day, I do not entertain its probability.

“As to a new Treaty, I have said nothing, and holding aloof, will say nothing. I will discuss your special proposal and dispose of that.

“In respect to the Treaty of 1855, which has been repeatedly mentioned, I beg to observe that I have made no mention of the Treaty of 1855. I have stated that the late Amir and Lord Lawrence met and made a Treaty and Covenant. But now that the subject of the Treaty has come before me, I beg to point out that the Treaty of 1855 was made with the late Sirdar Ghulam Hyder Khan, and the Treaty of 1857 by the late Amir himself with Lord Lawrence. Further, the last letter of Lord Lawrence in 1868 was sent to the Amir by way of a written (*wasica*) authority, and the subsequent conversations with Sir D. Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor of Lahore, were in accordance with it; as also were the documents of Lord Mayo from Ambala in 1869, and the papers of Lord Northbrook from Simla, including the last letter at the time of his departure, together with other State papers which I have already referred to to-day. These are all connected one with the other; they are not separate, they are one. Of course the tenor of all these will be attended to. If there be want of acknowledgment, and want of regard to the tenor of one of them, it will undoubtedly be the cause for want of acknowledgment and want of regard to the whole of them.

“With special reference to the Treaty of 1857 which the late Amir made with Lord Lawrence. Inasmuch as the condition of Afghanistan was thoroughly well known to Lord Lawrence, he bound himself in the 7th Article of that Treaty that the British Government might maintain an Agent at Kabul on the part of the English Government, but he was not to be an Englishman. The Government of Afghanistan will never in any manner consent to acknowledge the abrogation of this article.

“With reference to the desire of His Excellency the Viceroy for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan, and that it now rests with His Highness the Amir, in the trusting spirit he displayed at Ambala in 1869, to be in accord with the Viceroy, I beg to enquire what has occurred contrary to that trusting spirit of Ambala in communications and State observances. The Amir is, with sincerity of purpose, in accord with His Excellency the Viceroy, in accordance with those communications and the former course. And as to according His Excellency the Viceroy a “means,” I beg to say that no better means exist than those of the past, which formerly, in the time of perplexity, and subsequently up to the present time, have produced sincerity and good deeds from time to time. If I were to mention them in detail, it would prolong our discussion; but if you wish me to do so, I will describe them.

“The Amir has always received the praise and approval of past Viceroys on account of those of his good deeds as is manifest in their letters to him. Her Majesty the Queen has also given her approval to them. How then can he now hope to accord a new means which is not in his power?

“As to rejecting of advantages, has anybody ever rejected his own advantages? As to the cordial desire of His Excellency the Viceroy for the advantages of the Amir, it is based upon such new and hard conditions, especially the residence of British officers upon the frontiers, which of itself is clearly a cause for the rejection of his proposed advantages, that there is no need for the Amir to reject them. As to the admission of this principle of the residence of British officers on the frontiers which has been repeatedly brought forward, although I have distinctly explained the matter in my description of the condition of Afghanistan in the conference of the 12th February, I would now beg to observe as follows:—His Excellency the Viceroy will, of course, through your Agency, consider the whole of the quotations I have made in these Conferences from beginning to end. First, he will consider the Treaties and Agreements and writings from time to time without rejection. Second, the assurances of the Government which I have adduced this day in the commencement of this statement, to the effect that the probability of external danger had been removed. Third, he will, under



the conditions of Afghanistan, consider this chief proposal of the British Government is difficult. Inasmuch as this chief proposal, owing to successive causes, is impossible, I will again refer to documents, and first to the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy to the address of His Highness the Amir, dated 11th October 1876, which was sent by hand of the British Agent. In that letter it is stated to the effect that when the British Government takes upon itself weighty matters on behalf of the Amir, the Amir will, for facilitating these weighty matters, acquiesce in whatever the above-mentioned Agent, bearer of the letter, may explain to him; and in the absence of this the English Government will not be able to carry out the matters mentioned. Further, you yourself, in the discussion of the first day's conference, stated, and have repeated on various occasions in these conferences, that unless His Highness the Amir accepted this principle of the residence of English officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan, it was not possible for the English Government to take upon itself the responsibility of aiding to repel an external enemy. It was further stated that His Excellency the Viceroy has no wish or desire to embarrass the Amir in the matter of carrying out this proposal for the residence of English officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan. I beg to assure you that it is a matter of satisfaction, and enough of hope, to the Amir that His Highness the Amir has withdrawn from this source of embarrassment. He has, therefore, no weighty matter to anew present before the English Government; nor does he put upon the English Government the responsibility of assistance to repel an internal enemy; nor has he entrusted the protection of those frontiers from an external enemy to the English Government; nor has he the power to consent to so difficult a matter, the result of which will be nothing but reproach to the Amir himself, because the territories of Afghanistan have not in themselves the power to endure such a measure as the residence of British officers in their frontiers.

“Therefore I earnestly hope, for the welfare of the two Governments, that His Excellency the Viceroy, through your good offices, will, with great frankness and sincerity of purpose, act in conformity with the course of past Viceroys, and that by means of his own good acts the relations of friendship and unity may be increased.

“As to what was said in reference to no basis being left for negotiation, I beg to observe, in a friendly and frank manner, that the basis which has been laid for you by the wise arrangements of previous Councillors and Ministers of Her Majesty the Queen of England in London, of Her Viceroys in India, after mature deliberation and thought from time to time during the course of all these past years, and has been approved of by Her Majesty the Queen, still exists. Friendship has remained firm upon it since a very long time, and the previous Viceroys have written their praise and commendation to His Highness the Amir for his worthy acts. What matter then has appeared which is contrary to the tenor of past written communications that there should be now no basis left for negotiation?

“The Government of Afghanistan is certain that the British Government of its own perfect honesty will continue constant and stable to that firm basis.’

“The Kabul Envoy having finished his reply, Sir Lewis Pelly commenced :

“Then the Envoy declines the *sine quâ non* preliminary. As I have already said, I decline to leave the point immediately before us and go into controversy. But since the Envoy has stated that the Amir has always adhered to the terms of the old Treaty, I would ask the Envoy whether he considers the repeated refusal of the Amir to receive temporary and special friendly missions, the rejection even of British Agents, the absolute and permanent closing of Afghanistan against British subjects and their trade, and the denial to an English traveller of passage towards British India, are acts of friendship and good neighbourhood, or consonant with the spirit of the first article of the Treaty still subsisting. Or does the Envoy suppose that there is any other potentate claiming to observe civilized treaty relations who would venture thus to treat Englishmen?

“Again, the Envoy has stated to the effect that letters received from Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, have removed all need for fear as respects Russia. And in making this statement the Envoy has doubtless afforded what he may deem to be adequate consideration to the events of the past three years in the direction of Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand, and the Turkoman border, as also to the fact that more recently the Russian Governor-General, above mentioned, has made overtures, through the Russian Ambassador at London, to the present Viceroy of India for the disarmament of Afghanistan. Nor can the Envoy have forgotten the representation which the Amir has heretofore made to the British Government of India as to his apprehension of Russian aggressions. But all these matters are for the judgment of the Afghan Government. England has no reason to fear Russia.

“In conclusion, the Envoy Plenipotentiary, on behalf of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, having declined to admit the principle that British Agents shall be allowed to reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purposes already mentioned by me, I have no powers or authority to open negotiations. I am willing, however, as requested by the Envoy, to refer what he has said to the Viceroy, and to await His Excellency's written reply. But in the meantime the commencement of negotiations must be postponed, and I feel bound to tell the Envoy that in my opinion there is no probability of the British Government agreeing to negotiate on any basis other than that to which my powers have already been confined; and I fear the Amir has missed an opportunity, which may never recur, of greatly strengthening his position.’

"The Kabul Envoy, having heard the remarks of Sir Lewis Pelly, begged that all he had said to-day might be submitted to the Viceroy at Calcutta, and His Excellency's written reply be awaited, on receipt of which the Envoy would point out what he thought expedient or inexpedient in His Lordship's decision, and then either himself give a definite reply, or, if he should be unable to do so, would refer to the Amir for further instructions.

"Proceedings for the day then closed."

**129. Serious indisposition of the Kabul Envoy.**—After the close of the meeting of the 19th February Syud Nur Mahomed's sickness increased, and for four days he remained in seclusion. He declined European medical aid, and was attended by a Native Doctor. An injection of the milk of a nursing woman was applied, but did not afford him much relief, and it was intended to inject mare's milk. Notwithstanding these remedies he remained on the 25th quite unfit for business.

**130. Final instructions, dated 3rd March, from His Excellency the Viceroy, to Sir L. Pelly, directing closure of the Conference.**—On hearing the nature of the answer given by the Envoy at

See Sir L. Pelly's telegrams, dated 19th, 20th and 21st February, and Viceroy's telegram, dated 21st February. Appendix XXV.

the ninth meeting, and the action taken thereon by Sir Lewis Pelly, the Viceroy telegraphed to the latter his approval. His Excellency desired that the Envoy might be informed that the Government of India were glad to have received such full and detailed information in regard to the Amir's views and feelings in respect both to his past and present relations with the British Government. That with regard to the first portion of the Envoy's statement, the Viceroy regretted that the Amir should have felt cause to regard his relations with the British Government with dissatisfaction, but declined to discuss past events over which he had no control. That the concluding portion of the Envoy's statement had received attentive consideration, but that it did not appear to contribute to the improvement of existing relations or the settlement of present negotiations any facts or considerations which had not been fully anticipated and taken into account by the British Government. That the Viceroy was engaged in writing to Sir L. Pelly in acknowledgment of the latter's reports of the proceedings of the Conference, and with special reference to the points on which the Envoy appeared to be labouring under misapprehension as to the views and objects of the British Government. This statement of His Excellency the Viceroy's views as to what had passed at the Conference is contained in the following letter dated 3rd March, to Sir L. Pelly:—

"The statement made to you by Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, for my personal information, is now before me. I have read it with interest and attention, and have already authorized you by telegraph to express to the Envoy my thanks for the care he has taken to explain fully the views and feelings of the Amir in regard to the relations between His Highness and the British Government. I understand that the Envoy wishes that, before entering with you into any practical negotiations, he may be made acquainted with the general impressions left on my mind by the perusal of his above-mentioned statement. I therefore take this opportunity of enabling you to comply with the wish thus expressed to you.

"The Envoy's statement virtually consists of two chapters or parts,—one of which refers to the past; the other to the present. The first is not susceptible of discussion with a view to any practical result, since it relates exclusively to events which cannot be recalled. I sincerely regret to learn by it that the Amir has been for years secretly harbouring in his mind a sentiment of resentment towards the British Government in consequence of three or four incidents in the conduct of its relations with His Highness, which caused him, at the time of their unnoticed occurrence, feelings of annoyance, only now for the first time made known to the Viceroy. I am confident that the causes of annoyance enumerated by the Agent were not occasioned by any deliberate, or intentional, or even conscious, disregard of the Amir's feelings on the part of the British Government. I have no doubt whatever that most of them might, and would, have been prevented by the presence of a discreet and intelligent British officer at Kabul; had such an officer been admitted to that unrestricted intercourse with the Government of His Highness which an experience tested by centuries, and gratefully acknowledged by every civilized State in the world, has proved to be the only practical means of maintaining amicable, and mutually advantageous, relations between neighbouring States. Such States must always have many interests in common on which misunderstandings can hardly fail to arise, if their Governments have no adequately confidential and authoritative medium of communication with each other.

"The impression, therefore, which I derive from my perusal of the first portion of the Envoy's statement, greatly increases my regret that the Amir should still feel himself precluded, by the rude and stationary condition in which Afghanistan has remained under the administration of His Highness, from receiving a British Envoy at his Court; and thereby placing his relations with us on a footing commensurate with the rank and dignity which, were it possible, we would willingly accord to the Ruler of Afghanistan in the international hierarchy of those States with which the Government of the British Empire maintains diplomatic relations. As, however, the objections entertained by the Amir to any such arrangement have always been represented to us as invincible; as the practical impediments to it which, in the time of His Highness' father, were occasioned by the then unsettled and turbulent condition of the Afghan population and the comparative weakness of the sovereign power, appear to have increased, rather than diminished, under the reign of His Highness; and as the British Government has most certainly no desire, or intention whatever, to urge upon the Amir the adoption of this, or any other, arrangement which His Highness does not spontaneously and cordially recognize to be conducive to his own advantage and that of his dominions, it is useless to dwell on the considerations suggested by the first portion of the Envoy's statement, since the only practical conclusion to which it points is one which the Amir has no disposition to accept, and which the British Government has no desire to force on his unwilling acceptance.

"I turn, therefore, to the consideration of the second portion of the Envoy's statement. But, in doing so, I must confess that I experience the greatest difficulty in understanding the real drift and purport of it, which, I trust, I may have misapprehended. So far as I do understand it, it seems to amount to this: that the Amir, although dissatisfied by the result of his relations with us up to the present moment, is equally dissatisfied with all the proposals we have now spontaneously made for the improvement of them; whilst, at the same time, he has, on his part, no counter proposals to make for the attainment of that result. If this be indeed the case, it only remains for me to authorize you to inform the Envoy that, so far as I can judge, there is no basis left for negotiation between us. In the proposals it has already made through Atta Mahomed, and for the negociation of which we understood the Amir's Minister to be appointed with full powers, but which he has hitherto declined to discuss, the British Government went to the utmost limit of concession, and proffered aid, in order to prove the sincerity of its good-will. If, therefore, those proposals be rejected unconditionally, or entertained only on conditions obviously inadmissible, we shall have no choice but to regard the Amir of Kabul henceforth as a neighbour with whom our relations are neither satisfactory nor susceptible of improvement.

"The Envoy's language, however, which is rather ambiguous on this point, leaves me somewhat in doubt whether the objections he urges on the part of the Amir have reference to the arrangements His Highness was authorized to rely upon our willingness to agree to, and even to propose, were we assured that they would be agreeable to himself; or only to a proposal which he apparently supposes us likely to urge on his acceptance, although we have never given him any ground for such a supposition. The Envoy, in his language to you, has laid so much stress on the 7th clause of the Treaty of 1857 which has nothing whatever to do with the matters now under consideration, and has taken so many pains to explain the various reasons why the Amir still declines to receive a resident British officer at Kabul, whilst at the same time he has so carefully avoided all reference to the reception of British officers in other parts of Afghanistan, that I know not whether I am to understand his statement as a refusal to entertain any proposal for the residence of British officers, for certain purposes, on certain points of the Afghan frontier, or merely as a refusal to re-open the question, which we have never desired or attempted to re-open, of appointing a British officer to reside at Kabul. We do not propose the appointment of a resident British officer at Kabul; and the reason is, that we have never had any cause to anticipate that such an arrangement would be agreeable to the Amir, whose appreciation of his own interests we are not concerned to contest or discuss, so long as it involves no aggression upon the interests of this Empire. We have, however, intimated to the Amir our willingness to discuss with him the terms of a definite Treaty of Alliance involving the appointment of competent officers in other parts of Afghanistan, to aid both His Highness and ourselves in watching the progress of events, which the Amir has repeatedly represented to us as sources of alarm to him; and the reason is, that many previous utterances, on the part both of the present Amir and of His Highness' father, had induced us to believe that the advantages of such an arrangement would be cordially welcomed, and gratefully appreciated, by His Highness. If, as the Envoy's language tends to imply, this impression was entirely erroneous, there is an immediate end of the matter; for the British Government has not the slightest desire to urge upon a weak and unwilling neighbour an arrangement so extremely onerous to itself. As, however, I have before observed, the Envoy, whilst elaborately answering a proposal we have not made, and which he had no right to attribute to us, has left altogether unnoticed those proposals which are the only ones he is authorized to discuss. You will, therefore, request him to state distinctly and promptly whether we are to understand that the Amir does not now desire our alliance, and that His Highness refuses to receive British officers in any part of Afghanistan. For a plain answer to this plain question no further reference to Kabul is needed, or can be allowed.

"I observe that the Envoy has expressed a desire to discuss with you the expediency or in expediency of the conclusion arrived at by the Viceroy after perusal of his statement. I cannot authorize you to permit any such superfluous criticism. The Amir was afforded ample

time and opportunity to consider the expediency or in expediency of the Viceroy's conclusions (which the Envoy's statement leaves unaltered) before he accepted them as a basis of negotiation. He cannot discuss this now. In the communications made by the Viceroy to His Highness from Simla in the month of October last, the Amir was distinctly informed that, unless he was prepared to recognise in principle the expediency of appointing British officers to reside on certain parts of the Afghan frontier, it would be useless to appoint Envoys for the negotiation of a Treaty entirely conditional upon that arrangement. His Highness was at the same time earnestly requested to consider very carefully the expediency of the proposal then made to him before committing himself to a decision. He did take many weeks to consider it; and when, after having thus deliberately considered it, he appointed his Minister to negotiate with you the best means of carrying it out, we were entitled to assume, as we naturally did assume, that the principle clearly explained by us to be the only possible basis of negotiation on our part had been duly and fully accepted by His Highness, and that the expediency of carrying it out was no longer open to discussion. The Envoy's present attempt to ignore the recognition of that principle, and to discuss the expediency of it as an open question, is a breach (which should be pointed out to him) of the understanding on which we agreed to receive him as the Amir's representative in this negotiation.

"If, however, as would seem to be the case, the Amir, influenced by circumstances, or considerations still unknown to us, has completely changed his mind since he entered upon the negotiation (which, in its present form, was originated by His Highness), the very last thing desired or attempted by the British Government, would be to pin His Highness pedantically to the fulfilment of an understanding from which he now wishes to withdraw, or the adoption of an arrangement which he does not regard with satisfaction. So far from wishing to urge upon his reluctant consideration the expediency of British officers being appointed to assist him in the defence of his frontiers, I must request you to inform the Envoy that the proposal of this arrangement was regarded by us as a great concession; and that the British Government will most assuredly not allow its officers to undertake duties on behalf of Afghanistan involving a residence in any part of that country, unless their presence there is specially invited and cordially welcomed by the ruler of it, whoever he may be, and their personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the same authority. Therefore, if the Amir has made up his mind that he has no reason to desire a definite alliance with the British Government on the above-mentioned basis, it only remains for the Envoy to say so plainly and without hesitation.

"You will, I am sure, take every possible pains to make His Excellency clearly understand that he need be under no apprehension of any disposition on our part to urge upon the consideration of the Amir proposals which His Highness is not disposed to accept, on behalf of arrangements which could have no possible value in our eyes without the cordial concurrence of His Highness, and to which indeed nothing less than the complete assurance of his grateful and loyal appreciation of their generosity could ever reconcile us. But, in that case, there is nothing left to negotiate about, and consequently no reason why the Afghan Minister should not immediately return to Kabul. You have rightly pointed this out to the Envoy; and I entirely approve the terms in which you have done so. I observe, however, that the Envoy has incidentally referred to existing treaties as an alternative basis of negotiation. You will of course point out to him that these existing treaties, having long ago been negotiated and concluded, and not having been since then disputed by either party to them, afford no basis whatever for further negotiation. When the Viceroy agreed to the Amir's proposal that His Highness, who had declined to receive a British Envoy on Afghan territory, should appoint an Afghan Envoy, with full powers, to meet the Viceroy's representative on British territory, it was not for the discussion of old contracts, but for the preparation of new ones.

"If, therefore, the Amir has no desire whatever to place his relations with the British Government on a new and better footing, there is nothing left to propose or discuss; and, in that case, the two Governments will, in accordance with the wishes of His Highness, revert to their previous relative positions. But those relative positions appear to be so completely misapprehended by the Amir, and they have been so erroneously described by the Envoy, that I must request you, before taking leave of His Excellency, to point out very plainly, and, if possible, remove from his mind, the dangerous misconception by which much of his language to you on this subject appears to have been strongly influenced.

"The Envoy's contention is that the British Government is already bound, by its existing engagements with the Amir, to support and defend His Highness against any foreign or domestic enemy; and that consequently the Amir has nothing to gain by a Treaty of Alliance which, so far as the British Government is concerned, would be a mere restatement of the obligations it has already contracted on his behalf, whilst, so far as His Highness is concerned, it would impose upon him obligations altogether new.

"This is, I think, a fair summary of the Envoy's argument: and the argument would be perfectly sound if its premises were true. But, unfortunately for the Amir, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British and Afghan Governments are embodied in two treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. The second of these two treaties was contracted for a special and limited purpose, and with exclusive reference to an occasion which has long since passed away. This second Treaty, therefore, belongs to the class of treaties known as transitory treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it have lapsed, as a



matter of course, with the lapse of time. The first of the two treaties, however, clearly belongs to the class of treaties called perpetual. The obligations embodied in it were contracted with general reference to the permanent relations between the two Governments; and on each of the contracting parties those obligations still remain binding.

"The Treaty of 1855 contains only three Articles. The first stipulates that there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the East India Company (to whose treaty rights and obligations the British Government has succeeded) and the Amir of Kabul, his heirs, and successors. The second binds the British Government to respect the territories possessed by the Amir at the time when the Treaty was signed, that is to say in 1855, and not to interfere with them. The third Article binds the Amir, his heirs, and successors, not only to respect the territories of the British Government, but also to be the friend of its friends, and the enemy of its enemies. It is to be observed that this Treaty contains no corresponding obligation on the part of the British Government. The British Government is not without cause to complain that the Amir's conduct of late years has been inconsistent with the obligations contracted by the Government of His Highness under the terms of Article I of this Treaty of 1855. Friendship between neighbouring States does not necessarily involve liabilities on the part of either State to furnish the other with material assistance; but it does necessarily involve the uninterrupted maintenance of friendly intercourse, and the fairly reciprocal recognition and discharge of all the customary duties of good neighbourhood.

"Now, not only are all the territories of the British Government freely open at all times to all the subjects of the Amir, but His Highness has received from the British Government repeated gifts of arms and of money, as well as a consistent moral support both at home and abroad. In return for these advantages to His Highness, what has the British Government received from the Amir? The territories of His Highness have been, and continue to be, churlishly closed to all the subjects of the British Government, with whom the Amir forbids his own subjects to hold any kind of friendly intercourse. Trade, traffic, travel, all the customary bonds of union between neighbouring and friendly States, have been systematically discouraged, and practically prohibited to British subjects in Afghanistan, by His Highness.

"The Amir has refused permission to the Envoy of the British Government, bound on a peaceful mission to another neighbouring State, to pass through his territory; and the determination of His Highness to withhold from the British Government all such natural good offices has been conveyed to it in terms scarcely consistent with courtesy, and certainly not consistent with friendship. Colonel Macdonald, a British subject, was barbarously murdered on the borders of the Amir's territory, by a person subject to the authority of the Amir, and for whose punishment His Highness was, therefore, responsible. But, instead of cordially and efficiently co-operating to avenge this crime, the Amir has allowed the murderer to remain at large; and not only unmolested, but actually, I believe, in receipt of a pension from His Highness. I forbear to dwell upon the Amir's discourtesy in leaving wholly unanswered the proposal made to His Highness by the late Viceroy for the demarcation of his boundaries, in refusing to receive a complimentary mission from the present Viceroy, and in taking no notice whatever of the very friendly invitation to Delhi which was subsequently addressed to His Highness. More serious grounds of complaint exist in the fact that the closing of the Khyber Pass for the last two years appears to be mainly attributable to the hostile influence of the Amir; that His Highness has openly received at Kabul in an authoritative manner, and subsidised, the heads of frontier tribes, who are in the pay, and under the control, of the British Government: that he has, for some time past, been speaking and acting in such a manner as to indicate hostile designs upon territories beyond his own, and in the neighbourhood of the British Frontier; and that, even since the commencement of the present negotiations, he has been openly and actively endeavouring to excite against us the religious animosities of his own subjects, and of the neighbouring tribes, by misrepresenting the policy, and maligning the character, of the British Government.

"In short, the whole conduct and language of the Amir during the last four years has been one chronic infraction, or evasion, of the first Article of the Treaty of 1855. But this Treaty cannot be abrogated without the mutual consent of the two contracting parties to it; and, so long as it remains valid, the Amir is legally bound by it to co-operate with the British Government, if called upon to do so, in attacking its enemies and defending its friends, although the treaty does not place the British Government under any reciprocal obligation on behalf of the Amir. His Highness indeed was so conscious of this fact when he met the Earl of Mayo at Ambala, that he then vehemently complained of the Treaty of 1855 as 'a one-sided Treaty,' and earnestly solicited from the British Government a new Treaty based upon the terms which the present Viceroy was prepared to offer the Amir in the month of October last.

"It is clear, therefore, that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855, the British Government has contracted no liabilities whatever on behalf of the Amir. Moreover, although the British Government has assuredly no desire, or intention, to take advantage of the fact, it nevertheless is a fact, that the territories recognized by that Treaty as belonging to the Amir did not include Afghan Turkistan.

"I now turn to the consideration of the subsequent Treaty signed in 1857. This Treaty consists of thirteen Articles. The first of them recites the circumstances, arising out of the war then being waged between the British and Persian Governments, which induced the British Government to 'agree, out of friendship, to give the Amir' of Kabul one lakh of rupees monthly during the continuation of that war, upon certain conditions. The second,



third, fourth, and fifth Articles specify these conditions: whereby, in return for the pecuniary assistance guaranteed to him by Article I, the Amir undertakes to maintain his army at a certain strength, to appoint and maintain a Vakeel at Peshawur, and to receive at Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar, and other places in Afghanistan, British officers with suitable establishments, whose duty shall be to insure the subsidy granted the Amir being devoted to the purpose for which it was given. The sixth Article stipulates that this subsidy shall cease at the conclusion of the war between England and Persia, or at any previous date preferred by the British Government. The seventh Article, to which the Envoy has made special reference, with an emphasis and iteration apparently superfluous, stipulates that, on the cessation of the subsidy, the British officers shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but that the Amir shall continue, during the pleasure of the British Government, not only to receive at Kabul a permanent resident Vakeel appointed by the British Government, but also to appoint and keep on behalf of the Afghan Government a permanent resident Vakeel at Peshawur. The Envoy says that the Amir has scrupulously adhered to the terms of this seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857; but, so far as I am aware, His Highness has not for many years fulfilled the last-mentioned condition of the Article. All the remaining Articles of the Treaty refer exclusively either to the preceding stipulations, or else to special circumstances, considerations, and conditions, occasioned by, and ceasing with, the war between England and Persia, which led to the signature of the Treaty of 1857.

"I should not have thought it worth while to say anything at all about this Treaty of 1857, if the Afghan Envoy had not laid such special stress upon its seventh Article, which is indeed the only one of all its Articles that has reference to the conduct of general relations between the two Governments. It is obvious, however, that no treaty stipulation was required to oblige the British Government not to appoint a resident British officer at Kabul without the consent of the Amir; for it is not practically in the power of one State to accredit a representative to the Court or Government of another, without the consent of that Court or Government; nor could such an absurd idea ever occur to the Government of any civilized Power. It is equally obvious that the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 was not intended to bind, and could not possibly bind, the Amir never, under any circumstances, or at any future time, to assent to the appointment of a resident British officer at Kabul; for such a stipulation would have been clearly inconsistent with the freedom and dignity of the two contracting Powers. It is, therefore, certain that there is in the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 absolutely nothing whatever to preclude the British Government from pointing out, at any time, to the Amir the advantage, or propriety, of receiving a British officer as its permanent representative at Kabul, nor even from urging such an arrangement upon the consideration and adoption of His Highness in any fair and friendly manner. But it so happens that the British Government has not proposed, and does not propose, or intend to propose, that arrangement. Consequently, the Envoy's remarks on the Treaty of 1857 are not to the point, and need not be further noticed.

"Now, these two Treaties, of 1855 and 1857, are the only ones which, up to the present moment, the British Government has ever contracted with the Government of Afghanistan; and it is as clear as anything can be that neither the one nor the other imposes on the British Government, either directly or indirectly, the least obligation, or liability, whatever, to defend, protect, or support, the Amir, or the Amir's dynasty, against any enemy, or any danger, foreign or domestic.

"The Envoy, however, appears to be under an impression that obligations and liabilities of this kind, though not contracted under any Treaty, have been, none the less, incurred by the British Government through certain written and verbal assurances received by the Amir in 1869 from Lord Mayo, and by His Highness' Envoy in 1873 from Lord Northbrook. This impression is entirely erroneous; and I, therefore, proceed to examine in detail the facts and circumstances referred to by the Envoy in support of his assumption that the Amir of Kabul has, at the present moment, any claim upon the unconditional support of the British Government.

"The words referred to by the Envoy as having been addressed by Lord Mayo to the Amir on the 31st of March 1869 were as follows:—

"'Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and Your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Kabul, and rekindle civil war; and it will further endeavour, from time to time by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the government of Your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.'

"Now, what were the circumstances in which these words were uttered? Only just established on a throne to which he had fought his way through a long and bloody civil war, the Amir had come to Ambala, anxious for the support and protection of the British Government, and hopeful of obtaining from it a Treaty of Alliance. Disappointed in that hope, he eagerly besought the Viceroy to give him some written assurance of the good-will and friendship of the British Government, which might serve to strengthen his position when he returned

to Kabul, by convincing both his subjects and his rivals that his relations with that Government were of a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory character. In compliance with this request, the words above quoted were addressed to His Highness by the Viceroy. Such were the circumstances in which they were uttered. What, then, were the meaning, purpose, and intention, of their utterance? It is self-evident, in the first place, that whatever their meaning and whatever their purpose, they were not intended to have the force of a Treaty; for the British Government had just declined the Amir's request for a Treaty of Alliance with it, and it could have had no possible reason for declining the Treaty, if it were prepared to accept on his behalf, in a form equally conclusive, all the liabilities of an alliance.

"The meaning and purpose of the Viceroy's assurance to the Amir in 1869, however, are clearly indicated and explained, beyond all possibility of question, by the context, as well as the circumstances, of His Excellency's address to His Highness at Ambala. In that paragraph of the address which immediately precedes the one I have quoted (because it is the one to which the Envoy has referred), the Viceroy expressed his confidence (a confidence founded on the assurances of His Highness) that the Amir was about 'to create a firm and merciful administration,' and 'to promote the interest of commerce in every province of Afghanistan.' In encouraging recognition of these excellent intentions (never fulfilled by the Amir), and of the closeness with which the bonds of friendship were then drawn between the British Government and His Highness (whose subsequent conduct has relaxed them), the Viceroy assured the Amir that the British Government would view with severe displeasure any attempt to disturb his throne. It is perfectly clear, however, that the Viceroy did not, and could not, thereby commit the British Government to an unconditional protection of the Amir, or to any liabilities on behalf of His Highness which were not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects. In short, the plain meaning of the Viceroy's statement was neither more nor less than an assurance that so long as the Amir continued to govern his people justly and mercifully, and to maintain frank, cordial, and confidential, relations with the British Government, that Government would, on its part also, continue to protect His Highness; using every legitimate endeavour to confirm his independence and consolidate his power.

"In precisely the same spirit, and from the same point of view, the present Viceroy authorized the Kabul Agent to assure Shere Ali, last October, that if His Highness sincerely desired to deserve the friendship, and thereby secure the protection, of the British Government, they would be cordially and unreservedly accorded to him. But His Highness has evinced no such desire; and it is a puerile absurdity to assume that, because the British Government would have viewed with severe displeasure in 1869 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the damaged power of a mistrustful and untrustworthy neighbour.

"You will tell the Envoy plainly that the British Government neither recognizes, nor has ever recognized, any such obligation. British influence is so paramount throughout the East that the Government of India need rarely have recourse to arms in order to protect the friends who are faithful to it, or to punish those who are faithless. There is no neighbouring State which is not strengthened by the bestowal, and weakened by the withdrawal, of its friendship.

"The same observations apply to the statement made by Lord Northbrook in 1873 to the Amir's Envoy at Simla. The Envoy, on that occasion, represented and explained to the Viceroy the apprehensions and anxieties occasioned to the Amir by the recent advance of the Russian Power in Central Asia. His Highness, fearing that, without the declared alliance and material support of the British Government, his independence might ere long be exposed to dangers with which he could not cope single-handed, had instructed his Envoy to solicit once more from the British Government a definite Treaty of Alliance on the basis of reciprocity, as well as material assistance in arms and money. Lord Northbrook declined to give the Amir the Treaty which His Highness asked for. And, therefore, as in the previous case at Ambala in 1869, it is clear that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to commit, and could not possibly commit, the British Government to any of those liabilities which it would have contracted on behalf of the Amir, had the Viceroy felt able to comply with the request of His Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance. The Envoy then endeavoured, as he has again endeavoured on the present occasion, to maintain that the British Government had already contracted such liabilities by virtue of assurances received in time past from Lord Lawrence and the Earl of Mayo. In reply to this assertion, Lord Northbrook laid before the Envoy the whole of the correspondence which had passed between His Excellency's predecessors and the Amir, and requested him to point out in it a single word confirming, or justifying, the statement he had made, 'that the British Government was bound to comply with every request preferred by the Amir.' The Envoy, however, was unable to do so, and acknowledged the fact. Lord Northbrook then gave the Envoy the following assurance:—That in the event of any imminent aggression upon the territories of His Highness, 'should the endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Amir that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would also, in case of necessity, aid him with troops; adding, however, that 'the British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent: moreover, the

assistance would be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.'

"It is sufficiently apparent that this personal assurance committed the British Government to no pledges which were not carefully guarded on every side by positive conditions with which the Amir has, of late, evinced no disposition to comply. On receipt of it, the Envoy left Simla, apparently disappointed, and observing that the Amir was not likely to derive from it much comfort or support.

"I trust, therefore, that, on reflection, the Envoy will perceive and acknowledge that, in intimating to the Amir, last October, his willingness to grant him not only money, arms, and, should he require it, the services of British officers, but also a definite Treaty of Alliance such as the Amir had twice vainly solicited from the British Government,—once in 1869, and once again in 1873,—the present Viceroy was offering His Highness altogether new, and very substantial, advantages. It appeared to the Viceroy that relations of mutual reserve and mistrust between neighbouring States so closely contiguous, and having in common so many interests, as Afghanistan and the Empire of India, were much to be deplored; more specially in the interests of the weaker State. An attentive study of the correspondence to which the Envoy has referred induced him to think that, in judging of the unfriendly attitude which, during the last few years, the Amir has thought fit to assume and maintain towards the British Government, it would be ungenerous not to make great allowances for the disappointment and mortification with which His Highness appeared to have regarded the reiterated failure of all his previous efforts to enter into closer relations with that Government; the extent to which the increasing weakness and isolation of his position might have aggravated this feeling; and the fact that the unfortunate imperfection of the hitherto existing means of communication between the two Governments afforded to neither of them any adequate opportunity of avoiding, or removing, those causes of irritation which might be solely attributable to their ignorance of each other's motives and interests. The Viceroy, therefore, came to the conclusion that, if the Amir still sincerely desired the open alliance and protection of the British Government, and was prepared to prove the sincerity of that desire by taking practical steps for placing his relations with us on a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory footing, the wishes of His Highness in regard to the Treaty of Alliance, and any other reasonable evidence of our confidence and friendship, should receive from us a similarly frank and cordial response. Her Majesty's Government concurred in that conclusion; and it was in all sincerity that the Viceroy authorized Atta Mahomed to say to the Amir—'If you really desire to secure and reciprocate our friendship, you shall have it without reserve, and find in us a firm and faithful ally.'

"It would appear, however, from the whole tone of the Envoy's language to you, and from the statement so carefully made by His Excellency (at whose request it has been submitted to me) of the Amir's present views and sentiments, that His Highness now no longer desires our alliance and protection. The British Government does not press its alliance and protection upon those who neither seek nor appreciate them. This being the case, it only remains for the Viceroy to withdraw, at once, the offers made to the Amir in the month of October last; and, in so doing, to express his deep regret that these offers, and the spirit in which they were made, should have been so completely misunderstood, and so grossly and publicly misrepresented, by His Highness. Such unwarrantable misrepresentations of our recent policy, however, render it necessary to guard against similar misrepresentation of our present position. I must, therefore, request you to explain distinctly to the Envoy, and to place on record, in language not susceptible of misconstruction, that, in withdrawing from the Amir those offers of material assistance, in reply to which His Highness has instructed the Envoy to inform us that he neither requires, nor is disposed to accept, them, the British Government harbours no hostile designs against Afghanistan. This Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Amir and his dynasty. It does not indeed withdraw from any obligations previously contracted by it; but it absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever incurred any such obligations as those imputed to it by the Envoy of His Highness; and it, further, affirms that it will never, in any circumstances, undertake such obligations without adequate guarantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Amir. But, at the same time, it will scrupulously continue, as heretofore, to respect the Amir's independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognised as being in the lawful possession of His Highness; and will duly abstain from interference therein, so long as the Amir, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own. The Amir, therefore, so long as he remains faithful to those treaty stipulations which the Envoy has invoked on behalf of His Highness, and which the British Government fully recognises as still valid, and, therefore, binding upon the two contracting parties, need be under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government.

"It must also be placed on record, in a form to which authoritative and public appeal can be made, should the policy thus frankly explained be again misrepresented by the Kabul Durbar, that the British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires their permanent independence, prosperity, and peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly no desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It will unreservedly respect their independence; and, should they at any time be united in a national

appeal to its assistance, it will doubtless be disposed, and prepared, to aid them in defending that independence from aggression. Meanwhile, the Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories, or friends, of the British Government, no British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited.

"With these explanations and assurances you are now authorized to close those conferences with the Afghan Envoy which, up to the present moment, you have conducted with so much judgment and ability. The felicitous combination of firmness and conciliation, of frankness and caution, which has characterized your language to the Envoy, and all your official intercourse with His Excellency, commands the cordial approval of the Viceroy, and will doubtless receive that of the Secretary of State. I do not consider that your exertions have been in vain. On the contrary, they have, in my opinion, been prolific in useful results. For four years the Government of India has been acting, or abstaining from action, in profound and perilous ignorance of the actual condition of its relations with the Amir of Kabul, and the real sentiments and dispositions of His Highness. The information you have now obtained, partly in the course of negotiation, and partly by other means, and the completeness with which you have enabled the Government of India to verify that information, have torn aside the impenetrable veil which has so long concealed from us the increasing, and now apparently complete, extinction of British influence at Kabul. Your reports have also enabled the Government of India, whose policy, in regard to Afghanistan, has hitherto been based upon the merest guess-work, to form for the first time since the Amir visited Ambala a sufficiently definite and accurate notion, not only of the personal sentiments of His Highness, but also of his actual position, and the influences by which it is affected. I attach much value to these salutary revelations; and I am, &c.

"P.S.—I think that you may advantageously remind the Envoy that while we have received from the Amir no corresponding benefits, we have conferred upon His Highness, in addition to our moral support (which has hitherto helped to keep him on his throne), the following substantial gifts:—

"In 1869, we gave him 10,000 muskets and 2 batteries of artillery, in addition to a sum of £60,000, which formed part of the larger sum of £120,000 promised him by Lord Lawrence. In 1870, we presented him with 1,200 Brunswick rifles, 1,200 carbines, and 1,000 pistols. In 1872, we gave him a further grant of £20,000, 1,000 muskets, and 200 Brunswick rifles. In 1873, he received another present of 15,000 Enfields and 5,000 Sniders, besides £100,000, for which large amount of pecuniary assistance the British Government has not yet received from the Amir even a word of thanks.

Thus, since 1868-69 we have given to His Highness 12 guns, 21,400 rifles, 11,000 muskets, 1,200 carbines, 1,000 pistols, and a quarter of a million of money. What has the Amir done, at any time, since 1868-69 up to the present moment, to deserve these gifts, or to justify any continuance of our generosity?"

### 131. Communication to the Envoy of His Excellency the Viceroy's instructions.—

See Appendix XXVI. Sir Lewis Pelly's telegram and demi-official with enclosure, dated 16th March.

as noted in His Excellency's letter, cited in the foregoing paragraph, to Sir Lewis Pelly, were communicated to the Envoy. On the 16th the Envoy's Secretary called on Sir Lewis Pelly and said that Syud Nur Mahomed was too ill to give an answer at present, but was prepared to submit his answer to the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly at the meeting of the 19th February. The Secretary was told that if the Envoy was well enough to be able to answer Sir Lewis Pelly's observations, he could not have any difficulty in giving a plain answer to the Viceroy's instructions, and that any other answer could not now be received. The Secretary then took his leave, an immediate secret consultation was then held at the Envoy's house, and its result communicated by special messenger to Kabul.

### 132. Continued illness and death of Syud Nur Mahomed. Letter of condolence to the Amir.—

On the 27th February Doctors Courtenay and Bellew paid their first professional visit to the Envoy at his own request. They found him suffering from an old and virtually incurable disease of the urinary organs. On the 7th March Dr. Bellew visited the Envoy at his own request, and the following is his account of what passed:—

Dated Peshawur, 7th March 1879.

"At 2 P.M. this day I went to visit the Kabul Envoy at his own request made at about 9 A.M. this morning, when I accompanied Sir Lewis Pelly to enquire after his health.



"I found him lying on his bed with a coverlet over him, and attended by two of his servants who withdrew on my entry. The Kabul Envoy was too weak and prostrated to make any movement on my approach, and received my congratulations on his improved state of health, as indicated by his change from his bed-room to the drawing-room, with a languid smile. He presently after this asked me many questions about his ailment, and said he hoped he would live to reach Kabul again. After explaining to him the nature of his disease and of his present condition, though I could not say that he would get perfectly well, as his disease was of very long standing. After this a very long silence ensued. I then asked the Kabul Envoy if he had any news from Kabul. He replied that he had received a letter from the Amir last night, but that there was nothing of importance in it. It was merely a reply to his letter to the Amir, in which he had represented to His Highness that whilst he was here for

This is corroborative evidence of the  
jehad proceedings.

L. P.

the purpose of carrying out His Highness' instructions, the people of Kabul were making such demonstrations as were not called for, and thus adding to the difficulties of his business. The Envoy added that he had explained in his letter to the Amir that there was nothing to fear from the British Government, and quoted in proof the prosperous condition of the Rajas and Nawabs of India. The Amir's reply, he said, merely acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and informed him that the people of Kabul had made some unruly demonstrations, but that he had put a stop to them. The Kabul Envoy here closed his eyes and seemed much exhausted, his voice throughout being weak and broken. I waited a few moments and then rose to take leave. Whilst standing, I said that Sir Lewis Pelly had requested me to convey to the Kabul Envoy his compliments and congratulations on the improvement of His Excellency's health, which had been reported to him by Dr. Courtenay, and also instructed me to inform him that he was expecting the written letter from the Viceroy to arrive here on Friday or Saturday. The Kabul Envoy motioned me to sit down, which I did, and then said in a very faltering voice—'It will be better if 5 or 6 days elapse before its arrival. I cannot attend to any business till I am stronger.' I then said that Sir Lewis Pelly had also instructed me to inform him, for his own information, that Bakhtiar Khan had been summoned to Peshawur to consult with Sir Lewis Pelly. Immediately that the Kabul Envoy heard this, he said with unusual energy and apparent surprise—'What has Bakhtiar Khan to do with the matter? Atta Mahomed Khan is the man to consult with.' I replied I could say nothing more than as I had been instructed, and rose to leave. The Kabul Envoy then asked when he had been summoned, and whether he should

The Envoy sent off a letter last  
evening to the Amir.

L. P.

write and inform the Amir. I replied I had given him the messages I bore from Sir Lewis Pelly, and that he could do in the matter as he thought proper. I then said I perceived he was very weak, and would not further trespass on his patience, and with good wishes for his steady improvement and speedy restoration to health, withdrew."

Dr. Courtenay's professional visits extended over about ten days and produced slightly beneficial results. The Envoy, however, appeared unwilling to persevere with the treatment ordered, and at length, while expressing thanks for Dr. Courtenay's attendance, asked him to discontinue his visits. On the 8th March Dr. Courtenay saw him professionally for the last time, and on the 11th the Amir's own doctor, Hakim Abdul Rashid, arrived from Kabul and took over charge of the patient.

On the 26th March at 2 o'clock the Syud died. Appropriate measures of respect were immediately taken. Deputations of condolence from the chief officials at Peshawur were sent to the other members of the Mission; the flags at head-quarters and in the fort were hoisted half-mast high, and at the funeral minute guns were fired. A deputation of British officials attended the corpse as far as Burj Hari Sing, whence the Khalil Arbab with his following accompanied it to the frontier. The following letter from Sir Lewis Pelly to the Amir was immediately despatched by a special courier to Kabul:—

Dated Peshawur, 26th March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I.,

To—His Highness the Amir of Kabul.

"It is with feelings of profound regret I have learned that Your Highness' Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, died at his residence in Peshawur about an hour ago, i.e., about 2 o'clock this morning.

"Your Highness is doubtless aware that the Sadr-i-Azim has, for some time past, been more or less suffering, and that every effort was made on the part of the British authorities to be of aid and service to him in his illness. For some little time, beginning from the 27th February, the Sadr-i-Azim desired and received the professional attendance of the Civil Surgeon at this station, and at His Excellency's request, the Civil Surgeon discontinued his visits on the 9th March.



"I need not assure Your Highness that it will be the wish of His Excellency the Viceroy that every possible respect should be shown in Peshawur to the memory of the deceased, and that everything should be done which may be of service to the gentlemen of the Mission in their bereavement.

"Permit me to add that by the death of His Excellency the Sadr-i-Azim, I am sensible that I have lost a colleague, who was a devoted servant of Your Highness and a sincere well-wisher of the Afghan and British Governments. Personally, I feel I have lost in Syud Nur Mahomed Shah a friend whom I have known for 16 years.

"I beg Your Highness to accept the expression of my sincere sympathy in the loss which Your Highness has sustained."

**133. Measures taken for closing the Conference in consequence of Syud Nur Mahomed's death.**—As circumstances had turned out, it was clearly inexpedient to press for an immediate or definite answer to the questions asked in the Viceroy's instructions of the 3rd March. The answer, whatever its nature, could now hardly fail to be embarrassing. It was determined to close the Conference immediately on the obvious ground that the basis on which the British Government had agreed to negotiate had not been acknowledged by the Amir; that the Mirakhor not being authorised to negotiate on that basis, nor Sir Lewis Pelly on any other, the Conference had terminated *ipso facto*; and that Sir Lewis Pelly should leave Peshawur on an early day. In communicating this decision to the Mirakhor the most friendly language was to be employed, care being taken to throw the responsibility for the failure of the Conference entirely on the Amir. If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers should arrive to continue negotiations, they were to be told that Sir Lewis Pelly's powers had terminated. On closing the Conference Sir Lewis Pelly was to write to the Amir a friendly letter notifying the fact.

These instructions were duly carried out, and on the 2nd April Sir Lewis Pelly quitted Peshawur.

**134. Intrigues of the Mirakhor with the Akhund of Swat. The Viceroy's proposal to communicate with the Akhund and explain British policy to him.**—Before concluding this chapter with the final report of the Conference proceedings to the Secretary of State and Lord Salisbury's reply, it will be convenient to furnish here a brief, though, as far as possible, connected account of the Amir's attempts to raise a jihad both before and during and after the Conference.

According to information received by Sir Lewis Pelly about the middle of February, and collected by Captain Warburton, Assistant Commissioner at Hoti Murdan, the Mirakhor, whilst *en route* from Kabul to Peshawur, paid a visit to the Akhund of Swat, taking with him a letter from the Amir.

Its general tenor was that the Amir intended putting aside all his former views, and desired to fight the English; he would, if permitted, come to Swat and consult personally with the Akhund as to the arrangements to be made. The Akhund at first upbraided the Mirakhor, and said that no trust could be reposed in the Amir, who had ruined his own family by treachery and deceit; nothing could be gained by the Amir coming to Swat. If His Highness was in earnest and meant to act honestly, let him arrange his domestic affairs, and release his son; afterwards there would be ample time to arrange a plan of opposition to the English. The Mirakhor then asked for papers bearing the Akhund's seal, and calling upon all the Khans and Chiefs to assist the Amir should war break out. This request was granted, and a document given to the following effect: "The Amir of Kabul is your King and the Imam of all true believers; his desire is to wage war against *kafirs*; it is right for all Islam to assist him, not because he is your ruler, and you are bound to assist him, but for the righteous cause of the Islam religion." Papers were also written to the Afridis and others not the Amir's subjects and less amenable to his control. Three other documents were prepared with the intention, it was believed, of circulating them in India. Captain Warburton's informant subsequently visited the Akhund

As to these circulars see Appendix XXVII—letter from Fazl Latif Jan.

and obtained from his own lips the following account of the interview with the Mirakhor; but it is not to be supposed that his story is literally true:—

“After making enquiries after one another’s health, the Akhund said that about 1½ months ago Syud Mahomed Jan of Kunar came to the Jalash country, and sent two letters to me—one from the Amir, and the other from himself—asking permission for the Syud to come to Swat. I forbade his coming, as their arrival would give me a bad name, and their object was at variance with my duties. After this, the Amir, in reply to this, sent up the Mirakhor, who brought a letter; the contents were that from two sides powerful nations had come upon his country—Russia from the north and England from the east—and he felt himself unable to cope with either. If permission were granted, he would come and consult me, or, if you (*sic*) object to this, send your son. He further wrote in this letter that the English wanted him to give them three cantonments in his country—(1) Jellalabad, (2) Balkh, (3) Herat; whilst the other Power, Russia, wanted him to give them a road through his country, and, should they succeed in their object, all the country, as far as Lahore, would be handed over to the Amir. In reply to this, I (Akhund) said—If the Amir comes here, nothing is to be gained, as I can do everything on this side; make your arrangements on the other. *2ndly*, my son is unable to do anything, and as he is always vexing me by his actions, he is sure not to do anything that might help you. *3rdly*, I can give you no advice whether you are to permit the English to canton their troops in your country, or for you to give the Russians a road. In either case your sway will come to an end, and I recommend you to keep both out to the best of your ability.

“The Mirakhor then said that the Amir agreed to all this, and now give us some papers sealed with your seal by which the neighbouring tribes will render us aid in case of need. I gave him eight papers written bearing my seal, and twenty-six others on which nothing was written, but had my seal on them. Four of the written papers were for the men of Balkh, Herat, and Maimana, to help the Amir in his *jehad* against Russia, and the other four were for Wuziris, Mohmunds, and Afridis, to help the Amir, in case of need, against the English; the twenty-six were to be sent to any other countries where the orthodox faith was the religion of Islam. On the departure of the Mirakhor, two other Agents of the Amir have come, and are now with me, and they have come with the same petition as the Mirakhor.”

On receiving this account of the Mirakhor’s visit to Swat, it appeared to the Viceroy that the Akhund had been persuaded to supply the Amir with the documents alluded to, under the assumption that the British Government contemplated an immediate attack on Afghanistan. Time would probably cure all the misapprehension on this subject which existed in the minds of the Afghans and others; but His Excellency had for a long time past considered that sufficient trouble had not been taken to maintain friendly relations with the Akhund. That priest might possibly be of great value to the British Government, to which he was said to be not unfriendly, but he was evidently under an entire and unmistakable misapprehension of its objects. His Excellency, therefore, desired Sir L. Pelly to consult with Sir R. Pollock, Dr. Bellew and others as to the advisability of sending some persons in a friendly and unostentatious manner to explain matters to the Akhund, and to show him what the objects of British policy were, and that its whole course tended toward the defence of Afghanistan, of Islam and Swat itself from aggression from the north.

### 135. The Amir’s *jehad* preparations at Kabul. Remonstrance addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to the Kabul Envoy.—

The Kabul diaries ending with the 8th February, received about this time,

For papers relating to *jehad* preparations, *vide* Appendix XXVII.

showed the existence of an excited feeling at Kabul, aroused by a misrepresentation, which could hardly be accidental, of all the communications from first to last of the British Government with the Amir. This intolerable behaviour rendered it expedient to

Telegram, dated 16th February.

instruct Sir Lewis Pelly to require from the Envoy prompt and explicit explanation—*1st*, as to the Amir’s public accusations of the British Government, founded on statements by him which he new to be false; *2nd*, of his repeated appeals to his subjects to join a *jehad*; *3rd*, of his conferences with Russian agents and correspondence with the Russian Governor. The British Government noticed with surprise the libels which the Amir was deliberately disseminating, and which it expected His Highness would take the earliest opportunity of explaining and retracting as publicly as they had been made.

Sir Lewis Pelly had, however, already ordered Nawab Atta Mahomed to speak to the Envoy concerning the Amir’s proceedings, and Syud Nur Mahomed

had promised to communicate with His Highness on the subject. It was accordingly agreed that further expostulation might be conveniently postponed for a few days, by which time some further information would probably have been received from Kabul.

A private letter received on 23rd February from Bakhtiar Khan, Munshi of the British Agency at Kabul, further displayed the inimical attitude of the Kabul Durbar. The city people had been publicly forbidden by the Kotwal from visiting the British Agent,\* and Bakhtiar Khan complained of his position being straightened, and of the difficulty of carrying on work. His very servants' movements were restricted, and his residence at Kabul was hourly becoming more difficult. The letter concluded—"Pray for me that the Most High God may in these dangerous times save my honor, life and property." Sir Lewis Pelly on receipt of this letter sent Atta Mahomed Khan to the Envoy with instructions to inform him of its substance, and to request explanations concerning the Amir's action in respect to jihad demonstrations. Atta Mahomed returned, saying that the Envoy was too ill for business.

The Viceroy, however, ordered a firm communication, on the subject of Bakhtiar Khan's treatment, to be made immediately to the Envoy, no pretext of ill-health being allowed to relieve him of responsibility in the matter. He was to be told that the Amir's present attitude was irreconcilable with the Envoy having made an honest report of the attitude of the British Government. If Bakhtiar Khan was injured, the British Government might have to make reprisals.

Accordingly, on the 26th February, Sir Lewis Pelly addressed the Envoy the following letter, sending it by Atta Mahomed Khan. The Envoy at once replied verbally to the effect that he would lose no time in causing the jihad follies to be suppressed, and would send a satisfactory written reply so soon as he was able to work:—

FROM SIR LEWIS PELLY TO SYUD NUR MAHOMED.

"I have, on a previous occasion, addressed Your Excellency, either personally or through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, in a friendly and unofficial way, concerning the reports which reached me from many quarters of the Amir's misrepresentations of our acts and proposals, and of His Highness' endeavours to excite a pretended jihad against the British Government in India at the very time when you, his Envoy Plenipotentiary, are here,—a public guest on British soil,—for the declared purpose of friendly negotiations. Since the last occasion, on which I communicated with Your Excellency on this subject, the reports have become more numerous, and have been confirmed from many independent sources, and all consistent in showing the persistent and public manner in which the Amir is appealing to his subjects to join in a jihad openly aimed at the British Government. Now the Amir is free to accept, or to reject, the most friendly proposals on the part of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had hoped to have the honor of discussing with Your Excellency in the intended negotiations. But I must protest against misrepresentations wilfully and publicly made, and against the Amir preaching a jihad at Kabul, whilst His Highness' Envoy Plenipotentiary is professing to negotiate on friendly terms at Peshawur. And I am instructed to request from Your Excellency the favor of explicit explanations—

"*First*, as to the Amir's public accusations against the British Government, founded on statements which both the Amir and the Envoy must know to be without foundation.

"*Second*, as to the Amir's repeated appeals to his subjects openly aimed at the British Government.

With regard to Russian Agents at Kabul, see paragraph 10 *et seq.*, Chapter I and Appendix, Plowden's Central Asian Précis.

"*Third*, of the Amir's reported conferences with the Russian Agents, and of his correspondence with the Russian authorities, regarding his military arrangements.

"Finally, the Viceroy has reason to believe that the bearing of the Amir's officials is increasingly unfriendly towards the British Agency at the Court of His Highness; that inter-communication between the Agency and the people of Kabul has been publicly prohibited by the Mayor of the City of Kabul; that the British Agent is apprehensive as to his personal safety.

"As to the reasons for all these demonstrations, no one knows better than Your Excellency that the British Government is perfectly sincere in its assurance, repeatedly given, that it has not the slightest intention of attacking the Amir; and the Viceroy deems the present attitude of His Highness to be irreconcilable with his being in possession of full and faithful reports of that of the British Government.

"The Government of India notices with surprise the libels deliberately disseminated on it, and cannot doubt that the Amir will take the earliest opportunity of explaining these proceedings, and causing the libels to be retracted as publicly as they have been promulgated.

"I am also again to request that Your Excellency will make such communications to Kabul as may put a stop to wilful and injurious misrepresentations of the objects of the proposed friendly negotiations."

In a letter, dated 4th March, Sir Lewis Pelly forwarded the Envoy's written reply, of which the following is a translation :—

*Letter from the Kabul Envoy, to Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, dated Saturday, the 3rd March 1877.*

"The letter, dated 27th February 1877, which you sent by hand of Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, reached my residence in Peshawur Cantonment on Tuesday, the 13th of the month of Safar (begins Tuesday evening), and the tenor of your friendly writing is ascertained.

"It is true that either through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan or personally you have stated that reports have reached you from many quarters, to the effect that the Amir was exciting a jihad against the British Government. Kind friend! I at that time told Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan that during the time I was there, these matters had not place, and even now I am unaware as to what sort of matter this is. Secondly, I verbally told yourself (that kind friend) that this sort of matters pass in a variety of forms from mouth to mouth of the public till at length the news-writers write all sorts of things. Further, I place no reliance upon such statements. How can one rely upon the statements of the common people (public)? For when Captain Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner, came to the frontier of his own limits on the road to Koorum, what papers and statements did not trustworthy men write, viz., that such a large army is coming to Koorum, and that the British Government has such and such designs? The most noble Ruler (the Amir) placed no reliance upon them. In what manner, then, can the authorities of the British Government place reliance upon such statements? Kind friend! I again write that I have no knowledge of these affairs.

"In case, however, there should be something of the kind, whether the Government be a great one or a small one, and such an impossible measure be desired by a great Government, then every Government takes counsel for itself of the royal family, and also of the nobles and learned men, as well as of the Chiefs of tribes and camps. Therefore, in such a matter, the carrying out of which is recorded upon the responsibility of that people, it is incumbent on the King that he should consult with every tribe in this matter. With every tribe which may be consulted, it is the custom that each one, in consultation, should separately express his own opinion. And those persons, when they return to their own audience-halls, are questioned by their people; for each has his own tribe and people, and each tells them that he advised such and such. And when the matter is talked of in those counsel-chambers, it becomes altered and changed, and then these people, when they go to their own homes, again say something else which produces another alteration. Besides this, there are interested persons who, for purposes of their own, add other matters to it, and send it off to news-writers in a different character. To believe in such sort of statements is far from friendship.

"Again, you have written that 'it now rests with His Highness the Amir to accept or to reject the most friendly proposal of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had hoped to have had the honor of discussing with you, his Envoy, in these negotiations.' Kind friend! With much deference I beg to say that from the day I arrived in the nine conferences I have

\* This seems to confirm the refusal of the *sine quâ non* clause.

(Sd.) L. P.

veiled nothing of the true state of the case. Whatever has been said in those nine conferences, and especially in the last conference on Monday, the 19th February, no change in that can be accorded.\*

"That which you have written that 'I feel bound† you are professedly conducting friendly negotiations at Peshawur.' I repeat those very words of that kind one. From the day that I came to Peshawur with what varied arguments have I endeavoured to strengthen the customary friendship on the old footing! And in what manner did I bring it to an end in the last paragraph on Monday, the 19th February? Therefore, it is also surprising to me why you should not trust my word, but rely upon that of news-writers.

"In the matter of the accusations you have written of—Kind friend! From the day that I arrived, if there be a single matter on which it can be adduced that it was based on accusation, be pleased to make it clear. It is expected that that kind one will pay attention to my conversations and not to the absurdities of news-writers.

"And that which you have written in regard to the Russian Government. This is a very great question (*amr-i-azim*), and I am also not instructed in this question that I should say anything. But since I am sorry at the mention of such a matter, I will, by reason of right, say briefly from myself in a friendly manner, that from the day the most noble Ruler (Amir) returned from Umballa to his capital of Kabul, the paper that came from the Russian officers was opened, and the wax and seal removed in the presence of this very Agent of the

British Government who is now present here, and who was summoned nightly for the purpose. After two or three days' consultation that very paper, in the original English, Persian, and Russian, was forwarded to Lord Mayo, and by his advice a paper was written to the officer of the Russian Government. From that day to the present day, what paper has come from the Russian Government, a copy of which is not in the record office of the British Government? And what paper from the Amir has been sent to them which is contrary to the tenor of that first paper which was written in consultation with Lord Mayo? You advance objection to those very writings which in this particular were from the British Government.

"As to the Russian Agents. Will you (please) prove when a Russian Agent came into Afghanistan? Couriers of the Russian officer, who are Mussulmans of the Syud and Sahibzada clan (both religious classes), do come for the purpose of delivering letters. If from the accident of winter, &c., he should remain five days or so, nobody has said to a guest 'Get thee out of my house.' Since this matter of the Russian Government is a very great question, I cannot say more than this.

"When I become honoured by returning to the most noble Ruler the Amir, having thoroughly informed him of the views of the British Government in this particular, this point will become very well and satisfactorily cleared up. And that which you have written in respect to your own Agent, your Agent is present here with the Amir, none of the nobles or chiefs are more respected and honoured than he has been. And what are the matters that have been kept concealed from him?

"That which you have written that 'the people of the city of Kabul have been publicly prohibited by the Mayor of the city of Kabul from going to the Embassy quarters.' I have no belief in this.

"In the matter that 'there is not the slightest intention of attacking the Amir.' My friend! From the day that this friendship has continued, especially in these present discussions at Peshawur, in which the whole discourse has been full of this, that the British Government (has declared that it) will in no manner interfere with or aggress upon the territories of the Amir and of Afghanistan in which there should be displeasure to the Amir or his successor, or there should be a decline in the independence of that Government. Neither has the Amir at any time shown any reliance upon the sayings of people with interested motives in respect to the British Government. The regard has always been and will be for the friendship of the British Government.

"And that which you have written, *viz.*, 'Retract these libels in the same public manner that they have been promulgated.' My friend! I will never admit that anybody can have made an accusation against the British Government. But in the particular of a proclamation in respect to the matters which have come to pass between us, when I have reached the Amir's presence and there informed him of the friendly views of the British Government so far as I have seen and known, and also of these matters of contrary dispositions as to what is the reality of them and what their nature; having there weighed all these matters together with minuteness, it will be promulgated in a highly satisfactory manner as may be suited to the case, so that those proclamations shall openly reach the British Government.

"Written on Saturday, 3rd March 1877."

### 136. General information as to the Amir's preparations for a jihad prior to and during the Peshawur Conference.—

There is no lack of evidence to show that the Amir's sentiments both during the Peshawur Conference and the negotiations which preceded it were of a most unfriendly character. In July 1876, while the reception of the proposed British Mission was under consideration, the Akhoond Mashk-i-Alam of Ghazni, one of the most influential Mullahs in Afghanistan, paid his annual visit to Kabul. The Amir accorded him a most impressive reception and entreated his advice at the present crisis.

See paragraph 115, Chapter VI. His Highness dwelt on the precarious character of the relations between his Government and those of England and Russia, and upon his unwillingness to receive the British Mission at Kabul. He ended by exhorting the Mulla to encourage the people of Afghanistan to rally round the Amir's standard and assist in defending the threatened interests of Islam.

About the same time he addressed a deputation of Halimzai and Baezai Maliks, whose territories impinge on the Peshawur district, saying,—

"You should not hesitate secretly or openly from giving your life or property for the promotion of the strength of Islam, so that foreign tribes may not be able to interfere with this Muhammadan country, which God has given us, in despite of the wishes of the people of Afghanistan.\*"

\* Kabul Diary, 30th June to 3rd July 1876.



Towards the end of December 1876, when it was reported that British troops had been warned for immediate service and were being concentrated, the Amir remarked\*—

\* Peshawur Police Report, dated 7th April 1877.

“Before looking elsewhere, the English had better attend to their own home. Should they dare to move in this direction, they will first have the frontier tribes, like hornets about their ears, before they can ever attempt to cross the border.”

As time progressed, further manifestations of the Amir's hostility reached the Government. At first, his action was cautious, as though he wished to try the temper of the people. One day his officers would address the assembled residents of Kabul, and, having inveighed against the treachery of the British Government, would announce the Amir's determination to assert his independence at any risk and bid them advise what course should be adopted.

Kabul Diaries of January 1877.

Another day, his trusted Ministers, the Mustaufi or Arsla Khan, would use similar language to the Headmen of neighbouring hill tribes so as to gauge their sentiments also. And there was evidence that the contemplated jihad was directed against the British Government and not against any other European Power. In explaining at a public Durbar the deputation of Syud Nur Mahomed to Peshawur, the Amir said—

Kabul Diary, 30th January 1877.

“I have sent the Sadr-i-Azim to the British Government, with whom for some time past discussions are going on in some important matters. Should the British Government continue to maintain the old friendly relations which give no trouble, well and good, otherwise information will be sent to you, and we will jointly make arrangements to expend life and property in protecting ourselves.”

A day or two afterwards the Amir himself informed the Munshi of the British Agency of the unanimity of the Headmen of the neighbouring hill tribes, of the alacrity with which they would obey his summons, and of his determination to furnish them with arms from the Kabul arsenal, *i.e.*, with the arms which the British Government had itself supplied to him for a very different purpose. Then came further news of continued preparations, of lists being compiled of Mujahidin,—warriors of the faith,—of overtures made to different Chiefs of semi-independent tribes, of inflammatory letters sent to the Governors of Herat, Kandahar, Furrak, Zamindawar, and Turkistan, of tents being made, arms collected, and warlike preparations of various kinds set on foot. Tribes who had been alienated by the oppressions of the Amir or his officers were conciliated.

It appears to have been his expectation that his proceedings would influence the course of the negotiations at Peshawur and frighten the British Government. One day he discussed with Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Kandahari, the effect of the preparations for a religious war, and remarked—

Kabul Diary, 9th February 1877.

“If any (measure) affects the designs of the British Government, it is the fear of an insurrection (lit. riot), and nothing else makes that Government apprehensive; how should I neglect to adopt measures for a religious war; I will make great efforts as far as possible to make them firm so that our object may be gained.”

A still more significant act was the visit to the Akhund of Swat of the Mirakhor when on his way to Peshawur to assist Syud Nur Mahomed in the Conference, and which has already been described.

And all these things were being openly done while the Amir's Envoy was being treated at Peshawur with the utmost consideration as the honoured guest of the British Government, with whose representative he was engaged in apparently friendly negotiations.

Again, after the Conference when the Amir learned that the Mustaufi, whom he had deputed to succeed Syud Nur Mahomed, was on his way back to Kabul, he burst into a violent rage and openly threatened the British Government, saying—

“the English will no longer give me money! I do not want any. The English are encroaching on my territories in the direction of Kandahar! I now have no alternative left but to

Para. 7, Police Report, No. 24, dated 13th April.

fight. My Envoy died and the English closed the Conference. We could not come to terms. I have seven crores by me, every pice of which I will hurl at their heads and roll their border tribes on them like blasts of fire."

These words were followed up by increased activity in the endeavour to arouse the religious sympathies of the people. Renewed efforts were made to conciliate the Akhund of Swat and to secure his influence. His son, Mian Gul, was pressingly invited to Kabul. The Amir even offered to go in person to Saidugan as a mark of sincerity and attachment to the cause of Islam. But the Akhund hesitated to take any step which would identify himself too closely with the Amir. He allowed, however, his son, Mian Gul, to visit different tribal Chiefs, and take stock of their armament. He himself gave general directions to prepare for a jihad, and corresponded frequently with the Amir.

The Mustaufi Habibulla visited Jellalabad, and there interviewed the Chiefs and elders of the tribes beyond the Khaibar, receiving from them large promises of assistance. At Basaul he summoned the elders of the Shinwaris and of the Mohmand tribes. Appropriate gifts as well as arms were conferred on them, and written promises of assistance taken in return. The Mirakhor opened negotiations with the Afridis. He promised to restore the Pass allowances which had been withheld for three years, and invited their principal men to Kabul, when arms were given them and the old allowances increased by a fourth. The Tirah Afridis, the Orakzais under Osman Khan, the Daulatzais, all proceeded to Kabul and received money and arms; the Zaka Khel Afridis, who are notoriously hostile to the British Government, losing no opportunity of giving trouble, were treated with marked favor.

The Governor of Kuram openly discussed the impending collision between the Amir and the British Government. He warned the Utmanzai and Ahmedzai Waziris to stand fast ready to assist His Highness in return for their allowances. And he was said to be storing supplies for the troops to be poured into Kuram as soon as the Passes were open.

The Amir himself at Kabul was actively seconding the efforts of his Ministers and Governors. He received with courtesy, and treated with liberality, all the headmen who responded to his invitation to come to Kabul. He paid constant visits to the arsenal and gun-foundry, and was completely engrossed in attending to military preparations. He sent an address interspersed with frequent quotations from the Koran to the different Governors and chief military officers advocating a holy war. And the Proclamation translated in Appendix XXVII was issued and distributed from the Kabul press. He wrote letters to the Hindustani Moulvies residing in the Buner hills, asking them to proclaim a religious war, and endeavoured to tamper with the Chiefs of Biluchistan. Orders were sent to the Governor of Kandahar to proclaim the Amir's intention to commence a religious war within a month and four days. Rumours were freely circulated of instructions issued to the troops at Herat and Kandahar to concentrate themselves at Pishin, so that they might threaten the dominions of the Khan of Kelat and the British troops cantoned at Quetta. Azad Khan, Nowshirwani, who had long been at feud with the Khan of Kelat, was encouraged to create disturbances, and learned Mahomedans daily preached "jihad" in the great Idgah mosque at Kandahar.

News-letter from Dera Ismail Khan, dated 9th April 1877.

News-letter from Dera Ismail Khan, dated 22nd and 24th April.

News-letter from Dr. Leitner, dated 28th May 1877.

The most noted religious preachers in the country were summoned to Kabul, to receive orders to exhort the people to prepare for a holy war in the autumn.

Peshawur Police Report, dated 12th July.

**137. Dealings of the Amir with the Khans of Bajour, Swat and Dir. Position of the Amir towards Bajour and Swat as defined by the British Government.**—The Amir's overtures to the Khans of Bajour occupy a prominent place in the general jihad preparations.

There are also special circumstances connected with Bajour which would render these overtures a very doubtful act, apart from any connection with a jihad. The views of the British Government with regard to the Amir's pretensions over Bajour and Swat may be briefly stated thus. They form no part of the dominions of Kabul. They were not in Dost Mahomed's possession when the Treaty of 1855 was made, and they have never been in the Amir's possession since. It would be impossible to allow him to seize Swat, for its occupation would afford a dangerous facility for attacking our flank. And Bajour and Swat are so closely connected with one another that a movement against the one means a movement against the other.

For a full account of the position of Bajour and Swat towards the British Government and the Amir, see Punjab No. 20C., dated 29th April 1876, in Appendix XXVII.

As long ago as January 1861 the Amir, on the ground that "Bajour had always been a part of the Kabul Government," expressed his intention of remonstrating against the deputation thither of a Wakil by the Commissioner of Peshawur. But His Highness was promptly warned against interfering in any way with the affairs either of Swat or Bajour. Recently also he has been reminded, in the plainest possible terms, of the policy of the British Government towards these territories, and of the consequences of any contravention of it.

The Commissioner of Peshawur wrote (dated 31st March 1877) as follows:—

"After usual compliments,—Having heard rumours that Your Highness intends to bring Bajour, Swat, Dir, and Chitral under your dominion, I beg to remind Your Highness, as an instruction\*

of Government, that the British Government has never once admitted that you had the right of claiming dominion over the above-named countries. Previous to this, Major H. James, the then Commissioner of the Peshawur Division, had informed Your Highness, through a Wakil, that the said Government (British) did not consent to Your Highness' interference in those countries, because interference in those countries is the cause of injury† to the frontier of the British Government.

If Your Highness still resolves in any manner to bring those countries under Your Highness' dominion without the consent of the said Government (British), this act will be considered as one in contravention of friendship and as opposed to the present treaty and engagement."

The following brief account of the Amir's proceedings towards the Chiefs of these parts will show that the warning was fully justified. Early in 1877 invitations were sent through Syud Mahomed Padshah of Kunar to the various Khans of Bajour to proceed to Kabul. Mahomed Sharif Khan, son of Rahimatulla Khan of Dir, Haboo Jan, son of Paidar Khan of Nawagai, and Dilaram Khan of Khar, each accompanied by a considerable retinue, obeyed the summons at once. As soon as they reached Jellalabad, their entire expenses were defrayed by the Amir, and before entering Kabul, they were met with a salute and military escort. Their reception by His Highness was friendly and courteous to a degree, and during their stay at Kabul no money was spared to secure their comfort. On the second day they presented their nuzzurs,—Mahomed Sharif Khan, Rupees 600; Dilaram Khan and Haboo Jan, Rupees 500 each. They received handsome presents in return. The title of Nawab was bestowed upon Rahimatulla Khan, and that of Sirdar on Dilaram Khan and Hyder Khan. A firman was promised to each of them guaranteeing the independence of their territories, recognizing the Amir to be Padshah of Islam, and themselves his feudatories (Tabidar), and specifying the allowances which had been bestowed upon them. The news of their reception induced other Khans of Bajour, viz., the Khans of Barwa, Pusht, and Asmar, who had hitherto held back, to accept the Amir's invitation and proceed to Kabul.‡ They

\* or as an official act.

† i.e., would lead to the harm, &c.

‡ Peshawur news-letter, dated 29th June 1877.

also were courteously received. Arms and a yearly allowance of Rupees 6,000 were bestowed on each of them. To one, Huzrat Ali Khan, of Asmar, two fully-equipped mountain battery guns were given that he might "overawe the red kafirs with their noise and destructive effects." But the Amir did not contemplate a mere friendly alliance with these Khans; he took care to show that he considered that they had submitted themselves to him. The promised guarantee of their territorial independence was not inserted in the firman, and a written acknowledgment of the Amir's supremacy, as well as a promise of obedience, was taken from them. Rahimatulla of Dir is the principal of the Bajour Chiefs, and a translation of the firman given to him, and of a letter

written regarding the succession of his son, is included in Appendix No. XXVII. The terms of the latter are such as would be used to a feudatory.

The Amir's immediate object in securing the submission of these Khans was to secure their aid in the event of a rupture with the British Government. At their reception he said that the British Government intended to depart from old engagements, and interfere with Afghanistan. If these intentions were persevered in, he had resolved to stir up a religious war, in which the Khans of Bajour ought to join, and it was to obtain their consent that he had invited them to Kabul. If the want of money or arms produced any difficulty, this want he would himself supply.

If the Khans were not entirely sincere in the consent which they are said to have given, it is nevertheless certain that their interview with the Amir and his exhortations produced a considerable effect and inclined them against the British Government. On their return from Kabul the Commissioner of Peshawur sent Mian Abdur Rahman to confer with them, but they paid no heed to his remonstrances. The Khan of Nawagai said that the Amir had given him an allowance of Rupees 5,000 per annum, as well as fire-arms and valuable presents, and that he would not break with him; Dilaram Khan received the Mian very curtly, and expressed fidelity to the Amir. Both of these Khans subsequently received from Kabul colors for a regiment, buglers, and drill instructors for their troops.

**138. Ill-treatment of persons suspected to be British news-writers, and other unfriendly acts.**—Further indications of the Amir's animosity showed themselves in his treatment of persons suspected to be British news-writers or British subjects, the stoppage of the ordinary channels of trade between Kabul and British India, and the ostentatious employment of outlaws from British territory.

Shahbaz Khan, Governor of Kuram, whose efforts in the cause of jihad have been mentioned, was a chosen instrument in stopping all communications between the frontier districts of Kabul and British India. Under

News-letter from Dera Ismail Khan, dated 27th April 1877. orders from the Amir, he stationed guards

along the road leading from Kuram to Kohat with directions to intercept and turn back all passengers. On one occasion a Hakim, a resident of Peshawur, was arrested on suspicion of being a news-writer. The man urged that he was a Hakim, and Shahbaz Khan accepting the plea liberated him. For this leniency he was reproved by the Amir, who

News-letter from Dera Ismail Khan, dated 5th May. directed that such persons should be sent

Peshawur Police Report, dated 1st May. the same Shahbaz Khan blew away from a gun, under orders from the Amir, two men named Bazmir and Makri accused of supplying news to the British Government.

At Kabul the Amir's own proceedings were violent and oppressive. Mullah Abdul Rahim, tutor to the Heir-apparent, had written to his relatives at Kandahar, repeating to them news of the doings of the British troops at Kelat, which he had heard from his pupil. His letter was intercepted and brought before the Amir, who ordered the Mullah's instant execution. The earnest intercession of the Heir-apparent alone saved him.

An outlaw from the British district of Peshawur, Hakim Khan, whom the Amir had taken into his own service, was conspicuous in denouncing persons suspected of communicating intelligence. Amongst others he denounced Sheikh Usman, uncle of Kazi Abdul Kadir, one of the Amir's confidential officers, and also a dismissed servant of the British Government. The Sheikh was arrested and expelled from Kabul, and Abdul Kadir, against whom the Amir's suspicions were aroused, was disgraced.

Abdulla, recently a dâk-runner in the service of Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Agent at Kabul, was Letters from Peshawur, dated 17th and 22nd May 1877. sent to enquire whether certain packets forwarded to the Amir from British territory had been received. He was

arrested, kept in custody for a night, threatened with death, and, afterwards, unceremoniously ejected from the Amir's dominions. He brought news that orders had been issued prohibiting any Peshawuri, Punjabi, or Hindustani from travelling between Kabul and Peshawur without a pass from the Amir's officers.

Haidar Shah, a Sayad, arrested on a charge of news-writing, was sent round the city mounted on an ass, his face blackened and beard shaved, and was afterwards shot. Nawab Khan of Lahore was turned back at Butkhak on suspicion of being a British correspondent.

Baba Azim, a servant of the exiled Sirdars, Zulfikar Khan and Salik Khan, was expelled from Kabul for the same reason. Gholam Nakshbund Khan, formerly a Resaldar in the Bengal Cavalry, and now residing at Kabul, on his pension, was heavily fined on a like suspicion. Two Kazis—one a resident of Kandahar, and the other of Kabul—were put to death on a charge of writing political news, and their property confiscated. Three other persons were blown from a gun at Kabul on the same charge, and their bodies burnt. Two others had their limbs chopped off. Abdul Aziz and Attaulla, two respectable men of Kandahar, were accused of being English news-agents on the Kandahar border. They were stoned to death by order of His Highness in front of the Durbar Hall, and their bodies burned. Their execution was witnessed by Mauladad, an Afghan non-commissioned officer in British service, who had accompanied a deputation of his tribe to Kabul, and who was himself threatened with a like fate. Another man was buried alive up to his middle, and then stoned to death.

Captain Cavagnari's confidential reports, dated 18th and 25th June 1877.

The bankers both at Kabul and at Kuram were forbidden to cash any foreign drafts without previous sanction, on pain of being blown away from guns. The object of this order was to prevent any money reaching British news-writers who were suspected of being paid by bills of exchange. The export of horses to British India was also prohibited.

News-letters from Dera Ismail Khan and Kohat for May and June.

Besides Hakim, Peshawuri, mentioned above, Arjun Khan, late Khan of Tangi, an outlaw from British territory, was taken into special favour and directed to be in readiness for service on the Biluchistan border. Arjun Khan has since died. His son, Asaf Khan, succeeded him, and was under a promise, in the event of a jihad being proclaimed, to seize the fort of Abazai in conjunction with the Utman Kheyl. Mauladad, the Afghan non-commissioned officer abovementioned, reported that Ameen, a Kooki Kheyl, well known to the police and civil and military authorities of Peshawur, having promised the Amir the head of a Sahib, was presented in Durbar with a Snider and assured of the Amir's satisfaction and support. Gifts were bestowed on the members of the Utman Kheyl who perpetrated the Swat canal outrage in the commencement of 1877, and Rukh Mian of Tangi, its chief instigator, was rewarded with land in Kabul.

Peshawur Police Report, dated 3rd and 26th May.

Peshawur letter, dated 11th July.

**139. Final report to the Secretary of State.**—In May 1877 the Government of India submitted to the Secretary of State the following final report of the Peshawur Conference, the incidents which attended it, and its results:—

Secret despatch, No. 13, dated 10th May 1877.

"We have already notified to Your Lordship by telegraph the close of the recent Conference at Peshawur between the Envoys of the British and Afghan Governments; and we now take the earliest opportunity in our power of submitting a full report of our proceedings in connection therewith. Those proceedings have been governed by the general principles laid down for our guidance in Your Lordship's despatches of the 23rd January and 19th November 1875, and your further separate instructions of the 28th of February 1876. We were informed by the above-mentioned communications that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the time had arrived when it was desirable to place our relations with Afghanistan on a more definite and satisfactory footing; and that for the attainment of this object the first favourable opportunity should be taken to open amicable negotiations with the Amir of Kabul.



"2. For the complete explanation of the steps taken by us in accordance with the views thus held by Her Majesty's Government, we must preface our report of them by a brief recapitulation of our past relations with that Prince, so far as they affect the questions dealt with in this letter.

"3. The only formal obligation still extant between the British Government and the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan is the Treaty of the 30th of March 1855. This Treaty comprises three short articles. The first article established perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and Dost Mahomed Khan and his heirs; the second pledged the British Government to respect the territories then in His Highness' possession, and never to interfere therein; the third pledged the Dost, his heirs and successors, similarly to respect the territories of the British Government, and to be the friend of its friends and enemy of its enemies without any such corresponding obligation on our part. It did not take long to prove the somewhat imperfect character of the Treaty thus contracted. Two years afterwards, on the first occurrence of a crisis affecting British interests in Afghanistan, a much more complete engagement stipulating for British Agencies in Kabul, Kandahar, and Balkh, and granting aid to the Amir in money and arms, was entered into by Sir John Lawrence and Dost Mahomed. That engagement, though limited to the duration of the war then being waged

\* Lord Canning's Minute, 6th of February 1857.

between the British Government and the Shah of Persia, was declared by Lord Canning\* to be sound in principle, liberal, and simple; tending to 'redress the somewhat one-sided character of the Treaty of 1855, in which we appeared to take more than we gave;' and His Excellency expressed an earnest hope that, independently of the war in which we were then engaged, the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan might remain upon a permanent footing, similar to that upon which the above-mentioned engagement had placed them.

"4. Dost Mahomed Khan was informed, during the course of the negotiations of 1857, that† the British Government's support and assistance of him would be conditional on its officers being received in Afghanistan with the countenance and protection of His Highness. They were not, however, to exercise authority, or command, on Afghan territory; their duty (in the performance of which the Amir was expected to afford them every facility) being simply to give advice when required, and to obtain all the information needed by our Government. The readiness with which the Amir and his Sirdars perceived the propriety of this condition was, it is said, remarkable; and the measure, although not unattended by risk, met with reasonable success. This, at any rate may be as-

† Sir Henry Lumsden's rough Notes for a Lecture on Afghanistan.

sumed from a careful review of past records, and from the view‡ entertained by the experienced head of the Mission, then stationed at Kandahar, in favor of a renewal, at the present moment, of the policy then adopted.

"5. It must, however, be observed that, although the residence of a British Mission at Kabul formed part of the stipulations agreed to in 1857, this step was not enforced by the

§ From Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Punjab, to Government of India, 20th January 1857.

British Government. The Dost urged§ that the Afghan people would view it with dislike; but Sir John Lawrence deemed it more probable that the real motive of this representation was the disinclination of His Highness to let British officers discover the weakness of his rule, or come in contact with disaffected Chiefs at his capital. Provision was thereupon made in the Treaty that, whenever the subsidy should cease, and the British officers have been withdrawn from the Amir's country, a Vakil, not an European officer, should remain at Kabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Kabul. The stipulation, thus agreed upon, has so far as the British Government is concerned, been tacitly observed, for convenience sake, from that day to this; but it is worthy of remark that the Government of Kabul withdrew its Vakil from Peshawur in 1858, and has never replaced him by another. With the exception of this last-mentioned provision, the obligations of the Treaty of 1857 were contracted for a special and limited purpose, which has long since lapsed with the lapse of time; it fixed the relations of the British Government with the Ruler of Kabul, and their reciprocal obligations, for the duration of the war with Persia; and our only object in referring to it now is to bring to recollection the good feeling of the Afghan Ruler and people, some twenty years ago, in regard to the stationing of British Mission in their territory, elsewhere than at Kabul.

"6. No further change occurred for some years in the relations between the two Governments. They remained in a condition of friendly reserve. After the death of Dost Mahomed in 1863, Afghanistan became involved in civil war, which lasted four years. It did not necessitate, in the opinion of Lord Lawrence's government, any active interference on our part. The present Amir, alone and unaided, after varying fortunes, and many severe reverses, regained the throne bequeathed to him by his father, the Dost. But no sooner was he firmly established thereon, than he expressed a great desire,—not without some feeling of resentment for the neutral attitude which had been observed towards him in his hour of need,—to bring himself into friendly relations with the British Government. Lord Lawrence responded to his wishes; he presented His Highness in 1868 with a free gift of money and arms, and would have effected a friendly meeting with him at Peshawur, had not the expiry of his tenure of office obliged His Excellency to return to England.

"7. That meeting was, however, carried out at Ambaa in March 1869 by Lord Lawrence's successor, in a manner which laid the foundation of closer relations between the two neighbouring Powers, and enabled Shere Ali to consolidate his authority on his return to Kabul. The Amir, in his conferences with the Viceroy, bitterly complained of the one-sided character of the existing treaty relations—those of 1855—between the two Governments, and earnestly solicited an amendment of them. Lord Mayo, however, was precluded, not only by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, but by his own convictions, from acceding to the wishes of His Highness. The policy of the Viceroy was, in his own words, an 'intermediate' one, susceptible of development in proportion to the subsequent consolidation of the Amir's authority, and the continued good conduct of His Highness, in his dealings with the British Government. In order, however, to meet in some measure the wishes of the Amir, and to give him a tangible proof of the friendship of the British Government, Lord Mayo added a large gift of arms to that of the money already presented to His Highness; he, moreover, handed the Amir a written assurance that the British Government would assist His Highness in strengthening his government as circumstances might require, and would view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of His Highness' rivals to disturb his position as Ruler of Kabul. This document was in no way intended to have the force of a treaty; it was given to the Amir in compliance with the earnest representations of His Highness that, without such an assurance, he would be unable to return to Kabul; and it is needless to observe

\* *Vide* Secretary of State's despatch, 15th May 1869, and reply of Government of India, 1st July 1869.

future conduct towards us.

"8. We may here mention that there are undoubted grounds for the conviction expressed to Your Lordship in our despatch No. 19 of the 7th of June 1875—a conviction since strengthened by reference to persons in Lord Mayo's confidence, who conversed frequently at Ambala with Shere Ali and his confidential Minister—that a readiness† was then mani-

† Extracts from Proceedings of 1869 and Notes by Captain Grey, Dr. Bellew, and Colonel Burne.

festated on behalf of His Highness to agree to the presence of British Agents at any place in Afghanistan, excepting Kabul itself, on condition of more substantial assistance, and open support, than the British Government was willing to afford him in 1869.

"9. Owing to the strong personal influence established by Lord Mayo over Shere Ali, our relations with Kabul, although still somewhat distant and indefinite, remained for a few years upon a satisfactory and friendly footing. During this period the British Government completed, on behalf of the Amir, successful negotiations with the Government of the Czar for the definition, in a manner most favourable to His Highness, of the exact limits of the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, within which the Russian Government engaged to refrain from all interference.

"10. The result of those negotiations, which had extended over more than three years,

‡ To Secretary of State, No. 60 (Secret) of 30th June 1873.

expressed the opinion that—

" 'Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Amir by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Amir continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.'

"The Amir apparently actuated, at this period, by a deep-rooted fear of the Russians, professed himself at a loss to understand the great delay and difficulty which had arisen in the deliberations between the British and Russian Government; he informed the British Agent that it was 'impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations; and that his anxiety would never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money, and ammunition of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. If an emergency arises,' he said, 'for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens.'

"With these thoughts in his mind, His Highness deputed Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, in the summer of 1873, to wait upon Lord Northbrook, and submit this and other matters to the consideration of the Viceroy. The Envoy's object appeared to be the establishment of an assumption on the part of the Amir that both Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo had given His Highness unconditional promises of aid in money and arms,—an assumption which Lord

Northbrook at once refuted, reminding the Envoy that the British Government alone was to be the judge of the propriety\* of any request for assistance preferred by his master. The Viceroy, finding that the Envoy was instructed by Shere Ali to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective—the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a foreign power—and learning,

\* To Secretary of State, No. 75, of 15th September 1873, paragraph 3.

† To Secretary of State, 24th July 1873.

Amir of Kabul alarmed at Russian progress; dissatisfied with general assurances, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose to assure him, if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops if necessary, to repel unprovoked aggression. We to be the judge of the necessity.

From Secretary of State, 26th July 1873.

Cabinet think you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it. But you may assure him that we shall maintain our settled policy in favor of Afghanistan if he abides by our advice in external affairs.

deemed it advisable to avoid giving Syud Nur Mahomed any more definite pledge than this, or to comply with the request preferred by him for a distinct statement by the British Government that, in the event of any aggression on the Amir's territories, it would consider the aggressor as an enemy to itself.

"During the presence at Simla of the Afghan Envoy, the subject of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan became, as in 1869, a topic of discussion. Our Foreign Secretary suggested the deputation of a British officer of high standing and in the full confidence of the British Government, to the Court of the Amir as the best preventive of the danger apprehended by His Highness: this officer could advise Shere Ali as to the circumstances of each case, and the action which, in cases of emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of India could be communicated with; whilst such a measure need not be followed by the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, which would be incompatible with the pledges given by Prince Gortchakoff to Her Majesty's Government. The object of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan would, Mr. Aitchison said, be primarily to obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan, whilst in no way exercising interference in its internal affairs. The Envoy expressed his general concurrence in the principle of some such arrangement; but declined to recommend to the Amir any specific proposal for giving effect to it, on the ground that it might occasion mistrust and misapprehension. He suggested, as an alternative, the deputation of a British officer to inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan, who could enter by Kandahar and return by Kabul, and be again deputed to the capital, if necessary, at a later period. Such a course would, he said, familiarize the Amir and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually effect the desired object.

"A memorandum embodying the Envoy's alternative proposal was consequently communicated to the Amir by the Government of India. The proposed arrangement was, in this memorandum, strongly urged, as highly desirable, on account of 'the responsibilities that have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Afghanistan,' and 'the imperfect information which they possess regarding the border in respect to which these responsibilities have been incurred.' The Government of India, when reporting its proceedings in the matter, expressed to Your Lordship's predecessor the following† opinions:—

† To Secretary of State, No. 75, 15th September 1873.

" 'Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Kabul, Herat and possibly also Kandahar, would, for many reasons, be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary.'

"The Envoy left Simla without having obtained the avowed object of his mission. On bidding farewell to those members and officers of the Government of India with whom he had been associated during the course of it, the Syud was profuse in his expressions of personal gratitude for the hospitality of his entertainment, and the courtesy with which he had been treated. But no sooner had he returned to Kabul than it became apparent that his feelings towards the British Government were most unfriendly; and from that time forward his influence in the Kabul Durbar, which we believe to have been considerable, was exerted on every occasion to the prejudice of our relations with the Amir.

"At the conclusion of the Simla conferences, the Viceroy presented the Amir with £100,000 and 20,000 rifles. But notwithstanding His Excellency's gifts and assurances, the attitude of the Amir became increasingly frigid, sullen, and discourteous. His Highness evinced deep disappointment at the result of his Envoy's interviews with the Viceroy. To all appearance, whilst mistrusting our repeated assurances that he had nothing to fear from the rapid and unchecked advance of Russia towards his Asiatic frontier, he had nevertheless persuaded himself that, in any emergency, the British Government would be compelled, by its own interests, to afford him unconditional assistance. Under this impression he seemed to believe that, in the meanwhile, he might with impunity disregard its advice, and reject its offers of conditional protection.

"The fallacy of these views lay in their erroneous estimate of the political necessities of this Government, which are as adverse to the wholly uncontrolled personal action of any Afghan ruler, as they are favourable to the territorial independence of Afghanistan. It may, however, be admitted that the Amir was at this time led, not altogether without cause, to hope and seek from the British Government evidence, more conclusive than he had yet received, of its professed regard for his interests. The arms and money denied to His Highness at a time when they might, perhaps, have saved his country and himself from prolonged civil war, were subsequently given to him when his need of them was infinitely less, and his cause for gratitude proportionally small. But the particular form of support which, as the established legitimate Ruler of Afghanistan, he then most needed, was again refused him, at the time when, if given, it would have been best appreciated. On the part of the British Government, he had seen nothing but extreme caution in committing itself to his support, whilst it lost no opportunity of assuring His Highness of its friendship with Russia and its reliance on her promises. On the part of Russia, he saw nothing but a system of aggression on territories neighbouring his border, and a series of pledges unfulfilled. He had been officially informed in 1869 by Lord Mayo that the Government of the Czar would not interfere in Afghanistan, and would recognize as his all the territories then in his possession; and yet he was shortly afterwards beset with communications from General Kauffmann which seemed to him inconsistent with this assurance; nor was it till nearly three years afterwards that Russia finally withdrew her strong opposition to the recognition of his authority over a most important portion of his territories. Again, the promised restoration of Samarcand by Russia to the Amir of Bokhara had been formally announced to him by us, and yet evaded; whilst he found the pledge of the Russian Government not to annex Khiva virtually disregarded, and the Russian forces firmly established on the Oxus close to his own frontier.

"In such circumstances, it is, perhaps, hardly to be wondered at that the assurances given to His Highness by Lord Northbrook, in 1873, failed to satisfy the Amir, or to restore that confidence and good feeling which, for some time previously, had been upon the wane. His reply to Lord Northbrook's letter, submitted to him through his Envoy, was ungracious and evasive. He accorded no further notice to the Viceroy's proposals for sending an officer to inspect his boundaries, than the curt statement that he had read and understood them; he hesitated for some time to receive the arms that were sent for his acceptance; and the subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees, lodged to his credit at the Kohat Treasury, he contemptuously rejected. Moreover, in terms positively offensive, he refused to permit any English officer to enter his territories; and peremptorily prohibited Sir D. Forsyth from passing through Kabul on the return of that officer, in the capacity of British Envoy, from Kashgar to India. In his recent

\* Captain E. Molloy, to Foreign Department, 15th March 1877. interesting narrative of the journey of Syud Yakub Khan to Russia, Captain Molloy reports,\* and comments on, the prejudicial effect of this unfriendly act upon our position in Kashgar, and our prestige throughout Central Asia. Of such conduct on the part of the Amir, the reports received from our Native Agent at Kabul afforded no intelligible explanation. Of the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan, of the projects and proceedings of its Ruler, the strength of his military force, the sentiments of his advisers, and the circumstances of his subjects, the Government of India was then without any trustworthy information, or any means of obtaining it. The evidences of a strong irritation in the mind of the Amir against the British Government were obvious enough: but the true causes of this irritation our Native Agent seemed unable to remove, or even to indicate. It was also sufficiently apparent that, whilst the British Vakil exercised no influence over the Amir, the Amir was exercising considerable influence over the British Vakil; the tenor of whose correspondence with the Commissioner at Peshawur suggested an impression (which subsequent information proves to have been accurate) that his letters, if not always submitted to the Amir for approval, were generally written in the sense believed by the writer of them to be in complete accordance with the wishes of His Highness; and that they never contained any intelligence, or the expression of any personal opinion, which could expose him to the Amir's resentment, if those letters were to fall into the hands of the Kabul Durbar.

"Such was the condition of our relations with Afghanistan when we received Your Lordship's despatch,† conveying to us the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to take an early opportunity for improving them, if possible, by endeavouring to secure the Amir's assent to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. We informed Your Lordship that, whilst fully appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from such an arrangement, we could not disguise from ourselves the practical difficulties of carrying it out; and that, for any immediate attempt to overcome them, the time and circumstances appeared to us inopportune. In fact,

† No. 3, Secret, 23rd January 1876.



the late Viceroy was of opinion that precautionary measures in regard to Afghanistan might be advantageously deferred till the Russian frontier had been pushed on to Merv. It would then, in the opinion of His Excellency, be necessary to give more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and be probably desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him, followed by the natural consequence of the establishment of British Agencies upon his frontier.

" Your Lordship informed us in reply \* that it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur in this opinion. If the Russians advanced their frontier to Merv, the time would

\* No. 34, 19th November 1875.

probably have passed when representations to the Amir could be made with any useful results. The Amir's reported, and very probable, disinclination to the establishment of a British Agency in his country might possibly be overcome, if His Highness could be convinced of the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions, without this precautionary condition. At any rate, the attempt was, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, well worth making without further delay, since such delay was unjustified by any prospect of spontaneous change for the better in the ascertained tendency of Central Asian affairs or any initiative on the part of the Amir for the improvement of his relations with the British Government. Your Lordship, therefore, renewed the injunction previously made on the subject of a special mission to Kabul, for the above-mentioned purpose.

" On receipt of the despatch conveying to us this expression of the views of Her Majesty's Government, we asked† Your Lordship for further instructions, pointing out that any

† No. 10 of 28th January 1876.

overtures to Shere Ali, of the kind commended to our adoption, would probably provoke from His Highness counter-demands, which could not be satisfied without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government. All the recent conduct and language of this Prince had pointed to the conclusion that he cared little, or nothing, for such eventual protection of his country as our own political necessities might oblige us, in any case, to afford it against foreign aggression; and that what he really did care to obtain from us was some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support to himself and family. On this point we desired to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government before proceeding further. Your Lordship's reply directed us to take no action in the matter until after the receipt of fresh instructions from England.

‡ No. 3A. of 28th February 1876.

Those instructions‡ were received by us at the hands of the present Viceroy, and immediately commanded our careful consideration. In the main, they removed the chief ground of our objection to any step which might have the effect of bringing to a crisis the relations of this Government with the present Ruler of Afghanistan, by informing us that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into a more definite, equilateral, and practical, alliance with His Highness. Our consideration of Your Lordship's above-mentioned instructions was also influenced to some extent by the information which the present Viceroy was enabled to place before us, after personal conference, not only with Her Majesty's Government, but also with the Russian Ambassador in England, on the general circumstances of the situation we were now called upon to deal with. Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more responsible intercourse with a barbarous neighbour, so suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy, as Shere Ali, we certainly could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory.

" In 1869 overtures for closer relations between the two Governments, and freer intercourse between their respective subjects, had been initiated by Shere Ali. In 1876 there was every reason to anticipate that similar overtures, if initiated by us, would be rejected by His Highness. The Amir left Ambala apparently much impressed by the power, and most solicitous of the friendship of the British Government. Since then his respect for the one, and his desire for the other, had, to all appearance, been steadily decreasing. In the meanwhile, His Highness had received from the British Government 12 guns, 21,400 rifles, 11,000 muskets, 1,200 carbines, 1,000 pistols, and a quarter of a million sterling of money. It was certainly not in our power to point to any reciprocal benefits which, during the same period, the British Government had received from the Amir. The turbulent tribes which occupy the mountain passes between Kabul and Peshawur constitute a social barrier between Afghanistan and India, which the Amir would doubtless endeavour to strengthen, if he mistrusted our friendship. On the other hand, if he were sincerely desirous of improved intercourse between the two countries, and more practical relations with the Government on whose military support the protection of his Asiatic frontier has been assumed to be dependent, then he would naturally do all in his power to assist us in removing such a barrier, by bringing these turbulent tribes under orderly control, and keeping open the passes which it is in their power (if uncontrolled) to close between Kabul and Peshawur. This, indeed, His Highness engaged to do, when he took leave of the Viceroy at Ambala; and, for a short while after his return to Kabul, he adhered to his engagement. But for the last three years he has withdrawn the allowances previously given by him in conformity with that engagement to the Afridis, for keeping open the Khaibar Pass, which has consequently remained practically closed against us. In the meanwhile, the negotiations which had taken place between the Cabinets of St. James and St. Petersburg had placed us in the apparent position of the avowed protectors and controllers of



the Amir of Kabul. Prince Gortchakoff had not been slow to fix upon us all the responsibilities of such a position. Were Shere Ali, by his dealings with the Tekki Turkomans, to provoke the hostility of the Russian Power in Central Asia, it is the British Government which the Government of Russia would endeavour to hold responsible for the conduct of the Amir; and, in fact, complaints on the supposed intentions, or rumoured action, of Shere Ali have already, on more than one occasion, been addressed, in this sense, by the Russian to the British Government. Yet the imperfect character of our relations with His Highness virtually rendered us unable to control his action, or even to obtain timely knowledge of his intentions. At the same time, were the Amir's conduct such as to subject Afghanistan to a sudden attack from the Russian forces, the interests of our own Empire, complicated by the assurances we had repeatedly given to His Highness, would probably compel us to resist the attack *vi et armis*. In short, the policy hitherto pursued by the Government of India, in the relations with the Ruler of Kabul, had bequeathed to it certain imputed liabilities towards Russia on the one hand, and Afghanistan on the other, which the practical results of that policy did not enable it to fulfil, except under conditions heavily disadvantageous to its own interests. For all these reasons, we considered that, although the prospect of any attempt to improve our relations with the present Amir of Kabul was extremely unpromising, still the necessity of bringing those relations to a definite issue, and promptly defining the position in which they could safely be left by us, was no longer open to reasonable question.

"We, therefore, lost no time in acting on the last instructions of Her Majesty's Government. The Viceroy was of opinion that the opportunity and pretext hitherto wanting for the despatch of a complimentary special mission to Kabul were furnished by His Excellency's recent accession to office, and the addition which the Queen had been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles with special regard to India. Concurring in that opinion, we made immediate preparations for announcing these events to Shere Ali by a special Envoy, secretly authorized to use his best endeavours to bring about a favourable opening for the renewal of the discussions commenced in 1869 with the Amir, and continued in 1873 with the Minister of His Highness, on matters of common interest to the two Governments. But, in order to ensure,

Instructions to Commissioner of Peshawur, 24th April 1876.

Instructions from Sir Lewis Pelly to Ressakdar-Major Khanan Khan, 2nd May 1876.

From Commissioner of Peshawur to Amir, 5th May 1876.

1876. His arrival there was announced to

† Telegram from Commissioner of Peshawur to Private Secretary to the Governor-General, 22nd May 1876.

From Amir to Commissioner of Peshawur, 22nd May 1876.

tions with the British Government, which appeared to have been defined by that Government to its own satisfaction at the Simla Conference. If the British Government had now anything new to say about them, he would prefer to send his own Agent to the Viceroy, in order that the subjects of discussion, 'weighed by a minute and exact investigation, might be committed

‡ From British Agent at Kabul to Commissioner of Peshawur, 22nd May 1876.

to writing.' An explanatory letter, ‡ simultaneously received from the British Vakil at Kabul, stated that the additional reasons professed to him by the Amir for declining the proposed mission were—1st, that he could not guarantee the personal safety of 'the Sahebs;' and, 2ndly, that, if he admitted a British mission, he could not refuse to receive a Russian one, for the similar purpose of better defining his relations with the Russian Government.

"After full consideration of these communications, we came to the following conclusions:—1st, that the result of the Simla Conferences having been eminently unsatisfactory to ourselves, and apparently no less unsatisfactory to the Amir, it was not desirable to renew that experiment; 2ndly, that the Amir's objection to a British mission, on the ground that it would oblige him to receive a Russian one, involved a conscious and significant disregard of the understanding arrived at on his behalf between the British and Russian Governments, and communicated by us to His Highness; 3rdly, that in the Amir's interests, as well as our own, it was undesirable to regard as absolutely final an answer which appeared to have been written without due deliberation, and might possibly have been inspired by a very erroneous estimate of the position in which His Highness would find himself placed if we at once proceeded to act upon it. We, therefore, exhorted His Highness once more to consider seriously, before he rejected our proposals, the consequences to himself of obliging the Government to look upon him henceforth as a prince who had voluntarily isolated his personal interests from its proffered alliance and support. We felt that the studied ambiguity of his response to our preceding communication made it more than ever incumbent on us to ascertain promptly the precise nature of his real disposition towards us, and the extent to which we might rely, in case of need, upon his recognition of the favours he had received from us, up to this time, without any corresponding obligations on his part. The terms of our answer to his letter were governed by these considerations. But, in order not to leave untried every legitimate means of convincing His Highness that our promises, as well as our warnings, were sincere, we

authorised Dr. Bellew and other personal friends of theirs, in the service of our Government, to address at the same time to the Amir and his Ministers letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for materially strengthening its position at home and abroad.

"The Amir replied to our above-mentioned communications after a significant delay of two months. In the meanwhile, we had received from our Vakil at Kabul reports of the reception by His Highness of frequent confidential emissaries from General Kauffman. Of what had passed between the Amir and these Russian Agents, our knowledge was entirely confined to the contents of a letter delivered by one of them to His Highness from the Russian Governor. A copy of that document, communicated by the Kabul Durbar to the Government of India, and forwarded by us to Your Lordship, has already been the subject of a correspondence between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. The answer finally received from the Amir submitted to us two alternative proposals—*First*, that an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from the Viceroy at Peshawur; and, *second*, that the British Vakil at Kabul should proceed to Simla charged with a confidential explanation to the Viceroy of the personal views and sentiments of the Amir on the subject of his relations with the British Government. As regards the first of these proposals, we were of opinion that it was clearly inexpedient that representatives of the two Governments should be authorized to commence negotiations which could not fail to attract the attention, and excite the curiosity, of the public, before the basis of such negotiations had been duly considered, and distinctly accepted, by each party to them. The second proposal appeared to us not only free from objection, but altogether advantageous to the realization of our chief object, which was to ascertain the real sentiments of the Amir. We, therefore, authorised our Vakil to set out for Simla immediately, after placing himself in communication with the Amir on the subject of his instructions.

"This Vakil, the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, reached Simla on the 6th of October last. At first, though pressed to be explicit, he threw little light on the views and feelings of the Amir. His Highness was, he said, resentful of the rebuffs met with by his previous representations to the Government of India, and resolved not to incur any repetition of a result which he deemed offensive to his dignity. Further pressure, however, elicited from the Vakil four special causes of grievance as alleged by the Amir against the Government of India. The first was a communication from Lord Northbrook in 1874, on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakub Khan, whom he had imprisoned. This he resented as an unwarrantable interference in his most domestic concerns, as well as a support given to his personal enemies. The second cause of complaint was our decision on the question of the Seistan boundary, which he regarded as an unfriendly act, depriving him of his legitimate possessions. In the third place, he resented, as an interference with his authority, and an offence to his dignity, the gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to His Highness. Finally, the Amir was profoundly mortified by the repeated rejection of his previous requests for a defensive alliance, coupled with our formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his youngest son, Abdulla Jan. It was also elicited from the Vakil that the Amir was much in want of money, and his people much disaffected by his expedients for obtaining it; that the undoubted reluctance of His Highness to receive British officers was occasioned, not by fears for their personal safety, but by a dread of their probable popularity, and possible intervention on behalf of oppressed, or discontented, subjects; that the Amir, confident in the strength of the army our gifts had enabled him to equip, no longer felt his old dread of the power of Russia; that, in accordance with our own exhortations, he had lost no opportunity of improving his relations with the Russian authorities in Central Asia; and that between General Kauffman and His Highness permanent diplomatic intercourse was now virtually established, by means of a constant succession of special Agents, who held frequent conferences with the Amir, the subject and result of which were successfully kept secret. In short, the information gradually extracted from our Kabul Agent convinced us that the system on which we had hitherto conducted our relations with Shere Ali had practically resulted, not only in the alienation of His Highness from the Power which had unconditionally subsidised, and openly protected, him; but also in the increased closeness and confidential character of his relations with the only other Power that can ever cause serious danger to our Empire in India. The Vakil, however, represented to the Viceroy that the Amir, though strongly disinclined to admit British officers into any part of Afghanistan, would probably, if the point were pressed, accept such a condition, rather than forfeit the advantage of a long-desired alliance with the British Government, upon terms certain to strengthen his personal position at home, about which His Highness was chiefly anxious.

"These statements gave us, for the first time, a clue to the Amir's feelings, and the motives of his previous attitude towards us. After prolonged consideration of them, in connection with the last instructions received from Your Lordship, the Viceroy came to the conclusion that the Treaty of Alliance and the formal recognition of the Amir's selected heir, which His Highness was supposed to desire of us, might be safely and advantageously accorded to him, provided that his willingness and ability to fulfil with loyalty his own part, in the reciprocal obligations of such a Treaty, were first manifested to us in a satisfactory manner. These concessions, sanctioned by Your Lordship's last instructions, would not practically commit the British Government to anything more than a formal re-affirmation of the assurances already given by it, through Lord Mayo, to the Amir in 1869, and a public recognition of its inevitable obligations to the vital interests of its own Empire. There was great reason to

believe that, for the ultimate stability of his previously contested authority, the father of the present Amir was mainly indebted to the supposed protection of the British Government. It might, therefore, be presumed (and such a presumption was strongly confirmed by all our most verified knowledge of the social condition of Afghanistan) that, notwithstanding the apparently precarious tenure of Shere Ali's power and the youth of his appointed heir, the timely and positive proclamation of such protection would effectually prevent those civil conflicts, otherwise certain to recur upon the death of the present Amir. On the other hand, the conditions on which the concessions thus contemplated active friendship, might accept with personal cordiality and national benefit. They involved no interference with the Amir's independent authority, no occupation of any portion of his territory, no foreign control over his civil or military administration. They were strictly confined to the location of at most two or three British officers (accredited to His Highness, Government) upon those points of his frontier whence we were unable to obtain intelligence by other means, and which were most exposed to the attacks against which we were asked to defend it. The Viceroy was nevertheless of opinion that it would be wholly inconsistent with the dignity, and contrary to the interests of this Government to urge any proposals on the unwilling acceptance of the Amir, or afford His Highness the opportunity of rejecting its positive demands. The Amir's apparent object was to place the British Government in the position of a petitioner; and that position it behoved the British Government to reverse. Such were the opinions of the Viceroy, in which we generally concurred.

"The Vakil was consequently instructed to return to Kabul, and there explain to the Amir, with the utmost possible precision, the moderate and necessary condition on which the British Government was prepared to sign with His Highness a Treaty of Alliance, and to accord its formal recognition to his heir-apparent. The Vakil was charged to explain to the Amir very clearly that our assent to the Conference, suggested by His Highness in reply to our previous communications, would be entirely dependent on his agreement to this preliminary condition as a basis of negotiation. In order to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding on that point, Atta Mahomed received from the Viceroy an *Aide Memoire*, which he was authorized to communicate to the Amir. The Viceroy also addressed to His Highness a friendly letter, inviting him to Delhi as the guest of the British Government at the Imperial Assemblage, and proposing on that occasion to sign with him the Treaty of Alliance, which, subject to the above-mentioned condition, Sir Lewis Pelly would be authorised to negotiate at Peshawur with the Envoy of His Highness.

"On this errand, in the satisfactory result of which he professed great confidence, Atta Mahomed returned to Kabul at the end of October last, and at the same time the Viceroy left Simla, on a tour of inspection round the frontier. About this time, events occurred in Europe, the effect of which was immediately apparent on our negotiations with Shere Ali. Throughout India and Asia there was a prevalent expectation that war between England and the Czar was imminent, and that it must lead, ere long, to war between England and Russia. Had this expectation been realized, the policy which had hitherto governed our relations with Afghanistan would have been promptly brought to a very practical test. It was immediately evident that the Amir had no intention of committing himself to an English alliance on the supposed eve of a war between England and Russia. His apparent policy was to stand aloof from us till the latest possible moment; and then, if he found himself unable to maintain a strict neutrality between the two belligerents, to sell his alliance to the highest bidder, Russian or English, on the dearest terms. For this purpose, it was essential to His Highness to gain time. Accordingly, on his return to Kabul, the British Vakil was informed that the Amir was too unwell to receive him. This transparent pretext was prolonged till the Vakil, instructed by the Viceroy to insist on its abandonment, was at last admitted to the presence of His Highness. The Amir then informed him that he was still much too ill to discuss business, or even to receive the Viceroy's messages: and the Vakil, either from stupidity or disloyalty, accepted the excuse. So matters went on for more than a month. During this period the Amir, though too unwell to discuss business with the British Vakil, was able to review troops, and issue military orders. An Agent from General Kauffmann remained at his Court, and was supposed to be in secret communication with His Highness. But of all that was passing at Kabul we knew less than ever; for the reports of our own Agent there had become studiously infrequent, vague, and unintelligible. Thus, after many years of a waiting policy, patiently pursued and confidently trusted, our attainment of the object, for which we had so long been waiting, proved to be perilously uncertain at the very moment when certainty in such a matter was most essential to our interests; nor could we tell whether the lakhs of rupees and rifles, unconditionally lavished on Shere Ali by the British Government, might not at any moment be used against it by His Highness. At length the Amir, finding himself unable to evade any longer the issue put to him, without bringing his relations with us to an open rupture (a result no more compatible with his purpose than placing them on a definitely cordial footing), despatched his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur, and wrote to the Commissioner there, briefly informing him of the Minister's departure with instructions to open negotiations; but without noticing the Viceroy's letter, or answering the invitation it contained.

"The Amir's Minister, who was in ill health, and could only travel by easy stages, reached Peshawur on the 27th of January. Thither Sir Lewis Pelly also proceeded, with detailed instruc-

tions for his guidance. At the first meeting between the two Envoys it appeared that the Afghan Envoy had no authority from his Government to accept the basis we had laid down as a *sine quâ non* condition of our assent to the negotiations he had come to open. He, however, requested permission to defer his final answer on this point, until he had made a full and detailed statement of the Amir's views respecting his relations with us, and of certain episodes in the history of those relations which His Highness considered himself entitled to complain of. As we had all along been anxious to obtain authentic information of the Amir's real sentiments on this subject, the Envoy's request was at once agreed to, on the condition, which he understood and accepted, that his statement should not be received by us, or be treated by him, as a basis of discussion.

"This statement by the Afghan Envoy, which is herewith enclosed, is an interesting, instructive, and important document. It repeats and confirms the information previously given by Atta Mahomed to the Viceroy in regard to the Amir's professed grievances against the British Government. It assumes, as a matter of course, that the British Government is already bound, in honour and by written contract, to afford to the Amir and his dynasty unconditional military support, both at home and abroad, whenever called upon to do so by His Highness. On this assumption it naturally questions the advantages to the Amir of any Treaty of Alliance which, on our part, would merely re-affirm liabilities already contracted by us towards His Highness, whilst, on his part, it would involve the definition and acceptance of liabilities, altogether novel, towards ourselves. Furthermore, it refers indirectly to the Amir's relations with Russia in terms which seem to imply an impression on the part of His Highness that the claim of the Russian Government upon his consideration is practically much the same as that of the British.

"Owing to the Envoy's increasing ill-health, several weeks were occupied in the delivery of this long statement. During that time intelligence reached us from Kabul that the Amir was straining every effort to increase his military force; that he was massing troops on various points of his British frontier; that he was publicly exhorting all his subjects and neighbours to make immediate preparations for a religious war, apparently directed against his English, rather than his Russian, neighbours; both of whom he denounced, however, as the traditional enemies of Islam; that on behalf of this jihad, he was urgently soliciting the authoritative support of the Akhoond of Swat, and the armed co-operation of the Chiefs of Dir, Bajour, and other neighbouring Khanates; that, in violation of his engagements with the British Government, he was, by means of bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to bring those Chiefs and territories under personal allegiance to himself; that he was tampering with the tribes immediately on our frontier, and inciting them to acts of hostility against us; and that, for the prosecution of these objects, he was in correspondence with Mahomedan Border Chiefs openly subsidised by ourselves.

"In acknowledging the receipt of the Afghan Envoy's statement, the Viceroy instructed Sir Lewis Pelly to point out to the Envoy that the alleged grievances, over which the Amir appeared to have been resentfully brooding for some years in unbroken silence, were mostly the result of mutual misunderstandings which could not possibly have occurred had the two Governments possessed the ordinary means of diplomatic intercourse with each other. With this remark, Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded to correct the Amir's interpretation of our existing engagements with His Highness, and explain the thoroughly conditional character of them. He demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Amir's language and conduct, at a time when the representative of His Highness was still engaged in friendly and pacific negotiation with the British Government; and finally, he required from His Excellency an immediate and decisive answer on the Agency condition, which we had declared to be our only recognized basis of negotiation.

"The Envoy replied that the reports which had reached us of the Amir's utterances and proceedings were, he trusted, much exaggerated; he feared, nevertheless, that since his own absence from the Kabul Durbar, His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences, which he himself deplored and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Amir strong remonstrances on this subject. With regard to the Agency condition, he regretted to say that he was still without instructions, for which, however, he would again make special reference to Kabul. He was reminded in reply that the condition of our assent to negotiation with the Amir had been distinctly explained to His Highness many months before he had decided, after deliberately considering it, to open the Conference at Peshawur. If the Amir had subsequently changed his mind, and now wished to revoke his acquiescence in this condition, we were in no disposition to urge it on his acceptance. It was merely part of a general arrangement to which, if seriously desired by His Highness, we were willing to assent. If the Amir considered the arrangement disadvantageous to himself, he had only to say so, and the discussion of it would cease *ipso facto*. But we must, in either case, insist on a prompt and plain answer.

"The Afghan Envoy, who had long been suffering from a mortal disease, expired shortly after his receipt of this communication. His surviving colleague, the Mirakhor, declared that he had no authority to answer any question from the British Government; and Sir Lewis Pelly was consequently instructed to close the Conference on the ground that there was no basis for negotiation.

"Apparently the Amir, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the Conference,



His Highness was sending to the Mirakhor instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Kabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the conference. But it appeared to His Excellency that liabilities, which the British Government shown any eagerness to deserve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely, accepted in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic investigations. Under these circumstances, the prolongation of the Peshawur Conference could only lead to embarrassments and entanglements best avoided by the timely termination of it.

"To the letter addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to the late Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, on closing the Conference at Peshawur, no reply has yet been received from the Amir. Some time previously we received, from secret Agents of our own, information that the Amir had despatched a confidential Envoy to Tashkend, and this information has lately been confirmed by a telegram from Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran. Such a proceeding was to be expected on the part of His Highness, whose policy is to play off against each other his two powerful neighbours. Seeing no immediate prospect of further support from the British Government, and fearing perhaps the consequences of its surmised resentment, he would naturally become more urgent in his advances towards Russia. But the war now raging between that Power and the great Mahomedan Empire of the West will render it extremely difficult for His Highness to receive open support from the Russian Government, or enter into closer relations with the Russian authorities, in face of the religious fanaticism which the Amir himself has done his utmost to inflame throughout Afghanistan. Meanwhile, his endeavours to organize a general jihad against the British Government appear to have completely failed.

"The motive of this abortive attempt was not, in our opinion, a religious, but a purely political one, easily explained by the history of the Amir's relations with the British Government during the last four years. So long as Shere Ali cherished the hope of obtaining eventually from us a personal and dynastic support, he was willing to associate his interests with our own, and even anxious for the protection of the British Government. When, however, the discouraged hope of such support, with each succeeding year, grew feebler, he appears to have turned his attention to such sources of strength as might, in case of need, be derived from the fanaticism of the Mahomedan populations occupying the wild tract still left between the British and the Russian outposts. For some years his influence, so far as we can judge, has been passively opposed to our own over the border tribes: and, at last, apparent determination of the British Government to bring its ambiguous relations with His Highness to a definite issue, coinciding with the critical and sinister situation of the whole Eastern question, doubtless induced the Amir to believe that the decisive moment, to which he had long been looking forward as ultimately inevitable, was then imminent. Under this impression, he attempted to place himself at once at the head of an armed movement, fanatical on the part of his dupes, but purely political so far as he himself was concerned in it. The attempt, however, failed. The Akhoond of Swat mistrusted the designs of the Amir, even more than he disliked the neighbourhood of the British. Old, weary, and with nothing to gain by the sword, this spiritual potentate temporised with the secular ruler who had raised an inconvenient religious cry; but, when it came to the point, he refused to identify himself with it. The Amir's subjects responded coldly to his call, and the neighbouring Chiefs, to whom he had appealed, availed themselves only of the favorable opportunity to extract money from him. So completely had the whole movement collapsed before we closed the Conference at Peshawur, that the first step taken by the Amir, immediately after that event, was to send messages to the authorities and population of Kandahar, informing them that the jihad project was abandoned; requesting them to do all in their power to allay the religious excitement he had till then been endeavouring to arouse, and adding that his relations with the British Government were eminently satisfactory.

"If those relations are not as satisfactory as Shere Ali would have them suppose, we have at least every reason to believe that they involve no feelings of irritation against us, which are not entirely confined to His Highness. Our relations with the people of Afghanistan are as friendly as they have ever been. At Kandahar, where recent events in Biluchistan have brought us into contact with Afghanistan from a new side, we have every evidence of the amicable feeling of the population, and their disposition to look to us as protectors rather than as enemies. From Sibi the Chiefs and headmen, subjects of the Amir, recently waited on the British Agent in Kelat, for the purpose of inviting his mediation in their domestic and inter-tribal quarrels, and his protection from their neighbours, the Murris. Elsewhere, the British officers, lately at Thull, on a mission of inspection, were received by the Amir's people beyond the border, and invited inside their frontier posts with every demonstration of cordiality and confidence. On the other hand, all our reports from Afghanistan concur in representing the Amir's subjects as generally disaffected on account of the heavy military burdens recently imposed on them; his army in arrears of pay, and portions of it mutinous; his treasury nearly exhausted; and his personal position precarious.

"The further course of Kabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. In the meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Amir, or on our own part any cause for



interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Kelat (and others which will be separately reported to Your Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour.

"In closing this unavoidably long report upon the cause, the course, and the result of the Peshawur Conference, we desire to express our entire satisfaction with the manner in which that Conference was conducted by Sir Lewis Pelly. We are of opinion that, in the skilful discharge of a very delicate task, Sir Lewis has upheld with marked ability the dignity of our Government and the interests of this Empire. That opinion will, we trust, be fully shared by Your Lordship after perusal of the papers annexed to our present despatch."

**140. Reply from the Secretary of State.**—The following despatch from the Secretary of State conveyed the opinion of Her Majesty's Government of the results attained by the Peshawur Conference, and of the future policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan :—

No. 64, Secret, dated India Office, London, 4th October 1877.

From—Secretary of State for India,

To—Government of India.

"Her Majesty's Government have considered, with the attention due to the importance of its contents, the Secret letter of Your Excellency's Government, No. 13, dated the 10th May last, reporting the transactions which preceded the Conference lately held at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly, on behalf of your Government, and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, Prime Minister of the Amir of Kabul, the course of the discussions which then took place, and the views of Your Excellency in Council in regard to the results of the Conference and your future relations with the Amir.

"Before making the general observations which are suggested by the papers under notice it is my agreeable duty, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to convey to Your Excellency their full and cordial approval of the proceedings of your Government, their high sense of the patience and discrimination shown by Your Excellency throughout the negotiations, and their entire satisfaction with the manner in which, under Your Excellency's instructions, the discussions with the Afghan Envoy were conducted by Sir L. Pelly.

"The considerations which led Her Majesty's Government to desire the presence of British officers at certain points on the frontiers of Afghanistan were set forth at length in my despatches addressed to Your Excellency's predecessor on the 22nd January and 19th November 1875; while the instructions furnished to Your Excellency under date the 28th February 1876, in regard to frontier matters generally, placed you in possession of their views as to the manner in which the requisite negotiations with the Amir might most conveniently be commenced, and authorized you to make concessions to His Highness, which, it was known, had in former years been greatly desired by him, and which could not fail both to strengthen his own power and promote the permanent interests of his dynasty.

"When vesting Your Excellency with discretion to offer to the Amir large pecuniary aid, a decided recognition by the British Government of the order of succession established by him, in favour of his younger son, Abdullah Jan, and an explicit pledge, either by treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression on his territories, Her Majesty's Government were justified in hoping that advantages so great would be accepted by the Amir in the spirit in which they were offered, and that His Highness would not hesitate to allow to their Agents unrestricted access to positions in his dominions where their presence would not, even in appearance, prejudice his personal authority, and where they would be favorably situated for acquiring early information of any circumstances which might threaten disturbance to the independence or tranquillity of his dominions.

"But, while holding this reasonable expectation, Her Majesty's Government did not disguise from themselves that, of late years, the conduct of Shere Ali had been such as to indicate a possibility that, owing either to confirmed disbelief in the sincerity of the British Government or to doubts of its power, the Amir might reject the proposals which you were authorized to make to him. This contingency rendered it desirable to proceed with caution, but, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, afforded no sufficient reason why the necessary overtures should not be made; on the contrary, it seemed to them in the highest degree expedient that the real sentiments of the Amir should be ascertained beyond doubt.

"Upon this point the history of the events reported in the letter under reply is unhappily conclusive, and demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875, by Sir R. Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that 'no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Amir.' Share Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had 'now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government,' and ample confirmatory evidence of this fact has been furnished by

the refusal of the Amir to receive at Kabul or elsewhere the temporary mission which you proposed to send to him; by his obstinate objection to accept the principle of free access for British officers to Afghanistan as a preliminary to negotiations plainly declared to have for their object arrangements which had been pressed for by His Highness in 1869 and again in 1873; and by the attitude of positive hostility which he assumed while the discussions between his Envoy and Sir L. Pelly were proceeding at Peshawur.

"It would be futile to discuss the causes which may have led to this complete alienation of the Amir, or to speculate how far, and in what proportions, it may be attributable to the circumstances upon which Syud Nur Mahomed Shah dwelt with so much persistence, to imperfect appreciation of the political situation in Europe and Asia, or to foreign intrigue. Your Excellency judged correctly that, the fact having been established, continuance of the negotiations was unlikely to lead to permanently satisfactory results, and, in taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the death of the Afghan Envoy to close the Conference, you adopted that course which was in all respects the most expedient.

"Although that cordial agreement between the British and Afghan Governments, which is so much to be desired in the interests of both powers, still remains, therefore, to be effected, Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the result of recent proceedings as either unimportant or unsatisfactory. The position of the British Government towards that of the Amir has been clearly defined. His Highness has now been informed in unmistakable language that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855—which alone, of the two Treaties contracted between the British and Afghan Governments, has a character of perpetuity—the British Government has incurred no liabilities whatever on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that neither by Lord Mayo in 1859, nor by Lord Northbrook in 1873, was any assurance given of unconditional protection, or any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects. Any illusions, therefore, which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point, have been effectually dissipated. He has further learned that the British Government will not undertake the formal responsibility of assisting him to defend his country from the attacks of external foes, or of supporting his dynasty against sedition, unless British officers are allowed to reside on the frontier for the purpose of acquiring information for communication to their Government, and unless His Highness is himself prepared to receive, when necessary, the confidential Agents of the Viceroy of India.

"To both the parties to them, therefore, the recent negotiations may prove to have been beneficial. The British Government has, for the first time, become acquainted with the real sentiments with which it is regarded by a ruler as to whose disposition it was important there should be no uncertainty, and can regulate its policy accordingly; the Amir, on his part, now knows the precise terms on which he may obtain the support of the British Government for himself and his heir. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, His Highness may well be left for a time to reflect upon the knowledge which he has acquired. Your subsequent letter, No. 17, dated the 11th June last, reports a marked change for the better in the attitude of the Amir. Her Majesty's Government trust that the improvement may be progressive, and that His Highness may ere long awake to the fact that, while his interests are bound up with those of the Government whose alliance he has lately rejected, the converse proposition is by no means equally true. This result may, in the end, be most speedily attained by abstention for the present, on the one hand, from any hostile pressure on His Highness, and on the other, from any renewed offer of the concessions which have been refused.

"The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards the Amir under present circumstances has, indeed, been anticipated by Your Excellency in the assurance conveyed to the Afghan Envoy by Sir L. Pelly under your instructions, that 'while repudiating all liability on behalf of the Amir and his dynasty, the British Government will continue, as heretofore, to respect his independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognized as being in the lawful possession of His Highness, and will abstain from interfering therein, so long as the Amir, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own.' Her Majesty's Government would have been glad had the Amir, by a cordial acceptance of the propositions made to him, allowed them to substitute for the attitude of indifference indicated by the terms of the above assurance, one of hearty co-operation for the protection of common interests. The integrity of the Amir's dominions is liable to be menaced either by direct foreign attack, or by the results of domestic discord. Foreign aggression may not be, and probably is not, at all imminent, though the prospect of it has more than once, in recent years, excited the fears of the Amir; but danger from the members of his own family must be ever-present to the mind of His Highness, who can scarcely reckon with confidence upon immunity from it during his life-time, and must be well aware that it is certain to ensue upon his death.

"The independence of Afghanistan is a matter of importance to the British Government, and, as an essential part of arrangements for its protection, Her Majesty's Government would still be glad to station Agents, upon whom they could rely, at Herat and Kandahar. In the event, therefore, of the Amir, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with Your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by, him, his advances should not be rejected. If, on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British Government

stands unpledged to any obligations, and, in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan, will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-West Frontier of Her Majesty's Indian dominions, as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Amir Shere Ali, or the interests of his dynasty."

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER VII.

*Appendix No. XXIV.—Replies from the Amir to His Excellency's letters, dated 11th October 1876.*

*Appendix No. XXV.—Correspondence with Sir Lewis Pelly during the Conference.*

*Appendix No. XXVI.—Sir Lewis Pelly's telegram and letter, dated 16th March 1877, and enclosure.*

*Appendix No. XXVII.—Papers relating to the jehad preparations.*

## CHAPTER VIII.

THE TURKISH MISSION TO KABUL—JUNE TO NOVEMBER 1877.

### 141. Intimation from the British Ambassador at Constantinople of the Sultan's desire to send an Envoy to Kabul. Proposal to establish a Turkish Consulate at Peshawur.—

On the 8th June, Mr. Layard, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, telegraphed that the Sultan of Turkey was anxious to send an Envoy to the Amir of Kabul, and to know whether Her Majesty's Government would object. The Envoy selected would probably be Sulciman Effendi, a native of Bokhara, who had already been employed by the Porte in Central Asia, and was known to the Indian authorities. He would be instructed to do all in his power to further English interests. Mr. Layard at the same time mentioned that suggestions had been thrown out for establishing a Turkish Consulate at Peshawur with the object of promoting the Sultan's influence, counteracting that of Russia, and furthering a good understanding between the British and Kabul Governments. It may be observed here that Mr. Layard discouraged the nomination of Sulciman Effendi, whose trustworthiness he had reason to doubt. Eventually, a different selection was made.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied to the following effect: He had already written to Mr. Layard that the messenger\* last sent by the Sultan to the Amir, and now at Kabul, carried no weight. The Amir had fallen under Russian influence, was believed to have received money from General Kauffmann, and promises of share in plunder of India, if he would give Russia a right of way through Afghanistan. The Amir's relations with us, owing to Russian intrigue, were highly strained, Russian Agents being now at Kabul, and as the Sultan's messenger was formerly the servant of the British Vakil at Kabul, the Amir gave out that he was a British spy. Some time ago the Government of India had offered the Amir an offensive and defensive Treaty against Russia with a dynastic guarantee and a permanent subsidy on condition of permission being accorded to stationing British Agents, not at Kabul, but at Herat and Kandahar, to watch Russian movements on the frontier and provide for the protection of Afghanistan. The Amir had declined, and since had proclaimed a jihad, not against Russia, but against the British Government. The organization of this movement had failed, because the Akhund of Swat and others mistrusted the Amir's designs. Some of the Chief Sirdars of Kabul had remonstrated—but without effect—with the Amir on account of his hostile attitude towards the British Government. The Amir was universally unpopular, and his position so precarious that without British support it was probable that he would ere long be murdered or deposed. If the Sultan wished to raise Afghanistan against Russia, he should lose no time in sending a formal embassy to Kabul in charge of a person of some consequence, the object of whose mission should be made generally known to the Amir's subjects, whom His Highness was trying to deceive as to the real situation. In that case the Amir would probably be obliged to comply with the Sultan's appeal, otherwise he would sell his neutrality to Russia. If the Turkish Mission came through India, it might count upon an unimpeded passage to the Afghan frontier, but as England was neutral in the existing war between Russia and Turkey, public honors could not be accorded. The action of the Government of India must be controlled by the policy which Her Majesty's Government might determine to adopt. With regard to the establishment of a Turkish Consul, it would be advisable that the Porte should not move in the matter until the results of the Mission to the Amir was known.

On the 14th June, Mr. Layard replied that the Sultan had resolved to despatch at once an Ulema of high rank on a mission to Kabul. He would convey letters from the Generalissimo and the Sheik-ul-Islam, urging the Amir to abandon the

---

\* The name of this Agent was Haji Mahomed Hassan, and he was the bearer of a letter from the Sultan to the Amirs of Afghanistan and Bokhara, asking them to join Turkey in a jihad against Russia. He arrived at Kabul at the end of May 1877; was reported to have left for Bokhara about the middle of July. Subsequently, he returned to Turkey with Ahmed Khulussi Effendi.—T. C. P.

Russian cause, and to enter into a friendly alliance with England. If the Amir should persist in his present course, the Sheik-ul-Islam was prepared to issue an excommunication against all Mahomedans aiding or abetting him. The Viceroy's offer to guarantee an unimpeded passage to Afghanistan had been gratefully received. It was also considered that the journey should be as unostentatious as possible. Otherwise suspicions might arise that the Mission had been got up by England, a circumstance which would diminish its influence with Mahomedans. Mr. Layard had discouraged the proposal to maintain a permanent Turkish Agent at Peshawur, which had been again advanced.

On the question of the manner in which the Envoy should pass through India, the frontier authorities were consulted. They doubted the expediency of the journey being made in secret. The Mission would be discredited thereby, and the Amir induced to regard the Envoy as a British spy. It was therefore resolved that on his way through India he should be considered a guest of Government and be treated with politeness, but with as little show and parade as possible.

It is worth mentioning at this point, with reference to subsequent events, that the Akhund of Swat was said to have pronounced invalid the jihad proclaimed by the Sheik-ul-Islam against Russia. The reason given was that the Turks, having adopted European habits, had ceased to be true believers. It was thought possible that the Amir, taking advantage of this expression of opinion, might decline to receive the Mission.

#### **142. Communications with the Secretary of State on subject of the Turkish Mission. Temporary misunderstanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India.**—On the 20th June, the Viceroy telegraphed Mr. Layard's proposals

Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 1458P., dated 20th June. officially—to the Secretary of State. He added the opinion of the Government of India as follows:—

"We are unanimously of opinion that effect of Mission may be favorable to our interests, and we propose, without making too much parade, to receive the Ulema honorably and treat him, as has been heretofore the practice, during his passage through India. It is important to detach Mahomedan sympathy from Amir in his present attitude, and we therefore look to value of Mission more as affecting Mahomedan feeling generally than the Amir personally. Further tolerance of Russian influence and intrigue at Kabul very dangerous; and this Mission may help to stop it.

"Our frontier authorities consider that if Turkish Envoy passes through India secretly, and without the courtesies customary from our Government on all such occasions, he will lose weight at Kabul, and be treated by Amir as a British spy."

Lord Salisbury's reply (dated 21st June) is not available in the Foreign Department, but it elicited the following rejoinder from the Government of India:—

To Secretary of State, No. 1496 A., dated 23rd June. "Your telegram of 21st has been considered by the Government of India in special Council. The facts it refers to are these. On 8th instant, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople telegraphed to Viceroy that Sultan wished to send to Amir of Kabul a special Mission, whose object would be most friendly to British Indian interests, and its instructions communicated to British Ambassador. Mr. Layard enquired if there was any objection to passage of this Mission through India, adding that the above information and enquiry had been telegraphed by him to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On 10th instant Viceroy replied to Mr. Layard that, although in his opinion the proposed Mission would be advantageous to our present critical relations with Kabul, the answer to his enquiry depended on the policy of Her Majesty's Government; but that if the Mission came through India, we would guarantee its unimpeded and unostentatious passage to Afghan frontier. On the same day, Viceroy telegraphed to Your Lordship substance of Mr. Layard's message and his reply thereto, adding that whilst decision rested with Her Majesty's Government, he considered Government of India entitled to express its opinion, and pointing out advantages of Mission to Indian interests and danger of prohibiting it. To this telegram no reply was received from you. On 14th instant, Ambassador informed Viceroy by telegraph that guaranteed passage of Mission through India was gratefully acknowledged by Porte, and further explained the character and object of it. It was legitimately presumed by Viceroy and colleagues, to whom Mr. Layard's telegrams of the 8th and 14th had been submitted, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who was known by us to be in telegraphic communication with Her



Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs on this subject, was acting with cognizance and approval of Her Majesty's Government. Your omission to answer Viceroy's telegrams repeating the substance of those received from Mr. Layard was not otherwise explicable. In this behalf Viceroy telegraphed to you on the 19th instant substance of information last received from Mr. Layard, and explained how the Mission would be treated by the Government of India. This telegram also remained unnoticed. On 20th instant, we received from Mr. Layard a telegram, dated 19th instant, informing us that the Mission would start for Bombay in a week, and similar telegraphic information had already been published by Reuter, and read by all our Mahomedan subjects, feudatories, and allies. Your telegram of the 21st instant now disapproves Viceroy's action which was fully reported to you in his telegrams of the 11th and 19th instant, and orders Viceroy to inform Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that the passage of the Mission through British territory is forbidden by Her Majesty's Government. Viceroy has obeyed these orders, but is requested by his whole Council to convey to you the following expression of the Government of India's opinion on the subject of them:—

“ ‘The strong excitement which has recently and rapidly arisen amongst our Mahomedan subjects and feudatories, is only not dangerous so long as it is free from suspicion that we are influenced in favour of Russian aggression on the Sultan. This excitement daily grows more intense, and is not without considerable influence over the rest of the population, more especially the Hindu Chiefs. In face of these facts, the Government of India is unanimously of opinion that passage of Mission through India cannot safely be refused. Such refusal would infallibly be regarded by the whole Mahomedan community, including our Mahomedan soldiery, as a hostile act to Turkey, dictated by fear of Russia.

“ ‘On the other hand, if complained of by Russia as an unneutral act, the Government of India is prepared to prove that it is fully justified by the serious character of her hostile proceedings against us in Afghanistan.

“ ‘We therefore deem it our duty to protest against the orders addressed to us in your telegram of the 21st. Those orders imperil the peace of the country, if not the safety of the Empire, for which we cannot hold ourselves responsible if they are insisted on. We earnestly hope they will at once be reconsidered by Her Majesty's Government, otherwise the situation will be most critical.’ ”

It is sufficient to observe here that Her Majesty's Government, after considering a telegram from Mr. Layard which showed that he had informed the Sultan that the Turkish Envoy would be permitted to pass through India, came to the conclusion that the consent could not now be withdrawn, without discourtesy to the Sultan. Accordingly they cancelled their previous orders, but desired that the utmost care should be taken to prevent identifying Her Majesty's Government with the Mission. The Envoy was not to have an official reception, and no facilities were to be allowed him whilst in British territory of communicating with Chiefs or others beyond the frontier.

The Government of India expressed their satisfaction with these instructions. No attentions beyond the ordinary courtesies and hospitalities invariably shown to Agents of Foreign Governments passing through India would be permitted. The usual salute would be accorded, for its omission would excite unfavorable remark.

The temporary misunderstanding between the Home and Indian Governments regarding this Mission was elucidated by subsequent despatches. It will be convenient to dispose of the matter here before continuing the relation of the Envoy's proceedings. On the 8th June\* Mr. Layard telegraphed the same information to the English Foreign Office which he had sent to the Viceroy. Lord Salisbury was thereupon consulted. With regard to the Consulate at Peshawur, His Lordship held† that there was no occasion for sanctioning it. It was not the practice to permit a Consul to act in any town in India except where the community he represented had important commercial interests. Moreover, up to the present time, no Consul had been appointed to any inland Indian town. Touching the Mission to Kabul, His Lordship said—

“ It has been the rule of the British Government to discourage the reception at Kabul of the representative of any other power, and it appears to Lord Salisbury that to acquiesce in the appointment of a Turkish Envoy would be, in some degree, to associate Her Majesty's Government with the object of his Mission. As that object may be assumed to be the creation of a state of war between Russia and Afghanistan, it does not seem that the despatch of the Mission could properly be encouraged, whilst Great Britain is at peace with Russia.

“ It must, at the same time, be borne in mind that a war between Russia and Afghanistan would have this inconvenience—that, if the Afghans were defeated, Her Majesty's Govern-

Telegram from Secretary of State, dated 24th June 1877.

Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 1541P., dated 29th June.

Secret despatch, No. 46, 21st June.  
\* Telegram from Mr. Layard, to Lord Derby, No. 147, dated 8th June.

† Sir L. Mallet's letter, dated 14th June.

ment might be compelled, for their protection, to take part in it, under circumstances and at a time which, in reference to the general policy of Great Britain, might be highly embarrassing. Lord Salisbury cannot, therefore, advise that the Sultan should be encouraged to send such a Mission as is proposed, or that any promise of acquiescence on the part of the Indian authorities should be held out to Her Majesty."

In accordance with this opinion, Mr. Layard was instructed on the 20th June not to encourage the proposed Mission, or hold out any promise of acquiescence in it on the part of the Indian authorities. But Mr. Layard had already received, on the 11th June, the Viceroy's guarantee of an unimpeded passage through India. It would be very awkward and produce a bad effect to inform the Sultan of the orders now issued by Her Majesty's Government. He, therefore, applied for further instructions.

English Foreign Office telegram, dated 20th June.

From Mr. Layard to English Foreign Office, dated 21st June.

Upon this Lord Salisbury advised as follows:—

"Lord Salisbury gathers from these papers that Mr. Layard, acting upon an authority which he states to have been conveyed to him from the Viceroy of India, has not thought it necessary to wait for any further intimation of the views of Her Majesty's Government, but has at once assured the Sultan that the proposed Mission will be permitted to pass through British Indian territory; and that the Sultan, relying upon that assurance, has selected the Envoy, and has so expedited the preparations for his departure, that he is under orders to sail on Wednesday next.

"His Lordship is convinced that Mr. Layard, in assuming that he has received such an authority, must have misinterpreted the telegrams of the Viceroy; for Lord Lytton would not have authorized assurances to the Sultan, which it was beyond the competence of his Government to convey.

"The mistake, however, wherever the responsibility for it may lie, does not appear to Lord Salisbury to be now capable of a remedy. It would scarcely be courteous to the Sultan, and might be misinterpreted by His Imperial Majesty if the consent of Her Majesty's Government formally communicated by the Ambassador were to be withdrawn on the eve of the Envoy's departure. His Lordship therefore recommends that the order already given to Mr. Layard be withdrawn, and that the Envoy be allowed to sail.

"Instructions will be sent to the Government of India to give passage to the Envoy through Her Majesty's dominions, but to abstain from any action that may identify Her Majesty's Government with his Mission, or give the sanction of their authority to the advice which he may be instructed to offer to the Amir."

Lord Salisbury, in sending the correspondence to the Government of India, addressed them as follows:—

"Your Excellency will perceive from these papers that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is under the impression that he was authorized by you to promise to the Sultan that the proposed Envoy should be permitted to pass through the territories of Her Majesty. I am well aware that, in assuming Your Excellency to have given this assurance without the authority of Her Majesty's Government, Mr. Layard must have given to some language used by Your Excellency a wider meaning than it was intended to bear; and Your Excellency's telegram received here on the 24th instant fully explains the part taken by Your Excellency in this transaction.

"In consequence of this mistaken impression, Mr. Layard, before the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to pursue the opposite policy reached him, had entered into engagements with the Sultan, from which it is now difficult, without discourtesy to His Imperial Majesty, to retreat. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government have come reluctantly to the conclusion that their former orders must be cancelled, and that the Envoy must be permitted to pass through the Indian territories of Her Majesty.

"It is possible that the object of the proposed Mission is to attempt to persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to undertake hostile operations against Russia, or at all events that such may be its practical issue. As Her Majesty is neutral in the present conflict, Her Government can give no countenance, direct or indirect, to such an undertaking; and they could not view without dissatisfaction any action on the part of the Amir, which might, if he met with a reverse, place the integrity of his own dominions in peril. I have, therefore, on their behalf, to impress earnestly upon Your Excellency the necessity of abstaining yourself, and compelling those under your orders to abstain, from any proceeding which shall tend, in the eyes of the natives of India or of Afghanistan, to identify Her Majesty's Government with the Envoy of the Sultan. He should be received with ordinary civility, and every precaution should, of course, be taken to ensure his unmolested passage through Her Majesty's dominions; but his reception at places through which he may pass should not be allowed to assume in any degree an official character, nor should any facilities be given to him for communication with Chiefs, or others, beyond the frontier.

"In this, as in all other matters, I am convinced that Your Excellency will carefully enforce the observance, in spirit as well as in letter, of the policy of neutrality which Her Majesty's Government have announced.

"I need hardly call your attention to the probability that, if the Envoy is permitted to remain in any of the towns where a powerful Mussulman population exists, popular demonstrations will result, which may involve hazard to the public peace as well as be likely to give a false impression of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. Your Excellency will best avoid this danger by arranging that the Envoy should rest at places where the Mussulman element is not predominant in the population."

In due course Mr. Layard received fresh instructions from the English Foreign Office. In acknowledging them, he explained\* that he had received no answer to his telegram mentioning the Sultan's desire to know whether the English Cabinet would object to the Kabul Mission. He had also informed Lord Derby that he had telegraphed the Sultan's wishes to the Viceroy. When, therefore, three days afterwards, the Viceroy's guarantee of a passage through India arrived, Mr. Layard informed the Sultan accordingly. But he had also explained that, under present circumstances, no public honors could be paid, and had, subsequently, made it clearly understood that for various reasons the establishment of a Consulate at Peshawur could not be permitted.

### 143. The story of the Mission resumed. Views of the Turkish Government regarding the object of the Mission. Instructions given to the Envoy.—To return to the proceedings of the Mission. On the 19th June, Mr. Layard reported that Ahmet Khulussi

Effendi, brother of the late Grand Vizier Shirvanizada Mehemet Ali Rusdi Pasha, had been appointed Envoy, and advised that all attentions compatible with British neutrality should be shown him. It was probable that the Turkish Consul-General at Bombay would accompany the Envoy to the frontier.

Early in July, shortly before his departure from Constantinople, the Envoy called on Mr. Layard, and under orders from the Sultan proceeded to explain fully the object of the Mission, and to assure him that any influence it might have with the Amir would be exercised in favour of British interests. Mr. Layard wrote—

"The Envoy said that the Sultan was very desirous that Afghanistan should maintain its independence as a Mahomedan power, and should not allow Russian intrigues to draw it into hostility with England. His Majesty knew that the aim of Russia's policy was to weaken, as much as possible, the Mussulman States of Central Asia, in order that they might, sooner or later, become her prey. The surest mode of effecting this in Afghanistan would be by causing differences between that country and England. If Afghanistan were once brought under Russian influence, there would be no longer any independent Mahomedan State in Central Asia. It was consequently, His Majesty believed, as much to the interests of England as it was to that of Islamism, of which he was the head, to prevent Afghanistan falling into the hands of Russia. His Envoy would be instructed to make the Amir understand this, and to prevail upon him to maintain the most friendly relations with the Indian Government. This, Ahmet Khulussi Effendi assured me, he should endeavour to do."

A copy of the instructions furnished to the Envoy was handed to Mr. Layard. The text of these will be found in Appendix No. XXIX. They disclosed an apparent intention on the part of the Turkish Government to leave Ahmed Effendi, a member of the Mission, at Peshawur after the Envoy had left India. This was a revival in another form of the proposal to establish a Turkish

Consulate at Peshawur, which the British Government had declined. Lord Salisbury, † therefore, directed that the assumption by Ahmed Effendi of a diplomatic character should not in any case be recognized.

144. Opinion of the Khedive regarding the Mission.—The Envoy started from Constantinople on the 12th July, a week later than had been expected. The party consisted altogether of four persons, viz., the Envoy, Syud Ahmet Khulussi Effendi; Ahmed Mundi Effendi; Bala Effendi, Private Secretary; Ibrahim Effendi, Accountant and Treasurer. At Bombay, the Mission was joined by Hussein Effendi, the Turkish Consul-General, and there was besides in the suite of the Envoy a person called Syud Lall Shah.

On his way through Egypt the Envoy had an interview with the Khedive. The latter's opinion regarding the Mission, as reported by Mr. Vivian, Consul-General in Egypt, is worthy of notice :—

"The opinion that His Highness expressed to me about it was that it was rather *mou-tarde après diner*, and that no practical result was to be expected from it. It was all very well, he said, appealing in the hour of need to Mussulman sympathies, and inviting their help on the ground of community of faith; but religious feelings were not the only springs that governed men's actions, and he doubted if a people so far away would, on this ground alone, and on a sudden appeal from the Sultan, set aside all other interests and court serious dangers to respond to his appeal.

"If the Porte really desired to cultivate friendly relations with the Mussulmans in Central Asia, which it might utilize in case of need, it should pave the way to it by maintaining permanent diplomatic intercourse with them, and not attempt simply to use them as tools which it would very probably cast away whenever the hour of danger was past."

**145. Preparations for the reception of the Mission in India. Arrival of the Envoy in India.**—Due intimation was conveyed to the Government of Bombay of the expected arrival of a Turkish Mission to Kabul, and of its objects, but the arrangements for the Envoy's reception were entrusted to Major Bradford. The instructions issued for his guidance will be found in Appendix No. XXX. The principle upon which they were framed was that nothing should be done to identify the British Government with the Mission; subject to this condition, no suitable courtesy or hospitality was to be omitted. It may be mentioned here that at the request of the Turkish Consul-General at Bombay, Major Sandeman forwarded to Kandahar a letter addressed to the Amir by the Consul-General, asking His Highness to arrange for the journey of the Envoy between Peshawur and Kabul. This letter reached Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan at Kandahar on the 23rd July, and was immediately forwarded to Kabul.

On the 9th August the Mission landed at Bombay without inconvenient demonstration. After a stay of two days, during which the Envoy received no Mahomedan addresses, and declined all interviews with newspaper correspondents, the Mission started for the frontier in personal charge of Colonel Disbrowe. The Turkish Consul-General at Bombay also accompanied the party. They reached Allahabad at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 12th, and, starting again the same evening, arrived at Rawul Pindee on the 16th, having rested for a few hours *en route* at Lahore and Jhelum. At Pindee the Envoy suffered from slight dysentery, and medical attendance was provided for him.

**146. Deputation of two members of the Mission to the Akhund of Swat. Account of their proceedings.**—On arriving at Rawul Pindee, the Envoy expressed a wish to depute two of his followers to visit the Akhund of Swat, and to await their return to Peshawur before proceeding himself to Kabul. He asked the Commissioner of Rawul Pindee to forward two letters—one to the Akhund, and the other to the Hakim of Jalalabad. This request was complied with, nor did the Government of India offer any objection to the proposed deputation to the Akhund.

Subsequently Colonel Disbrowe wrote as follows regarding the objects of the deputation and the persons comprising it :—

From Colonel Disbrowe, No. 1, dated 18th August 1877.

"Two days ago, the Turkish Consul-General took me aside, and explained to me that it was the intention of the Envoy to depute Ahmed Effendi to the Akhund immediately; that Ahmed Effendi would be the bearer of letters, presents, and decorations from the Porte; that the purport of the letters was as follows :—

"The Porte expects you (Akhund) to exercise your influence to induce the Amir, and all his subjects everywhere, not to be unfriendly towards England. You should add that you yourself decline to be unfriendly with England. England, Turkey, and Kabul being one, Kabul, which lies between Russia and India, will thus not be troubled by Russia, and Russian designs on India will be frustrated."

"A word ere I close regarding the parties to be deputed.

"I am not certain respecting Ahmed Effendi. Unless I err, however, he was originally a Russian subject, but during the Crimean war, voluntarily exiled himself with family to Constantinople, in which city he has since been residing; his feelings must, therefore, be anti-Russian.

"Lall Shah, who accompanies him, was born at a village called Pindee Gabe on the borders of the Rawul Pindee District. He went to Peshawur and married, thence to Kabul, from Kabul to Constantinople, where he resided for about eight years. He has now accompanied the Envoy, and is *the* wily man of the Mission. What he says and does is watched, and will be reported in due course."

An account of Syud Lall Shah and of some of his proceedings will be found in Appendix No. XXXI.

The Envoy's delegates left Pindee on the 19th and reached Hoti Murdan on the 20th August. But on arriving at Swat, the Akhund, resisting all the persuasion of his son, Mian Gul, declined to receive them, and refused their presents. The Mirakhor, it was said, had recently visited the Akhund, and this treatment of the deputation was possibly due to his influence. On their return journey, the delegates were protected from personal violence by Sherdil Khan of Aladand. They arrived at Murdan on the 27th, where Ahmed Effendi remained, in case a fresh visit to Swat should be deemed necessary. Lall Shah returned to Pindee, where the Envoy was becoming somewhat impatient, no answer to his letter to the Amir having been received. According to later intelligence, there were signs that the Akhund regretted his conduct towards the deputation, which was disapproved by his warmest followers. To his disciples he explained that it would not have been becoming that he, an ascetic, should receive a purely political deputation. Had its mission been a religious one, the case would have been different. Besides, the Turkish Envoy had come accredited to the Amir, and it was improper to send a deputation to the Akhund before the proper business of the Mission had been accomplished. If the negotiations with the Amir proved satisfactory and advantageous to the cause of Islam, the Akhund would gladly receive another deputation, accept their offerings, give his blessings, prayers, and good wishes in return.

**147. The Envoy's journey to, and reception at, Kabul. Brief account of his conversations in Durbar with the Amir.—**  
The expected reply from Kabul was not much longer delayed. It reached the Envoy on the morning of the 28th August, and contained an invitation from the Amir to visit Kabul.

Preparations, it was known, had already been made for his reception. Shah Ali Mard Khan (Governor of Jalalabad), accompanied by 100 horsemen, had arrived at Dhakka on the 17th August *en route* for Jamrud and had made frequent inquiries regarding the Envoy's proceedings.

On the morning of the 30th the Envoy reached Peshawur, having been met by the Deputy Commissioner about two miles from the city. He requested that during his absence at Kabul, Ahmed Effendi might be permitted to remain at Peshawur, so as to enable him to maintain telegraphic communication with Constantinople. This was agreed to.

Arrangements were accordingly made to provide him with quarters in cantonments, and an allowance of Rupees 15 per diem was sanctioned for his maintenance. The Envoy was detained at Peshawur by ill-health until the 1st September, when he started for Kabul under escort, as far as the frontier, of the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Cavagnari. He reached Jamrud the same day, and, crossing the frontier, joined the Afghan camp on the 2nd in better health. He was received by Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Shahghassi, and Shah Mard Khan, in whose company he passed a sociable evening. The next day he reached Loargai, where he found some valuable horses sent by the Amir for his use. He arrived at Dhakka on the 4th, and was received by General Ghulam Haidar Khan, and a salute of 16 guns. He stopped one night at Jalalabad, and proceeded thence to Kabul, where he arrived on the 8th. His treatment was courteous and hospitable throughout. On reaching Butkhak he was met by the Amir's troops, the Mustaufi, and the heir-apparent, and



escorted to the city. In Kabul, a special camp had been prepared for him, which was surrounded by troops, and where he was received by the Amir in person under a salute of 17 guns.

On the day the Envoy arrived, the Amir despatched a special messenger to the Akhund of Swat. He asked advice in the event of proposals being made for a British alliance and for undertaking hostilities against Russia. The Akhund is said to have replied that he was an ascetic, who cared only for the welfare of Islam. As regards a British alliance, the Amir had better study his own interests. In the event of the Amir undertaking a holy war against infidels, he might count upon the Akhund's sympathy and influence.

On Friday, the 14th September, the Envoy attended public prayers in Mohabat Khan's mosque. The service was conducted by Mulla Gulam Jilam and his son, leading followers of the Akhund. At the close of the service, the usual prayers were offered for the supremacy of Islam, the defeat of the Russians, and the safety and victory of the Sultan. The following is

• From Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 24th September.

an account of a conversation in Durbar between the Envoy and the Amir\* :—

"In Durbar His Excellency the Turkish Envoy, in answer to a question of the Amir's enquiring the real cause of the present war, explained that 'the Russians are an avaricious, lying, and deceitful race. On four different occasions they had violated their Treaties with Turkey, and commenced hostilities; on each occasion they had been repulsed and defeated. Now, believing themselves to be invincible, they have, in the most unprovoked, uncalled for and perfidious manner, regardless of all Treaty engagements, commenced hostilities with the intention of subjugating and annexing Turkey. By the mercy and grace of God, they had hitherto met with a continuous succession of defeats. God willing, they would receive what they deserved. The Russians are not to be relied upon; they are lying tyrants, and friends only in self-interests; having once gained their object, they disown acquaintance.' Amir is reported to have remarked: 'Yes, such is the way of the world. Friendship is claimed only when there is an object in view.'"

†From Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 27th September.

A later account said†—

"There is every reason to believe that His Excellency the Envoy has fully explained the object of his mission to the Amir, and urged him to form a Mahomedan combination on his western border, preliminary to openly declaring against Russia. The Amir is said to have replied that the matter was an impossibility; the people of Central Asia were not a warlike race, that he himself had not the means or the money for the undertaking, and that in case he had nothing would have prevented him from attacking the English, who had violated their promises and encroached upon his prescriptive rights; whereas the Russians had in no way injured or molested him."

**148. Return of the Turkish Envoy to India. Information as to the result attained.**—On the 26th October the Turkish Envoy arrived at Peshawur on his return from Kabul. Major Cavagnari entertained him during his stay, but was unable to gather much information owing to the Envoy's very reserved attitude. It appeared, however, that the Envoy had done his utmost in offering advice to the Amir in British interests, and that he expected good results from his mission. He stated that he had ascertained three things—*1stly*, affection of the Amir for the Sultan; *2ndly*, his attachment to the English; *3rdly*, his dislike of the Russians. No Afghan agents were accompanying him to Constantinople, but probably some would follow hereafter. He brought no communication from the Amir for the British Government, but had with him letters for the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Major Cavagnari's own impression was, judged from the Envoy's marked reticence, that the Turkish Mission had not been very successful; its members, however, were favourably impressed with the Amir.

Subsequently Major Cavagnari reported the following information as having been volunteered by the Turkish Consul-General:—

"At first Kabul Amir distrusted mission, and said it was sent by the British Government. (After notice) change in the Amir's temper; some days afterwards presents and letters were delivered, the one from the Sheikh-ul-Islam, with denunciation, was also presented. Envoy explained to the Amir the grasping nature of Russia, and that if he did not court alliance with the English, his territory would soon be absorbed by Russia. He proposed that Turkey and Afghanistan should divide Persia, and that the Amir should extend his rule over Bokhara. Consul-General said that the occupation of Quetta is the only obstacle, Amir doing anything

that is required; he has a great avarice for territory, and wants Biluchistan to be considered his own. Letters sent by the Amir are formal ones to the Sultan; the one to the Grand Vizier contains Amir's grievances and proposul. Consul-General said that the Envoy will not communicate in India, but will explain everything to Mr. Layard at Constantinople."

In Appendix No. XXXII will be found an account prepared by Syud Lall Shah of what passed at the interviews between the Turkish Envoy and the Amir.

**149. Departure of the Envoy from India. Thanks of the Sultan of Turkey for the manner in which the Envoy had been treated.**—On the 20th November the Turkish Envoy sailed from Bombay for Aden and Jedda; orders were given to the British Resident at the former place to salute the Envoy, and to accord him a courteous but unofficial reception. The Sultan of Turkey informed Mr. Layard that he was much gratified with the treatment of his Envoy by the Viceroy of India, and desired that his warm thanks might be conveyed to His Excellency and to Her Majesty's Government. These thanks were repeated by the Grand Vizier after hearing from the Envoy that the latter was on his way back to Constantinople.

**150. Interrogations by the Russian Government in respect to the Mission of the Turkish Envoy.**—The proceedings narrated in the foregoing paragraphs did not escape the notice of the Russian Government. Early in September M. de Giers took occasion to broach the subject in a conversation with Lord A. Loftus, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He said that the Imperial Government had received information of the Envoy's deputation and of his passage through India, the object of his mission being to preach a religious crusade amongst the Mussulman population of Central Asia, and through the Amir of Afghanistan to induce the Amir of Bokhara to excite the populations of Central Asia to revolt against Russia.\*

\* Possibly M. de Giers was referring to the Mission of Haji Muhomed Hassan, the Turkish Agent, who brought letters from the Sultan to the Amirs of Afghanistan and Bokhara.—T. C. P.

The Amir of Bokhara, His Excellency observed, had proved a faithful ally to Russia, and the Imperial Government placed full confidence in him. But difficulties might arise in consequence of religious agitation between Bokhara and Afghanistan, which might compromise the friendly relations between those rulers. It was therefore of importance that seasonable advice should be given to the Amir of Afghanistan to abstain from any action which could endanger the peaceful relations of the two States.

M. de Giers added that General Kauffmann had been instructed to be guided by the arrangements entered into between Great Britain and Russia in regard to Afghanistan, and to remain strictly within the limits of those arrangements.

Lord A. Loftus merely replied that he would report M. de Giers' observations to Her Majesty's Government. In concurrence with the Secretary of State for India, Lord Derby replied to Lord A. Loftus that, at the request of the Porte, a Turkish Envoy to Afghanistan had been allowed to pass through Indian territory, but that Her Majesty's Government had no reason to suppose that the object of his mission was to preach a crusade in Central Asia, and that they would continue, as they had hitherto done, to use such influence as they possessed with the Amir of Afghanistan to induce him to maintain peace with Bokhara.

The above proceedings having been communicated to the Government of India, they replied in the despatch cited in the margin that they were not in possession of any information as to the objects of the Turkish Mission to Kabul beyond that contained in the instructions given to the Envoy by the Porte, a copy of which had been furnished to them. While they had accorded to the Mission the civilities usually granted in such cases to the Envoys of friendly powers, they had carefully observed the wishes of Her Majesty's Government as to the preservation of a strict neutrality. In their opinion the language of Lord Derby's despatch to Lord A. Loftus was wisely guarded, both as to the extent of British

Despatch, No. 51, dated 28th December 1877.

influence over the Amir of Kabul, and as to the desire to restrain any aggressive tendencies on his part. It should, however, be borne in mind that experience of the past few years showed that influence to be but feeble, and that there existed at present no means of increasing it.

With regard to the instructions, said by M. de Giers to have been given to General Kaufmann that he should be guided by the arrangements entered into between the two Governments, they referred Her Majesty's Government to Government of India letter, No. 41, dated 18th September 1876, and subsequent despatches, drawing attention to the proceedings on the part of General Kaufmann and other Russian officials, which appeared to be a serious contravention of the understanding come to between the English and Russian Cabinets on the subject of Afghanistan.

**151. Ahmed Khulussi's official report of his Mission.**—In July 1878 Sir A. Layard furnished Her Majesty's Government with the annexed report submitted by Ahmed Khulussi Effendi of his Mission to Kabul. The Mission was generally considered by the Porte a failure, and Ahmed Khulussi Effendi was not well received on his arrival at Constantinople, which had been much delayed by a pilgrimage to Mecca. He had not seen the Sultan. In Sir A. Layard's opinion the choice of this person, a Mullah, with no knowledge of the customs or languages of Europe, or of the usages of diplomacy, was an unfortunate one. He had not the necessary abilities or qualities for his task, and an additional blunder had been made in sending Lall Shah with him, who appeared to have betrayed the Envoy, and to have done his best to frustrate the objects of the Mission.

Report by **KHULUSSI EFFENDI** respecting his Mission to Kabul.

“ Dans un Rapport qu'il soumet à la Sublime Porte, Ahmed Khouloussi Effendi rend compte du résultat de la mission qu'il a été chargé de remplir dans l'Afghanistan, et des divers incidents qui l'ont signalée tant au cours de son voyage que pendant son séjour dans la ville de Caboul, capitale de ce pays. Après y avoir mentionné les différents télégrammes qu'il a déjà adressés à la Sublime Porte relativement à sa mission, il poursuit en ces termes :—

“ Comme il a été expliqué en détail dans mes instructions écrites portant la date du 1er Redjib, 1294, la Russie, ennemi de la religion Musulmane, ayant entrepris, il y a quelques années, une expédition dans l'Asie Centrale, et après y avoir conquis plusieurs Etats Musulmans, étant parvenu jusqu'aux frontières de l'Afghanistan, dans le but de mettre la main sur toutes ces contrées en faisant disparaître tout le monde Musulman qui les peuple, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a pensé qu'il n'y avait aucune autre voie à suivre pour s'élever contre une telle conquête que celle de l'union et de l'entente mutuelle. Cette Puissance étant en guerre aujourd'hui avec le Gouvernement Impérial, l'occasion se présente d'elle même de tâcher à amener cette entente et cette union contre tous les Musulmans des Etats sus-mentionnés.

“ Ma mission consistait donc à faire des démarches dans ce sens de la part, de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, Khalife Suprême de tous les Musulmans, auprès de l'Emir de l'Afghanistan. Dans l'ensemble des mesures à prendre à cet effet, la première et la plus importante, aux yeux, du Gouvernement Impérial, était celle qui consistait à vivre présentement en parfait accord avec l'Angleterre, Puissance amie et alliée de la Sublime Porte, et voisine, du côté des Indes, de l'Afghanistan.

“ La seconde partie de ma mission se rapportait à la Perse. J'avais pour tâche de m'informer auprès de l'Emir, si, dans le cas où cet Etat, qui était depuis longtemps gagné à l'influence Russe, viendrait à prendre une attitude hostile envers la Sublime Porte durant la guerre actuelle, il lui était possible d'aviser aux moyens propres à le tenir en respect.

“ A cause d'une indisposition de l'Emir, il ne m'a été donné d'avoir ma première entrevue avec lui que le quinzième jour de mon arrivée à Caboul. Au jour fixé, je me suis rendu à son habitation, et je lui ai remis la lettre autographe dont j'étais porteur, les lettres de leurs Altesses le Grand Vézir et le Chéikh-ul-Islam, les décorations et les présents de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Aali Khan m'a reçu avec une parfaite bienveillance, et un contentement visible ; entrant en matière, je lui ai exposé le but de la mission qui m'amenait auprès de lui, et j'ai eu soin de développer longuement et en détail les instructions qui m'avaient été données.”

“ Ce que j'ai pu relever de tout ce que l'Emir a dit en réponse, c'est qu'il ne pensait pas qu'une telle démarche de sa part auprès des populations des contrées avoisinantes pût produire un résultat satisfaisant en raison du désaccord qui a toujours régné parmi eux ; que déjà, bien avant l'expédition des Russes dans l'Asie Centrale, prévoyant leurs entreprises éventuelles, il en avait prévenu les Chefs des pays menacés, les exhortant à l'union, sans qu'il fût assez heureux pour se faire entendre ; que si aujourd'hui il se préoccupait sans relâche de la réorganisation militaire du pays et de ses approvisionnements en munitions, c'était dans le seul but

d'opposer une énergique défense contre celui des trois grands Etats, ses voisins, qui se serait avisé de marcher sur l'Afghanistan ; que parmi ces trois Puissances, à savoir, l'Angleterre, la Russie, et la Perse, celle qu'il redoutait le plus était l'Angleterre, qui déjà avait occupé une partie des territoires de Khiva, dépendant de l'Afghanistan, et qu'il lui était de toute impossibilité de prendre présentement une attitude hostile contre la Russie. En ce qui concerne la Perse, il a été d'avis que 30,000 hommes, fournis deux tiers par l'Afghanistan, et un tiers par la Sublime Porte, suffiraient, et au-delà pour la tenir en respect.

“ Lors de mon audience de congé, Aali Khan s'est reporté encore sur le compte de l'Angleterre, et m'a fait par des vœux (?) qu'il formait de voir la Sublime Porte se servir de ses bons offices auprès de cette Puissance, puis-qu'elle était en parfaite entente avec celle-ci, pour l'amener à retirer les forces qu'elle avait concentrées sur les frontières de l'Afghanistan. Il souhaitait voir mon départ s'effectuer un moment plus tôt pour travailler dans ce sens auprès du Gouvernement Impérial.”

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER VIII.

*Appendix No. XXVIII.—Information relating to the first Turkish Agent.*

*Appendix No. XXIX.—Copy of the instructions furnished to the Envoy by the Turkish Government.*

*Appendix No. XXX.—Instructions with reference to the reception and journey through India of the Turkish Envoy.*

*Appendix No. XXXI.—Syud Lall Shah.*

*Appendix No. XXXII.—Translation of an account of the interviews of the Turkish Mission with the Amir of Kabul during the months of September and October 1877, prepared by Syud Lall Shah.*

## CHAPTER IX.

THE RUSSIAN MISSION TO KABUL—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMIR FOR THE RECEPTION OF A BRITISH MISSION—THE DECLARATION OF WAR—THE TREATY OF GANDAMAK.

**152. News of the intended deputation of a Russian Envoy to Kabul and of the movement of Russian troops towards the Afghan frontier.**—On the 5th June 1878 Major Cavagnari telegraphed that a report had reached him of intimation having been given to the Amir by a Russian Native Agent at Kabul that a European Russian Envoy of equal status to the Governor-General of Tashkend would shortly visit Kabul. Further, that the Governor-General had written to the Amir to the same effect, adding that the Envoy must be received as an Ambassador deputed by the Emperor of Russia.

A son of the Khan of Khiva was to be employed with 800 horsemen to protect the working parties on both sides of the road about to be constructed between Khiva and Charjui and thence to Akcha in Afghan Turkistan, and to accompany the Envoy to Kabul. On receipt of this intimation the Amir had summoned a council of the leading Chiefs to deliberate whether he should join Russia or England.

The Secretary of State was informed of this report, which, it was added, required verification.

On the 29th June Major Cavagnari telegraphed that a merchant at Peshawur had been warned by his firm at Bokhara of the arrival of 30,000 Russian troops at Karshi, and advised to consign no more goods until further instructions. A letter from Kabul received at Peshawur corroborated this information. It mentioned the arrival at Kabul on the 13th June of a Russian Agent, who had informed the Amir of the intention of the Russians to establish cantonments at Shirabad and at the ferries of Kilif and Karki on the Oxus, all which places lie on the direct route from Tashkend to Kabul. A cantonment at Kilif would bring the Russians in immediate contact with Afghanistan. In reporting these matters to the Secretary of State, attention was drawn to the cumulative evidence arising out of the concurrent testimony as to the Russian movements which could not therefore be entirely disregarded, although it was evident that the numbers of the troops had been greatly exaggerated.

According to Chetan Shah, a British Native Assistant Surgeon, who had for a long time been private physician to the Amir and who arrived at Peshawur about the 21st July, the Russian pressure on the Amir and the preparations across the Oxus were true. General Kaufmann, he said, had arrived with troops at Karki on his way to see the Amir. The Afghan officials had tried, without success, to stop him at the Oxus, and the Amir had thereupon given orders to abstain from interference with the Russian officers. A further examination of Chetan Shah elicited the following information :—That he had heard the Amir tell his Ministers in Durbar on the 7th July that His Highness had received a report from Balkh that Kaufmann, or an officer of equal rank to him, from Tashkend, had crossed the Oxus and was on his way to Kabul, and refused to be stopped. Major Cavagnari was inclined to regard Chetan Shah's news as the old story already reported regarding an officer of rank being about to visit Kabul; and he thought it improbable that Kaufmann himself would come; more likely it would be one of his officers. Judging from the movement from Chikishliar, Major Cavagnari conjectured that the Russians were endeavouring to persuade the Amir to give them a right of way through north-west Afghanistan towards Merv, and, failing, would probably commence to open up direct communication from Charjui and Karki.

**153. Arrival of the Russian Envoy at Kabul.**—The first intimation of the actual arrival of the Russian Envoy was received at Simla on the 29th



July. He was said to be accompanied by an escort variously reported at 200 to 400 horsemen, and it could not be ascertained whether he wore European or Native costume. In a day or two this news was confirmed. Three special messengers, who arrived at Peshawur on the 30th July having left Kabul nine days before, reported the arrival of three Russians in European costume and accompanied by Kossack and Usbeg horsemen. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan had gone out to meet them. The chief of the Mission spoke Persian fluently, but his name had not transpired; he was called Goberna, which might indicate that he was General Kaufmann, whose official title was "Gubernat." One of the messengers spoke of the chief as "Deputy Governor-General," which seemed to identify him

Later on in this Chapter I have given a brief description of this Russian Mission compiled from papers subsequently received by the Government of India.

with General Abramoff, Governor of Tashkend. A letter received by Sirdar Jelaludin, one of the refugee Barakzye Sirdars, mentioned General Abramoff by name as chief of the Mission. Another person arriving from Kabul (1st August) stated that a salute had been fired in honor of the Russian Envoy who was spoken of as the "General Sahib." Even up to this point the Government of India were disinclined to place absolute reliance upon the reports which had reached them. Major Cavagnari was exerting himself to procure evidence which should be perfectly trustworthy of the presence of an European Russian officer at Kabul, although the information received from many quite independent sources disposed him to accept the report as true.

#### **154. Proposal to insist on the reception by the Amir of an English Mission referred to the Secretary of State. Arrangements for the passage of Mission through the Khaibar.—**

The situation disclosed in the information summarized in the preceding paragraphs was obviously of a character necessitating explicit instructions from Her Majesty's Government. Accordingly on the 30th July the Viceroy telegraphed the various reports as to the expected coming of a Russian Envoy ending with the latest intelligence of his actual arrival. Lord Lytton did not believe that General Kaufmann was the Envoy, who indeed might be a Native official of rank in the Russian service, though all accounts as yet pointed to his being an European Russian officer. If the arrival of a Russian should be corroborated by later news, a further report would be sent. The telegram ended as follows:—

"It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and Amir, having regard to Russia's formal promises and Amir's refusal to receive British Mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know without delay is, whether this will be treated by Her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between Amir and Government of India. In latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British Mission. I will communicate with you further on measures which may in this contingency become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain and very injurious to our position in India."

The possibility of deputing the British Mission to Kabul without the concurrence of the Amir was then discussed. Major Cavagnari expressed his opinion that a safe passage through the Khaibar could be arranged without difficulty for a Native Envoy, but that the Afghan officials at Ali Masjid and Jelalabad would not let an European officer pass except with the Amir's permission. Possibly the Mission might, by arrangement with the Khaibar tribes and the Mohmunds, and if no warning were given, be hurried through the Pass as far as Dakka. The contingency feared by the Viceroy was that the presence of a Russian Mission at Kabul might make it necessary to insist on the reception by the Amir of an European British Mission. It was probable that instead of committing himself by an armed resistance, the Amir would represent the unsettled state of the country and possibly incite independent tribes, for whom he could not be held responsible, to obstruct the Mission, while his own officers stood aloof and offered no interposition. The question was whether under such circumstances arrangements could be made with the independent tribes to refrain from molesting the Mission. Major Cavagnari (1st August) thought that the tribes could be managed if sufficient time for secret

negotiations could be allowed. The Mir Akhor's presence at Jalalabad increased the difficulty, but if the Mission could be conveyed in safety as far as Dakka, the Amir would not be able to plead irresponsibility for any subsequent opposition.

On the 2nd August the following telegram was despatched to the Secretary of State, asking permission to treat the question in its present aspect as a

Telegram, No. 1580P., dated 2nd August 1878. local one between the Government of India and the Amir, and to commence operations by insisting

on the reception at Kabul of a suitable English Mission. If the Amir received the Mission—as was probable—an endeavour would be made to arrange with His Highness in accordance with the policy already prescribed by Her Majesty's Government. If the endeavour failed, then it would be necessary to consider what measures were necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-West Frontier of India as indicated in the last paragraph of Lord Salisbury's despatch No. 64, dated 4th October 1877 :—

“Further confirmation received of presence of Russian Mission at Kabul headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand, who is mentioned by name.

“Referring to my telegram of 30th, which may now be considered official, we desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honor, and are staying at Kabul within short distance of our frontier and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there. We would also call attention to Captain Napier's telegram forwarded yesterday, showing progress of Russian arms and influence towards Herat.

“We have further reports of Russian officers having visited and been well received at Maimana.

“To remain inactive now, will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates. It is for Her Majesty's Government to decide how the situation should be treated in reference to Russia, and we would only observe that, as regards India, we have never attached weight to diplomatic representations unless couched in terms very different from any it has hitherto been thought desirable to adopt. Such representations cannot in any circumstances now undo the accomplished fact directly affecting our position here; and, judging by past experience, will lead to no result but assurances, causing delay in action, and dangerously prolonging situation above indicated. On the other hand, we believe we could correct situation if allowed to treat it as question between us and Amir, and probably could do so without recourse to force. But we must speak plainly and decidedly and be sure of your support. Amir knows we are more powerful for good or harm in Afghanistan than Russians; but he believes Russian policy bolder and more resolute, and therefore has granted to Russia what he has refused to us.

“It appears to us that the contingency contemplated in the Secretary of State's letter, No. 2, of 2nd January 1875, has arisen; and we propose therefore, in the first place, to insist on reception of suitable British Mission at Kabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Amir, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such Mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure. We would thus endeavour to effect arrangements similar to those urged on us by Your Lordship's predecessor in despatch above quoted, but avoiding all dynastic obligations. It is possible we should find considerable difficulty in obtaining Amir's assent to such arrangements; but in hands of skilful negotiator difficulties might be overcome, and at least it is desirable to make the effort in the first instance. Amir is aware we are in position to enforce our demands, which at present Russia is not. He knows that Kandahar is completely in our power, that there is discontent and disloyalty throughout his kingdom, and that open encouragement given by us to any party opposed to him would at once involve him in desperate struggle for life. Failing in these endeavours to re-establish the preponderance of British influence in Afghanistan which we believe to be necessary for the safety of India, we shall then have to consider what measures are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of our North-West Frontier, as indicated in last paragraph of Secretary of State's despatch, No. 64, of 4th October 1877. We earnestly solicit an early reply, as situation is urgent.”

**155. Orders issued by the Secretary of State. Further information as to the proceedings of the Russian Envoy at Kabul.**—In reply (telegram dated 1st August) the Secretary of State desired that the Government of India, before insisting on the reception of the British Envoy, should make sure of the facts, and suggested a Native being sent to ascertain whether the Russians were really at Kabul, the result being telegraphed home. This course had, however, been already adopted. Much information had reached the Government of India as to the rank and title of the officer at the head of the Mission; the constitution of his escort;

and the salute and other honours accorded him at Kabul. On the 3rd August the Secretary of State telegraphed that, assuming the presence of Russian officers at Kabul to be certain, the Viceroy's proposals to insist on the reception of a British Envoy were approved. If the Amir should refuse, the Government of India were to telegraph the compulsory steps which they would desire to take. The Viceroy replied (telegram, No. 1595, dated 5th August) that no hostile action would be taken without full previous communication with Her Majesty's Government, and that no employment of force in the Khaibar was contemplated under any circumstances at present foreseen. In a later telegram, No. 1633, dated 8th August, the Government of India supported their proposal to insist on the reception of a British Mission as necessary, unless Her Majesty's Government were "prepared to see the Russian power definitely established at Kabul." Arrangements were being made for the despatch of a Mission which would be entrusted to Sir Neville Chamberlain, and these would be continued, unless orders to the contrary were received. No serious obstacles to the reception of the Mission were anticipated, but the Government of India declined to propose it to the Amir, unless they were authorized to insist on its reception. Meanwhile, on the 8th August, Major Cavagnari reported that news from Kabul up to the 30th July intimated that on the 26th the Amir had received the Russian Envoy in Durbar. The Envoy had presented two letters—one from the Governor-General of Tashkend, which the Amir gave to his Secretary to read; the other from the Czar, which the Amir kept, but did not open. Presents of some rifles and watches were given by the Envoy to the Amir and his Ministers. Again, after a review of the troops on the 2nd August the Envoy had an interview with the Amir, during which His Highness gave a written reply to the letter which the Envoy had brought. The nature of this reply was not known, but special horsemen, Russian and Afghan, immediately started with it for Russian Turkistan.

**156. Preparations for the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul. Nawab Ghulam Hassan to go in advance with letter from the Viceroy to the Amir.**—A conference was then held at Simla on the 8th August between His Excellency the Viceroy, Mr. Egerton, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and Sir S. Browne, Military Member of Council, with the result that it was determined to send a Mission under charge of Sir Neville Chamberlain to the Amir by the Khaibar Pass route. It was understood that the Mission would leave Peshawur in about a month's time. A special Native emissary was to be sent to Kabul in advance, conveying a letter from the Viceroy to the Amir, intimating that an English Mission would immediately proceed to Kabul, and asking that the necessary orders might be issued as to safe conduct and the provision of supplies. Nawab Ghulam Hassan, C.S.I., was selected for this duty, and it was intended that he should start from Peshawur about the 23rd August. The following is the text of the letter of which the Nawab was to be the bearer:—

Dated Simla, 14th August 1878.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

To—His HIGHNESS AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

"The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the course of recent events at Kabul and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan has rendered it necessary that I should communicate fully and without reserve with Your Highness upon matters of importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. For this reason I have considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who is known to Your Highness, His Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit Your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he may converse personally with Your Highness regarding these urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can be best arranged for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the preservation of friendship between the two Governments, by a full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is therefore sent in advance to Your Highness, by the hand of Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, C.S.I., a faithful and honoured Sirdar of my Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that Your Highness may be pleased

to issue commands to your Sirdars and to all other authorities in Afghanistan upon the route between Peshawur and Kabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to my Envoy, the representative of a friendly power, due safe conduct and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing with his retinue through the dominions of Your Highness.

“I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself, &c.”

**157. Postponement of Nawab Ghulam Hassan's departure on account of the death of the Heir-apparent Sirdar Abdulla Jan. Letter of condolence from the Viceroy to the Amir.**—On the 13th August Major Cavagnari wrote to the Mustaufi Habibulla informing him of Nawab Ghulam Hassan's coming. The Mustaufi replied announcing the death, on the 17th August—the very day on which Major Cavagnari's letter had reached Kabul—of the Heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdulla Jan. The Mustaufi excused himself from communicating to the Amir the Native Envoy's coming, and begged that the latter might remain at Peshawur until further instructions. This request could not be complied with. But it was decided that Ghulam Hassan should be detained a few days at Peshawur so that he might take with him a second letter from the Viceroy condoling with the Amir. Major Cavagnari also wrote to the Mustaufi expressing regret at Sirdar Abdulla Jan's death, and adding that the Viceroy's letters being very important Ghulam Hassan would start in a few days for Kabul. The following is the second letter from the Viceroy to the Amir of which Ghulam Hassan was the bearer :—

Letter to His Highness the Amir of Kabul, dated Simla, 23rd August 1878.

“After the despatch from Simla of my letter dated 14th August 1878, which Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan will deliver with this letter to Your Highness, I received from Peshawur the melancholy news that Your Highness has suffered a great affliction in the untimely death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-apparent to Kabul and its Dependencies. I desire to express to Your Highness personally the sincere regret which this intelligence has caused to me; but life and death are in the hands of God, and resignation to His will is unavoidable. In consequence of this calamity I have directed my Envoy to postpone for a short time his departure, in order that Your Highness may not be troubled by any public business, however important and urgent, until the usual period of mourning shall have elapsed.”

This letter was written at the suggestion of Major Cavagnari, who advised that such a communication, so far from being considered a departure from the attitude assumed by the British Government, would be regarded by the people of Afghanistan as a natural and becoming act. It is scarcely necessary to observe that the death of Abdulla Jan, which would at any time have been deemed an event of great moment, was specially important at the present juncture. Materials were wanting to enable a reasonable estimate to be formed of its probable effect. Among Mahomedans the period of strict mourning, during which nothing is done, lasts three days, but minor ceremonies continue over forty days, and the pretext might be seized to decline the transaction of State business for this time. On the question of Abdulla Jan's successor, pride and obstinacy might operate to prevent the Amir from selecting Yakub Khan who was still languishing in prison; in this event the next most likely candidate was Sirdar Ahmed Ali, son of the Amir's eldest son, killed at the battle of Kujhbaz in 1865. These considerations rendered necessary some change as to the date of departure of the Mission, and existing arrangements were so far altered as to defer its arrival at Kabul until the expiry of the full period of forty days' mourning.

**158. Personnel of the English Mission to Kabul and instructions to the Envoy Extraordinary. Text of letter to be delivered to the Amir by Sir Neville Chamberlain.**—Meanwhile, it was not considered expedient to relax, beyond what was decorous under the circumstances, the preparations for the departure of the Mission which it was hoped would start from Peshawur not later than the 16th September. On the 7th September a Resolution was published in the *Gazette of India* nominating Sir



N. B. Chamberlain, G.C.B., Envoy Extraordinary, and attaching the undermentioned officers on political duty and as members of the Envoy's personal staff:—

MAJOR P. L. N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

SURGEON-MAJOR W. H. BELLEW, C.S.I.

MAJOR O. B. C. ST. JOHN, R.E.

KAZI SYUD AHMED.

MAHARAJ PERTAB SING OF JODHPUR.

SIRDAR OBEDULLA KHAN OF TONK.

CAPTAIN ST. V. A. HAMMICK, Military Secretary to the Envoy.

CAPTAIN F. M. ONSLOW, A.-D.-C.

LIEUTENANT N. F. F. CHAMBERLAIN.



The instructions issued to Sir Neville were as follow:—

From the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to His Excellency Sir NEVILLE BOWLES CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., No. 1912 P., dated Simla, 7th September 1878.

"I am directed to inclose to Your Excellency a copy of a Resolution of the Government of India, appointing you to proceed upon a Special Mission to the Amir of Kabul and its Dependencies, as Envoy Extraordinary on the part of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. The officers who have been attached to your Embassy, and to your personal staff, are named in the Resolution.

"I am to request that Your Excellency will have the goodness to arrange for your departure for Kabul from Peshawur, where the requisite preparations for your equipment and escort will have been made, so soon after the 16th September as may be practicable; and that you will travel to Kabul by the route of the Khaibar Pass and Jelalabad. The Government of India have no information leading to the belief that your journey through Afghanistan may be interrupted or opposed; but it is now many years since English officers have traversed that part of the country; while political exigencies may make it necessary that you should pass the frontier before any formal reply can be received from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter which notified that an Envoy would be sent. And the same exigencies, with the general importance of your mission, require that Your Excellency should reach Kabul speedily. If, therefore, any attempt is made by the local officers or authorities upon the road to delay or dispute your passage, you will be justified in disregarding dilatory excuses, expostulations, or refusals to authorize your advance, made on the pretext that orders are wanting, or are adverse. You will assume the responsibility of overstepping such opposition, and you will continue your march, with your escort, unless you are met by serious resistance. In such a contingency His Excellency the Viceroy leaves everything to your discretion; though if arms are used or any hostile demonstration is made in earnest by persons responsible to the Kabul Government, Your Excellency is instructed to return.

"His Excellency the Viceroy has directed me to communicate to Your Excellency the following instructions for your guidance in the exercise, upon your arrival at Kabul, of the full powers with which you have been invested. It is only necessary to trace in outline the general policy of the British Government in regard to the present state of affairs in Afghanistan; and to fix the essential points toward which negotiations, if you enter into any, should be directed. All details, and all questions as to the ways and means toward the accomplishment of the general objects of your mission, are left entirely to Your Excellency's judgment and decision. Very much will obviously depend upon the actual condition of parties and internal politics at Kabul, and upon the position and behaviour of the Amir himself. Upon all these matters the information now before the Government of India is still very imperfect, and it will be part of Your Excellency's commission to ascertain fully and precisely how these matters stand.

"Your Excellency's reception in full Durbar by His Highness will afford an opportunity for declaring publicly the friendly character of your mission, and of announcing that its object is to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Amir conferred personally with the Earl of Mayo at Ambala. In the less formal interviews which may be expected to follow, Your Excellency will be able to impress upon the Amir and his Ministers the necessity of bringing to an end these misunderstandings which are leading to serious political complications, by a frank and outspoken exchange of views. The immediate cause of Your Excellency's deputation to Kabul may be stated plainly to be the arrival at the Amir's capital of a Russian Mission, and its reception by His Highness soon after his persistent refusal to receive British officers. According to international usages throughout the world, this must be regarded by the Government of India as an affront, which requires explanation and remedy. The fact (which must be known to the Amir) that the Russians have entered Afghanistan in open contravention of promises made by their Government to England, gives to their presence at Kabul a specially ambiguous import. In short, Your Excellency will show that these proceedings, and the whole course of recent events in Central Asia, in the vicinity



of the Afghan frontiers, have materially affected the political situation; insomuch that the British Government is now very closely interested in ascertaining without delay what interpretation is to be placed upon the new aspect of affairs, and what are to be henceforward its relations with the Amir. On recent occasions the conduct and demeanour of the Amir toward this Government have been far from satisfactory; and this latest incident has brought the proceedings of His Highness to a point at which they can be no longer treated by His Excellency the Viceroy with indifference. The highest interests of both countries demand that the question of their future reciprocal relations shall be brought to a definite understanding: and this, it may be said, is the object of Your Excellency's mission.

"It is possible that the Amir may be found disinclined to explain or to make any conciliatory reply; and that he and his Ministers may assume a tone decisively significant of unfriendly resolutions. Your Excellency may thus be given to understand, or may gather from other quarters, that the Kabul Government is already pledged to a policy adverse to British interests. The Amir, his advisers, and Sirdars, should in that case be desired to consider very earnestly the grave consequences which must flow out of a complete and open estrangement and separation of interests between India and Afghanistan. If nevertheless it becomes clear that the Amir has views or engagements incompatible with the revival of satisfactory relations with the British Government, then Your Excellency's mission is terminated, and you will return to India. The test of the Amir's real disposition and intentions will be his agreement or refusal to require any Russian agency that may at the time be in Afghanistan, to leave his territory.

"If Your Excellency finds that the Amir is disposed to realize the value of a reconciliation with this Government, and the risks of a rupture, and to negotiate for the restoration of political connections, His Highness may then be moved to examine the actual situation in all its bearings, and to appreciate the urgent necessity of some definite and comprehensive arrangement. No arrangement, it may be observed, can be satisfactory which does not accord to the British Government a recognized position of diplomatic authority in regard to the external relations of Afghanistan, to the exclusion of the political action or influence of Russia in the country. The primary basis, therefore, of an alliance is that the Amir shall engage not to admit within his dominions any Russian envoy or emissary. It will accordingly be an essential preliminary to any negotiations that the Amir shall agree to take such steps as may be necessary for the withdrawal from his capital of any Russian officers or agents actually at Kabul, having due regard to their personal safety and dignity; that he shall desire them to leave his territory, and that, in case of their demur or refusal to comply, he shall break off all communications with them, direct or indirect. And Your Excellency is authorized to assure the Amir that in taking this step he may rely upon the support of the British Government, and upon their complete protection of him from any injurious consequences which he may apprehend.

"The second essential condition is that the Amir shall agree to permit the residence within his dominions of English officers accredited to him by the British Government. Experience has proved that for the prevention of misunderstandings in future, and in order that the British alliance may be recognized and made manifest in an indisputable manner, it is absolutely necessary that the British Government shall be adequately represented within Afghanistan. It would be in accordance with the general diplomatic usage among States, and it would be for several reasons advantageous, if the British representative were stationed at the Amir's capital or head-quarters, where he might have ready access to His Highness as occasion might require. But previous discussions of this point have elicited from the Amir expressions of particular disinclination to an English Resident at Kabul; and if these objections are repeated and adhered to, the alternative of placing agents at Herat and Balkh may be accepted. Under this latter arrangement, however, Your Excellency will stipulate for free access to Kabul, and to the Amir's presence, of special envoys from India, whenever this may be thought necessary by the British Government. If, on the other hand, a Resident is placed at the capital only, he must be at liberty to detach officers to visit any points upon the Afghan frontier at which their temporary presence may be rendered necessary by the condition, at the time, of external affairs. Thus the establishment of a single Resident at the capital will necessitate free access, for specific reasons, to the frontier; while the location of officers upon the frontier will necessitate free access, upon special occasions, to the capital. The precise terms of these arrangements are left to Your Excellency's discretion, upon the understanding that they will provide for the complete exclusion of the agents of Russia, and for securing to the British Government a real and visible preponderance in Afghanistan, by the establishment of British representatives in the country.

"If the Amir accepts the foregoing essential conditions of an alliance with the British Government, the principal concessions which Your Excellency is empowered to make in return are as follow:—

- (1) An annual subsidy—not exceeding, for the present, twelve lakhs—may be promised.
- (2) The British Government will undertake to recognize the heir-presumptive to the rulership of Kabul and its Dependencies, who shall be formally named, as such, by the Amir Shere Ali during his lifetime. And the subsidy will be continued to the Amir's successors, thus recognized, so long as he shall continue to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty of Alliance, in its entirety.

- (3) If any attempt be made at any future time, by Russia or by any State under Russian influence, to take possession of any part of the territories now under the acknowledged jurisdiction of the Amir of Kabul, the British Government engages to join the Amir in defending his territories by force of arms.

"Here, again, much must be left to the discretion of Your Excellency in regard to the terms and form of these concessions, but the following indication of the views of the Government of India on the subject may serve to guide you in the negotiations:—

"The Government are prepared to recognize the heir of the Amir's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, or to the known rules and principles which have always governed successions in the Amir's dynasty. But if the heir chosen prove, with the advantages of our recognition in his favour, unable to maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State; and Your Excellency will point out to the Amir that armed intervention, in the event of a contest for the rulership, would be inconsistent with these views.

"The engagement to defend the Amir's territory should not be unnecessarily offered to him, since a preferable arrangement would be the conclusion of an alliance upon more general terms, so long as the essential conditions already specified are included. If, however, the guarantee is asked for by the Amir, or if Your Excellency judges that to offer it is necessary, Your Excellency will in the first place explain to the Amir that it may unavoidably entail our exercising a certain additional degree of control over his foreign policy. If the Amir still distinctly desires the guarantee, it should be frankly and unreservedly given. But the guarantee must directly depend on, and be linked with, the admission of British officers to reside, as political representatives, either at Kabul or at certain important points upon the Afghan frontier. Of these points Herat is the most important.

"If the Amir alludes to Quetta, and to our action in Biluchistan, he should be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta have been stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than twenty years' standing, renewed two years ago, with the Khan of Kelat, and in pursuance of the policy adopted, in concert with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of trade. And Your Excellency may see fit to add that one of the objects of the British Mission to Kabul, which was proposed to, and declined by, the Amir in 1876, was to explain our intentions regarding Biluchistan, and to give the Amir satisfactory assurances on these points, before taking the action of which His Highness is now understood to complain. But it should be intimated that the time for discussion of these affairs is now passed.

"If the Amir asks to be supplied with arms, Your Excellency will reply that the British Government does not consider necessary any separate or immediate stipulation upon this head; and that the point is reserved as falling within the general question of the military dispositions to be taken for the defence of Afghan territory in case of war.

"On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and of allowing free transit of commerce through the Khaibar Pass, it may not be desirable to press the Amir; though some agreement for improving the existing state of things would be advantageous, and may be proposed to the Amir if the opportunity appears favourable. The subject may be brought forward in connection with any discussion that may be raised regarding the amount of the annual subsidy.

"I am directed to send herewith a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the Amir, which I am to request Your Excellency to deliver personally. A copy is also inclosed for Your Excellency's information."

The following is the text of the letter from the Viceroy to the Amir which Sir Neville Chamberlain was instructed to deliver to His Highness:—

"In my letter of the 14th August 1878 I informed Your Highness that I had considered it expedient to depute His Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit Your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he might confer personally with Your Highness regarding certain matters of urgency and importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. The departure of my Envoy was postponed for a time in consequence of the great affliction which befell Your Highness in the death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-apparent to Kabul and its Dependencies. The Mission is now about to set out from India; and this letter will be delivered to Your Highness at Kabul by my Envoy in person, who will communicate unreservedly with Your Highness upon the reasons and objects of his coming. General Sir Neville Chamberlain possesses the full confidence of this Government; and whatever he may say should be understood to have been said by myself. I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself, &c."

These papers were all forwarded to the Secretary of State with the despatch cited in the following paragraph.

**159. Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy and Despatch to Secretary of State.**—At this crisis of our dealings with Afghanistan, Lord Lytton deemed it desirable to record a statement defining clearly the nature of the problem before the Government of India, showing how it had arisen, and examining the various possible solutions which presented themselves. This statement, which took the form of a minute and was transmitted to the Secretary of State in the annexed despatch, will be found in Appendix No. XXXV:—

No. 79, dated Simla, 9th September 1878.

From—Government of India,

To—Secretary of State for India.

“In our letter of the 19th August\*, we reported to Your Lordship our preparations for the deputation of General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., early in September, upon a special Mission to the Amir of Kabul. His departure has been adjourned, as was explained in our subsequent letter of the 26th August†, in consequence of the death of the Heir-apparent to the Kabul throne, but the Mission will now leave Peshawur about the 16th instant.

\* No. 61, Secret.

† No. 67, Secret.

“We inclose copy of our Resolution‡ formally appointing Sir Neville Chamberlain; and detailing the officers and gentlemen who will accompany him, on political duty and upon his personal staff. It will be seen that two gentlemen belonging respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan families of the first rank in India have joined the Mission. We considered that it would be politically advantageous to attach them to it; and our offer to do so was accepted by them at once and very willingly.

‡ No. 1911P.

“We also enclose, for Your Lordship’s information, copy of a Minute recorded by the Viceroy upon the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia, upon the course of events in those regions which has brought about the present important conjuncture of affairs, and upon the various possible solutions of the problem which is now before the British Government. In general accordance with that part of the Viceroy’s Minute which has special reference to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul, the Instructions to our Envoy have been framed; after careful deliberation over the actual situation, and after examining the measures and lines of policy best calculated to secure a durable and satisfactory settlement of our relations with Afghanistan. It is to be understood that the remainder of the Minute expresses only the personal views of the Viceroy.

“These Instructions [which are contained in a letter to Sir Neville Chamberlain, of which a copy is inclosed §] may be summarized as follows:—  
§ No. 1912P., dated 7th Sept. 1878. We have directed our Envoy to ascertain what misunderstandings exist between the British Government and the Amir, and to endeavour to clear them up. If these misunderstandings cannot be removed, or if the Amir is unmistakeably and of set purpose unfriendly, the Envoy will return. If the Amir is found to be not ill-disposed, the Envoy will intimate that the British Government are prepared to place their political connexions with Kabul upon an improved footing; and that there are two essential conditions of an alliance. The first is the withdrawal of any Russian Agency that may be still in Afghanistan, and the complete exclusion, henceforward, of Russian Agents from His Highness’ dominions; and the second condition is the establishment within the Amir’s territories of English officers accredited to him by our Government. Upon this basis, if it is accepted, the Envoy may concede to the Amir a subsidy; a promise to recognize the successor whom His Highness may formally name in his lifetime; and also an engagement on the part of the British Government to defend the Amir’s present territories, if Russia, or any State under Russian influence, attempts to take possession of any part of them.

“It will be understood by Your Lordship that these terms represent the extreme limit up to which we have authorized our Envoy to grant concessions to the Amir; and that he is not instructed to offer or agree to make them in their entirety, unless he judges this to be necessary. Upon such points, and in the whole conduct of the negotiations, we have intrusted a very wide discretion to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who possesses our full confidence, and who is peculiarly qualified for this important Mission by his long experience of the Afghan border, by his personal acquaintance, in former days, with the Amir Shere Ali, and by his distinguished reputation upon our North-West Frontier.

“A copy of the letter from the Viceroy which Sir Neville Chamberlain will deliver to the Amir, is also inclosed.”

**160. Proceedings at Kabul. Departure of Ghulam Hassan Khan. Intimation to the Mustaufi, the Mir Akhor, and Faiz Mahomed Khan that the Mission would start on the 16th September.**—The death of Abdulla Jan prostrated and depressed the Amir to that degree that his mind was said to be deranged. The Mir Akhor was

summoned to Kabul from Jelalabad, and it was rumoured that Yakub Khan had escaped from confinement and fled towards Ghazni. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan was receiving the customary visits of condolence, but on the 20th August, after much persuasion, the Amir attended Durbar. Nevertheless it was determined that the Mission should not be delayed, and Major Cavagnari in a letter, dated 27th August, informed the Mustaufi that it would leave Peshawur on the 16th September. Ghulam Hassan also was desired on

Telegram, No. 1790P., dated 26th August 1878. arrival at Kabul to intimate quietly that the departure of the Mission on the fixed date was certain, and that attempts to prevent or delay its journey would be considered to indicate distinctly unfriendly resolutions on the part of the Kabul Government.

Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan left Peshawur on the 30th August, and was hospitably entertained at Ali Masjid by Faiz Mahomed Khan; he was expected to reach Kabul on the 4th September. A letter was also received from the Mustaufi at Kabul stating that all preparations for the Nawab's journey would be made. However, after reaching Dakka, the Nawab was only allowed to make short marches, the object evidently being to prevent his return to Peshawur with the Amir's answer before the 16th, and also, possibly, to enable the Amir to receive some communication from Tashkend before deciding on the reception of the British Mission.

On the 5th and 6th September the Commissioner of Peshawur (Colonel Waterfield) telegraphed that General Ghulam Haidar Khan had sent back the British postal runners from Dakka, and that letters received by Baktiar Khan from Faiz Mahomed Khan desired that letters should henceforward be sent through the Post Office, and advising him that the passing of the Vakil or Envoy would depend on the permission of the Amir. This letter had been written in Kabul for Faiz Mahomed, and was not his own spontaneous production. On 6th September the Mustaufi's reply to Major Cavagnari's letter, dated 23rd August,\* reached Peshawur. It was dated 2nd September, and was to the

\* This letter expressed great regret for the death of the Heir-apparent, and added that Ghulam Hassan would start in a few days for Kabul, taking Viceroy's letters, which were urgently important.

following effect:—

"Your letters received, but we cannot act or communicate with Amir. It is necessary for Nawab to remain at Peshawur. Mustaufi writes to Baktiar Khan, same date:—Your letters received; matter understood. I have informed Amir of coming of the Vakils. Amir remarked that he was unfit to attend to such business. I privately informed you that this matter must be deferred, perhaps after the Ramzan, Amir replied. Letter ends."

It was apparent that in the last few days of August some change had taken place, and it was deemed expedient to let the Kabul authorities know that the prearranged movements of the British Mission would not be altered. The Commissioner was therefore desired to inform the Mustaufi, both directly and indirectly, that the Mission would leave Peshawur about the 16th, whether the Nawab had reached Kabul or not, but that it would not arrive until after the termination of the fast of Ramzan, that the object of the Mission was friendly, but that a refusal of free passage and safe conduct to Kabul would be considered as an act of open hostility. A letter was also to be written to the Nawab Ghulam Hassan directing him to push on to Kabul as fast as he could and show firmness in resisting endeavours to delay him.

Telegram, No. 1907P., dated 7th September 1878.

At the Commissioner's suggestion similar information was sent to Ali Masjid, Dakka, and Jelalabad, as the officer commanding at those places would be obliged to communicate with Kabul for instructions and regarding the provision of supplies. Care was, however, taken to write in such a form as to show that the object merely was to give information of what had been communicated to Kabul, and not to enter into separate correspondence direct with local officials.

Telegram, No. 1920P., dated 9th September 1878.

These are the letters which were referred to in Parliament; and to which the Amir objected as harsh in tone and language; the Persian text will be found in Appendix No. XXXVI.

A prompt reply was sent from Ali Masjid where Faiz Mahomed Khan commanded, saying that, without permission from Kabul, he would not allow the Mission to pass unopposed; the letter was civil but firm, and was received on

the 11th September. On the 13th, Mufti Shah Mahomed, charged with the supervision of the frontier affairs of the Kabul Government, visited Ali Masjid, and having communicated secret instructions to Faiz Mahomed, returned to Kabul.

Meantime further news had been received of the Nawab's progress. He had been ill, but on leaving Dakka had been met by the Kotwal of Jelalabad; at Jelalabad, which he reached on the 4th, the son of the Mir Akhor had met him, and the Mir Akhor entertained and visited him. On the 5th he left for Kabul.

**161. Communications between Sir Neville Chamberlain and Faiz Mahomed Khan. Apprehensions entertained by the Khaibaris.**—It has been seen (paragraph 154) that the Government of India had foreseen the necessity of negotiating with the Afridis of the Khaibar Pass to allow the Mission an unmolested passage. These negotiations had been conducted with some of the Khaibari headmen who had been summoned to Peshawur, and their basis was that no active opposition to the passage of the Mission would be made by the Amir or his officials. The object of thus arranging matters with the Khaibaris was that if the Mission was opposed, there might be no difficulty in fixing the responsibility upon the Amir's own officers. On the 14th September Major Cavagnari telegraphed that Faiz Mahomed had summoned the Khaibar headmen to return, and that they had asked for instructions. If they disobeyed Faiz Mahomed, they would lose the subsidy now paid them by the Kabul Government, while if they returned to the Pass, no doubt they would be employed in preventing the Mission from reaching Ali Masjid. The main object of the British Government to bring to an immediate issue with the Amir's officials the question of the Amir's intention regarding the passage of the Mission would thus be frustrated. The allowances paid by the Kabul Government amounted to 40,000 rupees, Kabul currency, and unless the Government of India were prepared either for indefinite delay or to send the Mission by another route, the only course in the opinion of Sir Neville Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari was to guarantee the Khaibaris this sum and manage the tribes direct. The Viceroy however suggested an alternative course, which was adopted: it is explained in the following telegram:—

Telegram, No. 1364P., dated 14th September 1878.

To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peshawur.

“Your telegram of this day. Care is required to avoid giving Amir any plausible ground for complaint by separate arrangement with Khaibaris before he has offered open opposition to Mission. I recommend special messenger to Faiz Mahomed, with letter stating that Mission starts immediately, referring to recent visit of Mufti Shah Mahomed and summons to Khaibari headmen, and requiring immediate plain answer whether Faiz Mahomed, having, as we know, received instructions from Kabul, is prepared to guarantee safety of Mission through Pass. If he replies Yes, then I would let headmen obey his order, and Mission would advance, holding him responsible under guarantee. If he replies No, or gives evasive answer, or no answer within reasonable time, then make arrangements independently with Khaibaris, placing responsibility on Faiz Mahomed, and advance. Khaibari headmen should be informed of our action, and detained pending result, and guaranteed allowances and permanent protection in any event. This is my view; but Sir Neville's decision on the spot will be accepted and supported.

The following letter was accordingly written to Faiz Mahomed on the 15th September, and he was given to the 18th to reply. It was decided that if his answer was favourable, the Mission would advance at once; if otherwise, negotiations with the Khaibaris would be resumed:—

Dated, Peshawur, 15th September 1878.

From—HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL SIR NEVILLE B. CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Envoy and Plenipotentiary, Kabul Mission,

To—FAIZ MAHOMED KHAN, Commanding at the Fort of Ali Masjid in the Khaibar Pass.

“I write to inform you that, by command of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort, is about to proceed to Kabul through the Khaibar Pass, and intimation of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan.



"I hear that an official from Kabul has recently visited you at Ali Masjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has now been received that you have summoned from Peshawur the Khaibar headmen with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khaibar Pass, I therefore write to enquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the British Mission to Dakka, or not; and I request that a clear reply to this enquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from Peshawur. It is well known that the Khaibar tribes are in receipt of allowances from the Kabul Government, and also, like other independent tribes on this frontier, have relations with the British Government. It may be well to let you know that when the present negotiations were opened with the Khaibar tribes, it was solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khaibar Pass, in the same manner as was done in regard to the despatch of our Agent, the Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was well known that the object of the British Mission was altogether of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan.

"I trust that, in accordance with the instructions you have received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required assurances that the Mission will be safely conducted to Dakka. I shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most urgent.

"But, at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to me best for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own Government."

On the 16th September Faiz Mahomed answered\* this letter saying that as yet he had received no orders from the Amir to allow the Mission to pass. That the Mir Akhor was hourly expected at Ali Masjid, and might bring instructions with him, or be empowered to discuss matters with the British officers. He went on to suggest that the Mission should await the Mir Akhor's arrival, which might be productive of a friendly issue. It would be unwise to risk a collision by a premature advance.

\* See Appendix XXXVII.

**162. Reception of Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan at Kabul. His interviews with the Amir.**—The Nawab reached Kabul on the 10th September, and was hospitably entertained on his arrival. The Amir received him on the 12th, and the following account of what passed reached Sir Neville Chamberlain on the 17th August, and was telegraphed to Simla on the same day, so that the Government of India were able to consider it with Faiz Mahomed's letter, dated 16th September, to Sir Neville Chamberlain:—

"Native Envoy presented the letters from the Viceroy to the Amir at a private interview, no one else being present. The Amir then handed the letter from the Commissioner to the address of Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan to the latter to read. This letter was that sent in accordance with the Viceroy's cipher telegram of the 7th instant. One of similar purport was sent at the same time to the Mustaufi. These letters went by the Amir's post from Peshawur.

"Amir was very much displeased, objected to the harsh words, and said—It is as if they were come by force. I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner; and until my officers have received orders from me, how can the Mission come? It is as if they wish to disgrace me; it is not proper to use pressure in this way; it will tend to a complete (rupture?) and breach of friendship. I am a friend as before, and entertain no ill-will. The Russian Envoy has come, and has come with my permission. I am still afflicted with grief at the loss of my son, and have had no time to think over the matter. If I get time, whatever I consider advisable will be acted upon. Under these circumstances, they can do as they like. Nawab adds that the advance of the Mission should be held in abeyance; otherwise some harm will occur. Should the Amir decide to receive Mission, he will of his own accord and will make all necessary arrangements. If Mission advanced now, Nawab anticipates resistance. Letter ends.

"With reference to my previous telegram about the expected arrival of (Mir Akhor?) at Ali Masjid, I think Government had better await the result of any communication he may make, as possibly he may have later instructions from the Amir. It is worthy of notice that the letter Amir desired Nawab to read, and which contained the expressions he objected to,

was that addressed by the Commissioner to the Nawab, which the latter had not previously seen, and which Amir had no right to desire him to open and read to him, being a confidential letter.

“ Full details by to-morrow’s post.”

**163. Question of the reply to be sent to Faiz Mahomed’s letter, dated 16th September. Decision to arrange for the advance of the Mission.**—Sir Neville Chamberlain was disposed to accept Faiz Mahomed’s suggestion and await the result of the Mir Akhor’s arrival at Ali Masjid. The Viceroy, however, saw no reason to anticipate more definite

Telegram, No. 1979 P., dated 17th September 1878.

instructions by the Mir Akhor than those brought by Mufti Shah; and the letter from Faiz Mahomed, together with the Amir’s replies to the Nawab, both clearly indicated an intention of endeavouring to delay the Mission indefinitely. His Excellency therefore considered that the date originally named to Faiz Mahomed should be adhered to; and that, if no satisfactory assurance of safety through the Pass was received by the 18th, independent negotiations should be concluded as rapidly as possible with the Khaibaris, and that the Mission should advance without any avoidable delay, in accordance with instructions, till forcibly opposed.

The question now was how to bring the Mission face to face with some recognized official of the Amir’s Government, and so ascertain by actual contact

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.

His Highness’ intentions. Major Cavagnari reported that as far as Ali Masjid it was possible to arrange for its passage, but beyond that place the Khaibaris could do nothing until Faiz Mahomed was disposed of; and this would necessitate more deliberate arrangements, as every tribe and section would have to be detached. On the 18th September Major Cavagnari and Sir Neville Chamberlain telegraphed that there was a general consensus of opinion that the Ali Masjid officials would oppose the passage of the Mission, though Major Cavagnari personally doubted their doing so by force of arms. It was desirable to bring the matter to a speedy issue, and also to avoid, if possible, the extreme measure of permanently detaching the tribes from the Amir’s control. With this object negotiations had been opened with the Khaibaris to escort, as a matter of ordinary safe conduct, the Mission to Ali Masjid, and back if necessary. The Khaibaris were deliberating whether they could do this in spite of the prohibitory orders received from the Amir’s officials. If they assented the Mission could advance at once.

The Viceroy agreed that further delay was certainly most undesirable and

Telegram, No. 1996 P., dated 19th September 1878.

approved negotiations being commenced with the Khaibaris for the safe conduct of the Mission to Ali Masjid, and for permanently detaching the tribes from the Amir should the measure be necessary.

**164. Further news from Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan of his proceedings at Kabul.**—After despatch of the instructions, noted in the preceding paragraph, the following telegram, dated 18th September, was received from Sir Neville Chamberlain, communicating a further letter from Nawab Ghulam Hassan :—

“ *Clear the line.*—Another letter received from Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan after an interview with Wazir Shah Mahomed, who assured Nawab, on his oath, that the Amir intimated that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt to force this Mission upon him without his consent being first granted according to usual custom; otherwise he would resist it, as coming in such a manner would be a slight to him. He attributed the English grievances against him to mischievous reports of news-writers. He reiterated his Quetta grievances, &c. He says he did not invite the Russian Mission, but that, as his country was quite exposed, and as he was estranged from the English, he was obliged to let them come on after they crossed the Oxus. He denies that the Russians came for any other purpose than to exchange civilities in consequence of their having a common boundary with Afghanistan. He believes that a personal interview with British Mission will adjust misunderstandings. He has no wish to give Russians a right of way through his

country. He says that there has been sickness at Kabul, and that some of the Russian servants are lying ill; but that, as soon as they recover, he hopes to give them their *congé* in a suitable manner, after which he will send a confidential messenger to escort the British Mission. He undertakes to be responsible for the safety of the Mission, and its good treatment if he invites it. He wishes Mission to remain a short time longer at Peshawur. He stated that friendship has existed between the two Powers for a long time, and that he does not wish to destroy it; that in two or three days he will send for the Nawab, and, after consultation with him, will fix a date and make all arrangements for the coming of the Mission; that the Nawab should write and say that the sending of the Mission without Amir's consent will be a slight on the Amir. Nawab thinks that the Russian Envoy will be dismissed after the Eed, and that the Amir will then send for the British Mission. Letter ends."

The Viceroy held that the Nawab's letter made no change in the situation, and should not delay the movements of the Mission. Nevertheless it would be proper to write at once to the Nawab stating that the friendly sentiments expressed to him by Wazir Shah Mahomed on behalf of the Amir were reciprocated; that the departure of the Mission had been already postponed through reluctance to interfere with His Highness' mourning, and in order to give time for the requisite arrangements for the journey of the Mission; and that it was hoped that this delay would have enabled the Amir to make necessary preparations, so that the invitation which he had expressed his readiness to send might reach Sir Neville Chamberlain on the frontier of his territory.

Then came the following telegram from Sir Neville, dated 19th September:—

"*Clear the line.*—The following is an abstract of a letter just received from the Nawab, dated Kabul, 15th instant. Full translation will go by post.

"The Nawab says that the Amir is in a bad humour, and the Ministers tell me that on account of grief and indisposition he cannot bear to hear alternately harsh and conciliatory language. The Ministers express hope that when replies were received to the Nawab's letters of the 12th and 13th, the reception of the Mission will be satisfactorily arranged for. Further, that if Mission starts on 18th, without waiting for the Amir's permission, there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or reconciliation. In such a case, we cannot hold ourselves responsible for anything. What will happen, will happen. If Mission will wait Amir's permission, everything will be arranged, God willing, in the best manner, and no room will be left for complaint in the future. The Minister adds that the Amir is much annoyed by the various unbecoming communications, some to his own address, some to his officers. Communications should not be written in an authoritative tone, nor should any be addressed to his officials, as they are the servants of the Kabul Government, and not of the British. The Kabul officials have no power to do the slightest thing without the order of the Amir. Everything should be done quietly and in a friendly manner, and consistently with the dignity of the Kabul Government. The post-runners left by the Nawab had been ordered away. The Nawab writes that what he communicates is what he hears from the Wazir; that people are prevented from having any intercourse with him, that nobody visits him, and that he receives his food from the Amir. The Nawab says that if the Mission does not start on the 18th, there will still be an opening for further discussion. Also, that whether the Amir fulfils his promise to send for the Mission or not, he thinks the Amir will reply to the letters of the Viceroy. In the event of rupture and disturbances taking place, there will be no chance left for further discussion. The Nawab asks to be furnished with instructions."

Upon this telegram Sir Neville Chamberlain added his own opinion as follows:—

"It is now quite evident that the Amir is bent on stretching procrastination to the utmost, and determined on asserting his claims to total independence of action by making the acceptance of the Mission dependent on his sole pleasure and dictation when it shall be received. If these points be yielded, then he holds out the hope that he will hereafter, at his own time, send a person to bring the Mission, and receive it honorably. It has been said in the clearest language by the Amir himself, by his Minister, and by his officers in command of his outposts, that they will, if necessary, stop the advance of the Mission by force. That determination is just as clear, to my mind, as if half of our escort had been shot down. Unless Your Lordship accept this position, all chance of a peaceful solution seems to me gone. The Amir is bent on upholding his own will and dignity at any cost, to the dignity of the British Government. Our Agent at Kabul writes as if it was our duty to accept wholly the views of the Amir. He asks for answers to his letter when there is nothing to reply to; this is evidently done by the dictation of the Amir. I suggest that the Nawab be recalled. He has done what he was sent to do. Will Your Lordship sanction my recalling him?"

**165. Faiz Mahomed Khan refuses to allow the Mission to pass Ali Masjid. Orders issued for its withdrawal.**—During the

interval that had elapsed since the receipt of Faiz Mahomed's letter of the 16th September an agreement was concluded with the Khaibaris to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, or any nearer point at which it could come in contact with the Amir's officers. They declined all responsibility for what might then happen, but would be ready to convoy the Mission back to camp if necessary. Sir Neville Chamberlain's proposal was that the Mission should either stand fast in Peshawur or move out as far as Jamrud, and that a small party, sufficient to put the matter to the test, should advance to Ali Masjid. It was his strong conviction, and native opinion supported him, that resistance was intended. If after all preparations the Mission were to move beyond British territory and then be openly turned back, the British Government would be disgraced in the eyes of India, and it was desirable to avoid loss of prestige. His opinion therefore was that Major Cavagnari with a small escort should proceed to Ali Masjid and there ascertain from the mouth of the Amir's Commandant, whether he would allow the Mission to pass or not. If he refused, the answer should be considered, in effect, the same as though the Mission had been fired upon. The Viceroy considered that the whole Mission should move out of Peshawur to Jamrud, and that Major Cavagnari should then advance to Ali Masjid and demand immediate passage. If this were refused, the Mission would be withdrawn and negotiations broken off.

On the 21st September information, which the Commissioner of Peshawur believed to be true, came in that the Mir Akhor had received a letter from the Amir directing him to allow the Mission to pass and to disperse the Afridis. No preparations had been made for stopping the Mission, and the Afghan troops had returned from the Khaibar to Dakka. In Peshawur also the rumour was that there would be peace between the Amir and the English.

On the morning of the same day the Mission left Peshawur for Jamrud, where it halted, while Major Cavagnari went on to Ali Masjid to demand a safe passage on the 22nd. At a personal interview with Faiz Mahomed, he received a clear and decisive answer that the Mission would not be allowed to pass. Faiz Mahomed crowned the heights commanding the road with his levies, and, though many times warned by Major Cavagnari that his reply would be regarded as that of the Amir, persisted in his refusal. Sir Neville Chamberlain enquired whether a fresh attempt should be made on the morrow either to bring Faiz Mahomed to reason or make him fire upon the Mission; his own decided opinion was that enough had been done, and that any further attempt would only bring down more disgrace. The Viceroy replied :—

Telegram, No. 2032P., dated 21st September 1878.

To—SIR N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawur.

"Your last telegram to-day. Accepting the reply of Faiz Mahomed to ultimate demand by Cavagnari as positive refusal by Amir to let Mission pass, which has been pointed by a decisive show of force, I consider Mission must now withdraw, and that you should spare no pains to detach Khaibaris permanently from Amir. Inform Faiz Mahomed by letter that his answer to Cavagnari's demand, and his action, will be treated as those of the Amir. Simultaneously send letter to Nawab Ghulam Hassan stating briefly what has passed, and instruct him to return immediately."

Full information of what had happened was immediately (22nd September) communicated to the Secretary of State and orders were issued to dissolve the Mission. The Native noblemen attached to it were asked to visit Simla to receive the Viceroy's personal thanks. Major Cavagnari was desired to continue and to bring to a speedy conclusion his arrangements for detaching the frontier tribes from the Amir. Immediate steps would now be taken in conformity with the policy described in the Viceroy's minute (*vide* paragraph 159) as applicable to the present situation. There remained the case of the Khaibaris who had consented to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, and whose assistance had materially interfered with the Amir's temporising policy. They had asked what they were to do if the Amir molested them. Sir Neville Chamberlain replied that they had done their work well, and were looked upon as friends of the British Government, which would spend its last rupee and lose its last soldier in their defence, if need were—language which was entirely approved by His

Excellency the Viceroy. Subsequently, on the 26th September, the following telegram was despatched to the Secretary of State in continuation of that of the 22nd :—

Telegram, No. 2082 P., dated 26th September 1878.

From—Viceroy, Simla,  
To—Secretary of State, London.

“Your telegram 25th. Facts already given in mine of 17th, 21st, and 22nd. Amir has not replied, or indicated intention of replying, to my letters received by him 12th instant. He merely informed messenger verbally that British Government must indefinitely await his pleasure on subject of them, which he would consider whenever it suited him, adding that Russian Mission had come with his permission, and that, in the present state of relations with us, he saw no reason for our sending British one. Departure of Mission had been twice postponed in consideration for Amir's bereavement, but customary period of mourning had elapsed. Ample time allowed for reply to Viceroy's letters and preparation for receiving Envoy, and, in face of prompt courteous reception of Russian Mission at Kabul, Chamberlain and self considered it absolutely incompatible with dignity of British Government, and seriously injurious to position, to keep Mission indefinitely awaiting Amir's pleasure at Peshawur.

“Satisfactory arrangements having been concluded with Khaibaris to escort Mission to Ali Masjid, and safety of Mission depending on prompt execution thereof, Mission advanced to Jamrud, whence Major Cavagnari proceeded with purposely small escort to Ali Masjid, where Mission was repulsed with strong demonstration of force as already reported. This took place in presence of the six Native noblemen and gentlemen attached to Chamberlain's staff. Officer commanding fort said he had incurred Amir's severe displeasure by passing Native messenger with Viceroy's letters, and, but for personal friendship, would, in obedience to Amir's orders, have shot down Cavagnari and suite. Chamberlain writes thus :—No man was ever more anxious than I to preserve peace and secure friendly solution, and it was only when I plainly saw Amir's fixed intention to drive us into corner, that I told you we must either sink into position of merely obeying his behests on all points, or stand on our rights and risk rupture. Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing more humiliating to dignity of British Crown and Nation; and I believe that, but for decision and tact of Cavagnari at one period of interview, lives of British officers and Native following were in considerable danger. End of Chamberlain's letter. Mission has consequently now been dissolved. Khaibaris acted admirably at risk to themselves from Amir's resentment, against which Chamberlain, with my entire approval, has guaranteed them complete protection. For further particulars see my accompanying telegram in cipher.”

The detailed reports submitted by Sir Neville Chamberlain, Major Cavagnari, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins of the Guides, will be found in Appendix No. XXXVII.

**166. Despatch to the Secretary of State reporting Faiz Mahomed's refusal of a free passage.**—On the 26th September the following despatch enclosing papers and summarizing the events which had occurred since Sir Neville Chamberlain's arrival at Peshawur, up to the repulse of the Mission at Ali Masjid, was forwarded to the Secretary of State :—

No. 93, dated Simla, 26th September 1878.

From—Government of India,  
To—Secretary of State for India.

“We have regularly transmitted to Your Lordship, by telegraph, reports of our proceedings taken in pursuance of our resolution to depute Sir Neville Chamberlain upon an urgent and important Mission to the Amir of Kabul. And we now enclose the further telegrams up to the recall of the Mission, as noted in the accompanying Abstract of Contents.

“Sir Neville Chamberlain reached Peshawur on the 12th September; and placed himself in direct preliminary correspondence with the Amir's officers stationed upon the frontier, to whom it was necessary to give notice of his movements, and from whom their instructions had to be elicited. The general tenor of this correspondence, with the principal events and circumstances attending the departure of the Mission from Peshawur, and its withdrawal in consequence of the armed resistance offered at Ali Masjid by the Amir's officers, have been reported to Your Lordship by our telegrams.

“We have now the honor to enclose papers giving in detail the course of these affairs as they occurred after Sir Neville Chamberlain's arrival at Peshawur, and upon his intimation to the Afghan officials that he desired a passage to Kabul. The information which had been received, early in September, from Kabul, clearly indicated the desire of the Amir to withhold any decisive expression of his intentions regarding the reception of the Mission, his object being to keep the Mission waiting indefinitely. But it had been plain from the first that a procrastinating and ambiguous policy on his part, which had been anticipated with certainty,



would, unless at once put aside, assuredly involve the Mission in discredit and ultimate defeat. Sir Neville Chamberlain was therefore authorized to send early notice to the Mustaufi that the refusal of the free passage would bring matters to an issue.

"It was, moreover, essential, in order that there might be no subsequent shifting of responsibility, that the Amir's officers upon the road to Kabul should know what had been written to the Mustaufi, in time for taking orders from head-quarters before the Mission should leave British territory. But as the communication of this notice to the Amir's Minister and officers, disconcerted and crossed whatever plans for temporizing may have been entertained, it unavoidably gave offence to His Highness; and the reports that the passage of the Mission would be refused and resisted, grew stronger and multiplied. The Government of India were, nevertheless, reluctant to afford to the Amir even the slight ground for umbrage which might be taken at our arranging separately with the independent tribes who hold the entry to the Khaibar Pass, for the safe conduct of the Mission through their lands, before the Amir's dispositions had been fully ascertained. Faiz Mahomed, who commands at the fort of Ali Masjid in the Pass, was therefore asked whether he would give the necessary guarantee. On this point, however, the reply was that no orders had been received; although an officer of the Amir's had already come express to Ali Masjid with secret instructions, and had returned. On the 15th September Sir Neville Chamberlain addressed to Faiz Mahomed the letter (of which we enclose copy) conveying a formal summons to him to allow passage to the Mission; and subsequently informed him that his answer would be expected after the arrival of the Mir Akhor, a confidential officer of the Amir in charge of frontier affairs. The Akhor arrived on the 18th; but no satisfactory reply was received; and Sir Neville Chamberlain's proposal to put the intentions of the Amir to a practical test was at last approved.

"This being the state of affairs, the entire Mission moved from Peshawur to Jamrud on the morning of the 21st, and Major Cavagnari, accompanied by the two Native gentlemen who had joined the Mission, advanced with a small escort in the afternoon to Ali Masjid to demand a passage. He was conducted to the fort by the Chiefs of the Khaibar tribes, who had agreed, at the risk of incurring the Amir's hostility, to bring our officers face to face with the Amir's commander. The result was completely decisive. Faiz Mahomed not only opposed an absolute and repeated refusal to the demand for a passage, but made all preparations for supporting his refusal with all the armed force at his command; and it is known that the garrison had been hastily reinforced for the occasion. The Mir Akhor was in the fort, but did not appear at the personal interview between Major Cavagnari and Faiz Mahomed, which lasted long; though he is understood to have been watching the proceedings. Major Cavagnari finally returned to Jamrud; and upon receipt by telegraph of Sir Neville Chamberlain's report of the affair, the Viceroy at once directed him to return to Peshawur.

"It is to be regretted that this final endeavour on the part of our Government to arrive at some definite understanding with the Amir of Kabul, should have been thus met with repudiation and affront. We submit, nevertheless, that the situation of affairs, and their tendency, left us no choice but to make the attempt; and that we employed the only method which offered any chance of success. The obviously growing estrangement of the Amir, his attitude toward us of exclusion and scarcely veiled hostility during the past twelve months, and his disregard of the amicable overtures made to him in 1876-77, gave to his formal reception, in August last, of Russian emissaries the character of a grave political declaration. It appeared quite possible, however, that the significance of this event might have been over-rated or misconstrued in India, or that the Amir himself might be induced, by timely diplomatic representations, to realize the gravity of his action, and to appreciate its inevitable effect upon his relations with our Government. But the only hope of clearing up any such misunderstandings, or of bringing our legitimate influence to bear upon the Amir, lay in the renewal of direct personal intercourse with him through a British Envoy. And there appeared to be no way left open by which this end could be attained, other than the simple and straight course of despatching a Mission immediately to Kabul. To have asked the Amir whether he would receive the Mission, and to have awaited his time and pleasure, would have been a futile repetition of an experiment which had failed already. The repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain by Shere Ali at his frontier, while the Russian emissaries are still at his capital, has proved the inutility of diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Amir of all claim upon our further forbearance."

**167. Preparations for war and policy proposed to be followed by the British Government.**—The measures immediately initiated after the dissolution of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission may be very briefly

Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 2083 P., dated 26th September 1878.

described. It was urgently necessary to avenge the public insult offered to the British Government by the Amir, and it was also a paramount object to isolate him from his Sirdars and avoid any action likely to unite the Afghan nation against the British Government. For this purpose combined military and political action was required to strengthen the internal influences hostile to the Amir, and weaken his power of resisting them. The military operations decided upon were the immediate concentration of a force of 4,000 men at

Thul on the Kohat frontier, and of 6,000 men at Sukkur; Quetta was also to be reinforced with 3,500 men. It was expected that the Thul force would be ready to operate in Kuram in a month, if need were, but that the other troops could not be assembled in less than six weeks at the earliest. Instructions were also issued to the several officers in charge of British frontier rela-

No. 2050 P., to Punjab Government, dated Simla, 24th September 1878.

tions to lose no time and spare no efforts to detach from all political connexion with the Afghan Government those independent tribes lying outside the northern portion of the Punjab border whom it was most important, either upon military or political grounds, to bring permanently under British influence to the exclusion of that of the Amir. Of these, the principal were the several sections of the Afridis who hold the Khaibar Pass, the Mohmands, and certain sections of the Waziris whose country adjoins the route of the Kuram Valley. Special measures were to be taken to reassure the tribes occupying the country in the vicinity of the Kuram, to convince them of the friendly character of the movements so far as the tribes were concerned, and to secure their good-will. It was to be explained to them that they would be treated as allies, and their independence carefully respected, even though the British Government might possibly occupy a part of the Amir's territory.

If during the interval which these preparations must necessarily occupy overtures should be received from the Amir, the Government of India would not refuse to reopen negotiations on condition of His Highness visiting British territory in person for the purpose. If, however, the Amir continued recalcitrant the troops would advance into the Kuram Valley and towards

Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 2083 P., dated 26th September 1878.

Kandahar, and an endeavour be made to substitute some friendly authority in his place without actual collision with the Afghan nation. It would probably be necessary, for the security of the British frontier, to hold permanently a commanding position in Kuram, but the actual occupation of Kandahar was not contemplated. If no European power (Russia) intervened, it was Lord Lytton's opinion that no regular invasion of Afghanistan would be necessary, and he deprecated all military measures in excess of what was absolutely needed to support political pressure. He did not expect that the Amir would come to terms, but his early downfall by the action of his own subjects was highly probable, and this would enable the British Government without recourse to extensive operations or objectionable intervention in the internal affairs of the country to place its relations with Afghanistan under those conditions which were essential for permanent security.

**168. Return of Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan with Amir Shere Ali's reply. Measures recommended to the Secretary of State.**—On the 12th October a letter from the Nawab, dated 6th October, reached Peshawur, intimating his speedy return *via* the Kuram Valley with the Amir's replies to the Viceroy's letters. The Persian text of these letters will be found in Appendix XXXVIII; they have been translated as follows:—

Translation of letter from AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, of Kabul, to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 8th Shawal (6th October).

"After the usual complimentary beginning.—Be it known to Your Excellency (Janáb) that Your Excellency's friendly letter, which was sent by the hands of the highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, and which contained the news of the deputation of a friendly Mission, namely, a Mission from the British Government, has been perused by me; and on perusal I have fully informed myself of its contents. But the above-named Nawab had not yet been honoured with an interview, and Your Excellency's friendly letter had not yet been

\* With regard to Colonel Waterfield's letter here referred to, please see *ante* paragraph 160 and Appendix XXXVI.

(Sd.) T. C. P.

seen by me, when a letter\* addressed by Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawur, to Mirza Habibulla Khan, an official of this God-granted Government, having arrived here, was perused by this suppliant before the throne of God. And great surprise and astonishment was caused by the writing of the officer abovementioned—that is, the Commissioner. What

† Literally, "blustering," or "full of noise."

can be the result, meaning, and advantage of such a vehement† communication to an ally and friend, and of advancing by force a friendly Mission in this manner?

"Subsequently three more letters from the same officer, in the same tone and style, to the address of the officials of this God-granted Government, were seen. Moreover, in the course of a few days, several other letters, which were received from that direction, were seen. These were not free from harsh and rough words and expressions, which are inconsistent with the forms of courtesy and civility, and contrary to the mode of friendship and sympathy.

"In consequence of the attack of grief and affliction which has befallen me by the decree of God, great distraction has seized the mind of this supplicant at God's threshold. The trusted officers of the British Government, therefore, ought to have observed patience, and to have stayed, at such a time; and this would have been the most commendable and appropriate course. Your Excellency should be pleased to have regard to (mulahaza farmáyand) this harsh (style of) address and provocation, as well as to the altercation with such anger with my officials. How inconsistent is this with the sublime way of friendship and alliance? In any case the officials of this God-granted Government, notwithstanding the threatening communications of the officials of the British Government, which communications are still in the possession of the officers of this Government, will not evince any hostility or opposition to the British Government. Moreover, they do not entertain any hostile or antagonistic feelings toward any Government whatever. But should any Government entertain without cause any hostile and inimical feelings toward this God-granted Government, I commit all my affairs to the merciful

\* Literally, "the best Wakil."

God, upon whose will and intention all matters depend. He alone suffices for us, and he is the best to be trusted\*.

"The highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, who is the bearer of this friendly letter, has, in accordance with the instructions received from the officers of the British Government, asked leave to return, and the requisite permission has been granted."

---

Translation of letter from AMIR SHEER ALI KHAN, to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India dated 8th Shawal (6th October).

"Be it known to Your Excellency that Your Excellency's most friendly letter, expressing deep sorrow and regret at the death of my beloved son, Sirdar Abdulla Khan, the heir-apparent to the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, which Your Excellency sent by the hands of Nawab Ghulam Hassan, has been perused by me. The sorrow and regret which Your Excellency, in conformity with the forms of friendship and amity, has expressed regarding this mournful event, which has taken place by decree of God, is indeed according to the rules of friendship and concord, and to the behaviour of friends to friends in affliction. But as no one can resist or escape the Divine decree, it is fitting and appropriate under all circumstances to submit and resign one's-self to the will of God. What more of friendliness can be written?"

The actual text of these letters was not received for some days, but the contents of the one in answer to the Viceroy's letter, dated 14th August, were

† Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 2311 P., telegraphed from Kohat on the 18th dated 19th October.

October. It was observed † that although the letter had been written after more than three weeks' deliberation, the Viceroy's friendly proposal was left unanswered, no apology was offered for the recent public affront, and no desire to receive the British Mission or improve existing relations was apparent. Its tone was considered by persons conversant with oriental style to be intentionally rude and to convey a direct challenge, and it would be regarded in this light by natives of India. As it had been written after the Amir had been informed through the Nawab of the occurrence at Ali Masjid and of the view taken of that matter by the British Government, any demand for an apology would now, in Lord Lytton's opinion, be useless, and only expose the British Government to fresh insult while losing valuable time. A communication in the sense of the above observations having been addressed to the Secretary of State, a special meeting of the Governor-General's Council was then convened, and after prolonged discussion the following measures were agreed to. Their acceptance

Telegram, No. 2311, dated 19th October.

and the adoption of immediate action upon them was earnestly recommended to the Secretary of State:—

"Time for action this winter is short; if postponed till spring, operations will be more difficult and costly, large forces being maintained throughout winter in field at heavy cost without result. Advantages of delay none; disadvantages obvious. Distrust of our resolve to act already prevails widely, will increase daily, much raising Amir's prestige, lowering ours. Shall lose present opportunity of securing adherence of independent tribes, whose hostility would much embarrass if they join Amir. We therefore urgently request immediate sanction to measures stated above.

"First.—Immediate issue of Manifesto defining cause of offence, declaring friendly disposition toward Afghan people, reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing sole responsibility on Amir.

*“ Second.—Advance into Kuram Valley on completion of force now collecting at Thul.*

*“ Third.—Expulsion of Amir’s garrison from Khaibar Pass.*

*“ Fourth.—Advance from Quetta on Pishin, if necessary, to Kandahar.*

*“ Present military situation as follows:—*

*“ Peshawur garrison being reinforced to total strength 8,700, of whom 6,000 available for field service. At Hasan Abdal, reserve forming of 5,000. We propose also assembling there some Contingents of Feudatories who have offered service. Kuram Column, 4,000 strong, will be assembled Thul by end October, with reserves Kohat. Reinforcements raising Quetta garrison to 5,000, already on march, will arrive first week November. Division 6,500 assembling on Indus, can reach Quetta end November. Brahui tribes will protect Pass. Further Brahui levies for service with column can be raised if needed.*

*“ Kabul Line.—Season too late for advance this year on Kabul by Khaibar, even were it desirable. Occupation Jehalabad would require extensive preparations; to winter there would be costly. On that line we propose confining measures this winter to operations urgently necessary for securing Khaibar Pass and protecting friendly Khaibaris, of whom many now taking refuge in British territory. Mohmands and other Chiefs declared readiness join us on expulsion of Amir’s garrison.*

*“ Kuram Line.—Immediate advance here most necessary, owing to late season, and because only by this line immediate pressure can be exerted. Operations in Upper Kuram Valley not practicable after middle December. Will adhere closely as possible to general measures thus indicated, but some discretion must necessarily be left Government of India and Military Commanders.”*

### **169. Decision of Her Majesty’s Government to address a further letter to the Amir.**—In the opinion of Her Majesty’s Govern-

ment the matter had not yet reached a stage to justify the immediate adoption of the measures described in the foregoing paragraph. They desired that before British troops crossed the frontier of Afghanistan a demand should be made in temperate language for an apology and for the acceptance of a permanent British Mission within the Amir’s dominions, and that a reply should be required within a fitting and sufficient time. Meanwhile, the massing of troops was to be continued and an adequate force assembled at the various points from which an attack would be made in case of a declaration of war.

**170. Text of further letter to the Amir. No reply received by fixed date. Issue of Manifesto and commencement of the second Afghan war.**—In obedience to these instructions, the following further letter was written to the Amir and despatched after final approval by the Secretary of State, who desired that immediate telegraphic intimation should be sent to Her Majesty’s Government if the messenger bearing the letter was refused admission into Afghanistan. If the Amir’s reply should be not clear or categorical, it was to be treated as a refusal of the terms offered. The contingency anticipated by the Secretary of State of the possible refusal of a passage through Afghanistan of a messenger was provided for by instructions to Major Cavagnari to deliver the Viceroy’s letter by a suitable special messenger to the nearest responsible official of the Amir’s Government, and to post a copy simultaneously in the Amir’s post office in Peshawur. To send a special messenger to Kabul would involve delay and perhaps failure. These instructions were complied with, and the letter was despatched from Peshawur at dawn on the 2nd November. It was delivered the same day at Ali Masjid to Faiz Mahomed Khan, and his receipt obtained:—

Dated 29th October 1878.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

To—AMIR SHER ALI KHAN, of Kabul.

“ I have received and read the letters which Your Highness has sent to me by the hands of my Sirdar, Ghulam Hassan Khan.

“ It will be in the recollection of Your Highness that, immediately on my arrival in India I proposed to send you a friendly Mission for the purpose of assuring you of the good-will of the British Government, and of removing those past misunderstandings to which Your Highness has frequently alluded.

"After leaving this proposal long unanswered, you rejected it, on the grounds that you could not answer for the safety of any European Envoy in your country, and that the reception of a British Mission might afford Russia a pretext for forcing you to receive a Russian Mission.

"Although such a refusal to receive a friendly Mission was contrary to the practice of allied States, yet the British Government, unwilling to embarrass Your Highness, accepted your excuses.

"Nevertheless, you have now received a Russian Envoy at your capital at a time when a war was believed to be imminent in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides; thereby not only acting in contradiction to the reasons asserted by you for not receiving a British Mission, but giving to your conduct the appearance of being actuated by motives inimical to the British Government.

"In these circumstances, the British Government, remembering its former friendship with your father, and still desiring to maintain with you amicable relations, determined to send after such delay as the domestic affliction you had suffered rendered fit, a Mission to you under the charge of Sir Neville Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of the Government who is personally known to you. The escort attached to his Mission, not exceeding two hundred men, was much less numerous than that which accompanied you into British territory, and was not more than was necessary for the dignity of my Envoy. Such Missions are customary between friendly neighbouring States, and are never refused except when hostility is intended. I despatched by a trusted messenger a letter informing you that the Mission accredited to you was of a friendly character, that its business was urgent, and that it must proceed without delay.

"Nevertheless, you, having received my letter, did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the frontier to repel the Mission by force. For this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India in the person of Her Envoy, your letter affords no explanation or apology, nor does it contain any answer to my proposal for a full and frank understanding between our two Governments.

"In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier. But I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this, it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank.

"Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory. It is further essential that you should undertake that no injury shall be done by you to the tribes who acted as guides to my Mission, and that reparation shall be made for any damage they have suffered from you; and if any injury be done by you to them, the British Government will at once take steps to protect them. Unless these conditions are accepted fully and plainly by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government."

It will be seen that the letter gave notice that unless the conditions stated in it were accepted by the Amir not later than the 20th November, the Viceroy would be compelled to treat His Highness as a declared enemy of the British Government. No reply having been received by sunset on the evening of the 20th, orders were issued for the immediate advance of British troops from all points, and the second Afghan war began. On the 21st the following Manifesto was published. It was addressed to the Amir, his Sirdars and subjects, and all

the people of Afghanistan. Measures were taken to disseminate\* it widely throughout India and along the frontier, so that people might understand the real object of the British Government in entering upon hostilities, and also that the responsibility for the war rested solely upon the Amir:—

\* For Persian text *vide* Appendix XXXIX.

The Viceroy of India, to the AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN of Kabul, to his Sirdars and subjects, and to all the people of Afghanistan.

"It is now ten years since the Amir Shere Ali Khan, after a prolonged struggle, had at last succeeded in placing himself upon the Throne of Kabul. At that time his dominion still needed consolidation, and the extent of it was still undefined. In these circumstances, the Amir, who had already been assisted by the British Government with money and with arms, expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India. His wish was cordially complied with. He was courteously received, and honorably entertained, by the Viceroy, at Ambala. The countenance and support he had come to seek were then assured to him. He, at the same time, obtained further unconditional assistance in arms and money. These tokens of the good-will of the British Government, which he gratefully acknowledged, materially aided the Amir, after his return to his own country, in their securing his position and extending his authority.



"Since then, the Amir Shere Ali Khan has received from the British Government, in confirmation of its good-will, large additional gifts of arms. The powerful influence of the British Government has secured for him formal recognition, by the Emperor of Russia, of a fixed boundary between the Kingdom of Kabul and the Khanate of Bokhara and Kokand. The Amir's sovereignty over Wakhan and Badakshan was thereby admitted and made sure; a sovereignty which had, till then, been disputed by the Russian Government. His subjects have been allowed to pass freely throughout the Indian Empire, to carry on trade, and to enjoy all the protection afforded by the British Government to its own subjects. In no single instance have they been unjustly or inhospitably treated within British jurisdiction.

"For all these gracious acts the Amir Shere Ali Khan has rendered no return. On the contrary, he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that Province to a British officer of rank, returning from a Mission to a neighbouring State. He has closed against free passage to British subjects, and their commerce, the roads between India and Afghanistan. He has maltreated British subjects, and permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress. He has used cruelty, and put to death, subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government. He has openly and assiduously endeavoured, by words and deeds, to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incite war against the Empire of India. Having previously excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, and refused to receive a British Mission; having left unanswered friendly communications addressed to him by the Viceroy, and repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the British Government and himself; he has, nevertheless, received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul, an Embassy from Russia. This he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation thereto. Furthermore, he has done it, well knowing that the Russian Government stands pledged, by engagements with England, to regard his territories as completely beyond the sphere of Russian influence. Finally, while this Russian Embassy is still at his capital, the Amir has forcibly repulsed, at his outposts, an English Envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy attesting the importance and urgency of the Envoy's Mission.

"Even then the British Government, still anxious to avert the calamities of war, deferred hostile action, and proffered to the Amir a last opportunity of escaping the punishment merited by his acts. Of this opportunity the Amir has refused to avail himself.

"It has been the wish of the British Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State, whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a Prince, whose throne it has helped to support. Animated by this wish, the British Government has made repeated efforts to establish with the Amir Shere Ali Khan those close and cordial relations which are necessary to the interests of the two neighbouring countries. But its efforts, after being persistently repulsed, have now been met with open indignity and defiance.

"The Amir Shere Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government, has thus deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility for the recent acts of the Amir; and, as they have given no offence, so the British Government, wishing to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere with them. Nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

"Upon the Amir Shere Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India."

A description of the military operations which ensued during the winter of 1878-79 does not fall within the scope of this Précis, but it will be convenient to note briefly the several operations of the 21st November and their result.

The column under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne moved out of Peshawur soon after midnight on the morning of the 21st and crossed the British border.

For instructions as to operations to be undertaken on 21st November, *vide* Appendix XL.

Soon after midday on the 21st, Sir Samuel Browne's force opened fire upon the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khaibar Pass, two brigades having been sent round by other routes to turn the enemy's position. The cannonading in front lasted the whole day, and during the night the enemy evacuated the place, abandoning all their guns, ammunition, stores, and camp equipage. The retreating troops were intercepted by two regiments of the 1st Brigade, which had been sent round; and large numbers of prisoners were taken, and the opposing force completely dispersed. The total number of guns taken was twenty-two. Sir Samuel Browne continued his march through the Khaibar without interruption, and halted at Dakka.

General Roberts crossed the British frontier into Afghanistan, from Thul, on the morning of the 21st, his entry being quite unopposed. He then advanced steadily up the Kuram Valley, and occupied the principal post of the district, called Mohamad Azim's Fort. The people of the country furnished supplies, and arrangements were made for maintaining good order and for replacing the Amir's civil authority in the tracts under British military occupation.

From Quetta, General Biddulph moved toward Pishin, which he reached and occupied successfully on the 26th; the supplies were found to be abundant, and the people in no way hostile. The Amir's troops had been withdrawn. The small district of Sibi, which was important, as lying upon the line of our communications, close to Dadur, and as a valuable source of supplies, was occupied by a detachment of British troops on the 23rd.

**171. Review of the political situation by the Secretary of State up to the date of the despatch of the Viceroy's ultimatum to the Amir.**—The following despatch from the Secretary of State recapitulates the principal incidents in the history of the political relations of the British Government with Afghanistan from the Treaty of 1855 up to the reception of the Russian Mission, the rejection of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, and the despatch of the Viceroy's ultimatum to Shere Ali:—

No. 49, Secret, dated India Office, London, 18th November 1878.

From—Secretary of State for India,

To—Government of India.

"The letters\* and telegraphic despatches which your Government has transmitted to me, reporting the circumstances connected with the reception of a Russian Mission at Kabul in July last, and the subsequent rejection by the Amir Shere Ali Khan of the special Embassy accredited to his Court by Your Excellency, have been considered by Her Majesty's Government

\* No. 63 Secret, 5th August 1878.

" 61	"	19th	"	"
" 67	"	26th	"	"
" 79	"	9th September	1878.	
" 86	"	16th	"	"
" 93	"	26th	"	"
" 95	"	3rd October	"	"

with the care due to their importance.

"The various communications which have from time to time passed between the Government at Home and that of India, ending with Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 4th of October last year, contain a complete exposition of the general policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan, and, set forth, moreover, the considerations which lately induced Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to place their relations with the Amir on a more satisfactory footing. In order, however, that no misapprehension may exist on this subject, I deem it advisable to recapitulate some of the leading features of that policy, and to trace the course of events which have led to the present condition of affairs on the frontier.

"Although much difference of opinion has existed, and still exists, amongst eminent

† ARTICLE I.

Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, Wali of Kabul, and of those countries now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Amir, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

ARTICLE II.

The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness' possession, and never to interfere therein.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, Wali of Kabul, and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages, on his own part and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.

‡ Minute, 30th April 1855, in Secret letter No. 3 of 10th May 1855.

tier as complete security against a foreign and distant enemy as it is possible for us in the nature of things to compass.'

"The question, however, has assumed special prominence since the period of the transfer to the Crown of the direct administration of India. The growing interest in the subject has been the result partly of the increased responsibilities assumed by the Government of Her Majesty in maintaining Her Indian Empire, and partly of the intestine disorders to which Afghanistan became a prey after the accession of the present Amir to the throne in the year

authorities on the subject of the frontier policy to be pursued by the Indian Government, that difference has reference rather to the methods to be followed than to the objects in view. The consistent aim of the British Government during a series of years has been to establish on its north-western border a strong, friendly, and independent State, with interests in unison with those of the Indian Government, and ready to act, in certain eventualities, as an auxiliary in the protection of the frontier from foreign intrigue or aggression. The Treaty of 1855† negotiated by Lord Dalhousie, with the approval of Lord Aberdeen's Government, and still in force, bears witness to the importance then attached to friendly relations with Afghanistan. It was described by the Governor-General‡ in words which fully explain its intended effect: 'The Treaty gives to the Government of India on its western frontier

1863. Upon Lord Lawrence devolved the direction of the policy to be adopted in this new state of affairs, and that statesman considered that the objects of the British Government would be best obtained by abstaining from active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and by the friendly recognition of the *de facto* rulers of that country, or of portions of it, without undertaking inconvenient liabilities on their behalf. On this basis Lord Lawrence thought that the British Government would have the greatest chance of gaining the permanent friendship and alliance of the Afghan people. The outposts of Russia were then distant from the borders of Afghanistan, and His Lordship's Government attached no special importance to the probability and danger of the growth of the former Power in the direction of India, which, they considered, would in any case best be restrained or rendered innocuous by a friendly understanding on the subject between the English and Russian Cabinets.

"The views of Her Majesty's Government of that day on the subject of their relations with Afghanistan, were in complete harmony with those of Lord Lawrence. They did not desire to exercise active influence at Kabul, nor to interfere in the conflicts then rife between contending parties in Afghanistan, so long as those conflicts did not jeopardize the peace of the frontier. This policy was therefore adhered to, although not without some inconvenient results, during the civil war which raged for so many years after Shere Ali's accession, and might not unreasonably be thought suited to the circumstances of the time. But the final and unaided success of the Amir in regaining his throne, in the autumn of 1868, in some measure changed the position of affairs, and, in the opinion both of Lord Lawrence and of Her Majesty's Government, justified some intervention in His Highness' favour, and the grant to him of such assistance in money and arms as appeared conducive to the maintenance of his authority.

"The policy followed by Lord Mayo's administration in its dealings with Afghanistan was to a considerable extent in accord with the course of action thus finally adopted in the autumn of 1868 by his predecessor. Whilst, however, Lord Mayo did not deviate, in any material degree, from the attitude of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which had been so long maintained, he recognized Shere Ali as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* ruler of that country, and in a letter addressed to that prince, engaged to view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position. This step, added to the marked personal influence obtained by Lord Mayo over the Amir, was sufficient at the moment to remove a certain feeling of resentment which had been generated in his mind by the apparent indifference shown by the British Government to the result of his struggle for power, and, at the same time, rendered His Highness' position at Kabul more assured than that of any previous ruler.

"The advances of Russia in Central Asia had not, up to this period, assumed dimensions such as to cause uneasiness to the Indian Government. Lord Mayo agreed, therefore, in the views of his predecessor, that the best means of averting interference on the part of the Turkistan authorities in the affairs of Afghanistan would be by a frank interchange of views on that subject between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. Her Majesty's Government had independently arrived at the same conclusion, and early in 1869 initiated friendly negotiations at St. Petersburg, which terminated in a very distinct understanding on this subject, and in the recognition by the Czar's Government of the limits of the Amir's territories, in complete accord with the wishes of Shere Ali and of the British Government.

"The policy of his predecessors was that substantially followed by Lord Northbrook, although the rapid development of events in Central Asia was gradually increasing the difficulty of abstaining from closer relations with the ruler of Kabul. The capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had been given by His Imperial Majesty to England, and which had been communicated to His Highness by the British Government. Actuated by his fears on this score His Highness sent a special Envoy to Simla in the summer of that year, charged with the duty of expressing them to the Government of India.

"Finding that the object of the Amir was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord

\* Telegram from Viceroy, dated 24th July 1873. Northbrook's Government was prepared\* to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Govern-

† Telegram to Viceroy, dated 26th July 1873. ment at home did not share† His Highness' apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Amir that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season.‡ The effect of this announcement on His

‡ Letter from Viceroy, dated 6th September 1873.  
Secret letter, No. 75, dated 15th September "

Highness, although conveyed in conciliatory language, was not favourable; the policy which dictated it was unintelligible to his mind, and he received it with feelings of chagrin and disappointment. His reply to Lord Northbrook's communication was couched in terms of ill-disguised sarcasm; he took no notice of the Viceroy's proposal to depute a British officer to examine the northern frontier of Afghanistan; he subsequently refused permission to Sir Douglas Forsyth to return from Kashgar to India through Kabul; he left untouched a gift of money lodged to his credit by the Indian Government, and generally assumed towards it an attitude of sullen reserve.

"Such was the position of affairs when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office in 1874. The maintenance of Afghanistan as a strong and friendly power had, at all times, been the object of British policy. The method adopted in attaining that object had not met with the success that was desirable. Its accomplishment was, nevertheless, a matter of grave importance, and it had now to be considered with reference to the rapid march of events in Turkistan. Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference the probable influence of those events upon the character of an Asiatic prince whose dominions were thereby brought within a steadily narrowing circle between two great military empires, and although no immediate danger appeared to threaten British interests on the frontier of Afghanistan, the situation in Central Asia had become sufficiently grave to suggest the necessity of timely precaution. Her Majesty's Government considered that the first step necessary was the improvement of their relations with the Amir himself. With this object in view, they deemed it expedient that His Highness should be invited to receive a temporary mission at Kabul, in order that an accredited British Envoy might confer with him personally upon what was taking place, might assure him of the desire of the Queen's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack, and at the same time might point out to him the extreme difficulty of attaining this object unless it were permitted by him to place its own officers on his frontier to watch the course of events beyond it. It was true that the Amir's relations with the Russian Governor-General of Turkistan had of late become more intimate, and that a correspondence which that official had commenced with the Kabul Durbar in 1871, and which, at one time, had caused serious disquiet to the Amir, was being carried on with increased activity, whilst His Highness' original practice of consulting the Indian Government as to the replies to be sent to General Kauffmann's communications had been discontinued. Nevertheless Her Majesty's Government were willing to believe that Shere Ali, if his intentions were friendly, would be ready to join them in measures, advantageous to himself, and essential for the protection of common interests.

"In view of these interests and of the responsibilities which had morally devolved upon the British Government on behalf of Afghanistan, looking also to the imperfect information available in regard to the country in respect to which those responsibilities had been incurred, Lord Northbrook's Government had, in 1873, expressed the opinion that the temporary presence in Afghanistan of a British officer, as then proposed by them, might do much to allay any feelings of mistrust lingering in the minds of the Afghan people, and might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing permanent British representatives at Kabul, Herat, and elsewhere. Encouraged by this opinion, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that, although Lord Northbrook's efforts to attain the desired object had not met with success, the time had come when the measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed. Your predecessor in Council had, indeed, whilst appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from it, frankly represented to Her Majesty's present advisers the difficulties attending the initiation of it; he believed the time and circumstances of the moment to be inopportune for placing British agents on the Afghan borders, and was of opinion that such a step should be deferred till the progress of events justified more specific assurances to Shere Ali, which might then be given in the shape of a Treaty, followed by the establishment of agencies at Herat and other suitable places. Her Majesty's Government, however, were unable to agree in this view; they deemed it probable that if events were thus allowed to march without measures of precaution on the part of the British Government, the time would have passed when representations to the Amir could be made with any probability of a favourable result; and they considered it important that the actual sentiments of His Highness, in reference to which different opinions were held by different authorities, should be tested in good time.

"Accordingly on Your Excellency's departure from England to assume the Viceroyalty, Her Majesty's Government instructed you to offer to Shere Ali that same active countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian Government. It was clearly impossible, however, to enter into any formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the Amir some substantial proof of his unity of interests with the British Government. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore, authorized Your Excellency to concede to His Highness substantial pecuniary aid, a formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression, you were directed not to incur these heavy responsibilities unless Shere Ali, on his part, were prepared to allow a British agent, or agents, access to positions in his territories (other than at Kabul itself), where, without prejudicing the personal authority of the ruler, they could acquire trustworthy information of events likely to threaten the tranquillity or independence of Afghanistan.

"The measures which Your Excellency adopted on your arrival in India to give effect to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were framed with discretion, and in a spirit of consideration towards Shere Ali. You sent your Native Aide-de-camp, Ressaldar-Major Khanan Khan, to that prince, charged with the duty of informing him of your desire to depute temporarily to his capital, or to any other point in Afghan territory agreeable to His Highness, a special Envoy, whose mission was not merely to be one of compliment, but one for the discussion of matters of common interest to the two Governments; and you took care to convey to His Highness verbal assurances of the friendly character of your advances to him. But Shere Ali rejected your overtures and declined to receive your Envoy.



"Your Excellency exhorted the Amir to consider seriously the consequences of an attitude which might end in compelling the British Government to look upon him thenceforth as a prince who voluntarily desired to isolate his interests from those of the British Government. In a conciliatory spirit you abstained from pressing upon him the reception of your Envoy, and you acceded to a suggestion of His Highness that your Vakil at Kabul should make personal representations to you on the Amir's behalf. These representations proved to be a recapitulation of grievances dating from 1872, and were briefly as follows :—

"1. The communication which he had received from the late Viceroy in 1874 on behalf of his rebellious son Yakub Khan, whom he had imprisoned.

"2. The decision on the question of the Seistán boundary.

"3. The gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to the Amir.

"4. The repeated rejection of his previous requests for an alliance and a formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his son, Abdulla Jan.

"These grievances appeared to weigh heavily on His Highness' mind, and you therefore lost no time in assuring Shere Ali, through the Vakil, of the friendly feeling of the British Government towards him, of your desire to remove by a frank exchange of views all causes of irritation on his mind, and of your willingness to accede to his proposal that, in lieu of Sir Lewis Pelly proceeding to Kabul, an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from Your Excellency at Peshawur.

"Your Vakil thereupon returned to Kabul, charged with the duty of explaining to the Amir, with the assistance of a clearly worded *aide memoire*, the favourable treaty which the British Government was prepared, upon certain conditions, to negotiate with him, and its desire to clear up past misunderstandings. His Highness evinced no cordiality in his reception of him; but after some delay he deputed to Peshawur his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, there to carry on with Sir Lewis Pelly the negotiations which Her Majesty's Government had considered of sufficient importance to have taken place on Afghan soil with the Amir himself. Although the Amir had been informed in writing, both of the concessions which the British Government was ready to grant to him and the conditions attached to them, and although, at the same time, it was signified to him that it would be of no avail for him to send his Envoy to Peshawur unless His Highness were prepared to agree to those conditions as the bases of the proposed treaty, it became apparent in the course of the conference that the Minister had received no specific authority to accept them. As, moreover, the language and conduct of Shere Ali, which had so long been dubious, became openly inimical, you judiciously took advantage of the sudden death of His Highness' Envoy to discontinue negotiations, the bases of which had been practically rejected.

"This step on your part, as well as all your proceedings throughout the year preceding the conference, met with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. As observed by my predecessor in his despatch of the 4th October 1877, Her Majesty's Government had felt justified in hoping that the advantages which they were ready to tender to the Amir would have been accepted in the spirit in which they were offered. At the same time, the attitude of His Highness for some years past had been so ambiguous as to prepare them for a different result. Far, however, from regarding the possibility of failure as affording sufficient grounds for total inaction, and continued acquiescence in the existing state of relations with the Amir, they had arrived at the conclusion that while the prevailing uncertainty as to His Highness' disposition rendered caution necessary in their advances, it was in itself a reason for adopting steps which would elicit the truth. From this point of view Her Majesty's Government could not regard the result of the Peshawur conference as altogether unsatisfactory, inasmuch as they were no longer left in doubt as to the reality of the Amir's alienation, which had previously been a matter of speculation. On the other hand, the proceedings at the conference, and the previous negotiations, had placed before the Amir in a clear light the views of Her Majesty's Government as to their existing obligations towards him, and had, at the same time, informed him of the terms, so favourable to his interests, on which they were willing to draw closer the bonds of union between the two countries, and to place their mutual relations on a footing more advantageous to both.

"Their overtures having been thus treated, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that no course was open to them, but to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve until such time as the Amir might better realize his own position and interests. This view had been anticipated by you in the final assurances conveyed to the Afghan Envoy by Sir Lewis Pelly, and your policy since the close of the Peshawur conference has been in accordance with it. Whilst carefully watching the course of affairs in Afghanistan, so far as the imperfect means of obtaining information has admitted, you abstained from all interference in them, in the hope that time would enable His Highness to realize the dangers accruing to himself by the rejection of the friendly advances of the British Government. That hope, however, has not been realized. The Amir has persisted in his unfriendly isolation, and ultimately, having two years ago declined to receive a British Envoy, even temporarily, within his territory, on the ground that he could not guarantee his safety, nor



thereafter be left with any excuse for declining to receive a Russian Mission, he has welcomed with every appearance of ostentation an Embassy from the Czar, despatched to his Court at a time when there were indications that an interruption of friendly relations between this country and Russia might be imminent.

"In these circumstances Your Excellency represented to Her Majesty's Government that a policy of inaction could no longer be persisted in, and that the Amir's reception of the Russian Mission at such a time, and under such circumstances, left him no further excuse for declining to receive at his capital an Envoy from the British Government. Your Excellency proposed, therefore, to demand the reception of a Mission to Kabul, headed by an officer of rank, in the person of Sir Neville Chamberlain, whose name and family were held in high esteem by the Amir.

"This proposal was approved by Her Majesty's Government. It was evident that a potentate who willingly admitted to his capital, at a critical period, Envoys of a Power which at the moment might be regarded as making its advances with objects not friendly to the British Government, could not reasonably refuse to receive a Mission from a Power with which he had continuously been in alliance. Your Excellency in Council did not anticipate any such refusal, and Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to question the soundness of your opinion on this point, based, as it must have been, on the best information at your command.

"The anticipations both of Your Excellency and of Her Majesty's Government were, however, disappointed by the event. In a friendly letter, carried to Kabul by the Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, you informed the Amir of the date on which Sir Neville Chamberlain was to leave Peshawur, and you gave His Highness adequate time in which to issue orders to his local officials for the reception of the Mission. You caused it, moreover, to be intimated to His Highness and his officials that a refusal of free passage to the Mission would be regarded by you as an act of hostility. The orders sent to the Afghan officers at Ali Masjid were, nevertheless, the reverse of what you had a right to expect, and Major Cavagnari, who went in advance of your Envoy, was distinctly informed that any attempt to enter Afghan territory would be resisted by force of which an ostentatious display was at once made.

"This conduct on the part of the Amir was wholly without justification. He was aware from various communications addressed to him by Your Excellency's predecessors, that the Russian Government had given assurances to the Government of Her Majesty to regard his territories as completely beyond its sphere of action; he was equally aware that the whole policy of the British Government, since his accession to the throne, had been to strengthen his power and authority, and to protect him from foreign aggression, although the methods adopted for doing so may not have at all times accorded with His Highness' own views; he had received from the British Government evidence of good-will, manifested by large gifts of money and arms, as well as by its successful efforts in obtaining from the Czar's Government its formal recognition of a fixed boundary, agreeable to himself between his kingdom and the neighbouring Khanates; his subjects had been allowed to pass freely throughout India, to the great benefit of the trade and commerce of his country; and in no single instance has the Amir himself, or any of his people, been treated unjustly or inhospitably within British jurisdiction. By every bond of international courtesy, as well as by the Treaty engagement of 1855 existing between the two countries, binding him to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, the Amir was bound to a line of conduct the reverse of that which he adopted.

"In reporting to Her Majesty's Government the forcible rejection of your friendly Mission, Your Excellency expressed the conviction of the Government of India that this act deprived the Amir of all further claim upon the forbearance of the British Government, and necessitated instant action. Her Majesty's Government were, however, unwilling to accept the evasive letter brought from Kabul by the Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan as Shere Ali's final answer to your Government, and determined to give him a short time for reconsideration. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government acknowledged fully as binding on them the pledges given by Sir Neville Chamberlain to the friendly Chiefs and people who undertook the safe conduct of his Mission, they decided to make an effort to avert the calamities of war, and with this object instructed Your Excellency to address to His Highness a demand, in temperate language, requiring a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront which he has offered to the British Government, the reception of a permanent British Mission within his territories, and reparation for any injury inflicted by him on the tribes who attended Sir Neville Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari, as well as an undertaking not to molest them hereafter. These instructions were promptly carried into effect by Your Excellency's Government, and the Amir has been informed that unless a clear and satisfactory reply be received from him by the 20th November, you will be compelled to consider his intentions as hostile, and to treat him as a declared enemy.

"It only remains for me to assure Your Excellency of the cordial support of Her Majesty's Government in the onerous circumstances in which you are placed, and to state that I have received the commands of Her Majesty to publish this despatch for the general information of the public, in anticipation of the papers connected with the important question with which it deals. Those papers are in course of preparation, but, as they cover a period of not less than fifteen years, they must necessarily be voluminous."

**172. The Russian Mission at Kabul.** M. deGiers denies its existence.—It will be convenient to insert here a brief account of the proceedings of the Russian Mission, the arrival of which at Kabul has been described in paragraphs 152 and 153 of this Précis

At first, when questioned on the subject, responsible Russian officials strenuously denied that any Mission had been sent to Kabul, or even that the despatch of one had ever been contemplated. Thus in a despatch, dated 3rd July 1878, Lord A. Loftus, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, described an interview on the previous day with M. deGiers in which the latter had positively stated that no Russian representative had been instructed, either by the Imperial Government at St. Petersburg or by the Governor-General of Turkistan, to proceed to Kabul, and that there was no intention of sending one there.

Lord Augustus then observed that, for some time past, a Russian Agent had resided at Kabul, and that intrigues had been apparently carried on with a view to create dissension between the Amir of Afghanistan and the Indian Government. This course was not in conformity with the arrangements entered into between the Governments of England and Russia, and, if continued, it must inevitably produce results prejudicial to the maintenance of good relations between the two Governments.

M. deGiers replied that there had been a moment when war between England and Russia appeared to be almost imminent, and that, under those circumstances, no doubt the military commanders conceived it to be their duty to take such measures as might be necessary and serviceable to their country. He denied, however, as far as he was aware, that there had been any intrigues with the Amir of Kabul of the nature to which Lord Augustus had alluded. The only diplomatic measure which he had taken was to send M. Bakouline, the Russian Consul at Astrabad, to Meshed, to watch the movements of Captains Napier and Butler, who were reported to be inciting the Turkoman tribes to hostilities against Russia.

As Her Majesty's Government subsequently ascertained on excellent authority that the projects of despatching a Russian Mission to Kabul was discussed three times at the Council of Ministers,\* the task of reconciling M. deGiers' explanations with that precision of statement which among western nations is called Truth, becomes exceedingly difficult.

**173. Her Majesty's Government instruct the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to request the withdrawal of the Russian Mission.** M. deGiers' reply and M. Bartholomei's explanations to Lord Salisbury.—In a letter, dated 8th August, the telegrams, cited in the early part of this Chapter, which passed between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State on the subject of the reported arrival of a Russian Mission at Kabul were laid by Lord Cranbrook before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Attention was drawn to the repeated declarations† made in 1869, 1874, 1875, and 1876 by the Russian Government in

\* According to an article in the *Journal de St. Petersburg*, dated 9th-21st December 1878, orders regarding the despatch of a Mission to Kabul were sent to General Kauffmann in April 1878.

† On the 24th February-7th March 1869, Prince Gortchakow wrote to Baron Brunnow as follows:—"Vous pouvez donc, mon cher Baron, réitérer au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. B. l'assurance positive que S. M. Impériale considère l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de la sphère où la Russie peut être appelée à exercer son influence. Aucune intervention ou interférence quelconque contraire à l'indépendance de cet Etat n'entre dans ses intentions." On the 28th January 1874, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that, in a conversation with the Russian Chancellor, His Highness had expressed himself in the following terms:—"As regards Afghanistan, His Highness (Prince Gortchakow) repeated to me that the Imperial Government considered that kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might in the internal state of that country, the Imperial Government would not interfere." This intelligence was confirmed by Prince Gortchakow himself in a despatch addressed to Count Brunnow, which was communicated to Her Majesty's Government on the 17th February 1874. His Highness wrote:—"J'ai réitéré à Lord A. Loftus l'assurance positive que le Cabinet Impérial persiste à considérer l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de sa sphère d'action"—a declaration which was quoted by the Prince in a memorandum enclosed in a despatch to Count Schouvaloff, dated 5th April 1875. Finally on the 3rd-15th February 1876, the Chancellor issued the following instructions to the Russian Ambassador in London:—"Veuillez dire à S. E. d'ordre de Notre Auguste Maître que nous adhérons entièrement aux conclusions d'après lesquelles en maintenant, de part et d'autre l'arrangement convenu quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan, qui demeurerait en dehors de la sphère d'action de la Russie, les deux Cabinets considéraient comme closes les discussions reconnues peu pratiques relatives à la zone neutre et à la zone intermédiaire."

"It is only necessary further to mention that, in 1869, Prince Gortchakow expressed to Sir A. Buchanan, then Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, his concurrence with the late Lord Mayo's views, that Russian Agents should not visit Kabul.

Sir A. Buchanan, to Earl of Clarendon, dated 2nd November 1869.

respect to Afghanistan to the effect that that country lay beyond the sphere of Russian influence, and that Russian Agents should not visit Kabul. Lord Cranbrook observed :—

"The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of *absolute* non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State during the same period has been shaped in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Kabul, to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence; and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been, in the interests of peace, to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

"It is true that the Russian Government has denied the reality of any such step on its part as that now reported. M. deGiers has formally stated, in fact, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that no such Mission as that referred to by Lord Lytton has been, or was intended to be, sent to Kabul by the Imperial Government, or by General Kauffmann; he has, with equal emphasis, denied the existence of intrigues between General Kauffmann and Shere Ali. But, in the face of the particulars now received from India, corroborated, as they are, from other sources,\* Viscount Cranbrook cannot pretend to accept as satisfactory these denials.

"Assuming the truth of the facts reported, it appears that, contrary to all engagements with England, a Russian Mission has found its way to the Amir of Kabul, who has received it, either willingly or under pressure, without reference to the Indian Government. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men moving through the Turkoman country, and on the line of the Oxus, and converging on points which may be said to directly menace the safety and integrity of Afghanistan.

"To meet this difficulty, the Viceroy has proposed, as a preliminary measure, to insist on the reception by the Amir of a suitable British Mission at Kabul—a proposal which, as will be seen from the telegram quoted in the margin, the Secretary of State for India has deemed it expedient to sanction.

"But Lord Cranbrook cannot consider this step as adequate in itself to the occasion, and is strongly of opinion that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be at once instructed to address the Russian Cabinet upon the proceedings of the Russian authorities in Turkistan.

"It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agents, and it is the Russian Governor-General of Turkistan, rather than the Amir Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India.

"In view of the gravity of the situation, the Secretary of State for India may safely leave to Lord Salisbury, who has a full knowledge of the question, the adoption of such language at St. Petersburg as he may think best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."

A despatch in the general sense of Lord Cranbrook's remarks was then addressed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he was desired to mention to Prince Gortchakow the reports which has reached Her Majesty's Government, and to enquire whether there was any foundation for them. It was to be made known to His Highness that proceedings of the kind referred to, would cause uneasiness in India and dissatisfaction in England; and, should it prove that there was any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission had proceeded to Kabul, the British Ambassador was to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it might be at once withdrawn as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from His Highness.

On the 14th and 15th August, Mr. Plunkett, the British Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, reported the results of further communications with M. deGiers. The latter, whilst acknowledging that steps had been taken in Central Asia in view of the probability of war with England, declared that all had now been stopped, and asserted positively that no measures, either military or political, were being at present taken against England

Mr. Plunkett had referred to the conversation on the 2nd July between M. deGiers and Lord Augustus Loftus, and had enquired, with regard to the fact that danger of war between England and Russia had now happily passed

M. deGiers, to Lord A. Loftus.  
Lord A. Loftus, to Marquis of Salisbury, dated 3rd July 1878.

\* Lord A. Loftus, to Marquis of Salisbury—  
12th April 1878.  
11th May 1878.  
3rd July 1878, &c.

Enclosures of letters from Political Secretary, India Office, No. 79 A., dated 8th August, and No. 87, dated 5th September.

away, what measures had been taken for arresting the march of the Russian columns which had left Tashkend and Krasnovodsk, and whether it was true that the Russian Envoy or Agent was still residing at Kabul.

After carefully weighing his words, M. deGiers replied that in questions of military movements, he could not be answerable for the details with which he was naturally not acquainted; he could only answer for the principles which had been laid down for the policy of the Government. He was able to assure Mr. Plunkett that it was not true that any Russian emissary had proceeded to Kabul with any letters from the Emperor to the Amir.

Possibly there might have been a letter from General Kauffmann. Orders had been given to arrest the march of all the columns which had been put in movement from Tashkend, and, as a matter of fact, he was under the impression that the troops had already resumed their old stations. M. deGiers twice repeated his assurance that all the special measures which had been taken in Central Asia, and which Russia had as much right to take, in view of the impending risk of war, as Great Britain had had to bring Indian troops to Malta, had been stopped; and he asserted positively that, at the present moment, no military measures whatever were being taken which could give umbrage to the British Government.

In answer to the question whether equally satisfactory assurances could be given in respect to the political steps which had been undertaken in view of complications with Great Britain, M. deGiers at once replied—

“Everything has been stopped. The political as well as the military precautions which we thought ourselves justified in taking against you—everything has been stopped.”

The instructions issued to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg have been described. In accordance with them Mr. Plunkett, having failed to secure an interview with M. deGiers before the latter's departure to join the Czar in the Crimea, addressed that gentleman an official note, dated 26th August, to which after a delay of some days he received the following reply:—

Dated Livadia, 27th August-8th September 1879.

From—M. DE GIERS, Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

To—F. R. PLUNKETT, Esq., Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg.

“Ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui que je me trouve en mesure de répondre à la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 14-26 courant et qui m'est parvenu durant mon voyage.

“Soit en reconnaissant la parfaite exactitude des citations faites dans cette pièce, je ne puis que confirmer ce que j'ai en déjà l'honneur de vous dire, c'est que les dispositions du Gouvernement Impérial dans la question de l'Asie Centrale dont ces citations reproduisent les témoignages, ont dû nécessairement subir le contre coup des conditions politiques dans lesquelles l'attitude de l'Angleterre nous a placé durant la dernière crise en Orient. Mais dans les circonstances actuelles, ces dispositions sont les mêmes que jadis et de nature à n'inspirer aucune défiance au Gouvernement Anglais.

“Je dois ajouter que la Mission qu'à tort vous attribuez au Général Abramof est d'un caractère provisoire et de pure courtoisie; elle ne peut dès lors porter la moindre atteinte aux assurances pacifiques que vous mentionnez.

“J'aime à espérer que les explications que M. Bartholomey a déjà été chargé de donner à Lord Salisbury à ce sujet auront suffisamment éclairci la situation.”

With regard to these explanations it may be observed that the communications made by Mon. Bartholomei to Lord Salisbury were generally to the same effect as those by M. deGiers. He stated that the military and political measures adopted in Turkistan were actuated by the necessities of the situation caused by the state of affairs in regard to Turkey, and were called forth especially by the attitude of Great Britain towards Russia. General Kauffmann's proceedings must therefore be regarded as the result of a course imposed upon him by the force of circumstances. With regard to the letter from the Emperor which was supposed to have been transmitted to the Amir Shere Ali Khan, M. Bartholomei was authorized to state that there had never been any question of sending such a letter.

**174. General proceedings of the Russian Mission. Return of General Stoletoff to Tashkend accompanied by an Afghan Embassy.**—According to a letter from Tashkend in the *Russki Mir* of the



3rd-15th October 1878, the Russian Embassy, consisting of Major-General Stoletoff, who was accompanied by Colonel Rosgonoff, four interpreters, and twenty-two Cossacks, left Samarkand for Kabul on the 2nd-14th July. Its professed object was to open direct commercial relations with Afghanistan, as well as with India, and also to express to Shere Ali the Russian appreciation of his attitude during the Russo-Turkish war.

On the 6th-18th July the Embassy reached Mazár-i-Sharif, the Governor of which town had been instructed by the Amir to conduct the Embassy to Kabul. On their arrival the Governor was too ill to accompany them, and after a few days died. The Embassy then proceeded, accompanied only by an escort, and on the 29th July\* reached Kabul, where in accordance with the Amir's orders they were

\* 10th August.—N. S.

lodged close to the palace.

On the following day the Amir formally received the Embassy in the presence of his Ministers and Court officials. According to the accounts of witnesses the Amir was extremely gracious, and ordered that the Russians should be shown everything of note in the town. Ceremonial dinners were given, and a large parade took place in honor of the Embassy.

Further, the Amir, in order to express the extent of his appreciation of Russia's friendship, enquired whether it would be possible for some Afghan officials to accompany General Stoletoff to Tashkend, in order that they might personally testify to General Kauffmann the great honor which had been done the Amir by the despatch of an Embassy to him. Consequently, when General Stoletoff returned to Tashkend on the 3rd-15th September, he was attended by an Afghan Mission comprising of Munshi Mahomed Hassan, described as Minister of the Interior, a Colonel in personal attendance on the Amir, and three other persons. They were well received at Tashkend, and the following paltry presents—judged by Indian notions—were bestowed on them, *viz.*, Munshi Mahomed Hassan, a silver goblet with cover, the Colonel, a silver mug, and the others a silver cup each; some cloth and a silver cigar-case were also given to each of them. There was a talk of the Afghan Embassy being sent on to St. Petersburg. In Appendix XLII will be found a collection of papers relating to the proceedings of the Russian Mission at Kabul, a description of the route followed, and also of extracts from Russian newspapers on the policy of England and Russia in Central Asia.

**175. Further steps taken by the British Government in regard to the retention of the Russian Mission at Kabul after withdrawal of the Russian Envoy. Exchange of notes between Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff.**—It has been seen that General Stoletoff arrived at Tashkend on his return from Kabul on the 3rd-15th September; he left behind him at Kabul the following members of his Mission: Colonel Rosgonoff, M. Malevinski, M. Benedersky, M. Nasirov and Zamat Beg—these no doubt are the persons said to have accompanied the Amir in his flight from Kabul after the commencement of the war. On the 10th December 1878, in a conversation with Lord Salisbury, Count Schouvaloff mentioned that though the Russian Envoy who had been sent to Afghanistan had been recalled to Russia, the Russian Mission still remained at Kabul. Lord Salisbury expressed great surprise at this statement, which was entirely new to Her Majesty's Government, and pointed out to Count Schouvaloff the untenable position taken up by the Russian Government, which admitted that the despatch of a Mission had been an infraction of the understanding existing between the two countries only justified by the probability of war, but which now continued to maintain the Mission long after friendly relations had been fully re-established; and earnestly urged the expediency of withdrawing the Mission, the continued presence of which was entirely at variance with the engagements which were still in force between England and Russia. Count Schouvaloff admitted that the course followed by the Russian Government was abnormal, and asked whether Lord Salisbury admitted that the British Government had engaged to respect the independence of Afghanistan, basing his



contention that such an engagement had been made upon the memorandum contained in Lord Derby's despatch to Mr. Doria of the 25th October 1875.

Lord Salisbury said that all the engagements which the British Government had taken, or which the Russian Government had taken, in that correspondence were regarded as still binding; but he could not admit that the words used by Lord Derby went so far as to make the maintenance of the independence of Afghanistan a matter of engagement on the part of England towards Russia.

At a subsequent conversation on the 12th December the discussion was renewed.

Count Schouvaloff intimated clearly that it was the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to withdraw their Mission. At the same time he again asked whether he might consider the understanding formerly arrived at with respect to Central Asia to be still in vigour; and whether the British Government admitted that the recognition of Afghanistan as an independent State under British influence formed part of that understanding. He relied especially upon the language of the Memorandum of 1875.

Lord Salisbury said that England would adhere to all the undertakings she had given. The Memorandum did not, however, in the judgment of Her Majesty's Government, bear the construction which Count Schouvaloff placed upon it, and, therefore, it could not be admitted that England was under any engagement with respect to the independence of Afghanistan; but it might be seen from the speeches of Ministers in public that the maintenance of Afghanistan as an independent State under British influence was the policy which at present we desired to pursue.

Ultimately these conversations were reproduced in the following official communications:—

Londres, le 7-19 Decembre 1878.

De—COUNT SCHOUVALOFF,  
To—MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

“Vous avez exprimé de la surprise en apprenant que la Mission Russe que vous avez cru avoir quitté Cabool s'y trouvait encore. Vous m'avez rappelé la déclaration faite par M. le Sénateur de Giers au Chargé d'Affaires Britannique, concernant le caractère provisoire de cette Mission, envoyée dans des circonstances exceptionnelles et lorsqu'il était à craindre en effet qu'une guerre n'éclatât entre l'Angleterre et la Russie.

“J'ai reçu un télégramme du Prince Gortchakow dans lequel il me charge de vous demander si les arrangements entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, tels qu'ils existaient avant l'envoi de la Mission et tels qu'ils sont consignés dans la correspondance échangée à ce sujet entre les deux Cabinets, sont maintenus par le Gouvernement de la Reine, et s'ils conservent à ses yeux leur caractère obligatoire.

“Sa Majesté l'Empereur est disposé, pour sa part, à observer tous les arrangements relatifs à l'Asie Centrale conclus entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et à rappeler immédiatement la Mission Russe qui se trouve à Cabool.

Dated Foreign Office, London, 19th December 1878.

From—MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
To—COUNT SCHOUVALOFF.

“In reply to your letter of this day's date, I have the honor to state to Your Excellency that the continued presence of the Russian Mission at Kabul is the sole obstacle to a full revival of the understanding between the two Powers expressed in the correspondence which has passed between them upon the subject of Afghanistan and Central Asia; and when the Russian Mission is withdrawn, Her Majesty's Government will consider that all engagements on both sides with respect to those countries retain their obligatory character.”

On the 19th December, Lord Salisbury was informed by Count Schouvaloff that instructions had been sent on the 15th December to the Russian Mission to withdraw from Kabul.

**176. The Amir's reply to the Viceroy's ultimatum.**—A brief description of the chief political events which supervened during the continuance of hostilities and of the negotiations which ultimately terminated in the

conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak will bring this Précis to an appropriate conclusion. It has been seen that the Amir failed to reply within the stipulated period to the Viceroy's ultimatum of the 29th October; his answer, however, did eventually arrive. On the 30th November a subordinate officer of the Kabul Government reached the British Camp at Dakka and delivered a letter from the Amir to the address of the Viceroy. It was ascertained that this messenger had reached Basawal on the 22nd November, when, having received intelligence of the capture of Ali Masjid by British troops, he immediately returned to Kabul. The Amir's letter, though dated 19th November, was believed to have been re-written at Kabul after news of the fall of Ali Masjid. The text of this letter, which is given in full below, was telegraphed to the Secretary of State on the 7th December. On the 9th, Lord Cranbrook replied pointing out that it evaded all the requirements specified in the Viceroy's ultimatum, and could not have been accepted even if it had reached before the 20th November. He authorized the Government of India, if a suitable opportunity should arise, to reply to the effect that the British Government had every desire to maintain peace and close friendship with the Government and people of Afghanistan, but that there could be no cessation of hostilities or negotiations for terms of peace until a clear and unequivocal submission was tendered by the Amir.

Translation of letter from His Highness the Amir of Kabul, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 19th November 1878.

"Be it known to Your Excellency that I have received, and read from beginning to end, the friendly letter which Your Excellency has sent in reply to the letter I despatched by Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan. With regard to the expressions used by Your Excellency in the beginning of your letter, referring to the friendly character of the Mission and the good-will of the British Government, I leave it to Your Excellency, whose wisdom and justice are universally admitted, to decide whether any reliance can be placed upon good-will, if it be evidenced by words only. But if, on the other hand, good-will really consists of deeds and actions, then, it has not been manifested by the various wishes that have been expressed, and the proposals that have been made by British officials during the last few years to officials of this God-granted Government,—proposals which, from their nature, it was impossible for them to comply with.

"One of these proposals referred to my undutiful son, the ill-starred wretch, Mahomed Yakub Khan, and was contained in a letter addressed by the officials of the British Government to the British Agent then residing in Kabul. It was written in that letter that if the said Yakub Khan be released and set at liberty, our friendship with the Afghan Government will be firmly cemented; but that otherwise it will not.

"There are several other grounds of complaint of similar nature which contain no evidence of good-will; but which, on the contrary, were effective in increasing the aversion and apprehension already entertained by the subjects of this God-granted Government.

"With regard to my refusal to receive the British Mission, Your Excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British Government.

"I assure Your Excellency that, on the contrary, the officials of this God-granted Government, in repulsing the Mission, were not influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British Government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should be offered; but they were afraid that the independence of this Government might be affected by the arrival of the Mission, and that the friendship which has now existed between the two Governments for several years might be annihilated.

"A paragraph in Your Excellency's letter corroborates the statement which they have made to this Government. The feelings of apprehension which were aroused in the minds of the people of Afghanistan by the mere announcement of the intention of the British Government to send a Mission to Kabul, before the Mission itself had actually started or arrived at Peshawur, have subsequently been fully justified by the statement in Your Excellency's letter that I should be held responsible for any injury that might befall the tribes who acted as guides to the Mission, and that I should be called upon to pay compensation to them for any loss they might have suffered; and that, if at any time those tribes should meet with ill-treatment at my hands, the British Government would at once take steps to protect them. Had these apprehensions proved groundless, and had the object of the Mission been really friendly, and no force or threats of violence used, the Mission would, as a matter of course, have been allowed a free passage, as such Missions are customary and of frequent occurrence between allied States. I am now sincerely stating my own feelings when I say that this Government has maintained, and always will maintain, the former friendship which existed between the two Governments, and cherishes no feelings of hostility and opposition towards the British Government.

"It is also incumbent upon the officials of the British Government, that, out of respect and consideration for the greatness and eminence of their own Government, they should not consent to inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours, and to impose the burden of grievous troubles upon the shoulders of their sincere friends; but, on the contrary, they should exert themselves to maintain the friendly feelings which have hitherto existed towards this God-granted Government, in order that the relations between the two Governments may remain on the same footing as before; and if, in accordance with the custom of allied States, the British Government should desire to send a purely friendly and temporary Mission to this country, with a small escort not exceeding 20 or 30 men, similar to that which attended the Russian Mission, this servant of God will not oppose its progress."

**177. Flight of the Amir from Kabul and release of Sirdar Yakub Khan.**—On the 29th December Major Cavagnari telegraphed from Ali Baghan the receipt of authentic intelligence of the Amir's flight from Kabul to Afghan-Turkistan. He was accompanied by the remaining members of the Russian Mission, and Sirdar Yakub Khan, who had been released from confinement, had assumed charge of Kabul. The news have been brought by Ghulam Nakshband Khan, a pensioned Ressaldar of the Bengal Cavalry now residing in Kabul. Before his departure the Amir appeared to have lost all authority at Kabul, while his army had been weakened by numerous desertions. The country between Jelalabad and Kabul was described to be in a state of anarchy.

There appears to be no doubt that the Amir's object in leaving his capital was to proceed to St. Petersburg, and there endeavour to secure Russian aid or intervention in behalf of his cause. This intention is clearly expressed in the annexed letter addressed by the Amir to the officers of the British Government in which he proclaims that the arena of his dispute with the British Government will shortly be transferred to St. Petersburg, there to be decided in accordance with equity by a Congress of all Europe. This epistle was probably composed as a response to the British manifesto of the 21st November; it was brought in by Ghulam Nakshband Khan who received it from the Amir:—

Letter from the AMIR SHER ALI KHAN, to the Officers of the British Government, dated 13th December 1878.

"Be it known to the Officers of British Government that this supplicant before God never supposed nor wished that the matters (in dispute) between you and myself should come to this issue (literally, 'should come out from the curtain'), or that the veil of friendship and amity which has for many years been upheld between two neighbours and adjoining States should without any cause be thus drawn aside.

"And since you have begun the quarrel, and hostilities, and have advanced on Afghan territory, this supplicant before God, with the unanimous consent and advice of all the nobles, grandees, and of the army in Afghanistan, having abandoned his troops, his realm, and all the possessions of his crown, has departed with expedition, accompanied by a few attendants, to St. Petersburg, the capital of the Czar of Russia, where

\* The English word is used. before a Congress\* the whole history of the transactions between myself and yourselves will be submitted to all the Powers (of Europe). If you have anything in dispute with me regarding State affairs in Afghanistan, you should institute and establish your case at St. Petersburg, and state and explain what you desire; so that the questions in dispute between us may be made known and clear to all the Powers. And surely the side of right will not be overlooked. If your intentions are otherwise, and you entertain hostile and vindictive feelings toward the people of Afghanistan, God alone is their protector and real preserver. Upon the course of action here above stated, this supplicant before God has resolved and decided."

**178. Measures taken by the Government of India to ascertain Yakub Khan's sentiments. The Sirdar's reply.**—The Amir's flight and the restoration of Yakub Khan to liberty and power disclosed new possibilities. Instructions were immediately (21st December) issued to Major Cavagnari desiring him to use every endeavour to open communication with Yakub Khan. The latter might be assured of the friendly disposition of the British Government but no pledges of personal support were to be offered. It might be explained that the quarrel of the British Government was with his father; it had no quarrel with him unless he resumed hostilities. Major Cavagnari was further directed to abstain from all interfer-

ence in Kabul or in the country intervening between Jelalabad and the capital, and to take every opportunity of explaining to the people and Sirdars that the British quarrel was with the Amir alone and ceased with his flight, and that the British Government was anxious to renew the old friendship existing between the two countries, and would not continue hostilities unless driven to it by acts of hostility on their part.

In accordance with these instructions Major Cavagnari addressed the following letter to Yakub Khan, having selected as the bearer one Taj Mahomed Khan of Gandamak, who was related by marriage to the family of Shahghassi \* Ataulla Khan, an adherent of Yakub's. He was instructed to carefully ascertain the feelings of the Sirdar before he delivered the letter, and only to give it if confident that Yakub was friendly disposed, otherwise he was to return it :—

\* Corruption of Ishak Akassi, Master of the Ceremonies.

Translation of a letter addressed by MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, to SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Kabul, dated Jelalabad, 29th December 1878.

"It was with great satisfaction that I received the pleasing intelligence of your release from imprisonment, and I trust that your health has in no way been impaired by the restraint you have undergone. You are, no doubt, aware that the British Government has always felt a deep interest in you, and moreover endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between you and your father, which unfortunately was misinterpreted by your father into a desire to interfere in his private affairs.

"I beg to assure you of the friendly disposition of the British Government; that the quarrel of that Government was entirely with your father; and that I hope that nothing will occur to change in any way those friendly feelings the Government has always borne towards yourself, and the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan."

To this letter Yakub replied—

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated Monday, 19th Muharrum 1296 A. H.—13th January 1879.

"I have read your friendly letter, and have understood the whole of it from beginning to end. Seeing that the illustrious British Government is a great Government, it was necessary and fitting that it should act towards its friends and neighbours in accordance with the rule of friendship and magnanimity. Now I call on you, yourself, to judge whether the manner in which you have come and entered upon the provinces in our possession is not far removed from the rule and law of friendship—in fact, is so opposed to magnanimity and the behaviour of the great towards friends and neighbours that there is no necessity to expatiate further on the matter.

"Such action is quite incompatible with the lofty spirit of the officers of this Government which is the gift of God,\* for the officers of the Government of Afghanistan have never meditated enmity or estrangement with any State, and never will do so; but have remained firm and constant in the path of friendship. As far as lies in our capacity and strength, we shall not be found wanting. What more need be written?"

**179. Further communication from Sirdar Yakub Khan. Death of Amir Shere Ali. Conditions of peace offered to Sirdar Yakub.**—No answer was sent by Major Cavagnari to Yakub's letter of the 13th January, the tone of which was anything but friendly. At length, however, Yakub himself reopened communications in the annexed letter, dated 20th February, in which he expressed himself desirous of making peace if this were possible. This letter was followed a week later by another, dated 26th February, announcing the death, on the 21st February, of his father Shere Ali :—

Translation of a letter, dated Thursday, 20th February 1879, from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

"Previous to this I received from you a kind letter couched in friendly and sympathizing terms.

"As the substance of that letter was friendship and kindness, and as it contained no clear and obvious expression which might form a basis for the settlement of the trivial dispute and the removal of the accidental (temporary) hostility which have occurred, I also, in my reply, confined myself to the expression of friendship and fidelity, in the hope that I should speedily

\* Or, perhaps, the translation might be more correctly made thus: "such action as this cannot be acquiesced in by the officers of this Government, for, &c."—(Ed.) W. J.

receive a second letter from you which might form a basis for (or allude to?) friendship and for the removal of the accidental (temporary) hostility, and which I would certainly have replied to in a becoming and proper manner.

"Up to the present you have shown delay and hesitation, and, as you made no effort for their attainment (in sending it, *i.e.*, the 'second letter'), I did not know what advantage it was which you had in view, or what result it was which you desired.

"Therefore, considering that delay in the attainment of what is desired tends to the extreme loss and injury of both parties, and with a view merely to the welfare of both sides, and the advantage of both States, I have not thought it proper to delay any longer.

"It were better if the dispute were adjusted and the hostility removed from both sides.

"For that reason I write in a friendly way to say that I wish to use every exertion in this matter, so that through the favour of God, and human endeavour, I may adjust the accidental quarrel, and remove the trivial hostility which have arisen between the two States, and may also obtain for myself very great credit on account of the benefit accruing to both parties. But I know not whether this accidental hostility and this petty dispute are capable of removal and adjustment, or not.

"As I have a constant and firm trust in the officers of the illustrious British Government, and as they have the power in this good work of getting me a good name, I hope and desire that as is proper and becoming, they will exert themselves in the adjustment of this matter and not prefer hostility and quarrelling to harmony and friendship.

"It is clear that in enmity and strife there will be very great loss and injury to both parties; and no other result will be obtained.

"Should this matter be susceptible of arrangement and adjustment, I hope you will kindly inform me, so that I may, in a similar manner, bring every human effort to bear on my exalted father in the hope that, perhaps, the friendship of this God-granted State with the illustrious British Government may remain constant and firm."

---

Translation of a letter, dated 26th February 1879, from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

Previous to this I sent you a letter dated the 29th of the month of Safar (21st February 1879), designed for the establishment of relations of friendship and the settlement of the quarrel which has broken out between the British and Afghan States, and stating that if the matter were capable of adjustment, I would undertake to step in and use my endeavours to that end. That letter you, no doubt, have received.

"I now write a second time, in accordance with former friendship, to inform you that to-day, Wednesday, the 4th Rabi-ul-awal (the 26th February 1879), a letter was received by post from Turkistan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon Friday, 29th Safar (the 21st February 1879), obeyed the call of the summoner and, throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the Divine mercy. Since every living thing must relinquish the robe of life, and must drink the draught of death, I remain resigned and patient under this heavy calamity and misfortune.

"As my exalted father was an ancient friend of the illustrious British Government, I have, out of friendship, sent you this intimation."

This second letter was delivered by Shahghassi Shah Surwar Khan, nephew of Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, who, having received instructions to travel rapidly, had only spent two days on the road. Sirdars Ahmed Ali and Ibrahim Khan were said to have fled from Kabul. On the 5th March, Major Cavagnari replied expressing in suitable terms sympathy and regret for the death of Shere Ali; his letter was addressed to *Sirdar* Yakub Khan, no intimation having as yet been received that Yakub had succeeded his father. On the 7th March Bakhtiar Khan was despatched bearing the following letter in reply to Yakub's of the 20th February, and explaining the terms upon which the British Government was prepared to arrange a peace and revive its friendly alliance with Afghanistan. It was decided that this letter also should not be addressed to Yakub as *Amir*, but that suitable courteous expressions should be used in the body of the letter:—

Letter, dated 7th March 1879, from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, to SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, in reply to the Sirdar's letter, dated 20th February 1879.

"I have received the letter, dated 20th February, which Your Highness has sent me; and it has been laid before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

"His Excellency has instructed me to reply to Your Highness that it has always been the desire of the British Government to maintain peace and friendship with the Government, the Sirdars, and the people of Afghanistan. The events which caused the rupture of friendly relations between the two Governments, and which compelled the British Government to declare war against the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, have been publicly proclaimed, and are well known to Your Highness.



"His Excellency the Viceroy has now received with satisfaction the expression of Your Highness' anxiety for the renewal of friendship between the two Governments, and the assurance of your desire to make every exertion for that purpose. I am consequently authorized to communicate to you the preliminary conditions upon which, if they are agreed to, the Viceroy is prepared to entertain negotiations for the conclusion of peace, and for the restoration of a friendly alliance between the two Governments.

"In the first place, the following arrangements respecting the territories now in possession of the British forces are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-West Frontier of India :—

"1.—The Amir of Kabul must renounce all claim to authority over the Khaibar and Michni Passes leading from Jelalabad into the Peshawur District, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these passes.

"2.—The district of Kuram, from Thull to the crest of the Shuturgardan Pass, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi, will remain under the protection and control of the British Government.

"In the next place, the foreign relations of the Kabul Government must be henceforth conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; and European British officers, accredited to the Kabul Government, must be permitted to reside with suitable personal guards, at such places in Afghanistan as may hereafter be determined upon.

"It is necessary for the conclusion of any friendly settlement of affairs between the two countries that the Government at Kabul shall agree to these preliminary conditions: the Viceroy will thereupon be prepared to enter into negotiations for peace and a cordial alliance, on a basis conducive to the common advantage of the two countries and to the stability and prosperity of the Kabul Ruler."

**180. Return of Bakhtiar Khan with Yakub Khan's reply to Major Cavagnari's letter, dated 7th March, and with a separate letter from Yakub to the Viceroy. Proposal to send a British Mission under Major Cavagnari to Kabul.**—On the 16th March, Bakhtiar Khan returned to Jelalabad, bringing two letters from Yakub. One of these, dated 13th March, was addressed to the Viceroy. It announced the death of Shere Ali on the 21st February and continued—

"This melancholy occurrence caused me much sorrow and pain, and for three days I continued mourning. When the mourning was over, both the nobility and the populace of Afghanistan having gathered together, in accordance with the will made by my late father, unanimously acknowledged me the Amir and Governor of this God-granted Government, and tendered their allegiance to me.

"Since my much lamented father was an old friend of the sublime British Government and of Your Excellency, I have communicated this sad news to you. There is no doubt that this mournful event will cause Your Excellency trouble and pain; but in truth I expect more than this from a great Government like Your Excellency's. Since there is no other expedient to resort to but patience, I resign myself to the will of the Almighty, and it is necessary that Your Excellency should also do the same, and always gratify me with the happy news of Your Excellency's good health, so that the basis of the friendly relations between the two Governments may be made firm, and the ties of amity and friendship strengthened."

A translation of Yakub's reply to Major Cavagnari's letter of the 7th March is annexed. Briefly, the only condition which Yakub declined to accept was that which provided for the renunciation of his authority over the Khaibar and Michni Passes, and the independent tribes in the vicinity, and for the retention of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi under British protection and control. With regard to the reception of European British officers, Yakub specially stipulated that they should reside at Kabul only and should abstain from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan :—

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, dated, Wednesday, 12th March 1879.

"Your friendly letter, dated the 7th March, in reply to my letter, has been received by the hands of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan; and the whole of the contents have been fully understood. You state that you had submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy my former letter, which was simply designed for the renewal of friendship and the removal of the accidental enmity, and that His Excellency had instructed you to reply to it. You then state the object and desire of the British Government in three sentences, in detail, which I fully comprehended.

"In reply, I beg to say that I wrote to you before expressing my earnest desire, in the event of your agreeing to use every effort to restore friendship and remove enmity between the two contending parties, thereby gaining for myself a good name; and I also expressed a hope that the British Government, as it had the power, would, in this matter, get a good name for me.

"I expressed that wish before the death of my father. When my father died, and the Government and Amirship of Afghanistan, by the decision of the whole of the people of Afghanistan (all the chiefs and nobles and people having come and sworn allegiance) devolved upon me, I considered that it would be well for the welfare of both States if by any means strife and enmity could be changed into harmony and friendship, and the former amity restored. But I only meant so if it were compatible with my ability and capacity—to that extent I was ready to use every endeavour.

"I now reply to your propositions.

"1st.—As this is beyond the strength and capacity of the officers of this God-granted Government, and is opposed to magnanimity and friendship, you should, out of magnanimity and friendship, depart from this condition, and, relinquishing the territories of the Afghan State which you have taken possession of recently, you should positively not interfere with them.

"2nd.—As this is a good and proper proposal, and in conformity with friendship, there is no room for discussion or refusal. Certainly it will not be allowable for this Government, which intends friendship with the British Government, to enter into any friendship or relation with other foreign Powers without the advice and consent of the officers of the British Government.

"3rd.—In the event of strong and firm friendship and harmony always existing between the Government of Afghanistan and the British Government, the Afghan Government, out of friendship, agrees that, in accordance with the desire of the British Government, several officers (*sahibs*) of rank with a proper escort, should reside on the part of the British Government in the capital only, which is Kabul, but they must not interfere in any of the affairs of Afghanistan. This to last until such time as the British Government obtains complete confidence in the constancy and faithful friendship of the Afghan Government. After that, they have the right either to withdraw the officers, or appoint them permanently, whichever they choose.

"If the British Government from foresight and prudence approve and accept what has been written above, it will strengthen the friendship and tend to the welfare of both parties, and will, moreover, be in accordance with the practice of the great towards their neighbours. If, on the other hand, the British Government has other views and intentions, they are their own masters; no doubt that will come to pass which the Deity has willed."

It seemed to the Viceroy that matters having progressed thus far misunderstandings might best be removed by a personal conference between Major Cavagnari and Yakub. Accordingly measures were taken when sending the following answer to Yakub's letter of the 12th March to convey a hint, if a favourable opportunity should arise, that an invitation to Major Cavagnari to visit Kabul might be productive of good results. In consideration also of the fact that Yakub was *de facto* ruler of Kabul and had intimated his succession to his father, it was decided to address him as Amir; care being taken to show that the letter was from Major Cavagnari personally and not from the Government of India.

Translation of a letter from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN of Kabul, dated Jelalabad, 23rd March 1879.

"Your Highness' friendly letter dated 12th March 1879, in reply to my letter of the 7th idem, together with a letter addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, have been received by me and forwarded to His Excellency the Viceroy.

"Meanwhile, I deem it proper to point out to Your Highness certain matters of importance.

"I am very glad to notice that Your Highness has accepted two out of three demands mentioned in my letter of the 7th instant, but I regret that Your Highness has replied to the third demand in an uncertain manner ('mujmal'),\* and has, moreover, made a proposal that the British Government should absolutely withdraw from all interference in Afghanistan, and entirely evacuate the territory it has conquered.

"I beg in a friendly manner to inform Your Highness that this is a proposal which it is quite impossible for the British Government to accede to.

"The point which Your Highness has been asked to agree to is looked upon as most essential to the permanent security of the Indian frontiers, and has been adopted after much consideration with reference to the condition of Afghanistan.

\* NOTE.—This word has been employed advisedly, so that it may appear that the Amir's reply has been regarded as not final, and that therefore there is room for a further reference.—W. J.

"I therefore entertain great hope that when Your Highness has fully reflected upon the matter, you will not find this condition so difficult of acceptance, nor sufficient to prove an impediment to the development of friendly relations with the British Government which Your Highness has expressed yourself desirous of effecting.

"With this view I send Your Highness this friendly letter by the hand of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, and I indulge in a strong hope that, after reading it and reflecting upon the matter, Your Highness will send a suitable and satisfactory answer with due regard to your own personal advantage and with the view to cementing friendly relations between the British Government and Afghanistan.

"I hope Your Highness will always consider me as your friend and well-wisher."

The Amir answered this communication promptly. He laid stress on his ready acceptance of two of the conditions proposed to him and on his determination to regulate his future conduct in strict conformity to his profession of loyalty to the British Government. He earnestly deprecated the remaining condition relating to cession of territory, entreating that it might be waived. Finally he expressed his readiness to receive Major Cavagnari at Kabul and discuss matters. The following is the text of his letter :—

Translation of a letter from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 29th March 1879.

"I have received your kind letter dated the 23rd March by the hand of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, and have given the fullest possible consideration and reflection to what you have written, pressing me to accept the third condition ; and that you consider such acceptance as conducive to the permanent concord and alliance of the two Governments. In the permanent friendship and loyal affection to the British Government which it is my strong wish and desire to obtain, it is fitting that the British Government, having in view its own greatness and eminence, should have conferred on me numerous benefits and constant recurring advantages, and should have from beginning to end kept my advancement and independence in Afghanistan. In my acceptance of the two conditions which I have declared, and which I firmly and sincerely resolved to carry out, if you will carefully reflect, you will see that very important interests and matters are contained ; so that there is no further room for introducing or mentioning the third condition. I ask for justice in this matter from the British Government. When I have accepted a British Resident in my capital, permanent or temporary as the British Government may choose, and turning away my eyes from all aid or friendship from other States, have put the hand of hope and dependence firmly on the wide skirt of the British Government, what would be becoming in the strong and grand British Government to take away a small part of my kingdom, or to extend it a little. As I have sincerely, truly and decidedly chosen the permanent friendship of the British Government, I hope and expect from that great and magnanimous Government that my request on this point may be accepted, and that the foundation of friendship and alliance may be very speedily and firmly laid, and that by making happy your faithful friend with appropriate kindnesses, you may render your Government famous in the world and among all nations by your kindness and favor to me. Please God, the advantage of such kindness will appear sooner than that which the British Government anticipates from its third condition.

"For the sake of giving confidence in these statements, and of strengthening the foundation of friendship, if the British Government propose to appoint a Mission\* of rank, such as yourself to come to Kabul and see me, the real concord on both sides will be declared and proved face to face. I will certainly not oppose this proposal. In any case, I desire and expect good and advantage in every way from the British Government, and I look upon the friendship of that Government as entirely an advantage and the source of much good.

Just at this time a letter was intercepted, addressed by Yakub to the Khugianis, and dated 4th April, *i.e.*, subsequent to his letter of the 29th March to Major Cavagnari, expressing readiness to receive a British Mission. The letter complimented the Khugianis, who had recently been giving trouble to our troops, on their fidelity and religious zeal. It exhorted them not to fear the infidels, against whom he, Yakub, was ready to launch an irresistible force of regular troops and Ghazis. It continued—"Then by the favour of God and in accordance with the verse 'verily, God has destroyed the powerful ones,' the whole of them will go to 'the fire of hell for evermore.' Therefore, according to the sacred text, 'kill them to the extent of your ability.'" It having been decided that, notwithstanding this letter, negotiations with Yakub should not be broken off. Major Cavagnari addressed His Highness the annexed letter, saying that the British Government acquiesced in the Amir's suggestion that a British Mission should be deputed to Kabul, and would appoint one to be accompanied by a suitable escort as soon as intimation was received that the requisite

\* In the original, the English word is used, and is apparently understood by the Afghans as meaning an Envoy.—W. J.

arrangements for its reception had been made. Subsequently the Viceroy, in replying to Yakub's announcement of Shere Ali's death and his own accession to the throne, intimated that he had decided to depute Major Cavagnari to Kabul, and had invested him with authority to communicate unreservedly with the Amir upon the questions at issue, and that Major Cavagnari might be considered the representative of the Government of India. The instructions issued to Major Cavagnari for his guidance will be found in Appendix XLIII.

Translation of a letter, dated Jelalabad, 7th April 1879, from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Political Officer, to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN of Kabul.

"I have received Your Highness' friendly letter of the 29th of March 1879, by the hand of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan.

"It is a matter of gratification to learn that Your Highness earnestly desires the renewal of friendship between the two States, and that you recognize the advantage that will accrue to Afghanistan from an alliance with the British Government.

"I observe that in the concluding portion of Your Highness' letter you state that, if the British Government thinks proper to depute a Mission of rank to Kabul for the purpose of verbally discussing with Your Highness the matters now under consideration, Your Highness also will acquiesce in such an arrangement.

"As it is probable that this may be productive of good, and may tend to remove whatever misunderstandings exist, I am directed to inform Your Highness that the British Government will appoint a Mission of rank to proceed to Kabul, with a suitable escort on receipt of information from Your Highness that the necessary arrangements for its journey and reception have been made.

"I trust that Your Highness continues in the enjoyment of good health, and that you will consider me your friend and well-wisher."

---

Dated Camp Lahore, 11th April 1879.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

To—His HIGHNESS AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

"I have received Your Highness' friendly letter of the 13th March 1879, informing me of the death of your father His Highness the late Amir Shere Ali Khan. This news has caused me deep regret, and I desire to express my sympathy with Your Highness in the affliction with which you have been visited. But since every human being must taste the cup of death, and life and death are in the hands of the Almighty God, it is fitting for these reasons to have patience and to show submission to His will.

"Your Highness furthermore informs me that the nobility and people of Afghanistan have unanimously acknowledged you as Amir, and have tendered their allegiance. This information undoubtedly increases my expectation that the wishes expressed in Your Highness' letter for the establishment of a basis of friendship will be fulfilled.

"The friendly letter, dated 29th March 1879, written by Your Highness to Major P. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., has been seen by me. In that letter it is said that if, for the sake of strengthening the foundation of friendship, the British Government propose to appoint an Envoy of rank, such as Major Cavagnari, to come to Kabul and see Your Highness, you will certainly not oppose this proposal.

"I have accordingly deputed Major Cavagnari to visit Kabul, and this letter will be delivered by him in person to Your Highness. Major Cavagnari possesses my full confidence; he is authorized to communicate unreservedly with Your Highness upon the questions at issue between the two States, and he is to be considered as the representative of the Government of India.

"I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness' sincere friend."

**181. Yakub Khan proposes to come in person to the British Camp and there arrange matters with the British authorities.**—Bakhtiar Khan, bearing Major Cavagnari's letter, dated 7th April, reached Kabul on the 12th, whither the Mustaufi, Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, and Wazir Shah Mahomed had all returned on the 16th from Turkistan. Councils were held and the manner of receiving the British Mission discussed in secret conclave. There was reason to believe that his advisers, two of whom, Sirdar Shere Ali and Shah Mahomed, had just returned from Tashkend, were counselling Yakub to abandon the English alliance and trust to Russia.

Accordingly, Bakhtiar Khan, despairing about the reception of the British Mission, advised Yakub to personally visit the British Camp—a suggestion which was favorably received and ultimately adopted. On the 24th April Bakhtiar Khan returned to Safed Sung bringing the two following letters from the Amir. Both were dated 20th April, the first was written by the Amir's usual scribe and bore His Highness' official seal; the second was a secret letter written by the Mustaufi and sealed with Yakub's private seal. From Bakhtiar Khan's account Yakub was afraid to receive a British Mission lest it should undermine his authority at Kabul and so compel him to accept such conditions as the British Government might choose to dictate. There was a strong military party at Kabul averse from peace, and it was doubtful whether Yakub would be able to protect the Mission from insult; even when Bakhtiar Khan arrived at Kabul a hostile crowd assembled and urged a holy war.

## I.

Translation of a letter from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 27th Rabi-us-Sani=(20th April 1879.)

"Be it known to you that Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar Khan having waited upon me delivered your friendly letter to me, which I have perused. I am exceedingly gratified with its contents, which allude to the cultivation of friendship, concord, and amity between the two great States. From its beginning to the end, your letter expresses perfect unity and identity (of wishes). It is hoped that from this sapling of friendship the functionaries of the two great Governments will cull the fruit of their wish, and that from this goblet of affection the officers of that powerful Government and the Governors of this God-granted State will pour out a draught of their desire. Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar has been given leave to return and is proceeding towards you. I have made oral statements to him. He will, please God, communicate them to you one by one, and you will be pleased to rely upon them as true."

## II.

Translation of a letter from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 27th Rabi-us-Sani=(20th April 1879.)

"As Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar Khan is now going to return to that direction, I take the opportunity of writing this short friendly letter to you to say that I have, on my own part, resolved to remove all doubts regarding friendship as well as to strengthen the friendly relations between the two States. God willing, I will leave for that direction and have the pleasure of seeing my friends. I hope you will reply to this epistle speedily so that the terms (for the renewal) of friendship and concord between the two Governments may become known and manifest.

"Further, all well."

The proposal that the Amir should come to the British camp was considered by the Viceroy infinitely preferable to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul. Major Cavagnari was, therefore, ordered to reply in most friendly terms accepting the offer and promising to accord His Highness an honorable reception. Accordingly on the 26th April, Bakhtiar was sent once more to Kabul carrying the annexed letter:—

Dated Safed Sang, 25th April 1879.

From—MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Political Officer,

To—HIS HIGHNESS AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN of Kabul.

"I have received Your Highness' friendly letter, dated 27th of the month Rabi-us-Sani 1296 H. (20th April 1879), received by the hands of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, and have made myself acquainted with its contents.

"I gather from it that Your Highness wishes to arrange a friendly interview with the British authorities, and desires to come in person for this purpose.

"This intention is indeed a true sign of that earnest desire for the establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments which Your Highness in your recent letters has frequently expressed, and which the British Government fully appreciates and reciprocates.

"I am consequently directed by His Excellency the Viceroy of India to reply that, on receipt of intimation of the date of Your Highness' expected arrival at the British Camp, every effort will be made by the officers of this Government to secure for Your Highness the most honorable treatment befitting your exalted rank, during the period Your Highness, with whatever escort and retinue you may think proper to accompany you, shall remain as the guests of the British Government."



The reports received at this time from Kabul showed that Yakub's affairs were in a very unsatisfactory state. Soldiers plundered in the open street with impunity, and even threatened to pillage the late Amir's Treasury; they were only appeased by the payment of a large instalment of their arrears. Desertions were said to be frequent both among the troops at Kabul and those in Turkistan. On the 28th April, Bakhtiar Khan reached Kabul and delivered his letter; on the next day he received the Amir's reply, stating that His Highness would start from Kabul on the 3rd May.

Translation of a letter from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 7th Jamadi-ul-Awal=30th April 1879.

I beg to write this friendly letter to inform you that your very friendly communication, dated the 25th April 1879, sent by the hands of the worthy and intelligent Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, reached me at a very fortunate moment. Its gratifying contents, which notify the marks of noble friendship and give the glad tidings of the tokens of great affection between the two sublime States, have afforded me unbounded joy. The Munshi above-mentioned has strung one by one on the thread of description the pearls of your friendly hints and verbal messages with which you, actuated by the motives of most sincere friendship, entrusted him, and thereby he has opened the door of happiness and joy to the face of my heart. Inasmuch as the grasp of the desire of having an interview with the (British) officers of high rank and holding a happy conference with them has taken hold of the skirt of my heart, I will, please God, set out from the capital (Kabul) for my destination on Monday, the 10th Jamadi-ul-Awal (3rd May 1879). Further, what can I write beyond expressions of friendship?

**182. Arrival of the Amir Yakub Khan at Gandamak and conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879.**—At 9-30 A.M. on the 8th May, the Amir arrived in the British camp under a salute of 21 guns, and an escort composed of the 10th Hussars and the Guides

1. Sirdar Mahomed Hushim Khan.
  2. " " Tahir Khan.
  3. " " Asaf Khan (son of Sirdar Yahia Khan).
  4. Sirdar Fattah Mahomed Khan (son of Sirdar Zakaria Khan).
  5. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan, Commanding the Body-Guard.
  6. The Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik.
  7. General Daud Shah.
  8. Mirza Mahomed Nabi Khan (writer).
- (The Mustaufi was His Highness' chief adviser.)

the succeeding fortnight negotiations proceeded as to the terms of the Treaty of Peace; it would be tedious to describe in detail the several difficulties \* raised and how these were overcome; suffice it to say that on the 26th May, the Treaty of Gandamak was signed by the Amir himself on his own behalf and by Major Cavagnari on the part of the British Government. It was ratified by the Viceroy on the 30th May. The text is as follows:—

The following Articles of Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Mahomed Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

#### ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

#### ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Govern-

ment. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes on behalf of himself and his successors to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of His Highness will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

ARTICLE 8.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kuram to Kabul shall be constructed by, and at the cost of, the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed,\* shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government; that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deducting the charges of civil administration shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khaibar and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawur and Jellalabad Districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

---

\* NOTE.—Omitted for the present.

## ARTICLE 10.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of rupees.

Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani, 1296 A.H.

(Sd.) AMIR MAHOMED  
YAKUB KHAN.

Seal.

(Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, *Major,*  
*Polit. Officer on Special Duty.*

(Sd.) LYTTON.

Seal.

### 183. Final Report to the Secretary of State.—On the 7th

\* Secret despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 160, dated 7th July 1879.

July the following despatch\* was transmitted to the Secretary of State. It describes briefly the condition of the frontier prior to the rupture of friendly relations with Afghanistan, the object which the British Government sought to attain by the war, the nature of the military operations of the campaign and their result. Further, it explains the political negotiations which terminated with the Treaty of Gandamak and the advantages thereby obtained. Finally it acknowledges the services of the troops and the loyal co-operation of the Khan of Kelat and other Native Chiefs:—

No. 160, dated Simla, 7th July 1879.

From—Government of India,

To—Secretary of State for India.

“In our despatch of the 2nd of June, we transmitted to Her Majesty’s Government a copy of the Treaty concluded in May last with the Amir of Afghanistan; and we have now the honor to lay before Your Lordship a full report of our proceedings in connection with recent Afghan affairs.

“2. Your Lordship’s despatch of the 18th of November 1878 briefly recapitulated the leading features of the policy of the British Government toward Afghanistan, and reviewed the course of events and transactions which terminated with the reception of a Russian Mission at Kabul, the deputation of Sir Neville Chamberlain as British Envoy to the Amir, and the repulse of his embassy at Ali Masjid. Immediately upon that repulse being known, a demand for apology and reparation was addressed to the Amir; and, when no answer was received within the period prescribed, His Highness was declared an enemy of the British Government, and the British forces entered his kingdom on the 21st of November.

“3. The plan of operations to be followed by the British army in Afghanistan had received our most careful consideration; and, in its scope and aim, it was strictly limited to the attainment of certain definite objects. We deem it now due, both to ourselves, and to Her Majesty’s Government by whom they were approved, to state and explain those objects before describing the measures adopted for the attainment of them.

“4. For some time previous to the immediate occasion of the late Afghan war, the warning course of events beyond the north-west frontier of India had forced upon the anxious attention of this Government certain features in the character of that frontier, which could not but be regarded as defective if judged by the well-known axiom of modern military science,—that the strategic value of any natural obstacle, such as a river or a mountain range, is mainly dependent on the command of the points of issue on both sides, and the consequent power of operating at will on either side of it. Before the war just ended in Afghanistan the north-west frontier of India was drawn along the eastern base of a vast and widely extended system of mountains. With the exception of the southern defiles (recently secured by the Kelat Treaty of 1876) all the passes through that portion of the range which, sloping towards Afghanistan, rises immediately above the plains of India, were in the hands of wild, independent, and more or less hostile, tribes, and the army of India, if attacked upon this frontier by a skilful and powerful enemy, would have had no alternative between forcing the passes, under conditions of much difficulty and danger, in order to meet its adversary in a hostile country, far from its base, and without any friendly support within reach, or else, with a great, and often almost impassable, river at its back, awaiting his arrival behind a frontier line of one thousand miles in length, pierced by passes open to the enemy at points too numerous to be all effectually guarded. It is needless to dwell upon the serious character of the danger to which India would be exposed in any such eventuality.

"5. On the other hand, apart from this serious strategic defect, our late land frontier had much to recommend it from an administrative point of view; and we consider that, when that frontier was first accepted, the adoption of it was justified by a reasonable regard to the political circumstances, and general convenience, of the moment. It was not deliberately selected, on strategic grounds, with a view to contingencies at that time remote; and, even then, there were not wanting eminent advocates for the adoption of the Indus river as a better strategic border than the mountain chain beyond it. But this mountain chain approximately represented the limits of the Sikh power, and of the territories which the Punjab campaigns had transferred to the British Government; and, conquest having been carried thus far, we think it was a wise decision not to carry it beyond the point at which military operations would have become more difficult, and their results less satisfactory. Rich plains, although easily overrun, are easily held; and they remunerate the benefits conferred on them by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are not only difficult to traverse, and difficult to subdue, but, when subdued, the administration of them is unprofitable. The foot of the mountains offered to India a well-defined boundary; and, although the adoption of this line left our north-west border peculiarly exposed to injury and insult from the hill tribes around it, yet, on the whole, the inconvenience of remaining within it was less than the inconvenience of advancing beyond it. Between this line and the nearest outposts of the Russian power in Central Asia intervened nearly one thousand miles of difficult country, inhabited by warlike populations existing in various degrees of feudal relation to the Amirs of Kabul and the Khans of Kelat. So long as the land frontier of India was unexposed to the pressure of any political or military influences more formidable than those of the marauding tribes around it, and the weak governments of barbarous States beyond them, its strategic defects might be contemplated without anxiety by the Government of India. It is obvious, however, that such freedom from anxiety depended upon the assumption that Russian power and influence would be permanently excluded from the States of Afghanistan and Biluchistan. It cannot, we think, be doubted, and we believe that it never has been doubted, by any person acquainted with the social and political conditions of this Empire, or even with the common characteristics of Oriental society under alien rule in any part of the East, that, however amicable might be the disposition, and however pacific the policy, of the Russian Government, if the influence of that Government were established up to the gates of India, the disturbing effects of it would be felt from Peshawur to Cape Comorin. In any such contingency it would be of vital necessity to the Government of India that the keys of those gates should be securely in its own possession; and, even then, the Government would be compelled to strengthen its military force, throughout the country, to an extent which could not but seriously deteriorate the whole character of its civil administration, and intolerably burden all its financial resources.

"6. This contingency seemed so improbable, and was, in any case, so distant, when we first occupied the Punjab, that it constituted no sufficient cause for extending our frontier in anticipation of a danger not then existing. But the possibility of the danger was not overlooked; and it is, we conceive, with a view to the prevention of it, that the British Government, both in India and in England, has at all times attached supreme importance to the exclusion of Russian influence from Afghan and Biluch territory. Guided by this consideration, the invariable aim of its policy has been to secure the friendship, the confidence, and, in case of need, the co-operation, of the Sovereigns of Kabul and Kelat. Unfortunately, however, causes, which we need not now examine, rendered fruitless the measures adopted for that purpose; and in 1875 our relations with these two Sovereigns had become almost intolerable. The subsidy given to the Khan of Kelat had been withdrawn. The subsidy offered to the Amir of Kabul had been rejected. The whole of Biluchistan was in that condition of complete anarchy which so frequently precedes the loss of independence; and for the restoration of his authority the Khan was looking, not to his British but to his Afghan and Persian neighbours. For some time previous to this, the attitude assumed by the Amir of Kabul towards the Government of India had been growing more and more unfriendly and mistrustful; whilst the communications between His Highness and the Governor of Russian Turkistan had simultaneously increased in frequency and apparent confidence. In the meanwhile, the distance between the Indian and Russian Empires had been reduced from 1,000 to 400 miles, by advances exclusively on the part of the Russian military power; which had overcome, with astonishing rapidity, geographical obstacles formerly supposed to be insurmountable.

"7. In these circumstances, the Government of India could no longer afford to contemplate with indifference the strategic defects of its north-west frontier. We felt that strenuous endeavours should be made, without further loss of time, to find in the stability, friendship, and alliance, of the trans-frontier States those sources of security from external danger which were not furnished by the condition of the frontier itself. In Kelat our endeavours were not unsuccessful; and the treaty signed with that State in 1876, virtually placed in our hands the command of the southern passes, thus giving to India a strong frontier from the neighbourhood of Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles. This arrangement, moreover, by restoring order, and reviving trade and agriculture, throughout Biluchistan, has been eminently beneficial to the Khan and his subjects; in whom the Government of India found loyal and useful allies during the late Afghan war. All endeavours, however, to ameliorate our relations with the Amir of Kabul were completely abortive; and the unfriendliness of His Highness was apparently increased by the increasingly critical condition of relations between the British and the Russian Government, until at last it culminated in the open repulse of a British, after the open reception of a Russian, Mission to his capital. From the foregoing

summary of the circumstances and events immediately preceding the rupture of our relations with the Amir of Kabul, it will be seen what cause we then had to view with grave anxiety the defective features of our Afghan Frontier. It was not compatible with the policy and principles of this Government to have recourse to the sword for the remedy of those defects: but it was our paramount duty to India not to leave them unrepaired if we were successful in a war which we had made every effort to avert.

"8. When, therefore, military operations against the late Amir of Kabul had been necessitated by circumstances already reported, we determined to direct them, not only to the punishment of an unprovoked affront, but also to the prompt and complete attainment of the following objects: *firstly*, the exclusion of Russian influence from Afghanistan: and, *secondly*, such a rectification of our Afghan Frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that State. These, at least, are the results it was our object to secure; those which it was equally our object to avoid were more numerous; and, since they materially affected our plan of operations, we must here indicate the nature of them.

"9. When forced to declare hostilities against the Amir Shere Ali, we were warned by several high authorities that a short or a small Afghan war would prove to be impossible: that we should be opposed in overwhelming numbers by the independent tribes whom the Amir (to quote his own words) had threatened to 'roll against us like blasts of fire:' that, after forcing passes thus fiercely contested, we should be confronted by a united Afghan nation: that having once crossed the frontier, we could not safely arrest our progress till we had completed the entire conquest of Afghanistan: that such a conquest could not be abandoned without the risk of renewing, and, perhaps, aggravating, our political dangers, nor yet maintained without heavily augmenting our financial and administrative burdens: and that, in either case, our utmost military success would bequeath to the Afghan people, whether as neighbours or as subjects, memories and sentiments of inextinguishable animosity; leaving to ourselves no practical alternative between the helpless contemplation of the confusion and anarchy created by our own action, and the wholesale annexation of a barren country and a turbulent people.

"10. The Government of India would have been inexcusable had it disregarded warnings so numerous, and so authoritative. The dangers thus indicated were not underrated by us: but we had long and fully considered them from every point of view, in direct reference to carefully verified facts; and we were satisfied, by our knowledge of the actual condition of Afghanistan at the time when hostilities were declared, that no such dangers need be incurred if adequate precautions were taken to avoid them.

"11. In the first place, for the rectification of our frontier as defined in paragraph 8 of this despatch, no great extension of territory was required. All we needed was the permanent command,—not of passes extending far into the interior of the vast mountain tract beyond our border, but of those which, piercing the extreme eastern edge of that tract as it rises immediately above the plains of India, constitute the only practicable approaches to our Empire from beyond its northern and western confines. The main defiles of the Mohmand and Afridi hills, converging towards Peshawur, are peopled by independent tribes, and have never belonged to the Amirs of Kabul. For the command of these passes it would probably suffice, after clearing them of the Amir's troops, to resume to ourselves the payment and control of the pass tribes. The valley of the Kuram, rising eastward from the Punjab border between Kohat and Thal, terminates at the Shutur-gardan, a high ridge of the Safed Koh Range: and an army holding that position would command, on the one side, Kabul and Ghazni, on the other easy access into India. Our southern frontier, as before observed, had been greatly strengthened by our arrangements with Khelat; which gave us a strong position above the Bolan Pass. From Western Afghanistan, however, all the approaches to this position debouch in the fertile district of Pishin, which, bounded by the Kojak-Amran range, constitutes the great natural granary of Quetta. Holding Pishin, and commanding the issues of the Kojak Pass, we could descend at will upon the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet an enemy in the open field; whilst no enemy could debouch upon our own plains by the Bolan without first besieging and taking Quetta (no easy task), and then forcing a long and difficult pass, of which we hold the issues. For these reasons, we regarded the permanent military command of the Kuram and Pishin districts as essential to the complete rectification of our frontier. But all such objects could certainly be attained without wholesale annexation, and possibly even without any actual acquisition of territory.

"12. In the next place, many of the independent pass tribes were not indifferent, either to the Amir's withdrawal of the allowances they had formerly received from His Highness, or to the possible renewal of those they had at one time received from the British Government: and we had been careful to secure the neutrality of these tribes, so far as neutrality could be expected from robber hordes certain, in the event of any conflict between British and Afghan troops, to side with the victorious, and fall upon the vanquished, combatant. In the third place, an all-important change had been silently effected, during the reign of Shere Ali, in the social and administrative character of Afghanistan. This change was peculiarly favourable to our whole plan of operations which had, indeed, been mainly determined by the knowledge of it.

"13. During the reign of the Amir Dost Mahomed, the fighting power of Afghanistan was mainly of a tribal and feudal character. From the time of his accession to the throne, however, it had been the aim of the Amir Shere Ali to break up this tribal organisation, and replace it by a mercenary army. The system of internal Government thus introduced by His Highness had undermined the national foundations of his power. His standing army was



regarded by the local Chiefs as a menace to their independence. The compulsory enlistment of troops, for whose maintenance the nation was severely taxed, had extended the unpopularity of Shere Ali's rule to all parts of his dominions, and all classes of his subjects. The administration, as well as the army, had become denationalised. The chief civil and military offices of the State, to which the custom of the country had given a somewhat family character, were, under the new system, necessarily entrusted to men with no power or influence independent of the Sovereign's favour. By thus centralising his authority, the Amir had isolated himself from his Sirdars; and an administration destructive of popular privileges was naturally unsupported by popular sympathies. Partly by the aid and countenance of the British Government, Shere Ali had gradually brought under his personal sway all the dominions formerly claimed by his dynasty; but for the government of them he was driven more and more, by increasing mistrust of his Sirdars, his subjects, and his neighbours, to expedients which only increased a disaffection they were intended to suppress. The Afghans, in short, had grown weary of Shere Ali's domestic administration; whilst all their national sentiments and prejudices were opposed to that fatal intimacy with Russia which was the final error of his foreign policy.

"14. Such being the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan when war was declared by the British Government against the Amir of Kabul, it was no impossible task to maintain, between the Afghan people and their ruler, that practical distinction proclaimed by the Viceroy in the manifesto which accompanied the declaration of hostilities. We were persuaded that the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan (if considerately treated by the military and political officer charged with the execution of our orders, which, on this point, were most explicit), would not make common cause with the Amir, or support him in resisting the chastisement he had so recklessly provoked. We were also persuaded that the resources of his country would fail the Amir, no less effectually than the disposition of his subjects, in any attempt to prolong such resistance after the fighting power of his army had been thoroughly broken. By far the most serious embarrassment we had to anticipate was, neither the hostility of the Afghan people, nor the strength of the Afghan army, but the complete disintegration of the Afghan State, which might not improbably result from the swift and total destruction of Shere Ali's personal power. With this contingency, which had engaged our lengthened and anxious consideration, we felt we must be prepared to deal, in case of necessity. It was constantly before our eyes, and in our thoughts, during the period which elapsed between the declaration of hostilities and the signature of peace. As, however it has not arisen, we need not now say more about it than that it was a contingency which we were at all times anxious to avert.

"15. We have recorded, and explained at some length, the importance attached by the Government of India to the prevention, as well as to the promotion, of certain political results during the conduct of the war, and the negotiation of the peace, with Kabul, because our entire plan of military operations was directly dictated, and all its strategic combinations constantly restricted, by these important political considerations. From first to last, throughout the recent campaign in Afghanistan, military action has been strictly subordinated to political purpose: and this acknowledgment is due to those able military officers whose discreet exercise of the political powers entrusted to them has greatly enhanced the practical value of their successful achievements in the field. It was necessary to inflict signal and public punishment on the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, and to destroy his fighting power as speedily and completely as possible. These objects would have been most swiftly and simply accomplished by the immediate capture and temporary occupation of Kabul. But we had serious cause to apprehend that, by thus precipitating the downfall of Shere Ali, we might irretrievably shake to pieces all the independent materials of government in Afghanistan; bequeathing to Shere Ali's successor no stable basis of authority, and placing ourselves in a position from which we could not afterwards retire without surrendering to anarchy and civil conflict a State which it was our object to strengthen and consolidate in the manner most conducive to peaceable and friendly relations with it. For this reason, although the capture and occupation of Kabul involved no military difficulty, and offered several military conveniences, to the British columns which routed the Amir's army on the Peiwar, and expelled his garrisons from the Khyber Pass, that measure was deliberately excluded from our plan of military operations for the opening of a war which we hoped to finish in a single campaign. The only advanced movements not originally included in this plan were the occupation of Jelalabad and Gandamak. But these measures were dictated by considerations partly of a sanitary, partly of a political, character, and were undertaken with the certainty that they would not be opposed by any military force. The occupation of those points was intentionally temporary; but, even in the selection of temporary outposts we were determined that the British troops should not occupy any position which they could not permanently hold, in case of need, without risk to their communications and supplies; or from which they could not be withdrawn, at any moment, without detriment to our political interests, and military reputation. We deem it due, no less to the cause of historical truth, than to the character of our Government, and the right understanding of a policy which has been much represented, to place thus distinctly on record these decisions, and the grounds of them. It remains to explain the further considerations which dictated the more important details of our military action, and guided our constant endeavour to minimise the unavoidable expenditure of blood and treasure in the effectual attainment of its objects.

"16. We have already stated the reasons which induced us to regard the Amir's standing army as the only fighting power we should have to deal with in Afghanistan. The known

strength of that army was about 60,000 men. Its artillery we believed to be good; and this impression was confirmed by subsequent experience; but, with the exception of the breech-loaders formerly given to His Highness by the Government of India, the musketry of the Amir's army was, of course, much inferior to that of our own. With this army the Amir, according to our anticipations, would have to garrison all his outlying provinces, protect his Persian flank, defend his capital and central districts, and, at the same time, resist our advance. It was, therefore, not difficult to calculate approximately the maximum force he could oppose to us at any given point. We consequently determined to attack him simultaneously on three different lines; thus obliging him to distribute his force, or else to leave one or other of these lines undisputed.

"17. The three lines thus selected were those of the Kojak, the Khaibar, and the Kuram. These three lines were not only the most suitable for the immediate purposes of our attack; they also included all the advanced positions we had, for the reasons stated in paragraph 11 of our present despatch, determined to hold permanently. The line to which the Viceroy attached special importance was that of the Kuram. His Excellency believed that if the Amir allowed a British force, advancing on this line, to reach the Shutur-Gardan in full strength, both Kabul and Ghazni would remain completely at its mercy. He, therefore, anticipated strong resistance to our advance at some point in the Upper Kuram Valley, where the Amir's troops would command positions of great strength, easy to hold, and very difficult to attack. He calculated, however, that, if Shere Ali's army were thoroughly beaten here, its defeat would immediately be felt in the very heart of the Amir's power, which must be more severely shaken by the loss of a battle in the Kuram than by a similar disaster in any other part of his dominions. Our object, therefore, in despatching a force to the Kuram, was to defeat and disperse any Afghan army which might be found there, and to seize with the utmost rapidity a position directly menacing Kabul and Ghazni, but without advancing beyond the Shutur-Gardan. This force was entrusted to the command of General Roberts.

"18. The force operating on the Khaibar line was commanded by General Sir Samuel Browne, whose instructions were to capture Ali Musjid, expel the Amir's garrisons from the Khaibar, and occupy Lundi Kotal, Dakka, or such other point as might be found most convenient at the head of the Pass; thus threatening Jellalabad, but not advancing further.

"19. Our longest line of operations lay in the direction of Kandahar; and it was, therefore, necessary that the force operating on this line should be proportionally stronger; as, whilst its transport and supply were more difficult, the rapidity of its movements was less essential to the primary objects of the campaign than that of the Khaibar and Kuram columns. In order to cripple the financial resources of the Amir, it was deemed desirable to expel his authority from the richest districts of Western Afghanistan; and for this purpose the temporary occupation of Kandahar was clearly requisite. Such a measure, moreover, was dictated by two other considerations of a more far-reaching character. In the event of a complete disintegration of the Kabul Power, we could not allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of any Chief or State whose possession of it we had not previously approved on conditions dictated by ourselves; and, in the event of re-established relations with the Ruler of a united Afghanistan, the power of restoring Kandahar to such a Ruler, also on our own conditions, could not fail to give us a most advantageous position from which to negotiate the terms of peace. The permanent retention of Kandahar, however, has never formed part of our political programme; and no endeavour has been spared during the war to render our temporary occupation of it as little burdensome as possible to its inhabitants. The command of the Kandahar Force was entrusted to General Stewart; and his instructions were to carry out a reconnaissance in force as far as the Helmund and Kelat-i-Ghilzai; ascertaining the features and resources of the country in that direction, and attacking any enemy he might find within striking distance, but not establishing himself at any point beyond Kandahar.

"20. The Generals Commanding the Forces employed on the above-mentioned lines of advance were invested with the chief political authority beyond the frontier. Their instructions were to intercept the collection of the Amir's revenues, and preserve order throughout the country occupied by their troops. They were required to conciliate its inhabitants, and protect them from all avoidable injury. They were also to use their best endeavours to effect a friendly understanding with the tribes in their vicinity; but they were to avoid all unnecessary interference or collision with those tribes. When, in the development of operations opened on the Khaibar line, the British troops had advanced to Jellalabad, Major Cavagnari was intrusted with the conduct of relations between the Government of India and the Afghan Sirdars and tribes with whom that movement brought us into contact.

"21. We calculated that all the operations thus ordered could be completed before the commencement of the winter; when the passes would be closed by snow, and a suspension of hostilities imposed on both belligerents by the rigour of the season. It was our hope that the previous success of our military operations would then set free at Kabul various political forces and interests specially favourable to negotiations for peace. In any case, the situation might advantageously be left to develop itself during the period of inaction which must necessarily elapse before the passes were again practicable for the passage of troops. We naturally desired to be spared the necessity for further operations; but we felt that, if forced to re-open the campaign in the spring of the following year, we should then be in a position to do so with every possible advantage on our side. Our advanced bases would have been firmly established, their communications thoroughly secured, the organisation of transport and supply completed

for more extended lines of advance, and our political influence pushed far beyond the range of our military posts, upon the three main approaches into the interior of the enemy's country. In short, we considered that the precautions thus taken to minimize both the magnitude and cost of the military operations, and the number of political risks and responsibilities involved in them, were also best suited to facilitate further military action, should such action be unfortunately rendered necessary by the course of events between the close of 1878 and the spring of 1879.

" 22. Such was the general plan of the campaign opened by the Government of India in Afghanistan on the 21st of November 1878. On that date General Sir Samuel Browne entered the Khaibar, and attacked the Fort of Ali Musjid. The fire of the fort was well sustained and directed; and the defence made by the garrison of Ali Musjid for several hours was creditable to its spirit. But the position, having been turned during the night, was precipitately abandoned by the enemy with the loss of all his guns, stores, and camp equipage. Several of the fugitives were captured by our troops, and the remainder were plundered and dispersed by the Afridis. Sir Samuel Browne met with no further resistance on his march to Dakka, which he held unmolested for some weeks; but, this position being found inconvenient for the lengthened occupation of so large a force, the General was, in the month of December, authorized to advance beyond it, and occupy Jellalabad, which he did without resistance, receiving there the unconditional submission of the local officials, and their request for British protection. No attempt was made by the Amir's army, at any subsequent period, to resist the advance of the British troops on this line of operations.

" 23. On the same day, General Roberts entered the Lower Kuram Valley; and he subsequently occupied, without opposition, the head-quarters of the district, replacing the Amir's officials by his own. He found the people of this district willing to submit to his authority, and furnish provisions for the supply of his troops. Continuing his advance into the Upper Kuram Valley, General Roberts there encountered a large Afghan force, established in a position of great strength, strongly armed with well posted artillery, on the ridge of the Peiwar Kotal, which commands the valley on one side of it, and the road on the other, towards the Shutur-Gardan. This force he at once attacked. The attack resulted in the sharpest, and most important, engagement that has occurred during the whole campaign. The strategic strength of the enemy's position was very great; but it was quickly turned by our troops who, under the skilful command of General Roberts, completely defeated and routed those of the Amir. The broken Afghan regiments fled across the Shutur-Gardan, leaving all their guns behind them; and the limit assigned to the advance of our Kuram Force was thus speedily reached and secured without further resistance. General Roberts had been instructed to push his reconnaissances, as opportunity might offer, into the adjoining valley of Khost, with a view to prevent the Amir from drawing either supplies or revenue from that district; and this instruction he successfully carried out in the month of January.

" 24. General Biddulph, entering Pishin on the 26th of November, found it already evacuated by the Amir's troops. The small, but important, district of Sibi, lying upon our line of communications close to the Biluch border, had in the meanwhile been occupied by a British detachment on the 23rd of the same month. Much political inconvenience had been caused by the interposition of this small Afghan district in the midst of Biluch territory, with which it is almost entirely surrounded; and we had, therefore, determined upon its permanent withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Kabul authority. In December, General Stewart reached Pishin, and, assuming command of the Kandahar Expeditionary Force, crossed the Kojak Range with considerable difficulty, owing to the want of roads. On the 9th of January, after a skirmish with the Amir's outposts, in which the Afghan cavalry showed itself completely unable to make any stand against our own, he entered Kandahar. The town surrendered quietly. On the 21st of January, his cavalry had pushed as far as Kelat-i-Ghilzai, while Girishk, on the Helmund, was occupied by a force under General Biddulph. On the 26th of February, General Biddulph's cavalry distinguished itself in the repulse of an attack upon his rear guard when returning to Kandahar. With the exception of these engagements, the occupation of Kandahar, and the reconnaissance of the Helmund, were effected without resistance, or any serious manifestation of national resentment at the presence of British troops.

" 25. Thus, within two days after the declaration of hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission at Ali Musjid was appropriately avenged on the spot where it had been offered. Within two weeks after the same date, the passes of the Khaibar and the Kuram were completely in our hands, and the Amir's troops swept clean beyond the range of our operations. Not long afterwards, Jellalabad and Kandahar were occupied without resistance; and, before the end of January (that is to say, in less than three months from the commencement of the campaign), the greater part of Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmund to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, had passed into the possession of the British Government. The rapid success of our military operations completely confirmed the calculations on which they had been based. The Amir's standing army was defeated and dispersed beyond all possibility of recovery; yet his Sirdars had not risen to the rescue of his power. His towns opened their gates without remonstrance to our summons; their authorities readily responded to our requirements; and their inhabitants evinced no disposition to forfeit the pecuniary advantages they derived from the presence of our troops. Nor was the neutrality of the independent tribes less satisfactory than the indifference of the Afghan people. From these tribes our convoys and outposts, especially along the Khaibar Pass, were exposed to occasional annoyance;

but, generally speaking, all the long lines of communication between our advanced positions and their bases in British India were far more facilitated by the friendly co-operation, than impeded by the occasional thefts and assaults of the tribes along the tracts they traversed. Three years ago no European British subject could approach the Khaibar Pass without serious personal danger. But, during the greater part of the recent campaign, telegraphic communication from Peshawur to Jellalabad was maintained along the entire length of this Pass.

" 26. In the meanwhile, our anticipations as to the probable political effects of successful military operations on the Kuram line had been justified with startling rapidity and completeness. General Roberts routed the Afghan Army at the Peiwar Kotal on the 2nd of December. Following, as it did, so shortly after the capture of Ali Musjid and the expulsion of the Afghan garrisons from the Khaibar Pass, this event completed the destruction of Shere Ali's power which had already been much weakened by previous reverses. The detailed news of their total defeat was carried to Kabul, with all the rapidity of panic, by the Amir's beaten and demoralised troops. Their discomfiture was contagious: it infected the garrisons of the capital, and the columns on which the Amir was reckoning for the reinforcement of a position already irretrievably lost. Instantaneous and wholesale desertions attested the moral effect of General Roberts' decisive victory. The standing army of Afghanistan had ceased to exist; and, with it, disappeared an authority which had no other support. On the 19th of December we received from Major Cavagnari, by telegraph, authentic intelligence that the Amir Shere Ali Khan had fled from Kabul, accompanied in his flight by the remaining officers of the Russian Mission; and that, in the last moment of his hurried departure, he had released from prison, and invested with the regency, his long incarcerated son, Yakub Khan. The Amir announced his departure by a letter addressed to the British authorities. In this letter His Highness informed us that he had abandoned his dominions, with the intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg for the purpose of there laying his case before the European Powers.

" 27. In these circumstances, we authorized Major Cavagnari to address to Yakub Khan a letter which, though couched in general terms, was friendly in its tone, and such as to afford His Highness an opportunity of separating himself, were he so minded, from the policy which had proved so disastrous to his father. We, at the same time, instructed our authorities upon the frontier to explain to the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan that the cessation or continuance of hostilities now mainly depended on the manifestation of their feelings and wishes in regard thereto. Shere Ali, however, appears to have left Kabul in the hope of promptly obtaining from Russia all the means he required for the renewal of hostilities with the British Government. This, at least, was the hope attributed to His Highness by his son, his Sirdars, and his subjects. Until the reasonableness of such a hope had been practically tested, the dread of the Amir's return to power, and possible reconciliation with the British Government, sufficed to repress any manifestation of the national sentiment. The Amir had left his capital, but not his country. He halted on the Afghan side of the Oxus, where he was believed to be in communication with the local authorities of the Russian Government. Yakub Khan was not regarded either by himself or his fellow-subjects as a free agent. His reply to Major Cavagnari's letter expressed no desire, on his own behalf or that of his father the Amir, for a reconciliation with the British Government. But at Kabul, where apparently such a reconciliation was not yet regarded as impossible, there seemed to be a prevalent impression that, if it took place, Shere Ali would be restored to power; and that, in that case, his vengeance would fall, without scruple or restraint, upon all who had incurred his displeasure or suspicion during the war. It was obviously the interest, and indeed the necessity, of all concerned in the development of this ambiguous situation, to wait upon events; and we had, at least, the satisfaction of feeling that, from the commanding position we had already secured, we could better afford to wait than either Shere Ali, or Yakub Khan.

" 28. Towards the end of January, it was reported about our frontier that the Amir Shere Ali had died at Mazar-i-Sharif in the north of Afghanistan. Early in February, we received from Sirdar Yakub Khan a spontaneous communication which contained distinct overtures for a reconciliation with the British Government, and an offer of his good offices, as an intermediary between ourselves and his father, the Amir, for the removal of differences which he regarded as susceptible of adjustment. A few days later, we received from the Sirdar a letter, dated the 28th of February, informing us of the death of the Amir, and his own accession to the throne. These letters were addressed to Major Cavagnari, who was authorized to respond to the latter by a suitable expression of the Viceroy's condolences, and to the former by a plain statement of the terms on which His Excellency in Council was prepared to entertain negotiations for peace.

" 29. Those terms were in accordance with the essential objects of the war, as described in the preceding paragraphs of our present despatch; and they were subsequently embodied, without modification, in the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Amir of Afghanistan. They required that the foreign relations of His Highness should be placed under the acknowledged control of the British Government; and they provided for the effectual fulfilment of the mutual obligations involved in that condition; *firstly*, by securing to us the command of the principal passes between India and Afghanistan, together with the administration of the three districts since assigned to us by the Treaty; and, *secondly*, by the admission of a permanent British Resident at Kabul, with the right to depute British officers, as occasion may require, to any part of the Afghan frontiers. The further commercial and telegraphic clauses of the Treaty are the result of subsequent negotiations opened at Gandamak.



"30. The Amir Yakub Khan agreed, without hesitation, to place his foreign relations under British control; he also at once accepted in principle, as a necessary consequence of this arrangement, our condition respecting European British Agencies in Afghanistan. To our territorial conditions, however, His Highness, as might have been expected, evinced considerable repugnance, and for the withdrawal of them he made to us a strong appeal.

"31. These conditions could not be waived, without sacrificing one of the essential objects of the war—an object dictated to us by a deep concern for the permanent security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. We were in a position to enforce them without further reference to the Amir; for we already held a much larger portion of Afghan territory than we had any desire to retain. It was, therefore, at all times open to us to proclaim the permanent extension of British jurisdiction to the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. A similar course had been found convenient by Lord Dalhousie in dealing with the Court of Ava at the close of the last Burmese war. But the circumstances and objects of the second Burmese war were very different from those of the second Afghan war; and, for obvious reasons, we contemplated with great reluctance the adoption of any such course on the present occasion. We conceive that the Government of a powerful civilized State is in no circumstances morally free, because it is practically able, to consult its own convenience without reference to the manner in which the legitimate welfare of its weaker neighbours may be affected by its action or inaction. But special force was given to this consideration by all the circumstances and conditions of the late Afghan war. The efficient, but humane, prosecution of that war involved duties, not only towards the people of India, but also towards the people of Afghanistan, whose country we had not willingly invaded, and whose legitimate interests we had assuredly no wish, or cause, to injure. We desire the friendship and prosperity of that people, the confidence and stability of their ruler, and a mutual recognition of those peaceful interests which are common to their Government and our own. The withdrawal of our troops from their advanced positions in Southern Afghanistan without reference to the effect of such a measure on the country concerned, would have probably consigned all parts of the Amir's dominions to a condition incompatible with orderly government or tolerable neighbourhood. We had already secured possession of the improved frontier we required; but this was not enough. We had still to secure the exclusion of Russian influence from the whole of Afghanistan, as well as the goodwill and confidence of the Afghan people and their ruler. To the attainment of these objects our policy had been not less steadily directed; for the undisturbed tranquillity of any frontier must necessarily depend, to some extent, upon the peaceable condition of the countries with which it is contiguous, and the satisfactory character of relations with the Governments of such countries. Although, therefore, we could afford, far better than the Amir, to await the result of negotiations for peace, we deemed it our duty to spare no effort, consistent with the dignity of the British Crown, and the just interests of its Indian dominions, for the early establishment of mutually satisfactory relations with the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan.

"32. So many and such mischievous misrepresentations of our Afghan policy, more especially in reference to territorial questions, had been propagated after the rupture of our relations with Shere Ali, that the Amir's reluctance to entertain any territorial basis of negotiation appeared to us very probably attributable to exaggerated and erroneous apprehensions as to the real character of the arrangements we deemed essential to the future security of our frontier. We felt, however, that their moderation must be admitted if they were compared with the conditions of a similar character hitherto dictated, at the close of victorious wars, by conquering to conquered Powers; and we believed that, if the object and scope of them were thoroughly understood by the Amir, the last obstacle would be removed from the conclusion of a mutually honourable and advantageous Treaty of Peace between His Highness and the British Government. For this, it was necessary that there should be between us a frank interchange of views and wishes on the subject of our relative positions. Such interchange of views could not be satisfactorily carried on by formal correspondence, or without personal intercourse; but long and varied experience had convinced us that the policy of a European Government cannot be adequately interpreted or represented by Asiatic Agents, however loyal and intelligent they may be. Many of our minor troubles on the frontier have been caused by the employment of Asiatics as mediums of communication between the British authorities and the border tribes; and whatever improvements have been effected during the last three years in our relations with those tribes and the neighbouring tribal States, such as Biluchistan, are due to the personal influence of British officers. Warned by this knowledge, we felt that to entrust the detailed explanation and discussion of our views to any Native Agent would insure misconception and resistance on the part of the Amir. On the other hand, we reposed complete confidence in the discretion and ability of Major Cavagnari; and, for all these reasons, we were anxious to bring about, if possible, early and unreserved personal intercourse between him and the Amir of Kabul. Having regard to the Amir's position at that time, we did not feel justified in proposing that His Highness should leave his capital for this purpose; and having regard to our own position, we were fully conscious that our motives in proposing to Yakub Khan a personal conference with Major Cavagnari at Kabul, would probably be misconstrued by the public, and possibly misrepresented to the Amir. We considered, however, that we ought not to be deterred by this consideration from taking the course which we had good reason to regard as most conducive to the early re-establishment of peaceful relations with His Highness upon a thoroughly sound and honourable footing. We therefore, authorized Major Cavagnari to address to the Amir proposals for a personal conference at Kabul on the subject of our territorial condi-



tions. These proposals having been accepted, the native bearer of them was instructed to arrange with Yakub Khan for the proper reception of Major Cavagnari at the Court of His Highness.

"33. In the meanwhile, the suspended activity of our troops upon the Khaibar line had begun to exercise a very prejudicial influence upon our political, as well as our military, position in Afghanistan. Although, for political reasons, the capture and occupation of Kabul had been excluded from our plan of military operations, it was obviously most inexpedient to proclaim or avow that decision. The continued inactivity of our forces, however, in positions so closely threatening the Afghan capital, and the comments made upon it by our own Press, had gradually encouraged the people of Kabul, and the intervening tribes, to attribute their freedom from molestation on our part to our concealed inability to advance any further. We had reason to believe that these impressions were strengthened by questions asked, and opinions expressed, in Parliament; of which the reports, rapidly circulated beyond our frontier, were such as to suggest a conclusion that, rather than incur the cost and inconvenience of further military operations, the British Government was ready to make peace with the Amir of Afghanistan on terms dictated, not by itself, but by His Highness. The result was an apparent disposition on the part of the Amir to assume towards us a more reserved and ambiguous attitude, and a recrudescence of petty, but vexatious and harassing, attacks from the surrounding tribes, acting on the instigation of fanatical Mollahs from Kabul. These attacks gave rise to two actions, in which severe loss was inflicted on the Shinwari tribe by Brigadier-General Tytler at Deh Sarrak, and on the Khugianis by Brigadier-General Gough at Putehabad. The tribes thus defeated are among the most restless and warlike of those with whom our troops were brought into contact during the recent campaign; and we cannot doubt that their complete discomfiture, on the occasions above mentioned, contributed to the encouragement of pacific influences in the councils of the Amir. At the same time, the increasing heat of the weather, and the defective sanitary conditions of Jellalabad, had begun to tell injuriously on the health of the large force concentrated in that locality; and due regard to the well-being of our troops necessitated an immediate change of quarters to some higher and healthier ground.

"34. We consequently authorized General Sir Samuel Browne to advance a portion of his force as far as Gandamak. This movement was primarily dictated by sanitary motives of an urgent character; but, in authorizing it, we were not indifferent to the important political advantages it offered, as a significant corrective to the erroneous impressions referred to in the preceding paragraph.

"35. Within a few days after the occupation of Gandamak, a letter from the Amir announced his intention of proceeding to that place, for the purpose of there entering into personal conference with Major Cavagnari. This was, clearly, a more satisfactory arrangement than the deputation of a British Envoy to Kabul. Major Cavagnari was, therefore, instructed to arrange with General Sir Samuel Browne for the honorable reception of His Highness, and was invested with full powers to represent this Government in negotiations, respecting which he had previously been furnished with detailed oral instructions by the Viceroy at Lahore. The Amir reached Gandamak on the 8th of May, and was received there by the British authorities with all possible honor and hospitality. After the formal ceremonies of his reception, negotiations were opened by His Highness, and continued without interruption till the 26th of May, when the Treaty of that date was signed in the British camp by the Amir on behalf of Afghanistan, and by Major Cavagnari on behalf of the British Government.

"36. The several Articles of this Treaty were framed in the belief that they fully secure all the objects of the war, which have already been explained. The 3rd Article establishes our paramount position in Afghanistan, and our adequate control over the Amir's external relations. Our obligation to assist His Highness against foreign aggression is the legitimate consequence of this condition; and it is required of us not less imperatively for the security of India than for the independence of Afghanistan. But the British Government could not have undertaken such an obligation, if the means of fulfilling it had not been secured by the 4th Article of the Treaty; which provides for the residence at Kabul of a British representative, and for the right to depute British Agents, as occasion may require, to all parts of the Afghan frontier. The Amir himself had requested that our permanent representative should reside at his capital; and, from the opening of the negotiations, he has evinced no disinclination to the admission of British officers within his dominions. Such disinclination would, indeed, have been incompatible with any sincere desire for the advantages of British friendship and support; and the Amir's appreciation of these advantages has been manifested, not only by his conduct during the negotiations, but still more effectually by the alacrity and loyalty with which he is already carrying out his treaty obligations in reference to the Amnesty clause, and other minor matters.

"37. Under the 6th and 7th Articles of the Treaty, His Highness engages to take measures for the protection and encouragement of commerce between India and Afghanistan. This engagement will receive practical development in a special Commercial Convention to be concluded within twelve months from the ratification of the Treaty of Gandamak. Some such interval was required for the arrangement of details connected with the selection and improvement of roads, and for the examination of the nature and circumstances of the trade between the two countries, as well as for the reciprocal adjustment of duties. It is premature to forecast the ultimate results of arrangements now for the first time possible, in reference to the security and expansion of the overland commerce of India with other Asiatic countries. But

on our western frontier access to and from India, although far from easy, is not impeded by such great natural barriers as elsewhere interpose almost insuperable obstacles to regular and frequent intercourse, by land, with the rest of Asia. On this part of our border the main hinderances to commerce have always been political; and of late years such hindrances were increased both by the chronic misrule and jealous isolation of the Afghan Government, and also by the inadequacy of internal restraints upon the marauding tribes who hold the passes. When these impediments disappear, we may look for a considerable expansion of the land-borne commerce of Northern India. Afghanistan itself is a country of no great productive resources, but it commands the routes which penetrate into Central and Western Asia; and the commercial classes, not only of that country, but also of those immediately beyond the Upper Oxus, are largely Indian, or of Indian descent. The trade of Afghanistan is principally in Indian hands; and the Russian Governor at Tashkend recently promulgated a severe edict against the Hindu bankers of Turkistan, who are mostly emigrants from the western districts of India. The route by Herat and Kandahar runs through the more open and fertile parts of Afghanistan, connecting the important towns of Herat and Kandahar. The Treaty signed with His Highness the Khan of Kelat towards the close of the year 1876 effected the pacification of Beluchistan, and re-opened the great trade route, through the Bolan Pass, which has not since been interrupted. By that arrangement the commerce of Central Asia, after reaching Kandahar, is placed in safe connection with the railway system of India, and the rising sea-port of Kurrachi. There is already a noticeable tendency to increase in the number of caravans now annually passing the Bolan; and the merchants of Sind have always been among the most industrious and enterprising of our foreign traders. With proper management, therefore, and under a judicious system of transit duties, considerable expansion may be reasonably expected in the external commerce of India upon this important line. All such considerations will receive our careful attention in the negotiation of the Commercial Convention which remains to be concluded with the Amir of Kabul.

" 38. It may be here mentioned that our political officers who accompanied the columns withdrawn from Kandahar in the spring of this year, have explored much of the country, hitherto almost unknown, which lies on the direct lines between Pishin and the Indian frontier below Dera Ghazi Khan. They have ascertained that the routes through this country traverse elevated valleys and high plateaux, where the climate is at no season of the year very unfavorable, and where supplies and water are comparatively abundant. The tribes who inhabit this region are less unfriendly to strangers than the northern Pathans; and the construction and maintenance of good fair-weather roads present no serious difficulties. There is little doubt that this was the direction taken by the earlier trade routes into India from Persia and Southern Afghanistan; and on commercial, as well as on military, grounds the possibility of restoring those channels of communication deserves further examination.

" 39. The Treaty of Gandamak provides for the immediate commencement of telegraphic communication between Kabul and India. The advantages of such communication are obvious; and the establishment of it will both illustrate and confirm the character of the change now effected in our relations with Afghanistan.

" 40. The territorial concessions imposed upon the Amir are light, and involve no permanent alienation of any part of the dominions claimed by his Government. The Khaibar Pass has never formed part of those dominions; while the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram are retained by the British Government under an assignment. For the better protection and security of our frontier, and for the proper maintenance of communications with our advanced garrisons, which will observe and command the three principal passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. But we have entertained no projects for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior of the country, or for occupying any posts not absolutely required for the defensive purposes explained in the 11th paragraph of this despatch. Accordingly the towns of Kandahar and Jellalabad are restored by the Treaty of Gandamak to the Amir of Kabul. The passes of the Kojak Mountains will be carefully kept under our own control; and it is probable that the hill skirts of the Pishin country, like the upper districts of Kuram Valley, will provide fresh and valuable sanitarium for our troops. But the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require, or have ever contemplated. It is reported to be a position of no material strength; it can be easily turned; and the surrounding country could not support a large military force. Kandahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Pishin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty: but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure, without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Kandahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his Government. Without Kandahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Kabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions, would have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence which the Treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

" 41. Similar objections applied to the retention of Jellalabad. As a military position that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Lundi Kotal ridge. It

can, at any moment, be seized by a rapid advance from the Khaibar; and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation, as far as Gandamak, of a troublesome line of military communications. Such an extension of our frontier, though necessarily increasing our permanent military expenditure, would also, no doubt, increase our permanent political influence over the adjacent tribes and petty Chiefships to the north-east of the frontier thus extended. But the only political advantage thereby acquired would be the means of utilizing those tribes and Chiefships as a barrier, in case of need, against the action of any hostile power at Kabul; and for the control or punishment of such action, material guarantees, far more effectual, are provided by the Treaty which secures to us the permanent military command of Kabul from the crest of the Shutur-Gardan. In short, we have framed this Treaty with an earnest desire to render all the conditions of it, not only consistent with, but also conducive to, the maintenance of that friendly and mutually advantageous footing on which it re-establishes our relations with Afghanistan: and from those relations we have laboured to eliminate every appreciable cause of irritation and disunion.

"42. The engagements thus concluded, at Gandamak, with the Amir Yakub Khan, represent and attest an important change in the whole condition of Central Asian affairs. The magnitude of this change will be best appreciated when our present position and influence beyond the frontier are compared with what they were during the greater portion of the preceding period between the Ambala Conferences, and the recent Afghan war. We do not, however, profess to ascribe any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the part of Afghan Princes. The late Amir Shere Ali, throughout the whole period of his reign, was under a formal Treaty obligation to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Government; but that engagement in no wise prevented his adoption of a course which led him into inevitable rupture and open hostility with this Government. We regard the present Treaty rather as the commencement, than as the confirmation, of a new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan. It provides for, and facilitates, the attainment of results incalculably beneficial to the two countries concerned. The character of those results, however, will, to a great extent, be determined by the steadiness with which the British Government maintains, and the intelligence with which its local agents carry out, the policy that has dictated this Treaty—a policy which has for its object to substitute co-operation for isolation, and to replace mutual mistrust by mutual confidence. Nor do we disguise from ourselves that the practical value of the Treaty mainly depends upon the character and disposition of the Amir and his successors. Relations established with Afghanistan under the most favorable conditions, and with the most promising prospects, may, of course, be again impaired either by the disloyalty of Afghan Princes, or by the alienation of their unrequited confidence. In either case, complications may arise, against which no present precautions on our part can completely guarantee our successors in the Government of India. But, though anxious to deal considerably with the Amir's susceptibilities, and to take into the fullest account all the reasonable requirements and legitimate interests of his Government, we deem it absolutely requisite that, in countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British Government to punish its enemies and protect its friends should be so generally recognised as to render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it. We have, therefore, been careful to secure, for British interests and influence in Afghanistan, a position substantially independent of the personal caprices of any Afghan ruler; and for the effectual maintenance of that position the Treaty provides strong material guarantees, by the territorial conditions which place the British power in permanent command of the main avenues from India to Kabul.

"43. Your Lordship will, of course, understand that, in thus speaking of British interests and influence in Afghanistan, we mean the interests, only, of our alliance with that State in reference to external affairs; and the influence, only, which is necessary to maintain and direct a common policy on behalf of those interests. We, in no wise, contemplate any system of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; and the British Envoy at Kabul will be strictly required to abstain from such interference. The small subsidy which we grant to the Amir will, we hope, strengthen his hands in maintaining his authority.

"44. Notwithstanding the conditions it imposes, the Treaty of Gandamak, so far as we can judge, is regarded with satisfaction by the Amir; to whose possession it restores important tracts of territory which His Highness could not have recovered by the sword, and to the peaceful consolidation of whose authority it will, we trust, powerfully contribute. We desire to record our high appreciation of the signal ability with which Major Cavagnari conducted the negotiations to this successful conclusion; and it is, we think, difficult to over-estimate the value of his political services throughout the campaign. The political officers, generally, had difficult duties to perform, and they discharged them with great tact and efficiency.

"45. We have also much pleasure in mentioning to Your Lordship that, not only the justice of the war, and the humanity with which it has been waged by the British Government, but also the fair and generous terms on which we have concluded it, are now receiving unreserved recognition in numerous communications spontaneously addressed to the Viceroy by Her Majesty's feudatories and Native subjects in all parts of India.

"46. By the Khan of Kelat (with whom our relations four years ago had been very unsatisfactory), the cause of the British Government, throughout this war, has been well supported beyond the frontiers of India. It cannot be doubted that the conditions of the Treaty signed with the Amir of Kabul at Gandamak in 1879 have been greatly facilitated by the results of the Treaty signed with the Khan of Kelat at Jacobabad in 1876. Certain it is,

that the military difficulties of the war, and the political impediments to the peace, now happily concluded, would have been seriously aggravated by hostile or untrustworthy conduct on the part of the Sovereign and Sirdars of Kelat. For the fidelity with which the Khan has observed his treaty obligations, and for the uninterrupted sympathy and good-will of the Biluch tribes and Sirdars, we are largely indebted to the personal influence of Major Sandeman, and to the ability with which he has discharged his important duties as the Governor-General's Agent in Kelat. We shall take an early opportunity of submitting to Your Lordship the measures whereby we propose to mark our appreciation of the friendly and loyal attitude maintained by His Highness Khodadad Khan of Kelat, throughout the progress and settlement of our disputes with the late Amir of Kabul.

"47. It now only remains to notice those conditions of the Treaty which have reference to the independent tribes of the Khaibar and Michni Passes. We do not, of course, anticipate the immediate or habitual good behaviour of all these wild hillmen; whose tribal organization is infinitely various, and whose management will doubtless require much skill and patience on the part of the political officers intrusted with that task. But it is a task which presents no difficulties insurmountable by the steady exercise of such qualities. At no time since the annexation of the Punjab has the mountain border of that province been wholly free from depredation and insult on the part of the surrounding tribes; nor can it be reasonably expected that what successive Governments of India have failed to accomplish in the course of thirty years will now be accomplished all at once. We must be prepared for occasional misconduct (especially during the first two or three years of the new arrangements) requiring from us recourse to punitive measures. But, apart from the indirect advantage of such increased respect as our authority has acquired from our military successes during the war, our practical power of controlling the border tribes has been greatly strengthened by the Treaty. The Amir of Kabul has now neither the motive nor the means to incite these tribes to acts of hostility against us. The policy applied during the last three years to the pass tribes of Biluchistan has already effected the complete pacification of even their most turbulent sections: and the Bolan Pass, though unguarded by British troops, has been remarkably safe and quiet. These facts justify us in anticipating the most satisfactory results from the judicious and patient application of a similar system to the management of the Khaibar and Michni Passes.

"48. We cannot close this narrative of the second Afghan war without bringing prominently to Your Lordship's notice the high character maintained by Her Majesty's troops, both English and Native, and their admirable conduct throughout the campaign. The enemy's positions in the Khaibar and Kuram Passes were of great natural strength; but, though powerfully armed and vigorously defended, they were rapidly captured. His forces, dislodged from these positions with the loss of their guns and stores, were not merely defeated, but dispersed. In the advance to Kandahar, the superiority of the British cavalry was established as soon as tested, at the outset of the campaign. Against the valour and steadiness of the British soldier the fiercest assaults of the most warlike mountain tribes were as ineffectual as the organised resistance of the Amir's regular troops. Under conditions more trying than those of actual combat, the strictest discipline has been maintained throughout all ranks of the field forces, and the life and property of non-combatants effectually protected. It would be out of place in this report to specify particular services, or particular regiments; but the Viceroy desires to record his high appreciation, in which we cordially concur, of the good service performed by the Native, as well as the European, regiments of the army of India in Afghanistan; where their discipline and courage were attested, not only by the uniform success of their arms, but also by the steadiness of their conduct under those trials and privations which are incidental to periods of inaction on the part of an invading army in a wild and inhospitable country.

"49. We have also to acknowledge with sincere satisfaction the thoroughly creditable efficiency and patriotic spirit with which the contingents of the Native States have sustained their honorable part in the labours of the late campaign.

#### 184. The Secretary of State's reply.—The following despatch \*

\* From Secretary of State, No. 27 S., dated 7th August 1879. conveying the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government as to the manner in which the military operations against the Amir of Afghanistan had been carried on and the political results thereby achieved was received at Simla on the 30th August :—

No. 27, dated India Office, London, 7th August 1879.

From—Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India,  
To—Government of India.

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of letter from Your Excellency's Government, No. 136, dated the 2nd June last, transmitting, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the treaty of peace and friendship which you have concluded with the Amir Yakub Khan, and also of your subsequent letter, No. 160, dated the 7th July, received on the 2nd instant, explaining the considerations by which you were influenced in regulating the course of the recent campaign in Afghanistan, and in the settlement of terms of peace.



"2. My despatch of the 18th of November last reviewed the leading features of the policy followed by the British Government towards Afghanistan in such detail as to render unnecessary, on the present occasion, any further remarks on the subject. The refusal of the late Amir, Shere Ali Khan, to admit within his territories an Envoy from Your Excellency, after he had, in the summer of last year, welcomed a Russian Mission to his capital, compelled Her Majesty's Government to demand reparation for the insult thus offered, and to intimate that his position would be regarded as that of a declared enemy, unless the reparation required was afforded by a specified date. The Amir had for some time previous adopted a course of conduct which tended to endanger both the security of the north-west frontier and the peace of the Empire at large. This unfriendly attitude was met with forbearance, but the time at length arrived when it became necessary to abandon a policy which had apparently encouraged His Highness to undervalue the power, as he had already disregarded the wishes, of the British Government.

"3. Her Majesty's Government were not without hope that the communication addressed to the Amir would rouse him to a sense of his critical position, and that he would reply in such terms as might render hostilities unnecessary. This hope, however, was not fulfilled; the date specified passed without any reply from His Highness, and no alternative remained but prompt and decided action. The passage of the Afghan frontier by British troops was followed by the defeat of the forces which guarded it, and the rapid occupation of positions which placed the territories of the Amir at the mercy of the British Government. Simultaneously with the advance of the troops, Your Excellency issued a proclamation, which clearly intimated to the Afghan Sirdars and people that the invasion of their country was the consequence solely of the ill-advised conduct of their ruler; and that the British Government in no way desired to injure the people of Afghanistan, or to attach to them any share of responsibility for Shere Ali's proceedings. The considerations which led Your Excellency in Council to anticipate important advantages from thus proclaiming a practical distinction between the Afghan people and their ruler, as set forth in the 13th paragraph of your letter of the 7th July, were weighty, and are proved by the result to have been based on an accurate estimate of public feeling in Afghanistan, and of the extent to which the late Amir, by his domestic and foreign policy, had alienated the feelings of his subjects.

"4. There were grounds for believing that the rapid march of the British columns and the signal failure of the Afghan troops, although occupying formidable and well-selected positions, to offer any effective resistance, might satisfy Shere Ali of the rashness of his conduct and induce overtures from him of an acceptable character. The event, however, was different; within three weeks after the advance of Her Majesty's forces, the Amir, having first released from prison his son, Yakub Khan, whom he at once appointed Governor of Kabul, quitted that city for Turkistan, accompanied by those members of the Russian Mission who had remained at the capital after the departure of General Stoletoff.

"5. The ultimate intentions of Shere Ali at this time are necessarily involved in some obscurity. Whatever they may have been, they were frustrated by his death on the 21st of February. Capricious at all times, and, in his later years, unfriendly as he had proved himself to be, Her Majesty's Government could not but receive with regret the intelligence of the decease of a Prince with whom the Government of India had at one period been on terms of cordiality, and who, moreover, had shown himself possessed of many of the qualities required in a ruler of Afghanistan. The event, followed as it was by the undisputed accession to power of the present Amir, enabled Your Excellency's Government to suspend further military operations, and unquestionably rendered less difficult the re-establishment of relations between the British and Afghan Governments on a satisfactory footing. Yakub Khan had necessarily been free from responsibility for his father's policy; pacific overtures could, therefore, be made by him without humiliation, and he wisely took immediate steps to secure that alliance which his father had forfeited. His early communications addressed to your political officer at Gandamak indicated a desire for peace, and his eventual decision to leave his capital and proceed in person to the British camp, afforded proof of his confidence in the moderation and justice of the British Government, and of his readiness to accept in principle the terms you were prepared to offer him, with the general nature of which he had been previously made acquainted.

"6. This confidence was not misplaced, and to it, and to the correct appreciation shown by the Amir of the true relative positions of the two Governments, must, in a great measure, be attributed the success of the negotiations which followed his arrival at Gandamak. I have already conveyed to you by telegraph the approval, by Her Majesty's Government, of the conditions of the Treaty by which those negotiations were closed, and it is, therefore, only requisite for me now to make a few general remarks on some of its more important Articles.

"7. The second Article, which guarantees an amnesty on the part of the Amir in favour of those of his subjects who may have aided the British forces during recent operations, was essential to guard against the occurrence of reprisals such as followed the close of the last Afghan war. Her Majesty's Government learn with particular satisfaction that the Amir has indicated in a practical way his desire to give effect to its stipulations, and they are confident that His Highness will take care that this desire is not contravened by any act or negligence on the part of subordinate officials. Her Majesty's Government attach special importance to this matter, which materially affects the honour of the British name.

"8. The third Article of the Treaty, which defines the future political relations of two Governments, appears to Her Majesty's advisers to secure to each of the parties to it everything



that is essential to their respective interests. On the one hand the Amir undertakes to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government: on the other hand, he receives a guarantee against any consequences which may ensue to him from the due observance of this undertaking, and against unprovoked foreign aggression. At the same time, the concluding passage of the Article indicates the strict adherence of the British Government to its oft-declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which is again plainly affirmed in the fifth Article. It being obvious that, so long as His Highness conforms strictly to his Treaty obligations, foreign aggression must necessarily be unprovoked by any spontaneous act on his part, Her Majesty's Government see every reason to believe that the unambiguous stipulations which have now been recorded in a solemn instrument will be conducive to the material prosperity of Afghanistan, to the tranquillity of India, and to the peace of Central Asia.

" 9. The conditions embodied in the fourth Article in regard to the establishment of British Agencies in Afghanistan are likely to secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view. It is satisfactory that one of the first acts of the Amir after opening negotiations should have been to express his desire to receive a permanent British Resident at his capital. Although Her Majesty's Government always abstained from pressing this measure on the late Amir in deference to his objections, they have never ceased to consider it in itself expedient; they believe that even the occasional presence at Kabul of an officer of sound judgment might have obviated many of the misunderstandings of recent years; they are satisfied that the objections expressed by Shere Ali will be shown to have been without substantial foundation; and they anticipate with confidence that the effect of the presence of a British officer at Kabul will be to consolidate that unity of policy between the Governments of India and Afghanistan which it is the first object of the Treaty to establish. Her Majesty's Government are glad to observe that you have accorded to the Amir the privilege of deputing his own Agents similarly to India. They believe that many advantages will accrue to both Governments by the presence of an Afghan Envoy of good sense and ability at Your Excellency's Court.

" 10. The right has properly been reserved to the British Government to send subordinate agents to the Afghan frontier, when such a measure may be considered necessary. With a competent Resident at Kabul, the permanent location of English officers at Herat, Kandahar, and other points on the frontier, will no doubt be less essential than, up to the present time, Her Majesty's Government have considered it to be. It is clear, however, that the British Government cannot ensure the integrity of the Amir's dominions against foreign aggression unless they have every reasonable facility for acquiring trustworthy information of events beyond the border through the channel of officers deputed from time to time to the frontier.

" 11. The territorial arrangements specified in Article 9 secure to the British Government that control over the western passes, and the tribes inhabiting them, which the course of events has rendered essential. The strategic defects of the Indian frontier in the direction of Afghanistan, as that frontier has existed since the acquisition of the Punjab, are very clearly stated in your letter of the 7th July. As is therein observed, it was not compatible with the policy and principles of the British Government to have recourse to the sword for the purpose of strengthening its position; but the successful conclusion of a war, which every effort was made to avert, has been legitimately used to remedy defects, of which the gravity could no longer be overlooked. Her Majesty's Government are gratified that it has been found possible to secure an object so important without actual annexation of Afghan territory, and, in particular, without a permanent occupation of the cities of Kandahar and Jellalabad. They agree in the opinion of Your Excellency in Council that the loss of those places, and especially of Kandahar, would have been extremely detrimental to the strength and credit of the Afghan Government, while they see no reason to question the judgment of your competent professional advisers that it was not necessary, on strategic grounds, to incur so grave a political disadvantage.

" 12. Her Majesty's Government do not underrate the difficulties which may for some time be experienced in dealing with the tribes now first brought under the control of the Indian Government; but they are persuaded that the same energy and judgment which has been attended with such admirable results on the existing Punjab and Sind frontiers will be equally successful in the new and more extended sphere in which those qualities will now be exercised.

" 13. The engagement in regard to the construction of a line of telegraph to Kabul through the Kuram Valley, and the improvement of the present imperfect facilities for commercial intercourse between India and Afghanistan, which are embodied in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Treaty, are cordially approved by Her Majesty's Government. Although the promises made by Shere Ali to the late Lord Mayo on this subject were never fulfilled, he lived to see the benefit which accrued to his country by the measures agreed upon between Your Excellency's Government and the Khan and Sirdars of Kelat, affecting the lower trade routes between Afghanistan and Biluchistan. The Amir Yakub Khan has only to observe the improvement in those regions, in the way both of extended trade and of increased civilization, to appreciate the solid advantages which commercial facilities and improved communications bring in their train.

" 14. The subsidy accorded to the Amir, under Article 10 of the Treaty, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be moderate in amount, and necessary to the support of His Highness's legitimate authority. Experience has shown that it is difficult for the Ruler of so poor

a country as Afghanistan to dispense with material aid of this kind; but its continuance has properly been made dependent on the efficient fulfilment by the Amir of the engagements which he has now contracted.

"15. Her Majesty's Government have observed, with great pleasure, the loyalty manifested by the Native Chiefs and Princes of India, both individually and collectively, in the recent crisis. Their anxiety to take an active part in the war, and the unreserved manner in which they placed their resources at the disposal of Your Excellency's Government, are gratifying evidences of unity of interests and mutual good feeling and confidence between the British Government and the great Feudatories of the Empire. Equally satisfactory has been the conduct of the Khan of Kelat, whose friendly and loyal attitude, no doubt, greatly facilitated the military operations in Southern Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to give the most favorable consideration to any measures which Your Excellency in Council may propose for the purpose of marking their recognition of His Highness's services.

"16. As I propose to address you separately in the Military Department on the purely military aspect of the operations now happily terminated, I confine myself at present to recording Her Majesty's complete satisfaction with the conduct of officers and men, European and Native, under circumstances trying to their endurance and discipline.

"17. The various Political Officers attached to the columns and detachments in the field have had delicate and onerous duties to perform, and have discharged them in such a manner as to add materially to their reputations. The services of Major Cavagnari and Major Sandeman in particular have been of special importance to your Government. The value of Major Sandeman's personal influence over the Khan of Kelat and the Biluch Sirdars can scarcely be over-rated; while Major Cavagnari's conduct of the various duties which fell to him during the campaign, and of the negotiations which have led to the restoration of peace with Afghanistan, was marked by tact and ability of a high order.

"18. I have only, in conclusion, to express the deep interest with which Her Majesty's Government have perused the clear and able exposition of the policy of the Government of India in connection with the recent Afghan affairs, which is contained in your letter, No. 160, of the 7th July, and their cordial approval of the proceedings of Your Excellency in Council throughout the critical period which is now closed. In carrying out, from time to time, their wishes and instructions, Your Excellency and your colleagues have displayed uniform discretion and judgment, and an accurate appreciation of the objects essential to be attained. Her Majesty's Government confidently believe that the policy embodied in the Treaty of Gandamak, to which Your Excellency personally has so eminently contributed, will, if pursued consistently, secure both British and Afghan interests, and promote the stability and peace of the Empire.

---

#### APPENDICES TO CHAPTER IX.

*Appendix No. XXXIII.—Memorandum, dated 11th July 1878, by His Excellency the Viceroy, calling for expressions of opinion on certain questions relating to Kabul affairs, and answers submitted by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Major Cavagnari, Dr. Bellew, Mr. Plowden, and others.*

*Appendix No. XXXIV.—Memorandum on the Political state of Kabul, dated Amritsar, 25th October 1878, by Chetan Shah.*

*Appendix No. XXXV.—Minute by His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 4th September 1878.*

*Appendix No. XXXVI.—Persian text of letters, dated 7th and 10th September, addressed by Colonel Waterfield to the Mustaufi, the Mir Akhor, and Faiz Mahomed Khan.*

*Appendix No. XXXVII.—Reports by Sir Neville Chamberlain, Major Cavagnari, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins; also letters from and to Faiz Mahomed Khan.*

*Appendix No. XXXVIII.—Persian text of Amir Shere Ali's letters, dated 6th October 1878, to the Viceroy. Brought from Kabul by Nawab Ghulam Hassan.*

*Appendix No. XXXIX.—Persian text of British manifesto of 21st November 1878.*

*Appendix No. XL.—Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy of operations to be undertaken on 21st November 1878, if the Amir of Kabul is declared an enemy of the British Government.*

*Appendix No. XLI.—Translation of Memorandum on Kabul affairs by Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, C.S.I., dated Kohat, 19th October 1878.*

*Appendix No. XLII.—Collection of papers relating to the proceedings of the Russian Mission at Kabul. Extracts from Russian newspapers on the policy of England and Russia in Central Asia.*

*Appendix No. XLIII.—Instructions, dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari in the event of a British Mission proceeding to Kabul to arrange the terms of peace.*

*Appendix XLIV.—Collection of papers relating to the Amir's reception at Gandamak and the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Treaty.*

## APPENDIX I.

MR. EASTWICK'S MEMORANDUM WRITTEN ABOUT 1858 ON THE PERSIAN CLAIMS TO SEISTÁN.

(Referred to in paragraph 5, Chapter I.)

The geographical notices of Seistán in English writers have been well condensed by Thornton in his article "Seistán" in the "Gazetteer of the countries adjacent to India." The information furnished by M. Ferrier, however, is not comprised in that article, M. Ferrier's book having been published subsequently to the "Gazetteer." Mr. Thornton makes scarcely any allusion to the history or political relations of the province. The whole body of information possessed in this country regarding Seistán may be condensed as follows:—

Seistán lies between N. lat.  $30^{\circ} 30'$ — $31^{\circ} 50'$ , and E. long.  $61^{\circ}$ — $62^{\circ} 20'$ . This excludes Lash and Jowain; but if these districts be included, Seistán will extend to  $32^{\circ} 8'$ . The province is, in round numbers, 100 miles from north to south and 90 broad from west to east. Thornton gives the breadth at 80 miles and the area at 5,000 square miles, from which estimate the area of the Lakes Zirah or Great Hamun, Duk-i-Tir and Aishkenaik, amounting collectively

to probably 4,000 square miles, must be excluded. Seistán is without doubt the ancient Drangia or Zarangia, and was one of the ancient provinces of Persia, having been given to Sani, the grandfather of Rustam, by Mimichehr, to be governed as a dependent principality. Rustam is said to have been born in the province at a mountain called Sigz, whence the province, which was anciently named Zawal or Zabalistan, came to be called Sigzistan, written Sigistan, and then Seistán.

The province anciently extended far beyond its present limits reaching up to Ghur and Zamindawur. It is now bounded by Lash and Jowain to the north, by districts dependent on Kandahar to the east, and by Kerman and Mekran to the westward.

The climate of Seistán resembles that of Sind. The whole province is a level plain, except one eminence on the eastern shore of Lake Zirah which is called Rustam's hill, and more recently the Kwajah's hill. The fort on the top of this hill used to be regarded as impregnable, and might be made a very strong place. The soil is incredibly rich, and every plant that grows in Persia and Kandahar, as well as sugarcane and other productions of Hindoostan, would no doubt flourish in Seistán. The cotton plant bears a large pod, but the plant itself is diminutive, probably from want of culture. Mules, asses, and cows thrive well, but camels and sheep die off in numbers poisoned by a plant called Trutk. Horses cannot exist in the country, being destroyed by a fly, the bite of which is scarcely less poisonous than that of the African Tretze. At present the climate is unfavorable to human life, but the remains of great cities and the evidence of history prove that Seistan was once extremely populous. Ferrier reckons that the Beloochees of Seistán, who form one-half of the population, could without doubt bring into the field from 30,000 to 35,000 excellent infantry. According to this estimate the total number of inhabitants would be about 300,000. The same writer attributes the declining state of the population in part to the excessive fertility of the soil, which renders it an object of cupidity and invasion to the surrounding tribes. There is no doubt, however, that Seistán has never recovered the invasion of Tymour who, to use the words of the Persian historian, slew every human being,—from the infant at the breast to the old man of a hundred years. He, besides, destroyed the great embankment by which the waters of the Helmund were retained for irrigation. With the security

to life and property afforded by a strong Government, and the restoration of the canals, the whole province would in a few years once more become a garden.

In the legendary history of Persia as the country of Rustam, his sire, grandsire, and his son, Suhrab, Seistán occupies a prominent place. It seems to have continued a province of Persia down to the conquest of that country by the Arabs, and to have passed under the dominion of the Khalifs. In 872 A.D., Yakoob bin Lais, a brazier of Seistán, and afterwards the leader of a band of robbers, having been admitted into the service of Darham, the Prince of Seistán, gradually rose to power; and, at the death of Darham, succeeded him in the government of the province. He then rebelled against Khalif Mahomed, conquered the

whole of Khorassan, and formed the dynasty of the Saffaringam\* or Braziers. His death took place in 878 A.D., when he was in full march upon Bagdad. He was succeeded by his brother, Umzuldais, to whom the Khalif granted the sovereignty of Persia, but who was taken prisoner by Ismael Samani in A.D. 900, and sent prisoner to Bagdad where he died. After him, Tabir, his grandson, reigned six years, till A.D. 903, when he was sent prisoner to Bagdad, and with him ended the dynasty of the Saffaringam who ruled over Persia from Seistán where they had their capital. From this date till the reign of Mahomed of Ghuznee, Seistán continued a dependency of the Samanid Kings, whose capital was Bokhara, and in A.D. 961, Munsoor, the sixth of that dynasty, restored Khalaf, of the family of Lais, to the government of Seistán, from which he had been expelled by his subjects.

\* (Sic.)

In 1004 A.D., Mahomed of Ghuznee defeated this same Khalaf and sent him prisoner to Jirgam. From this date nothing special is recorded of Seistán till the time of Tymour. The province appears, however, to have been a dependency of the house of Seljuk, but still to have been governed under that dynasty and the following ones by its own Princes. In 1383 Tymour took Zarninj, the capital of Seistán, after a most obstinate conflict, and destroyed it utterly, sending its Prince, Shah Kutb-ud-din, into captivity. The Seistánese had an army of not less than 50,000 men garrisoning the capital alone. Shah Rukh, the son of Tymour, who fixed his capital at Herat, A.D. 1409, was immediately acknowledged in Seistán, and appears to have appointed the deposed Shah Kutb-ud-din his Viceroy; but in 1408 Kutb by his dealings with Abu Bakar, nephew of Shah Rukh, roused the jealousy of that monarch, who invaded Seistán and reduced it to complete subjection. Shah Rukh died in A.D. 1447, but Seistán probably remained a dependency of his successors till, in 1509, Shah Musil Sapani, King of Persia, conquered Khorassan and the adjacent countries. We must conclude that Seistán remained incorporated with Persia from that time till 1719, when Meer Vaiz, a Ghilzi nobleman, revolted at Candahar and made himself master of that province and probably of Seistán; for the next year his son and successor Mahmood marched through Seistán to invade Persia. The occupation of Persia by the Afghans followed, when Nadir Shah had expelled those tyrants in 1730, he was rewarded by Tumaspa, the nominal Shah of Persia, with the government of the four provinces,—Khorassan, Mazanderan, Seistán, and Kerman. This seems to show that, up to that time, Seistán was considered an ordinary province of the Persian kingdom.

At the death of Nadir in 1747, his nephew, Ali, who was then Governor of Seistán, was proclaimed Shah, and marched immediately to Meshed, when Ahmed Shah Abdalli reduced Seistán to a dependency of Cabul. From the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773, the obedience of the Chiefs of Seistán to the crown of Kabul became only a nominal one; and, in 1800, Bahram Khan, who was the most powerful among them, received Allahmin Shah, the younger brother of Shah Zaman, and assisted him to invade Kandahar. He also gave his daughter in marriage to Kamram, the son of Mahmood, and offered to join the latter with all the force of the province. This offer was, however, declined at the advice of Fath Khan, Barukzye, the father of Dost Mahomed, through whose influence Mahmood got possession of Kandahar.



## APPENDIX II.

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL TO GENERAL GOLDSMID OF 9TH AUGUST 1870.

*(Referred to in paragraph 22 of Chapter I.)*

Her Majesty's Government, having selected you, on account of your special qualifications and experience, as a fitting Agent to conduct certain important negotiations with respect to the definition of boundaries, in which the several States of Persia, Afghanistan, and Beloochistan are interested and concerned, I have to convey to you, for your guidance, the views entertained by the Government, with respect to the objects and conduct of your mission.

2. You are aware that during a long series of years, the Governments of the Shah of Persia and of the Ameer of Kabul, respectively, have laid claims to portions of the territory known as the province of Seistán,—claims, however, the validity of which the other party has with equal persistency, denied. Appeals to Her Majesty's Government on the subject of these claims have been made by the Persian Court; but we have hitherto abstained from committing ourselves to any recognition of the claims thus asserted, and are, in fact, at the present time, unfettered by any expressions of opinion with respect to the true sovereignty of the disputed possessions.

3. The Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and Persia, concluded at Paris in March 1857, declares in Article VI. that "in case of differences arising between the Government of Persia and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan, the Persian Government engage to refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to take up arms unless those friendly offices fail of effect. The British Government on their part engage at all times to exert their influence with the States of Afghanistan to prevent any cause of umbrage being given by them or by any of them to the Persian Government; and the British Government, when appealed to by the Persian Government in the event of difficulties arising, will use their best endeavours to compose such differences in a manner just and honorable to Persia." For some years after the conclusion of this treaty, the relations of the Persian and Afghan States attracted no particular attention on the part of Her Majesty's Government. But, in November 1863, the Persian Minister at this Court solicited the interference of Her Majesty's Government to prevent invasion by the Afghans of the territory of Seistán. In reply to this appeal the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Russell) wrote to the Persian Minister, saying that "Her Majesty's Government, being informed that the title to the territory of Seistan is disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline to interfere in the matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms." This communication was approved by the Secretary of State for India (Sir Charles Wood).

4. The British Government having thus declined to use its good offices for the prevention of hostilities between Persia and Afghanistan, Persia, it is alleged, proceeded to assert her claims by force of arms; but of the movements which then ensued, the British Government took no notice and had but little accurate knowledge. The question, indeed, of Seistán did not come prominently before me until, on the 12th February 1870, I was informed in a letter from the Foreign Office that the Persian Government apprehended that the Ameer Shere Ali of Kabul was about to re-assert the Afghan claims over Seistán, whereas a Persian Governor was already established in parts of that province; that the Government of the Shah were prepared to resist, if necessary, any such proceedings, but that they requested that the (British) Indian Government would "use its influence with the Ameer to prevent him from carrying his supposed intentions into effect." In reply to this appeal I intimated, as you are

aware, that if the Persian Government should wish the question of Seistán to be submitted to British arbitration, in accordance with the sixth Article of the Treaty of Paris above quoted, I would communicate with Lord Mayo on the subject.

5. The correspondence which then ensued between the Foreign Office and Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran on the one hand, and between His Excellency the Viceroy and myself on the other, is given at length in an Appendix to this letter. You will observe from it that the Persian Government, while accepting our proffered arbitration, lay great stress upon Lord Russell's letter of November 1863 above quoted, and declare that they can submit to arbitration only their claim to that portion of the territory which they have not already occupied. They allege that, under the operation of Lord Russell's letter, they have conquered and are now in possession of the Seistán territory up to the Helmund River (on the south), and that the other half, still open to arbitration, comprises "all territory on the other bank, including Chacknesoor, and the territory under Ibrahim Khan Beloochee."

6. With respect to this limitation of the scope of arbitration, His Excellency the Viceroy intimated to me that he could not propose to the Ameer Shere Ali to negotiate on the basis laid down by Persia, as the Ameer claims some portion of Seistán which Persia excludes from arbitration.

7. It was therefore resolved (and the resolution was communicated to the Persian Government) that the first object of your mission should be to ascertain the actual territory which Persia had acquired in Seistán since the receipt of Lord Russell's letter. The Persian Government propose that you should proceed as soon as possible to Teheran, and thence, accompanied by a Persian Commissioner, you should make your way to some point on the Seistán frontier. There you would be joined by the Commissioner of Shere Ali, who would be accompanied by a British officer selected by the Viceroy. The precise point of meeting (whether on the Perso-Afghan frontier, at Herat, Furrah, or Lash-Jowain, or in Seistán itself, at Sekoha or Chaknesoor) I must leave it to you to determine, in communication with the representative of the Government of India. Having thus met the Commissioner from the Afghan side, you will proceed to examine the territory in dispute between the Persian and Afghan Governments, laying down as nearly as you can, upon a skeleton map of the country, not only the line of frontier as determined by actual possession at the present time, but also the two lines of frontier which would have to be respectively assigned if the claims of either one party or the other were admitted to their full extent. You will hear all that is advanced by the two Commissioners on the parts of their respective Governments, and will take such evidence as you may require on the spot, both as regards the ancient rights of the two States, and the action which has been taken by them, respectively, since 1863. Having thus acquired all the local information which you can obtain, it will be your duty, in conjunction with the Persian and Afghan Commissioners and the delegate of the Viceroy, to select some place, either in Seistán or in the adjoining territory, where the whole question can be full discussed, and your judgment, in respect to the matters in dispute, may be formally delivered.

8. The correspondence which has been laid before you will place you generally in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to these negotiations. There are, however, one or two points of more than common importance, to which it is desirable to call your special attention. You will have observed in the correspondence that Persia, as indeed I have above remarked, lays most stress upon the Foreign Office letter of November 1863. It is unquestionable that this letter relieved Persia for the time from any pre-existing obligation not to take up arms against the Afghans for the recovery of Seistán without a previous resort to the good offices of the British Government. But this temporary release was understood to relate to the particular events, then in course of development, not to convey an unlimited sanction to the extension of Persian territory to the eastward in all time to come. Moreover, you will bear in mind that the permission given in Lord Russell's letter to resort to hostilities did not necessarily include any recognition on the part of the British Government of the conquests on the one side or the other resulting from such hostilities, and it does not follow, therefore, that we are bound, in our capacity of arbitrators, to admit the recent acquisitions of Persia as over-riding all ancient rights that

may be asserted and established by Afghanistan. In weighing these conflicting claims there will necessarily be much difficulty and delicacy. But Her Majesty's Government have full confidence in your judgment and discretion, and do not doubt that you will eventually succeed in reconciling them.

9. As it is proposed that the Afghan Commissioner should be accompanied by a British officer, selected by the Viceroy of India, you will be placed fully in possession of the views of the Ameer of Kabul and those, also, of the Government of India. This officer will not have authority co-ordinate with your own. His functions will be simply of a consultative character. The sole power of arbitration will be vested in yourself, and it will be communicated to the Persian and the Afghan Governments that your decision with respect to the rights of the claimants is that of the British Government. But you will avail yourself of the assistance of the delegate of the Viceroy, and you will doubtless find his acquaintance with the opinions and feelings of the Court of Kabul extremely serviceable to you in your negotiations. One of the great objects of Her Majesty's Government is that the fullest confidence should be placed by both parties in the impartiality of the arbitration, and, as you are to proceed in the first instance to Teheran, and thence to be accompanied to the Seistán frontier by the Persian Commissioner, it would naturally have an appearance of one-sidedness at Kabul if the Afghan Commissioner should be invited to proceed to the frontier without previous communication with, and unattended by, a British officer.

10. It is not improbable that the Afghan Commissioner will urge, with respect to the rights which Persia claims to have established since 1863, that the Ameer had no knowledge of the permission then given to Persia to assert her position by force of arms. To this it may be replied that Afghanistan, not having been a party to the Treaty of Paris, was under no obligation to Great Britain to invite British mediation with respect to any disputed territory, and was in no wise restrained from asserting her claims by any existing engagements between Persia and the British Government whether she were or were not cognizant of those engagements. Her action was unfettered; and, in point of fact, any intervention that has been applied for, whether granted or refused by us, has been in consequence of allegations by Persia that the Afghans were advancing into Seistán, and that therefore our good offices were due, under treaty, to the Shah's Government for the restraint of such alleged aggressions.

11. I do not know that there are any other leading points to which it is necessary to direct your attention. You will doubtless hear a great deal from both sides, with respect to *de jure* and *de facto* rights of the two States, which it will be your duty to consider in connection with the documentary evidence which you will take with you from the archives of Her Majesty's Government. Whether you will proceed at once, after hearing and weighing all that can be said on the spot, to deliver your opinion, or whether you will move your camp from Seistán to some other place with the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, must be left to your judgment to determine.

12. I need scarcely point out to you that, however little the choice of localities may affect the decision, or reasonably be considered to affect it, it is not improbable that the jealousies and suspicions of Oriental States may, in such a case, discover cause of offence in a selection which has had nothing but local convenience to recommend it. Your experience of the Eastern character will, in this and other matters not more important, make you practically regard the fact that, in all Oriental diplomacy, much depends upon the observance of trifles.

13. The decision at which, with all the facts and arguments before you, you may ultimately arrive will be delivered by you in writing to the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, who will forward it to their respective Governments. At what point upon the frontier you may await the results of these references to Teheran and Kabul, I must leave it to your discretion to determine. It would not, I think, be advisable, pending an answer to these references, that you should proceed towards the Coast to enter upon the other enquiry which Her Majesty's Government entrust to you and regarding which I purpose to address you in another letter.

14. It is scarcely probable that an unreserved acceptance of your proposed conditions of mutual surrender and concession will, in the first instance, be communicated to you by either Government. You will more probably find it necessary to enter into a renewed communication with the two Commissioners, with a view of reconciling, if possible, the objections that may have been taken at Cabul and Teheran. If these renewed efforts, however, should fail of success, you will then inform the Commissioners, for communication to their respective Governments, that your labors are at an end with respect to the question of Seistán, that the good offices of Her Majesty's Government having been unsuccessfully exerted, it remains for you only to communicate the results to your Government and to await their further instructions.

15. I will not encumber this letter with matters connected with the personal details of the mission, but you will be fully instructed with respect to them in a separate communication.

# APPENDIX No. III.

(Referred to in para. 40 Chapter I.)

MEMORANDUM ON SEISTÁN BY GENERAL GOLDSMID, DATED 17TH MARCH 1872  
MEMORANDUM AND DEMI-OFFICIAL LETTER, DATED 11TH AND 18TH  
MARCH 1872, BY GENERAL POLLOCK.

## Memorandum on Seistan by General Goldsmid.

"I omit geography, except where politically required, and confine myself to politics.

"What I should call 'Seistán proper' in possession of Persia at the present moment may be described by reference to your very good map compiled in the Quarter-Master-General's Office (of which we have a photo.) as follows :—

"From Gurguri, and what is called the 'Naizar,' reedy bed of the Hamun north, draw a nearly straight line to the eastward until you reach an imaginary point below the letter N. in Hamun; then run a straight line at right-angles to the first between Jehanabad and Nád Ali to Khwajeh Ahmed, to describe the lower Helmund main bed. This line, except that it omits Nád Ali, is that of possession. Prolong it a little to the south to near the latitudinal line (31°), parallel to which draw a line under Sekoha to the Hamun for the southern boundary. The western side is unimportant: it may be supposed, for illustration, to be Ferrier's track west of the Hamun, but for present purposes we can keep within the line defining its eastern side.


"Of course, there are questions of possession and of claims beyond, but attention is specially needed to the small confined tract specified. It is now inhabited by Persians, Seistánis, and Biluchis, and though I cannot guess at the actual figures, I should say the population was large. The villages and towns are numerous, and many of them show a goodly number of inhabitants.

"The Persians need no detailed account. I refer to settlers from Kain and Central Persia, driven here by famine or similar causes, or called in by the Amir for political objects. They are by no means few.

"The Seistánis are exactly as shown by Elphinstone: Kaianis, Shahrekis, Sirbundis. On the first and third I can give you good information, though I should have wished to check it with the Chiefs themselves had it been practicable. The jealousy and suspicion of the authorities prevented all open or fair enquiry.

### First—KAIANIS.

Tree,



"The Kaianis were more or less the ruling power in Seistán, from Malik Muhammad to Jelalodin, or for one hundred consecutive years; and probably for long before the period of Nadir Shah. Such allegiance as they gave or such tribute as they paid from the death of Nadir to the expulsion of this last Prince, Jelalodin, would appear to have been to Afghanistan only. At the same time, after the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773, it is doubtful how many years may have passed without substantial acknowledgment of sovereignty at all. In the reign of




Zaman Shah, or in about 1800, Shah Muhammad found Bahram Khan ready to assist him with 'the force of his province' (Elphinstone) in his rebellion, but declined his offer of aid. He may, however, have taken with him some of the Biluchis then scattered about the country. It is also stated that many Seistánis were in the ranks of the Wazir Futteh Khan when he fought the Persians at Kafis Kaleh in 1818.

"In 1836 the Kaianis were displaced, and the Sirbundis, Shahrekis, and Biluchis divided the country.


## Secondly—SIRBUNDIS AND SHAHREKIS.

### Tree—Sirbundis.

A.D. 1730. Kumber—Chief of Sekoba in time of Nadir Shah.




"But Amir Khan's sons and grandsons were :—



### Shahrekis.

Mir Saifudin, before Nadir, lived at Kulch-i-Mir on right bank of Helmund.




"The Sirbundis and Shahrekis can in no way be considered Biluchis. Their history is briefly given as follows :—They claim to have been residents in Seistán from centuries ago, together with the Kaianis. In the days of Timur the Shahrekis were 'Nakháís,' and the Sirbundis had also doubtless a distinctive title. After Timur's death, his son Shah Rukh came to Seistán, destroyed the bund of Gershasib across the Helmund in Malakhan, and captured the city of Zaidars, driving out and scattering its inhabitants. The Seistánis spread here and there: the Kaianis in the direction of Khelah on one side and the Caspian on the other: the Nakháís and others towards Hamadan and Gulpárgan in Irak (Western Persia), getting land allotted there. The Nakháís in after years returned to Seistán as Shahrekis, from their Persian settlement of Shahrwan: the others also returned there as Sirbundis from their abode in the Sirband of Silakhor. In the days of Nashi it is well known that Malik Hosein, Kaiani, was the acknowledged Prince of Seistán.


"There is also a comparatively small tribe of Seistánis called Kalantan.\* They are related to the Shahrekis, and call for no separate mention, except perhaps that their present head, Mir Mubhariz, is devoted to Persian interests. I can find no more *Seistánis*, but those described as Kaiani, Sirbundi, and Shahreki, though doubtless losing their ancient epithets, are very numerous. Indeed, they constitute the bulk of the population, and may all be considered Parsivans, or Persian-speaking.

"The *Biluchis* in Seistán may be divided into two large tribes or sections; *Nharnis* and *Sunjaranis*. I give the trees from the first Chief of whose existence it is important to know anything as connected with the present enquiry:—

*Nharnis* :—



*Sunjaranis* :—



They seem to have settled in Seistán about the commencement of the nineteenth century. The *Nharnis* have become so far Persianized that their Chief Sharif Khan is perhaps next to Mir Alum Khan, the highest local authority. He is reported a Shia, though *Biluchis*, as a rule, are known to be Sunis. On the other hand, the *Sunjaranis* in the person of Ibrahim Khan of Chakansur refuse allegiance to Persia. Imam Khan and Kumal Khan profess themselves, before Persians, to be subjects of the Shah, but their country is far away from the 'Seistán Proper,' which I am considering.

"I do not believe there are many *Biluchis* amongst the inhabitants of towns in Seistán; certainly not many in proportion to the *Seistánis*.

"The trees will be useful in resuming the history after 1836, when Jelaludin and the Kaianis were expelled. It should be noted that, in 1832-33 or 1834, an attempt had been made to get rid of him by Muhammad Reza, Sirbundi, Hashim Khan, Shahreki, and Ali Khan, *Sunjarani Biluch*; but Shah Kamran had reinstated him with the aid of troops.

"Whether 1836 is the precise date of Jelaludin's expulsion, it is difficult to determine, but it may certainly be accepted as occurring before 1840. Supposing it the earlier date, from 1836 to 1848 Muhammad Reza Khan, Sirbundi, remained the chief authority in Seistán, annexing Jelalabad and dependencies to his previous possessions. We may further admit the statement that Hashim Khan, Shahreki, also became possessed of additional territory on the displacement of the Kaiani dynasty. Dost Muhammad Khan, *Nharni*, who had succeeded Alum Khan as chief of his tribe in Seistán, does not appear to have been affected by the change. Ali Khan, *Sunjarani*, held Chakansur, or, if not Ali, his brother Ibrahim, who in course of time took occasion to enlarge his territory by seizing Jehanabad and other places west of the lower (or old bed of the) Helmund.

"Many instances may be cited of services rendered by Muhammad Reza or other Chiefs of Seistán during the above supposed period of 12 years to Herat or Kandahar; and there is documentary evidence of allegiance to Kohndil Khan. But it is worthy of note that, while Jelaludin was being driven from Seistán proper by Muhammad Reza and his fellow-Chiefs, Ali Khan drove out Gholam, Khan Afghan, Shah Kamran's nominee, from Chakansur. No sovereign power but that of Afghanistan came into question. The question is whether that power was to be exercised from Herat or from Kandahar. Kamran was murdered in 1842.

\* One statement makes these actually Shahrekis, dividing the last into 14 families, i.e., Kumber, Khashdad, Hozawar, Kummer, Juzui, Bamori, Baras, Mahmudzai, Pulaki, Trakui, Shamalani, Ramsudo, Arbabi, Kalantan.

"I cannot arrive at the date of death of Ali Khan of Chakansur; but local evidence is in favor of its occurrence at the commencement of, if not before, the period of 12 years here given. Ferrier's account of Ali Khan must, therefore, be erroneous as regards the name, or, if not the name, the identity of the individual described. From one or two circumstances connected with this particular enquiry, I think it highly probable that Ibrahim Khan may have been designated by his deceased brother's name to a European passing in an unrecognized capacity through the country. The mere fact of Mr. Ferrier's disguise might raise the suspicion that his mission was to identify the murderer. Leech mentions Ali Khan as the Sunjarani Chief of Chakansur; but his account of Seistán clearly points to a time prior to Jelaludin's expulsion, and Conolly, in 1839, mentions Ibrahim Khan only.

"From Muhammad Reza's death until the death of the Wazir Yar Muhammad in 1851, the same state of dependency on Herat or Kandahar continued; but interference on the part of both these States is more actively exercised in Seistán than ever. Lutf Ali Khan succeeded his father, and endeavoured to support his authority and enlarge his succession by the assistance of Herat and the presence of Afghan Governors: Ali Khan, Sirbundi, his brother, refused to acknowledge the new Chief, and fled to Kandahar. Sirdar Mehrdil Khan brought a force from Kandahar, seated Ali, and deposed and blinded Lutf Ali. Yar Muhammad Khan of Herat was about to retaliate, and had quitted Herat at the head of a force for that purpose, but his death left Ali Khan in possession.

Further instances may be found of allegiance to Kandahar on the part of Seistánis or Biluch Chiefs of Seistán. But the history of the country generally from this period is that of Persian interference and eventual occupancy. Ali Khan's visit to Teheran and marriage with a Persian princess: his murder by Taj Muhammad: the succession of Taj Muhammad, and support nominally given to his authority by Persian troops, with his removal to Teheran: all these questions may be reserved for official report, details being already recorded with tolerable accuracy for the information of Government.

"I would solicit attention, however, to the Roman figures used for distinguishing now surviving Chiefs mentioned in the trees, whose present position is briefly shown as under:—

"I.—Abbas Khan, or Malik Abbas Khan, Kaiani, called by the Persians Governor of his grandfather's town, Jelalabad. His name was used as the authority declining to give us admission there (*vide* paragraph 35 of my Report of 11th instant, No. 17).

"II.—Lutf Ali, blinded by Mehrdil Khan, now living in Sekoha.

"III-IV.—Hashim and Kulb Ali, cousins, being unemployed in Kimmuk.

"V.—Dervish, Nharni, son of Dost Muhammad, late Chief of Nhamis in Seistán. His uncle, Sharif Khan, marrying his brother's widow, succeeded to chieftdom.

"VI.—One of Sharif Khan's sons is in charge of Nád Ali in Persian interests. Another is said to have just left the Persian side.

"VII-VIII.—Sirdars Sherdil and Azim Khan are living. Neither of them called on me when encamped at or near their villages. The son of the former, however, Haidar Ali Khan, was with us at Burj-i-Alum Khan and Kimmuk. He is a well-bred and agreeable-looking lad, and has been educated at Teheran.

"IX-X.—Ibrahim Khan of Chakansur. I have not seen this Chief; but Major Lovett was civilly treated by him on passing through his country, and his son, Khan Jehan, accompanied General Pollock to Giriskh. His country is not included in the possession of Persia. He has four sons besides Khan Jehan, one of whom, Sarfaraz Khan, is said to be at Teheran. Ibrahim Khan is supposed to be the murderer of Dr. Forbes.

"XI.—The two Chiefs Kumal and Imam Khan called on me when travelling up the Helmund. Their oral acknowledgment of subjection to Persia was made in the presence of the Yaum, or Persian officer in charge of my escort, who accompanied each on the occasion of his visit to my tent.

"To sum up in few words:—Possession of Seistán *by Afghanistan*, if allowed to date from 1747 by right of conquest of Ahmed Shah, becomes qualified by the intestine divisions of that country after his death. At the same time, *no country but Afghanistan* is found to interfere with her independence, for a very long period—perhaps for 80 years, say 1773 to 1853. The question is, what kind of possession\* is proved by payments of tribute at one time, or supplies of contingents at another, to Herat in her contests with Kandahar, or Kandahar in her contests with Herat? *Prior possession* to 1747, if considered, must be mainly in favor of the other side. After-possession to 1852-53 is tolerably well known. Were the question one of ancient right only, the same might present many features of doubt, and difficult in arbitration. When present possession is to be considered also, I fear my decision may disappoint Government. But kindly observe that I am speaking of Seistán proper as here defined, which includes necessarily no part of the Helmund on either bank below the bund described in paragraph 24 of my report, dated 11th March."

---

\* Do not infer any fixed opinion of my own to exist from my asking the question.

Memorandum by, and demi-official letter from, General Pollock  
in Seistan, dated 11th and 18th March 1872.

*Memorandum.*

"The Seistán arbitration having been rendered impracticable on the spot by the action taken by the Persian authority in declining to accede to any of the arrangements made by the officer appointed specially for this duty by the British Government, an opportunity is afforded now to consider the question of the Persian possession of Seistán in a purely political light, and the following points may be considered worthy of attention. (The rest of this need not be cipher, as, if intercepted, it will only read like the Afghan Commissioner's arguments.)

"I.—Seistán has been uniformly held and admitted by Persian conduct to be an integral portion of the kingdom founded by Ahmed Shah, Durani.

"II.—Since the establishment of the Durani kingdom, it has always been more or less under Afghan control, either as a portion of the Herat territory or of the Kandahar frontier, and has, until the present occupation by Persia, never paid tribute to Persia, nor coined money in her name, nor read the Khutba, nor given any other signs of belonging to Persia.

"III.—In the Treaty of Persia, Persia binds herself never to interfere in the affairs of Herat and its dependencies—Seistán being at the time a dependency of Herat.

"IV.—Lord Russell's letter of 1863, on which Persia lays much stress in support of her action in Seistán, was, as may well be asserted and maintained by us, obtained by grossly false and fraudulent statements. It (the letter) followed Persia's representations of an anticipated invasion of Persia by that part of Afghanistan, the real facts being that, to serve as a plea for counterbalancing the influence of the late Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, then recently established by the reduction of Herat to his own direct authority, the Persians falsified or magnified the customary Biluch raids upon the Haftadra tract into hostilities on the part of the Afghan Government, and made it an excuse for the occupation of Seistán, which they claimed as Persian territory. The permission granted them by Lord Russell to settle their differences with the Afghans by an appeal to arms, did not guarantee them any right to the acquisition of Afghan territory, nor permit them to conquer a country undoubtedly part of the Afghan kingdom in direct violation of Article VI of the Treaty of Paris.

"V.—When Persia was permitted to settle scores against Afghanistan by force of arms, it was evidently not contemplated that her aim was to take up a position on the Afghan border, by which she completely detached Herat from the rest of the kingdom, and at the same time reduced Kandahar to entire submission to her own interests and authority!

"By her false representations the Afghan Government were made to appear in the light of invaders of Persia, whereas, so little was this the case, that the Kabul Government were actually ignorant of what was going on in this extreme corner of their kingdom, till alarmed by the rapid advance of the Persians, of whose action under British Government authority they had no intimation till six or seven years after their settlement in Seistán.

"VI.—Had the Afghan Government, however, been duly warned of Lord Russell's letter, they would have been unable to resist Persia's advance in Seistán owing to the civil war which was then raging in the country and threatening during three or four years the utter ruin of the kingdom. But in 1869 the Ambala Conference led to the restoration of order in Afghanistan, and the very first point referred for the consideration of the British Government was the Persian encroachment on Seistán. The Kabul Government was withheld from action, and the whole question was taken up by the British Government in India. Surely, therefore, the infamous conduct of the Persian Commissioner and the local Governor give an opportunity for cutting Lord Russell's knot, and reverting to the language held by our officials for long years in connection with Persia's efforts to encroach eastwards by Herat or neighbourhood.

"VII.—The permission given to Persia to appeal to arms did not necessarily lead to an invasion of the country by an organized military force. The fact is, there was no enemy to oppose Persian emissaries, and gold bought over one Chief after another, and troops were gradually introduced for the support of the new authority. In this manner they have gradually advanced till they have possessed themselves of the whole of the country west of the Helmund, and have gradually introduced into it a very considerable Persian population from the adjoining Persian provinces.

"VIII.—It is clear from the claim of Persia, only now boldly set forth, to the east bank of the Helmund, as well as Lash-Jowain, that her game is a very deep political move, for, from her position here, she virtually extinguishes the Afghan kingdom and reduces its western provinces to Persian dependencies.

"IX.—The capabilities of the Seistán district are further of very great importance in a politico-military sense; and the possession of the district by Persia is not only a direct menace to the very existence of the Afghan kingdom, but a blow to the security of the western frontiers of India.

"X.—The policy of the British Government, heretofore uniformly observed, in regard to the political status of the Afghan countries lying between their own north-west frontier and the Persian Empire, has been to maintain them as far as possible under an independent King, who should be friendly disposed towards, and consider his own interests as identical with, those of the British Government, while they have at the same time persistently opposed

all attempts made by Persia to acquire a footing in these countries, either by encroachment upon Afghan territory, or by alliances and treaties with its Rulers and Chiefs; and the results have been so far successful that, till this Seistán encroachment, the Persians have been effectually excluded from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan.

"XI.—In the kingdom founded by Ahmed Shah, and enjoyed by his successor, Timur Shah, the Afghan border towards the west included Kain; but in the trouble following upon Timur's death, they fell off from the Afghan, and, after a period of independence, were attached to Persia. The latter (Kain) has only recently been thoroughly reduced to Persian submission. Sadulla Khan, Arab, father of Mir Alum, the present head of Kain, on being called on for revenue, refused submission to Persia, and, when forced by the Asaf-ud-dowla, who took his son as hostage to Meshed, fled to Seistán *for assistance*, and was reinstated at Kain as an Afghan dependent by the ruler of Herat, Yar Muhammad Khan. Mir Alum, after two years' detention at Meshed, escaped and joined his father at Kain. He subsequently succeeded him as Amir, his proclivities soon declared for the Gujar, and he has always worked to advance their interests in Seistán. I only instance this to show how recent is the hold of Persia upon even the *next* district to Seistán, not to open up any question about Ghain, which, of course, would not be entertained. Ghain is separated from Seistán by the Ibundat range of hills, here recognized as the boundary between the two districts. The country in this side is a vast level plain extremely fertile and capable of enormous development. It is abundantly watered by the rivers flowing to the termination of the Helmund, and possesses every facility for the maintenance and supply of a very large force.

"From its geographical conformation, as much as from its political situation, a division of Seistán between independent and rival powers is not, in my humble opinion, to be for a moment thought of. Such a partition would, from the very position of the country, place one of the possessing parties at the mercy of the other, and leave him no option but to resign the half of his kingdom to his superior, or else to hold the whole as a tributary and *protége*."

*Demi-official from General Pollock, dated, Camp Lash, 18th March 1872.*

"In continuation of my cipher Græco-English demi-official note, which accompanied my official letter of 11th instant, I now venture to offer, in the same demi-official form, some further remarks. I advisedly adopt the demi-official form, as it may be considered beyond my province to offer such suggestions, and, in that case, it will be easier to set aside and ignore my remarks than if I had formally and officially put on record my opinion, which I offer under the belief that it *may* be of use and *cannot* do harm, being a strictly confidential communication.

"Should it be considered, as I think quite possible, that the attitude of the Persian Commissioner and local Governor render any further attempt to arbitrate impossible or inadvisable, and should it also be thought—which is also possible, or even likely—that Government cannot take up the high position of reverting to the old policy of insisting that Persia shall not be allowed to encroach to the east, either by Herat or any other route, then, in my humble judgment, a third mode of dealing with the question seems practicable.

"Let Persia be told that, as her conduct has rendered arbitration impossible, and as our object is to fix a boundary, and close present differences between Persia and Afghanistan, rather than to fight about a particular tract, however wrongfully and fraudulently that tract may have come into Persia's possession, Government will give the Persians an ultimatum:—

"*First*.—Persia to retain those portions of Seistán which are already in her hands, except those on the banks of the Helmund, both banks of that river, or, at all events, both banks from a certain point, say, a straight line drawn north and south from Kolub or neighbourhood.

"*Second*.—Persia to withdraw from Seistán all regular troops, merely retaining Irregulars Ghainis, and Seistánis, sufficient for the protection of the district and maintenance of the civil power; the numbers might be fixed.

"*Third*.—Persia to agree to build no forts in the country, and to leave Nasirabad in its present state.

"*Fourth*.—Persia to execute a treaty with Afghanistan, or with Afghanistan and England accepting such boundary, and agreeing to make no further efforts to extend her border eastward at any point.

"Even in doing this, we shall be agreeing to a standing menace, and, if Persia should decline to accept such an ultimatum, it will, in my humble judgment, be absolute proof that she has well-matured designs for further offensive action and absorption of Afghan territory. If Government would agree to this, and would insist on Persia agreeing, I believe that the Amir would reluctantly accept the arrangement, for his unhappy country is torn by internal dissensions. Elements of cohesion *are almost entirely wanting*, and, after moving through the south portion of his kingdom, I am more than ever of opinion that great troubles are in store for Afghanistan, even supposing—which it is very difficult to suppose—that neither Russia nor Persia by their action precipitate matters.

"I will mention as briefly as I can my reasons for arriving at that opinion. His Excellency will understand whence my opinion is chiefly derived, and I mention this because I am



*most* anxious that such information should be considered *most* strictly confidential, for the obvious reason that, if the Amir could know some of the conversations that have passed between Sayid Nur Muhammad Shah and ourselves, he would, beyond all doubt, fall fatally into disgrace with the Amir. The elements of discord are as follow: Amir will not hear of nominating Yakub as his successor or ———. I am assured that any attempt, verbal or written, to induce any change in his intentions to nominate Abdulla Jan, would certainly fail.

"The rocks on which the Sayid split with Amir were (first) this succession question, and (second) the army question. The wisest councillors of the Amir tell him that, while such a regular army as he is endeavouring to organize might be useful in meeting Persian troops, it would be absolutely useless against Russian army or English army, while it can only be raised and maintained at the cost of its founder's extreme unpopularity. To create it, numerous irregular retainers are discharged. What the Amir wants, said my informers, are a devoted body of Chiefs and feudal troops, who will hold by him in prosperity or adversity, following him, if necessary, from hill to hill, partly from affection, but also from the stronger motive of self-interest. He should so treat them as to create a deep-seated feeling that no other Ruler could take his place with advantage to his subjects. The so-called regular troops are inferior of their kind, notoriously weak in the matter of siding with the highest bidder, and always have an excuse for ill conduct in the bad treatment they resent.

"Pay is never disbursed punctually, is hardly sufficient if paid, and is often withheld altogether on various pretexts.

"Then, the two classes of political exiles are another terrible source of anxiety. They have to be divided into—1st, men who have fled the country in despair, such as notably Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan; Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan in Russian border; Shah Nawaz Khan (son of Sultan Ahmed Khan) at Teheran; Sekunder Khan, his brother, in the Russian service; and others: 2nd, Political detenus, *e.g.*, Sheikh Muhammad Ismail Khan, Sheikh Jelal-ud-din Khan, Sheikh Muhammad Sharif Khan, and others. I am assured that, were Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan to appear in the northern provinces, he would be a most dangerous claimant to the throne, and has numerous adherents in Kabul and elsewhere; while, if Yakub took the field, all south Afghanistan, and numbers at Kabul and neighbourhood, would at once declare for him; and Abdulla Jan would have little to rely upon after his father's death but a purse which would soon be emptied when no revenues reached Kabul, and a Court party ready to do anything unscrupulous that would benefit them.

Perhaps as bad an element of discord as any is the position of Yakub. Sayid Nur Muhammad Shah declares that, when Yakub was, in a fashion, forgiven, and yet not really conciliated or made Wali Abud, he (Sayid Nur Muhammad) implored the Amir to send Yakub either to Kuram, where he would be isolated, or to Kandahar, where he would be overawed on one side by Herat and on the other by Kabul; but the Amir, with his usual obstinacy, has sent him to the very place where he, an ambitious and discontented eldest son, is most exposed to Persian intrigues and trickery, and it is commonly thought that he is already in communication with Meshed and Teheran. While, on the one hand, I feel bound to record confidentially all this, and to express my opinions that the Amir has no worse enemy than himself, and is therefore a difficult person to help, I must also say that, unless we interfere to prevent Persian encroachments, Kandahar and Furreh will soon go over to them. The Persians have first by fraudulent representations got into Seistan. It is not for a moment to be believed that they are content with that. All that we see here goes to prove that, if they dared speak out, they would say—what they said many years ago to our representative at Teheran—'that they have extensive plans in the direction of Afghanistan!' I put from memory—Thousands of families are said to have left this Lash, Jowain neighbourhood and settled in Seistan under Mir Alum's wing, being driven to do so by his driving off their flocks, destroying or cutting down their cultivation, and, while threatening on the one hand further similar proceedings, promising them an easy time of it in Seistan or here if they joined the Persians. The Chief of this place said openly yesterday that he had refused Persian offers and Russian advice (Khanikoff) to join Persia; but, if nothing was done to check Mir Alum, he must ultimately submit to him to keep body and soul together. Ibrahim Khan, at Chakansur, is similarly situated, and only awaits the result of our present proceedings to decide whether he can hold by the Amir at a distance, or bow to the Persians close by. Khanikoff came here in 1858 with four other Russian officers, including a General and a Doctor, and a numerous retinue, so the people here say; and I have with me in French the account that he gave of his visit. I can easily believe, from what we have seen and heard here, and what I knew previously, that Persia's action is dictated to her by Russia, and that the local Khan only tells the truth in asserting that Khanikoff advised him to side with Persia. I am convinced that Goldsmid believes he can offer no arbitral opinion that will meet the requirements of the case; 2nd, that no mere arbitral opinion or decision will be carried out in good faith by Persia; 3rd, that, unless strong measures are taken, the process of absorption will gradually continue till some new disaster in Afghanistan admits of more open and decisive action; 4th, that Persia is a mere tool in the hands of Russia; were it not, she would never have dared to treat us as she has done; 5th, I believe that, whichever way the matter is decided, Afghanistan will be convulsed ere long by another civil war, unless the Amir can recover his popularity; and that the only course for us to pursue will be either to let her go to pieces, or to support one side and have an Agent in Kabul; but I pity the Agent.

"I cannot help thinking that Alison has acted in the most extraordinary manner in not making it more clear that I was coming with the Afghan Commissioner, and in allowing Mirza Maasum Khan to be the Persian Commissioner in this business, after his knowledge of what occurred last year; and that Mirza Maasum is a low, tricky fellow, who has been employed twelve years in Russia. Goldsmid only tolerated his coming, and would much have preferred another coadjutor, though he hardly expected what has occurred now. I hope you will think this letter worth all the trouble it will give in deciphering it.

" *P.S.*—Goldsmid holds similar ideas; he has read this letter (*i.e.*, the rough draft)."

---

## APPENDIX No. IV.

### REPORT, DATED 22<sup>ND</sup> MAY 1872, BY GENERAL GOLDSMID ON THE PROVINCE OF SEISTÁN WITH REFERENCE TO THE PROPOSED ARBITRATION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF ANCIENT RIGHTS AND PRESENT POSSESSION.

"It would be a very difficult matter to define what at the present day is meant by the term 'Seistán.' Intelligibly to illustrate the case, I see no better plan than to suppose two territories,—one compact and concentrated, which I will call 'Seistán Proper;' the other detached and irregular, which may be known as 'Outer Seistán.'

"The first is wholly in possession of Persia; the second is partly in possession of Biluch Chiefs, who profess, with more or less earnestness, to acknowledge Persian sovereignty, or disclaim allegiance to any sovereign power but Afghanistan.

#### *I.—Seistan Proper.*

"This tract of territory is bounded on the north by the 'Naizar,' or reed-bed, which fringes the 'Hamun,' or expanse; west by the Hamun itself, of which the hill called 'Koh-i-Khwaja' marks the centre of the line; south by a line comprising Sekoha and all villages and lands watered by the main Seistán canal; and east by the old bed of the Helmund from a mile or so above the 'bund' at Kohak to the mouth.

"The more northerly inhabited villages may be considered 'Kaleh-i-Nao' and 'Bindan.'

"The western side is marked sufficiently by the 'Koh-i-Khwaja.'

"The southern line should comprise Burj-i-Alum Khan, as well as Sekoha.

"The eastern line may be designated by the villages of Khwaja Ahmed and Jehanabad, both on the left bank, or west of the true bed of the Helmund.

#### *Area.*

"The area is estimated at 947 square miles.

"The fixed population of Seistán Proper may be roughly stated at 35,000. To this may be added a nomadic population of 10,000. In classifying the first, I have been disposed to consider one-third as Persians, Biluchis,

Afghans, and other non-aborigines; and the remaining two-thirds to be Seistánis. But the statement of the Amir of Kain, that 20,000 Persians had come recently into the country owing to famine and other causes, while held far from admissible in its entirety, leads me to modify the proportions to  $\frac{2}{3}$ ths and  $\frac{1}{3}$ ths; therefore, of 35,000, it may be said that 25,000 are Seistánis and 10,000 settlers, the greater part of whom are Parsivans (I use this term in a generic rather than specific sense to indicate a Persian-speaking people). Indeed, with little, if any, exception, all the true inhabitants of Seistán speak the Persian language. The nomads are simply Biluchis.

"Taking the aggregate at 45,000, and looking at the extent of country comprehended, there would be found nearly 48 persons to the square mile: these figures are not dissimilar to those of certain European counties or cantons, and are eight times in excess of the proportional result found for the whole of Persia.

Kircudbrightshire, for instance, in 1861: area 954 square yards, population 42,495.

"Seistán Proper is a considerable tract of sand and clay alluvium, generally flat, but irregular in detail. It has heaps, but no hills; bushes, but no trees, unless, indeed, three or

four tamarisks of aspiring height deserve the name; many old ruins and vestiges of comparative civilization, but few monuments or relics of antiquity. It is well watered by river and canals, and its soil is of proved fertility. Wheat or barley is perhaps the staple cultivation; but peas, beans, oil-seeds, and cotton are also grown. Among fruits, grapes and mulberries are rare, but melons and water-melons, especially the latter, are abundant. Grazing and fodder are not wanting, and, besides the reeds peculiar to Seistán, there are two grasses which merit notice, that called *bonnu* with which the bed of the Hamun abounds on the south, and the taller and less salt, *kirta*, on the higher ground.

"The expanse termed the Hamun, which stretches far and wide on the north, west, and south of Seistán Proper, is for the most part dry, and the existence of a lake can only be certified at the present day, at least in the early spring, by pools or hollows of water formed at the mouths of the principal feeders, such as the Khush Rud on the north-east, the Furrak Rud on the north-west, and the Helmund, where its old bed terminates at no great distance from the Khush Rud. The Warud and Khuspas were both dry in the middle of March last. We crossed, moreover, a perfectly dry, though grass-covered, level on entering Seistán from

the south-west, and an equally dry space on passing from the province into Lash-Jowain on the north; yet the edge of the Hamun is tolerably defined on both these sides,—1st, by the 'Naizar,' or reeds, on the north; and 2ndly, by a clay cliff of irregular height, called the Sangbar, to the south.

"The comparatively small area here described is termed Seistán Proper by no capricious or arbitrary nomenclature. In adopting the definition, I have been guided by local practice and evidence. When at Imam Khan's residence on the right bank of the Helmund, I was informed that at a time of scarcity they were provided with grain from 'Seistán.' When approaching Sekoha from the south and within the latitude of the supposed Lerrie Lake, an old confidential Seistáni in our service expressed much annoyance that, owing to negligence or ignorance, our guides had missed the short track 'leading into Seistán.' The banks of the Helmund above Kohak may well be considered to involve a separate report, both in a geographical and political sense; and so also Chakansur on the north-east.

"The natural water-supply of Seistán is, perhaps, as uncertain as that of Sind, though the general inclination to one bank, the left, is more marked in the Helmund than in the

Irrigation.

Indus. The soil of the two countries has much the same character, and Sehwan, with its rich corn-fields, might be found as like Seistán in fertility as connected with it in etymology. Under these circumstances, even the boundary-lines which we have sketched must be received with slight reservation. It is easy to see that a good year of inundation extends the borders of the so-called lake to within the 'Naizar,' and there are well-defined beds of dry canal intersecting the country, which prove the existence erewhile of an extensive water system no longer prevailing.

"The main canal of Seistán, confounded by some writers with the parent river, bears the waters of the Helmund westward into the heart of the country. They are diverted by means of a large bund or dam known as the Amir's, the Seistán, or the 'Kohak Bund,' indifferently. It is constructed of horizontally-thrown tamarisk branches, earth, and perpendicular stakes, and protected from damage by a fort on the left, and a tower on the right, bank of the river. Although this diversion of the streams may be an artificial development of a natural cause, and undoubtedly dates from a period long prior to recent Persian occupation, it appears that the late arrangements have been maturer and better organized than those carried out by the predecessors of the Amir of Kain. The towns of Deshtak, Chelling, Burj-i-Alum Khan, Bahramabad, Kimmak, and others of less note are actually on the banks of this main canal. But it is, moreover, the indirect means of supplying water to almost every town and village in Seistán Proper; for, from it proceed minor canals which carry its waters north and south; and by these, in their ordinary course, and occasional inundations, a system of profuse irrigation is put in force, which, with an industrious and a contented population, should be productive of most extensive grain cultivation.

"To consider the main canal, here described as the river itself, is a theory which a brief inspection of the locality seems quite to disprove. On the one hand, we have a comparatively narrow passage abruptly turning to the westward; on the other, a broad and well-defined river-bed, prolonged in the old direction into which the waters would at all times flow unrestrained but for an artificial embankment. Whatever argument, however, be used on this head, I feel warranted in assuming the larger bed to be the original Helmund for purposes of territorial limitation.

"Experience of the climate from the end of January to the middle of March enables me to report an extraordinary range of thermometer, the fluid rising from 5° above zero to a maximum of 93°. Cold was the prevailing characteristic; severe heat more exceptional than severe cold. The winds were often strong and continuous, usually cool, and sometimes sharp and piercing. Snow fell on the 5th February, but we were informed that this circumstance, as well as the general severity of the winter, were rare.

"Provisions we found, as a rule, sufficient: sheep somewhat poor, and oxen indifferent. Bread was cheap and good, being procurable to natives at less than half-penny the pound. Vegetables were scarce, and rice was chiefly obtained from Herat. The inundated lands were alive with waterfowl. Partridges and sandgrouse were occasionally seen. River-fish were plentiful enough, but confined to one species, the barbel, and these were not inviting.

## II.—Outer Seistán.

The country on the right bank of the Helmund, and to the eastward of its *embouchure* in the Hamun, extends to a distance of 120 miles in length, or from a point between the Charboli and Khuspas rivers north, to Rudbar south. In breadth the district of Chakansur, measuring from the old bed of the Helmund, inclusive of Nád Ali, to Kadeh, may be estimated at some 30 miles. Chakansur produces wheat and barley, melons, and perhaps a few vegetables and oil-seeds. Beyond the Chakansur limits southward, or up to the Helmund, I can suppose no cultivation, except that obtained on the river-bank, and ordinarily illustrated by patches of wheat and barley with melon-beds.

On the opposite side of the river, in addition to the cultivated portions of the bank, there is a large tract extending from above Kohak, or the Seistán 'Bund,' to the gravelly

soil below the mountain-ranges which separate Seistán from Biluchistan and Narmashir. The distance from north to south of this plain may be computed at 40, and from east to west at 80 or 90 miles.

"The exact frontier of Lash-Jowain I reserve for later consideration, as the possession of lands north of the Naizar is disputed.

"There is a fort in which the Sirdar resides, and there are about 150 houses outside bearing the name of Chakansur. I cannot ascertain that there are any other towns or villages of note in the district so designated, with the exception of Kadeh on the eastern limit. The population consists of Seistánis or Parsivans of Biluch, nomads and Afghans, but I have no sufficient data to speak confidentially as to numbers. Major Lovett was unable to trace the Sheikhnasur of Ferrier and Colonel Pelly, which was probably intended for 'Chakansur,' though given in both forms in the Quarter-Master-General's map. The lake formed by the waters of the Khus and Helmund rivers is described as a 'wide expanse of water, with patches of reeds growing in its midst.' Between the bund and Rudbar the fixed inhabitants are Biluchis, of whom there are naturally many nomads also. The tribes are chiefly Sanjurani and Toki, the Sirdars jealously claiming to themselves the former appellation."

---



# APPENDIX No. V.

(Referred to in para. 48 Chapter I.)

## COMPLETE STATEMENT OF GENERAL GOLDSMID'S ARBITRAL OPINION.

" Discussion on this question having been formally opened at Teheran, the following statement of proceedings is placed on record. I summarize the original papers received.

" *Persian original statement.*—Persia sets forward her claim to Seistán under 15 heads.

" Of these, the 1st is an assertion of principle, as the last is of general right; the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 10th, 12th are inferences drawn from diplomatic treaties and writings; the 11th and 4th are arguments on the general character and condition of the country under dispute, and its inhabitants; the 7th, 8th, and 9th point to the arbitrator's own opinions on the question at issue; the 13th recites an individual instance of procedure tantamount to written admission of sovereignty; the 4th is a positive assertion that, while Persia has, of old, been the recognized sovereign power in Seistán, the name of an Afghan Governor there is unknown to history.

" *Afghan original statement.*—Afghanistan, on the other hand, commencing from a distinct period, claims Seistán as an integral portion of the monarchy founded by Ahmed Shah. Names of special Governors are then recorded, as well as specific acts of allegiance.

" The Commissioner carries on the history to the present day, with the view of showing that, up to recent years, the Chiefs of the country have acknowledged the same ruling power by supplying troops when required on particular occasions, sometimes even against Persia herself.

" In the collection of grain as revenue to Afghanistan, the writer's own agent had been employed; and in the recovery of stolen property from the people of Seistán, he himself had been the medium of communication with the Persian Government. The Afghan Commissioner sums up the case under 11 heads.

" Of these, the 1st is a general assertion of accuracy; the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th, and 11th indicate particular witnesses in support of his allegations; the 6th, 8th, and 9th are inferences in favor of his claims deducible from facts; the 2nd quotes a particular document, which can be produced in evidence.

" Although consideration of these statements in detail is essential to the due formation of an arbitral opinion on the issue to which they relate, few of the component parts have sufficient importance for separate discussion.

" The 13th and 14th on the Persian, and the 2nd on the Afghan side, are recorded last for readier reference, as their practical character seemed provocative of oral enquiry, and their purport has been put before a special meeting of Commissioners. On that occasion an original letter of Sirdar Kohndil Khan was produced in support of the written statement, and the question of particular Afghan Governors of Seistán freely argued.

A.H. 1260.

" The agreement of Muhammad Reza Khan, quoted by the Afghan Commissioner, was also exhibited.

" But the cases themselves have been exchanged, and a copy of the original Persian statement was furnished to the Afghan Commissioner, and *vice versa*.

" Replies have been received in both instances.

" *Persian reply, or second statement.*—Persia has four grounds on which to base the Seistán claim—

" *First.*—Because the country is an integral part of Persia, and no revolutions or changes can make it otherwise.

" *Second.*—Because temporary dispossession does not invalidate a natural and universally-acknowledged right, otherwise she would herself urge claims to countries of which she had for a time held possession.

" *Third.*—Because she has taken possession of the country in pursuance of her rightful claim.

" *Fourth.*—Because the *British* Government letter of the 5th November 1863 authorized her to resort to arms, and she is now in possession of Seistán under that authorization.

" *Afghan reply, or second statement.*—Afghanistan makes a more direct answer to her opponent, taking certain of the heads just as they occur in the Persian original, and others more generally, thus:—

" To the first, or general assertions of Persian sovereignty in Seistán, an appeal is made to history in favor of an opposite view, and a Persian historian is cited to prove Afghan possession in the reign of Futteh Ali Shah.

"To the assertions under the second head, that during the war between Persia and Afghanistan there were Seistánis in the Persian ranks, it is replied that, if such were the case, they must have been following Afghan leaders hostile to their own Government.

"To the question as to the Wazir Yar Muhammad's invasion of Seistán,—a measure disapproved by Mr. Ellis,—it is contended that the attack was not upon a Persian Governor, but by Herat on Kandahar. Divisions among the Afghans are admitted, and intrigues on the part of Governors, such as Ali Khan, Sirbundi; but they are not held to affect the question of sovereign rights to the country. And as to the difference of language and habits, it is urged that the same exists with many subjects of Afghanistan besides the Seistánis, such as Badakhshanis, Uzbeks, Turkistanis, Hazarehs, Seahposh Kafirs, and others.

"*Documentary evidence.*—In addition to the writings heretofore alluded to, produced at a meeting of Commissioners, copies of sannads and other documents, compared with the originals in Her Britannic Majesty's Legation, have been forwarded by the Persian Government; those bearing upon the tenure in Seistán of the Kaiani Maliks, governing under the Sufavian kings, are interesting and valuable records, ante-dating from 165 to 294 years (Hijri) from the present period.

"A second letter from Kohndil Khan, though without date or address, details his recovery of Kandahar from the Sadozais, and so proclaims the period.

"On a later occasion, fifteen more sealed papers have been sent, professedly in original; they are from Sirdars Kohndil, Mehrdil, and Rahmdil Khan of Kandahar, and from the Wazir Yar Muhammad and his son, Sayid Muhammad of Herat; one is from Mir Afzal Khan; they bear no date, but the period may be traced in many of them from the particular occurrences to which they relate. The general sense of these papers is expressive of dependence on Persia.

"*Local enquiry.*—The direct evidence gathered in Seistán was not such as had been contemplated. Neither the Amir of Kain nor the Persian Commissioner assisted the arbitrator to carry out the professed objects of the Governments of England and Persia in the manner which he himself judged proper; and admission was denied to the British officers at Jehanabad, Náð Ali, Kohuk, and (with exception under pressure in favor of the Engineer Major) at Jelalabad.

"At some places, such as Burj-i-Afghan and Bolai, supplies could not be purchased without an order; and free communication with the Chiefs or inhabitants was, as a rule, restricted and difficult. The arbitrator, nevertheless, using his best endeavours to meet the wishes of the two Governments, and referring the subject of these impediments to ordinary diplomatic discussion, he applied himself to his task with such means as have been at his disposal, and now proceeds to set forward the result of his enquiries.

"It is not his fault if the action of the Persian officers concerned invoked at any time in his mind natural doubts and misgivings in the cause which they had to sustain.

"*Ancient right.*—I have been instructed to pay special regard to the two heads of ancient right and of present possession, and I shall, therefore, consider the question in each of these respects separately,—1st, as to ancient right: there will be no occasion to go into any minute investigation of sovereignty over the province before the days of Nadir Shah. But I will glance at the familiar local traditions, as well as more popular histories, treating of the subject, premising that such statements as are not susceptible of proof need not affect the gist of the arbitration.

"We are told that Jamshid married the daughter of the Prince of Seistán, and had a son named Ahat, whose son was Garshasp, whose son was Neriman, whose son was Sam, the father of Zal and grandfather of Rustum.

"Sam is called 'hereditary prince' of Seistán, and had been nominated Governor thereof, as also of Kabul and countries north of the Indus, by Manuchetor. Seistán claims to be the scene of battle between Kai Khusru and Afrasiab; to have been invaded by Bahman; to have been recovered by the family of Rustum by Azarbazin.

"There will be no occasion to speak of the 'Maluk-i-Tuaif,' or the Princes of the Ashkari dynasty. The stories of these remote and uncertain periods rather point out old associations than supply missing links to history; and, if such associations be conceded in a national sense, as I think they should be, to Persia, they can only afford a vague and very general testimony in a practical question of present boundary.

"During the 425 years of the Sassanian Kings, from Ardashir Babagan to Yezdijird, among the items of information obtainable in the province, I find that Seistán was included with Khorasan and Kirman in one of the four great Governments of Nowshirwan, and that Yezdijird fled there after the battle of Nahmand (A.H. 21). Subsequently to the days of the Peshdadi Kaini and Sassane Monarchs, Seistán fell under the rule of the Kaliphs, and Yakub-bin-Lais, passing his boyhood there, made it the seat of his power when conquering the greater part of Persia.

"Before his accession, it had been-seized by Saleh-ibn Nasir, whose successor was Dirhem-bin-Nasir. Amr-bin-Lais succeeded his brother Yakub, at one time acknowledging the authority of the Kaliph, at another in arms against him.

"Finally, he was conquered by Ismail Samani, brother of Nasr, Governor of Mavaranahar, a distinguished prince, who is said to have had his palace in Seistán. During the interval of 100 years from this epoch to that of Mahmud of Ghazni, the Samanis held power over Khorasan, Seistán, Balkh, and other neighbouring countries; and among the names of Governors of Seistán are recorded Badi-ul-Zuman Mirza, son of Sultan Husein Mirza of Khorasan; Sultan Ali, brother of Zuhún; and some princes of the family of Bin Lais, one of whom, Khalif, a *protégé* of Mansur Samani, was deposed and imprisoned by Sultan Muhammad.

After the Ghaznavi dynasty (A.H. 434), which in the time of Mudud lost all its possessions in Persia, Alp Arslan, Malik Shah, and the Seljukis became masters of Khorasan, their first leader, Toghrul, having set up sovereign claims at Nishapur in the Hijri year 429.

"Sultan Sanjar and others of the tribe (A.H. 511) were then successively paramount in Persia, and may be considered as sovereign princes until the conquest of Jenghiz Khan, to whose son, Tull Khan, were assigned Persia, Khorasan, and Kabul. It was, however, to his son (A.H. 651) Haluku that history accords the consolidation of power in Persia. He was succeeded by Abaka (A.H. 663), and he by others of the same dynasty, of whom Abu Sayid is said to be the last who enjoyed any power. But there is special mention in history that Seistán was subdued by an invasion of Chugutai Moghuls in A.H. 700, at which time Ghuzan Khan held sovereign sway in Persia. This was somewhat prior to the accession of Abu Sayid (A.H. 716), within 50 years of whose decease Timur Lang (A.H. 736-785) added Seistán and Mazanderan to his numerous conquests.

"In the former province, the terror of the name and devastations of the renowned Tartar Amir has supplied an unfailling topic of conversation among all classes of people up to the present day.

"By some he is said to have destroyed Zuranj, the capital, sending its prince, Kutab-uddin, into captivity; but it is impossible at this distant period to determine whether the capture of Zaidan many years later by his son Shah Rukh, and dispersion of the inhabitants, is a different version of one and the same event, or a separate occurrence altogether.

"On the death of Shah Rukh, Seistán must have shared in the troubles (853), in which were involved Mirza Ulagh Beg, Abu Sayid (873), and other of the descendants and successors of Timur. But after a series of revolutions extending over sixty years, Shah Ismail Sufavi conquered Khorasan (914) and adjacent countries, and founded a dynasty of powerful kings which held dominion for more than 260 years (1135).

"During this period, it may be admitted that Seistán remained more or less a dependency of Persia; nor do I find any proof that the province was actually seized by the Afghans when they had advanced from Kandahar through the Seistán desert, and Kirman to Ispahan, at the close of Shah Husein's reign. On the other hand, the conduct of its Chief on this last-noted occasion was certainly not that of a loyal vassal to Persia.

"But we have reached the days of Nadir Shah, and from this date the history of the province may be investigated apart from fable and tradition, and more in detail.

"The Government of Seistán, at least under the Safavian dynasty of Persia, appears to have been vested in the Kaiani Maliks, who claim descent from the Royal House of Kai Malik. Muhammad, Kaiani, was the reigning prince at the time of the Afghan invasion of Mir Muhammad; and by league with the invader, or other intrigue, he secured for himself, not only his accustomed principality, but Meshed also, and a great part of Khorasan.

"There is good evidence to show that when Prince Jamasp applied to him for armed assistance, he was sufficiently strong to afford it, but turned the successful result of his intervention to his own personal advantage.

"Finally, it is related that he was slain by Nadir Kuli Khan, the General of Shah Jamasp, who, however, allowed his relative, Malik Husein, Kaiani, to succeed to the Seistán Government. History states that the province of Seistán was formally confirmed to Nadir Kuli Khan, afterwards Nadir Shah, by Shah Jamasp, together with Khorasan, Mazanderan, and Kirman. (A.H. 1143).

"It is certain that, on Nadir's subsequent accession to the throne, and conquests, Seistán formed part of the conqueror's past dominions.

"But it is also stated that the Kaianis for some time resisted the authority both of Nadir and his nephew, Ali, afterwards Adil Shah. The names of Futh Ali and Lutf Ali, and their prowess in these early contests, are not forgotten in their native land; and the retreat of the Kaiani Chiefs from the right bank of the Helmund to Koh-i-Khuja is a well-established local narrative. On the death of Nadir and Adil Shah, Seistán passed, together with other provinces, into the dominion of Ahmed Shah Abdali. This change occurred about 125 years ago, when Afghanistan became first a defined and consolidated kingdom. It is from this epoch that the Afghan Commissioner takes his stand. He considers that Seistán is essentially part of the one kingdom of

A.H. 1162.  
" 1165.

ago, when Afghanistan became first a defined and consolidated kingdom. It is from this epoch that the Afghan Commissioner

Afghanistan, created by Ahmed Shah, and that it has remained so till within a few years, when circumstances transpired which are reserved for later consideration.

"His arguments are much as follows:

"Under Ahmed Shah, Sulaiman, Kaiani, was Governor of Seistán. He gave his daughter in marriage to the king, furnished troops, and paid revenue.

A.H. 1160.  
" 1187.

A.H. 1187.  
" 1207.

"Under Timur Shah, Zuman Khan, Popalzai, was the Governor. He rebelled, but his rebellion was put down.

"Under Shah Mahmud, Bahram, Kaiani, was Governor, and gave his daughter in marriage to Shah Kamran, the king's son. Shah Mahmud was attended by the Seistán Chiefs when he proceeded to take Kandahar.

A.H. 1216.  
" 1218.

Haji Feroz-ud-din, another son of Timur Shah, captured Furreh by the aid of the Seistánis. Shah Kamran, putting down a revolution in Seistán, confirmed his authority by giving the daughter of Muhammad Reza, Chief, to the son of his Wazir, Yar Muhammad.

"The Barakzais have similar claims on their side: the Seistán Chief assisted Wazir Futtah Khan at Kafir Killa; Kohndil Khan obtained an agreement in proof of allegiance from Muhammad Reza, was aided by his troops and revenues, and, at a later period, Ali Khan, Sirbundi was his own *protégé* and nominee. It was only on the death of Kohndil Khan, and owing to the weakness caused by internal dissension among the Barakzai Chiefs, that part of Seistán fell into possession of another Power.

"Persia does not accept or deny the above statement. But, as already shown, she puts in a general claim to Seistán on the score of ancient rights, protests against former occupations of the country by Afghan Chiefs as unwarrantable aggression, and points to possession as now obtained.

"The Sadozais are disavowed as a dynasty of kings; the Barakzais are considered as Persian subjects in revolt, or submissive, as the case may be. In proof of the latter theory are produced letters from Kohndil Khan, addressed to Muhammad Shah as a liege-lord; and as regards Ali Khan, Sirbundi, Taj Muhammad, and brother Chiefs, written evidence is given in of acknowledged allegiance to Persia.

"I have paid great attention to these points, for upon their true appreciation the question of ancient right must be determined.

"The reign of Ahmed Shah began in the English year 1747, or 125 years ago, and the death of Sirdar Kohndil Khan occurred in 1855. If up to 17 years from the present period a continuous Afghan sovereignty of more than one hundred years be established, a very important aid is attained, because we very nearly reach the time when the Seistán question was specially brought into discussion by the representative of the British Government at Teheran.

A.H. 1160.

"Now I find the circumstances to have been these during the specified limit of 108 years.

"Seistán was certainly part of Afghanistan when Afghanistan was a consolidated kingdom. It was afterwards dependent on Herat or Kandahar, according to circumstances, or it may be independent of either, if occasion offered.

"I am unable to divide these periods with confidence according to dates, but the nearest approach to truth must be sought in local history. From the accession of Ahmed Shah to that of Muhammad Shah, there is an interval of 54 English years, and from the accession of Muhammad Shah to the death of Kohndil Khan there is another of precisely the same duration.

"I am of opinion that these two periods will meet the two phases of Seistán history here described.

"The termination of the first portends a struggle for possession of the province between two members of one and the same sovereign house.

"The second closes on the appearance of a third claimant, who would set aside not only the two litigants, but the household of which they are members. No good purpose would be served were I to examine the circumstances under which the Kaianis were contented to give their allegiance to Ahmed Shah and his successors until the one kingdom of Afghanistan was broken up into separate Chiefdoms.

"I have good independent historical evidence to show that, while events were in progress leading to the last-named result, Malik Bahram Kaiani was ready to take an active part with Shah Mahmud against his brother

A.H. 1207.  
" 1216.

Zuman Shah; and Bahram's son Jelaludin had no supporter so strong and earnest as Prince Kamran.

"Nor need I explain minutely how the Sirbundis, Shahrakis, and Biluchis established themselves in joint possession of the country and became sharers in its fortunes.

"Whatever the origin of the two first,—whether they were settlers or aboriginal inhabitants of Seistán,—it is tolerably certain that they did, at one time in their history, migrate from Western Persia to Seistán, and that, in comparatively recent times, Mir Khan, Sirbundi, and Hashim Khan, Shahrûki, were distinguished among Seistánis, as Alum Khan, Nahrin, and Khan Jehan Khan, Sanjurani, were the most noted of the Biluchis who settled in the province.

"I have said that the second period which I have selected in illustration of the status of Seistán was one of shifting and uncertain dependence. In proof of this, I may cite the published testimony of travellers and historians, as well as evidence more directly bearing on the present arbitration. Allusion has already been made to the assistance given by the Seistánis and Biluchis to Shah Muhammad and his sons.

"It is now nearly forty years ago that Prince Kamran overran the country and reinstated Jelaludin, the Kaiani Chief whose cousin he had married.

"Muhammad Reza, Sirbundi, had then succeeded his father Mir Khan; and Ali Khan, Sanjurani, had succeeded his father Khan Jehan Khan, in authority over their respective tribes.

"Together with Hasim Khan and the Biluchis, the first had been mainly instrumental in expelling Jelaludin; and, notwithstanding the favor shown to him by Kamran, the conspiracy was renewed on his return to power, and a second expulsion effected. On this occasion, the investment of Herat by Persian troops (A.H. 1254) prevented further armed intervention from that quarter, and Muhammad Reza, Hashim Khan, and the Biluchis divided the possessions of the Kaiani Chiefs. Dost Muhammad, Biluch, became head of the Nahrins in Seistán on the death of his father Alum Khan.

"In the spring of 1839 (A.H. 1255), Sirdar Kohndil Khan passed through Seistán on his way to Persia. Returning there from Shuhr Babek two or three years later, he was accompanied by some of the Chiefs to Kandahar.

"On the death of Muhammad Reza Khan, Shah Kamran supported the claims of Lutf Ali, son of the deceased; but the brother's succession found favor at Kandahar. Lutf Ali was deposed and blinded; and Ali Khan, his uncle, installed at Sekuha by Sirdar Mehrdil Khan, acting under orders from his brother Kohndil Khan. The Wazir Yar Muhammad died before he could carry out a new invasion, and four years afterwards Sirdar Kohndil Khan died also.

"There is no evidence before me to prove acknowledgment of Persian sovereignty by the local Chiefs of Seistán during the whole period sketched; certainly not for more than one hundred years.

"But there is evidence that certain Afghan Chiefs, who nominally or really held the country, were driven or tempted by circumstances to seek aid from Persia, and make admissions of *quasi*-allegiance.

"The question is, in what light are such admissions to be regarded with reference to the present enquiry? I confess that I do not attach to them weight or importance, even though in the form of sealed writings.

"Whatever force such documents may have, they can only apply to particular short-lived conditions and circumstances; and I do not consider they can affect the validity of Afghan sovereignty over the province in respect of the period under review.

"The allegiance of Seistán was of a feudal nature, which could not be transferred to suit the personal convenience of a temporary ruler.

"I have no hesitation in affirming that, had I been honored with a call to arbitrate in an appeal from Persia against Yar Muhammad Khan for supporting Lutf Ali, Sirbundi, or against Kohndil Khan for blinding Lutf Ali and installing Ali Khan, I must have decided that, whatever the merits of the case, no other country but Afghanistan had the right of exercising interference; and both occurrences are of comparatively recent date.

"But the enquiry does not end here—far from it; at this epoch dates the commencement of a new state of things.

"More than 20 years have elapsed since the occurrences last named, and it is 17 years since the death of Sirdar Kohndil Khan. At that time, Ali Khan remained in undisturbed possession of Muhammad Reza's share of Seistán, and his brother-Chiefs were Hashim Khan, Shahrûki, Dost Muhammad and Ibrahim Khan, Biluchis. The last had become sole representative of his family on the death of his brother Ali Khan, Sanjurani.

"It is not necessary to analyse the inducements; the fact is patent that, before long, the Sirbundi Chief had entered into negotiations with responsible Persian authorities closely affecting the interests of the country under his charge.

"Two and a half years after the death of his Barakzai patron, he came to Teheran, was received with distinction, and returned in three or four months to his government, married to a princess of the Persian royal family. His acts would bear record of his intentions, were there no written evidence to adduce; and there is no doubt that personally he had transferred his old allegiance, or sacrificed his precarious independence by constituting himself a vassal of Persia.



" His reception in Seistán was not, however, that of a Chief acknowledged and approved by those whom he had come to govern; and five months had not passed since his departure from Teheran, when the news of his assassination reached that capital.

" The particulars are well known.

" Taj Muhammad, son of the old Chief Muhammad Reza and nephew of Ali Khan, had either himself done the deed, or was one of the assaulting party.

" Sirdar Ali Khan had been murdered in his own castle at Sekoha; and it was said that his wife, the princess, was present and had been wounded on the occasion.

" A special envoy was despatched from Teheran to bring the lady back, but no attempt to displace Taj Muhammad appears to have been made in any quarter, and he continued to exercise the control he had usurped.

" There is evidence to prove that he also professed allegiance and submission to the Persian Government, accepting pay and honors in return; that, about seven years ago, Persian troops entered Seistán from Khorasan with the avowed object of retaliating upon one Azad Khan who had plundered the district of Kain; that the late Governor of Kirman went

A. H. 1282.

there under special orders of his Government in 1866, when one or more regiments under the Masuffar-ud-dowla were brought in from the Neh side of the Hamun; that, later still, the Amir of Kain occupied the province with a considerable force; in short, that, for the last six or seven years, the more esteemed part of Seistán may be said to have been in military occupation by Persia.

" Moreover, certain of the sons or other relatives of Seistán Chiefs were sent to Teheran; and, on the occasion of the visit of His Majesty the Shah to Meshed, Taj Muhammad himself, who had been specially summoned thither, was made a prisoner, and deported with his brother Kohndil to the capital.

" The question of right remains to be applied to the events of which an outline is here recorded.

" Persia, holding to the theory that original possession constitutes a continuous claim, and disavowing the authority of Afghanistan over Seistán, has of late years entered into direct correspondence with the local Chiefs of that province, and actually pushed forward troops to garrison its forts and towns. She further quotes Lord Russell's letter of the 5th November 1863 in support of her action.

" Afghanistan, admitting that a brief period of trouble and revolution called off the attention of its Chiefs from Seistan, and gave Persia the desired opportunity of active interference, adds that she has refrained from taking any steps at the close of that period to regain lost territory, because the British Government proposed to effect an amical adjustment of the difficulty.

" I have given it as my opinion that the Persian claim to Seistán on the score of ancient right is not such as to warrant revival after the lapse of a hundred years, during which it has virtually been in abeyance; and I do not think that the English Ministerial letter quoted alters the position in this respect. It left the litigants to settle their quarrel together, but gave no right to Persia which she did not possess irrespectively. Therefore an unjust conquest in an arbitration on right cannot be considered just by virtue of this letter.

" *Opinion.*—If Seistán were in no way subject to Afghanistan when brought under the *regis* of Persia, and subsequently garrisoned by Persian troops, then has her independence been assailed; and I cannot say that the acts of Ali Khan and Taj Muhammad, Sirbundis, have satisfied me that their allegiance to Persia was the general desire of the inhabitants.

" *Possession.*—I will now turn to the question of present possession.

" It is not easy to define what, in the present day, is meant by the term 'Seistán.' The expression is very vague, for ancient limits have long since become obsolete, and modern signification practically comprehends the peninsula of the Helmund and Hamun only.

" I see no better way to illustrate the case than by supposing two territories—one compact and concentrated, which I will call 'Seistán Proper.'

" The other detached and irregular, which may be designated 'Outer Seistán.'

" The first is bounded on the north and west by the Hamun, dividing it from Lash-Jowain and Neh Bundan districts, respectively; on the south generally by the Hamun, but immediately by the Dusht-i-Sungbar and barren tracts south of Sekoha and Burj-i-Alum Khan; and on the east by the main branch of the Helmund below the bund at the mouth of the great canal.

" The second is composed of the country on the right bank of the Helmund, and extends to a distance of about 120 English miles in length, or from the vicinity of the Charboli and Khuspas rivers north to Rudbar south. Its breadth is variable, but trifling compared to the length, the actual boundaries being in Afghanistan. To this may be added the Seistán Desert comprising Zirreh and the Shila.

" Seistán Proper is now, under certain reservations, to be hereafter noted, in possession of Persia, whose Governor is Mir Alum Khan of Kain. Outer Seistán, on the other hand, irrespectively of the Desert Shila and uninhabited tracts, is in possession of Biluch Chiefs who profess to acknowledge Persian sovereignty, or disclaim allegiance to any sovereign power but Afghanistan.

"A study of the territorial history of Seistan Proper leads to the conclusion that, in the days of Shah Kamran, Jelaludin, son Bahram, Kaiani, held Jelalabad, Banjar, and other places to the north and west of this tract; Muhammad Reza, Sirbundi, held Sekoha, Chelling, and other places west and south-west; Hashim Khan, Shahruki, held Deshtuk, Pulgi, and other places in a central position and near the main canal; the Nahrni Biluchis under Dost Muhammad Khan held Burj-i-Alum Khan and the south-eastern corner; and Ali Khan or Ibrahim Khan, Sanjurani, whatever his claims on this side the Helmund by inheritance from his father Khan Jehan, was restricted to Chakansur and the opposite bank.

"Ali Khan had at one time to recover Chakansur from an Afghan nominee of Shah Kamran; but fighting and dispossession were not uncommon in Seistan, and the above distribution seems to illustrate with sufficient accuracy the condition of things at a particular epoch.

"On the expulsion of Jelaludin, Muhammad Reza took Jelalabad and other places to the north. It is probable that his associates shared in the spoil, and that, before his demise, Ibrahim Khan had crossed to the left bank of the Helmund; but it is evident that if, during his life-time, there was any *one* acknowledged Chief of Seistan at all, that one was Muhammad Reza.

"Lutf Ali succeeded his father Muhammad Reza, but was removed by his uncle Ali Khan; and he, again, was killed and succeeded by Taj Muhammad, a younger brother of Lutf Ali.

"Before the arrival of the Governor of Kirman in Seistan, Taj Muhammad appears to have availed himself of Persian soldiers to oust Ibrahim Khan from Jehanabad and other places which he had seized and held in Seistan Proper; and the subsequent arrival of strong reinforcements from Persia prevented the return of the Biluchis.

"Mir Alum Khan, of Kain, then possessed himself of the whole country of 'Seistan Proper.' Sharif Khan, brother of Dost Muhammad, whose succession to that Chief on his death in 1857 (A.H. 1273) was acknowledged to the prejudice of Durwesh Khan, son of the deceased, is associated with him to some extent in administration, but in a subordinate capacity. Few traces of the old feudal or independent Seistan Chiefdoms now remain.

"Of the Kaianis, two grandsons of Malik Bahram have some kind of nominal status,—one at Jelalabad and one at Bahramabad.

"Of the Sirbundis, the recognized head, Taj Muhammad, has been removed to Teheran. The representative of the Shahrukis, Muhammad Ali Khan, resides in the same capital.

"*Opinion.*—Briefly, being unable to justify the recent action of Persia in Seistan on the score of ancient right to that province, I am bound to state my opinion that, as regards her possession of 'Seistan Proper,' the fact is established, although the action of the authorities before described has unquestionably caused me to entertain misgivings on the attitude or sentiments of the population in certain instances.

"As regards 'Outer Seistan,' the professed allegiance of Kumal and Imam Khan, the Biluch Chiefs residing on the banks of the Helmund, does not, to my mind, constitute a case of absolute possession similar to that of 'Seistan Proper;' nor do I find that any arguments bearing upon these particular lands have been used by the Persian Government, except that my own request for the recovery of a stolen horse made on the right bank of the Helmund to a Persian Yawur is cited in favor of Persia's claim.

"As it is unusual for an arbitrator to express his opinion on the merits of a dispute while actually in process of investigation, or to supply at such time evidence on either side, I am bound to explain that my reference was simply to the head of an escort accompanying me for ordinary protection, and had no bearing whatever on the matter of territorial possession.

"Had the Yawur chosen to decline the responsibility as being in a foreign country, I might not perhaps have demurred.

"But the horse was never recovered at all, nor compensation for the neglect of the Persian soldiers.

"The garrison in Kaleh-i-Fath, I regret to consider as brought there in contravention of the terms of the arbitration, therefore the fact of its existence can have no value, nor can its discussion be appropriate in the present paper.

"Chakansur is not in Persian possession, but held by Ibrahim Khan on the Afghan side."

## APPENDIX No. VI.

### FURTHER REPORTS BY GENERAL GOLDSMID ON THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF HIS ARBITRAL DECISION.

*From MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. GOLDSMID, on special duty, Seistán, to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta,—No. 54, dated 30th November 1872.*

As my report \* on the late arbitration may be considered incomplete without a special

\* No. 21 of the 31st October 1872, of which copy forwarded to Government of India with No. 53 of 15th November.

reply to your letter No. 2367P. of the 31st October 1871, and its enclosures, the receipt of which by me at Aden on the 24th November was acknowledged on the 29th idem, I have the honor to submit the same for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

2. It is premised that, in Camp at Lash-Jowain, on the 18th March last, I briefly explained, by letter to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, to what extent I

No. 5 of the Home Register.

had been enabled, when in Seistán, to carry out the letter of my instructions; and that a copy of this explanation was forwarded to your address apparently on or about the 2nd April from Birjund.

3. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of letter from your Office now under reference contain all the points to which attention is at present required; and to these, therefore, my remarks will be confined.

4. A very few words will suffice for the disposal of paragraph 3. Major-General

No. 2367P. of Government of India, para. 3.

Pollock will no doubt have reported himself on the suspicions aroused in the minds of the Persian officials, perhaps of the Persian Ministers, at his presence; and how necessary it became for him, when at Teheran, to retire from the scene of public discussion. Whether or no much of the mistrust evinced was a genuine feeling; and whether or no part of the programme of Persian diplomacy was to make the matter a special grievance: these are questions open to demur. But Government will remember that I expressed myself prepared for the state of things reported, when in Calcutta at the close of the year. The Prime Minister was jocose on the subject, but gave me to understand that he looked upon the English officer as everything, and the Afghan Commissioner as a cipher, in effecting a practical settlement of frontier on behalf of the Amir Shere Ali.

5. As regards paragraph 4, I trust that, notwithstanding much official silence hereon,

No. 2367P. of Government of India, paragraph 4.

Government will give me credit for carefully studying its views and policy, as set forth in printed letters Nos. 39 and 41 of the 1st and 7th July 1870. The question has been discussed fully and frequently irrespectively of the Mission under my charge, but its importance warrants a return even to oft-repeated arguments, if by such procedure any new light may be obtained for guidance in Central Asian politics.

6. Government will, doubtless, have gathered from my reports of the past year that the possession by Persia of "the western half of Seistán up to the Helmund river including

No. 39, Government of India, Foreign Department, Secret, 1st July 1870, paragraph 3.

Sekoha', is literally a true representation, and that if the verbal statement of local Chiefs be admitted as positive evidence, Persia has more or less sovereign hold of both banks of the Helmund, from its mouth upwards and in a southerly direction, to Rudbar inclusive. In this view, it must be understood that her pretensions to the half, "which she claims but does not possess", are to a country well within the present commonly understood limits of Afghanistan, comprising Chakansur to the north and Malakhun to the south. It would not be easy to define the precise limits of this claim;

but some rough idea of its extent may be formed from the Persian Commissioner's reply to my "second question," given in on Enclosure 1 with letter No. 21 of the 31st ultimo. the day of delivery of arbitral opinion, and Major Lovett's rough map accompanying this letter.

7. Without presuming to offer any new exposition of the force of Lord Russell's

No. 39 ante, paragraph 4.

letter to that contained in my instructions, I will simply recall the line of action pursued by myself when direct reference to this despatch became unavoidable. On the 8th February last, Mirza Maasum Khan, the Persian Boundary Commissioner, wrote to me officially that, according to the despatch of the English Minister for Foreign Affairs in the records of the Persian Foreign Office, "the lands and places in Seistán which are at the present moment in

possession" (of Persia) "should not be enquired into, and should be considered as one of the ancient territorial possessions of Persia and foreign to the question of boundary between Persia and Afghanistan." To this I replied on the day following, expressing determination to be guided by "the conditions laid down in the agreement entered into between the Persian Foreign Office and British Legation at Teheran." On the same day, a second letter from Maasum Khan drew attention to the writer's opinion that the agreement to which I referred could "in no possible way be held to invalidate the contents of Lord Russell's despatch." He added that his Government considered that despatch as the "very foundation" of my Mission, "maintaining at the same time that it holds good in all its integrity." To this I replied again on the same date that my Mission had "power and authority to consider thoroughly all claims on either side to any place in Seistán wherever situated, as clearly shown in the agreement of the 7th Shaban, which says that 'if it is necessary to inspect any locality, the Commissioners should visit any place they deem expedient and prepare maps of any district without let or hindrance.'" Again did the Persian Commissioner address me a letter—the fourth which had passed between us on this date—supporting his former views, and vaguely reasoning on the purport of the agreement. To this last communication I replied, on the day following, that I regretted inability to change the opinions already expressed on this subject, and remarking on the inexpediency of raising difficulties by anticipation. Copies of the English translation of Persian correspondence in which these letters are found, accompanied my report from Banjur to your address, No. 17 of the 11th March last.

8. In one or two occasional conversations held with the Sadr Azim, after the Mission Letter to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State had reached Teheran, His Highness adverted for India, No. 19 of 31st July 1872; copy forwarded to Earl Russell's letter as being, no doubt, with No. 41 of 12th August, to Government of India. the proper basis of negotiation; but I was careful to let him understand I in no way limited enquiry to events arising out of that despatch, or, indeed, admitted it as a groundwork of arbitration at all.

9. Finally, in that part of the arbitration, given in Persian to the two Commissioners, and in French and Persian to the Persian representative of his Government, I expressed myself in the following terms: "I do not admit that the manner in which Seistán was occupied by Persian troops corresponds with an appeal to arms such as contemplated by Lord Russell's letter quoted. There was no fair fighting at all. Nor can it be admitted that allegiance was obtained by the single means of military movements or open procedure of any kind." And I had already stated in the first part of these papers: "I do not think that the Ministerial letter quoted alters the position. \* \* \* It left the litigants to settle the quarrel together, but gave no right to Persia which she did not possess irrespectively. Therefore, an unjust conquest in an arbitration on right, cannot be considered just by virtue of this letter. If Seistán were in no way subject to Afghanistan, when brought under the ægis of Persia and subsequently garrisoned by Persian troops, then has her independence been assailed; and I cannot say that the acts of Ali Khan and Taj Muhammad, Sarbandis, have satisfied me that their allegiance to Persia was the general desire of the inhabitants."

10. I have naturally not the detailed information on the present state of Afghanistan possessed by the Government of India or Major-General Pollock; but I cannot conceal my impression that any resources which the Amir Shere Ali may command, to set in the scale against Persian aggression, have been so husbanded or reserved as to be almost ignored in Persian Seistán of the present hour.

Paragraph 5, Government of India letter No. 39 of 1870, and marginal extracts, *passim*. On the other hand, should he have no counteracting or defensive power to meet the serious encroachments effected or threatened from the westward, I submit that the sooner a line of limitation is attained by the intervention of England, the better for His Highness, even were that line to give Persia all present possessions under physical force or subsidy.

11. The line which I have had the honor to determine has been attained after long and careful consideration of the claims to Seistán sovereignty of both Governments, on grounds both of ancient right and present possession. The question of title has been weighed with that of actual tenure; and stress has been laid on the nature of the occupation and length of time during which it has continued.

12. The second printed despatch enclosed with my letter of instructions of the 31st October 1871, alludes to a note prepared by the Under-Secretary containing a "history of the Province of Seistán so far as it can be gathered from the papers on record in the Foreign Office here." I can bear personal testimony to the general accuracy of this narrative, inasmuch as it has been closely tested with oral and written evidence obtained on the spot of litigation itself or in the neighbourhood, on the march to or from Seistán, or in Teheran. The books or records which I have mainly consulted, in addition to the above note, are "Conolly's and Leech's Papers in the Asiatic Society's Journals," "Malcolm's Persia," "Khanikoff's Travels in Eastern Persia," "Burnes," "Elphinstone," "Ferrier," "Watson," and a few other volumes of history or travel as well as Government Press Publications. I have, moreover, attentively looked over the official manuscript correspondence of several years recorded in Her Britannic Majesty's Persian Legation. A review of certain points which

suggest themselves from the notes I have jotted down in the course of this last mentioned duty may not be useless or inappropriate.

I.—There is a marginal note in page 7 of Mr. LePoer Wynne's Printed History just referred to, quoting a letter of Mr. Ellis to Lord Palmerston in 1836. It is somewhat remarkable that in the first Persian statement of claims attached to my arbitration papers,\* the writer uses the following argument: "The remonstrances addressed in our official letter by Mr. Ellis, an Agent of the British Government, and one well versed in geography, to Shah Kamran, against his having sent his Wazir, Yar Muhammad Khan, to attack and plunder Seistán, is a proof and a full admission on the part of the British Government of the sovereign rights of Persia over Seistán." I did not find the blue book containing the letter in question until after long search in the record-room at Teheran; but the Persians must have had at hand some skilled adviser to direct them to the book and the significant passage. If I have not dwelt upon this quotation in delivering the arbitral opinion, the omission has not been accidental. The reply that seemed to me most apposite would have involved a question of too great delicacy for official foolscap. I therefore contented myself with stating verbally to the Persian Commissioner concerned that if one British Minister's opinion were to be taken in evidence on Seistán, that of another might have equal weight; and *all* would not certainly be found favorable to the Persian claim. Mr. Murray's remonstrances on the movement of troops eastward were of too recent a date to be forgotten.

II.—In page 8 of the same paper are quotations from Leech, who wrote probably in 1838, about the beginning of which year he came to Kandahar. According to Masson, he was sent there immediately after the arrival of Vikarich in Kabul on the 19th December 1837. He talks of Jalaludin "restored by Kamran and not yet re-expelled." Now the first expulsion of Jalaludin would seem to have been in 1834; for Leech says "about four years ago," and Mr. Wynne's Memorandum, quoting Mr. Ronald Thomson, says "five years later" than 1829, referring to this particular event. He fled to Kamran, and was probably restored by that Prince on his invasion of Seistán "in the summer of 1837," a campaign noted by Sir John Kaye in his War in Afghanistan. This date is supported by Masson, who, speaking of the year 1837, says, "Kamran's army, in the early spring, had threatened Kandahar, and advanced to the Helmund, from which it moved upon Lash and Jowain, and then spread itself over Seistán." Mr. McNeill's letter to Mr. Macnaughten shows that on the 22nd January of that year he had learnt the actual movement out of Herat of an army of 12,000 men; he thought it probable that Yar Muhammad Khan would "content himself with re-establishing Kamran's authority in Seistán, whence a nominee of the Herat Government was last year expelled by the people of Kandahar." I learn from local evidence that Jalaludin had but a brief tenure of power after his restoration at this time; and, in a report of Major Todd of the 2nd October 1839,† he mentions that this Prince was then a refugee "in Herat" having been driven from his country twelve months before. Major Todd, appointed Special Envoy to Herat, had remained there from August 1839 to February 1841: the Persian army had arrived before the city in November 1837, and the siege had been raised in September 1838. It is not improbable that Jalaludin may have enjoyed power in Seistán between 1834 and 1837; for the years 1835 and 1836 were years of disquiet in the province from the Herat side. Irrespectively of the letter before quoted, Mr. Ellis, writing to Lord Palmerston on the 30th December 1835, says: "Yar Muhammad Khan, the Wazir of Kamran Mirza, has lately established either his own or his master's authority in Seistán, a province undoubtedly belonging to Persia:" and again on the 1st April 1836: "It appears that Kamran Mirza of Herat has obtained complete possession of Seistán, that his means of defence have been much augmented; but there is no reason to suppose that he would be able to resist a combined attack by the Shah and the Chiefs of Kandahar." On the 25th June 1836 he talks of "the recent successes of the Kandaharis" against Kamran's troops in Seistán.

III.—I have already alluded to the conjectures hazarded on the identity of the murderer of Dr. Forbes, and given it as my opinion that Ibrahim Khan, now Chief of Chakansur, must be the man. Of "Sheikh Nassur" I can learn nothing; it should be intended for Chakansur.

IV.—Kohndil Khan's intrigues, however well illustrated by the letters produced in evidence on the Persian side, may be traced in the Legation records for a period of nearly twenty years prior to his decease in 1855. In 1837 he is reported to have received the Shah's orders to operate against Seistán. In 1838, while the Kandahar Sirdars generally profess to assist British Government officers, provided they do not meddle with Muhammad Reza Sarbandi, Mir Hasham Khan Shahraki, and Ali Khan Biluch of Seistán; Kohndil Khan, in 1839, informs the Shah's Government that "Muhammad Reza Sarbandi and the Seistánis generally" had become servants of

\* Enclosure 1 and Appendix A in letter No. 21 of the 31st October last.

Malik Jalaludin, last of the Karani Chiefs of Seistán.

† So in proof-sheets of Colonel MacGregor's Gazetteer in Major-General Pollock's possession.

Sirdar Kohndil Khan of Kandahar.

Journal kept by Mirza Aglia, Colonel Stoddart's Mandahar, shi, 1st December 1839.

Lieutenant Leech to Colonel Stoddart, dated, Kandahar, 6th March 1839.

Teheran news-writer to Colonel Sheil, latest date 19th November 1839.



the British ; and is admitted to discuss matters personally with the King. Three years later, leaving his residence at Shahr Babek\* in Persia, and repairing to Seistán and Kandahar, he is heard of in the spring of 1843 as coining in the Shah's name : in the summer of the same year, he admits the subjection of Kandahar to the Shah. In 1844, instructions are sent to him from Teheran to give assistance to Persia in her operations against the Kain districts. In 1845 he is restrained from giving effect to his wish to

\* Reported to have been 4th November 1842.

Colonel Sheil to Lord Aberdeen, 30th May 1843.

Informed by Mirza Abul Hossein Khan.

Colonel Sheil to Lord Aberdeen, 1st August.

Ditto ditto 18th May 1844.

Ditto ditto 22nd February 1845.

Ditto ditto 28th March.

Ditto ditto 20th July.

return from Kandahar to Persia, and repeats his professions of allegiance and submission. This year also it is reported that when Sir Charles Napier undertook his expedition against Sind, Kohndil Khan wrote to his agent in Persia to inform the Persian Government that the English were marching towards Kandahar ; the said Government having replied that the British had no such intention, but that should this impression be unfounded, assistance would be sent

Colonel Farrant to Lord Palmerston, 23rd December 1847.

Colonel Farrant to Lord Palmerston, 24th August 1848.

Colonel Sheil to Lord Palmerston, 19th December 1850.

by it to the Sirdar. In 1847, Colonel Farrant gives official currency to a rumour that Kohndil Khan had been summoned to Meshed, and, in 1848, that he offered to take Herat for the Shah, if supplied with men and money. In 1850, Colonel Sheil reports the presumed object of the visit to Teheran of a Kandahar agent : " Kohndil Khan, in alarm no doubt at the vicinity of the English, has asked for protection against foreign aggression." In

Colonel Sheil to Lord Palmerston, 20th January 1852.

1852, the story is that Kohndil Khan had sent a force from Kandahar to Furrah, to act against Syud Muhammad of Herat, and that Persia must assist the latter, who had applied to her for aid. The Sirdar is afterwards compelled or induced to retreat : and later in the year, Persia despatches a special agent to him, while his son† is received with the highest honor at the capital in 1853. In 1854, the Amir of Kain is directed to make over a whole year's revenue to Kohndil Khan, and assist him in every way sending his son with troops to Furrah.

Colonel Sheil to Lord	† Sultan Ali,
Malmesbury—	12th November 1853.
21st April 1852.	
1st May "	
7th June "	
5th October "	

Report of news-writer from Meshad in February 1854.

V.—The Legation records here and there afford information of Persian designs upon Seistán in former years, and in such respect harmonize with the statement of Mirza

Malcolm Khan, the last appointed Persian Commissioner in this enquiry, that action was first taken under Muhammad Shah to re-assert Persia's dormant claims to sovereignty in certain outlying provinces or districts. In support of this view, the quotations above given of Mr. Ellis' letters in 1835 and 1836 may be cited. But I see no notice of direct invasion or assertion by Persia, who rests satisfied with pushing her pretensions by the agency of intriguing or dissatisfied Chiefs. The province of Kain was only fairly subdued in very recent years ; the father of its present Governor having openly defied the Persian armies and been aided in his resistance by Herat. There can be but little doubt that the Seistánis sided with the people of Kain in their warfare ; for Colonel Sheil's letters amply prove the statements to this effect

To Lord Aberdeen, 17th June and 20th July 1845 ;  
1st February 1846 ; also Colonel Farrant to Lord  
Palmerston, 23rd November 1847.

of the Afghan Commissioner Syud Nur Muhammad Shah. Yet now the Amir of Kain is *de facto* Governor of Persian Seistán as of his inherited districts, and commits all his aggressions in the name of the Shah, who testifies his royal approval by the despatch of honors and presents. The following extracts of bygone correspondence appear worthy of notice as bearing on the present enquiry.

On the 20th February 1837, Mr. McNeill sends many papers to Lord Palmerston ; among other translations of instructions by the Persian Government to its Envoy at Kabul, one Kambar Ali Shah, he is to enquire into the strength of tribes, *Seistánis*, *Biluchis*, &c. And in passing through Biluchistan he is told to " raise great expectations of the munificence and benevolence of His Majesty in the minds of the Khans of Biluchistan and Seistán."

On the 28th November 1838,† the same Minister sends copy of a farman read at Tcheran,

† About two months after the siege of Herat raised by the then Shah (Muhammad).

addressed to the Prince Governor (of Meshed) ! "The distinguished chieftains also, *Muhammad Reza Khan and Ali Khan of Seistán*, together with the leaders of the Biluch tribes, were among the foremost in tendering to us their service and allegiance, and displayed in the most becoming manner the sincerity by which they were actuated."

On the 16th June 1841, Colonel Sheil writes to Lord Palmerston from Trebizond as follows : " Dr. Forbes of the Bombay Establishment, who is travelling through Persia to India, in a letter, dated, Meshed, 14th May, informs Dr. Riach that a messenger had passed from that city proceeding to Herat with upwards of twenty farmans from the Shah addressed to the various Chiefs to the eastward, among the tribes of the Hazarahs, Jamshidis, *Seistánis*, directing them to place themselves at the disposal of Yar Muhammad Khan."

On the 10th May 1845, Colonel Sheil writes to Lord Aberdeen that he has reason to believe troops are "being collected by the Asaf-ud-daulah with a view to movement on Birjand or *Seistán*;" and continues on the 28th December following: "Asaf-ud-daulah has disbanded troops collected during Shah's illness with the ostensible object of an expedition against *Seistán*;" adding on the 21st January, a report that "in spring it was intended to send 40,000 men to Khorassan under the Shah or Prince Royal," with the further explanation, on the 6th May 1846, that "*Khiva*, *Herat*, and *Seistán* were alternately assigned as the destination of the force."

About two years after the death of Muhammad Shah in 1848,\* an agent from the Wazir Yar Muhammad was despatched to Teheran; and Her Britannic Majesty's Minister,† on the 19th December 1850, reports that a suggestion had been made to

\* 4th September.

† Colonel Sheil.

him by the said individual for the grant of aid by the English Government to enable the Wazir to reduce Maimana, *Seistán*, Lash and Jowain. "*Seistan*," he alleged, "at least the chief part of it," was at that moment in the hands of the Biluchis. "That province is, however, claimed by the Kings of this country as a portion of the Persian dominions."

On the 21st December 1850, Colonel Sheil reports to Lord Palmerston that "Yar Muhammad Khan had despatched 1,000 horse to pillage *Seistán*, from which the son of Kohndil Khan had fled . . . , had taken Jowain, and was besieging Lash."

On the 24th January 1851, the same officer reports, "the contest between Yar Muhammad and Kohndil Khan for the possession of *Seistán* continues undecided. Pillage of each other's country seems the mode of warfare. Yar Muhammad summoned 2,000 Turkomans to plunder *Seistán*, instead of which they . . . plundered Ghorian."

It can hardly be surprising that on the death of Yar Muhammad in June 1851, and of Kohndil Khan in August 1855, Persia, long seeking occasion of more direct interference in the affairs of *Seistán*, should see a good opportunity of reviving her claims through the agency of the *Seistán* Chiefs themselves, who needed relief from those accidents which had made their country a scene of perpetual contention.

13. I now come to the all-important questions treated in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the second printed despatch enclosed in letter of instructions which I received from your Office at Aden in November of the past year.

*Ante* marginal note, paragraph 12.

14. Personal experience, combined with a study of the declared experience of others, leads me to the conclusion that fixed and understood boundaries between restless and antagonistic nations, guided rather by circumstances than principles and not amenable to strict laws of civilization, afford the best guarantee for peace and progress within the territorial limits of those nations, especially in the neighbourhood of the frontier defined. But it is almost as essential to the due adjustment of frontier disputes, such as the Perso-Kelat and Perso-Afghan, to secure the lasting integrity of a defined frontier, as to define it acceptably in the first instance. And while I hazard the opinion that, both in a geographical and political sense, the best boundary between semi-civilized Oriental States is a desert or barren mountain-range through or along which an arbitrary line offers no inducement to transgression from either side, I believe, on the other hand, a river to possess, in this respect, simply geographical advantages. Politically, as it is the cause of rendering land fertile and valuable, so must it be the cause of envy and dissension to a nomadic population equally ready to find means of livelihood in cultivating the right or the left bank; and therefore, politically, is it all the more necessary that these nomads, or their representative Chiefs, should be subject to one sovereign power, whichever side they may select for the transfer of their labors. *Seistán* Proper, as I have shown in my arbitration papers, I should hold myself unable, in justice or policy, to take from the hands of Persia; and this tract must be bounded by a few miles of the Helmund towards its mouth; but above, and south of the Kohak Bund, or the south-east corner of *Seistán* Proper, I have judged it fair to turn the boundary-line westward from the river, and give both banks to the Afghans. This arrangement appears to me equitable, and, in some degree, compensatory to the latter people for the loss of the more fertile and populous though comparatively circumscribed portion of the whole country under dispute. Nor do I see the smallest necessity in dispensing even-handed justice to leave Persia in possession of Nád Ali, Kaleh Fath, or any newly-garrisoned fortress whatever on the right bank of the Helmund. I will add nothing to what has already been stated in paragraph 11 *ante*, on the probable result of a resort to arms on both sides.

15. Villages called Husseinabad and Khairabad are so commonly found in Persia and Muhammadan countries that I have been in doubt whether some confusion did not exist in the application of the particular acts of encroachment connected with these names, to the Upper Helmund. The settlement of Nasirabad, north of the main canal in *Seistán*, comprises the old walled village of Husseinabad, as well as the separately fortified cantonment and residence of the Amir of Karan. There is also a village of Khairabad on the borders of Lash-Jowain which has suffered lately from the Amir's incursions. And the term "occupation" has appeared to me to apply so much more truthfully to *Seistán* Proper than to the country south of the

Paragraph 4, letter No. 41 of 1870, of Government of India.

bund across the Helmund. The garrison at Kaleh-i-Fath, a ruined fort and village at 20 miles distance, I have spoken of already as, in my opinion, an institution of "recent date." Kamal Bandar is, from the same point, about 40 miles along the left bank, and Char Burjak about 10 miles further on the right bank up the river; at neither place did I see sign of military occupation. Mirza Maasum Khan, the Persian Commissioner, dated his letters to me at Char Burjak, as from "Husseina-bad;" but a village of the latter name was stated, on good authority, to be situated some miles higher; and as our enquiries did not satisfy us that Char Burjak was ever known by the name of Husseina-bad, I was loth to admit the propriety of his giving it the designation of a place which he must have known we were seeking to identify. That possession by Persia of any part of Seistán up to either bank of the Helmund is of importance in a strategical sense, there can be no doubt; but possession south of the bund is a more immediately threatening movement to Kandahar, and would seem to foreshadow the construction of towns, forts, villages, and canals on the high road to, and at an easy distance from, that city. The necessity for these things would be occasioned by the bare fact that, to the westward and between Char Burjak, or Rudbar, and Persia Proper, is a vast unpeopled expanse and desert; and as this part of Seistán could not be perpetually dependent on the smaller but more fertile tract at the mouth of the Helmund, it must be made productive by the help of colonists and settlers acknowledging Persian supremacy.

16. Believing myself to have acted in the spirit of Government instructions, and that my arbitral opinion has been both prepared and matured according to "the rights and reasonable expectations of both parties," I write more freely than hitherto in the present letter, on the general question involved in these boundary disputes, and solicit attention to the details of arbitration as recently submitted. Appeal, moreover, having now been notified on both sides, I am bound to set forth for consideration the more material views under influence of which I have passed the unwelcome decision. I will not disguise the fact that my efforts have all along been rather to get a decision passed in some shape, consistently with the terms of diplomatic agreement, than by satisfying all parties, to accomplish an end which was to my mind Utopian and quite unattainable. In a geographical definition of the "points where the

river turns into the territories now in the possession of Afghanistan," and whence it is considered essential that the Amir's possession of both banks should be maintained, I read the meaning of Government to be that from a village such as Kamal Bandar, where the Helmund takes a more direct course to the eastward, or, more correctly speaking, where it turns from a westerly to a northerly direction (as its upward tracing on the map really represents a downward flow), the land on both sides should be in the possession of the Afghans. I have already, however, shown cause for drawing the line of separation nearer Kohak; but to the disadvantages of bringing the Persians to this part of the Helmund, across the desert tract and south of Seistán Proper, I may add another one of perhaps equal weight, and that is the division of the territorial possessions of the Sanjarani Biluchis. Members of tribes and families should, it is conceived, be as little divided from each other by permanent boundaries as Sunis or Shias from their respective co-religionists. The two brothers Kamal and Imam Khan occupy both banks up to Rudbar. Other Chiefs in the same neighbourhood have appeared to me to possess a minor importance, but those named cannot be ignored. I should foresee difficulty and dissension in dividing the brothers, whether in respect of territory or allegiance, and, according to ocular demonstration or oral evidence, I find Kamal Khan resident at Kamal Bandar on the left bank, and Imam Khan at Char Burjak on the right bank of the Helmund, while they possess Rudbar in common. Kamal Khan, it will be remembered, was reported by

Paragraph 68, pages 30, 31, Mr. H. LeP. Wynne's Memorandum. Mr. Eastwick in 1862 as receiving a sum of Rupees 500 yearly from the Persian Government for holding in check Biluch marauders apt to carry on their incursions westward; but he was one only out of many recipients, at a time when Persia was making vigorous efforts to counteract the moral effect upon the people of Seistán of Dost Muhammad's advance upon Herat. Among the items of Meshed intelligence received at Her Majesty's Legation, for the first-half of December 1862, is the statement that "the Chief of Seistán has received from the Prince Governor of Meshed ten 'kharwars' of powder (about twenty mule loads), and a supply of cannon balls in proportion to this quantity."

17. I now proceed to speak of the best means of bringing the boundary laid down, or to be laid down, in Seistán, into correspondence with that of Biluchistan so as to give one general line of eastern frontier to Persia from Lash-Jowain to the sea. It is presumed that the line of separation between the two countries, from Herat to where Lash-Jowain touches the Seistán Province, is sufficiently clear to be included in a general determination of the frontier from the north-west corner of Afghanistan above Herat to the Bay of Gwattur. At the same time, the reply to my telegram on this subject, despatched in accordance with a suggestion of General Pollock in reference to certain instructions of the Government of India to Major D'Arcy Todd,\*

Paragraph 7, letter No. 41, above marginally noted.

From Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 25th July 1872, "nothing traceable in our records."

\* Ferrier's History of the Afghans, pages 406-7.

made it very doubtful whether any description of actual frontier between these particular points

is on official record. As regards the longer sections below Lash-Jowain, my letter No. 42 of the 12th August last will have conveyed a tolerably accurate notion of the line proposed; and Major Lovett's sketch in illustration has now been supplemented by a more comprehensive map\* of Major St. John. Any

minuter drawing would be premature until final disposal of the two distinct boundary questions. If the matter at issue were merely of a geographical nature, undoubtedly the line suggesting itself is one from a point above, *i.e.*, south of Kamal Bandar at the elbow of the Helmund, to the Mashkid east of Jalk, and from the elbow of the Mashkid, between Kohuk and Panjgur, to Gwuttur Bay, agreeably to last year's settlement; but I will not here intrude upon Government a recapitulation of arguments as regards the line most desirable in all respects. Data have been supplied for defining a permanent line in Seistán, also for rectifying, if thought fit, the already accepted line in Mekran; and the connection of the two by intervening demarcations sufficiently specific and practical to prevent misapprehension, presents no great difficulties. Supposing all doubt and discussion on the two boundaries investigated fairly set at rest, there appear to me to remain two ways of completing the work begun:—

1st.—By wording the terms of mutual understanding, in whatever form conveyed, so as to restrain Persia from advancing eastward of a certain line drawn between the Helmund and Jalk, rather than to invest her with full or sovereign authority over all people and lands within that line. This arbitrary line could not, it is true, divide the territories immediately in dispute, but an Umpire State, adjudicating between countries such as those concerned, may reasonably provide that the flank of either litigant be not turned by aggressive movement, as for the non-transgression of the actual boundary line declared.

2nd.—By sending an officer of Engineers to survey the intervening tracts in question, awaiting his report of the tribes and people before linking the two boundaries in one.

I most respectfully suggest adoption of the former way.

18. I will venture, in conclusion, a few remarks as regards Russia, of whose military officers and diplomatists I have had some personal knowledge at St. Petersburg, Tiflis, Teheran, and elsewhere. That she takes great interest in the Perso-Kelat and Perso-Afghan boundary questions, I have no doubt. Were it not so supposed, we should fail to do justice to the mere ordinary shrewdness and competence of her statesmen. And I believe her interest in these matters to be far greater than is apparent by any overt action of her Legation established in Persia; but I cannot assume that she has exercised influence over Persia to any serious extent in the proceedings of the past two years. Neither the facts, nor, so far as they

† Almanek de Gotha, "Stremounkoff."

have become evident, the results, have warranted the assumption. M. Stremounkoff,† Director of the Asiatic Department of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed me, when on my way to Seistán in 1870, that he fully concurred in the propriety of determining lines of political frontier by the intervention

My letter No. 8 of 12th October, to Secretary of State for India. of Her Majesty's Government. On my return to Teheran in July of the following year (1871), the Secretary of Russian Legation, Prince Ouroussoff, evinced much interest in ascertaining what the mission had been about, and questioned my Personal Assistant eagerly on the subject. On my return to Teheran in June this year (1872) from Seistán, the same Prince Ouroussoff was Chargé d'Affaires, but he has appeared comparatively indifferent on our last proceedings. The statement of Persian claims given in by the Minister of Foreign

† My telegram to Foreign Secretary, 13th idem.

Affairs, under date the 10th July, certainly bears no mark whatever of the aid of a Foreign Power, least of all one skilled in the subtleties of diplomatic argumentation. The rejoinder was a more sensible performance, and the letter which followed it at the eleventh hour a better paper still; but they bore to my mind marks of being the genuine work of Malcolm Khan, written under the inspiration of the Prime Minister.

19. Russia is steadily advancing along the whole line of Persian frontier to the north, and will probably before long touch Persia at every point east, as she now does west, of the Caspian, from Ararat to the Murghab river. And so long as our frontier arrangements with Persia do not interfere with this particular phase of her progressive policy, it would, it is conceived, be her interest, if not her actual desire, that we should see in her no more than a passive spectator. But there is much to be done yet to absorb nationalities and extend territorial possessions up to the point indicated, and more still to prolong a line of frontier, should such be the aim, conterminous with the still precarious boundaries of Northern Afghanistan: and before completion of either scheme, much time must necessarily elapse. These passing years which favor the development of a power, and give strength and substance to the policy of tradition and prestige in a like ratio, are detrimental to the stable character of Treaties or Conventions caused by such exigencies as produced the Perso-Kelat and Perso-Afghan Commissions. That Russia is, however, not slow in her movements may be gathered from a comparison, geographically considered, of the manifesto of 1864, with the map of her possessions and military position in Central Asia at the present moment. And this progression has been effected under an Emperor whose nature is essentially pacific and conciliatory.

20. For my own part—arguing in no dictatorial spirit and avowedly subject to correction—I ask pardon if my opinions are superfluous or ill-timed. Without acknowledging to Russophobia, I see no course open but one—to question where there is right to question: where there

is none, to be watchful, observant, and cautious, the last especially in maintaining the frontier policy of India as clear and unchanging as that of Russia. It must ever be remembered that if an interested Power, looking on at certain results brought about by the diplomatic agency of other Powers, takes no part in the movement because of the supposed uncertain and ephemeral character of those results, an action, however friendly in seeming, is no real proof of disinterestedness; therefore, any such attitude taken up by Russia, particularly at a time when she may need our confidence or forbearance for her own acts elsewhere, will demand as much caution in the development of England's future policy as though Russia had thought fit to exercise an immediate interference to our prejudice. In plain words, I would respectfully urge that the whole question of frontier from Herat to the sea be only set aside by Treaty or Convention of such description, and, under such guarantees, that infraction would be most unlikely, if not altogether impossible.

In sending the report to the Secretary of State (No. 26, dated 28th February 1873), the Government of India drew attention to its paragraph 17, and expressed concurrence in the views therein expressed by General Goldsmid.

---



## APPENDIX No. VII.

### ACCOUNT OF THE FAMILIES OF THE KAIANI, SIRBUNDI, SHAHRAKI, NHARNI, AND SANJURANI CHIEFS.

*Genealogical Trees, with notes, for the Seistán Chiefs of the Kaiani, Sirbundi, and Shahraki Families, as also the Nharni and Sanjurani (Toki) Biluchis of Seistán,*

Compiled from various sources and information gathered on the spot by MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. GOLDSMID, on Special Mission.

#### MEMORANDUM.

"The accompanying Trees and Notes may be useful in illustrating the position and claims of the principal families or tribes of Seistán as represented by individuals at the present hour. The only notable names under recent Persian encroachment and occupation are those of—

Lutf Ali	... No. XIII	} Tree No. 2, Sirbundi Seistánis,
Taj Muhammad	... No. XVI	

the first of whom is said to be still living at or near Sekoha, blind; the second is a *quasi-prisoner* at Teheran.

"Sharif Khan, No. III Tree, No. 4, Biluchis Nharni, a Shia and connected by marriage with the Persian Governor, Mir Alum Khan, whose Lieutenant he may be considered to be in the general administration of the province of Seistán.

Ibrahim Khan	... No. VII	} Tree No. 5, Biluchis Sanjurani,
Imam Khan	... No. IX	
Kamal Khan	... No. X	

the first of whom acknowledges Afghan sovereignty in Chakansur, the other two professing allegiance to the Shah in Khamul, Bandar, and Rudbar districts of the Upper Helmund.

"I.—Asadulla, mentioned by Khanikoff as the father of Malik Husein. Flourished probably about A.D. 1700. There appears to have been a Malik Jafar about the same period, but his omission from the tree does not affect the general question.

"II.—Malik Muhammad, called 'Shah of Meshed,' whose name is still well known in Seistán and parts adjacent. According to Malcolm, he made terms with the Afghans when they besieged Ispahan in 1722, and retired from the neighbourhood of that city with 10,000 men to take possession of Khorasan, awarded to him, in addition to his hereditary province of Seistán, by his new allies. Later on, Malcolm says he proclaimed himself king and gained possession of almost all Khorasan, except Herat. Put to death by Nadir.

"III.—Malik Husein, called the younger brother of Malik Muhammad by Mr. Wynne, quoting Conolly (page 5 printed memorandum). He is also mentioned by Khanikoff as the son of Asadulla, and evidence locally obtained is to the same effect. As he is said to have been invested with the government of Seistán by, and to have rebelled against, Nadir, he must have flourished between A.D. 1730 and 1747.

"IV, V, VI.—Mr. Wynne, quoting still, I apprehend, from Conolly, says: 'The Kaiani brothers, Fath Ali and Lutf Ali, were succeeded in Seistán by their brother Sulaiman.' I have endeavoured to test the truth of the statement by local evidence, and have obtained at least negative corroboration of the conclusions exhibited. Khanikoff, moreover, makes Sulaiman the son of Hosein. Flourished certainly between 1740 and 1780.

"VII.—Malik Nasir, called the elder brother of Bahram by Khanikoff, and mentioned by Leech as the deceased uncle of Jalaludin.

"VIII.—Malik Bahram, mentioned by Elphinstone, Malcolm, Christie, Conolly, Leech, and Khanikoff. His position as Chief in Seistán is corroborated, moreover, by all local evidence. The date of his decease is undetermined, but I take it to have been at an advanced age in about 1833.

"IX.—Daughter of Malik Sulaiman, married to Ahmed Shah, Abdali, who reigned in Afghanistan from 1747 to 1773.

"X.—Daughter of Malik Nasir, married to Shah Kamran, who was killed in 1842.

"XI.—Jalaludin, eldest son of Malik Bahram, whose history is told by Leech and Taj Muhammad, and summarized by Mr. Wynne. Although the exact period of his rebellion is doubtful, as well as of his first expulsion, I gather from local enquiries that the first event took place shortly before his father's decease, and probably between 1832 and 1835, and the second in the latter year, or 'about four years before' Lieutenant Leech wrote his report on

Seistán. That he was reinstated in 1836 or 1837, and re-expelled in 1838, is tolerably well ascertained from a report of Major Todd to Government, dated 2nd October 1839. He writes that Jalaludin was *then* a refugee in Herat, having been driven from his country 'twelve months before.' As in November 1837, Muhammad Shah's army arrived before Herat, and the siege was not raised until September 1838, the last insurrection against Jalaludin was most probably at some time between these two dates, when the Heratis were engaged in resisting the Persian aggression. He is said to have died ten years ago, a powerless prince, in Seistán.

"XII.—Husein, of whom no particulars are given beyond the fact that he never obtained any high position.

"XIII.—Malik Humza, mentioned by Leech and local evidence of the present day.


"XIV.—Nasir, mentioned by Leech, but no particulars given by local evidence.

"XV.—Malik Abbas, as he is still called, is now nominal Governor of Jalalabad, in reality an inferior kind of Major or Burgomaster. Attended the 'istokbal' which met the Mission on arrival at Nasirabad this year.

"XVI.—Gulzar Ketkhuda, as local authority as his brother, but in a less important place, Bahramabad.

### TREE No. I.

*Kaianis.*



N.B.—The Malik Mahmud here mentioned, who flourished in the reign of Shah Husein, abdicated A.D. 1722; but a sanad produced at Teheran shows that there was a Malik Mahmud also in the time of Shah Abbas. It is dated 995 Hijra (A.D. 1596); and is important in solving a doubtful point as to whether Abbas was actually raised to power before 1587.—(Vide note in *Malcolm's History of Persia*, vol. V, page 523.) Other sanads of Shah Abbas show a Malik Jalaludin and his son Shajadin, the latter of whom is succeeded in the Seistán Government by Malik Fazl Ali (A.D. 1606-08).

"I.—Kambar, or Mir Kambar, said to have been Chief of Sekoha in the time of Nadir Shah, A.D. 1730-47.

"II.—Kuchak, or Mir Kuchak. On local evidence I am informed that Adil Shah, Nadir's nephew and successor, conferred upon him Kirman in jagir. Shah Rukh, Afghan, their Governor there, could not, however, surrender the place; they fought, and Kuchak was killed.

"III.—Muhammad Reza. Khanikoff makes him the son of Kuchak, and I should have accepted this arrangement as more consistent with the chronology of the Tree, but my local evidence was opposed to the change. The above-named writer states that Mir Kumbar, 'Chief of the Sirbundis from Shiraz,' was sent to Seistán by Nadir Shah for purposes of cultivation, settled at Sekoha as *Kaluntur*; 'and the title descended to his successors;' probably A.D. 1780-90.

"IV.—Amir Khan. Khanikoff calls him 'Mir Khan,' and says that in Futteh Ali Shah's time he became nearly independent, 'encroaching on the lands of the Kaianis.' He is one of the persons mentioned in Mr. Wheeler's memorandum of the 17th February 1868, as the three independent Chiefs of Seistán.

"V.—Muhammad Reza, eldest of five sons and his father's successor in power, joined Husham Khan, Shahraki, and Ali Khan, Sanjurani Biluch, against Jalaludin, Kaiani, whom they succeeded in expelling. He was reinstated by Shah Kamran, but again driven out of Seistán, Muhammad Reza becoming possessed of much of the Kaiani territory. He was found by Ferrier, in 1845, perhaps at the zenith of his power, but he is wrongly described by that author as a 'Shahregi' (page 415, *Caravan Journeys*) and "Biluch Chief" (page 417); died, it is believed, in the same year as Muhammad Shah of Persia, or A.D. 1848.

"VI.—Ali Khan, having been passed over in the succession on the death of his brother, Muhammad Reza, took up arms against him, and eventually obtained the assistance of Sirdar Kohndil Khan of Kandahar. Sirdar Mihrdil Khan, bringing an Afghan force to Seistán, seized and blinded Lutf Ali Khan, the son and successor of Muhammad Reza, and deposed him from the chieftdom in favor of his uncle, Ali Khan. The last named, looking to Persia for support in his ill-gotten authority, was induced to proceed to Teheran and accept in marriage the hand of a Royal princess. On his return to Sekoha with his bride, he was assassinated.

"VII, VIII, IX.—Need no separate mention.

"X, XI, XII.—Daughters of Amir Khan: one married to Dost Muhammad, Nharni Biluch; one to Humza Khan, Kaiani.

"XIII.—Lutf Ali, now living in Seistán, blinded, and deposed, as stated, for No. VI.

"XIV, XV.—Need no separate mention.


"XVI.—Taj Muhammad, if not the actual assassin, was present, and instigated the murder of his uncle, Ali Khan, whom he succeeded at Sekoha. Acknowledged allegiance to Persia; visited the Shah at Meshed; is now at Teheran.

"XVII.—Kohndil Khan died at Teheran, whither he had proceeded on more than one occasion from Seistán. Date of casualty comparatively recent.


"XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI.—Need no separate mention. One daughter of Muhammad Reza given by Shah Kamran to the son of the Wazir Yar Muhammad.

## TREE No. II.

### *Sirbundis.*



## TREE No. III.

*Shahrakis.*

"An old Shahraki, Haji Abdulla, guide to the Seistán Mission, states that he and his clansmen can in no way be considered Biluchis, or indeed anything but Seistánis, as they were residents in Seistán centuries ago, together with the Kurunis and Sirbundis. They were originally 'Nakhais.' After Taimur's death, his son Shah Rukh came to Seistán, destroyed the bund of Garshasib across the Helmund at the Mala Khan, and captured the city of Zaidan driving out and scattering its inhabitants. The Seistánis spread here and there, the Nakhais and others going towards Humudar and Gulpakgan in Irak, and acquiring a grant of land there. Years afterwards, the Nakhais returned to Seistán as Shahrakis from their Persian settlement of Shabrowan; and some of their companions took the name of Sirbundi from their abode in the Sirbund of Silukhor.

"VI.—Hashum Khan. Perhaps the most noted in modern times of the Shahrakis. He joined with Muhammad Reza, Sirbundi in effecting the expulsion of Jalaludin, Kaiani. But though he shared in the distribution of Kaiani territory consequent on this revolution, it does not appear that the Shahraki Chiefs had the same influence as, or divided the ruling power in Seistán with, the Sirbundis.

"XIII.—Muhammad Ali Khan in 1867 accompanied Taj Muhammad, Sirbundi, of Sekoha to Meshed, to meet the Shah of Persia. Thence they were sent, as *quasi*-prisoners, to Teheran. Had been deputed before to Teheran, some three years after the death of Ali Khan, Sirbundi.

"Other numbers need here no separate mention.

"I.—Alum Khan, said to be first cousin of Shah Mehrab Khan of Bampur in Pottinger's time. Settled in Seistán under the auspices of Malik Cahram, Kaiani, on the borders of the little Hunmer, in the lands called 'Subz Kim.'

"II.—Dost Muhammad—a powerful Chief, died 1857. Leech, writing probably in about 1838-39, mentions that he married the sister of Reza Khan and gave his own sister to Ali Khan, Biluch, adding 'he is under Kamran.' His tomb is shown close to Kaleh-i-Nao, or, as sometimes called, 'Kaleh-i-Dost Muhammad Khan,' near Burj-i-Alum Khan, the capital town of the Nharni Biluchis in Seistán.

"III.—Sharif Khan: the principal Biluch Chief in Seistán, whose devotion to Persian interests, whether assumed or real, has no doubt greatly tended to consolidate the power of the Amir of Kain. The son of the latter is, it is believed, married to Sharif Khan's daughter. Sharif Khan has many sons, of whom one has expressed openly allegiance to the Amir Shere Ali Khan of Afganistan. Others are in Persian pay or service.

"IV.—Sherdil Khan of Kimmak and Burj-i-Alum Khan: has local influence, but is ostensibly in Persian interests.

"V.—Azim Khan, of Deh Sharif Khan.

" VI.—Needs no separate mention.


" VII.—Darvesh : passed over in the succession to his father's chiefdom in favor of his uncle, Sharif Khan.

" VIII.—One of these is in charge of Nád Ali, the recently-acquired Persian fort on the right bank of the Helmund.

" IX.—Haidar Ali, a well-mannered youth educated in Teheran, but now at Burj-i-Alum Khan.

#### TREE No. IV.

*Biluchis (Nharni).*



"The story is that, in the days of Malik Bahram, Kaiani, the Toki Biluchis, of which the Sanjuranis may represent the ruling branch, under their Chief, Khan Jahan, had wandered some time on the left bank of the Helmund when Jalaludin, son of Bahram, fell in love with the Chief's daughter and married her. The consequence was the gift of a fortress, whence sprung the settlement of Jehomabad, and a considerable increase of the influence of Khan Jahan.

" I.—Jan Beg : the first of any note of whom mention is made in Seistán history, among these particular Biluchis.

" II.—Khan Jahan : spoken of by Christie, Khanikoff, Leech, and other writers on Seistán. He seems to have held Chakansur in gift from the Wazir Fath Khan, Barakzai.

" III, IV.—Need no separate mention.

" V.—Moin : murdered by his brother Ali Khan after the death of their father, Khan Jahan.

" VI.—Ali Khan : succeeded to the chiefdom of the Sanjuranis in Seistán on the assassination of his elder brother. Is supposed to have died in 1840.

" VII.—Ibrahim ; now Chief of Chakansur. Shared power with his brother Ali Khan during his life-time.

" VIII.—Besides Jan Beg there may have been two other brothers ; but there is little worthy of record regarding them to be here noted.


" IX.—Imam Khan, now residing at Charburjak on the right bank of the Helmund. Shares control over Rudbar, and other places bordering on the river, with his brother.

" X.—Kamal Khan. Both these Chiefs profess themselves to be subjects of Persia.

" XI, XII, XIII.—Need no separate mention. One or more of the sons educated at Teheran.

#### TREE No. V.

*Biluchis Toki (Sanjurani).*





## APPENDIX No. VIII.

### GENERAL POLLOCK'S FINAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEISTÁN MISSION.

This report was submitted by General Pollock under cover of a letter, dated 14th February 1873, which is extracted below. Of the enclosures which it contained, A and B have been printed as Selection No. CIV for the records of the Government of India. From Dr. Bellew's Political Memorandum, I have taken one extract, which is given below :—

*From Commissioner of Peshawar, on special duty, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,—dated, London, 14th February 1873.*

I have the honor to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, my final Report on the Seistán Mission proceedings.

2. I trust that my letters, demi-official and public, and my diaries submitted from time to time during the progress of our work, will have been considered full and satisfactory, for I labored at all times to keep the Government fully informed of progress, not still at the close of the Mission; and, although I was not actually employed in giving the arbitral opinion on the Seistán Boundary question, there is much matter for me to place on record.

3. I will commence by briefly stating the circumstances which led to my employment. I had been Commissioner of Peshawar since 1866, and held that appointment when His Highness the Amir of Kabul visited British India and met His Excellency the Viceroy at Umballa. The first point urged by Shere Ali at that meeting was the Seistán boundary. He sought the assistance of the British Government to recover from Persia the portion of Seistán which he charged her with having fraudulently tampered with, and was promised, on condition that he held his hand and allowed no raids or retaliation of any kind on the part of his Governors on the south-west frontier of Afghanistan, that the British Government would use its best endeavours to bring about an amicable adjustment of all pending misunderstandings between Persia and Afghanistan.

4. The diplomatic correspondence which followed this promise occupied of necessity a long period, and after an unsuccessful attempt had been made in 1870 to take up the Seistán question before General Goldsmid's enquiries on the more southern or Mekran boundary question (between Persia and Kelat), it was not till October of the following year, 1871, that Persia and Afghanistan agreed to abide either by the decision of an English arbitrator on the Seistán boundary, or, in the event of their being dissatisfied with such decision, to accept as final and conclusive the decision of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, given after hearing the objections urged by both sides to the decision of the arbitrator.

5. In October 1871, Sir Frederick Goldsmid having been appointed arbitrator, I had the honor of being selected by the late lamented Viceroy as Special Commissioner to accompany the Agent or Boundary Commissioner appointed by His Highness the Amir of Kabul to plead the Afghan side of the case before the English arbitrator.

6. Leaving England on the 10th November with General Goldsmid and party, we landed at Bombay on the 3rd December; summoned to Calcutta, General Goldsmid and myself arrived there on the 7th idem. The former, after receiving his instructions, started again on night of the 7th, travelled continuously to Bombay, and, proceeding thence by Karachi and the Persian Gulf, landed at Bunder Abbass, and marched through Southern Persia to Seistán.

7. I was detained first in Calcutta, and then at Lahore, by questions of route. At Lahore I was joined by Dr. H. W. Bellew, who had been appointed my Assistant owing to the special knowledge acquired by him while employed in 1857 under Major Lumsden, and during many years' service on the Peshawar frontier, where he had gained an excellent knowledge of the Pushtu language and of Persian also. Mirza Ghulam Ahmed also joined me at Lahore as Munshi. He also had been employed with the Kandahar Mission, and had subsequently served up to the present time as Head Reader or Sherishtadar of the Commissioner's Office, Peshawar Division. Government had decided in favor of the most southerly route, and we proceeded by Multan and Sukkur to the frontier station of Jacobabad, where, as acknowledged in former communications, I received all possible assistance rendered in the kindest manner by Sir William Merewether and Colonel Phayre.

8. I believe it will have been apparent from the diaries that we used our best endeavours to push on quickly, and that it would have been impossible to move faster than we did. Owing, however, to the absence of good roads, to the inferiority of our baggage animals till

we joined the Afghan Commissioner, and to the exceptional inclemency of the season, we only joined General Goldsmid's camp early in March, when his party had already been nearly 40 days in Seistán.

9. And I believe I had best proceed at once to offer such remarks as appear to me of possible use on the boundary question.

10. Situated as I was with regard to General Goldsmid, had I felt it due to the Afghan Government to differ with that officer in the conclusions to which he had arrived, I should have done so with care and circumspection; but I have to explain that I concurred entirely with General Goldsmid in his decision, and the remarks I am about to offer only point to the necessity of not yielding *further* to Persia.

11. If "present possession" had to influence (as it undoubtedly had) General Goldsmid in giving his decision, still the following points appear to me worthy of very grave consideration, as showing—*1st*, that Persia has, mainly owing to Lord Russell's despatch of 1863, preserved by General Goldsmid's decision a tract she acquired surreptitiously and by fraudulent misrepresentations, and by the accident that Afghanistan was torn by internal dissensions for several years after the demise of the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan in 1863; *2nd*, that Afghanistan must, in agreeing to the decision, do so more on account of her helplessness, and the necessity for continuing on friendly terms of alliance with so powerful a neighbour as ourselves, than because she can acquiesce in the justice of an award which confirms the Persians in the possession of  $\frac{1}{8}$ ths of the territory recently annexed by them, and leaves them in dangerous proximity to Kandahar.

12. Seistán has been uniformly held and admitted by Persian action to be an integral portion of the kingdom founded by Ahmed Shah Durani. Maps in use by Persia up to the period of the Seistán boundary question, and allowed by them to be correct, give the Neh-o-Bundan range, which lies to the west of Seistán, as the boundary between Persia and Afghanistan.

13. Since the establishment of the Durani kingdom, Seistán has always been more or less under Afghan control, either as a portion of the Herat territory, or of the Kandahar province, and has, until the present occupation by Persia, never paid tribute to Persia, nor coined money in her name, nor read the khutbah, nor given any other signs of belonging to Persia.

14. In the Treaty of Paris, 1857, Persia binds herself never to interfere in the affairs of Herat and its dependencies, Seistán being at the time a dependency of Herat.

15. Looking back to the action of Persia, consequent upon the despatch of Lord Russell in November 1863, it should always be borne in mind that Lord Russell's letter, on which Persia lays such stress, *followed Persian representations of an anticipated invasion of Persia from the Afghanistan side*. Now the merest students of the history of that period know that Afghanistan, convulsed by civil war and weakened by the death of the ablest ruler she has had, *was never less likely* than at that particular time to entertain projects of invasion. As an excuse for counterbalancing the influence of the late Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, then recently established by the reduction of Herat to his own direct authority, the Persians falsified the customary Biluch raids upon the Huftad Rah tract into hostilities on the part of the Afghan Government, and made them an excuse for the occupation of Seistán, which they claimed as Persian territory on no better grounds, if so good, as those on which they formerly claimed Herat—claims which our Government resisted to the extent of spending vast sums of money, ultimately obliging Persia to withdraw. (Treaty of Paris.)

16. The permission granted by Lord Russell to settle their differences with the Afghans by an appeal to arms did not guarantee to the Persians any right to the acquisition of Afghan territory, nor did it permit them to conquer a country, undoubtedly a part of the Afghan territory, in direct violation of Article VI of the above Treaty, which would seem not to have been borne in mind in the proceedings of 1863; the permission then granted being quite inconsistent with the terms of that Treaty which had cost us so much. Again, as remarked in a despatch of the Government of India of 1870 to the Home Government (No. 41, dated 7th July 1870, Secret), "the occupation of part of Seistán up to the Helmund by Persia during the last few years appears to have been accomplished by way of stealthy advance and gradual encroachment during the troubles in Afghanistan, rather than by an open assertion of her rights by force of arms."

17. When Persia was permitted to use force, it could not have been understood that her aim was to take up a position which vitally affected the security of Herat and Kandahar.

18. By the false representations of Persia regarding her possessions in Seistán, the Afghan Government were made to appear in the light of invaders of a province belonging to Persia, whereas, in fact, they were not only paralyzed by their own internal troubles, but actually unaware of the Persian application to England, and of the permission granted by England to her enemy, in direct opposition to the policy formerly followed by England in dealing with the Herat question.

19. It may be that had the Afghans been duly advised of Lord Russell's despatch, they would have been unable at that time to protect their border, for in fact they were both helpless and ignorant of the permission granted to the Persians. When they did hear of it, and when circumstances in 1869 admitted of their seeking the assistance of the British Government,

they at once did so. Their first representation at Umballa had reference to the Seistán question, and they agreed to hold their hands entirely and refer the question to the British Government for adjustment.

20. While Afghanistan remained inactive, first, from inability to protect herself, and later in observance of her promise to us and in confidence of our assistance, Persia, by means of emissaries and gold, and sometimes of intimidation, won over Chief after Chief, and troops were gradually introduced into Seistán for the support of authority till the whole of what may be called Seistán Proper, west of the Helmund, came under their control.

21. Nor has Persia stopped here, nor will she stop, unless we adopt a different policy towards her. It can be demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt, and the official correspondence of the last 30 years shows, that Persia, whether affecting to give way to us and ostensibly acquiescing in the views of the British Government, or whether adopting the language held on one occasion to our Minister at Teheran, that Persia had *extensive plans in the direction of Afghanistan*, her policy has always agreed with that last statement. She has never abandoned her design on Afghanistan; foiled at Herat, she has turned her attention to the country south of it, and permission on our part to retain the tracts she has occupied condemns us in regard to our Herat policy.

22. While bound by the Treaty of Paris to interfere in no way with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is notorious that she has unceasingly endeavoured to buy over the Afghan Governors near her frontier. She hardly makes a secret of her still claiming Herat. Sirdar Muhammad Yakub Khan, Governor of Herat, is notoriously in correspondence with the Prince-Governor of Meshed. Sirdar Ahmed Khan, the Chief of Lash-Jowain, is well known to have received Persian pay, he himself having shown us a document from the Meshed Governor making overtures to him (a copy is given in Appendix).

23. Should Persia continue to be allowed to deceive us by fictitious statements—however plausible, statements utterly antagonistic to the action she has really adopted—it will be impossible for the Amir of Kabul any longer to believe that we are acting in good faith with him.

24. Should England give way to Persia so far as to leave her undisturbed on the Helmund, or should England allow Badakshan to be annexed by Bokhara, I firmly believe that all the good done by the proceedings of 1869 and subsequently will be annulled, and we shall be in a *worse* position than we were during the civil war which preceded Amir Shere Ali's visit to Umballa.

25. I think a time has arrived when the servants of Government are bound to speak out their opinion unreservedly, and my own view is that the present opportunity should not be lost of telling Persia that we are not deceived by her disingenuous course of action, and will not, any more than in 1857, allow her to carry out schemes of ambition on her eastern frontier, *either in her own interest, or at the dictation of the great Power which overshadows her.*

26. Persia agreed to submit the Seistán question to British arbitration and to allow enquiries to be made on the spot. General Goldsmid's despatches of February, March, and April clearly show her duplicity in this matter.

27. Persia, while affecting to be a true ally to the British Government, allows herself to be influenced by other considerations, and to be made an instrument for furthering the ambitious projects of a Power which she fears and feels incapable of resisting. In a statement which will be found in the appendices to this report, a remarkable account of the line which her authorities have given out as the course which they adopted in 1856-57, and which, according to them, led to the Mutiny in India; and although I have no reason to believe that that account is really true, it is at least an indication of the policy which she wishes it to be believed that she adopted, and which perhaps she would have followed, had she had the power of doing so.

28. Having put on record the above remarks on the Boundary question, I think it unnecessary to write further in this Report, except to express, as I have already done in former letters, my strong sense of the excellent service rendered to Government by my companion and Assistant, Dr. H. W. Bellew.

29. Amongst the appendices will be found some admirable historical, geographical, and general notes and route diaries prepared by him since his return to India from rougher notes taken during his travels.

30. I have already written of the services performed by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, my Munshi, and I trust that he will ere this have received some promotion or substantial acknowledgment of his work. From the time of the Mutiny till now he has held an unusually difficult and responsible post at Peshawar, as Head Reader or Sherishtadar of the Commissioner's Office, and has won the confidence and esteem of all my predecessors.

*Extract from a Memorandum by DR. BELLEW, dated 5th July 1872.*

It now remains to consider the political results of this encroachment by Persia upon Afghan territory.

The political results or consequences to be anticipated by Persia's occupation of Seistán are of a threefold nature, *viz.*, those arising from the exercise of a paramount influence; those

arising from the possession of a grand strategic position ; and those arising from the prestige of a triumph over the Herat policy of the British Government. Each of these requires but a brief notice here.

With reference to the first then : The advance and establishment of Persian authority in a Province within the borders of the Afghan territories places Persia in a position whence she can exercise an almost sovereign control over the internal affairs of the country of the whole of Afghanistan ; whilst her mere presence in Seistán can be viewed in no other light than that of a direct menace to the peace and security and independence of the whole country up to Ghazni—of the southern half of the Kabul Amir's dominions.

That Persia will neglect the opportunities offered by so advantageous a position, we have no reason to expect ; for the entire and uniform policy of the Kujar Sovereigns in respect to Afghanistan is opposed to any such expectation. That, content with her present position, she will restrain herself from further encroachment, or more extended exercise of power in Afghanistan, we have no reason to hope ; for so late as June 1870 the Shah of Persia admits to the British Minister at Teheran that he is not without hopes of getting possession of the other half of Seistán on some future date.

That is to say, Persia undisguisedly aims at annexing Afghan territory up to Bost. Short of this, indeed, the Persians cannot stop with any advantage to themselves ; for a division of the province between Persia and Afghanistan is incompatible with the existence of peace or order or prosperity ; and in the conflict one must gain the ascendancy.

From her position in Seistán, Persia cannot help interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan ; whilst the whole policy of the Kujar Kings in regard to the Afghan territories confirms the belief that from here she will redouble her efforts to prevent the unification of the Afghan provinces under the rule of a single or sole Native Chief. Further, from this advantageous position, she will have little difficulty in fomenting internal discord, and perpetuating rivalries and jealousies, all already too rife amongst the Afghan Nobles, until she reduces them to acknowledge the Persian Shah as their paramount Sovereign.

It is indeed with this very object in view that Persia has, after years of intrigue and misrepresentation, at length succeeded in stealthily creeping into Afghanistan and taking possession of Seistán.

As regards the second political result to be anticipated by this move on the part of Persia, Persia's possession of Seistán, viewed as a strategic position, is one of the gravest importance in respect to the independence of Afghanistan, and the security of the passes into India. Details as to the capabilities of the country for the support of an army, and the facilities for the movement of troops along the Persian frontier, will be found in my Report on Seistán and the route through Khorassan. Here a few brief remarks on the salient points for consideration will suffice, noting merely that history affords abundant evidence of the practicability of military operations on a large scale in this region, of the facility of moving armies along the Perso-Afghan frontier, and of maintaining them both there and in Seistán.

In a strategic sense, Persia's position in Seistán is one of the utmost advantage to her. With Seistán in her possession, she isolates Herat, and holds Kandahar at her mercy. On the outbreak of hostilities, she can at once from this position paralyze Afghanistan ; and by a combined movement, suitably timed as to season, she can at once seize both Herat and Kandahar without the possibility of either of them receiving either timely or efficient aid. These remarks apply only on the supposition that, with Persia firmly established in Seistán, Afghanistan continues to maintain her independence—a supposition in itself most unlikely of realization, always holding that she is left to herself, and is unsupported from without. Because the mere fact of Seistán being in the possession of Persia, whilst it adds enormously to her preponderance, at the same time disarms Afghanistan of all power of resistance except within the narrow limits of the Kabul highlands and the fastnesses of the Suleiman mountains.

With this fate before him, brought to this state of helplessness by the presence of Persia in Seistán, the Afghan Sovereign, rather than lose his kingdom and authority, would be forced to ally himself with the dominant Power ; to throw himself into the arms of Persia ; and to hold his possessions and power as a dependent of the throne of Persia. He has no escape from this alternative. And it is already pointed to by the Afghans themselves as the inevitable consequence of Persia's possession of Seistán. The case, weighed as it is, is sufficiently grave ; but it becomes very much graver when taken in connection with Persia's relations with Russia—her thorough subservience and treaty obligations to that Power.

With regard to the third Political consequence. Persia's possession of Seistán completely turns the position of Herat, for the security of which in its integrity the British Government has during nearly half a century labored, warred, and expended its treasure. By this move of Persia upon Seistán, the consistent policy of the British Government for nearly half a century on the Herat frontier is at once neutralized. By this flank movement Persia gains all that she has aimed at since the rise of the Kujar dynasty, and the British Government loses all that it has consistently striven to protect during the same period.

The prestige acquired by such a triumph is not to be lightly estimated ; for the successful encroachments of Persia, not only upon Afghanistan, but upon the adjoining frontier of Biluchistan as well, are watched and commented on by the neighbouring States with an interest not entirely free from mistrust—little known to, and little appreciated by, the outside world.

This policy of Persia, moreover, is firmly believed, justly or otherwise, by the surrounding nations and peoples to be pursued at the bid and by the guidance of Russia. And for this reason it is that it carries so great weight with them; otherwise Persia has no ostensible reason for such activity in this direction. Her right to the possession of Seistán, or indeed any other part of Afghanistan, expired with the extinction of the empire of which it formed a part. She has far greater reason and more just cause for the exercise of any superfluous energy in the direction of the Turkomans, who with impunity raid her northern borders, sell her subjects into slavery, and render her roads unsafe to travellers.

Some of Persia's partizans, in extenuation of her encroachments upon Biluchistan and Seistán, lay stress on the fact of the people of those countries being of the Shia sect and co-religionists of the Persians, and speaking the Persian language. This argument, however, carries no great weight. The mere fact of twenty thousand out of the thirty thousand or so families inhabiting Seistán Proper being of the Shia persuasion gives Persia no claim on them as subjects. Seistán is not the only part of Afghanistan which has a Shia population. There are twelve thousand families professing this faith in Kabul alone. There are several thousands of this sect in Herat and Kandahar. At the latter city, the village of Gundigan is inhabited entirely by Shias. The Jaji tribe and others in the Suleiman range are Shias; so are some of the Afridi and Orakzai in the Khyber. Most of the Chitral tribes, and many in Badakhshan, are Shias. And, with trivial exceptions, so are the entire Hazarah tribes. About a fourth part, approximately, of the people of Afghanistan are of the Shia persuasion. But for this they suffer no disabilities.

Again, as to language, Seistán is not the only part of Afghanistan where Persian is spoken. It is the language of all the people of Afghanistan who are not Afghans and Pathans, excepting the tribes of Kafaristan. The Hazarah, the Kizlbash, the Tajik, the Parsiwan, the Biluch, and others, all use dialects of the Persian language. Some of them, too, as the Tajik and Parsiwan, certain Biluch and certain Hazarah, are of the Suni sect, not of the Shia.

Apart from these considerations, however, Persia's permanent occupation of Seistán, and its annexation to the Persian dominions, Lord John Russell's letter notwithstanding, is in direct violation of Article VII of the Treaty of Paris. And this she has effected by overriding and setting aside the provisions and stipulations of the preceding Article VI; for at the time this treaty was made, Seistán formed an integral part of Afghanistan, and on the conclusion of peace in 1857 was included with the rest of the Herat territory to be evacuated by the Persians, though at that time they had not taken possession of any part of Seistán Proper, but held the forts in Hokat forming the northern portion of the district. Of these they retained tenacious possession long after they evacuated Herat, and finally only relinquished their hold on them after repeated remonstrance on the part of the Amir Dost Muhammad and the firm demands of the British Government.

Such, in brief, is an indication of the political consequences to be anticipated from Persia's annexation of Seistán, under the three heads above specified. In each case, she gains a direct ascendancy over Afghanistan, and, unless checked, must ultimately reduce the whole country to acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia.

But if, on the other hand, in strict adherence to the terms and spirit of the Treaty of Paris, Persia withdraws from her encroachment within the Afghan border, and relinquishes her hold on Seistán, and for the future abstains from all further claim upon Afghan territory, then there is some hope of the endurance and consolidation of the Afghan monarchy. Naturally, the Afghan tendency is to ally with the paramount power in India. Towards the Shia Persian, as a ruling race, they have an invincible aversion; whilst of the Russians they have a profound mistrust and dread.

The development of the policy of the two great western Powers in Asia has convinced the Afghans that their safest course is an alliance and dependence on the British. But hitherto, until recently, they consider they have not met the encouragement in that direction they had of their own lights led themselves to expect; and consequently the Amir has been able to exercise less control over his turbulent nobles and wilful relatives than he otherwise would have been. A continuance, however, in the present policy of sincere friendship and complete abstention from interference in the internal affairs of the country promises the best results; but only provided the professions of friendship are backed by a certain amount of support, both moral and material, by advice and money.

This seems necessary for the following reasons, *viz.*, that during a long series of years the intrigues of Persia have so ramified through the country, and taken such firm root, that the Amir, ruling by his own unaided resources, would not have the influence and weight amongst his own people and the surrounding States that he would have were it known that he held his power as an ally of, and with the support of, the British Government.

His establishment in such a position, as a recognized member of the Indian community Princes, such as Nipal for example, would effectually check the intrigues of Persia, and show her that it was not worth while to take in hand and encourage every rebellious noble or discontented Prince who may choose to ask her aid against the constituted authority of his country.



The money aid or subsidy need only be temporary, until such time as the Amir had set his government in order, and put the revenues of the country in a proper state, and effected other improvements required by the country. Such schemes, however, are contingent on the restoration of Seistan to Afghanistan; otherwise, it seems, the existence of Afghanistan as an independent monarchy is doomed to extinction sooner or later. Everything in the present state of parties in that country favors such a dissolution. The Amir's son, Yakub, Governor of Herat, holding an undefined but very suspicious relation to the Persian Government; the Kandahar Chiefs, and not a few in Kabul, avowedly in the interests of Persia, together with a numerous and influential Persian colony in the Afghan capital, all these combine to favor the Kujar schemes. And from Seistan, owing to its favoring situation, such schemes could be pushed forward with redoubled energy and doubled facility. It was to Seistan the rebel Yakub fled from his father. It was the Persian Governor there, Mir Alum of Ghain, who hospitably entertained him, recruited his ranks, replenished his purse, and sent him on his way to Herat. Yakub took Herat from the Amir's Governor, Fath Muhammad, who was killed in the conflict. He then repented and threw himself on the Amir's mercy at the capital. He was restored to Herat, and is still there on the part of the Amir. But the reconciliation between father and son, though outwardly cordial and perfect, is in reality not as thorough and true as is desirable.

It was to Seistan that, shortly previous to Yakub's visit, Muhammad Azim in 1869, on his final defeat by the Amir Shere Ali, retired. And here it was that Mir Alum entertained him, and finally started him on his way to the Persian capital *via* Meshad.

## APPENDIX IX.

### REPORT BY CAPTAIN THE HON'BLE G. C. NAPIER ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SEISTAN WITH REFERENCE TO LATE ARBITRATION, DATED 1st MARCH 1875.

I HAVE the honor, with reference to paragraph 5 of your letter of instructions, dated 7th November 1874, to submit herewith such information as I was able to gather while in Khorassan regarding the present situation in Seistan in relation especially to the late arbitration on the Perso-Afghan boundary.

The following summary of events in Seistan from the date of the late rebellion to the present time derived solely from Persian sources, which is given as concisely as possible, may be of use for comparison with reports received through Afghanistan, and is almost necessary to preface the subsequent remarks regarding the arbitration.

**Summary of events from winter 1872-73.**  
**Mir Alum Khan, Governor.**  
 Mir Alum Khan, Chief of Ghaeen, was Governor of Seistan at the time of the visit of the Arbitration Commission, and had then held the Government for three or four years, having succeeded Taj Mohamed Khan, the hereditary chief of the Sarbandis, who is now under detention at Teheran, and Sharif Khan Nahroe, who was for some time placed in power by the Persians. He is described as an energetic and liberal ruler, and is said to be liked by his own people of Ghaeen and Birjand, but with the Seistanis he is exceedingly unpopular, both personally and on account of the introduction of numerous Ghaeen officials, whose assumption of superiority the Belooch chiefs and their followers could not brook, the Ghaeenis having always in former days been dependent on, and often subject to, the chiefs of Seistan.

It is worthy of note that in March 1872 the British Mission left Seistan apparently without seeing any indication of the disturbances that ensued in the following winter.

On the 10th Zikada 1289 (21st December 1872), Mir Alum Khan was forced to shut himself up in his newly built fort of Nasriya or Nasirabad. At the head of the coalition against him were:

(1.) Ibrahim Khan of Chakansur, who, though continuing to reside on the Afghan side of the boundary, gave his countenance and some aid to the Seistanis. He had suffered the loss of eight or nine hamlets on the Persian side of the river made over to Sharif Khan by the Governor.

**Rebel Chiefs. Ibrahim Khan, Sanjurani.**  
 (2.) Ahmad Khan of Lash Jouvein, who, at one time, enjoyed the favour of the Shah of Persia, and received money and presents from his hands. He believed that the Chief of Ghaeen had come between him and the Persian Sovereign, and had to complain of frequent raids on his villages and of support given by the chief to his nephew and enemy Sultan Mohamed Khan, to whom the village of Nohak had been granted.

(3.) Sharif Khan, who, though connected by marriage and not actually on bad terms with the Chief of Ghaeen, finding all his people and the principal chiefs united in opposition, went with the stream.

**Sharif Khan, Nahroe.**  
 (4.) Kamal Khan of Bunder and Imam Khan of Roodbar (since dead), and Sarfaraz Khan, Belooch, who had all to complain of loss of villages or lands. Both Kamal Khan and Imam Khan had villages on the Persian side of the boundary.

**Kamal Khan, Sanjurani.**  
 (5.) Mullik Abbas Khan, Kayani, an influential chief, though in full sympathy, did not openly join in the rebellion; his brother Oosay Khan being detained by Mir Alum Khan in the fort. He, however, to make sure of being on the right side, sent his brother Gulzar Khan to the insurgent camp.

**Abbas Khan, Kayani.**  
 The clans of Seistan, united against the Persian Governor, were the Sanjurani, Kayani, Shahreki, Nahroe, Sarbandi, Karanzai of Kharan,\* and the Chief of Lash Jouvein is said to have been present, and some Eeljari or Militia of Furrak under Mohamed Omar Khan, Alezai, who would probably be the 500 Elyats above referred to.

**Rebel clans.**  
 The Governor had with him some Birjandis, his own people, 100 men of Darg, and Sultan Mohamed Khan, nephew of Sultan Ahmad Khan of Lash, and Mir Jafir Khan, Sarbandi, the only Seistani on his side.

On the 1st Mohurram (about 10th February) a force was sent to Seistan with Abbas Khan Sartip, Herati, Ataoolla Tymore, and Baba Khan, Troops from Mashad. Hazara, consisting of the regiments of Turshiz and Damghan with two guns, 600 horse Tymori and Hazara, and 100 Shamkhalchis (mounted matchlock-men). By the end of Mohurram the Governor was reduced to the last extremity, having been

\* Probably nomads from the southern portion of the basin.

driven out of Huseinabad into the "ark" or citadel of Nasriya, leaving a gun in the hands of the insurgents; 40 or 50 men had been killed during the siege or blockade, and provisions had come to an end.

At this juncture Ibrahim Khan, who apparently had no wish to push matters to extremities, stepped in, and by his influence with the Seistanis procured a cessation of hostilities and fair terms for the Governor, who was allowed to retire with all his property and followers, carriage being provided by Ibrahim Khan. This chief is said to have received a large sum of money and large promises of reward on the return of the Governor with Persian troops. After the baggage and women of the Ghaeenis had been sent off, and before the evacuation of the fort, news was received of the approach of the Persian regiments. The insurgents began to disperse, and the Governor refused to surrender.

In the next month Safar (about end February), Mirza Mohammad Husein, Mustowfi, Mustowfi Mirza Mohammad Husein, and Mustafa Kooli Khan Sartip, who had been sent from Mashad entrusted with full powers to inquire into the grievances of the Seistanis, arrived, and were met by the whole of the Seistan Chiefs, who conducted them into Huseinabad. They declared themselves ready to obey any orders from the Shah, but would not again put themselves under the yoke of the Ghaeenis.

The Governor, having now troops at his back, was for taking severe measures, but the two pacificators took a different view, and their first act was to order him out of the country. They reported to the Governor-General of Khorassan that the Seistanis had many causes of complaint against Mir Alum Khan, and were now completely pacified by his departure. After taking an oath and written acknowledgment of allegiance from Sharif Khan, and from Ibrahim Khan also by direction of the Governor-General, they returned to Mashad.

In Rabi ul Awal (April) the Simsam-ul-Mulk arrived in Seistan as Governor. He was met by all the Chiefs save Sharif Khan, who sent his brother Sherdil Khan in his place, pleading sickness, but he had, in truth, received a hint that the Persian Government was ill disposed towards him.

Sherdil Khan was sent back with a threatening message, and Sharif Khan at once prepared for flight, sending his wives and property across the river. Under the security of an oath given by Abbas Khan, Herati, he subsequently made a formal submission and brought his household back to the Persian side, but still would not trust himself within reach of the Persian Governor. His brother, Sherdil Khan, accompanied Abbas Khan to Mashad, and there lodged a complaint against the Simsam-ul-Mulk, who, he said, was dissatisfied at the turn affairs had taken and the quiet submission of Sharif Khan and others, whereby he was deprived of the chances of enriching himself at their expense, that would have presented themselves, if the rebels had remained obdurate. The Governor-General sent him back to summon Sharif Khan to Mashad under safe conduct, but he did not live to reach his journey's end.

Abbas Khan was then sent to Teheran to explain the state of affairs to the Ministers, and took back to the Governor-General an assurance that he, Simsam-ul-Mulk, should be recalled, and the Government of Seistan left entirely in his hands.

In the meantime the further reinforcement asked for by the Simsam-ul-Mulk having arrived, he determined to force Sharif Khan to submission, and send troops to attack him in Sharifabad. The chief was taken by surprise and fled without resistance, leaving his property to be plundered by the Persians. This affair is called the battle of Sharifabad, the troops were commanded by General Buhler, an Alsatian in the Shah's service. This event occurred in the month of Rajub, about August 1873.

Ibrahim Khan, who had abetted the rebellious conduct of Sharif Khan, had also on the first alarm retired to Chakansur abandoning his villages on the Persian side, which were immediately confiscated by the Persian Governor.

In the winter of 1873-74 the Simsam-ul-Mulk was recalled and succeeded in the following spring by Mohammad Jafir Khan, son of Mohammad Wali Khan, who was nominated by the Governor-General. He received strict injunctions to conciliate the Chiefs and people, but appears to have failed in furthering Persian interests with sufficient vigour. Mirza Mahomed Ali Ghaeeni (subsequently sent to Herat) accompanied him as Mustowfi or Chief Accountant, and appears to have acquired much influence in the country. Being an enemy of Mir Alum Khan and exiled from Ghaeen, it was supposed that he would be acceptable to the Seistanis.

Before the recall of the Simsam-ul-Mulk, one Haji Shah Mohammad had been sent from Teheran commissioned on the part of the Persian Government to demarcate, in conjunction with an Afghan deputy, the boundary laid down by the Arbitration Commissioners.

Arrangements had been made for the meeting before, and the Afghan deputy had once arrived in Seistan, but returned on finding no one to meet him.

Early in the month of Shawal (September) a meeting was effected and a number of the Seistan Chiefs summoned to Husseinabad. The Simsam-ul-Mulk, however, found reasons for delaying the demarcation and finally dismissed the deputies, on the plea that all the necessary revenue and administrative arrangements for the partition of lands and demarcation were not complete.

It is stated also that Haji Shah Mohamad had orders to make secret enquiries into the alleged extortion of the late Governor Mir Alum Khan, and reported that he had, during his four or five years' tenure, extracted from the people, over and above the revenue, about 280,000 tomans.

After the departure of the Haji came the change of Government, and the country remained tranquil through the spring and summer of 1874. Mohamad Jafir Khan, however, though popular, was not considered efficient, and his recall was talked of as certain.

Return of Mir Alum Khan.

In August 1874 Mir Alum Khan returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca, and after some stay in Mashad, left for his home in Birjand.

In December 1874 he was again sent to Seistan, and reinstalled in the Governorship in place of Mohamad Jafir Khan. This step could not fail to be displeasing to the Seistanis, whose submission had been purchased by his recall, and already rumours of disturbances reached Teheran.

Deputation of elders.

A deputation of the elders of villages, headed by Mustowfi Mohamad Ali, is at present here, but their prayer for the removal of the new Governor is not likely to be heard. The result, however, is not yet known.

Some further particulars regarding Mir Alum Khan may perhaps be of interest. The Khan is a short, stout, well preserved man, of about 45 years of age, with a stolid heavy look, and a face of Afghan rather than Persian type. In dress and exterior he follows Persian fashions closely, identifying himself with them ostentatiously. He is said to be liberal and kind in his dealings with his own people, but exceedingly overbearing and haughty towards the Seistanis. Under his rule the country advanced in material improvement and security; and he would not, under favorable circumstances, perhaps prove a bad ruler. But situated as he is on the borders of Afghanistan and Persia, subject to the jealousy of the one party and the enmity of the other, influenced by local interests, and swayed by traditional or personal feelings of sympathy or enmity towards each Chief and clan on the border, he can never be a popular, or, for the true interests of Persia, a good ruler, and it is a misfortune that he should be again entrusted with extensive and almost irresponsible powers. His re-appointment, however, though it will be thoroughly displeasing to the Afghans, does not necessarily indicate the existence of a policy of encroachment and of hostility towards Afghanistan, for it is apparently as likely to be due to Court intrigue.

Mir Alum Khan had given offence, in various ways, to the Hissam-ul-Sultana, the Governor-General of Khorassan, and ultimately defied his authority, finding protection and countenance from the Prime Minister at Teheran. This sufficed to distinguish him, and it is, perhaps, merely to gratify these feelings of jealousy that the Minister has permitted his return to the province.

The following information regarding the attitude of the Persians with regard to the boundary laid down by the Arbitration Commission is derived wholly from Persians and Seistanis of the Persian side, and I have been unable either at Mashad or in Teheran to check it from official sources, but while it is necessary to declare this, I believe that the truth of the statements I received may be fully relied on. The deputation of Haji Shah Mohamad Khan, above referred to, appears to have been the first step taken by the Persian Government towards an actual demarcation of the boundary line. He arrived, as was stated, after much delay, and was met by an Afghan deputy, and a number of the Seistani Chiefs and Mulliks, who were assembled to assist in the deliberations.

Failure of ostensible object of Haji Shah Mohamad's mission.

Simsam-ul-Mulk opposes demarcation.

The Governor of Seistan, the Simsam-ul-Mulk, had also to advise him, Zulfikar Khan, a Major of Persian Engineers, and Abbas Khan Sartip, Herati, who had served in the country for some time, and was well acquainted with the people. The Seistanis were very shortly dismissed, and after them the Afghan deputy; the Governor declaring that, on the pretexts above noted, the demarcation could not be carried on.

It is possible that the Haji's mission was merely to ascertain and report to Teheran the effect on Persian interests of the demarcation, if carried out strictly according to the award; whether so or not, this was its only result. He, in concert with the Governor, reported, it is said, strongly against the proposed demarcation, giving various reasons, the principal of which were detailed to me by Major Zulfikar Khan himself, and to some extent attested by my Seistani informants. The weight to be attached to these objections will be known to the officers of the Seistan Mission, by whom all such points must have been fully discussed. The

Objections raised by Governor to boundary line.

report of the Commission not being in my hands to refer to, and having no local knowledge, I was unable to gauge their value, or in fact to do much more than note them. The main objection raised, one which it is said vitiates entirely the justice of the arbitration award, is that the Afghans are able at any time by sufficient exertions, to cut off entirely the water of the Helmund from the upper portion of Seistan Proper, which is within the Persian line, and that this will be the ultimate result of the re-occupation of the old seats of population on the Afghan side of the Helmund, known as Palungi, Sar-o-Zar, Amiran, Siahposhan, &c.

The swampy malarious basin, it is argued, has come to be the seat of the densest population since the destruction of the old cities and of the canals, by which the fine lands to the south of the basin and on the right bank were rendered unculturable. A state of constant wars and anarchy and frequent changes of rulers, the result of the position of the country between Persia, Herat, and Afghanistan, have combined to prevent the re-occupation of the better lands. It is feared, and apparently with reason, that with the establishment of Afghan rule on the right bank, facilities and encouragement to a re-settlement will be given, the result of which will be not only to limit the supply of water available for Seistan Proper, but to draw away much of the population at present settled there. This, I was informed, would, undoubtedly, be the result of an energetic resort to works of irrigation on the Afghan side, even if the whole country were under one rule; when, therefore, the Persians are aware that their people are in the main disaffected, as events continue to prove, they have good reason to fear a ruinous desertion of their lands.

It is probable that some stipulation was made regarding a division of the water of the Helmund by the "arbitrator," but if so, it is never alluded to by the Persians. They perhaps feel, as they well may, the futility of any such conditions under circumstances precluding the possibility of a speedy settlement of disputes. The party naturally the stronger and with the strongest hold on the country, having entire command of the source of the water supply, and it being practically impossible to refer a dispute for settlement to any third party, the weaker party has good reasons to fear that its interests will suffer. After discussing this question, and looking at it as far as possible from all points, the conclusion arrived at is that the Persians have certainly much reason to fear loss of population and consequently of revenue, but that whether they have any reason to complain is doubtful. Many causes have for a long period combined to crowd an abnormally large population in the portion of the country that has fallen to their lot. A change of conditions threatens to alter this arrangement of the population and permit the return of things to their normal condition. This surely is cause for regret but not for complaint or objection, when the change of conditions and its result is one that must have been foreseen at least on the spot, and might have been made the ground for rejection of the arbitration.

To the south of the Seistan basin and of the boundary line, and west and south of Bunder Traku lands. Kamal Khan, stretches, it is said, a wide tract of fine arable land known as Traku.

It is studded with the ruins of villages, but has long remained a waste, on which graze the herds of the Seistan and Belooch nomads. The whole is said to be irrigable by the water of the Helmund, and of far greater fertility and value than the lands of the basin, where fields and villages are constantly liable to destructive inundation. It is in fact said to be worth more, *i.e.*, capable of supporting a larger population, than the whole of inhabited Seistan.

It is to the relinquishment of this tract that the Persian object, and its possession would probably leave them little to desire; for it would form a counterpoise in their hands to the advantages enjoyed by the Afghans in the possession of the lands on the right bank, and a counter attraction to the wavering population.

The Simsam-ul-Mulk appears to have been especially bent on the acquisition of these Traku lands, and it was the hope of ultimately effecting his object that induced him, it would seem, to oppose the demarcation and the alleged purpose of the Persian Government to give effect to the decision of the arbitration.

In addition to the fear of losing the water of the Helmund, and the possible attraction to the Afghan side of the population, the Persians complain of the loss of the greater portion of the "Naizar," the belt of reed beds skirting the permanent lakes of Seistan, which are valuable for various purposes, especially for grazing, a large part of the revenue of Seistan Proper being derived from a tax on cattle.

The Persians, or at least the local authorities, thus finding their position in the country a disadvantageous one, refused to accept the arbitration as a *fait accompli*.

The actual position of the boundary line, which is locally known as the "Seem," has never been declared to the people, but is nevertheless, to some extent, known to them, and the effects of its demarcation much discussed.

Consequently not respected. The boundary line also, and consequently, has not been uniformly respected.



As regards the actual possession of the tracts affected by the arbitration, it was difficult to obtain exact information, for the local authorities purposely leave that question as little defined as possible. With free access even to the people who chanced to be at Meshed, it might have been possible to ascertain with some exactness the villages and lands from which revenue is actually taken, but even this would be an unsafe test, for the revenue paying tracts appear to vary somewhat with the state of the relations at the time of demand between the local Governor and the local Chiefs. There are, however, no Persian troops beyond boundary.

Persian troops beyond the actual boundary line, and they have relinquished possession of, though not their claim to, the villages between Kohak and Bunder Kamal Khan.

From the Traku lands up to last summer a grazing tax was levied, but this appears to Bunder Kamal Khan and Traku have been since discontinued. It is to the north of the basin given up. that they have not withdrawn altogether within the line laid down, for though not actually in armed possession, they have succeeded in obtaining revenue Revenue taken from villages beyond from a number of villages on the Afghan side for the past northern boundary line. year. The Afghan Government possibly has been too much occupied in other directions to give heed to complaints or to forward them.

Both Sharif Khan and Ibrahim Khan have villages on the Afghan side of the northern boundary line, which they have abandoned under pressure of Abandoned villages of rebel Chiefs virtually in Persian hands. personal fear, and which are actually in the possession of the Persians. And Abbas Khan, Kayani, who appears to have at first held aloof from the rebellion, sending a brother to each side, but ultimately to have joined in it, has also villages on both sides of the boundary line, the whole of which are assessed by the Persians.

It apparently, however, rests with the Afghans by a vigorous occupation of their rights to put an end to such encroachments, and there is probably some their rights. little reason to fear a collision, if they content themselves with occupying their own villages.

In conclusion, I will give in as few words as possible the conclusions I have arrived at as to the views held by the several parties interested regarding the arbitration and its future prospects.

The Persians, and especially those who have local knowledge, appear to regard the arbitration as a device to rob them of the lands they have acquired Persian opinions. and have an ancestral claim to, by taking advantage of the weakness and ignorance of the Shah and his Ministers, and this is in the interest not of the Afghans but of the Government that promoted the arbitration. Believing this, and seeing also more plainly the losses that may ultimately be suffered by the more complete occupation of the lands on the Afghan side of the Helmund, they are furnished with a motive for disregarding the award and delaying as long as possible to give effect to it, and are stimulated thereto by a hope that some change of fortune may in the meantime occur to improve their position. Every year that they can delay a settlement of the country and the occupation of the Afghan land is a direct gain, and also leaves room for changes that must be favorable. For, in the opinion of those Persians with whom I have conversed on the subject, their position in the country is so bad that if the arbitration award be strictly adhered to, their share of it will not be worth holding, and that matters being thus at the worst any change that time may produce must be to their advantage. Such opinions fully explain why the people are left in the dark regarding the boundary, and are led to believe that the matter is still unsettled, and that there is room for further changes.

The view taken by the Seistanis is very much the Persian view. They show that they believe, though they may not say so in so many words, that Opinion of Seistan. the arrangement was forced on the Persians by us for our own benefit, and that in awarding so much of the country to the Afghans we were simply gaining our own ends. They talk of the Afghan side of the boundary almost invariably as "mal i Inglis" (English possession) and of the people as "raiya i Inglis." Such beliefs are the natural outcome of Afghan friendship towards the Mission and of Persian hostility, followed by an award, regarded as in every way favorable to the Afghans; and as they are an article of faith with every Seistan peasant, and tend to imbue him with a deep feeling of respect for the distant nation wielding a power that is mysterious and almost unseen and yet affects the relations of his present and future daily life, and with a feeling of contempt for the Persians, who, while evincing their hostility by every act and their dislike to the arrangements forced on them by insidious encroachments, are unable to openly resent the interference, they cannot be disregarded or passed over as unworthy of note.

Of the feelings of the Afghans regarding the award, I had no means of judging save at second hand.

They appear to have been to some extent disappointed at the loss of the revenue-paying portion of Seistan, though on the whole satisfied.

The Persian portion of the country is now and must for some time remain by far the most valuable, the settlement of other portions being a matter of time. Persian Seistan is the granary of Western Afghanistan and of parts of Persia. Wheat is exported to Yazd, a journey of 24 days, to Candahar and Cabul. It was selling this year at 100 lbs. per kran (10 pence),

and barley at a still lower rate. The revenue for the past year was 22,700 kharwars and 4,000 tomans in cash. It is not therefore surprising that there should be some little jealousy of the superior advantages enjoyed by the Persians, but the feeling is probably local, and it is on the spot that the real advantages secured by the award are best known and appreciated. It is satisfactory to learn on the best authority that the Afghans remained entirely neutral during the late disturbances, at least subsequently to the first attack on the Persian settlement.

Of the future prospects of the arbitration as a measure aimed at securing the present peace of the tract affected by it, the view presented is rather gloomy, as may be inferred from the following facts. The new Governor, as before mentioned, is thoroughly unpopular, and will complete the alienation of the people from their allegiance to the Shah. The Persians affirm that he is not unpopular with the lower classes, but there are, on the other side, the facts that the people rose in rebellion against him as one man, and that his return has been followed by rumours of fresh disturbances, and the deputation of 60 of the headmen of villages, not Chiefs, to pray for his removal. He is almost pledged by local connections and feuds to a policy of aggression and provocation, and is placed beyond reach of efficient control. He finds also a border undefined, and probably undefinable by any means at present at his command.

On the other side are two Chiefs, who have been, by the late measures of his predecessors, estranged from his government and are his enemies. The first causes of difference between him and the Chiefs, Ibrahim Khan and Sharif Khan, have been noted before. Ibrahim Khan subsequently aided in his escape, and might be presumed favorable to him, but he is said to be exasperated at the ill-requit of his services by the Simsam-ul-Mulk, and now devoted to the Afghan cause. His treacherous character is well known, but it cannot be doubted that very great sacrifices would be necessary to win him back. With the Afghans and Sharif Khan he is now on good terms, having been spared the threatened division of his lands.

Return of Sharif Khan. Sharif Khan, who has lost the five villages—Sharifabad, Killa Now, Killa Kohina, Kimak, and Burj Alum Khan—that he possessed on the Persian side, and was plundered by the Persians, has now returned from Cabul, and has been granted lands at Killa Fath and on the left bank opposite Jelallabad. The proposed occupations by latest accounts of Killa Fath and Dahshukha. former are to be irrigated by the opening of two old canals, known as Zarkan-o-Zoorkan, which formerly watered a tract stretching through the lands of Palangi, near Killa Fath, to Chakansur, and money for the work has been advanced by the Amir of Cabul. This will, it is said, at once draw over the whole of the Nahroe tribe, and probably emigrants from many others. The latter is a well watered tract, known as Dahshaka, on which are extensive ruins bearing the same name, 8 miles west from the Helmund, and 14 miles north-east of Nasirabad. A fort is to be built there as a stronghold of that portion of the Afghan territory, and to check the encroachments of the Persian. Sharif Khan comes to Seistan pledged to carry out this work within sight almost of the Persian garrisons, and it seems probable that he will not do so free of interference.

Kamal Khan of Bunder also, whose position at the head of the old canals that used to water the Traku lands, and might, if re-opened, continue to irrigate the Seistan basin even if the Afghans should fully occupy the opposite tract, and would be a valuable one to the Persians, is suspected of intrigues. He has been ordered by the Amir to relinquish his intercourse with the Persians or his lands; and these have been already promised in prospective to the sons of Sirdar Mohamad Hosein Khan, Barakzai, Governor of Subzwar.

The whole of the people of Seistan appear to be wavering between the retention of their lands under Persian rule and immigration to the Afghan side. The families of more than 5,000 men, who were implicated in the late rebellion, have been sent across the river since the return of the new Governor, and the first act of severity, it is said, will be the signal for a general flight. Though the aspect of affairs appears thus threatening, it is possible that the storm may pass away, for the recall of Mir Alum Khan is a possible contingency, and the Persians have a great hold on the people in the possession of the lands they have now occupied for many generations. The position is not certainly worse than must have been anticipated, and the arbitration may be deemed to have gained its end where it has averted, as is believed in the country, a collision between the rival nationalities. Local difficulties are minor questions, for the settlement of which a basis and ample time has been gained.

The annexed list of villages, based on the list given by Dr. Bellew in his official report with corrections suggested by a Seistani Mullik, and some further information, may, perhaps, prove of use.

Regarding Azad Khan of Kharan, whose son last year visited the Amir of Cabul, and about whom some question as to ownership of lands in Seistan was raised, I was unable, after careful enquiry, to ascertain that he had any lands at all in Seistan, and certainly none that could be included in the Persian boundary. Belooch nomads of Kharan at times visit with their flocks the Traku lands, and it is possible that a tax may have been levied on some of these by the Persians.

No. and Name of Village.	Tribe.	Remarks.
1. Jelalabad ...	Kayani.	
2. Burj-i-Afghan ...	Sarbandi, Dehkan, and Afghan.	
3. Bunjar ...	" and Kayani.	
4. Shytan ...	" and "	
5. Bolay ...	" and Dehkan.	
6. Bolay ...	" and "	
7. Kasimabad ...	" and Kalantari.	
8. Iskil ...	Kalantari.	
9. Zahidan ...	Sarbandi and Dehkan	... Ibrahim Khan, Persian side.
10. Khadang ...	Dehkan and mixed tribes.	
11. Boghbar ...	" "	
12. Kechgan ...	Kayani.	
13. Afzalabad ...	Mixed tribes and Sarbandi.	
14. Nasirabad (Fort) ...	Kayani and Persians.	
15. " (Town) ...	Sarbandi and Dehkan.	
16. Sekoha ...	Sarbandi.	
17. Pusht-i-Dasht...	"	
18. Warmal ...	"	
19. Sadki ...	"	
20. Dowlatabad ...	Half Kayani	... Half property of Abbas Khan.
21. Chiling ...	Sarbandi.	
22. Doday ...	"	
23. Hoseinabad ...	"	
24. Burj-i-Haji ...	"	
25. Buhramabad ...	Kayani.	
26. Ibrahimabad ...	Sarbandi.	... Ibrahim Khan, Persian side.
27. Changi Murghan ...	"	
28. Dashta ...	Shabreki	
29. Kimak ...	Nahroe	... Sharif Khan.
30. Wasitan ...	Shabreki.	
31. Pulki ...	"	
32. Kanah ...	"	
33. Shitak ...	"	
34. Tiflak ...	"	
35. Laff ...	"	
36. Jazinak ...	"	
37. Burj Sirband ...	"	
38. Khammak ...	"	
39. Cabri ...	"	
40. Ziyarat Gah ...	"	
41. Burj Alam Khan ...	Nahroe	... Sharif Khan.
42. Cala Now ...	"	... Do.
43. Sharifabad ...	"	... Do.
44. Kimuck ...	"	
45. Abbas Ali ...	Sarbandi.	
46. Kod ...	"	
47. Chakansur ...	Sanjurani.	
48. Khash ...	"	
49. Kaddah ...	"	
50. Jahanabad ...	"	... Ibrahim Khan, Persian side.
51. Nadali ...	"	
52. Tiftak ...	"	
53. Rodbar ...	"	
54. Charburjak ...	"	
55. Bundar Kamal Khan ...	"	... Iman Khan (deceased), who made over to Sharif Khan.
56. Khyrabad ...	"	
57. Ishkinak ...	Isakzai.	
58. Hoseinabad ...	"	
59. Alamdar ...	Sanjurani.	

No. and Name of Village.	Tribe.	Remarks.
60. Khwaja Ahmed ...	Sanjurani ...	Ibrahim Khan.
61. Nazar Khan ...	" ...	
62. Agha Jan Khan ...	" ...	Ibrahim Khan, Persian side.
63. Dih Sayat ...	" ...	Ibrahim Khan.
64. Dih Mir Jafir Khan ...	" ...	Do.
65. Dih Sirkam Khan ...	" ...	Do.
66. Dih Pahlawan ...	" ...	Do.
67. Kila Margo ...	.....	Ibrahim Khan, and half property of Abbas Khan.
68. Shahrستان ...	.....	Ibrahim Khan.
69. Dih Aghai ...	.....	Do.
70. Dih Asadullah ...	.....	Do.
71. Dih Jafir Khan ...	.....	Do.
72. Ganda Beg ...	.....	Do.
73. Malika ...	.....	Ibrahim Khan, and half property of Abbas Khan.
74. Magoon.		
75. Dih Balaj.		
76. Dih Fakeer Mohamad.		
77. Dakki ...	.....	Ibrahim Khan, and half property of Abbas Khan.
78. Kalakhi.		
79. Kala Kohna ...	.....	Sharif Khan.
80. Dih Khalikdad.		
81. Dih Sokhta.		
82. Kalpibaz.		
83. Dih Nazar Khan.		
84. Dih Allahdad.		
85. Dih Mohamad Karbalai.		
86. Karkoo.		
87. Dih Shighalak.		
88. Dih Rustum.		
89. Bhurj-i-Mir Alam.		
90. Dih Kohak.		

## APPENDIX X.

[Referred to in paragraph 74, Chapter IV.]

" TRADUIT DU RUSSE.

" Office de l'Aide de Camp Général de KAUFFMANN à S. A. le Prince Général Labanov, en date de St. Pétersbourg, le 29 Novembre 1872, No. 121.

" J'AI l'honneur de soumettre la copie à V. E. d'une mémoire sur la question de la frontière septentrionale de l'Afghanistan. Cette mémoire a été élaborée sur la base des quelques données et matériaux que j'ai réussi à réunir, dans le courant des dernières années au sujet de la situation des affaires sur la frontière de l'Afghanistan et du Boukhara et sur les États indépendants de nous supérieures de l'Amou Daria.

" Ces données je l'avoue sont loin d'être complètes.

" L'investigation ou l'observation personnelle exercée sur les lieux mêmes, est en Asie Centrale, l'unique moyen d'obtenir des éclaircissements sur une question quelconque, soit de politique soit de géographie je n'ai pu, jusqu'ici avoir recours à ce moyen.

" L'envoi d'un employé russe dans ces contrées fût ce même sous prétexte d'une mission scientifique, aurait pu jeter l'alarme dans l'Afghanistan et aurait éveillé des soupçons et des appréhensions de la part du Gouvernement des Indes. J'ai dû éviter tout ce qui aurait pu nuire, quoique ce fût, à l'état satisfaisant de nos relations établies à la suite de l'échange d'idées amical et sincère qui a eu lieu entre le Gouvernement Impérial et celui de S. M. Britannique.

" J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de communiquer à votre Altesse mon opinion sur une des causes de la fermentation des esprits dans les Khanates de l'Asie Centrale, limitrophe et voisins de la Russie. C'est que tous nos voisins, et particulièrement les Afghans, sont pénétrés de la conviction qu'entre la Russie et l'Angleterre il y'a une inimitié qui, tôt ou tard, nous amènera à une rencontre avec les Anglais en Asie.

" En me conformant aux instructions et aux vues du ministère des affaires étrangères je me suis attaché à faire disparaître ce spectre d'un conflit, soi-disant imminent, des deux Grandes Puissances. Dans mes relations avec le Kokand et le Bokhara, et surtout dans mes lettres à Shir Ali Khan, j'ai toujours parlé de l'amitié qui existe entre nous et l'Angleterre, et je ne suis attaché à démontrer que ces deux Puissances, la Russie et l'Angleterre, sont également soucieuses de la tranquillité des contrées et des populations qui se trouvent dans la région de leur influence et de leur protection. Voilà la raison qui, jusqu'ici m'a déterminé à ne pas envoyer sur les lieux (?) des employés dans le but d'obtenir des éclaircissements sur les questions qui n'étaient passées par le Ministère Impérial.

" Cette situation et surtout aussi avantageuse pour nous que pour l'Angleterre; mais elle peut changer du moment, ou l'on garantirait à Shir Ali les possessions dans les limites proposées actuellement par Lord Granville dans sa dépêche à Lord Loftus en date du 5-17 Octobre dernier. Une pareille garantie lui donnerait un prestige considérable et il tâcherait immédiatement de s'emparer *de facto* des territoires qui lui auraient été ainsi concédés. Avant tout son attention se tournait du côté de Badakshan et du Koteha (Kokand?), butin le plus facile et le plus abordable.

" Par l'acquisition de ces deux territoires il prolongerait sa ligne de contact avec le Boukhara et il se trouverait côté-à-côté avec la Karatigin d'où le Kokand est à portée de main. Enfin il toucherait sur les confins N. E. aux possessions de Yacoub Beg. Voilà un chemin qui même tout droit a une collision avec la Russie.

" Si le Gouvernement Britannique est en effet animé du même désir que nous de maintenir la paix et la tranquillité intérieures dans les Khanates qui nous séparent des possessions anglaises dans l'Inde, si les Anglais veulent ajouter foi à nos sincères protestations que nous ne songeons même pas à entreprendre quoique ce soit d'hostile contre leurs possessions de l'Inde le simple bon sens devra leur suggérer la nécessité de reconnaître l'indépendance de Badakshan et du Kokand, tout par rapport à l'Emir de Cabul, que par rapport à celui de Bokhara.

J'AI L'HONNEUR, &c.

---

" DANS le sens rigoureux du mot, les possessions de l'Emir Shir Ali Khan ne s'étendent à l'est que jusqu'au méridien du point de jonction de la rivière Kormtcha avec l'Amou Daria. Cette ligne sépare le Badakshan et le Kokand de la province de Koundouz qui fait incontestablement parties des domaines de Shir Ali Khan. Elle a été annexée à l'Afghanistan il y a une vingtaine d'années par le fils de Dost Mahomed, Afzul Khan, qui était à cette époque Gouverneur de Balkh. Afzul Khan, comme nous l'apprend une communication anglaise, a fait une tentative infructueuse de s'emparer de Badakshan, qui a cependant pour conséquence que le Mir de Badakshan, pour assurer la sécurité de son domaine, s'est engagé à payer à Dost Mahomed Khan une contribution annuelle de deux roupies par feu et à lui livrer les gisemens de rubis et des lapis lazuli situés dans ses états. Cependant cet engagement ne fut



point rempli, la mort de Dost Mahomed suggéra aux Chefs du Badakshan, peu desireux de soumettre au Caboul, l'idée de rechercher la protection de Bokhara. L'Emir Seid considérait ce pays comme une dépendance de l'Afghanistan, mais par la raison qu'à cette époque il suivait avec anxiété les progrès de nos armées dans l'Asie Centrale et se préparait à marcher contre le Kokand.

" Djandar Shah, qui gouvernait à cette époque le Badakshan, était un souverain complètement indépendant, et tous ses voisins le reconnaissaient comme tel. Il s'était mis en rapports d'amitié avec Mahomed Afzul Khan et avec Abdou Rahman Khan, son fils, et ne leur payait aucune redevance. Lorsque Shir Ali Khan victorieux à Abdou Rahman Khan, fût occupé Caboul et Balkh, et se fut rendu maître de tout l'Afghanistan, il envoya une ambassade à Djandar Shah, en l'invitant à conformer les engagements qu'il avait contractés autrefois. Djandar Shah répondit par un refus. Alors Mahomed Shah, son neveu secondé par les troupes afghans renversa son oncle, se constitua maître de Faizabad, tandis que son frère cadet Mizrab Shah, s'emparait de Tcharab, Chef-lieu de la province de Bonslakh. Aujourd'hui les deux frères paient à Shir Ali Khan, comme par reconnaissance de la coopération qu'il leur avait accordée, une contribution annuelle de 15 roupies (9 roubles). Toutefois à l'exception d'un très petit nombre d'aventuriers afghans, on ne rencontre dans le Badakshan ni employés, ni troupes de l'Emir de Caboul, et le peuple lui même deteste les Afghans.

" Ces notions fournies par Abdou Rahman Khan, et recueillies en partie de la bouche des envoyés du Sirdar de Balkh qui vinrent à Tashkend, se trouvent confirmées par le récit d'Alif Beg, ex-Gouverneur de Sankoul (province de Kashgar limitrophe de Vakhan) qui se présenta à Tashkend au mois d'août de cette année. Il a ajouté que Djandar Shah, le maître légitime du Badakshan, qui s'était retourné dans la suite par Samarkand et Kokand, à Chouquan.

" Une semblable état de choses dans le Badakshan démontre en toute évidence que l'Emir Shir Ali Khan ne saurait prétendre à la possession du Badakshan, comme à un héritage qui lui aurait été légué par Dost Mahomed Khan, et que son autorité ne s'est pas encore établi à Badakshan. Mahomed Shah et Mizrab Shah, les maîtres actuels du Badakshan, ne se considèrent point comme begs de l'Emir de Caboul, et s'ils lui paient une redevance, c'est dans l'intérêt de leur propre sécurité et pour se mettre à l'abri des coups de main's des brigands de Koundouz. De plus ils ont encore à redouter leur oncle Djandar Shah.

" Rien ne porte à croire que la position des affaires à Badakshan puisse changer dans un proche avenir en faveur de Shir Ali Khan et il est certain que l'état actuel des choses dans cette contrée répond à peu de choses près, aux vues que nous poursuivons dans l'Asie Centrale de commun accord et après une entente préalable et volontaire avec l'Angleterre. Rien ne présage non plus la possibilité d'une collision entre l'Afghanistan et le Bokhara du côté de Badakshan, l'Emir Seid Mouzaffar n'élève point de prétensions à la possession de ce pays. De même Shir Ali Khan qui maintient à grand peine un semblant d'autorité à Badakshan, n'est point et mesure aujourd'hui d'exercer une influence quelconque sur les affaires de Kouliat et de Kissai les villes de Bokhara les plus proches de Badakshan. La reconnaissance officielle par la Russie et par l'Angleterre des droits de Shir Ali Khan sur ce pays porterait aussitôt ce souverain à employer tous ses efforts pour se fixer à Faizabad et dans le Roustakh, et du moment où on y parviendrait, une collision s'ensuivrait inmanquablement entre l'Afghanistan et le Bokhara. Il suffira de citer à l'appui de cette prévision que l'ancien Beg de Hissar qui s'était révolté contre l'Emir Seid Mouzaffar en 1869 et qui en 1870 s'est refugi dans l'Afghanistan a déjà fait des tentatives pour se mettre en possession de sa province avec l'aide des Afghans, auxquels il promettait l'entière commission à l'Emir de Caboul de toute la province de Hissar et de Koubouls. Si cette combinaison n'a pas été mise à exécution il font l'attribués à ce que l'autorité de Shir Ali Khan était nulle dans le Badakshan et que l'Emir ne disposait dans cet état d'aucun moyen d'agression.

" A l'est du Badakshan dans le bassin supérieure de l'Amou Daria se trouve une contrée peu connue, nommé Vakhan. Ce pays que l'on désigne parfois sous le nom de Daria-Pendj (les cinq fleuves) à cause des cinq principaux confluent donnant naissance à l'Amou Daria, avoisiné au N. le Pamir qui le sépare du Karatigin ; à l'E. il confine avec le lac de Son-Koul qui fait partie des états de Yakoob Beg ; au S. il est séparé du Tchilzar (pays complètement indépendant du Caboul) par les montagnes de Vonksan (Tianschan?), qui sont la prolongation orientale des Hindu Kusch.

" Le Vakhan est administré par un chef spécial, mais la pauvreté des habitants et la stérilité du sol de cette région montagneuse l'ont placée sous la dépendance du Badakshan dont les begs s'abstiennent cependant de se mêler de ses affaires intérieures. Une fois par an le chef de Vakhan fait parvenir aux begs du Badakshan une certaine somme d'argent, mais il n'exite aucun rapport direct entre ce pays et l'Afghanistan.

" Une route reliant Koundouz avec Sarikool, Yarkand, et Kaschgar traverse le Badakshan et le Vakhan. D'après certains renseignements qui sont en notre possession cette route est plus longue que la route directe de Peshawur à Yarkund suivie par M. Shaw.

" Quant à l'Amou Daria ce fleuve sert la ligne de démarcation entre l'Afghanistan et le Bokhara sur une étendue approximative de 300 verstes depuis l'embouchure de la Konkcha à l'Est jusqu'au point où les deux rives du fleuve deviennent boukharés, et notamment jusqu'au passage de Tchouchka Gouzar, situé vis-à-vis du village boukharé Khoja Saleb, qui se trouve sur la divite du fleuve.

“ Enfin pour ce qui est de la limite Nord Ouest de l’Afghanistan lieu qu’il existe des doutes quant au fait de la possession par l’Emir de Caboul des villes d’Axtchi, Siripoul, Maimané, Chibirgan, et Ankoï situées à l’ouest de Balkh, on pourrait prendre en considération que toute cette région est isolée des états de Boukhara par un désert peu praticable et même en partie par les sables, et que dès lors, de ce côté, une collision immédiate entre l’Afghanistan et le Boukhara serait moins à craindre.”

## APPENDIX XI.

[ *Referred to in foot-note, paragraph 76, Chapter IV.* ]

*First Private Meeting, 29th March 1869.*

Private Meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Highness the Amir of Kabul, at 4 P.M., 29th March 1869.

*Present :*

1. HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
2. SIR DONALD MACLEOD, LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR.
3. HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR.
4. THE MINISTER OF HIS HIGHNESS, NUR MAHOMED, SYUD.
5. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, W. S. SETON-KARR, ESQ.
6. CAPTAIN GREY, Interpreter.

AFTER compliments, and an expression of His Excellency’s hope that the Amir had been satisfied with his reception, the Viceroy intimated to him that it was the firm desire of the British Government to see established at Kabul a just, strong, and independent government, in whose administration the Government of India would exercise no interference, and which should not bear the appearance of being maintained mainly by extraneous aid. His Excellency added that this would, in a great measure, depend on the Amir himself.

The Amir, for some time, could not apprehend the exact force of His Excellency’s words, and he kept on repeating that a great deal depended on the Government of India, and on the line of policy which it proposed for itself in future; that he was disposed to look to that Government in all things; and that assistance and support must be open in order to be useful.

After the views of the Viceroy had been fully and clearly explained to His Highness, His Excellency told him in pointed language that he must now state distinctly by what particular acts of ours we could help him to establish a strong and independent rule at Kabul.

To this the Amir replied that he had already committed his sentiments to writing; that he had explained his views both to Sir John Lawrence and to the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; and that the friendship with his father was a “dry friendship” and one-sided; he seemed unwilling, though rather pressed on the subject, to give any more distinct or decided expression to his feelings and wishes, though his Minister at last explained that they were—*first*, guarantee of Amir and family against all comers whilst in actual possession of the throne; *second*, such present assistance in money and arms as could be given.

His Excellency again pressed the Amir to state distinctly the precise mode in which he thought we could help him, but he replied in general terms. At last he broke out, and with great vehemence declared that the premature recognition of Azim Khan in November 1867 had been the main cause of all the bloodshed and misery which had since occurred; that Azim Khan at that time did not hold the whole of Afghanistan; that he was not the lawful ruler; and that it was our recognition which enabled the usurper to hold his position for two years. The tardy recognition of himself in 1863 seemed also to rankle in his mind; and in regard to the treaty with the Dost in 1857 he said it was a one-sided treaty and a “dry friendship.”

Sir Donald Macleod here observed to me, in English, that he was extremely surprised at this statement; that he had been on most confidential terms with the Amir since his arrival, and that he had never in any way referred to the subject.

From this Lord Mayo at once saw the real object of his visit, which was to obtain from us a promise that in no case would we repeat the policy of 1867, and acknowledge a *de facto* ruler while any part of Afghanistan remained in his hands. He declaimed at great length on this point, and became very excited. His Excellency told him that they were not there to discuss past events; that their business was with the present, and to provide against evils for the future.

At length, after some hesitation and conversation in Pushtu with his Minister, Nur Mahomed, he declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should

recognize and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal successors, or successors in blood  
 \* *Nuslan ba'd Nuslan*, or generation to generation. (*man-wa-dulad-i-man\**), and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis.

He explained again, and at some length, that to acknowledge the ruler *pro tem* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognize him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his or his descendants' part should vitiate all engagements on ours.

The Viceroy here remarked that it was impossible to prophesy, or to anticipate events, that we must deal with the present, and that His Highness could not expect him to enter into engagements as to a state of circumstances which might never occur.

At another period of the discussion he urged that friendship between nations and State could not remain hidden; and that a man might just as well try to extinguish the sun by putting his hand before his face; that whatever assistance was afforded to him by the British Government could not remain concealed, and would lose its value if it could, but must be known to all States in India and Asia.

To this His Excellency replied that mystery or concealment was the last course he should ever take; that the acts of the British Government must have shown His Highness that our friendship for him was open and warm; that his predecessor had, at a most critical moment, supplied him with money and arms; and that he himself had publicly admitted that to those acts he mainly owed his throne; that the splendour and consideration with which he had been received at Umhalla would show to the world the estimation in which he was held; and that we had no intention to deviate from the course which we had adopted since he had last regained his throne; that we desired to see him firmly established as Ruler of Kabul; and that he should speedily establish tranquillity and good government throughout all his territories.

The Amir then said that the tranquillity of the country, which the Viceroy had so much at heart, would be the natural consequence of the security of his power and dynasty, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation), which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent government.

After much conversation of this character, it was arranged that the Viceroy should send the Amir a letter the next day, in which the desire of the Government of India for a strong and independent rule would be set forth, as well as its deep interest in the affairs of Afghanistan, and its personal recognition of, and friendship for, himself; and he was informed that the Government, as circumstances would permit, would consider how, without direct interference, it could aid him in this paramount object—the formation of a strong and an independent power.

This assurance seemed partly to satisfy him; and he was altogether, at this part of the conference, in a different frame of mind after the above incident than he was at first, when he seemed suspicious that our expressions meant more than appeared or that he understood.

His Excellency then directed his attention to trade and commerce, and the facilities of intercourse between India and Afghanistan, the Amir always replying that trade had been much impaired and interrupted by intestine wars, and that, with order and harmony, trade and commerce would flourish again.

As regards routes into India, he announced his determination of reviving the subsidy paid to the Khaibarís, and raising it to what it had been in the time of his father. He said that besides the route into India by the Khaibar Pass, there are two other routes in the same range which turned off before the locality where the Khaibarís had the power of stopping the traffic; and there was also a road through the Kurram Valley, and another one into the Derajat; "Tatina" and "Kuruppa" through the Momunds, whose Chief was connected with him by marriage, and under his entire influence, and which had always been safe; the "Peiwar," which he hoped to render practicable; the "Gwaleyri," which he could not do much in, but which was only the Povindah Pass, and always had been, and would be, traversed by those merchants with the strong right hand.

He spoke of the roads leading to Turkistán, generally recommending that *viâ* Kandahár and Herát as safe and easy throughout its length. All routes through the Paropamious (?) were safe, but very difficult till they reached the plains of Balkh. The Khulumor Tashkurghán (Big stone) route, however, was habitually traversed, and, as being the shortest from Kabul and Pesháwur, would receive his attention.

All these would be kept open. He added that the custom dues had fallen off immensely since the time of his father, owing to these commotions and this warfare, and that he hoped they might again be raised to their ancient figure, which he put at 28 or 30 lakhs.

He was then told that the Government of India wished to present him with some artillery, and he was asked whether he would prefer a field battery or two siege guns and a howitzer. He expressed a great desire for *breech-loading* guns as striking terror into his enemies.

His Excellency told him that the Government would consider the matter.

The interview ended.

CAPTAIN GREY, 31st March 1869.

Memorandum on conversations held with the Confidential Minister of HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR SHERR ALI by CAPTAIN GREY, on special duty with His Excellency the Viceroy.

The Amir is prepared to act on what he may see is the nature of the friendship the British propose to afford him—if, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the ruler of Kabul *de facto*, well and good; but if prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may point out (acknowledges that any such must be distinctly brought forward now, the contrary having produced the present troubles), there is nothing he will not accede to.

“He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian Power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part, or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an agent or engineer superintendent there\* (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger for such, did they respect the Afghans and themselves, and Afghan enmity is far more bitter against Persians and their friends than ever it was against us at the bitterest; and with us acting as their friends, they will co-operate with a hearty friendship and energy in the field which we can little imagine. Our troops would have no work save in the actual shock of battle: every other military duty would be performed, and requisites supplied so effectually that no thought nor precaution on the part of columns or garrisons of ours would be required.

“With regard to the western frontier, he leaves it to our sense of our own dignity and his to oppose this infraction of the treaties of 1856-57, and rectify the border between Ghain and Lash Jowain to twenty farsangs (a farsang is three and a half miles) west of the latter, as it has been since the days that Dost Mahomed recaptured Kandahar and its appanages from Kohen Dil Khan. He would require nothing but arms and treasure, and would himself act against the Persians, thus showing his sincerity and the non-existence of relations between himself and them; he merely would ask that, under the terms of the treaty, we would, on reference to us, support him in objecting to its infraction by the Persians. The aggression is formidable from the commanding positions assumed on the communications, not from the value of the tract itself.

“With regard to the eastern border, he would undertake to manage all the Berdooran tribes. He proposes to introduce a thorough reform into his administration, whereby his sons will not be independent princes as under the Dost, but governors of provinces;† and being more directly subordinate and weaker, will merely collect and remit his revenues and carry out his amelioration policy of direct collection and cash payments; the effects of this will eventually extend to the tribes; meanwhile he will make their principal men his own by allowances, and will also by force, if necessary, check every further attempt to give us trouble.

“With regard to trade, he will undertake to make the principal routes safe: those of the Paropamisus are so; the Herat route always was so; and though the Khulum one is at present closed, his troops will clear Tukhtapul on his return. Through the Sulimane Range he will secure the Khaibar, Tatara and the Gwaleyri route by “Mowajibs” (allowances). He recalls to the mind of the Government how that when Yakoob Khan’s mother’s brother, Saadut Khan, was complained against merely by the Commissioner of Peshawur he removed him, confined him, and he died in confinement, and the substitution of a safe man kept many thousand Mohmunds out of the fray (Ambela). He appeals to this specimen of what he was willing to and could do when not bound to the Government in any way, as a proof of the friendship he can now display.

“When the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sent him written questions, he did not know his ground, and answered evasively; he now speaks openly and specifically; his wish is to return hearty friendship with entire confidence, and puts himself at the disposal of the Government. He himself has throughout sought our friendship; had it been extended three years ago, when the reasons which hold good now were equally strong when his own case was better, and his cause stronger, three years’ affliction would have been spared. When the Wazir recommended him, after the refusal of 1867, to try once again, he determined he would not till he had recovered Kabul for himself, he did so, and then he wrote; now it is afforded he will show himself worthy of it. He will, with our help, arrange the country somewhat, and then commence any internal measures we may wish, and receive any officers we may desire.”

(Sd.) H. GREY.

Notes of a conversation held at Umballa on 1st April 1869. Present MR. SETON-KARR, Foreign Secretary, MAJOR POLLOCK, Commissioner of Peshawur; SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, Minister of the Amir, MR. THORNTON, Secretary to Government of Punjab, and MR. GIRDLESTONE, Under Foreign Secretary.

“The Minister began the conversation with saying that he thought we wished him to  
I. What are His Highness’ wishes with reference to trade between India and Afghanistan? commit himself. The Commissioner and the Foreign Secretary took considerable pains to reassure him. The Minister then said—‘You have given us guns, treasure, &c., &c. You

\* On the northern border.

† This he has done.

would not do so without some special motive. What is your motive?" The Secretary answered—"In order that the Government on our borders may be independent and strong, just as Kashmir and Nipal are." As a proof of our good intentions, the late policy with respect to the Kashmir succession were explained to the Minister. Upon this the Minister said that he accepted the explanation, and would not credit us with ulterior motives. He hoped we should have a good understanding, and the advantage of it to us would be that were the Russians or other enemy to come, even though the Afghans of themselves could not successfully keep them out of their country, they could harass them in every way. The fact of the good understanding will spread fast over Asia. Ten thousand will know it this year, twenty-thousand next year, and then a lakh, and so on. 'We know the Russians,' he continued, 'to be great tyrants and not so trustworthy as you. In old days in Afghanistan you showed a want of consideration to those who were most entitled to it. From the public reception at which he was present the other night he saw that this policy had been put aside, and that little Native Princes of the Punjab, such as he had met, were fairly and honorably treated. You do not want our country, and were you to get it, there would be no profit to you.'

"Referring to the first question the Minister said that kingcraft belongs to Kings, and trade to traders; but still the more trade prospers, the greater will be the customs dues of the Kings. Any road by which we wish traders to pass to and fro into his country shall be maintained and be kept safe. The horses of Afghanistan go mostly to Bombay and Bangalore; they are passed by committees into the Government service, and command prices from Rupees 500 to Rupees 600. The horse trade with Peshawur has fallen off considerably owing to a less demand. If the merchants in one year sell a thousand at Government prices, a second year they would probably send fifteen hundred; and on the contrary, if no remounts were required for a year or two, merchants would have to sell their horses to private individuals for smaller sums.

"At Mr. Thornton's request, under instructions from the Lieutenant-Governor, the question was put whether the Amir would object to the establishment of a public post for the benefit of traders and others. The Minister answered that there would be no objection whatever.

"It is the wish of the British Government that on his return to Kabul the Amir, as soon as circumstances will permit, should indicate the passes which might be most adapted for trade, and should consider how he could make them safe and practicable, and the British Government, on receiving intimation to the above effect, will give general publicity to the same for

This remark of the Minister was by the way.

the trading public. 'In the way of friendliness and not in the way of enmity, I dread one thing.' 'You are,' he said, 'so very particular and exacting, I make a promise, and then supposing I do not perform it to the day and hour, you are down upon me at once, and keep on writing letters to spur me on. I may have been breaking my heart probably to keep to my word, but you will allow nothing for change of circumstances.'

"The Minister referred to his answer already given to the Punjab Government, that when the Amir returned he would do all in his power to conciliate the tribes and keep the people in order, and said he considered this the best answer which could be given. By forbearance to the tribes confidence will be instilled amongst them, 'but it is no use for you to take a stick on one side and we on the other.' The Amir is ready to encourage his subjects to resort to the fair at Peshawur.

"The Minister was told that if presently the Amir liked to send any of his great Ministers in a private capacity to England, every facility should be shown, so that they might see every thing of interest. It was quite possible he was told that the British Government would appoint an officer in attendance, if men of rank went, and might contribute something towards the cost of the visit. There would be no fear that religious influence would be brought to bear on any persons going. Also the British Government would forward the education of any young Afghans, whom the Amir might wish to send for the purpose of learning our military system, our manufactures, the science of telegraphy, railways, &c. The Minister said he would speak to the Amir. This, he said, might perfect our 'Amezish' or intercourse, and those who had visited England would come back, comprehending the benefits of our civilization; and so there would be a greater binding of the two nations. But he would take the Amir's views clearly on this, as the above were his own sentiments only.

"The Minister remarked that he did not wish to commit himself, and asked rather anxiously whether European Agents were intended, observing, at the same time, that it was no use to send any but Mahomedans? Hindus were of no good at all. He begged that his reply might not

III. Would the Amir sanction Native Agents in Afghanistan, either as visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British Government wished it?

be put on paper. He said that he first distinctly wished to ascertain the Amir's sentiments. He mentioned that there was now a man named "Unwar" at Kandahar who supplied information to the officer (Sir H. Green was the name he gave) on the Sind frontier. But, he added, he was looking far forward and the day might come when the 'Russ' would arrive, and the Amir would be glad, not only of British officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them.



The Minister on being told that the British Government would allow Afghans to come into India, to Rurki, Lahore, Calcutta, &c., to learn our arts and trades, answered that he would consult the Amir.

The Secretary remarked that in this morning's conversation he had reserved nothing, and had nothing to reserve, to which the Minister answered that he was in precisely the same condition, and that in fact, since the interchange of civilities, he felt as a man might feel who had changed his religion.

(Sd.) C. GIRDLESTONE,  
*Under Foreign Secretary.*

Memorandum of a conversation held at Umballa on April 3rd, 1869.

*Present.*

W. S. SETON-KARR, Esq., Foreign Secretary.  
SYUD NUB MAHOMED SHAH, Minister of the Amir.  
T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab.  
MAJOR POLLOCK, Commissioner of Peshawar.  
CHARLES GIRDLESTONE, Esq., Under Foreign Secretary.

REFERRING to the points which were reserved in the conversation of April 1st, 1869, the Minister said that there was no occasion to include Ghazni as a place of residence for a British Agent, as Ghazni was included in Kabul. The Amir was ready to have a writer to accompany him wherever he moved, and to allow of men in Turkistan and Balkh, when the country was more settled. The Minister himself considered Unwar, the present news-writer at Kandahar, to be "a thorough rascal." Any Agents so sent were to be merely for the sake of sending intelligence. The great danger of these Agents was, unless they were treated as they wished, they vilified the Government in their reports. As an instance, he quoted that when the Amir was defeated at Kandahar, Azim Khan sent to Unwar khillats, money, &c., and in return Unwar wrote false accounts of Shere Ali's proceedings, and flaming reports of Azim Khan's power and success. "If you do not believe me," he urged, "send for the diaries of that period from Jacobabad." As long as the Amir gave the news-writer *dilasa* (smoothed him down) it was all very well. With these reservations the British Government has full power to send news-writers. If any news-writer was personally offensive to the Amir, the Secretary explained, of course the Government would not continue him in his post or insist on his retention.

The Minister, on being asked whether the Amir wished to send Afghans to learn trades and so forth at Rurki and other places in our territory, answered curtly, "it cannot be done, you might write a whole book of objections about it, but if ever we change our minds on this subject we will let you know. The Amir has personally no objection but fears the interpretation his people might put on the arrangements. The fruits of the Amir's visit to the Viceroy cannot be properly understood yet by Afghans. They would understand the aid given to their Sovereign to be conditional on Afghan youths being Anglicised." The same reasons apply to sending Afghans to Europe. After a few years, as suspicion gets dissipated, the Amir, if he thinks fit, will intimate his desire for men being sent. "Just think," he said, "a short time ago such an interview as has taken place would never have entered into any one's imagination. It has happened, what more can be said? And who could have expected, a year since, that I should have been sitting here alone, talking in a friendly manner to four English officers."

(Sd.) CHARLES GIRDLESTONE,  
*Under Foreign Secretary.*

At the close of the interview the Foreign Secretary took the Minister apart and clearly explained to him His Excellency's instructions that, under no circumstances was the Amir to expect that British troops would cross the border to put down civil war or domestic contention.

This intimation was repeated to the Minister by the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent interview, and the Minister's reply on both occasions was clear and satisfactory as to the Amir's full understanding on this point.

(Sd.) W. S. SETON-KARR,  
*Foreign Secretary.*

Notes of an interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General and the Amir of Kabul, held at 4 o'clock P.M. on the 3rd of April 1869, after which the Amir took his final leave of His Excellency.

*Present :—*

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL.  
THE AMIR SHREE ALI KHAN.  
THE HON'BLE SIR D. MACLEOD, Lieutenant-Governor.  
SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH.  
W. S. SETON-KARR, Esq., Foreign Secretary.  
MAJOR F. R. POLLOCK, Commissioner, Peshawar.  
CAPTAIN GREY, Interpreter.

The Governor-General commenced by expressing his satisfaction at finding that his letter had gratified the Amir: to this he entirely assented, and expressed much gratitude.

The Governor-General then said that he trusted that the Amir would, when he had established himself in his Government, be able to assist in promoting the peace of the frontier which the Amir promised he would do, sooner or later, according to his ability. As regarded the publication of my letter, he said he would, on reaching Kabul, or about a month hence, make it generally known, and explained that it would be impossible and undesirable to keep it secret from all in Afghanistan, high or low. He thought that we had better wait till then, which the Governor-General agreed to do, observing that it was most desirable that at some very early period the exact truth should be known to all States. He then said that the Afghans, though suspicious at first of relations with the British, must now be pleased, but that they were a stupid race; but, any way, he would "drive if he could not lead them." He observed that "you could not take in wisdom (*akl*) as you could sustenance—by eating a loaf of bread;" also he said that his neighbours, Persians and Russians, who had not hitherto interfered with him, might become the aggressors on learning that he had attached himself to us,—this was the first time he had mentioned either Russian or Persian to the Governor-General,—when the Governor-General expressed his hope that he would strive to spread civilization among a people so distinguished for courage, high spirit, and sagacity; and quoted ourselves as an example of how a nation, by cultivating the arts of both war and peace, might rise from barbarism to the utmost heights of civilization. The Amir replied that it rested with Providence; that God had indeed fitted *us* thus to improve, but had made the Afghans, notwithstanding their many good qualities, crassly stupid; but that he was one himself, and knew how to manage them. The Viceroy explained to the Amir that powerful as the British Government was in India, it had to regard the wishes of the Queen and Her Ministers at home, as well as the will of the nation as expressed in Parliament. After some explanation he seemed to take this in. It was therefore most desirable that His Highness should evince an interest in maintaining peace and encouraging trade, both of which would be gratifying to the British people. His Excellency also explained that, at this moment, England was on most friendly terms with all European Powers, and that there was no probability of any misunderstanding which could result in war. He then very shrewdly remarked that with such terrible engines of war as were now invented, nations would not engage hastily in hostilities.

The Governor-General then pointed out Major Pollock as the channel for communication, which is trusted would be frequent; and the Amir said he regarded him as a near neighbour (*hamsāya*).

His Excellency introduced the subject of the succession, and said it would afford the British Government much satisfaction to be made aware of the heir whom the Amir might nominate, so as to avoid contentions for the future; to which the Amir pointedly replied that he would inform him on that head by letter on reaching Kabul.

The Governor-General then dismissed the Amir with best wishes for his return journey and success.

(Sd.) W. S. SETON-KARR.

*The 4th April 1869.*

The 17th March 1869.

Secret Council held by the Amir in the Fort of Lahore in the Samman Burj on the 17th March 1869.

HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL	...	... <i>President.</i>
1. SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH,		} <i>Members.</i>
2. ISHAK AKASI SHERDIL KHAN,		
3. MIRZA MAHOMED HUSSAN, MIR MUNSHI,		

*Question put by the Amir.*

Should the British inquire what is your object and desire, what reply should be given?

*Reply given by No. 1 Member.*

"As far as possible nothing should be said which would indicate want or covetousness. But only this should be said, that regarding the house of the British as your own house, it was

necessary that you should have expressed your desire to meet the British authorities, and evinced your good-will and friendship towards the British Government; therefore, Your Highness first intimated your desire to do so, and having been asked to come over, you have come down; that Your Highness has been much pleased, and has no other object than that the British Government should treat you with patronizing kindness.

"The Amir and the second and third Members:—'Yes; this would be the proper reply.'

"Isbak Akasi Sherdil, the second Member, said:—'Notwithstanding this if the British authorities should insist and say that Your Highness should nevertheless say what your desires are, and the Government would accede to them, then Your Highness should say that you are much obliged for the assistance which Her Majesty has given you, without any wish to interfere with your Government. Your Highness should then go on to say that the British authorities should, in the first instance, inform you of their sentiments, and you would then give a reply.'

"The Amir and the other Members approved of this suggestion.

"Syud Nur Mahomed Shah said—'should the opening of the Khaibar route and the chastisement of the Afridi, Mohmand and Shanwari tribes be urged on you here also, as the Commissioner of Peshawur at the first interview said to some of our men that the Amir should be persuaded to open out the Khaibar route and to make a road, it should be replied that these are matters of minor importance; the most important matter of all should be attended to, which is this: that Russia is daily extending its conquests and has come up to the confines of Balkh and Herat. The British Government should take measures openly for the protection of those borders; and you were prepared with your heart and property to oppose the Russians for the sake of protecting your country and in deference to the wishes of the British Government. Lastly, that Your Highness would in no way fall short of evincing your good-will and friendship towards the British Government. Let the British Government state the measures they propose to take in this matter; the external enemy should be first attended to.'

"The Amir and the other Members concurred in, and approved of, this suggestion.

"The Amir then said—'Should the British authorities propose that a European Agent be stationed at Kabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such arrangements, but the people of Kabul are turbulent and mischievous. Should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Amir, my father, on this very considerations, refused to have a European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Kandahar, or Balkh, or Herat, there would be no objection. Such an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments; for instance, at the present time the people of Lower Seistan have commenced encroachments on the Kandahar boundaries. Lower Seistan was formerly always attached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by Persia only since a short time. We are not aware what agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistan. If there should be a European Agent on the border, he would be possessed of the necessary information, and would be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to territories beyond the borders.'

"All the Members approved of what the Amir had said.

"The first and second Members said—'Doubtless the reply to be given to the requests of the British authorities should be to the effect, that the object is to maintain cordial and sincere alliance between the two States. Your Highness can accede to the wishes of the British Government only so far as is compatible with the wishes of your people, your religion, and your authority, so that nothing may happen at any time opposed to the mutual friendly relations.

" 'The policy of Your Highness should be in the first instance to ascertain the sentiments of the British Government. Should the authorities express themselves verbally, they should be asked to reduce them to writing, so that we may discuss them in our own Councils, and then Your Highness could state your views after due deliberation.'

"After this the Amir sent for the treaties entered into between the late Amir and the British Government, and perused them.

"His Highness then said that he approved of the determination come to in the Council.

"I expect that the Amir will express himself to the above effect to the Government. I have ascertained the result of the discussion, and submit the same for the information of the Government.

"His Highness individually is a sincere friend of the Government; but in regard to some matters, he is suspicious of his brothers and the tribes."

(Sd.) F. B.

The 18th March 1869.

## APPENDIX XII.

PERSIAN TEXT OF LETTER FROM AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, DATED THURSDAY, THE 21<sup>st</sup> RAMAZAN, 1290 A.H., CORRESPONDING WITH 13<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 1873.

[*Referred to in paragraph 67, Chapter II.*]

Janab-i-jalalat o nabalat ma'ab, rafaat o manaat iyab, mahabbat o mu'alafat intisab, nawab-i-mustatab-i-makli alkab, Viceroy Lord Governor-General Sahib Bahadur, farmán farmá-i-Kishwar-i-Hind, zádá mawaddatohu rá shauk-i-mulákát-i-bahjat alámát, wa zauk-i-makálát-i-mahabbat dalálát, bar mazid bad. Bad az sharh-i-ma'ani-i-mahabbat o mu'alát, wa tarh-i-mabani-i-khullat o musáfát, ki tarika-i-anika-i-dostán-i-bá safá, wa salikab-i-raziyyah-i-muhilbán-i-mahabbat iktizá ast, makshúf-i-zamir-i-mu'anasat takhmír gardúnidab mi áyad. Darín zamán-i-masirrat iktirán, wa awán-i-bahjat tauámán, áli janáb-i-izzat o saádat o sayádat dastgáb, solálat-us-sádát-ul-kirám Sayyid Nur Muhammad Sháh, sharaf-yab-i-huzúr-i-áli gardidab sahífaját-i-yagúnagi áyát-i-sámi girámi rá rasánid. Chun mazámín-i-bahjat áin-i-shán, mabni bar siháb-i-mizáj-i-wahháj bud, báis-i-inbisát wa mujib-i-insbiráb-i-khátir gardid. Wa ánehe dar iazáz o taukír o ihtirám-i-sayádat panáh-i-mausúf az jánib-i-mahabbat jawánib-i-án dostdár, wa ahálián-i-daulat-i-buland saulat-i-Sarkár-i-Angrezi, bar rúe kár ámadah, ba nazar-i-tawabhud-i-daulatain-i-aliatain mujib-i-basá shukr guzérihá ast. Al hamd o lillah ki ghuncha-i-khairiat-i-tarfain ru ba shiguftgi dárád, wa ummed ánost ki mahabbat o ittihad-i-daulatain-i-aliatain yaumiyyah dar tazáyud bád, fakat. Ánehe dar báb amr-i-sarhadd-i-shimáli rukam zada-i-kilki durar silk farmudah budand hakikat-i-an báli-o-dánistab-i-in dostdár gardid. In mustamand-i-bárgáh-i-samadi shukránah-i-iláhi ra bajá mi áwarad, wa sipás mi guzárad ki alhamd o lillah-i taálá, sulh o áshti-i-dáimi, dar tamámi daulathá, kaím shud, wa shubah o iatirázát, az har taraf, bartaraf gardid, wa chunán amniyyat dar kull-i-manilokathá hásil ámad, ki kase az hudud-i-khud mutajáwiz na khwáhad shud, wa na kase rá ba kase bahas o guftogúe dar darun-i-alakab-i-shán khwáhad búd, wa itlák-i-harf-i-dushmani dar maktubát o nawishtjât-i-daulat matrúk mand, wa ásaish o amniyyat baráe jumbúr-i-anám shámil gasht, fakat. Barkhe ki dar khusus-i-muámala-i-Sistán inshá farmúdab búdand, ki má barín amr rázi hastem, mashrut barín ki, chun amal-i-hakk-i-khud ba zuhúr áwardab shawad, án rá sababe na sázand, ki juzwe az mamálik-i-Irán ba Afghánistán mulhak kardab shawad, wa niz in ki lashkar-i-Afghánistán ki ba maksud-i-mazkur az sarhadd úbúr kunad, bád az husul-i-maksud tawakkuf-i-dáimi daránjé na kunad wa ba khák-i-khud murájuat numáyad, wa shart-i-sadr azin sabab mundarij shuda, ki dar ahad-namah-i-Paris fi mábain-i-Inglistán o Irán sharte ba mukábil-i-shart mazkur dar khusús-i-tajáwuz-i-Afghánistán dar mamálik-i-Irán mundarij ást, Janáb-i-maáli-álkába, ágar chunánche faisalah-i-úmúr-i-Sistán, mutábik-i-fasl-i-shashum munakidab-i-Paris, inikád mi yaft, harfi báki namí mánad. Amná chun án mihrabán markum farmúdab ánd, ki salah-i wakt ánost ki ba sarhaddarán o kárguzáran-i-khud tákid o kadghan kuned, ki ba húdúd-i-Irán dast ándázi na numáyand. Mustamand-i-bárgáh-i-samadí, az ibtida ham tá ba hál ba libáz-i-daulat-i-Sarkár-i-Angrezi kadghan o tákid farmudah ást. Aknun mukarraran ba sarhadd-darán-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád tákid-i-akid infáz yáft, ki ba hudud-i-Iráni ba Karár-i-sábik az dast ándázi báz mánand. Wa ánehe ki an mihrabán markum-i-kalam-i-mahabbat shiam farmudah ánd, ki tarikah-i-rá ki Lord Lawrence sáhib bahádur wa Lord Mayo sáhib bahádur nisbat ba in dostdár masluk dáshtab ánd, az jánib-i-án janáb niz ba dastur jári khwáhad bud, zuhur-i-in mani mujid-i-basa shádmánihá ást. Mushfiká, pas in guftoguhá-i-ki dar makám-i-Simlah, ba sayádat o saádat dastgah Syud Nur Muhammad Sháh, dar mahall-i-tibián dar ámadab bud, hich ihtiaj ba in guftoguhá na dásht. Humán bandobust o karárdád-i-makám-i-Ambálah kifáyát ást. Tá-mádáme ki az jánib-i-marbamat jawánib-i-daulat-úlyá hazrat-i-malikah-i-muazzamah-i-Inglistán páyae dosti bar hál o bar karár báshad, inshallaho tála, az tarf-i-in niázmand-i-dargáh-i-samadi niz ba dastur-i-ki dar makám-i-Ambálah bá Lord Mayo sáhib mulákat shudah, wa sanad-i-shán dar dast ast, wa hujjat-i-Lord Lawrence sáhib bahádur niz maujud uftadah, páyae dusti o ittihad ustawár o kaím khwáhad bud. Khatir-i-mihr maásir rá mutmainn farmayand. Digar án ki Mr. MacNaab sáhib bahádur Commissioner o Superintendent-i-kismat-i-Pesháwar ba jihat-i-Agent-i-mukim-i-Kábul tahrir namudah budand ki Colonel Baker sáhib ijázat-i-ámadan-i-khud az Teherán dar Hindustán ba ráh-i-Afghánistán mi khwáhad. Janáb-i-maáli-álkába-i-mahabbat intisábá dar-báb-i-taraddud-i-hameho mardo-mán misl-i Colonel Baker sáhib waghairah dar alákah-i-Afghánistán, chun wakil-i-in jánib dar bin-i-mulákát-o-guftogu in hama guzárishát rá ba khidmat-i-án sáhib-i-mihrabán mafassalan izhár o bayán dáshtab ást, ki dar alákah-i-Afghánistán iatirázát-i-bisyár ást, libázé nazar barán, hájat-i-takrár na dárád, fakat. Tarassud o tarokkub ki in dostdár rá dost-i-sádik tasawwar farmudah ba muzhdah-i-siháh-i-mizáj-i-wahháj-i-mawaddat imtizáj fátib-i-ábwbá-i-Khullat o mu'alát mi gardidab báshand. Harrarahu fi yáum-i-Panjshanbah 21 shahr-i-Ramazán-ul-mubáarak, saannah-i-1290 Hijri min makám-i-Kábul. Fakat.

PERSIAN TEXT OF LETTER FROM AMIR SHER ALI KHAN TO IS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, DATED FRIDAY, THE 22ND SAFAR 1291 A.H., CORRESPONDING WITH 10TH APRIL 1874.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 85, Chapter IV.* ]

Janáb-i-jalálat o nabálat maáb, rafáat o manáat iyáb, mahabbat o muálat intisáb, nawáb-i-mustatáb-i-maáli álkáb, Viceroy Lord Governor-General Sáhib Bahádur, farmán farmá. i-Kishwar-i-Hind, zádá mawaddatohu rá shauk-i-mulákát-i-bahjat alámát, wa zauk-i-makálát. i-mahabbat dalálat bar mazid bád. Bad áz sharh-i-maáni-i-mahabbat o muálat, wa tarah-i-mabáni-i-khullat o musáfát, ki tarikah-i-anikah-i-dostan-i-bá safá, wa salikah-i-raziyyah-i-muhilbáb-i-mahabbat iktizá ást, makshuf-i-zamir-i-muálasat takhmir midárad. Námah-i-dostánah-i-mawaddat khitámah, muarrakhah-i-23 máh-i-January sannah-i-1874 Isawi, dar jawáb-i-murásalah-i-yagánagat muásalah, muarrakhah-i-21 shahr-i-Ramazán sannah-i-1290 Hijri-i-Nabawi, Salla Allaho Alaihi-wa sallam, ba tárikh-i-27 shahr-i-zi-Hijjat-ul-harám, ebihrah-i-wusul áfrokhtah, káshif-i-úsfár-i-dosti-o-muálat gardid. Az siháhi-i-mizáj-i-wahháj. i-kasir-ul-ibtiháj, surur-i-ghair mahsur, mahsul áward. Án ki dar tayy-i-sahifah-i-sharifah, indiráj yáftah búd, ki in dostdár dar khusus-i-ráe án janáb imáe na farmudahánd, janáb-i-maáli álkábá réi in jánib humán ast, ki safir-i-in dostdár, dar makám-i-Simlah, dar takrir o tahrir mashruhan, ba khidmat-i-áu janáb, izhár o bayán dáshtah, wa hich amre rá poshidah-o-pinhán na guzáshtah; ba wasf-i-án, humán ast, ki dar murásalah-i-muarrakhah-i-21 Ramázan, izhár-i-ráe dostdár mufassalan dar hayyiz-i-tahrir dar ámadah, ki humán bandobast o karárdád-i-janáb Lord Lawrence sáhib bahádur, wa Lord Mayo sáhib bahádur, wa mulákát-i-makám-i-Ambálah, kifáyat ást, wa hich ibtiáj ba takrár-i-in hamah guftoghá na dárád, fakat. Wa áuchi ki án janáb-i-jalálat maáb, hawálah-i-kalm-i-tawabhud rakam, farmudahánd, ki nazar bar dosti-i-mukarrarah, sar-sabzi o bihbudi wa istibkám-i-daulat-i-in dostdár markuz-i-khátir-i-átir ást, wa dar makám-i-Simlah ham, dar takrir-o-tahrir, ba safir-i-in jánib pardaena dáshtahánd, wa dakikae rá faro na guzáshtahánd, yakin-i-kámil hásil ást, ki ábálián-i-daulat-i-buland saulat-i-Sarkár báwikár-i-Angrezi, ba nazar-i-tawabhud-i-daulatain-i-áliatain, paiwastah sarsabzi-o-bihbudi o istibkám-i-daulat-i-in dostdár rá manzur o malhuz dáshtah o dáránd, ziré án ki uluw-o-wálá-i-daulat-i-buland saulat-i-ulyá hazrat-i-malikah-i-muazzamah-i-Inglistán ázharo min-ashshams o ábyano min-al-ams ást. Nazar ba liház-i-dosti o ittibád, safir-in-jánib áz ru-i-sadakat-i-dili-i-dostánah, wa safá-i-bátini-i-yakjehaténah án hamah guzárishát-i-tahriri wa takriri wa ma-fizzamir rá dar maball-i-tibián dar áwardah, wa áslan pardah-i-bar ru-i-kár na guzáshtah ást, fakat. Taásofáte ki án janáb záhir farmudahánd, bakikat humán ást, ki in dostdár ham taásofát o tashwíshát áz in sababhá mi dárád ki mardom-i-Afghánistán mardomán-i-kobi o áz ilm o kamál o dánishmandi be bahrah mi báshand, chunánche tawajjuh-i-in jánib shah o roz dar ámukhtan-i-ilm o hunar o kamál-i-in kaum masruf ást. Ummed-i-kawi ást, ki Afghánistán ham áz tahsil-i-ilm o kamál ba tadrij bahrahmand gardad, fakat. Janáb-i-rafáat iktináhá, chun Lord Lawrence sáhib bahádur, wa Lord Mayo sáhib bahádur, khususan Lord Lawrence sáhib bahádur, dar Afghánistán o sarhaddát-i-án, ba khubi o durusti, wakifat hásil farmudahánd; wa án janáb niz ba wákíi ilm áwurdahánd. Lihazá bad áz ghaur-o-fikr-i-kámil, ba manzuri-i-ulyá hazrat-i-Malikah-i-muazzamah-i-Inglistan, wa sanad-i-Lord Lawrence sáhib bahádur, wa hujjat-i-Lord Mayo sáhib bahádur, dostdár ázmand-i-án ast, ki áu janáb-i-jalálat maáb niz, ba dastur káim o ustawár khwahand búd, ki Afghánistán o sarhaddát-i-án, barhál o barkarár o dar kamál-i-istibkám, báki bimánad, fakat. Darín áukát murásalah áz jánib-i-muhibb-i-muálat nishán Thomas Douglas Forsyth sáhib bahádur, C.B., áz makám-i-Yárkand, ba wásitai-Muhammad Ibráhim Khán, mulázim-i-safarat-i-mazkur, rasid, ki nakl-i-sowál-o-jawáb-i-án ba-ainibi, marsul-i-khidmat-i-án janáb gardid. Yakin ást, ki Forsyth sáhib-i-mazkur, áz itirázát-i-Afghánistán o guftoghá-i-án janáb-i-rafáat maáb, wa wakil-i-in dostdár, ittilá na dáshtahánd; álbattah án janáb, Forsyth sáhib-i-mazkur rá, ittilá o ágáb khwáhand farmud, fakat. Báki áz in taraf karín-ush-sharaf. Khátir-i-mihr mazáhir ra matmaiun farmudah áz siháhi-i-mizaj-i-kasir-ul-ibtiháj, dostdár rá paiwastah masrur-ul-wakt mi farmudah báshand. Tahriran fi yaum-i-Jumah, 22nd máh-i-safar-ul-muzaffar, sannah-i-1291 Hijri-i-Nabawi, salla állaho álaihi-wa-sallam.

PERSIAN TEXT OF LETTER FROM AMIR SHER ALI KHAN TO THE SHAH OF PERSIA, DATED ZIHJIAH 1290 A.H., CORRESPONDING WITH JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1874.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 89, Chapter V.* ]

Nakl-i-murásalah, ki banám-i-ála hazrat-i-shahr yár-i-mamálik-i-Irán, mabni bar ittila-dihi-i-Wal iahadi-i-Padshahzádah, Sardár Abdullah Khán, irsál shudah.

Sipás-i-be kiyás, berun áz ihátah-i-wahm-o-hawás, hazrat-i-jahán-áfrín-i-yaktá, wa khudáwand-i-kádir-i-be-hamatáe ra sazú ást, ki sar-i-ángusht-i-irádatash, kubba-i-búrgáh-i-rafáat-o-iatílá-i-saláatin-i-zi ihtirám-o-khawákin-i-bá ihtishám rá, ba kummah-i-tárim-i-alá bar



áfrákht, wa durúd-i-na madud, dūr áz dáirab-i-idrák-o-ihsás áwwalin-i-junbash-i-kalam-i-kudrat, wa ákhrin-i-zuhur arsah-i-khilkat, sáhib-i-adab úmmi lakabi rá rawá ást, ki siráj-i-hidáyatash saráchnab-i-kulúb-i-mashar-i-islám rá, chun fátiha-i-subh-i-sádk munawwar sákht, pas áz hamd-o-sipás-i-izad-i-ghaffár, wa nat-o-durúd-i-sayyid-i-abrá, marfu-i-ráe-i-mahabbat pairáe-i-tawwa-hud iktizáe-i-nayyir-i-ázam-i-ásmán azmat-o-jalálat, wa badr-i-firozán-i-sapihr-i-nisfat-o-adálat, ákhtar-i-álam-aráy-i-falak-saltanat-o-shahr-yári, wa gaubar-i-girán bahá-i-sadaf-i-mamlokat-o-jahándári sháistah-i-takht firoz bakht-i-káániyyah barázindah-i-sarír-i-saadat masir-i-khákánia ala hazrat-i-kaiwán rutbat shahryár-i-mamálik-i-fasih-ul-masálik-i-Irán, ádám allaho taála ibkábo, midárad. Azánjá ki ba hamdillab-i-taála, áháli-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád, wa muntasibán-i-án daulat-i-kawi bunyád rá, sharf-i-islám-o-saadat-i-itúat-i-hazrat-i-khair-ul-ánám alaihi áláf-ut-tahiyate was-salám básil, wa dar álam-i-díndári-o-musalmáni ba madlul-i-karimah innama-l-mominuna ikhwátun, tasháhhud-i-manawi kamá yabaghi wásil ást, pas ittila-i-zuhur-i-har ámré, ki áz ázam-i-umúr báshad, lázim-o-zarur, hamáná chihrah pardaz-i-sháhid-i-makál mi gardad, ki darin áwán-i-farhat iktirán aázim o áfákhim wa buzurgáu-i-ábáli-i-Afghánistán, muttafik-ur-ráe, ba mariz-i-bayán o shuhud dar áwardand, ki ba kánun-i-umaráe námdár-i-salaf, wa arikah nashinán-i-bárgáh-i-izz-o-sharaf, bar zi shaukat o sáhib-i-daulat rá, taayyun-i-Waliabad, wa takarrur-i-já-nashin, lázim-o-zarur ást, níazmand-i-dargáb-i-málik-i-ghafur, amr-i-mazbur rá, hawálah ba jirgáh-o-shura dásht. Rá-i-ádáni o aáli, wa áháli-i-Afghánistán, áz khwáss-o-ámm badin karár yáft, ki farzand-i-saadatmand-i-kámgar Sardár Abdullah Khán, pas áz wujúd-i-mahabbat namud-i-má, wáli-i-kishwar o lashkar búdah báshad. Libazá yaum-i-shanbah ghurrah-i-shahr-i-Shawwál, wa roz-i-awwal-i-íd-i-saidah-i-humáyun fál, farzand-i-saadat mand-i-mausúf ra, ba mansab wálá-i-Waliabadi, saráfráz, wa baráe takafful-i-amr-i-khatír-i-khiláfat o tahammul-i-bár-i-girán-i-iyálat, pas áz wujúd-i-mahabbat namúd-i-khwesh, áz sáir-i-áulád-o-áhfád, muntakhab-o-mumtaz gardánid. Adáni o aáli wa áhali-i-mamálik-i-Afghánistán, lab ba duá báz o dast ba baiat-i-farzand-i-mausúf daráz kardand. Wal-hamdo lillahi ala tawátur áláihí, ki zuhúr-i-in amr-i-saíd, mújib-i-saláhiat-o-rafáhiat-i-hál sákinín-i-in mamlokat-i-Khudádád gardid. Chun ba har daulat-i-kawi saulat, azín surat badí ittila raft, libazá ba mani-i-mukhtasare pardákht, wa áuliá-i-án daulat-i-jáwid áyát rá bar hakikat-i-murád-o-kaifat-i-mawádd, muttali-o-mustahazar sákht. Was-salám o khátim-ul-marám. Tahrir fi shahr-i-Zihijjat-ul-harám, sannah-i-1290.

## APPENDIX XIII.

### ACCOUNT OF HERAT BY RESALDAR DAUD KHAN (1872).

THIS city is square in its form; contains a strong remarkable fort, which is surrounded by a deep and wide ditch, and is filled with earth to about the half of its height. The length of the fort lies from north to south, and the breadth from east to west. Four bastions are constructed at the four corners of the city. The two towards north and west are called Shah Karam-beg and Bela-Khana, and those towards the south and east Khwaja Abdool Missar and Khakistar. The buildings inside the fort are called Arak, and are very strong; the ditch round them is filled with water and mud, and the outer fortifications are very firm. Towards the northern wall of the fort the city is situated; a wall is built between them, and the site included in it is called "Arak-i-Nau." This Arak has no building in it, but its site is sometimes cultivated and sometimes left waste as the parade ground for infantry troops. There are five gates leading into the city. The gate in the east is called Khushk, and leads towards several villages, and towards Shaflan, Obek, and Hazarajat. The western gate is called Irak, and its road goes towards Ghorian, Kohsan, and Meshed. The southern gate is named Kandahar, and it shows the road towards Furrah and Kandahar. The remaining two gates are in the north, one, called Kata-chak, between the bastion of Shah Karam-beg and the Arak of the fort, leads towards the ziarat of Khwaja Abdool Ansar and the Karakh territory, and the other, called Malik, between the Arak and the bastion Khwaja Abdool Missar, leads to the road to Marghab Mar-chak, Maimena, and Turkistan. This gate has got its name from its founder, Malik Ikhtyar Din Ghor, who also constructed the Arak, which is therefore in some places called in histories Killa Ikhtyar Din. There are four bazars in the city, and in their centre a platform is built. That part of the bazar which lies between this platform and the Arak is called the Malik Bazar, while that which lies between the platform and the Kandahar gate is called the Kandahar Bazar. The third extends from it to the Kushk gate, and is called the Khushk Bazar, and the fourth stretches as far as the Irak gate, and is called after the same name. Mosques, serais, baths, tanks, and shops of different descriptions are in all bazars. They need not be noticed in detail. Since the construction of the Mahomed Shahi fort many of the houses in Herat have been demolished and have not been built again; this is the case with about two-thirds of the city, and only one-third is inhabited in the direction of the Arak and the bazars. Even in this part the serais have not more than 1,500 doors. The population in the environs of Herat and the neighbouring villages is on the whole considerable, and they contain gardens and cultivated lands. Of the noted buildings in Herat, Jama Masjid is the one which was built by order of the King Ghayasudin Ghor, though at present it requires some repairs. The other is the Musalla (a place for prayers), about two thousand paces from the Malik gate of the city; it was constructed by the King Shah Rukh, son of Amir Timur-lang, but is now in a ruined state, though the turret, the dome, and a few "hujras" are still standing. The third building is the school-house of Mirza Sultan Hossein, which has been built on the Anjir stream, twenty paces from the Musalla. It is called Chahar-Manar on account of its containing four minarets with two windows between them; it is also almost demolished. The fourth is the tomb of Prince Umar Sheikh, son of Amir Timur-lang, with four minarets in the west. The fifth is a tower between the Musalla and the school-house, in which the graves of Mirza Sultan Hussein, Gauhar Shah Begum (the queen of the Amir Timur), Amir Mahomed Jogi, and of some Princes of Amir Timur's family are found. About two thousand paces from the school-house a flower bed called Oolooman is seen, near which two towers called Buzan are erected. On both sides of this site grave-yards are observed with some small-houses like those of Imam Fakhr-Razi, Mauhr, Jami, Moola Hossein, preacher of Koran, Kashfi, &c. Of the other remarkable buildings the tomb of Khwaja Abdool Ansari is one, which is situated in the skirt of a hill about one league in the north of the city, where Sanjar, Timur, and Safur had erected several magnificent buildings, which have now been destroyed. At present, therefore, there are two tombs, a mosque, and a tank at that place. The Roza-bagh, situated two farsangs from Herat on the Kandahar road, is one of the most noteworthy buildings. It was erected by the Uzbek Kings, many of whose tombs are there. Besides the main city, of which an account has been given above, Herat contains twelve towns not worth notice, and four districts called Obek, Karakh, Ghorian, and Isfaraz, which are under separate Governors appointed by the Ruler of Herat. Every kind of fruit, especially grapes, grows abundantly. Wheat, barley, rice, mash (*Phasolus max.*), &c., are produced in great quantities. Mines of iron, lead, marble, and copper are seen, and are being worked. The annual growth of cummin seeds, pistachio-nuts, "kusamba," manna, shirkhisht, assafœtida, &c., is also very large. Nitre is prepared in the city for the manufacture of gunpowder. In the main city and its neighbouring villages Persians and Afghans commonly reside. Some of the people called Chahar-imaks also live in them. In former times they were divided into four sections, viz.—

1st.—Jamshedis. Their Chief is Khan Aka, generally called Mehdi Kooly Khan, Aminood-dowlah, who holds possession of Dazishk, Shamar, Chak, and Upper Marghab, and

exercises authority over 12,000 families, of whom 5,000 are armed men, foot and sowars. He has made over 400 sowars to the Ruler of Herat as Government servants.

2nd.—Hazara. Formerly their aggregate number was twelve thousand families, and they lived between Shulak and Killa-Nan. In the reign of Wazir Yar Mahomed Khan, their Chief, Karimdad Khan, rebelled; he was killed in a fight against the people of Herat and the people of his tribe were plundered, and they remained in a distressed condition until the Persian troops conquered Herat, but when they abandoned that territory and retired to Persia they took the Hazaras with their Chief Yusuf Khan to Jam and Akbarz, and the next year they allowed them to take up their abode in Asfarayn between Subzwar and Nehpur where they still live. Of these people those who absconded from that place and came to Herat and its neighbourhood are about two thousand families in number, and they generally live in the Koshak and Jamshedi territories. Their Chief is Mahomed Sadik Khan, son of Mahomed Hossein Khan, a nephew of Karimdad Khan. They live in a very wretched state, some of them are employed in service at Herat with Mahomed Sadik Khan. The Hazaras are skilful weavers of Bark-i-Kurki and Bark-i-barra, and many of them sell pistachio-nuts and "kusamba" in the city, which they bring from the woods. No revenue was assessed on them by the predecessors of Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, but he assessed on them forty thousand rupees of Kandahar currency on account of Government revenue.

3rd.—Ferozkobis. They live in the Rabat territory, which is frequented by the caravans of traders coming from Bokhara to Herat. It is difficult to take possession of this territory on account of its hilly and strong character. They amount to about fifteen thousand families in number, and they are under several Chiefs, such as Naib Futtehollah Khan, the son of the late Akram Khan Nizamood-dowla; Sarbuland Khan, Kamran Khan, Bahram Khan, and Nasir Beg, who are employed in service at Herat and receive allowances from the Ruler of that province. Five hundred sowars of this tribe are also enlisted in Government employ. This tribe has lands in the several villages and towns of Herat. They paid no revenue before, but Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan imposed sixty thousand rupees on them on that account annually. The skill of these people is limited to the manufacture of barks, woollen daris, sacks and such like articles.

4th.—Taimanies. Some of these people reside in places on the Kabul road between Daulatyar and Dai as mentioned before; they are under the authority of the Governor of Herat. The other Taimanies live in the Ghorian territory, which was a dependency of Furrah before the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan took possession of Herat, but it is now under the control of the Ruler of Herat. The Government revenue of this territory in cash and kind amounts to about one lakh of rupees. They are not called upon to give recruits for the Government army, but merely the revenue is received from them.

Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan is a firm administrator, and his rule in the last few years in Herat has made him ostensibly popular among the people of that country and the Imaks. He himself exercises supervision over the working of the customs department, the conduct of the army, and the feelings of the people. These qualifications did not exist in the person of Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, who relied in every branch of business on the discretion of his officials, keeping himself ignorant of that which was going on, though he faithfully obeyed the instructions of the Amir Shere Ali Khan. Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan does not wish that any officer forwarded to him by the Amir should interfere with his authority. It is certain, however, that the people endure the exactions of their Governors with great difficulty, especially the troops, who consist of the natives of Herat, Kabul and Kandahar, and of whom some receive six months' pay in a year and some get nothing. The people of Ferozkohi and Taimani and of the Chahar-imak tribes, &c., wait on Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan in a time-serving manner. Some of them receive small allowances. In reality these people are neither truly attached to the Amir nor to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, nor is the Sirdar so to them. As regards the question whether or not Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan received assistance from the Governor of Kayu (during his rebellion), some reliable persons stated that the said Governor on arrival of the Sirdar at Barjand with five hundred sowars and some footmen received him with great honor and hospitality. He paid the Sirdars daily expenses until an order was received from Persia that some money for road expenses as well as some persons collected from the neighbouring country should be made over to the Sirdar. The Governor of Kayu, therefore, in accordance with instructions from the Persian Government, sent supplies and some people with the Sirdar from Barjand to Ghorian, and by advising him to adopt a route different to that which is usually taken, sent him to the Ghorian territory. The Governor of this place, by name Ali Khan Barakzai, who knew nothing about the arrival of the Sirdar, was attacked, taken prisoner, and his country brought into possession by the Sirdar. Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan on receipt of this information sent three thousand cavalry and infantry troops and some artillery guns to Ghorian under the command of Sirdar Abdulla Khan and his son. On being informed of the movement of these troops, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan with his own followers and with some sowars and footmen from Ghorian went to oppose them, and after some serious fight succeeded in defeating them and in taking some of them as prisoners. The officers of these troops ran away and the mounted men and those persons who were in charge of the artillery guns and who were taken prisoners were given hopes of kindness by the Sirdar, and they having started with him and his followers came to Herat and laid siege to its forts. The citizens also sympathised with him, and between him and some of the persons inside the fort communications were carried on secretly. The siege lasted for a few days, an attack was then made and possession was taken of the fort. Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, his son, and some

other Chiefs were killed. During my sojourn at Herat I carefully ascertained that since then communications and presents are sent by the Sirdar to the Mir of Kayn, and by the latter to the former. The Amir Shere Ali Khan having received information about the friendship between the Sirdar and the Mir of Kayn, wrote to him that he was much displeased with this line of conduct as his reputation before the British Government will suffer, and that he should therefore return all the presents sent by the Mir to him. My enquiry satisfied me that two or three carpets, a few maunds of tobacco, and some pieces of old farash were purchased for the satisfaction of the Amir under the pretence of the presents of the Mir having been returned, though those presents which were good and valuable were in reality retained by the Sirdar. The friendship between the Mir and the Sirdar was as strong until my departure from Herat as before, and it is still so. As regards the friendship between the Sirdar and the Persian Government, I am fully satisfied that it is warm enough. I can give reasons verbally to substantiate this fact.

## APPENDIX XIV.

NARRATIVE BY EXTRA ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER GHOLAM AHMED OF HIS VISIT TO  
KABUL IN MAY 1874.

[*Referred to in paragraph 95, Chapter V.*]

[*Translation.*]

On the 8th May 1874, at 8 A.M., on arrival of Mirza Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, brother of the Meer Moonshee, Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, to conduct me to the Amir's audience, I waited on His Highness in company with the British Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, and his Moonshees, Bukhtiar Khan and Abdoolah Khan. His Highness made some polite enquiries as to the health, &c., of Commissioner, Lady Pollock, and their children. On my representing to His Highness that Commissioner was anxious that by the Grace of God His Highness' family matters should be suitably settled, he gave no reply, and I imagined that His Highness did not wish that any representations about State matters should be made in the first public interview, or that he did not like to allow me to speak directly about such matters. His Highness said "after the countries you have travelled in you will laugh at the resources of this kingdom and think it a desert." In reply to this I represented "may God save Your Highness; 18 years ago I came to this country in the time of the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan; the army has since then made very great improvement in discipline, &c. Every measure requires to be perfected gradually; a desert is converted into a garden by continuous successful efforts." I then submitted the presents which I had brought with me, and His Highness appreciated the breech-loading gun and the lamps. As to the saddle, I said that, though it was purchased by the Commissioner in India, it was made in Europe by a well-known saddler. After receiving these presents His Highness remarked, "the friendship existing between Russia and England has been increased by the recent marriage of the Emperor's daughter with the Duke of Edinburgh; every sovereign, however, looks to his own interests in the State matters. The Prince and Princess are at present at Nice (?), and will thence go to London."

On the 9th May 1874 I took the presents which I had brought for Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, the Sadr-i-Azam, to that high officer.

On the 10th idem I intimated my wish to have a private interview with him, and by permission of the Amir he replied that I could see him on the 12th May, on which date I waited on him in company with the Agent, and after a short polite conversation represented to him as follows:—"On this occasion of my deputation to pay a friendly visit to the Amir on his part, the Commissioner observed at the time of my departure from Peshawur that he had been informed by several papers that the British Government had offered some rifles and ten lakhs of rupees to the Amir, that on his arrival at Peshawur he found that the rifles had been taken to Kabul and the money was lying in deposit, that when I could find a suitable opportunity I should represent to you and His Highness the Amir that through friendship and affection (towards the Amir) Commissioner did not consider it suitable to see the money remain for a long time in deposit or have it recredited to Government." He (the Sadr-i-Azam) observed that Commissioner must be acquainted with the discussions which he had had with Mr. Macnabb in this matter at Peshawur, and that no communication declining the above offer in money has been sent by the Afghan Government to the English authorities. Then turning towards the Agent, as an enquirer, he said that it would be better to settle this matter in consultation with the Amir. After this I represented as follows:—"On the same occasion as stated above, Commissioner in the interests of the Government of Afghanistan and the British Government considered it advisable that I should say on his own part that, though he had received no paper, he was informed that His Excellency the Viceroy had directed the Yarkund Mission to return to India *via* Kashmir; that if this Mission had returned through Afghanistan, it would have tended to exhibit better friendship existing between the British and the Afghan Government. If a proposed measure were really impossible, the excuse of inability to carry it out would suffice, but where friendship existed and a measure said to be impossible turned out (or appeared) practicable, then astonishment was aroused (or created)." The Sadr-i-Azam said that he had full and complete discussions in this matter before His Excellency the Viceroy, that he did not like to repeat them, that he was not aware whether or not those discussions were made known to Commissioner, but that if I gave him a written agreement holding myself responsible as to any objection (on part of Government) to the rediscussion of this matter, he would invite the Amir's attention to it. His object in thus replying was to prevent further discussions in the matter; the Amir must have been informed by Agent, before this interview, of the purport of my representations as above, as I considered it advisable to disclose them to him, and His Highness must have consulted with the Sadr-i-Azam. I, however, replied that he must have understood the real object of Commissioner, *viz.*, that on the occasion of my arrival at Kabul I should point out on his part, in His Highness' interests, what would most conduce to the greater cementing of friendship, that the matter did not require protracted discussions, and that Commissioner did not make the above observations with the view of



moving the Sadr-i-Azam to renew any discussions or obtain any object. The Sadr-i-Azam observed first that discussions in the matter had been concluded, and that it was not advisable to make mention about it again to the Amir, and said that he would bring my representations to the notice of the Amir in a suitable manner, and that he would either send for me after four days, or that I should send a servant to him after four days, enquiring whether or not my attendance was required.

On the 13th May 1874 I had the honor of waiting on the Amir the second time. His Highness remarked that the people of Ireland were said to be generally less obedient and submissive than the people of England and Scotland, and when I replied that they were not noted for disobedience of orders, and that they might be obstinate (or self-willed) in a few instances, His Highness said that they are intelligent people and better than those who profess obedience in this country, but that they pay taxes, &c., with some difficulty. I represented that there is probably no kingdom the people of which pay Government demands without pressure.

After this I said that ten lakhs of Enfield rifle cartridges were ready at Peshawur; that they were not made over to Shahmurd Khan along with the rifles formerly sent to Kabul, because Syud Nur Mahomed Shah had stated at Simla that similar cartridges were made at Kabul; and that, as now His Highness wishes for them, the Agent has received instructions to ask His Highness to arrange for the number of camels which will be required to bring them to Kabul. The Amir observed that of course these cartridges were prepared at Kabul, but with great expense and labor. His Highness then remarked that European military officers dealt with Native soldiers in a strict and severe manner. I said that they are certainly strict in matters of instruction, but that they receive well-disciplined soldiers with kindness, and are also kind to others after drilling is over. His Highness continued that the British officers award sentences of imprisonment to soldiers for light offences, and the Agent replied that in spite of sentences of imprisonment and other heavy punishments awarded the number of cases continue (a polite way of hinting that punishment is necessary). His Highness further said—"Many of the British officers are polite, kind, energetic, and well-experienced in administration. I refer to the late Lord Mayo, how able and polite he was, but it is a matter of great regret that a man of this country has behaved so ill as to kill him. In like manner, see how (the late Hon'ble Chief Justice) Norman and Major Macdonald have been unjustly ('barnahak') dealt with. When British troops were in the Bala-Hissar of Kabul, an Afghan killed a British officer and took flight; I found the Afghan alive when I reached Kabul." I said that the Afreedee who killed Lord Mayo had made up his mind to lose his life before acting as he did owing to aberration of mind when Lord Mayo chanced to visit the Andamans. Had he not done so very likely his murderer would have killed *himself*. Also that Mr. Norman's murderer was a Wahabee, and that number of murders in Kabul had decreased of late as compared to former times, when people were found committing such offences in bazars recklessly. The Amir evidently offered the above remarks with reference to what I had said on the previous day to the Sadr-i-Azam as to the Yarkund Mission. It was an indirect way of hinting at the dangers attending the proposed route by Kabul, and the consequent dislike of His Highness to its adoption.

On the 15th May 1874 I intimated my wish to the Sadr-i-Azam, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, to have another interview with him, and he replied that I might see him the next day. He brought my wish to the notice of the Amir, and His Highness first sent for Bukhtiar Khan, but when he could not be found, the Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, was summoned, when both he and Bukhtiar Khan waited on His Highness. He asked them for what purpose I desired to meet the Sadr-i-Azam, and they said that they did not know it. The next day the

It will be noted that no mention whatever was made by His Highness or Syud Nur Mahomed Shah of Seistan affairs, or of the arbitration.

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,  
Commissioner.

Sadr-i-Azam gave me the honor of meeting him at his house, and after the customary polite conversation asked me whether I had called on him for any object, or whether the interview was only a formal one. I said that as I had the honor of his company with the Seistan Mission and in other places, I was anxious to see him as frequently as possible, but that as he was occupied in his work, I did not venture to ask him for that purpose.

After this finding that he was not going to give any reply to the message which I communicated to him on the 12th May 1874, though he had promised to do so, I said, in the course of conversation on some other subject, that I had recovered from the fatigues of the journey, that the weather was getting hot, and that I intended to return to Peshawur. In reply, he said that he would bring this to the notice of the Amir. On my telling him that he had promised on 12th May to send for me after four days, he remarked that I should represent on his part to the Commissioner that in reality the subject alluded to was a transaction of receiving the money and of making arrangements for Her Majesty's Ambassador's return to India *via* Afghanistan; that it was considered inadvisable to give this permission, *viz.*, for Mr. Forsyth's return *via* Afghanistan, lest Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan should make this a pretext for raising disturbances; that when arrangements could not be made for the British Ambassador's return *via* Afghanistan, the above money appeared an offer to which the Afghan Government was not entitled (literally it was a sort of shame to receive it); that when the Amir had no hesitation in accepting the two lakhs of rupees (which he received a short time before his departure to Ambala), what excuse could His Highness make in accepting the present offer of ten lakhs of rupees, and that probably the matter would be settled before

my return to Peshawur. I continued that it appeared from a letter from Colonel Gordon that he was to leave Panja, Wakhan, on the 26th April 1874, and the Sadr-i-Azam said that Colonel Gordon had to halt pending the recovery of horses, &c., from illness or fatigue, that discussions in this matter were concluded, and that it was not necessary to reopen the question. He asked me whether Atta Mahomed Khan was to be recalled to India, and I replied that deliberations had not yet been held on this question. He said that the Foreign Secretary asked him at Simla as to what kind of man Atta Mahomed Khan was, and that he replied that he (Atta Mahomed Khan) was a good man, on which the Foreign Secretary laughed and said "Bukhtiar hai" (meaning that Bukhtiar Khan had been invested with great authority by Atta Mahomed Khan).

On the 17th May 1874 I went over to the Amir's to pay a complimentary visit to His Highness, and after a short formal conversation His Highness, in remarking on the unfavorable condition of the people of Afghanistan, observed "in my first interview with the late Governor-General of India in presence of Seton-Karr, I observed that if it were intended that Afghanistan should enjoy prosperity, the said intention could not be carried out by the recent offer of two lakhs of rupees, of which forty thousand rupees were expended in the purchase of the presents brought to Ambala, sixty thousand rupees were paid to servants, and the remaining one lakh of rupees with 5,000 guns were lying at Jellalabad. The Governor-General observed that the offer was made of twelve lakhs of rupees, and I replied that I would continue to remain a friend of the British Government even without receiving any money from them." The prosperity of Afghanistan said I lies in the power of God, improvement is being made in all the branches of administration by Your Highness' efforts and by the Grace of God. As soon as I said "as regards the aid of the British Government" the Amir touched upon another subject, and I could not add to the above phrase as I had intended "whatever amount of money they have lately considered advisable to offer with regard to the circumstances of the time is a token of friendship and kindness." Then His Highness asked me why we, who are Mahomedans and of the same religion as His Highness, did not celebrate the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Khan by an illumination at Peshawur. Considering it a matter of no importance I replied first that this was not done, because none of the elders suggested it or offered themselves as managers of this affair. His Highness made some further observations, and I said that in reality no letter was sent by His Highness (either to any of the natives of Peshawur or the British Government), on which His Highness said that we should have asked him to permit them to notify this nomination (by illumination). I could have given a reply, but I remained intentionally silent, because I thought my representations on this subject might probably be at variance with the wishes of my Government, or that they might tend to discussions on religious points. The lengthy observations of the Amir appeared to show that it was thought probable at Kabul that the British Government considered His Highness' selection of Sirdar Abdulla Khan as his heir-apparent injudicious. After concluding the above observations, His Highness enquired whether the information received by him as to the sale of some unserviceable artillery guns was correct, as he wished to buy one hundred kharwars (one kharwar=800 lbs.) of copper for the manufacture of as many new guns as there are already at Kabul, in order that if the latter become unserviceable, the new guns may be used. I replied that I had seen no notice or other paper about the sale of any guns. Then His Highness touched upon some other subjects, and afterwards expressed his gratification with Commissioner, and observed that he was highly gratified by that officer's appointment to the Peshawur Division. His Highness also spoke of Dr. Bellew and Mr. Forsyth with praise. I represented that Commissioner entertained as much respect and good wishes towards His Highness as His Highness was kindly disposed towards him, and that he did his best for His Highness in the Seistan Mission, and also wrote in favor of His Highness. As mentioned in a Kabul Diary, a murrasila about the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Khan was written by the Amir to the address of the King of Persia, and it was forwarded by Ursulla Khan, Foreign Minister, to the Samsam-ul-Moolk, Governor of Seistan, by hand of the Amir's Peshkbidmut, Mahomed Hossein Khan, for transmission to Teheran. This Peshkbidmut lately returned from Seistan with a letter from the Samsam-ul-Moolk to the address of Ursulla Khan (Ghilzai), stating that he had forwarded the Amir's "ariza" to Teheran. The Amir observed, after reading this letter, "the Samsam-ul-Moolk has put down the word "ariza" (petition) out of his own devilry ("as rui shaitanat-i-khud.") Then he spoke with great dispraise about the King of Persia, and said "his kingdom does not yield a revenue of even two crores of rupees a year, but he gets himself called a Shahinshah (Emperor). If an occasion present itself (for an encounter between him and my army), he will take flight beyond Ispahan (literally no person will see him before he reaches Ispahan.)" The officials, &c., who were present at that time represented "of course Persia is protected by the agreements which exist between several States, otherwise the people (or troops) in it are not strong enough (to hold it). Mahomed Hossein Khan, Peshkbidmut (a nephew of the late Mahomed Rafik Khan), above referred to, was then called in, and he made some representations as to the undisciplined and distressed condition of the Persian army. It appeared from the tone of the Amir's observations that His Highness was probably annoyed not only on account of his having read the word "ariza" in Ursulla Khan's letter, but on account of some accounts which Mahomed Hossein Khan must have given against the Samsam-ul-Moolk, or against his administration on the Seistan border. His Highness said in a taunting manner "the Shah of Persia, who lately visited Europe, must have become acquainted with the position in which he is (in the world)." Then he laughed at the idea of the Shah wearing jewelry and embroidered dresses in Europe.

On the 20th May 1874 I again waited on Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, and on his enquiry as to my intentions I said that, as the climate was getting hot, it would be better if I could get permission to return to Peshawur. "A guest is never ordered to go away," said he, "but should you like, you can obtain the Amir's permission to return to Peshawur on the 23rd May 1874, and leave the next day. As regards the money, my observations about it are the same which I communicated to you the other day; if it is lying in an English Treasury, suppose it lying in our Treasury (meaning that it was the same thing), let it remain there, and we will send for it when we require it; we have not declined to take it in any paper; the letter which was sent to Mr. Macnabb about (Snider) guns contained at the end 'by the help of God further accounts will follow,' this was an allusion to the above money." I represented to him, "very good, there is no division (between the British and the Afghan Governments.) I made mention of this matter by permission of Commissioner on account of the objection (to the money being kept in deposit for a long time.) In my last interview with the Amir, His Highness made some remarks on the prosperity of Afghanistan and as to his assistance by the British Government, and I applauded His Highness for the efforts which were being made by him for the comfort, peace, &c., of his subjects; but when I attempted to make any representations about the above money, His Highness commenced observations on another subject, and I did not consider it advisable to invite His Highness' attention to what I had to say and which I have communicated to you." The Sadr-i-Azam said that I was quite right in not inviting the Amir's attention to the representations which I had made before him (the Sadr-i-Azam) about the above money; that we had entered into discussions on a subject about which I had obtained no documentary authority, and that it was therefore advisable that they should now be concluded. I said, "very good, Commissioner wished me to make the above representations in this matter merely from his friendly disposition (towards the Amir), and it was incumbent on me to carry out his wishes. The matter does not require any arguments; as you were with Commissioner for some months with the Seistan Mission, and you knew that I was with him, and you had become acquainted with me, he (Commissioner) did not consider it necessary to give me written permission for making such representations." On this he observed that I was correct; that one day at Peshin, Commissioner in the course of some conversation had told him that he trusted me like a brother, and that my presence should not be considered objectionable when discussions on any subject were taking place between him (the "Syud") and Commissioner; that he (the Syud) was convinced of Commissioner's confidence in me, and that he had spoken about it to the Amir a few days before my arrival at Kabul. He then enquired about the Snider guns, and I told him that I did not know at the time of my departure from Peshawur how far these guns had been brought, and that I only knew that on receipt of a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the Secretary of State had given orders for their despatch *via* the Suez Canal. The Sadr-i-Azam again continued his observations as to the return of the Yarkund Mission *via* Afghanistan by saying, "I had discussions about this Mission at Simla with His Excellency the Viceroy; to cut the statement short, it is not advisable that one who is feasted by another should not allow the Agent of the latter to come to his house (meaning that it was difficult to have to refuse permission for the transit of the Mission and yet to take the treasure). Should Commissioner ever write any letter in this matter, he should consider my above observations as merely my own. I think your observations are also on your own part, though in reality both your and my observations may be on the part of our Governments." I replied that the object of my deputation was to ask after the health, &c., of the Amir, and to deliver some presents to His Highness, that Commissioner considered it a fair opportunity to direct me to make a few observations on his part on which no discussions were required. He asked me whether Commissioner placed confidence in him, and I said that he did trust him on account of the friendship which exists between them. "That's enough (meaning that he was satisfied)," said he, "I will see about this matter some time shortly. Did you speak about this matter in the Agency Office?" When I told him that I had spoken nothing in the Agency Office in this matter further than what I had said in presence of the Agent on the occasion of my interview with him (the Sadr-i-Azam) on 12th May, he expressed himself gratified.

On the 23rd May 1874 I paid my last visit to the Amir; and His Highness, in remarking on the manufactures of Afghanistan, observed that only kakuma, bark, and similar articles were prepared in his kingdom; that I should give His Highness' compliments to Commissioner, and then present to him some presents consisting of a kakuma, bark, skins, &c., and two horses of mixed colors (spotted skew-bald) on his the (Amir's part); that one of these horses should be used for riding purposes by Colonel Pollock, and the other by Lady Pollock, who, he said, must be by this time at Abbottabad, and that a coat of some silk fabric which His Highness directed my attention to was presented to His Highness by Colonel Pollock, and His Highness had kept it as a token of remembrance. In three of the four visits which I paid to the Amir, and which generally lasted from half an hour to one hour, I found only the Sadr-i-Azam and Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, the Meer Moonshee, present. On one occasion only Ahmed Ali Khan, Ursulla Khan, and Asmatoolla Khan were present with the above two officers. Private councils or conferences are held by order or permission of the Amir. His Highness' observations were generally confined to the shortsightedness of his subjects, and to suggestions for efforts being made for their welfare. His Highness recollects a great many subjects discussed in the *Illustrated London News*.

Besides the above-mentioned visits, I waited on 10th May 1874 on the Amir's heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdulla Khan, in company with Mirza Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, and he was gratified with the pistol which I presented to him from Commissioner. He was sitting in

a military dress on a chair, and his Persian and Arabic teacher was sitting on the carpet on his right hand. On the left hand, at a distance of about two yards, the Commander-in-Chief was sitting on a chair, and about two yards far from him the Sirdar ordered me in a polite manner to sit down on a chair. The conversation was of no special interest, but he enquired about Commissioner and the family, especially about the eldest son, *viz.*, now in England.

On the 23rd May 1874, after I had obtained the Amir's permission, I again waited on the Sirdar accompanied by Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, and said "I have been allowed by the Amir to return to my country and have come to you to pay my compliments on this occasion. Though many of your servants frequently go to Peshawur, I shall carry out your commands most cheerfully if I get any from you." The Commander-in-Chief replied on his part, "Why shall we not ask you (to comply with our request) if there be any; may God save you."

When I called on the Sadr-i-Azam, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, merely to present to him a rifle, an album, and a box of cheroots, I asked him whether it was advisable in his opinion that I should call on the Commander-in-Chief, the Mustowfee, and some other officers, but when I found that he made some excuses, I abandoned this intention.

The Amir sits on a cushion about 1½ yards square on a carpet, on his right hand sits the Sadr-i-Azam, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, on a carpet, and on the left hand the British Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, sits. His Highness in a kind manner ordered me to sit in front of his cushion. Whenever I expressed my wish to see Nur Mahomed Shah, the latter officer, as a matter of precaution, always obtained the Amir's permission, and the next day allowed me to go over to him. Two guards are appointed behind the place where the Amir holds Durbar, and one guard is deputed at the threshold ("deorhi") of the Durbar room.

In the matter of the return of the Yarkund Mission the following discussions had taken place before my arrival at Kabul. When the Amir received Mr. Forsyth's murrasila (by hand of Ibrahim Khan, Inspector) in this matter, the members of the Durbar who have been invested with titles by His Highness were consulted, and none of them, with the exception of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, considered Mr. Forsyth's return through Afghanistan

\* One of the Peshawur Kazikheyl family, and formerly a Naib Tehsildar, has received an indifferent education in English. All the family are very bigoted, and it was commonly believed that Dilawar Khan's death on the Chitral border was brought about by information sent by the Kazikheyl as to Dilawar Khan's object in visiting Chitral.

objectionable. After consulting with these officers the Amir gave a hint to Kazi Abdul Kadir,\* who generally waits on His Highness to read newspapers, to give an opinion, and he, after understanding the object of the Amir, said that Mr. Forsyth's return through Afghanistan would not be advantageous to the kingdom. Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, who had reserved his opinion, differing from the above members of the Durbar, concurred with

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,  
Commissioner.

the Kazi, and the Amir coincided with him. It will appear from the result of discussions in this matter and councils on other subjects that the Amir, after ascertaining the views of the members of his Durbar, coincides with those opinions which he considers advantageous. His own opinions or views in State matters are more sound than those of the members of the Durbar. The views of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah are better than those of his colleagues, but he seldom ventures to make the Amir deviate from an opinion which His Highness may have formed after deliberation as through farsightedness he does not press his own opinions until he finds an opportunity to do so. It is the Amir's habit to consult with his Durbar officials in all State matters; but if their opinions do not coincide with his own views, he introduces other persons invested with authority or otherwise influential, who apprehending his intentions give opinions keeping with those of His Highness. As regards other matters, such as the increase or decrease of allowances, the forgiveness of crimes, &c., the members of the Durbar can succeed one way or another in getting them settled agreeably to their wishes.

It appeared in one of my private interviews with the British Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, that the Amir considers a murrasila from Sir John Lawrence and one from the late Lord Mayo as authority for (claiming) assistance (in money) from the British Government, without (expecting) a return from His Highness.

Nothing can be said about the ultimate consequences of disaffection which exists between the Amir and his son, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. As the Mirakhor Ahmed Khan was very uncertain of his success in persuading Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to return from Herat to Kabul, he solicited the Amir to direct Shahghassee Sherdil Khan to accompany him. The Shahghassee was unwilling to go on this mission to Herat, but the Amir approved of the suggestion of the Mirakhor on the consideration that should the Sirdar return to Kabul, well and good, otherwise the Shahghassee will separate his two nephews, who are the Sirdar's trusted Agents, from the Sirdar, and will bring them to Kabul. The Shahghassee said privately to his friends "when the Amir's own son is rebellious towards His Highness what hesitation will my nephews have in disobeying my instructions." The members of the Durbar and other persons are of opinion that should the Sirdar from a sense of filial duty return to Kabul in company with the Mirakhor and Shahghassee, the Amir will not place him in prison, unless his (the Sirdar's) apprehensions on being directed to remain at Kabul lead him to cause annoyance to the Amir. His Highness merely wishes to deprive him of all authority gradually by tact and energy without treating him directly and indirectly with tyranny. In a council held about the advisability or otherwise of the deputation of troops against Herat in the event of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan's refusal to come to



Kabul, the Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan advised that Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan should command those troops; Ursulla Khan Ghilzai suggested the Amir's own departure with them, and others said that the services of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, late Governor of Kandahar, should be obtained for this purpose.

Through farsightedness and on account of uncertainty as to the future course of events, the Amir did not disclose his own views. It, however, appears, that His Highness is meditating on the appointment of a suitable Commandant for the troops who may have to proceed *viâ* Kandahar, and he is afraid lest in the event of his himself advancing with troops to Kandahar the snow on the "Sar-i-Jungle" route (the direct road through the hills from Herat to Kabul) should have melted, and the Sirdar, Mahomed Yakub Khan, considering himself unable to oppose His Highness, should start *viâ* the said route with three or four thousand sowars to raise disturbances in Kabul or to attack Turkistan. He is therefore procrastinating. He intends to send during this summer detachments of Kabul troops to various places on the Kandahar road, to have the Turkistan troops deputed to different points near Maimena, and to have some cavalry troops of the Chief of Maimena (Mir Hossein Khan, obtained to help the Turkistan troops. If it should be resolved that operations should take place against Herat, it is probable that the Sadr-i-Azam, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, will be deputed with troops, together with a Barakzai Sirdar and General Daud Shah Khan, or the Naib Commander-in-Chief, General Hafizoolla Khan. At the same time it is probable that on arrival of Kabul troops in the neighbourhood of Herat the troops and Chiefs in that city, who are originally natives of Kandahar and Kabul, may feel apprehension in aiding Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan and may separate from him. If so, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan will have to vacate the Herat fort with a detachment of cavalry. Formerly Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan used to send presents to the members of the Kabul Durbar, such as the Mustowfee, the Mir Moonshee, &c., but now this custom has been discontinued. Since the Moonshee, Faiz Mahomed Khan, was killed by order of the Amir for being found in secret communication with the Sirdar, the system of the despatch of private letters by *dâk* from Kabul to Herat has been abolished. If any such letters are carried by messengers, strict watch is kept over them by the sepoy who have been posted at various points by the Commander-in-Chief, who do not allow any traveller to proceed without a passport bearing the seal of the said high officer. This system is ostensibly adopted to prevent the flight of deserters of the Kabul army. Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan, Governor of Furrah, exaggerates his statements about Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, through his partiality towards Sirdar Abdulla Khan, who is his grandson. None of the influential Chiefs in the neighbourhood of Kabul intend to help Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. His maternal uncle, Nowroz Khan, Chief of Lalpurah, can give him no assistance in consequence of his being so distant from him.

The Amir Shere Ali Khan enjoys good health, and devotes almost all his daytime to State matters. He, in particular, supervises the discipline of the army and the management of the Arsenal Department and of the factories where guns and other munitions of war are prepared. He tries his best to getting arms made after any new European specimen which he may get. He sleeps only for a very short time at noon in one of the rooms of the Durbar Hall, and if he is ever able to go sooner to his harem, he has to settle several questions about the allowances of the wives, &c., of the Barakzai Sirdars. If in Durbar any petitioner finds an opportunity to wait on him, he pays fair attention to his statement. He considers only Friday as a day of rest, and goes to see gardens or some other places worth inspection on horseback, or in a jampan. English newspapers are read and translated to him, and he pays attention to subjects which relate to State matters or mechanics. He is very economical, and desires that there should be as much saving of money as possible. If a farmer applies for the lease of a country agreeing to pay more than the actual revenue of that territory, His Highness gives the farm without taking into consideration the fact that the farmer will have to exercise oppression in realizing this excessive revenue. He is very anxious for the discipline of troops, and the collection of munitions of war, and is very fond of horse-breeding; he neither sends to, nor receives any letters or messages from, the Amir of Yarkund (Yakub Beg). His border adjoins the Persian frontier, but he often complains against the "Shah" in consequence of the want of appreciation of each other, and the difference of religion, as the Amir is a "Suni," and the Shah is of the Shia persuasion. The more satisfied the Amir remains as to the tranquillity of his border adjoining the British frontier, and the more reliance as to assistance or kindness he places on the British Government, the more anxiety he feels on account of the advance of the Russians. Almost all the people of Afghanistan share with him in his anxiety. They feel great apprehension on account of the receipt of a report which was subsequently published in the *Shams-ul-Nahar* of Kabul about the exchange of Karki, Charjoi, and Kulab between the Russians and the King of Bokhara for Samarkund and Urtappa, until such time as the said report was ascertained to be incorrect. The Amir has full command of his temper; he was not formerly so polite or kind to his officials as he has become since the flight of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan from Kabul. He is fastidious as to his diet, and the quantity he eats is very little.

Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan is really annoyed with his father the Amir, and it is probable that his dissatisfaction with the nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Khan will never be removed from his heart. The Amir's disaffection towards Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan commences from the time when His Highness after his repulse from Kandahar arrived at Herat (where the Sirdar was Governor) and on departure from that place towards Balkh he (the Amir) requested some of the Sirdar's revenue officials to give him some money, but the Sirdar



disliked this idea, and His Highness could not get any money in Herat. On the other hand, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan bears a grudge towards the Amir since the conquest of Kabul or Kandahar, from His Highness having taken Sirdar Abdulla Khan to Ambala, and commenced to deprive him (Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan) of authority from time to time. The Amir was very sorry for the death of Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan, late Governor of Herat, and of his son, Sirdar Abdul Aziz Khan, and his Highness considers that it was caused by

\*In this he follows his father the Dost. The relations between the Dost and Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan were very remarkable. The Sirdar repentedly rebelled, and as often was forgiven, and gradually restored to favor.

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,  
*Commissioner.*

Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. The Amir never purposes to award sentences of death\* to any of his relations who cause injury to him or rebel against him, though he takes steps to punish them otherwise. This is proved by the action which he took against his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan, Sirdar Mahomed Sarwar Khan, Sirdar Ahmed Khan, and others. It was therefore considered most inadvisable to attempt to propose capital punishment for Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. When after the fall of Herat Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan returned to Kabul, and made an apology to the Amir, it was thought most inexpedient to place him in prison, as this course would have tended to the disgrace of the Amir. Besides this objection it was feared lest his imprisonment should prompt his younger brother, Mahomed Ayub Khan, and his Agents, who were left at Herat, to rebel and disturb the peace of the Kingdom. There are very few adherents of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan at Kabul. His father-in-law, Sirdar Yahaya Khan, his trusted agents, Bahadoor Khan, Shahghassee Attaulla Khan, and some others are at Kabul, but they possess no influence or authority. In consequence of the punishment which was awarded to the late Moonshee Faiz Mahomed Khan, they do not venture to send letters about State matters to him frequently, nor can they do so, but if they find opportunity, they send him as much information as possible. Almost all the junior military officers are new and faithful to the Amir. As regards the high civil and military officers, such as the Commander-in-Chief, the Mir Moonshee, Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, Ahmed Ali Khan, Treasurer, General Sufdur Ali Khan, Commanding the Kandahar troops, and Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, they undoubtedly entertain no idea of giving any assistance to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan. Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, the Sadr-i-Azam, the Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan, Ursulla Khan, Ghilzai, and Asmutulla Khan, however, are well disposed towards him, though for the sake of their honor and interest they desist from ostensibly giving him any aid. Should he through any mismanagement of the affairs of the Amir overpower His Highness' troops, they will find an opportunity to excuse themselves to the Sirdar, and say that they never entertained any designs against him. On account of his being impoverished he is noted for taking excessive revenue in the Herat territory. His brother, Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khan, is only a boy, and his conduct does not therefore call for remarks, with the exception that he acts entirely in conformity with his (Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan's) instructions.

Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, own brother of the late Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, who was eldest son of the Amir, is the Governor of the City of Kabul. He makes over almost all the civil suits for disposal to the Kazee, who sits with him in Court, but the Sirdar himself decides many of the criminal cases. A few civil and criminal cases of great importance are submitted to the Amir.

It is said that he imposes fines on the accused persons more than the circumstance of their guilt require. His father the Amir frequently applies to him in his presence, and in presence of many other people, epithets of folly and stinginess. He waits once every day on the Amir to pay compliments to His Highness. He does not engage his attention in military affairs, nor does he possess any authority in that department. He does not ever incur the trouble of going to inspect reviews or drilling of troops. He is very anxious for collecting money. Though his manners are not harsh, he is unpopular among the people of Kabul, and he possesses little tact or energy. His riches amount to about two or three lakhs of rupees, and he holds considerable landed property.

Sirdar Abdulla Khan, the Amir's heir-apparent, is 13 years old. He is receiving instruction in Persian and Arabic with fair progress. He waits on his father once every day in a military dress to pay his compliments to His Highness. The three infantry regiments in which the soldiers are at present about 15, 18, or 19 years old, and which were entertained three years ago specially after his name, with a view to their being most loyal and affectionate to him, are under the command of officers who instruct them in drilling. The young Sirdar goes almost every day to inspect them. They receive their pay every month, but commonly two months' pay being withheld as a check on desertion. At the present stage of life the Sirdar appears to be a lad of ordinary intelligence. The Commander-in-Chief, Hossein Ali Khan, has to wait on him as a tutor, and as an escort in the daytime.

Sirdar Ahmed Ali Khan, son of the late Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, the Amir's eldest son, is a lad about 14 years old, very smart and intelligent. His manners are likely to make him popular. He considers himself as a claimant for the heir-apparentship of the Amir, as his father was His Highness' eldest son, and was appointed by him his heir-apparent. Should eventually the reins of the Government of Afghanistan be assumed by Sirdar Abdulla Khan, or should they fall to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, he will bear a grudge to them, though, as appears from the present state of affairs, he will not be able to cause any injury to them.

The Amir is very favorably disposed to him, and he occasionally waits on His Highness to pay compliments. He is under the guardianship of his uncle, Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Kabul.

The Sadr-i-Azam, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, is the most intelligent and clever officer, of all the members of the Durbar. In the management of political affairs the Amir considers his views better than those of the other members. He, however, follows the Amir's views, and does not give an opinion before ascertaining the intentions of His Highness. The Amir desires that this officer should examine the accounts of the income and expenditure of the kingdom, and introduce a new system of realising the Government revenue, taxation, &c. This can hardly be done at present on account of the dissension which has been stirred up between the Amir and Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, and because this system will be very detrimental to the Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan, and his agents and adherents such as Khudai Nazar Khan, Warduk, Governor of Ghaznee, and other influential persons, and will cause great annoyance to them. Should the above anxiety be removed, and should a fair opportunity present itself, the Sadr-i-Azam will undoubtedly adopt measures for the recovery of the money already misappropriated by Government servants, and for the prevention of embezzlement in future. He and the Amir contemplate the idea of making such arrangements as may enable them to collect  $1\frac{1}{2}$  crores of rupees a year, instead of one crore 10 lakhs at present realised on account of the Government revenue, and the various cesses in Afghanistan. The members of the Durbar, such as Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, Hossein Ali Khan, Ahmed Ali Khan, Treasurer, and others, who have to keep accounts or to spend money for Government purposes, feel apprehensive on account of his disinterested (or impartial) (literally "dry," or khushk) disposition. He treats the people of Kabul other than the above members in a supercilious manner. He purposes putting a stop to the present system of the British Agent himself presenting all reference from the English Government to the Amir, and wishes that after the present Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, is recalled from Kabul, the new Agent should bring all matters through him to the notice of the Amir. He will not probably be able to obtain the Amir's consent to this proposal. His Highness may not concede to this innovation, not because of any want of confidence in the Sadr-i-Azam, but because His Highness himself is a very enquiring, observant, and painstaking ruler. The intervention of the Sadr-i-Azam would cause considerable delay in the disposal of almost all references from the British Government.

Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan belongs to the Warduk (Ghilzai between Kabul and Ghuznee) tribe. He possesses full authority in the revenue branch of the administration of the kingdom. He can enhance, remit, or reduce the Government revenue; he issues cheques, and is the Controller of Accounts. Hence almost all the Government servants have to deal with him. He is a man of fairly polite manners. At present there are three infantry regiments wholly consisting of the men of his tribe in government employ in Afghanistan, and one of his relations by name Ghulam Haidar Khan is a Brigadier. Many of the men of his tribe are also in the army at Kabul. He is really loyal to the Amir, and His Highness is also kind to him. The people of Kabul say that in the last five or six years he has accumulated about eight or ten lakhs of rupees for himself. The Amir does not intend to bring him into disgrace for any misappropriation of Government money, but he wishes that he should desist from this line of conduct, and that all such money be credited in future to Government. Ill-feeling exists between him and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah.

The Commander-in-Chief, Hossein Ali Khan, is a Kazilbash, and is most faithful to the Amir. He is a native of Kabul, Kazilbash quarter (Chandaul). In addition to his other duties he is employed as a tutor to Sirdar Abdulla Khan. The Amir knows that he will not be able to perform satisfactorily the duties of his high and most responsible office, but he does not fail to place confidence in him otherwise, because he thinks that as he is not a man of influence (literally a Chief of any tribe) it suits his interests to remain loyal and a well-wisher to His Highness. He keeps the Amir well informed of all important and unimportant military matters. He supervises all the factories in which guns, small arms, uniforms, &c., are prepared, and acts agreeably to the Amir's orders and instructions. He is not well up in army discipline, &c. He is an illiterate man, but performs his duties with great zeal. Many Generals, Brigadiers, and other officers of rank only obey his orders from fear of the Amir (or under protest). General Daud Shah, who possesses more experience (than the Commander-in-Chief), and who considers himself, an old military officer, is seriously dissatisfied at being obliged by His Highness the Amir to remain as one of his subordinates.

Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, Mir Moonshee, is the Private and Government Secretary of the Amir. He has gained His Highness' confidence, and he is admitted to councils (which are held about State matters) more frequently than the other members of Durbar. He acts agreeably to the Amir's intentions, and attaches himself to no party. All the murasilas from the Amir are written by him, or under his supervision, and he is the Superintendent of the Postal Department in Afghanistan.

Ahmed Ali Khan, Treasurer, is as faithful to Sirdar Abdulla Khan as to the Amir. He is the Superintendent of the Octroi Department of Kabul, of which the income is about ten lakhs of rupees a year. In almost all councils which are held about State matters he is found present, but his opinion is seldom asked for.

Asmatulla Khan and Ursulla Khan, Ghilzai Chiefs, receive more allowances and possess more property than they enjoyed before. They are loyal to the Amir, and are allowed to give opinions in State matters, though His Highness does not concur with them on account of their

views being unintellectual. However, their opinions in private matters, such as about Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, or any Chief, &c., are believed to afford great assistance to His Highness, and are considered suitable. A nephew of Asmatulla Khan is a Brigadier. Many of the men of his tribe are sepoy and officers in several infantry regiments. The Amir places great reliance on these Chiefs in collecting recruits, and considering them very useful to him, treats them with kindness.

The people of Kabul say that at present there are 32 infantry regiments at Kabul. It appeared to me from estimating the number of tents and standards at Siasang and Tappa Sherpoor and in the Bala-Hissar that there are only 22 infantry regiments at Kabul. Each regiment contains 650 men including officers. Many of the sepoys have gone on furlough to their homes, and there are therefore only about six thousand infantry troops at present at Kabul. The three infantry regiments which are deputed to Jellalabad in winter have gone on furlough to their homes. The officers and sepoys appear more submissive than before. Almost all of them are young, stout men, but not well experienced in drilling, &c. Many of them are dissatisfied with their compulsory enlistment. It is probable that if the present efforts for training them continue for about eight or ten years, they will gain satisfactory instruction, and will be able to perform their duties with credit. At present the majority of these troops consists of the people of Ghilzai and Warduk (a section of the Ghilzai) tribes. It may appear that the fact of these tribes having occupied too large a place in the Amir's army may at some time prove injurious to the kingdom, but His Highness is glad to see so many men of these tribes in his army—(1) because he considers them as his co-sharers in all accidents and contingencies, and therefore treats them with more kindness than others; (2) because their homes are not distant, and if furlough is granted them, they can return quickly when desired to do so; and (3) because they are brave and bold. Each sepoy receives seven rupees of Kabul currency (=5 Rupees 12 annas of English coin) a month. Their Commanding Officers possess no authority to reduce or increase their pay, as they are paid from the Government Treasury. Out of the 12 months' pay one or two months' pay is deducted on account of the cost of uniforms. Uniforms are generally kept in the magazine apartments, and the troops drill in a sort of common dress of one description. At the time of drilling each company is organized according to the height of the men. The Commanding Officers cannot dismiss or enlist a sepoy without the permission of the Commander-in-Chief. In the rudimentary part of drilling both the English and Pushtu technical terms are used. The magazine apartments contain uniforms for about fifty thousand soldiers. I found the batteries of artillery at Kabul in complete order, but their horses were not at that place. In winter their horses are sent to places about three stages from Kabul; at present some of them are in Deh-Afghanistan and other places, one or two miles from Kabul.

There are factories for artillery guns, rifles, and percussion caps, but the amount of work performed in them is very little, for instance, 500 or 600 percussion caps are prepared every day. The Amir desires to have steam or water machinery prepared for the manufacture of these articles. Mirza Abdul Kureem, who was sent last year by His Highness to Lahore, and thence to the Roorkee Engineering College, is preparing a machine on a water cut in Deh-Afghanistan, the water of which is sufficient for the working of two mills. A model of ten-barrelled artillery gun has also been prepared in wood.

There are 12 cavalry regiments in the province of Kabul, and each regiment consists of 400 sowars. The sowars who were sent in the winter to Charikar, to the Kohistan, and other places have not yet returned. Judging from the strength, appearance, &c., of the artillery horses and of the baggage ponies, the cavalry horses must be good and suitable. In consequence of the absence of sowars on leave nothing can be said about discipline and drilling.

Two infantry regiments are permanently deputed to the Bala-Hissar to guard the Durbar Hall, the Amir's harem, the magazine stores, and all the entrances to the Bala-Hissar. At night watch is kept up so strictly that even a man of rank and position is not allowed to pass unless he mentions the "parole." This is done by order of the Commander-in-Chief—(1) because he fears lest Sirdar Mahomed Sarwar Khan and Sirdar Abdul Azeez Khan, sons of the late Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, should escape from imprisonment; and (2) because he considers it incumbent on him to guard the Amir most carefully.

There are about 1,800 Government camels and 400 ponies at Kabul as carriage for Government baggage.

The Amir has at present about 35 or 36 lakhs of rupees of Kabul currency, of which 24 lakhs is purely Government money, in custody of Ahmed Ali Khan, Treasurer, and a guard is placed over it, and the remaining 11 or 12 lakhs of rupees, which consist of gold tillas and ratiskas and of diamonds to the value of about 2½ lakhs of rupees, is His Highness' private money, and is kept in the chief harem, viz., where Sirdar Abdulla Khan's mother lives. One of these diamonds is worth about 60 or 70 thousand rupees. His Highness took it from Sirdar Aminoodowla Khan when he (the Amir) left Kabul for Ambala. At present the annual savings of Government money amount to three or four lakhs of rupees. As regards the other treasuries of Afghanistan, not more than one lakh of rupees is kept in each treasury.

To the north of the present City of Kabul a new city called Sherpoor is being built near a "tappa" called "Tappa Beebee Mahro," about one mile in length. A Bala-Hissar or fort is to be built on the "tappa" itself, at a distance of about half a mile from it will be constructed certain walls to enclose the city, near them military lines will be built and the houses for citizens will be constructed. To the south of this tappa, at a distance of half a mile the walls

of the city have risen in some places about 12 feet high, and in others more than this. The breadth of the wall is about 13 or 14 feet. The city will assume an oval form when completed. A heavy gun fired from the mound near Deh-Afghanan to the south-west of this tappa can cause injury to this city, but rifles or muskets can do no harm. The ground is more level than that of the old city. As there is not sufficient accommodation at present at Kabul for the residence of troops in winter, the new lines which will be built on this tappa will remove this difficulty. Should the construction of this city continue to proceed at present pace, its completion will take eight years. The Amir has devised the construction of this city—(1) to avoid the difficulty which the Kabul troops experience in winter on account of want of accommodation; (2) to make his reign by calling it after his name; and (3) to bring such people as he may choose to reside there.

The Barakzai Sirdars generally confine themselves to their houses, and though they attend the Amir's Durbar occasionally, they do not really care to do so, because they are not treated with as much kindness or politeness in conversation as they think themselves entitled to. Most of them engage themselves in agricultural pursuits. Though they desire that such occurrences should present themselves as would enable them to collude with the Amir's enemies, they can hardly raise any disturbances or kindle fire. If they continue to remain in the present powerless state for 10 or 12 years, and if out of them Wullee Mahomed Khan, Shamsudin Khan, Mahomed Umar Khan, Yahaya Khan, and Zakria Khan should die, the Amir will have no cause to feel anxiety on account of these Sirdars, as the other Sirdars are youths and will gradually become loyal to His Highness. Of the Kandahar Sirdars, Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan is the senior and possesses about 12 or 13 lakhs of rupees. He is the Governor of Furrah and is really loyal to the Amir. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan (Kandaharee), though somewhat annoyed at his removal from the Government of Kandahar, and on account of the discontinuance of some allowances, is not so adverse as to stir up any disturbances, nor can he do so during his residence at Kabul. The other Kandahar Sirdars are occupied in the management of their lands, &c.

All the finance records are in custody of the Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan, and they are kept in his house. One copy of them is kept by the sons of Mustowfee Abdul Razak, and another copy remains with the agents of the Sadr-i-Azam, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah. The authority of issuing instructions for the speedy or slow realization of Government revenue and other cesses is held by the Mustowfee Hubiboolla Khan alone. Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, the Mir Moonshee, keeps all the murrasilas which come to the address of the Amir. Only a few murrasilas from the late Lord Mayo, Sir John Lawrence (now Lord Lawrence), and the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, are kept by the Amir himself as "Sunnods" (or documentary evidence). His Highness is making efforts for the collection of all murrasilas which were received before he assumed the reins of government, and has now opened a book in which all murrasillas are copied. This was not done before. He is also making enquiries into the object and result of the deputation of all Agents sent by the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan to the British Government, or of the deputation of those sent by the latter to the former. He strongly desires that all Government records be kept in a Government house under a guard.

The dâks established between Peshawur, Kabul, Kandahar, and Turkistan carry letters regularly and add to comfort of the people, but no arrangements have yet been made for the improvement of this department by which the Government might realize any pecuniary advantage. In summer the dâk from Kabul reaches Peshawur in 3½ days, the Kandahar dâk comes in six days, and the Turkistan dâk reaches Kabul in about the same period. Three dâk start from, and arrive at, each of the above stations every month.

Of the leading Governors I give accounts of as many as I know :—

1. Shahmurd Khan, Governor of Jellalabad, is an ingenuous-hearted ("safdil") and a quiet man. He is well acquainted with the people of Jellalabad, exercises little oppression, and is not much in the habit of taking bribes. Outside the Jellalabad town he has constructed a village and prepared a few gardens, and spends a portion of his time in their improvement. He considers the Government of Jellalabad better for him than other Governorships, though they may be more lucrative. In cases of theft of property from British territory he exerts himself well for two reasons in the apprehension of criminals and the recovery of stolen property—(1) because he occasionally comes to Peshawur, and is received with honor by the British authorities; and (2) because he is a man naturally of good disposition. In other matters which are beyond his power, he does not take any steps without the permission of the Amir, of whom he is much afraid. In consequence of the laxity of his influence over his subordinates, who exercise oppression, people of two or three tribes go every year to the Amir to complain against him.

2. Sirdar Wullee Mahomed Khan, Governor of Kurram, takes many bribes and realizes excessive revenue for himself, and if complaints are made to the Amir, His Highness passes over them, because he is an influential Sirdar, though after the death of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan he took part in stirring up strife in the family. He appears to have now desisted from such intentions. He owns about seven or eight lakhs of rupees in cash. His brother, Faiz Mahomed Khan, who possessed full authority in Turkistan, was killed on the Amir's side in the battle which took place at Bajgah. The Amir desires to see Sirdar Wullee Mahomed Khan in some occupation (to keep him out of mischief).



3. Khudai Nazar Khan Warduk is the Governor of Ghuznee; he realizes excessive revenue, and through partizan feeling wrongfully oppresses those who are supposed to be against him in politics. When he was lately at Kabul some people of the Andar tribe came to Kabul to complain against him to the Amir. His son placed their relations in prison. The Amir received this report, but in consequence of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan's matter he passed over these complaints which were about the misappropriation of Government money.

4. Naib Mahomed Alum Khan is the Governor of Turkistan. Having declared himself a well-wisher of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, he has gained the Amir's kindness. He exercises oppression over his subjects, and, besides the Government revenue, takes in different ways, horses and other presents in money, &c., to the value of about two lakhs of Rupees from the Chiefs of his territory every year for the Amir. After deducting all the expenses from the Government revenue, he forwards the surplus money to the Kabul treasury. He is more alert than the other Governors of Afghanistan. He has appointed spies in his territory and beyond his border. I did not hear that any Russian waited on him in Turkistan, but it is very probable that some Russians may be travelling in disguise in that country to collect information and send no written reports to the Amir about his frontier, but makes verbal representations to His Highness when he comes to Kabul. He has kept an Agent at Kabul who sends him information about Durbar matters.

As far as I could ascertain, Barat Ali, an Agent of Syud Jan, trader (who went to Bokhara and Samarcand), writes news at Kabul for the Russians. His letters go to Bokhara to another Agent of Syud Jan, and thence they are sent to the Russians, and thus the chain of communication is continued.

The following is a brief account of trade in Afghanistan:—On account of the security of the road merchandise is carried from Peshawur as far as Turkistan. As regards the approximate value of goods exported from and imported to Afghanistan and Bokhara, all goods pass through the Kabul city, and the octroi officials realize ten lakhs of Rupees a year. The tax is ostensibly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. ("Chehl-o-Yak") on value. According to this calculation the estimated value of all these goods must be assumed to be four crores of Rupees, but this estimate would be incorrect, because (1) when goods arrive at Kabul their value is fixed by those "dalals" who are servants of the Octroi Department, and they add 50 per cent. (i.e., things valuing Rupees 100 are considered worth Rupees 150), and the owners have to accept this arbitrary assessment; (2) afterwards the octroi officials add 20 per cent., making 170 per 100, and tax them accordingly; (3) at the time of the same goods leaving the Kabul city extra duty of different rates is levied on loads. In levying this duty indigo and tea are weighed along with their boxes, wrappers, &c., and their value is fixed according to the weight of each load. Under these circumstances the taxation appears roughly to be about one anna in the Rupee, or  $\frac{1}{10}$ , or just over 6 per cent. instead of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. as stated above, and the approximate value of these goods is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  crores (or 15 millions) of the Kabul Rupee, of which one Rupee equals 13 annas British Indian currency. Goods to the value of 75 lakhs of Rupees\* go through Peshawur towards Kabul. These goods can be divided into three parts: one part consists of piece-goods and some pashmina fabrics; another part contains tea; and of the third part half consists of indigo and half pedlars' wares, spices, &c. In exchange for these goods one-third or one-fourth of the sale proceeds is brought in gold coins of Russia and Bokhara, and the remainder mostly in silk and partly in skins, horses, charras, and silk clothing made at Bokhara. When I was lately at Kabul it was reported that hill teas are not appreciated at Bokhara, but I could not believe this, as letters from Bokhara were contradictory. Such reports were made before also, but they were without foundation. Should this rumour continue for one year, we can draw some inference as to its truth. After the Russians took possession of Samarcand, one or two noted merchants of Bokhara having become bankrupt took flight to Samarcand. Many of their creditors lost their money in consequence, and since then little trust is placed by traders on each other.

Trade in slaves and slave-girls is carried on in Afghanistan. In Herat and Kandahar Hazara slaves; in Turkistan partly Hazara slaves and partly Badakshan slaves, i.e., the Siahposh and Chatral slaves; and in Kabul partly Hazara and Badakshan slaves and partly Afghan slaves, i.e., of Khost and Zurmat, are sold. People of the Kabul city and of a village in its neighbourhood called Wazirabad, who are Shias, take goods for sale to the Hazara District, and buy in lieu of these goods young boys and girls from their relations. In like manner the people of Zurmat sell their boys and girls. As regards the Badakshan slave-girls, the Ruler of Chatral takes daughters and sisters from almost all accused persons as fine and sells them to Badakshan traders, who give them the designation of Siahposh because they much resemble the latter in complexion and appearance, and sell them on return to Badakshan. Under the name of "Siahposhes" they realize a better price. The Afghans of Kunar, &c., carry away six or seven Siahposhes every year for sale; their frontier adjoins Kafiristan, and by crossing the river (which intervenes between their country and the Kafiristan territory) on skins they kidnap any young boys or girls they may find and bring them to their country. If any special feud arises between the people of Kunar and Kafiristan, the latter also take away as many boys and girls of the former as possible by similar action. Many of the Badakshan slave-girls through their comeliness live comfortably either by being married or kept as concubines, but the Hazara slave-girls have always to live a hard life by being obliged to work.

Formerly newspapers received by the Durbar authorities from India were read to the Amir. In March last in one of these papers a translation of an extract from the *Indian*



*Public Opinion* about Sirdar Abdulla Khan was published, and the Amir was annoyed with its purport. His Highness therefore gave orders for the discontinuance of several of them, and now only the *Illustrated London News* is read to him.

The Amir has started a workshop for the manufacture of silk fabrics called "suf," one for making carpets, one for "jin," (or double "jin") and one for the preparation of broadcloth. On arrival of two well experienced artizans from Benares, one workshop for the manufacture of Benaresi embroidered "dupatas," &c., and one for making kinkhab, will be established.

My own observations about the assessment of Jellalabad, and my enquiries about the assessment of Kabul, show that an old assessment called the Kalandarkhani assessment is still in force. It is not one rate for all; the Afghans have to pay revenue in cash, and the Tajaks, &c., pay "sekot" (literally one-third), of which the following is an illustration:—

Supposing the produce of a plot of land to be one kharwar, or ten English maunds, out of this the Government takes—

1rd or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  maunds (net revenue).

12½ seers grain, Daman cess.

12½ „ „ Kalam (or Daftar) cess.

Two rupees for grass grown on the land.

And the Collectors take—

12½ seers grain for Rashadar (or Government watcher).

12½ „ „ for carriage of grain to the stack.

25 „ „ for Sheikhdar (who is like a tehsildar).

It appears that this assessment is not heavy if the crops be not injured, in which case the landowner is able to pay the above revenue and cesses, but in reality it is heavy, because (1) neither any revenue nor any cesses are remitted when crops are destroyed or injured with hail-storms or locusts; (2) when any crop is used for Government purposes proper compensation is not paid; (3) in supplying provisions for troops, &c., the owners do not receive proper pay; (4) on account of the imperfect administration, executive officers realise excessive revenue. In some places mustagirs for farmers hold leases and they collect excessive revenue, and no redress is afforded to the landowners. The farmer exercises criminal powers over land proprietors. This causes the cultivators to live in a distressed condition.

In lands which are held "kham" or under direct management, Sheikhdars exaggerate the weight of grain produced on lands in order to get more fee for themselves, and besides this they receive meals from proprietors so long as they remain with them. These Sheikhdars are not Government servants, but the adherents or agents of Governors.

There is no police in any of the territories of Kabul and Jellalabad. In those stations where judicial officers like thaunnadars are appointed, they are called foudjars. They receive Rupees 2 per tuman (=Rupees 20) of fines realized from accused persons, and therefore they seek opportunities to attach accusations, and if they succeed, they make very summary enquiry, and at once impose fines, and after receiving them credit  $\frac{2}{10}$ ths to Government, and take the remaining  $\frac{1}{10}$ th for themselves.

When I was in the Jellalabad District on my way to Kabul, and also on my return, I ascertained that dissension had been created between the Mohmunds of Basol (who are the subjects of the Governor of Jellalabad, and who pay revenue to him) and Nowroz Khan of Lalpoorah. Both parties seized property of each other. Many other people who have to deal with Nowroz Khan complained against him, and it appears that Shahmurd Khan, Governor of Jellalabad, is also somewhat annoyed with his actions. I think he interferes much with the "Ulasdari" matters. He acts agreeably to the intentions and instructions of the Kabul Durbar. When I was on my way to Kabul he was making arrangements for collecting levy troops, and when on my return I reached Lalpoorah these troops had been collected, and the Khan had expressed his intention to leave the next day against Haidar Khan, Chief of the Naogi (in the Bajour territory), and afterwards bring the Kandaharee Ulas, a section of the Mohmund tribe, into allegiance. Nowroz Khan owns in Jellalabad the villages of Baru, Sharshabi, Girdi, and Girdi-Kaj as a jaghire worth Rupees 40,000. Besides this he gets about sixty thousand rupees on account of taxation on rafts, timber, and escorting travellers ("Badraka"), and from fines imposed on accused persons. Thus his annual income amounts to about one lakh of rupees. He has about 300 infantry and 100 cavalry, who receive allowances from him. He has given his own horses to the cavalry. He takes no revenue from the people of his tribe (the Mohmunds) who live in the hills, but if he or his son visit their country, they feast him as well as his servants if he remains at night in their villages, otherwise he takes cash ziafats from them. He realizes heavy fines from them in cases of murder, grievous hurt, &c.

When I was at Jellalabad no watch was kept up by the Government servants of that place over the whereabouts of Bahram Khan (murderer of Major Macdonald), nor did I hear that any orders had been given for his apprehension. He through fear of his life kept himself at a distance of 2 or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  "koss" from the Afghan border, living at the foot of the Shinwari Hills, sometimes in Patan Bagh, and sometimes in other forts. It is probable that he does not associate with, or agree to be, a companion of any person through fear, lest he should be apprehended as notified by the British Government. His followers come occasionally to Pesh-Bulak, but no report is sent to Jellalabad.

During my sojourn at Kabul no mention was made by the Amir in my presence in favor of or against the Barukzai Sirdars in India, or in other parts of the world, nor did I hear that His Highness made any observations about them in my absence.

I reached Kabul *viâ* Abkhana in 11 days, and having remained there 18 days returned thence in seven days to Peshawur. From Peshawur, Dhaka is three stages *viâ* Abkhana and Tatara; the road is very difficult and hilly, and supplies are not procurable. From Gandumak, Butkhak is three stages, and supplies can be procured with difficulty. As, however, this road is not so insecure now as it was before, travellers congratulate in spite of these difficulties.

## APPENDIX XV.

### A COMPARISON OF THE PRESENT WITH THE PAST CONDITION OF KABUL UNDER AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN.

*I.—Past.*—After the death of Dost Mahomed Khan, Shere Ali displayed the greatest desire to acknowledge the protection and friendship of the British Government. He received British Agents and representatives with honor and distinction. He forwarded regular and really reliable information of the state of affairs on his own frontier and beyond, through the British Agent.

He regarded the enemies of the British Government as enemies to himself. In Durbar he spoke of the British Government, and treated communications received by him from the Governors-General of India with marked deference and respect.

His communications with Persia and other foreign States expressed no desire to be independent of the protection of the British Government, nor aimed at forming separate friendships and alliances.

In 1863, when the expedition against Mulka and Sittana was ordered, and British troops were employed at Umbeyla, the Akhoond of Swat circulated throughout Afghanistan instructions for a Jihad against the English. The assembly of Mohmunds under the orders of Saadut Khan of Lallpoora and his son, Sultan Khan, to attack the forts of Michni and Shubkud-dur, was disapproved of by Shere Ali, who sent his son, Mahomed Ali Khan, to Lalpoora and summoned Saadut Khan, the head of the Mohmund tribe, to Kabul, where he placed him in confinement, taking from him his government of the clan, which numbered 80,000 men. The influence and position of Saadut Khan at that time with the Mohmunds was singularly marked, and throughout Afghanistan he was looked upon as a man of importance, being the Amir's father-in-law.

A strong religious feeling was evinced against the action taken by the Amir in this case throughout the entire country.

Following on this, a series of misfortunes deprived Shere Ali successively of the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh, &c., till he was left with nothing but Herat in his possession. Even during these reverses he adhered faithfully in his allegiance to the professions made to the British Government, and showed no tendency to turn either to Persia or Russia for assistance. Had he disposed of the province of Herat at that time, and become practically subordinate to Russia through Persian influence, it would not have been surprising.

Mahomed Afzul Khan, Mahomed Azim Khan, and Abdool Rahman Khan prepared at this time, when in possession of Kabul, Balkh, and Kandahar, to eject the British Agent from Kabul, and made ready for a religious war against the English, the soldiers at Kabul receiving orders to dress their hair after the fashion of Ghazis.

Meanwhile, Shere Ali Khan in his misfortune received from the British Government neither aid in money or arms nor diplomatic support by recognition as Amir, the Government merely conveying to him an expression of their regret at his misfortunes.

Through the assistance of his son, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, and Mahomed Ismail Khan, the son of his brother, Mahomed Ameen Khan, he regained his kingdom and was firmly established as Amir on the 8th September 1868.

Afzul Khan was at this time dead, and Azim Khan and Abdool Rahman had fled from Kabul.

One of the first steps taken by him, after entering Kabul, was to eject Syud Abdool Jaleel Daghistani, *alias* Syud Rumi, a messenger from the Governor-General of Turkestan, who, for about 1½ years, had been in attendance on Sirdar Azim Khan in Kabul; he also ejected Peroze Shah, nephew of the old King of Delhi, who had taken refuge in Kabul, stating that he was an enemy to the British Government.

His public letters to the Government of India expressed his intention of adhering to the trust and the friendship he entertained towards the British, and he strictly expressed a desire for an interview with the Viceroy.

21st January 1869. Lord John Lawrence wrote to the Amir relative to the character of assistance he might expect from time to time to receive, His Majesty having, as it was stated, consented to the propositions laid before me by the Viceroy with reference to such assistance.

The argument adopted in this letter, *viz.*, that year by year the Governor-General should investigate the requirements of the Amir before recommending the assistance to be given, &c., caused the Amir to entertain great expectations from the British Government.

This letter put forward distinctly the policy of non-intervention while Lord Lawrence further explained that no fear of Russian aggression was entertained.

The Amir thoroughly understood that the Government of India desired in no sense to interfere with the internal administration of Afghanistan; at this time nothing indicated that the Government sought to use Afghanistan as a "buffer" against Russian advance in Asia.

The manner of the despatch of this communication of His Excellency the Viceroy was not calculated to gain what was required. A British officer carrying such a message would have been, at that time, welcomed in Kabul; his explanation of the Viceroy's views would have been valuable, and the barrier to British influence now existing had never been allowed to grow up.

The reply to the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy runs as follows:—

"It is apparent that your kindness and good-will towards this hopeful Government is greater than towards other Governments. That, notwithstanding your own safety and independence from all profit or loss which may occur, you still desire to see the strength of my Government: to this verbal expression you have given manifestation by open act, and have made it apparent to the whole world.

"In this supposed state of affairs should a single individual amongst mankind transgress against the desire of friendship, let him be overwhelmed by a thousand calamities. The gist of the matter is this: that I and my children, from generation to generation, will show neither carelessness nor neglect, under any circumstances, in seeking the welfare and in obeying the orders of Her Majesty the Queen."

In 1869 (29th March) at the Umballa Durbar Lord Mayo presented the Amir with a sword, and thus addressed him:

"I present this sword to Your Highness with the hope that you may be victorious over your enemies in the protection of your lawful territory, and that you may always succeed in the establishment of your kingdom. The Amir replied—

"Also over the enemies of the British Government."

At the last interview the Amir's confidential officer intimated that His Highness would not consent to the appointment of British Agents at Kabul, Balkh, and Herat; that, if it was necessary for the British Government to gain intelligence regarding the countries beyond the border of Afghanistan, the Amir himself would spend what was necessary for this purpose, and would communicate the intelligence received to the Government of India. From the Amir's accession up to the termination of the Durbar at Umballa His Highness received by way of subsidy

Rs.	12,00,000
For expenses when in India	63,000

6 Field guns | 6 Mountain guns.

Besides stand of arms.

The following explains in what engagements and complications involving expenditure the Amir has been engaged since he acquired Kabul:—

I.—In November 1868 Abdool Rahman Khan and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan made a movement on Kabul from Turkestan. They failed to march by the direct road in consequence of the snow, but reaching Zingam, in the province of Ghuzni, on the 4th January 1869, they were totally defeated and retired on Khorassan. Azim Khan then died in Merv.

II.—About the same time Mahomed Surwur Khan, the son of Mahomed Azim Khan, by the assistance of Sirfiraz Khan (Jabar Kheyli) and Noor Mahomed Khan (Taghawi) collected forces in the Taghau District to the north-east of Kabul.

The Amir despatched Sirdar Mahomed Uslum Khan (his brother) and Arsulla Khan (Jabar Kheyli), Ghilzaie, to meet the rebels. Near the pass of Dam Dirin and in the Sirowli range a series of skirmishes ensued. Noor Mahomed was captured, and the other Chiefs fled.

III.—At Balkh, in Turkestan, June 1869, Mahomed Ishak Khan, the son of Azim Khan, together with Nazir Hyder and several men in authority, were attacked on the part of the Amir by his Lieutenant Naib Alum Khan. Fighting lasted for three months when Naib Alum Khan was eventually victorious and Mahomed Ishak fled to Bokhara.

IV.—Sirdar Mahomed Ismail Khan, the son of Sirdar Mahomed Amin Khan, the Amir's brother, broke into rebellion in July 1869, in consequence of the Amir's having deprived him of the command of a regiment he had held from his father; he had prepared as far as he was able for an outbreak in Kabul, but his attempt to create a disturbance was frustrated, and he himself was captured and despatched to British territory to Kohat. He escaped from his escort in Kohat and made his way by Lallpoora to Kulab, in Turkestan. In 1870 he returned of his own accord to pay his respects to the Amir; the Amir again despatched him to India, where he was detained in the fort at Lahore. He died in April 1873.

His two brothers, Sirdar Zulfikar Khan, Sirdar Mahomed Saleh Jan, who were engaged with him, remain as State prisoners in Lahore.

V.—Mahomed Ishak Khan, son of Mahomed Azim Khan, arrived about this time at Charjui in company with the Amir of Bokhara, who had marched with a force to eject his rebellious son, Abdool Malik Tora, from Charjui, July 1869.

Abdool Malik Tora on his being turned out of Charjui fled to Balkh.

The Amir of Bokhara then returned home, but Mahomed Ishak Khan raising the Turkomans on the banks of the Oxus advanced into Afghan territory and gained possession of everything as far as Tukhtapool.

Amir Shere Ali then despatched General Daood Khan from Kabul, who had made two or three marches only, when at the end of August 1869 a battle was fought at Mazai-i-Chilguzi near Tukhtapool.

The battle was a severe one, but eventually Ishak Khan was defeated and fled across the Oxus to Bokhara.

VI.—Jehandar Shah, the nominee of Mahomed Azim Khan, was at that time Mir of Badakshan; on the accession of Shere Ali Khan as Amir at Kabul he refused to recognise his authority.

Shere Ali recalled Mir Mahmoud Shah who was in Kulab. He had been Mir before Jehandar Shah, and was ejected by Mahomed Azim. He on this sent his nephew, Mir Mirza Jan, to Kabul with a horse and presents, &c.

The Amir issued a firman appointing Mahmoud Shah to the Government of Badakshan, and directed Sultan Murad Beg, the Mir of Koondooz, to give him every assistance in establishing his authority.

Naib Mahomed Alum Khan of Balkh also received orders to support Mahmoud Shah.

Jehandar Shah abandoned the country without fighting, and made his way to Kulab.

Mahmoud Shah became Mir, and the revenue of Badakshan was fixed 60,000 (Mahomed Shaie) rupees.

1 Mahomed Shaie rupee = 1 rupee 4 annas of our coinage.

VII.—Mir Alum Khan of the Hutuk tribe, who was the head of the Hutuk tribe, had for a long while received yearly by way of jahire Rupees 40,000 from the Kandahar Treasury. On account of the support that this Chief had given to Mahomed Azim Khan, Amir Shere Ali stopped his allowance. On this he raised the standard of rebellion, assembled his tribe under arms, and declared himself Amir of Afghanistan, causing the Kutbah to be read in his own name. He was joined by the Tokhi tribe, and a revolt of considerable dimensions appeared imminent. Sirdar Shah Pussund Khan, Suftur Ali Khan (Kizilbash), and General Futteh Ali Shah with 15,000 men marched to attack the rebellious leader. The Amir's forces suffered a decided reverse at Kuttawas, but after three or four engagements Mir Alum Khan eventually fled and the rebel troops under his standard dispersed, December 1869 and January 1870.

This revolt threatened the Amir's hold of the Khelat country.

VIII.—Amir Shere Ali Khan originally intended the annexation of that part of Seistan which had formerly been under the authority of Ahmed Shaie and the Sirdars of Kandahar, his uncles (Meerdil Khan, Kohundil Khan, Purdil Khan, &c.) At this time he commenced making representations to the Government of India to the effect that the possession of Persian Seistan by the Shah was a usurpation, and that the Mir of Kaime, the Persian representative on the border, sanctioned raids, &c., into Furreh, Herat, Gurmeh, &c., by which disputes between Persia and Afghanistan were inevitable. Documents on this subject were despatched very frequently and in close succession. On enquiry it appeared that the Persian hold on Seistan was a firm one, and that the Shah had no intention of relaxing it in favor of the Amir. The Amir was informed of the relations between the British and the Persian Governments, and had explained to him the 6th Article of the Treaty of 1856 between these two Governments, which points out that whenever dispute shall arise between Persia and Afghanistan, the British Government shall act as umpire between them, but shall assist neither one nor the other, acting in such a manner that the dignity of the Shah of Persia may not suffer.

The Commission for the settlement of the Seistan boundary followed. The settlement arrived at, however, has caused the Amir of Kabul extreme disappointment.

IX.—Another serious complication was imminent in 1870, but was averted.

Abdool Malik Tora, the son of the Amir of Bokhara, originally fighting with the Russians at Samarcand, Karsh, and Shahr-i-Subz, subsequently rebelled against his father. When he was ejected from Charjui by the Amir of Bokhara, he at first entered Balkh, and afterwards made his way to Amir Shere Ali at Kabul, and sought his aid against his father and the Russians. The Amir contemplated the possibility of getting possession of Charjui and Kerki, under pretence of giving Abdool Malik Tora the assistance he desired; he even proposed to the British Government that he should make such an attempt, but was requested to refrain from any endeavour to add to his territories. In consequence of this he rejected Abdool Malik Tora's request, and directed him to leave the country after he had treated him with hospitality. The Amir received from the Viceroy thanks, &c., on account of his loyalty in this matter.



During 1870 it appeared in the Kabul Diaries that Naib Alum Khan of Balkh was in the habit of inflicting mutilation as a punishment on criminals. The Viceroy addressed the Amir on the subject, pointing out that such punishments were, in the eyes of European States, unbecoming to good Governments. The Amir at once accepted the advice given to him, and prohibited the further infliction of mutilation as a punishment.

X.—At the conclusion of 1870, Mir Sara Beg, Khan of Kulab, escaped from Kulab to Balkh on the arrival of a force from Bokhara to seize Kulab.

The Amir of Bokhara despatched Munsoor Khwaja as an Envoy to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, with a request that Mir Sara Beg might be handed over as a prisoner and sent to Bokhara. The Amir Shere Ali gave orders to the effect that answer should be given that it was unbecoming to give up any one who had sought protection under him. Naib Alum on this dismissed the Envoy summarily with an insulting speech. The Amir of Bokhara was at that time at Kurgan Tuppa when he heard of the return of his Envoy under the above circumstances; he was indignant, and contemplated sending for Abdool Rahman Khan who was at Karshi with some 250 sowars under Abdool Rahim Khan Tokhi, with the idea of helping him to recover Badakshan, Balkh, &c. Mir Jehandar Shah, Ex-Governor of Badakshan, was with the Amir of Bokhara at the time; he received advice to endeavour at once to recover his old Mirship. In December 1870, Jehandar Shah crossed the Oxus and attacked and burnt the fort of Yongkela, the frontier fort of Badakshan on the Oxus.

However, the Amir of Bokhara gave up the idea of employing Abdool Rahman and here the matter ended; but in Kabul, a great deal was made of this with the idea of obtaining assistance towards the protection of the frontier from the British Government in money and arms. The Amir directed false reports to be submitted to Kabul from Naib Alum Khan and Mir Mahmoud Shah of Badakshan and Sultan Murad Beg, Mir of Koondooz. These he worked up in the Kabul Diaries to mislead the Government of India. He gave a detailed list of troops disposed on the frontier to meet invasion as follows:—

1,000 Sowars at Yung Kala.
1,000 „ at the fort of Zal above Koondooz.
1,000 „ „ „ Kisht-Tippa above Kulm.
1,000 „ at the ferry of Khwaja Saleh.

No direct application was made for money, &c., but the reports were trumped up in the hope that the Government of India would propose assistance.

The Amir then wrote to the Amir of Bokhara proposing to give up Mir Sara Beg of Kulab in exchange of Abdool Rahman, Jehandar Shah, and Mahomed Isbak Khan; nothing however was done in the matter.

XI.—It is customary in the Mahomedan countries of Asia for Rulers and Chiefs to limit the number of their wives to four in accordance with the precepts of the Koran: many however exceed this number, and also fill their harems with female slaves. No matter however how many may be termed wives, to one alone is accorded a superior position in their love as the recognised as “Dilkhwah”. In the household of the Amir of Kabul the first lady has always been the daughter of Mir Afzul Khan of Kandahar, who is the mother of Abdoolla Jan, now “heir-apparent;” the children of this wife and her relatives have received greater attention than others. The affection which Amir Shere Ali displayed for Mahomed Ali Khan during his life, and his expressed intention to proclaim him his heir-apparent, were due, not to

The mother of Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan. the position accorded to the mother of that Sirdar, but to his personal qualities and the reliance which the Amir had learned to place in him.

Mahomed Ali Khan was killed in action at Yulduk near Kandahar in the month of Mohurram by the hand of Mahomed Amin Khan, his uncle.

The Amir specially selected Abdulla Jan to accompany him to Umballa to the Durbar held by Lord Mayo: this was accepted in Kabul and India as an indication of preference for the mother of this son and of additional affection towards his youngest children, while others perceived in it the first step towards declaring his intention of proclaiming Abdulla Jan his heir-apparent.

The other wives of the Amir complained of the preference shown on this occasion, and the first indication of a change in the relations existing between Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan and his father dates from this time. The mother of Abdulla Jan, too, took occasion to influence the Amir against Mahomed Yakub Khan.

The Amir at this time, to appease his son, promised to give him the Governorship of Herat and Kandahar; this promise however was long withheld, and Mahomed Yakub Khan in September 1870 left Kabul without his father's leave, accompanied by Ayub Khan, his

The mother of Mahomed Yakub Khan is the daughter of Saadat Khan Mahomed of Lallpurna.

brother, several Sirdars of rank, and a regiment of cavalry. The Amir sent a force in pursuit which failed to come up with him; the Governors of Kandahar and Herat were, however, apprised of the Sirdar's approach and directed to be in readiness against his coming. General Feramoz Khan, who was Commander-in-Chief, was at that time in Balkh in Turkestan, and Sirdar Mahomed Uslum Khan was at Khost: these were the most trusted of the Amir's officers, and he recalled them for the purpose of despatching them in pursuit of his son.

When Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan reached Ghuznee, the Governor closed the gates; he consequently made direct for Kandahar. Sirdar Shere Ali Khan (Hazara), the Governor, closed the gates and prepared to defend the town: depending however on the sympathy of adherents within the walls, Mahomed Yakub Khan attacked the gate of Bar-Doorain; he however failed in gaining admittance and was driven from Kandahar, 10th October 1870. The Commander-in-Chief and Mahomed Uslum Khan were at this time approaching Kandahar. On hearing this the Sirdar fled by way of Girishk and would have gone to Herat, but anticipating failure owing to the limited number of his following he made for Seistan.

Mir Afzul Khan, Kandaharee, the maternal grandfather of Abdulla Jan, was Governor of Girishk; he exerted himself to bring about a reconciliation between the Amir and Mahomed Yakub Khan; but the arrival of General Feramoz Khan, with the troops under him, prevented his arranging anything definitely with the Sirdar previous to his further flight.

The Amir's troops arranged to attack Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan at Washir, but having gained information of the intention of the leaders he fled.

During the first three months of 1871 Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan remained in the territory of Seistan making frequent raids upon Afghan territory. The Amir applied to the Government of India to prevail on the Shah of Persia to remove the Sirdar from the border or to send him into Afghanistan. The arrangement through which in April 1871 Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan gained possession of Herat without opposition on the part of the Amir is not apparent.

He, however, established himself in Herat making repeated protests of his submission and desire to return to Kabul; it was however long before he came to Kabul, where he appeared early in 1872 and received his father's forgiveness, and was appointed Governor of Herat.

At the instigation of Sirdar Uslum Khan about this time, Feramoz Khan, Commander-in-Chief, and a man of trust was assassinated. On this account Sirdar Uslum Khan and his brother, Mahomed Hossein Khan, who was civil Governor in Kabul, were executed by the Amir's orders.

XII.—In 1873 Mir Jehander Shah, Ex-Governor of Badakshan, was wandering in Shighnan and Wakhan and eventually made his way to Chitral to Aman-ul-Mulk, and at this time he did his utmost to stir up the population of Badakshan. In consequence of their dislike to Mir Mahmoud Shah and their objection to the taxes levied by him, the people of Badakshan were doubtless ready to welcome Mir Jehander Shah. On this they assembled and endeavoured to eject Mahmoud Shah. The Amir upon this directed Naib Alum Khan to move into Badakshan and remove Mahmoud to Kulla, and include the Badakshan province in his own Government. The people of Badakshan however resisted Naib Alum Khan, but were subdued. At the present time there is, consequently, tyranny practised on the people of Badakshan, wives and daughters have lately been taken as slaves, and boys have been sent to Kabul and Balkh to be attached to the harems of the Chiefs.

The Mir of Shighnan has given his sister to Naib Alum Khan, and all the Chiefs of Wakhan and of Ishkashm and Tejebok have forwarded female slaves and boys for the Naib and for despatch to Kabul.

The Mir of Wakhan visited Naib Alum Khan in Balkh. Meanwhile the people of Yasseen and Chitral under Mir Wullee complained of the tyranny of Aman-ul-Mulk to Naib Alum Khan.

In July 1874 Mir Jehandar Shah and his brother, Shahzada Hossein, supported by the hill tribes of Badakshan, and some of the people of Chitral made a raid on Badakshan. Naib Alum Khan immediately moved to Fyzabad, a skirmish ensued, on which Jehandar Shah, beaten back, escaped by the Nakhon Pass to Chitral. Orders

Kabul Diary, 31st July. then came from Kabul to Naib Alum to subdue Chitral, and arrange for the payment by Aman-ul-Mulk of a yearly payment to Kabul in recognition of submission. The same orders directed the reinstatement of Mir Wullee in Yasseen. Mir Wullee was despatched in the direction of Yasseen, Naib Alum arranging to send Aman-ul-Mulk and arrange for his regaining the Government of Yasseen.

Kabul Diary, 4th to 6th August. The latest report on the state of affairs in Badakshan is in Kabul Diary of 25th and 27th August. A daughter of the Aman-ul-Mulk has been betrothed to the heir-apparent at Kabul and Jehandar Shah is now in Bokhara territory.

XIII.—Syud Nur Mahomed Shah visited Simla in 1873 as Envoy of the Amir of Kabul (August) at the time that the Yarkund Mission was leaving British territory. This Envoy came to explain the Amir's views regarding the subsidy paid him by the British Government.

The Syud made a favorable impression upon His Excellency and upon all the officers of the Government whom he met and promised on the part of the Amir concession on many points desired by the Government.

He declared that there would be no difficulty in the return of the Yarkund Mission through Kabul, and that arrangements for postal communication with the Mission might easily be made through Kabul.

The Amir throughout has made application for a fixed allowance from the Government, instead of gifts at intervals and at the pleasure of the Government of India.

On the return of Syud Nur Mahomed, and the receipt of the news that the grant made last year would be forwarded, the Amir changes his opinion on all matters under consideration with the British Government.

News was at once communicated from Kabul of disturbances in several directions, notably of the rebellion of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, of the necessity for moving a force to Bajour, &c., and in the beginning of 1874 rumours of disturbance in Kabul were circulated persistently. The Amir gave out that Mirakhor Ahmed Khan had been turned out of Herat by Yakub Khan. In Kabul it was well known that Ahmed Khan had arrived at Kabul on the part of the Sirdar to make representations to the Amir to the effect that the revenues of Herat did not meet the expenditure of the province: that he would be satisfied if Furrak and Maimena were added to his Governorship. Ahmed Khan stated in Kabul that the Amir's intention was to make this additional grant.

During the current year 1874 the display of illuminations, &c. in honor of the acknowledgment of Abdulla Jan as "heir-apparent," have increased the ill-feeling and disgust of Sirdar Yakub Khan. Up to the present time, however, in all the documents which have reached Kabul, he has addressed his father in terms of humility and respect. He has remonstrated, however, on the chance of the army now maintained in Kabul being used against him, and for the ruin of the house of the reigning Barukzaies. The Amir has not yet addressed him in terms implying disfavor or distrust.

It has been consequently stated that the difference between Yakub Khan and his father is feigned, and that they are acting with one object: this, however, is unquestionably an erroneous view of the present state of affairs; for the acknowledgment of Abdulla Jan has been cause of offence sufficient to the Sirdar, and the Amir is well aware of the intrigues of his son and of his professed determination not to allow his brother to succeed the Amir in Kabul, and that the entire tribe of Mahomed Shinwari and the people of Ningrar are completely under the influence of Sirdar Yakub Khan, and would join him in revolt.

The Amir has collected troops and has despatched them to Zurmat, anticipating necessity for a move on Herat, but there has been no outbreak hitherto. The arrangements made by the Sirdar in Herat for increasing the troops at his disposal, &c., have been no secret. The Amir's counsellors, however, appear to think that there will be no open hostility indulged in.

The Amir in writing to the Sirdar drew comparisons between his present behaviour (27th August) and that of Abdool Rahman Khan towards his father and uncle. In reply, Yakub Khan wrote, saying that he was in no way a rebellious son, but that he suffered from his father's displeasure. "Mun Khalaf pisr-i-shuma mi bashum, na-khalaf wo bukarah pisr-i-shuma u'estum."

It is rumoured that the disputes between father and son are indulged in solely for the purpose of ascertaining who are their real friends and who are their enemies—in the same way as they did long ago; and by so doing discovered the intended treachery of Sirdars Uslum Khan and Mahomed Hossein Khan. Also that the British Government may be led to believe that the Sirdar is being forced to accept Russian aid and advice, and that if he were independent, he would join Russia or Persia, and that they should give a further subsidy and arms to the Amir.

It appears clearly to be the Amir's intention to bring the countries of Upper and Lower Chitral, Bajour, Wakhan, Shighnan, Maimena, Darwaz and of the Wuzceree tribes on the frontiers of Dehra Ismail Khan and Bunao directly under his protection by the erection of forts and the location of garrisons, as well as to establish a line of forts on the banks of the Oxus towards its source.

For this purpose he desires a regular monthly or yearly subsidy from the Government of India; he, however, desires that there should be no interference on the part of the Government with the arrangements he proposes to make. He has no intention of allowing any influence to the Government of India in his country.

At the present time the Amir's advisers counsel him in direct opposition to the wishes of the Government of India. In the first place preventing him from giving over offenders, murderers, &c., against English law who have escaped to Kabul territory, they argue that Dost Mahomed Khan and Azim Khan before him never did such things, and that therefore it is unsuitable for him.

In Azim Khan's time the Government applied for the murderer of one Beau, a strolling player, who attempted to reach Kabul. Azim Khan would not give him up even refusing the usual price of blood. For this reason the Amir would not consent to give up Bahram Khan, the murderer of Major Macdonnell, but allowed him to escape to Swat. The Amir is aware that as far as evidence, which has been made public, goes, Mir Wullee stands charged with the murder of Mr. Hayward, and that he has not yet cleared himself before the Government of India of this imputation; yet the Amir has consented to cause his reinstatement in Yassin as Mir.

III.—The Amir has practically closed the Khyber route to travellers and traders, and has not the smallest intention of allowing it to be opened.

IV.—The Amir has forbidden the Native Agent representing the Government of India from visiting in his Court excepting at his own Durbar and at the house of the "heir-apparent;" this order was given on the death of Feramoz Khan at which time it was rumoured that Mahomed Uslum Khan had received assistance in money through the Agency.

V.—The Amir has forbidden the Governors of his provinces, &c., to refrain from acting on any communication that may reach them from the Government of India excepting under express orders from Kabul. Naib Alum has rebuked Mir Futteh Ali Shah for his attentions to the officers of the Yarkund Mission under Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, and has demanded from him the presents he has received.

Shah Abdool Rahim, Mir of Tohkassine, and Shah Yusuf Ali, Mir of Shighnan, and Aman-ul-mulk have, all of them, accused Mir Futteh Ali Shah and Naib Alum of intriguing, &c. Their enmity against Futteh Ali Shah arises from two or three causes.

I.—Alif Beg, Ex-Governor of Sirikol, Tashkurgan, is a brother-in-law of Yusuf Ali, of Shighnan, his sister being married to a brother of Yusuf Ali Khan. At his brother's death Murdan Ali Shah (the son of Futteh Ali Shah) married the widow without Yusuf Ali Khan's consent. Murdan Ali Shah has divorced a daughter of Aman-ul-mulk sending her home to Chitral.

VI.—The Amir advised the Russian Governor-General of Turkistan of the selection of Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent, and has received congratulation in return.

VII.—Naib Alum Khan keeps up regular communication with the Russian Officer in Samarkand, &c., and it is commonly believed in Balkh that the political leanings of the Amir are at this time towards Russia.

VIII.—At the commencement of this year it became known that communications had passed between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Amir of Kabul, the former offering to assist the latter with loans of money, &c. The Maharaja's influence and money reaches the British Agency now in Kabul.

IX.—The Amir refuses admission into his territories to European officers, nor has he ever received a British Embassy in Kabul, nor has he at present the slightest intention of inviting them to visit him.

X.—The excuse of the Amir put forward to prevent the return of the Yarkund Mission through his territories was a mere fabrication. The reception and entertainment of the British officers of the mission in Kashgar by the Amir, who is a comparatively new friend to our Government, was ostentatiously friendly and cordial. The freedom he has given his visitors and the unusual character of the Commercial Treaty he has made by which Hindoo and Mahomedans obtain equal privileges, have been marked features in the diplomatic negotiations conducted with Kashgar. The Amir resented the despatch of an officer bearing a letter from Her Majesty the Queen to the Amir of Kashgar, and is reported to have said in Kabul—if the Government of India had matters to arrange with Yakub Beg of Kashgar, why didn't they en-

trust the business to me, and I would have arranged it satisfactorily. The Amir now argues that British India has so great an interest in his strength and in the permanence of his rule that we are dependent on him, but that no steps are taken by the Government of India to strengthen his frontier

or to give him real assistance. The Amir now wishes to gain an influence in Yarkund on the footing of former days, when the Mir of Badakshan kept an Aksakal (Vakil) at Yarkund for the protection of traders as well as at Kashgar and Khotan. During the Chinese occupation there were some 6,000 houses belonging to Badakshees in Kashgar territory, and from there the Aksakal forwarded a yearly sum to the Mir of Badakshan.

What has been the Amir's reason for increasing the strength of his army?

At the time when the Persian army was engaged against Herat in 1856, Amir Dost Mahomed Khan maintained an army as under:—

*Permanent.*—16 Regiments Infantry of 800 men each.

3 Regiments Cavalry of 300 sowars each.

1 Field Artillery Battery of five guns and one small mortar distributed amongst the fortified places in the 76 guns of various calibre. Besides this one Mountain Battery.

3,500 men, *Yazarchi*, armed with wall pieces.

1,500 men, Infantry. Irregulars formed of police.

20,000 Irregular sowars under their own Chiefs.

On the 22nd January 1857, it was stipulated in the Treaty made with Dost Mahomed Khan that the Amir should maintain his forces of cavalry and artillery at their existing strength, and that he should never have less than 18,000 infantry, comprising 13 regular regiments of 1,000 each, 5,000 men being distributed in garrisons, &c.

The Government at the same time stipulated to pay the Amir Rupees 1,00,000 per mensem during the continuance of the operations against Herat.

In the 4th Clause of this Treaty it was agreed that officers appointed by the Government of India should be responsible that this money was spent advisedly in *bona fide* military operations and in the maintenance of the army. That they should not, however, interfere with the payment of troops nor give advice to the Amir with reference to the management of his forces, nor should interfere with the civil administration.

At the accession of Shere Ali Khan the army of Kabul consisted of 40,000 men of all arms. Mahomed Afzul Khan and Mahomed Azim Khan maintained in Kabul, Kandahar, and Turkistan a total of 24,000 men.

From 1868 to 1872 the average strength of Shere Ali's troops were as follows:—

<i>Balkh.</i>	
6 Infantry Regiments of 600 men.	3 Field Batteries (horse).
4 Cavalry " 200 to 250 men.	1 " Battery (mule).
<i>Herat.</i>	
6 Infantry Regiments of 600 men.	2 Cavalry Regiments of 300 men.
	3 Field Batteries.
<i>Kandahar.</i>	
3 Infantry Regiments of 600 men.	1 Cavalry Regiment of 300 men.
	2 Field Batteries.
<i>Kabul.</i>	
8 Infantry Regiments of 600 men.	5 Cavalry Regiments of 300 men.
	3 Field Batteries.
Jezarche, 2,500 men.	Irregular Cavalry (under its own Chiefs, 14,000)
6 Mortars, 1 Field Battery, 1 Mountain Battery received at Amballa Durbar.	

At the end of 1873, and in the beginning of the present year, the Amir declared his permanent army to consist of 80,000 men of all arms apart from the irregular cavalry of Afghanistan: it is, however, improbable that more than 40,000 men were ever equipped and drilled as a standing army in the Amir's dominions.

No doubt exists that during the present year the Amir's arrangements for adding to the armament and equipment have been greatly developed.

The returns existing in Kabul in connection with the collection of the revenue bring the population of the provinces now acknowledging the Amir's authority up to 25,35,000 men.

The same authority fixes his revenue, exclusive of pensions and salaries paid through jaghires, &c., 1,25,00,000 of Sicca Rupees = 13½ annas each.

In time of war the following tribes would, it is believed in Kabul, assemble to assist the Amir:—

Afreedees of the Khyber.	Bajaour.
Bussec Kheyl.	Dir.
Adam Kheyl.	Swat.
The men of Tira.	Bonair.
Mohmunds of (Tartara, Abkhana Kripa Pundiali).	Chitral.

The Amir's most dangerous enemies now living are—

1. Abdool Rahman Khan, son of Amir Afzul Khan, now resident in Samarkand.
2. Sikunder Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, formerly Governor of Herat, resident in Russian territory.
3. Sirdar Shah Nawaz Khan, son of the same, a traveller in Turkey, Persia, &c.
4. Sirdar Mahomed Ishak Khan, son of Amir Mahomed Azim Khan.
5. Sirdar Mahomed Surwur Khan (Nos. 4 and 5 are in confinement in Kabul).
6. Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan, younger brother of the Amir, with his two sons (expatriated, now in Dehra Doon).
7. Sirdars Mahomed Umr Khan, Mahomed Zaman Khan, Ahmed Khan, brothers of the Amir, expatriated, living at Ambala.
8. Sirdar Jellal-ood-deen Khan, son of Wazeer Mahomed Akbar Khan (expatriated, Resident at Rawul Pindie).
9. Sirdar Zulfikar Khan, Sirdar Mahomed Saleh Khan, sons of Mahomed Ameen Khan, nephews of the Amir (expatriated, now in the fort at Lahore).



Through the intervention of the Government of India, the Amir has been and is protected from the intrigues and designs of most of the above.

The stipulation between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia, defining the Oxus as the boundary of Afghan territory from Wood's Lake to the ferry of Khoja Saleh, and further west is likely to prove a cause of difficulty to the Amir.

Karki and Charjui are on the south bank of the Oxus, and in these places the Amir of Bokhara holds ground on the Afghan side of the river. The main road to Herat passes through these places.

Russia and Persia have formally acknowledged that Herat is Afghan territory.

The Amir complained through his Envoy of the unsatisfactory character of the boundary in its more eastern part, the districts of Shighnan, Roshan, and even Wakhan comprising villages and land to the north of the river, and that a portion of the Pamir rightly known as Afghan territory was excluded by this boundary. Recent geographical enquiry, and the light thrown on these matters by the travels of the Yarkund Mission, are likely to raise the question whether the stream flowing from Wood's Lake be the real source of the Oxus, and give confirmation to the statement made by the Amir's Envoy.

Had the Amir welcomed the Yarkund Mission all doubt on these points might have been set at rest, and the boundary might have been clearly defined.

In 1870 General Kauffman, Governor of Turkestan, wrote to the Amir that he was under the protection of the British Government, and that friendship existed between the Russian and the British Governments. That he (General Kauffman) had, in consequence of this friendship, refused aid to Abdool Rahman Khan, who had applied to him for assistance against Amir Shere Ali.

The Amir has a regular staff of newspaper readers, who translate for his benefit all that is written and has been written in the English newspapers; he gives particular attention to the past relations of Great Britain and Russia: he consequently places no trust on the present friendship of Russia and England. He is informed of every little newspaper article bearing on the affairs of Kabul which appears in the Indian newspapers and is irritated by them, and indignant with the British Government attaching a genuine significance to the numerous suggestions and proposals put forward.

Amongst his readers is a Bengali, who lately read him a paper in Durbar, indicating that the first Afghan campaign originated in the fear of a joint advance on India of Russia and Persia, and that the Persian advance on Herat was made at Russian instigation, and that the British Government desired an effectual barrier against Russian advance beyond its northern and western frontier. This paper in fact indicated the policy of a "bufferzone."

The newsreader subsequently read and explained the nature of the Treaty between England and Persia in 1814, in the first Article of which the Shah of Persia agreed to refuse assistance or leave to pass through his dominions to any European nation seeking to attack British India, and agreed to act in conjunction with Great Britain against any force moving by a more easterly line through Bokhara or Samarkand. In Article VIII the Shah of Persia agreed, in the event of an attack upon India by the Afghans, to maintain an army at the expense of the British Government for the purpose of acting against Afghanistan.

By Article IX it was stipulated that in the event of disagreement between Persia and Afghanistan, England would remain neutral, but that she would always be ready to act as arbitrator in their disputes when called upon to do so.

The conditions under which this Treaty was drawn up have entirely changed; but in hearing it read the Amir applied it to his own position in the present day as a barrier against Russia, similar to Persia in former days, and expressed his opinion that for this reason alone he should receive a fixed and regular allowance in money from the Government of India for the maintenance of his army. He now treats communications relating to British interests when read in Dubar with marked disrespect and not as formerly.

In consequence of the continued military operations and disputes between the sons of Dost Mahomed Khan which followed his death, the condition of the landowners and cultivators throughout Afghanistan has been brought down to that of comparative poverty and insignificance.

The condition of the people of Afghanistan.

Visitors from Kabul on witnessing the freedom enjoyed in British India, the security to property, free trade, and light taxation are wont to compare their own condition in Kabul to that of the Israelites under Pharoah. They speak of the absence of justice in judicial matters, excessive taxation, and labor. The Shials and Sunnies of Kabul are in fact discontented, and resent the present system of Government under the Amir.

The former habits of the more important amongst the tribe-leaders and landowners are much changed, with reference to their inclination to indulge in perpetual feuds and quarrels and to resent the slightest dealing with the unbeliever! The younger sons of such have been forced into his standing army by the Amir: the tax upon the produce of their land has been raised.

Jaghires formerly given to some of the principal subjects have been taken from them, others have had their jaghires reduced.

The Moollahs and religious doctors in Kabul resent the absence of the Amir from the Musjid on Fridays, and his failure to indulge in any outward show of religion.

The nomination of Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent was an unpopular measure, and has never had the approval of the people.

The following men, resident in Kabul, are in the pay and employment of the Maharaja of Kashmir:—

I.—Moonshee Bukhtiar Khan, Moonshee attached to the British Agency. (Two letters of this man relating to money dealings with the Maharaja and his Dewan Kirpa Ram are in Faiz Buksh's possession.)

II.—Syud Mustafa Shah (Kashmiri) (a seller of pashmeena cloths, &c., Gomashta of His Highness the Maharaja.

III.—Seth Elahi Buksh of Peshawur (paracha) who has commercial houses in Calcutta, Bombay, Peshawur, Kashmir, Kabul, Tashkend, Bokhara, and has commercial dealings with all the principal Mahomedan houses in Asia.

IV.—Mahomed Ameen Sehti, a paracha of Peshawur.

V.—Khan Bahadur Lohain. Bukhtiar Khan sends regular intelligence on all subjects to Kashmir.

---

This report, drawn up by Moonshee Faiz Buksh, has been translated by Captain Chapman.

*The 29th Sept. 1874.*

(Sd.) T. D. FORSYTH.

---

Note on a comparison of the present with the past condition of Kabul under Amir Shere Ali Khan, drawn up by Moonshee Faiz Buksh, attached to the Kashgar Mission.

FAIZ BUKSH is well known to the Government of India as a native official of great intelligence and experience, who has travelled through Kabul, Badakshan, Bokhara, and Kokand.

The information which he has from time to time submitted to the Government of India has been found to be generally accurate and reliable. There is no official, European or Native, who has a superior acquaintance to his with the actions and feelings of the rulers and people across the North-Western Frontier of India.

This paper has been drawn up by him voluntarily and without my knowledge till it was presented by him for translation.

His views are derived from his own sources of information, quite independent of that brought by Ibrahim Khan and others.

His opinion that Amir Shere Ali wishes to receive a regular subsidy from the British Government, without allowing us any advantage in return, and in fact that the necessities of the case make him master of the situation, is quite in accordance with what I heard in Kashgar where Syud Yakub Khan told me the popular opinion was that we had engaged to pay the revenues of Peshawur to the Amir, and yet that our alliance was anything but popular.

If it be true that Shere Ali is coquetting with Russia, it is by no means to be inferred that he has any preference for her alliance, or desires to see her advance south of the Oxus: but merely that he pays court to the power he dreads most. He would gladly be rid of Russia and England, but being between these two great powers, he wishes to play one off against the other. He knows or thinks that we cannot afford to drive him entirely into the arms of Russia, and so he takes opportunity of our necessities.

The story which comes from several quarters as well as from Faiz Buksh of the Amir's intention to attack Kashgar is put forward with a purpose, and need not be seriously entertained.

It is quite probable that he may send Envoys over to Yarkund to propose a renewal of the Aksakali dues, which were formerly paid to the Ruler of Badakshan. But he could not enforce his demand, for he has quite enough work on hand at home.

I look upon the whole story as part of a systematic plan for disturbing Amir Yakub Khan in the enjoyment of his sovereignty and for sowing in his mind distrust of us.

Much the same may be said of the story of a Chinese attack. Mr. Wade has told us that the Russian Ambassador at Peking incites the Chinese to make an attempt to recover their lost provinces, but M. Stremounkhov told me it was not Russia's policy to resuscitate decaying powers: and it would not at all suit them to see the Chinese exclusive policy restored in Kashgar. The tone of the articles in Russian papers clearly indicates their views, which are to derive advantage to themselves from threatened disturbances in their neighbour's territory by interposing friendly offices for which some equivalent will be assuredly demanded. It is curious to observe how similar the tone adopted by Russia towards Amir Yakub Khan is to

that held towards Turkey. At one time Russia disturbed the Sublime Porte with menaces of invasion. But after the Crimean war, the Russian Ambassador has taken pains to let the world know that the Czar is the Sultan's best friend. Exactly the same language has been held towards Yakub Khan. As long as we were kept off the field, the European Press was filled with stories of his atrocities, and it was represented to be in the interests of humanity that Russia should interpose her civilizing influence in Eastern Turkestan. But as soon as the success of this mission became a fact, a marked change came over the spirit of the Russian Press. Stories of Chinese advance are circulated through Europe, and the advantage of preserving Yakub Khan from destruction are ably portrayed. The chances of our sending any effective aid in time of real danger are known to be remote, and therefore Russia is the power to which the Amir must look for help. If Russia really deprecated the advances of China westward, we may be quite sure no such attempt would be made. But judging from our experience of Russian diplomacy, it is reasonable to suppose that she will not discourage, if she does not actually favor, the Chinese advance till it has proceeded just sufficiently far to suit her own views, and then she will step in and reap considerable advantage. Inaction on our part will therefore be all the more acceptable to Russia.

(Sd.) T. D. FORSYTH.

## APPENDIX XVI.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 108, Chapter VI.* ]

### OPINION OF THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF THE PUNJAB (SIR R. H. DAVIES) AND OTHER PUNJAB OFFICERS ON THE QUESTION OF LOCATING ENGLISH RESIDENTS AT HERAT OR KANDAHAR, &c. (MARCH-APRIL 1875.)

Copy of a Minute by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on the enquiries contained in the letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 48 C.P., dated the 25th March 1875.

*Question 1.*—I have always had the impression that in the present state of affairs the Amir would not willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Kandahar or at either place, and from a perusal of the secret papers in this Office and of Captain Grey's statement, it seems to me extremely doubtful whether His Highness ever intended to be understood as expressing such consent. My belief is that while he may have been ready to acquiesce in the appointment of mere news-writers, such as were Mr. Masson or Shahamat Ali before the occupation of Afghanistan, he never was ready to acquiesce in the appointment of Political Agents.

*Question 2.*—I do not think the presence of Residents at either of the places named would be advantageous to the British Government. On the contrary, I think their presence against the Amir's wish would irritate him personally and would disincline him to communicate information to them himself or to allow them to acquire it. On the other hand, the Residents might be courted by His Highness' opponents, which would add to his vexation; or they might be insulted with the direct object of embroiling him with our Government. Distrust and alienation on his part would not be unlikely to lead to complaint on ours; interference might follow on complaint, and interference would certainly be met with open or secret resistance. Nor can I see how a Resident at Kandahar or Herat is better placed for acquiring early information of Russian movements than one at Meshed. At the same time, as the Amir has professed his willingness himself to procure information, there could be no harm in requiring him to do so promptly and regularly, though I am much mistaken if he would require much pressing on this head if he were under any apprehension of impending encroachment on his territories.

*Question 3.*—The information contained in the bi-weekly diaries of the Native Agent at Kabul is for the most part correct. He has always appeared to me to be extremely cautious in what he writes, and to eschew superfluous details. It is probable that his influence with the Amir depends in a considerable measure on his abstinence from criticism on the internal state of Afghanistan and on the persons trusted by the Amir. On the whole, I consider this reticence favorable to British interests and calculated to give weight to advice which the Agent on serious occasions may be authorized to put forward. I do not think that any innovations on the existing system would at the present time be of any advantage, and I consider that the Amir having now got Herat into his own hands will probably be himself sensitive of any menace to it, and will not be slow to apprise the British Government thereof.

Opinion of SIR R. POLLOCK, Commissioner of Peshawar.

*Question 1.*—I am quite convinced that His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan would *not* willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place, and that his dislike to such an arrangement would only be short of what he would feel if asked to consent to the location of such an officer at his capital. As regards the past, it is well known to Government that the strongest objection has hitherto existed to such nominations. Major Lumsden's deputation to Kandahar was only agreed to ungraciously when the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan found that only on this condition could he obtain the valuable subsidy promised by our Government.

In my judgment nothing has occurred since that time to lessen the dislike of the Afghan Government to allow European officers to take up a permanent position in their country while one additional reason for their not unnatural dislike to such a measure has arisen. The recent action of Russia, and specially her military operations in the Khanate of Khiva, would lead the Amir and his councillors to believe that any permission granted to the British Government to send Agents to Herat or Kandahar or to both places would be certainly followed by a similar demand from the Russian side.

*Question 2.*—I am equally convinced that the result of sending such officers would not be advantageous, assuming my previous statement to be correct, *viz.*, that the Agents would be there contrary to the wish of the Amir and his councillors.

We know what occurred in Major Lumsden's case, and how impossible he found it to bring any influence to bear usefully or to obtain valuable information for his Government; and although it may certainly be urged that the circumstances were peculiar, and that the

breaking out of the mutiny or insurrections of 1857 lowered our prestige for a time and led to the serious discussion of plans for the invasion of British India, I feel quite sure myself that more favorable circumstances would not have produced good results, and that from the Amir's point of view, excellent reasons can be brought forward in justification of the dislike to all interference which I believe to exist.

*Question 3.*—There is not much to be said against the accuracy of the news from week to week submitted by the Kabul Agent, though the sufficiency of it may doubtless be questioned—any Native Agent who took a perfectly independent tone at Kabul and made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government, without reference to the wishes of the Amir, all information that he believed to be correct would very shortly find his position at Kabul unbearable.

Obvious objections exist to the employment regularly of paid secret correspondents, and I am myself inclined to recommend that we should continue to content ourselves with receiving the official diaries, supplementing and checking them by the occasional employment of Agents such as the person whose narrative was lithographed in the jail press here, and whose second narrative is now in course of being printed, or the person whose reports, received recently through Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, were so full of interest and, in many particulars, correct. Secret agents regularly entertained and salaried are, whether resident or peripatitic, a mistake so far as my experience goes; for thinking it necessary to earn their bread by writing something periodically, correct or incorrect, they seriously mislead their employers; besides which their employment becomes gradually a matter of notoriety and this is clearly undesirable.

Opinion of CAPTAIN CAVAGNARI, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur.

*Question 1.*—Whether the Amir of Afghanistan would willingly assent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Kandahar or at either place?

*Answer.*—I do not believe that Amir Shere Ali Khan would willingly assent to such appointments in any part of Afghanistan. He would probably declare that the unsettled state of his kingdom prevented his being able to guarantee the safety of the officers appointed. The Amir has always evinced extreme jealousy at any step towards interference on the part of our Government, and more especially at any measure which would enable our officers to deal direct with any of the Afghan Provincial Governors or officials. This is especially noticeable on the Kuram border of the Kohat district. I have never yet been up to Thal (on the Kuram), either with or without troops, that an agent has not been deputed from Kabul to watch my movements, and particularly to see that nothing approaching to cordiality takes place between myself and the Kuram Governor (Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan).

*Question 2.*—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government?

*Answer.*—Could the Amir be brought to see and acknowledge the advantages that would result to his Government by the appointment of such Residents, the measure would undoubtedly be very beneficial to both Governments—

*First.*—It would tend to check all opposition against the Amir, for those inclined to resist his Government would assuredly consider that the presence of an European British officer was a sign that the British Government was prepared to aid the Amir in every possible way, not only by money and arms, as heretofore, but by force if necessary.

*Second.*—The presence and advice of British officers might inaugurate a better state of Government, and thus tend to allay much of the present discontent against the Amir, which is in a great measure caused by the oppression of his Governors.

*Third.*—The British Government would be in a better position to obtain reliable intelligence and to watch passing events, than can possibly be the case by trusting, as at present, to the Native Agent at Kabul or to casual sources of information. But should the Amir refuse, or unwillingly assent to the measure, it would possibly be productive of very evil results. Everything would be done to thwart the action of the Resident, and not unlikely some sort of insult would be offered, which would either result in his having to be withdrawn, or supported in his position by force of arms.

I do not believe that the people generally of Afghanistan would seriously object to the appointment of such Residents, not only at Herat and Kandahar, but at Kabul itself and Balkh. What could be worse for them than the condition of the last-mentioned province, the people of which are goaded to the utmost exasperation by the tyranny and oppression of a low-born ruler (Naib Mahomed Alum Khan), the only point in whose favor is that he is a Mahomedan! The slightest show of resistance at Herat by Ayub's party would to a certainty have been followed by a general revolt in Balkh. The Sirdars, who probably hope to become Governors in the different Afghan provinces, would, like the Amir, be averse to the appointment of European British officers. They probably fear that the appointment of such Residents would be merely a preliminary step to annexation!

*Question 3.*—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence now received from the British Agent at Kabul, and if not, whether he can suggest any way of procuring further and more accurate intelligence?



*Answer.*—It is notorious that only such information as the Amir approves of is furnished by the British Native Agent at Kabul. Such can only be expected, as the Agent knows that he must either act up to the wishes of the Amir or else he would be treated as a nonentity and very possibly be brought to disgrace in some way or another. During the first days after his appointment Ata Mahomed Khan did attempt to act independently, but he soon discovered that his Munshi, Bakhtiar Khan, who acted up to the Amir's wishes, received far more distinction and honor than he, the British Agent, did. The position is now quite reversed, and Atta Mahomed Khan is spoken of as one of the Amir's confidential advisers.

I think it possible to establish a system of communication through Kuram by means of reliable Agents who would furnish regular and authentic information on important Central Asian matters. Doing so from the Kohat side would probably attract less notice than could be hoped for if Agents were employed from Peshawur; for I am informed that any man coming from Peshawur, of the class likely to be used as a means of furnishing information, rarely escapes scrutiny, and if at all suspected of being on such an errand, he would be so closely watched that his usefulness would be very much impaired.

The difficulty however is not so much in finding agents to furnish news as to get men who will send really true and unvarnished information. News Agents are very apt to imagine that the very fact of their being employed is a sign that we wish to discover something going on in Afghanistan inimical to British interests, and that news of that kind is expected from them. They therefore are inclined either to trump up something which will meet the object in view, or else they twist and turn about with the same intent facts that have really occurred, so that a minimum amount of value can be attached to what is reported.

Personally I am more inclined to credit information received from special Agents deputed occasionally into Afghanistan to observe and report what is going on than that furnished by a regularly appointed agency; for the latter after the first freshness is worn off, sooner or later degenerates into news writing more or less of a stereotyped form.

PESHAWUR,  
The 1st April 1875. }

Note by T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have been desired by the Lieutenant-Governor to record my opinion upon the three points noted in Foreign Department's letter, No. 48 C.P., dated 25th March, and give it for what it is worth.

In regard to the first point, I concur in the opinion expressed by Sir R. Pollock, Major-General Taylor, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari, that the location of English officers at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place, would be very distasteful to the Kabul Government. I was not present at any of the conferences between Lord Mayo and the Amir at Ambala in 1869, and cannot consequently speak from personal knowledge of what passed on those occasions, but from the evidence contained in the Secret records of the office, of

which I append an abstract,\* it would appear that though the Amir was, at first, personally inclined to meet the supposed wishes of the British Government in the matter of having English agents in certain parts of his territory, his Council, and especially the present Prime Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, were decidedly opposed to the measure.

\* *Vide* Appendix to this note.

Captain Grey states in his letter of the 29th March 1875 that the Amir "freely consented to the appointment of European British officers in Balkh or Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul"; but I cannot find in Captain Grey's letter that any definite understanding was come to on the subject; all that the Amir appears to have been ultimately prepared to accede to was the deputation of *Native* Agents wherever we pleased, and the deputation of an English envoy at some future time when things had settled down.

But if this is all that could be obtained from the Amir at a time when "his whole attitude was that of one eager to please"—what is likely to be the policy of the Amir and his councillors now that he is no longer "eager to please," but still suffering from bitter disappointment at the result of the Seistan arbitration? We have some indication of what their policy and feelings are in the Kabul Agent's letter of the 14th April 1873, in which an account is given of the manner in which the proposal to send Mr. Maenabb to Kabul to explain the details of the Seistan arbitration was received in Darbar; from that account it is clear there was then a decided objection to an English officer proceeding to Kabul for even a temporary purpose; the same policy was exhibited in reference to the proposed return of Sir D. Forsyth's mission through Afghanistan, and I have no reason to believe that matters have in any way improved. It is possible, indeed, that the Amir's strange unwillingness to take the subsidy which long lay ready for him on the frontier was dictated by a fear of its leading to a proposal to depute a British officer to see how it was spent.

But though I believe the location of British Agents (Europeans) in Afghanistan would, under present circumstances, be most distasteful to the Kabul Government, I am not without a hope that a change for the better may hereafter take place. F. B., himself an Afghan and in frequent communication with his countrymen, is of opinion that the people of Afghanistan and many of the Sirdars are getting weary of the present state of things, and are becoming inclined to look upon the presence of English officers in their country as likely to bring about an amelioration of their condition.

In regard to the second point, it would not, in my humble opinion, be to the advantage of the British Government to send European officers into Afghanistan, if their deputation is, as I believe it to be, highly distasteful to the Amir or his councillors; on the contrary, such a measure would probably lead to grave embarrassment.

With reference to the third point, I have no reason for doubting the accuracy of Atta Mahomed Khan's intelligence; but it is undoubtedly meagre, and if we get the truth, we do not get the whole truth, *e.g.*, at this present moment we are not by any means fully informed of the circumstances under which the hostile movement against Nouroz Khan has been undertaken, though of course we can very well guess the cause; still I cannot suggest any other practicable means of supplementing our intelligence save those indicated by Sir R. Pollock.

*The 21st April.*

Appendix to DR. THORNTON'S note.

From a reference to the Secret records of the Persian Office, it appears that on the 17th March 1869 (while the Amir was at Lahore), F. B. reported the substance of a discussion\* which took place at Kabul on the receipt of the Viceroy's letter of the 9th January 1869. In this discussion the Amir, Sirdar Mahomed Aslam Khan, Mustaufi Habibulla, Sayad Mahomed Ishak, and Nur Mahomed Shah took part, and the conclusion arrived at was that the British Government had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This discussion was followed next day by a private discussion between the Amir and Nur Mahomed Shah, at which no third person was present; it turned upon the following passage in the Viceroy's letter: "It will be left to the head of the Government of India year after year to determine what shall be done by the British Government in proof of its desire to strengthen Your Highness' power, and what assistance in the shape of money and arms shall be given year after year for the consolidation of Your Highness' Government, and in evincing the good-will of the British Government." Syud Nur Mahomed Shah observed that—"It does not appear from the wording of the passage what are the wishes of the British Government. If the Government desires to ask for any place in Afghanistan wherein to establish a cantonment, it is impossible to comply with its wishes, considering the usage of Afghanistan. If the Government should desire to send its troops to this country under the name of an auxiliary force, this will alienate the tribes from us and unsettle men's minds. What is practicable is this, that the money and arms be given by the British Government; the men composing the troops should be provided by us, and the power and management should rest with ourselves. It shall be our duty to show due submission and good-will towards the British Government."

(Sd.) T. H. T.

Hearing this interpretation, the Amir said—

"May God will that at the time of treaty, the wishes and requisitions of the British Government be such that there may seem nothing to prevent our complying with them. I would agree even to this, that the troops be our own, and the military officers and drill instructors be furnished by the British Government, and that a confidential Agent of the Government be stationed in Balkh and Herat!"

Syud Nur Mahomed Shah said—

"Be that as it may, at the present time the British Government has also its own objects in view. You are the same Amir Shere Ali Khan who after the defeat at Kandahar repeatedly asked for assistance. Why did not the English agree then? Now both the parties have their own objects. May God vouchsafe all that is good!"

The Amir then said—"May God send us good! And may the requests of the British Government be such that our people may be able to agree to them! If the British Government put upon my neck a heavier load than my country and religion would be able to bear, there will be difficulty."

On the 18th March F. B. repeated a discussion that took place in the Saniman Boorj in Lahore Fort on the 17th March, at which the Amir observed that personally he would have no objection to an English Envoy being stationed at Kabul, but that owing to the turbulent character of the people, it would not be safe. The same objection, however, did not apply to Balkh, Kandahar, or Herat, and the arrangement by which an English officer should be stationed at these places would be beneficial to both Governments. A translation of this report was sent to the Foreign Office and printed *in extenso*.

On the 26th March F. B. reported a discussion which took place at 7 A.M. on 25th March between the Amir, Mirza Mahomed Hassan, Shaghassi Sher Dil Khan, and Nur Mahomed Shah on certain questions which had been put to the Amir by Sir Donald McLeod. One of these questions was—

"What can the Amir do to procure intelligence from the frontier of Afghanistan, and what assistance can the British Government give in this matter?"

The Amir and his councillors are reported to have said—

"The object of the British Government appears to be to place their own men on the frontier. On every account the best plan would be that the Amir arrange himself to procure

intelligence and send it to the British Government. His Highness would be prepared to expend two lakhs of rupees annually for this purpose from his own treasury.\* On the 2nd April 1869, F. B. reported that the previous night Syud Nur Mahomed Shah had represented to the Amir that it would be advisable that the British Government depute Mahomedans to the borders of Afghanistan, Kandahar, and Herat, and after the conquest of Balkh, to Balkh, for the purpose of procuring information. No more than one European or Native news caterer should be stationed at one place. The Amir approved of this advice."

F. B. now states that, so far as he could ascertain at Ambala in 1869, it was the belief of the Amir's councillors that he never agreed to the location of British Agents in Afghanistan.

(Sd.) T. H. T.

---

Letter dated 29th March 1875 from CAPTAIN H. GREY, referred to in DR. THORNTON's note.

In reply to your letter, No. E., of the 27th instant, I have the honor to state that the Amir *did* freely consent to the appointment of European British officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul.

My authority is a copy, certified by the Foreign Secretary, of a note submitted by me to Lord Mayo on conversations held with the Minister Nur Mahomed. In that copy I find the following passage:—"He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, he still thinks precautions should be taken, would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger for such did they respect the Afghans and themselves."

Mr. Seton-Karr heads the paper from which the above is taken "Memorandum on conversations held with the confidential Minister," and dates it the 31st March; I observe however that my summary of proceedings, dated 4th April 1869, gives its date as being the day of the first private interview, *i.e.*, 29th March 1869, and distinctly states that the Amir was party to the conversation, and such I remember to have been the case.

A further authority upon which I go is a passage in my private memoranda to the following effect:—

"In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new letter (No. 1) was addressed to the Amir, to which I was directed (No. VII) to obtain, if possible, an answer of complete satisfaction; and also to arrive at a definite understanding with him on various other points noted below, after which should be held the second private interview, which would, in a manner, sanction and confirm the result of the negotiations. The points (recorded in pencil notes in my possession) were—

"(1.) That the Amir should accede to our deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased. To this the Amir agreed, and promised to assist them in every way.

"(2.) To ascertain whether the Amir was agreeable to the deputation of an Envoy at some future date. On this point the Amir expressed his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere save at Kabul, where he thought it would affect his power with the people \* \* \* \* \*

I may note that the Amir was at that time eager to meet what he supposed to be our views, and his whole attitude was that of one eager to please.

General Reynell Taylor, Colonel A. Munro, Nawab Foujdar Khan, and Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan all concurred in the opinion that the Amir would be more unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat.

---

\* The written reply actually given to the question was as follows:—"Since His Highness and Her Majesty's Government are partners in each other's benefits and losses, how can His Highness act lightly in collecting information and watching the course of events in Central Asia. On the contrary, he will, to the utmost of his power, endeavour to collect correct information of passing events. There is no such necessity for assistance in the collection of information on the affairs of Central Asia from the Government of Her Majesty, for the two Governments are as one, and if any expense be incurred, it is of no consequence."

This written reply bears the seal of Nur Mahomed Shah, and is, it will be perceived, quite in accordance with the views set forth in the reported discussion, and is so far a proof of the correctness of F. B.'s information.

## APPENDIX XVII.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 113, Chapter VI.* ]

Letter dated Delhi, 21st May 1876, from AGHA SAHEB, to LIEUT.-COL. O. T. BURNE.

A letter from Kabul, dated the 10th Rabee-ul-sanee (corresponding with the 5th of May), brings the undermentioned news of the Trans-Indus dominions :—

After the British Vakeel had left the Amir Shere Ali Khan, all the Sirdars, Khamaneens, and heads of the surrounding tribes, attended the Court. Conversation took place that an English army is proceeding to Bolan to occupy Kandahar. They stated that this will not frighten the Dooranees, but convince all Afghanistan that English are coming to revenge the past atrocities.

To this the Amir replied that the present Wazeer Azum (Prime Minister) of England is the same nobleman (Omra) who had sent the late Lord Mayo as Governor-General of India to India, who met him at Ambala, and was his true friend. The new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, is also nominated by him, and will be a friend of the Afghans, adding that His Lordship is accompanied by the Secretary of Lord Mayo.

As to the rumour of the British force coming to occupy Kandahar, the Amir said to the courtiers, it is perfectly groundless; there is an English officer escorting the kafila through the Bolan Pass, and will patch up the differences existing between the Kelat Chief and the Belooch tribes surrounding the merchants' road to Afghanistan.

The Amir cleared the Court, and spoke to the confidential Sirdars that he believes the English Government is thinking seriously of the approach of the Russians towards Merv, and consequently are desiring to send an Envoy to Kabul, or, by his permission, to remain at Herat. At the same time he is afraid that once they are firm in their intended destination, he will be embroiled in difficulties, internal and external both, and give a plain cause to the Russian Chief at Samarkand that Afghans have taken measures hostile to Russia. The Amir asked their opinion on this subject.

The Sirdars replied to the Amir as follows :—We are in a dilemma, which requires a deep deliberation to remove it. The Amir should either summon or write Meer Alum Khan, the Balkh Governor, who is in constant communication and well versed with Russian affairs, for advice what to do. The Amir has written to him.

One of the present Sirdars described that he had a letter by his nephew, now on service at Herat, that the King of Persia has assembled a large army in Khorasan, and intends to lead in person, whether by the counsel of the Russian or English Ambassador at Teheran, and that he swears that the time is not distant when, if diplomacy fails, military menace, or armies of observation of the various Powers, namely, Persia, Russia, Afghanistan, will move about Herat, Meshed, and Merv. Those who live will see it is certain. On hearing this, all seemed concerned, shaking their heads, while the Amir remained mute.

The merchants from Bokhara say that it is spoken openly in Russian camps of Samarkand and other places of Turkestan that the daughter of the Emperor of Russia, who was married to one of the English Princes, has been offended, and gone to her father the Emperor to complain. This has caused a rupture between these two Powers.

After a long pause, the Amir broke silence, and said that since the English escort of the kafila has passed unmolested through the Bolan Pass, the Commissioner of Peshawur complains that why should not the Amir keep the Khyber Pass safe for trade, which, in fact, is against his original policy. Consequently he is bewildered what to do finally in this matter.

Syud Nur Shah, the Prime Minister, said that, as long as the English free and commercial intercourse with Kabul, on any pretext whatever, is put off, the interests of the Amir and the Afghans will continue flourishing, and his friendship will be eagerly sought by Russia on the Oxus side, and by the English on the Peshawur side. The lesson which he had fully taken by his frequent missions to the English Government in India will never efface this impression from his heart.

## APPENDIX XVIII.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 115, Chapter VI.* ]

(1) Extract from Kabul Diary from the 30th June to the 3rd July 1876, inclusive.

ISMATULA Khan, Chief of the Jabbar Khel Ghilzais, at present a Minister of the Court of Kabul, is an old chief follower ("Purana Khas Murid") of the Akhund Mulla Mushk-i-Alam, resident of Ghazni, and consequently many of the Jabbar Khel people place great confidence in him (the Akhund), and at present the Amir gives preference to him over all the Mullas in Afghanistan, and treats him with high honor and respect. He (the Akhund) comes invariably to Kabul every third year to pay a visit to the Amir, and has also now come for the same purpose. Ismutula Khan and other Durbar authorities received him most honorably, and on calling on the Amir, His Highness stood up and embraced him, and observed privately as follows:—

"Akhund Sahib, with due regard (lit. giving life) to the laws of the Prophet, may peace and the blessing of God be with him! I maintain friendship with the British and Russian Governments. The British Government in particular, in conformity with their (good) ideas (or views, 'bar tabak apane khiálát ke'), frequently express themselves well-wishers of Afghanistan, and occasionally give assistance in money and rifles. As the borders of these two Governments are in juxtaposition with Afghanistan, which God has given me, I, looking to the future, desire that the moral behaviour of the people of Afghanistan may be improved by the advice and exhortations of all senior and junior Mullas in Afghanistan, and that first they (the people) may make endeavours to give young recruits and pay taxes, and subsequently, when necessary, exert themselves to promote the strength and safety of Islam. Improvement in the conduct of these people is impossible without the advice and exhortations of the efficient Mullas of Afghanistan. It is desirable that through your own efforts you should, in compliance with my wishes, summon all the Mullas and learned men of all grades from time to time, and direct them to advise and exhort the people occasionally, so that by your exertions the objects above referred to may be gained (lit. the gem aimed at of the promotion of the strength of Islam may fall into the palm of success as desired), because, though hitherto the friendship existing between the Governments (meaning Afghanistan and Russia and Great Britain) has not been disturbed, it is evident that, if a more powerful bird (lit. a tyrant body) catches a little one in his claws, the small bird does not refrain from using its claws (in defence) for its release until it is killed. It is a matter for thousands of congratulations that the Mahomedans of Afghanistan have, from ancient times, stood against the depredations ('dast burd') of foreign races (lit. have shown hearty detestation). Under these circumstances, it is incumbent on me and on you to consider it one of your most important objects to direct the people of Islam to make efforts for their safety, and to provide for, or guard against, the evil day ('wastê rôz-i-mabáda ke')." In the meantime, by desire of the Amir, the Sadr-i-Azam submitted to the Akhund, one by one, all the murasillas received from the British Government and the Russians, and the replies sent to them since his (the Sadr-i-Azam's) conference at Simla, and represented—"The British Government desire, for some time past, to send a mission to the Kabul Durbar, and the latter, through regard to some matters (lit. precautions), considers the deputation of the mission unadvisable. Whatever your opinion may be in this matter, and for the maintenance of the Islam authority (Shaukat-i-Islam), explain it after careful deliberation." The Akhund observed that he would give his opinion in all these affairs after full consultation and consideration; that he (and his followers) sincerely desire that the authority of Islam should in no way decrease, but should, on the contrary, be promoted every day. In short, the real object of the Amir in the above observations is, that as on account of His Highness' friendship with the British Government and the Russians, the Mullas and learned men of Afghanistan frequently accuse him of having weakened Islam, it would fulfil his wishes if, by his remarks and by the persuasions of the Akhund, &c., the people agree first to pay a tax, and afterwards to give recruits, to promote the strength of Islam, and, at all events, it (his present action) would undoubtedly tend to meet the above accusation.

Extract from Kabul Diary from the 4th to the 6th July 1876, inclusive.

Mulla Mushk-i-Alam summoned the Mullas of the Kabul City and its neighbouring Provinces, and, as desired by the Amir, exhorted them towards the promotion of the strength and dignity of Islam; but by a misunderstanding some short-sighted persons gave out at once in the city that the Durbar have proposed a religious war ("Ghaza"), and that Mulla Mushk-i-Alam is their co-operator ("Momid"). On receipt of this information, the Amir directed the Sadr-i-Azam to go to the house of Arsala Khan Ghilzai to summon Mulla Mushk-i-Alam there through Ismatula Khan, and to enquire from him why the above rumour had been caused by him against the wishes of the Durbar, and to tell him that the objects of the Durbar have been wrongly understood by him (the Mulla), and that he should carefully understand that the real wish of the Durbar is the promotion of the strength of Islam—(1) by taking taxes, and (2) by levying recruits, and that he (the Mulla) should make endeavours to these ends, so that the strength of the army and the amount in the treasury may increase. Mushk-i-Alam



replied that he well understood the objects of the Durbar, and made the Mullas and learned men thoroughly understand the same, but that the above action of the people has occurred owing to their want of comprehension; also that the Sadr-i-Azam should represent on his (the Mulla's) part to the Amir that His Highness should pay regard to the incapability of his subjects, and, should he give up at present his intention to take (extra) taxes and recruits from them, it would tend to their great comfort. The Mulla further stated—"I promise to give a muster of thirty thousand active armed men of the Ghazni territory alone twice a year to the authorities at that place, and, without claiming any pay for them, would make them over to the Amir when required to do so. As regards the deputation of a mission by the British Government, I concur with the Durbar, looking to the want of understanding of the people and to other matters, lest by such action, which would be contrary to the natural wishes of the people, instead of advantage which might be expected (by the mission), all the Mahomedans in Afghanistan may be caused to suffer injury."\*

\* An evident hint at assassination.  
(Sd.) F. R. P.,  
Commr.

(2) Letters, &c., showing proceedings at Kabul after delivery to the Amir of Sir R. POLLOCK's letter dated 8th July.

No. 1, dated 17th July 1876.

From—British Agent at Kabul,

To—Commissioner of Peshawur.

I have, at a private interview, laid before His Highness the Amir the *murāsilla* (to his address) and the letter (to myself). Only three Ministers were present—the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the "Dubir-ul-Mulk." His Highness, after mastering the contents of both documents, once, twice, and a third time, through and through (*harf-ba-harf*), and having become perturbed and thoroughly distressed, said that the answer in this matter would be given after full consideration.

Accordingly, yesterday and to-day (16th and 17th), private consultations have been held. This much has been heard (*sunagya*) that from the phrase "Fahmi-na-sawáb"† in the *murāsilla*, and the phrase "Bar-dashtan-i-Zimmai Sangin,"‡ in the letter (to Agent), it is understood that the British Government thoroughly menaces (*khúb damkáta hai*) Afghanistan.

Regarding the phrase "Arájif-o-harzagoi-o-fitna angéz" contained in the letter (to Agent), the Foreign Secretary remarked casually to the Prime Minister that the (above) words seemed to be applied to him, on which His Highness expressed his opinion that these words applied to the whole Durbar, or Council (*Júmla Ahalián Durbar*); also that the British Government, in their *murāsilla* (to him), and their letter (to the Agent), had, in many places, threatened him.

In regard to the coming of the mission, it is ascertained that, although the determination of the Amir remains unaltered on this point, there is this difference, that they say (Amir and his Ministers) amongst themselves "that in all kingdoms there is this custom, that the discussion of State matters is always commenced by (or between) the Prime Ministers of States; let us send our Prime Minister to the British border, and let the British Envoy, coming there, discuss State matters with him.

In short (*alghurz*) the discussions have not been completed; and I, on my part, am counselling the Amir and his Ministers to accept the (proposed) British mission. No efforts shall be spared on my part, and I stand ready to leave for Peshawur, if ordered to do so.

Dated 31st August 1876.

From—British Agent at Kabul,

To—Commissioner of Peshawur.

THE Members of the Amir's special council had again a confidential consultation with the Amir in private, and made statements of their views.

Some of them offered the following suggestions:—

"Although it has already been proposed that a trusted Envoy from the Kabul Government should first be sent, and that proposition has not met with acceptance, still it might be well to bring forward that suggestion again in conciliatory words [*ba narmi kalâm*], relying on long standing friendship and the custom of past years. The real object in view being that, if the British Government should consent to receive an Envoy from Kabul, and that Envoy, after becoming thoroughly apprised of the intentions of the British Government, should represent to the Amir that there is nothing in these intentions of perplexing import [*amri dakik*], and that the desire of the British Government is clearly the promotion of the welfare of Afghanistan, then there could be no objection to the reception for a time of an Envoy from the British Government; and in case, in conformity with the resolution already expressed, the British Government should still refuse to receive an Envoy from Kabul, this further suggestion should be thrown out that, in accordance with the custom observed by all States, confidential Agents of both Governments should meet on their frontiers, and ascertain the objects and intentions entertained by each. Then, after having understood and weighed the results of that conference, such resolutions might be come to as the safety and advantage of Kabul might dictate."

In brief, no definite conclusion has yet been arrived at as to what answer should be sent.

(3) Further letter from AGHA SAHEB to COLONEL O. T. BURNES enclosing following extract from letter, dated 26th July, from Kabul:—

There exists *now* a very great difference between the *former* and the *present* time. The more intercourse takes place between my master the Amir Saheb and the English, the more he becomes well versed in the state of things, and cautiously makes distinction from what is beneficial and what is injurious to his interests, and acts accordingly. He is not careless of news and the passing events as he used to be formerly. Now he finds that the wish of the Peshawur Commissioner and the Vakeel in waiting is that no intelligence should leak out from Kabul to India, the sender is threatened to be blown up by gun if his letter be intercepted.

If news were forwarded by a special messenger, and by the lengthened, and not much frequented, routes, it will cause great expense, and yet the risk of its interception remains in a great measure unmitigated. The daily news of this place, of course, goes to Peshawur through the regular channel of the British Vakeel and others. On these reasons, whenever letter to you, containing the *true* intelligence, what is only known to the Amir, his two (or) three confidential counsellors, and to me by my being in constant attendance. It is useless to send you all sorts of *gup* (talk) of the market people.

Here is the fresh news for you. When the *murasilla* (letter) of "Latun Saheb," new "Lat" (Lord Lytton), announcing his appointment and arrival as Viceroy of India, came to the Amir of Kabul, the usual answer of rejoicings was transmitted. One day after that the Amir made a mention to his advisers in *khilwat* (privacy) that let us see how he (Lord Lytton) treats me. Larun (Lord Lawrence) met my paradise-placed father at Peshawur, and knew all us brothers well. He gave me pecuniary aid. Lat (Lord) Mayo, his successor, asked me to meet him at Ambala. He gave me honor, money, and ammunition. After that Lat Narbark (Lord Northbrook) did not add much to the past things. He showed hospitality to my Agent, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, during his long stay at Simla, and pleased him with the hopes of better days.

The Amir continued that Mulla Vahid, merchant, has come from Calcutta. He and other sources of information describe Lat Latun Saheb (Lord Lytton) to be a person of eminent wisdom (*zeeruk*), and has seen *ghair sultantha*, foreign kingdoms, and is sent to rule India by the very *jirgah* (assembly or party) of the Vuzra (Ministers) who had sent Lord Mayo. These *arkan-i-dowlut* (State pillars of England), said the Amir, are too farsighted. They are skilful in the art of weighing the balance (*pullah beener*), and keen observers of the opportunities. By sending the *Vali-ahd-i-Malikah*, Heir-apparent to the Queen (Prince of Wales), to India, and causing Her the assumption of the title of Shah-i-Shah (Empress of India), they have tied the bonds of unity between the subjects of England and India upon one hand, and, by the purchase of land and water in Egypt (Suez Canal he means I believe), have secured the safety of the Indian Empire on the other. By this their names will be perpetuated in the world.

The Amir added that on one side the Russians have sway on Merv, approaching the boundary of Herat and Balkh, and on the other side the English are at Peshawur with large force, well-armed, well-equipped, ready to march, and, by buying over the Khyber Pass, can occupy Jellalabad, if they resolve, before the information reaches Kabul of their movement from Peshawur. In these restless speculations I pass my day and night, looking forward for the will of God.

After a long debate the courtiers said to the Amir in reply—"Bokhara and Hoorgurj (Khiva) are the dependencies of, and ruled by, Russia. But the policy of the King of Persia is salutary and praiseworthy. His Majesty has Ambassadors of Russia and England both in Teheran, his capital. Both are trying to secure his good-will, and, in return, the King pursues such a diplomacy in communicating with them which has secured for him a quiet and comfortable reign. The Amir Saheb should also follow the example of the Shah of Persia."

On this the Amir Saheb remarked that you are unaware there is a vast difference in the affairs of Persia and Afghanistan. There the King, fearless of any pretender, reigns at will and peace. Here we have family dissensions and pretenders hanging on Russia at Samarkand, who are always thinking to come down on Balkh and Kabul. Moreover, Persia is far from India, while Kabul is close to Peshawur, the British possession.

Consequently, if the Russian Ambassador was to remain at Kabul like Teheran, the English army will move on Kabul; and, if the English Officer was to reside here, we will give offence to Russia, and shall be ruined. It is, therefore, necessary that I should continue in the adoption of the good advice of Syud Nur Shah, that no representative of any of these two Powers should live in Kabul.

The Amir remarked that, if an opportunity was offered by the inclination of the new Lat (Lord Lytton), like that of Lord Mayo, he (Amir) would go from there to meet his Lordship. The result of this interview will be fruitful. Sufficient subsidy to fortify our army and warlike materials will be given. Above all, the holding of the consultation with His Lordship regarding the future remedies on the advances of Russia will also be secured.

A *lungee frosh* (seller of the turband texture) of Peshawur stated to the Amir, on the authority of an English Officer in that place, that an Envoy from Kashgar, who had formerly come and taken the Englishmen with himself (meaning Forsyth's mission), has arrived near

Kashmir with the view to wait on the Lord Saheb. This made the Amir to turn towards his courtiers, and say that, notwithstanding Yarkand and Kashgar have joining boundaries with Russia, while the distance of miles in hundreds makes them far from India, yet the Atalik Ghazee seeks for the friendship of the English for the fear of Russia, and sends deputations after each other. But Afghanistan is so closely joined with Peshawur, &c., (*paikloo-ba-paikhloo*) side by side, or like the rib with rib, that it is impossible to give them cause for enmity.

A Jew from Bokhara has come with the Russian tea and sugar-loaves. During the visit he paid to the Amir he related that the Russian General has again issued orders in Samarkand and Bokhara to proclaim that all the commodities brought from India must be disposed of within the limited time of the proclamation, and that, in future, if any one brings merchandise from the English Hindostan, he will be made to pay duty equal to the value of the article. Should the trader persist in bringing it again, his property will be seized, auctioned, and the proceeds given to the King at Bokhara, and to Russia at Samarkand.

The same Jew gave information that several Russian officers with their *burgahbar*, baggage, equipage, and escorted with the Ozbeg cavalry, had joined his *kafila*, or caravan, from the direction of Samarkand. Some went to Merv, some to Maimena side, and some towards Andkoo, Shiberghan, Sirikol, and Wakhan. They said they will journey all the summer to enjoy sights, and return to Samarkand head-quarters in the winter. One of the officers (who had got friendly and confidential with the Jew in these few days' travelling) said to him that he would probably go to the Amir of Kabul, and, if not prevented by him, visit the Peshawur cantonments also.

A *kalantar* (head man) of the Hazarah Deh Koondee, who had formerly never come to distant Kabul, has arrived here with four donkey-loads of *barak* (wool stuff) for sale. He presented the Amir with one piece of the best texture. In the conversation he mentioned that two Fringeers (Europeans) with about six Ozbeg and Parseeban servants, leaving Herat aside, had entered the Deh Zungee Hazarahjat without the slightest fear of danger. They stayed there a few days, and their servants were conversant and enquiring all about the country. They have gone back whence they came, and have said to return with little trade to penetrate Kabul by this route.

One of the Deh Koondee Hazarahs told them (European travellers) that the road was full of danger. Before you reach Kabul the other Hazarah and Afghan tribes will kill you. The Europeans said in reply that, if they were hurt by any one, the Bokhara and Meshed forces will massacre the Hazarahs, and the Amir of Kabul will root up their country in punishment.

On hearing this, the Amir Saheb told the man—You should all join to seize those Europeans when they come again, and take care not to kill, but to deliver them unmolested to my Governor at Herat. After the Hazarah was dismissed, the Amir Saheb spoke that those Fringeers (Europeans) do not let me at rest. Formerly one was coming from Meshed to Herat with a view of seeing Kandahar and Kabul. On being prevented, he went back to Meshed. It was shortly after found that he was an English Colonel in the army.

Now another set of them (Europeans) has been making appearance in the Hazarahjat with the intention to enter Kabul by this route.

From the accounts of the Peshawuris and Bokharis, as well as from the newspapers, the murder of the Sultan Room (Turkey) and Ministers, and the rebellion caused by the Christian population, have been received by the Amir with concern. He was pleased to say that from a very long time the Russians are after that kingdom, and are striving to take away the Baitoolnekuddus (Jerusalem) from the Mahomedans in their own possession, and annihilate the Osmanizah (Ottoman) Empire. But English help is keeping it safe.

The Court enemies of the Mustaufi of Herat and Alum Khan of Balkh and Badakshan Governor have filled the ears of the Amir against them both. They charge them of enormous embezzlements, and caution the Amir against their perfidy of inviting the Russians from their frontiers to preserve their wealth and life.

This has caused the suspicion of the Amir, and he is thinking to remove the Mustaufi and Alum Khan from those important posts of the frontier, and place the whole line, composing Herat, Maimena, Balkh, Koondooz, Badakshan, &c., under his trusty Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, who will be a fitting man to deal with the Russians on the other side of the Oxus and the Afghanistan boundaries. But the idea of the Amir becoming alone, and of the influential persuasions of the beloved wife of the Amir (the mother of the favorite son, Abdullah Jan, who is Alum Khan's patroness), will prevent this plan of the Amir's carried into execution.

Sirdar Yakub Khan is still lingering in custody.

#### (4) Russian Native Agents at Kabul.

Extract from Kabul Diary from 9th to 12th June 1876, inclusive.

On the 9th instant, Mirza Abdul Karim, the bearer of the *murasilla* of the Russian Governor-General, arrived at Kabul with the agent of the Mir Munshi, who, as reported in diary of 1st instant, was sent to bring him. He has put up in the house of Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan. The Durbar appointed no official, &c., to meet him on the road. He receives cooked food from the Amir's kitchen. To-day he waited on the Amir through Sirdar Mahomed

Yusaf Khan, and delivered the *murasilla* to His Highness, and, after a formal interview of about half an hour, returned to the Sirdar's house. The British Agent has not yet read the *murasilla*, but it is reported that it is merely a complimentary one, conveying information of the fall of Kokand. God willing, a copy of it will be submitted by next post.

Extract from Kabul Diary from 18th to 10th August 1876, inclusive.

It is reported that another Russian Agent has arrived in Turkistan, and that in reply to a letter submitted by the new Naib, the Amir has written to him (the Naib) to inform His Highness as to whether the said Agent had come to visit the deceased Naib, Mahomed Alum Khan, or desires to come to Kabul, and whether he is a Russian or a Mahomedan. Further information will follow after enquiry.

Extract from Kandahar news-letter, No. 29, for the week ending 9th August 1875.

A Kandahari, who hires out baggage animals in Turkistan, Bokhara, and Kabul, and who has been on friendly terms with the writer (Daod Khan) from his infancy upwards, and who, for the last three or four years, has been on intimate terms with Sirdar Mahomed Alum Khan, Loi Naib Bahadoor, arrived at Kandahar a few days before the death of the Sirdar. On the writer of this letter asking him for the news of the country, he said that Mahomed Alum Khan brought with him to Kabul secretly a Russian, who came from Turkistan. On his arrival at Kabul, by order of the Amir, he went to reside in the house of Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan, situated in the quarter of the town called Alli Raza Khan. Of the arrival of this Russian, which is kept secret, only the Amir, Mahomed Alum Khan, and Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan knew of it. When the Amir has interviews with the Russian, they take place secretly in the garden of the fort, where they hold council together. A few days after the arrival of the Russian, the Amir sent for Mulla Mushk Alam, who is a man trusted by the Amir, and of note in the country. He lives some distance from the city. The Amir consulted with him, pointing out that he was on friendly terms with the British Government, that he could now get nothing from them and was disheartened, and desired to fight with them. He asked, in the event of his doing so, whether the Mullas and Mahomedans would aid him, and whether it would be contrary to their religion to do so. The Mulla replied that were he (the Amir) to do so, it would be in accordance with his religion, and would benefit him in this world and in the world to come. Enquiries were made of the Kandahari as to whether the British Agent at Kabul, Atta Mahomed Khan, or the Sadr-i-Azam, knew of this occurrence, and he replied in the negative. The writer can fully certify that the Kandahari who gave him this news has been, for the last few years, an intimate friend of the late Mahomed Alum Khan; that he felt it to be his duty to give this news, as told to him, and that, in writing it, he has only done what was right and proper; that, if true, it is of value; if false, telling what was told to him can do no harm.

Extract from Kabul Diary from 11th to 14th August 1876, inclusive.

The report, alluded to in the last diary, regarding the arrival of another Russian Envoy in Turkistan, has now been ascertained to have been submitted by Colonel Mirza Ahmed Khan, brother of the Dabir-ul-Mulk, left at Balkh by Naib Mahomed Alum Khan to govern that country in his absence. It was forwarded to the Amir by the new Naib, and His Highness enquired whether the Envoy had come merely to visit the deceased Naib, or desired to go to Kabul, and whether he is a Mahomedan or a Russian. Yesterday His Highness received another letter from the above Colonel through the new Naib, stating that Mirza Mahomed Yusaf, Mervi Samarkandi, the Russian Envoy, arrived at Balkh with six sowars, with a view to proceeding to Kabul, and was in possession of a *murasilla* from the Governor-General of Russian Turkistan to the Amir; and that as information of his arrival was sent previously to His Highness, and he desired to proceed to Kabul, and news of the death of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan had been received, the Envoy was sent to Kabul on the 7th instant in company with an agent of the Colonel, who is acquainted with the Turki language.

Extract from Kabul Diary from 22nd to 24th August 1876, inclusive.

Yesterday Mirza Mahomed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, the Russian Envoy, put up by desire of the Durbar in the house of Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan with Mirza Abdul Karim Khan, the first Envoy, and they both receive cooked food from the Durbar. To-day at 10 A.M. he waited on the Amir in company with Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, and, after communicating the compliments of the Governor-General in Russian Turkistan, submitted a *murasilla* from the latter in the Russian and Turki languages. His Highness, after formal enquiry (as to health, &c.) in twenty minutes, allowed him to return to the Sirdar's house, and got the *murasilla* translated from the Turki language. It appears that the Governor-General has sent this *murasilla* merely to inform His Highness of his return to Tashkend from St. Petersburg. He writes that the Emperor of Russia summoned him to St. Petersburg to discuss about some important affairs of (Russia) Turkistan; that he returned to Tashkend in six months; that he is glad to say that the friendship existing between His Highness and the Russians has now become firm; and that the Amir's rectitude will keep the subjects of both Governments happy. A copy of the *murasilla* will be submitted as soon as it is obtained.

Extract from Kabul Diary from 5th to 7th September 1876, inclusive.

The day before yesterday, in private Durbar, the Amir collected all the murasillas and other papers which have been received by the Kabul Government from (British) Government since (British) rule, and, after reading them, His Highness directed the Sadr-i-Azam to prepare an abstract of them, so as to be useful for the present (state of affairs). The Sadr-i-Azam is occupied in this business.

Dated Delhi, 7th September 1876.

From—AGHA SAHED,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL O. T. BURNE, C.S.I., Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

At Ludiana I met Shahzadah (Prince) Shahpoor, one of the sons of the late Shah Shuja. He is the same Shahzadah whom Sir George Pollock's army, on evacuation of Afghanistan, had planted on the Kabul Throne, and who, on the approach of Mahomed Aplus Khan, the murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, was compelled to fly to, and take shelter at, Ludiana.

In the conversation the Shahzadah mentioned, on the authority of his distant relative lately come from Kabul, that the Russian Agent was kindly received by the Amir, and lodged in the house of his brother, where he is treated with consideration. The Amir does not allow him to go about, but now and then sends for him secretly at night to hold conversation with him.

At such interviews the Amir abuses the English as faithless and self-interested nation, and paints the acts of the British Government towards Afghanistan in bad colours before the Russian Agent.

At the same time, the Amir is said to speak openly that he will go, and is preparing to go, to Peshawur to meet the Governor-General. If the Amir comes down, he is determined to bring his imprisoned son, Yakub Khan of Herat. He intends to deliver him to the English Government as a State prisoner.

The Shahzadah and his relative both say that the Amir has resolved to try all stratagems to procure 80 or 90 lakhs of rupees, if not more, before he accepts any overtures of the Samar-kand Governor of Russia, and gives any true and definite reply to his Agent now in Kabul.

No one is openly permitted to see the Russian Agent, says the new arrival. The extortion of the money, wherever it is reported to exist, and the enlistment of the young lads by force in regiments, are the deplorable complaints against the authority of the Amir. All this above-mentioned information is confirmed by many comers and petty merchants from Kabul.



## APPENDIX XIX.

[*Referred to in paragraphs 117 and 118, Chapter VI.*]

### INTERVIEWS AT SIMLA IN OCTOBER 1876 WITH NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, BRITISH AGENT AT KABUL.

(I)—*Summary of a conversation with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Kabul, held at Simla on the 7th October 1876.*

*Present:*

SIR LEWIS PELLY.

LIEUT.-COL. O. T. BURNE.

CAPTAIN GREY.

After an interchange of the usual complimentary enquiries, the Agent submitted that, in obedience to instructions, he had waited on the Amir at Kabul, and had learned from His Highness his view of the relations at present subsisting, and those to be desired, as between himself and the Government of India.

The Amir had declared that all his wishes had already been communicated to our Government, either by himself at the Ambala Durbar in 1869, or by his Agent, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, at Simla in 1873, or in the correspondence which passed at or about that latter period.

Being pressed to explain more in detail the views or wishes which the Amir expressed at his interview, the Agent repeated that the Amir had no further wishes than those already on record, and deemed that a renewal of a request for their fulfilment would lead to no solid result, as nothing had come of his previous efforts.

The Agent was then requested to state in particular his own estimate of the feelings and causes which had estranged the Amir from the British Government, and had induced His Highness to object to the reception of a complimentary mission.

The Agent replied that he could not pretend to be acquainted with all that passed in the mind of the Amir on the above subjects, but that, in so far as he could ascertain, among the causes of estrangement and annoyance were the following:—

1st.—The Amir and his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Khan, had been extremely disappointed by the decision and consequences of the Seistán Boundary Commission, in which, after dissuading His Highness from an appeal to the sword, we had raised his hopes of an equitable settlement under our arbitrament, and had then given award in terms unjust towards him and injurious to his interests.

2nd.—That our recent proceedings in the Kelat territories had given umbrage to the Amir, who regards those territories as having formed a portion of the Afghan State since the time of Ahmed Shah Dooranee. But the Agent, on being asked if he were speaking seriously, laughed and admitted that this grievance was of a sentimental character, and not seriously urged.

3rd.—That our proceedings in 1874, or remonstrances on the occasion of the incarceration of the Amir's son, Mahomed Yakub, had irritated the Amir, who was strongly averse from our intervention in this domestic affair, and suspected us of being in communication with Mahomed Yakub or his party. The Agent stated that the Amir was all the more irritated by our proceedings, because he had been previously assured, in 1869, that any attempt to disturb his rule on the part of a rival would be regarded by us with severe displeasure; that subsequently his son had unmistakably rebelled against his authority, and plotted against his father's life and rule; and that, notwithstanding this, we interfered, almost authoritatively, in his favor.

4th.—The Amir had taken exception to our transmitting presents by the hand of Ibrahim Khan to Wakhan, without His Highness' consent or knowledge.

5th.—That the results of the mission of Syud Nur Mahomed in 1873 had offended the Amir, while the treatment which the Syud pretends to have received at our hands, as well on the occasion of that mission as during the period of his being associated with us in the Seistán Boundary Commission, had annoyed the Syud, who, on further finding that both his missions had proved failures, ceased any longer to counsel the Amir to friendly and close alliance with the British, and used all his influence in an opposite direction. The Syud is still embittered against us.

Upon being asked what were the specific grounds of the Syud's complaint in respect to the treatment he had received, the Agent explained that among those causes were the disregard of the Syud's requests, the pressure put upon him to accede to our views, and the scant courtesy shown to him at Simla. He remembered with much soreness that an officer, provoked at his want of accord, had used towards him some angry expression in English.

6/h.—In the opinion of the Nawab, the Amir was not pleased with the reference made to his advisers in a recent letter addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to him (the Agent). When that letter was read out, some of his advisers had remarked—"The British will require the removal of Nur Mahomed Shah," to which the Amir had replied—"Yes, and the removal of all of you."

7/h.—That His Highness is under the impression that our lines of policy and action in his regard have been traced towards objects of our own self-interest, irrespective of the interests of Afghanistan; that he has thus come to question our consistency and good faith; while his counsellors are habitually seeking hidden meanings in our communications.

8/h.—That the principal object of Syud Nur Mahomed's mission to Simla in 1873 was to secure a definite Treaty of alliance with the British Government; and that this Treaty signed, the Amir would have been prepared to aid us with a Contingent in the event of war. But that our proceedings on that occasion showed that, while we desired to depute Political Agents into Afghanistan, and induce the Amir to guide his policy by our advice, we were unprepared to bind ourselves to any future course in regard to him. Under these circumstances, His Highness had been unwilling to bind himself by our wishes, and had consequently declined to accept our proffered subsidy. He looked for something more valuable than money.

As regards the Amir's objections to receiving the mission which His Excellency the Viceroy had proposed sending to Kabul, the Agent stated—

1st.—That His Highness was under the impression that, after all that had occurred in 1873 and since that time, no practical result would follow the mission, and that he entertained no hope of an improvement in our mutual relations.

2nd.—That the presence at Kabul of even a temporary mission might create excitement, and be attended with personal risk to the Envoy.

3rd.—That His Highness feared that the mission might merge into one of a permanent character, and that the Envoy, like our Political Agents at the Courts of the Indian Native States, might become a referee for discontented Afghan subjects; that, in any case, the permanent presence of a mission would embarrass His Highness in his internal administration, causing annoyance to the patriotic party, and raising the hopes of the disaffected.

Another reason advanced by the Amir for declining the mission was, that a pretext would thereby be afforded to the Russians for deputing a similar mission to Kabul; that the circumstance of their having given assurances to the contrary would not stop them; that the Russians broke treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their policy and feared no one. The recent political history of Europe showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere to treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions. The Amir was well aware that, sooner or later, Russia would attack Afghanistan, and this with ulterior objects; but that His Highness also knew that in such crisis the British would defend him in their own interests. His Highness does not suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice, nor does he suspect the British of coveting any portion of his territory, which, at the utmost, could not yield them more than a crore of rupees worth of revenue, while it would cost them tenfold that sum to hold the country. As to Russian Agents at Kabul, the Agent admitted that one had recently arrived at Kabul, and thence returned to Russian territory. Two Russian Agents were still in Kabul, but were, the Agent said, men of no consequence, and were not often honored with interviews by the Amir.

The Agent, on being reminded that the option was accorded the Amir of receiving the mission either at Kabul or at any other point, explained that the Amir held it concerned his own dignity not to leave his capital for the purpose; that His Highness pretended to be a Sovereign equal with, or even superior in dignity and power to, the Shah of Persia, and was even now dissatisfied with the titles accorded him in British correspondence. At the same time, the Agent was of opinion that the government of the Amir is not so firmly established as to admit of his leaving Kabul, so long as Mahomed Yakub Khan remains there in confinement.

The conversation thus turning on the subject of Mahomed Yakub Khan's position, the Agent said that the Amir would be disinclined, under our present relations, to hand over Mahomed Yakub to us for surveillance in British India, and this because His Highness suspected our real views and wishes in respect to him; that on one occasion we had gone so far as to imply that the maintenance of our alliance was in some degree dependent on His Highness' fair dealing with Mahomed Yakub; while that Sirdar himself had, on one occasion, promised

\* Wife of the Amir.

† Since put to death.

to bestow the mother\* of the present heir-apparent, Abdullah Jan, upon one of his personal friends, named Bahadur Khan.† In the opinion

of the Agent, the Amir could never venture to release his son, Mahomed Yakub.

As to Mahomed Yakub Khan in person, the Agent considers that we have overrated his character and abilities. His successes have been principally attributable to his well-selected instruments. He showed himself to be extremely rash when he came alone to Kabul, and then bearded the Amir in his own capital. The Sirdar once had a party composed, in large part, of Heratees, Momunds, and some Chiefs, but this party is now broken up.

As to Sirdar Abdullah Jan, the Agent thinks it too soon to estimate his future. He doubts this Sirdar becoming a man of mark. As yet he is without power or party.

Reverting to the subject of the mission, the Agent added that one reason for the Amir's objecting was his fear that the Envoy might press him on behalf of Mahomed Yakub Khan, whose cause the British had so frequently favored.

The Agent being asked as to the general situation in Afghanistan, replied that at present no communications passed between the Courts of Teheran and Kabul; that the Amir regards the Agents from Russia as sources of embarrassment; that quiet prevails along the Herat frontier; that the frontiers of Maimenah, Shibbergan, Andkhoe, &c., are tranquil; that the principal Usbeg and Eimakh Chiefs are at Kabul; that the Amir has no relations with the Turkomans, but will be prepared to afford them asylum when Russia drives them from Merv, and that, as to the British Government, His Highness entertains no hope of support from us, either for himself or his dynasty, unless as against Russia; that our policy is dictated by the convenience of the moment; that at Ambala we had engaged to regard with severe displeasure all attempts to impair his power and rule, and yet that we had subsequently rather encouraged Mahomed Yakub.

The interview being now terminated, Captain Grey accompanied the Agent on his ride home, and afterwards visited him, in view to quietly ascertain (without committing Government in any way) somewhat more as to the Amir's real position and views.

During the ride to his house the Agent informed Captain Grey that the position of the Amir is certainly precarious, and that, in his opinion, he would be glad to come to our terms, if he were once convinced of our meaning real business, but that we must be clear and open in our communications, as the Afghans have come to suspect a second meaning in all that we utter.

The Agent recommended that we should agree to our Envoy meeting Syud Nur Mahomed Shah on the frontier, in view to arranging for the reception of the mission, &c. These details, the Agent thinks, might be smoothly arranged, if we were prepared to reassure the Amir of our future support, on which His Highness does not at present place the slightest reliance.

On the morning of the 8th instant, Captain Grey paid the visit to the Agent, previously arranged, and learnt from him the details contained in the following note of his conversation:—

"I visited the Nawab this morning to ascertain what, in his opinion, were the Amir's probable demands.

"He premised by repeating that the Amir himself would put forward none, considering it useless to do so, but would wait to know what we proposed. At the same time, there could be little doubt that the requests brought forward in detail in 1873 would be those that would be again urged by the Amir, should he be led to believe that there is any chance of our really befriending him.

"So far as the Nawab is acquainted with the feelings of the Amir and his advisers, the matter which they have at heart are—

\* "I asked how they proposed that we should be responsible for a frontier without either defining it or watching it. He said that he had little doubt that, if the arrangements were otherwise satisfactory to the Amir, the deputation of British officers for both purposes would be acceded to."

† "The Nawab thinks it possible that, in default of these assurances, Mahomed Yakub will be murdered. I think that, if the assurances were to be given, there would be little difficulty in making Mahomed Yakub over to us for safe custody."

‡ "When I suggested this might entail our being continually called upon to put down disturbances caused by the Amir's own ill-advised measures, the Nawab replied that there was little fear of that. The Afghans would be exceedingly chary of calling us in, and every time that we were so called in, would cause an immediate accession to our power."

hitherto bestowed have been expended.

§ "The Nawab considers a lakh a month too little to really enable the Amir to put his army in good fighting condition. He thinks that the money should be given expressly for 'the maintenance of troops.' But he would not recommend that it should be given for the maintenance of any special Contingent, or payment of any specified number of troops."

|| This request seems to me to disclose the Amir's real estimate of his own position.

(Sd.) L. P.

¶ Yet only a few lines above our interference is demanded.

(Sd.) L. P.

\*\* "The Amir was very urgent about this at Ambala. He evidently places great faith upon this particular form of words."

Here, perhaps, we reach the heart of his hopes and wishes, and the permanent basis of his own security as Ruler.

(Sd.) L. P.

"1st.—That no Englishman should reside in Afghanistan, at any rate at Kabul.\*

"2nd.—The British Government should utterly disclaim connection with Mahomed Yakub, or any other pretender (actual or possible) to the Afghan Throne, agreeing to recognize and support only his declared heir.†

"3rd.—That we should agree to support the Amir, on demand, with troops and money in all and every case of attack from without. Also, should he call upon us to do so, to aid him in the event of internal disturbance.‡

"4th.—That we should come to some permanent arrangement regarding subsidy. All those The treasury is empty; the revenue, which is under a million sterling, is quite inadequate to the maintenance of his present force of some 75,000 troops. Consequently the force is under-paid, ill-found, and inefficient, and our help is needed to make it efficient.§ The Amir is also keen upon having a *pied a terre* in British territory, whither to send his family and property, when he clears for action with the Russians.||

"5th.—That the British Government should engage to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.¶

"6th.—That, in any engagement entered into, an expression to the following effect be embodied:—'The British Government regards the Amir's friends and enemies as its own, and the Amir similarly regards those of the British Government.'\*\*

"7th.—That we should alter the style in which we address the Amir, according him more dignified titles. He considers himself quite the equal of the Shah of Persia."

(II)—*Memorandum of an interview at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul, on 10th October 1876.*

*Present :*

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

SIR LEWIS PELLY.

LIEUT.-COL. O. T. BURNE.

CAPTAIN GREY.

The Viceroy opened the conversation by recapitulating all the heads of the information furnished on the 7th instant by the Agent, respecting the views and feelings of the Amir. The Agent having acknowledged that his statements had been correctly repeated to the Viceroy, His Excellency said that this information was very full and interesting, but quite new, although it ranged over a period of two or three years. The Agent's diaries during the last six months, and those furnished under the preceding Viceroy, contained merely reports of events, without comment or explanation, and without any expression of the Agent's own views. Why was this?

The Agent disputed the justice of this description of his reports; but, on being further pressed, observed that, in the first place, he had received no encouragement, or instruction, from the Government to furnish it with impressions and opinions, as well as facts; and, in the next place, it was not safe to put very confidential matter into the Kabul diaries.

The Viceroy then requested the Agent to understand that henceforth he would be expected to keep the Government fully informed, not only of all that actually takes place at Kabul, but also of his own impressions as to the cause and character of the events reported by him, as well as the dispositions, motives, and influences, of the chief actors in Afghan affairs. He must do this fully, even at the risk of occasionally expressing mistaken views, and take his own precautions for the safety of his dispatches as far as Peshawur, at which station the Commissioner would be responsible for their safe transmission to the Viceroy.

His Excellency then proceeded to say that he regarded, with no other feeling than that of profound compassion, the present situation of the Amir, and the state of mind attributed by the Agent to His Highness; for whilst, on the one hand, it was evident that His Highness believed he had good cause to resent the past policy, and mistrust the present attitude, of the British Government, on the other hand, it was equally clear that the Amir very inadequately realised the gravity and imminence of the danger into which he is drifting under the influence of these unfortunate impressions, or the practical impossibility of maintaining himself in a position of independence isolated from the protection, or exposed to the mistrust, of the British Government.

The Amir had apparently come to the conclusion that, having nothing to hope from us, and, at the same time, nothing to fear, he may safely stand aloof from the British Government, confident that, in the event of external attack, we shall be obliged to help him, for the protection of our own interests, even if we are under no contract obligation to do so.

This was a very natural conclusion; but unfortunately for the Amir, there was a fatal flaw in its premises. It is true that, if the Amir proves himself our friend and loyal ally, not our interests only, but our honor, will oblige us to defend his territories, and support his throne. But the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened, both at home and abroad. As regards the former, the British Government can only assist those who value its assistance; and the assistance which the Amir seems at present disinclined to seek, or deserve, may, at any moment, be very welcome to one or other of those rivals, from whom he will never be free till he has our assured support. As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether. If the Amir does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does, and she desires it at his expense.

To prove that this is no imaginary danger to the Amir, the Viceroy then detailed to the Agent the proposals made to His Excellency last March, before his departure from London, by Count Schouvaloff, on behalf of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and explained the nature of his own reply thereto. He further quoted an extract from the *Golos* containing Russian proposals to the same effect as those made by the Count.

As matters now stand, the British Government is able to pour an overwhelming force into Afghanistan, either for the protection of the Amir, or the vindication of its own interests, long before a single Russian soldier could reach Kabul. His Excellency illustrated

this statement by detailed reference to the statistics of the Russian military force in Central Asia, and the British military force in India, showing the available troops of either Power within certain distances of the city of Kabul.

The Viceroy then said that, if the Amir remained our friend, this military power could be spread round him as a ring of iron, and, if not, it could break him as a reed. But our relations with Afghanistan could not remain as they are. They must become worse or better. It was His Excellency's sincere desire that they should become better; and, on his part, he was cordially willing to do all in his power to make them so.

The Viceroy, however, pointed out that he could not help a State which would not allow him the means of helping it; nor undertake responsibility for the protection of a frontier which he is unable to look after by means of his own officers. Unless we can have our own Agents on the Afghan frontier, and thus know what is going on there, and beyond, we cannot effectually defend that frontier. It is out of the question that we should be committed to seeing the Amir through a war with Russia, without being in a position to prevent his becoming involved in such a war.

It was natural enough that, in the present state of his relations with us, the Amir should view with aversion, and even alarm, the presence of British Agents in any part of Afghanistan. There is probably at present no part of Afghanistan in which the Amir's hold over his own subjects is not liable to be weakened by any doubt in their minds as to the friendliness of our attitude towards him. And, in the unhappy ambiguity which still characterises his relations with us, the Amir's people might suppose that the British Government had sent its Agents into Afghanistan to exert pressure on His Highness, to threaten, or to bully him, to spy out the nakedness of his land, or encourage the disaffection of his subjects. The Amir, however, must surely perceive how different would be the result, and how advantageous to himself, if the presence of any British Agent in Afghanistan were preceded by the publication of such a document as his most powerful predecessors had been eager to possess, frankly declaring to all the world that the British Government is the friend of his friends, and the enemy of his enemies. The Amir's people would, in that case, recognize, in the representatives of the British Government, the most potent supporters of his authority, and their influence would go far to consolidate his rule. On such conditions, moreover, the residence of a British officer at Herat would be a significant advertisement to all the external enemies of the Amir; that the Power of England is there upon the watch to defend him from aggression; and that whoever touches him will be touching us.

In short, the Viceroy reaffirmed the necessity of the British Government watching the Afghan frontier, if it is to undertake the protection of that frontier; and to this arrangement it is necessary that the Amir should accede; as also to the reception of special missions when requisite, if his relations with the British Government are to be maintained at all.

It is indispensable that His Excellency should be in a position to acquaint himself with the true state of things in Afghanistan. The Vakeel had said that the Amir was strong, but what were the facts admitted by himself? His own son was his opponent. This son had been imprisoned certainly, but was still so formidable that the Amir could not leave Kabul on his account. It was believed that conspiracies were rife in favor of this son; that the people were discontented on account of the conscription; that the treasury was empty; and, in fact, that the Amir's position was surrounded with difficulties.

This, said His Excellency, is the man who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia independent of either! His position is rather that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots.

The Viceroy went on to observe that British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite treaty engagements. The Amir has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms. If once a Treaty be given to the Amir, no Viceroy, whatever his views, will act contrary to its tenor. There is now a Ministry willing to give him such a Treaty, and a Viceroy, with five years' tenure of office before him, willing and able to give such effect to the provisions of the Treaty as may render the Amir the strongest Sovereign that has ever sat on the throne of Kabul.

The Amir complains of the insufficient dignity of his titles, and desires to be treated on the same footing as the Shah of Persia. But Persia has shown every disposition to enter into the category of civilized States. The Shah receives at Teheran a large English mission on a permanent footing, and entertains Englishmen, who can travel throughout Persia, and penetrate to all parts of the country, under the protection of the Persian Government. Let Afghanistan act in the same way, and the Amir may then claim to be the Shah's equal.

The Viceroy then proceeded to detail the concessions he was prepared to make, and the conditions on which he would make them.

#### CONCESSIONS.

(1.)—That the friends and enemies of either State should be those of the other.

(2.)—That, in the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan from without, assistance shall be afforded in men, money, and arms; and also, to strengthen him against such aggression, the British Government is willing to fortify Herat and other points on the frontier, and, if desired, to lend officers to discipline the army.



(3.)—That Abdulla Jan shall be recognized as the Amir's successor, to the exclusion of any other; the question of material aid in support of such recognition to be discussed by the Plenipotentiaries.

(4.)—That a yearly subsidy shall be afforded to the Amir, the amount of which, and other details will be settled by the Plenipotentiaries.

#### CONDITIONS.

(1.)—That the Amir refrain from external aggression, or provocation of his neighbours, and that he hold no external relations without our knowledge.

(2.)—That he decline all communication with Russia, referring their Agents to us.

(3.)—That British Agents reside at Herat and elsewhere on the frontier.

(4.)—That a mixed Commission of British and Afghan officers shall determine and demarcate the Amir's frontier.

(5.)—That arrangements be made, by allowances or otherwise, for free circulation of trade on the principal trade routes. In the cost of these arrangements the Amir will be assisted by the British Government.

(6.)—That similar arrangements, with similar assistance, be made for a line of telegraph, the direction of which shall be subsequently determined.

(7.)—That Afghanistan be freely opened to Englishmen, official and non-official, and arrangements be made by the Amir, as far as practicable, for their safety, though, of course His Highness will not be absolutely held responsible for isolated accidents.

(8.)—The Viceroy will forego the establishment of a permanent Envoy at Kabul on condition—

1st.—That the Amir depute an Envoy to the Viceroy's head-quarters.

2nd.—That he receive special missions whenever requisite.

The Viceroy further added that, if the Amir required it, he was prepared to undertake the safe custody of Mahomed Yakub.

The Viceroy then concluded by saying that the Amir, while refusing the mission originally proposed, had suggested two alternatives—

1st.—That the Kabul Vakeel should come to Simla to detail the Amir's views, and learn those of the Viceroy.

2nd.—That his Agent should meet a British officer on the frontier, and discuss matters with him.

The first proposition had been acceded to with good results. His Excellency had learnt the Amir's feelings, and the Vakeel was put in possession of his own intentions. His Excellency would now accede to the second proposal. If the Amir were prepared to treat on the basis required by the Viceroy, he should at once send Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to come to an arrangement on that basis with Sir Lewis Pelly, meeting him at Peshawur, Jellalabad, or wherever the Amir might desire. His Excellency had deputed Sir Lewis Pelly, as being entirely in the confidence of the Cabinet and of himself. Dr. Bellew was appointed to assist him, as being believed to be a person acceptable to the Amir, and on friendly terms with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah.

Unless, however, the Amir was prepared to enter into such a Treaty as proposed by His Excellency, it would be useless his sending his Agent to discuss matters further, as no discussion on any other terms can be admitted, and relations must be broken off. If, however, he agrees to the Treaty on this basis, it might be drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries, and the ratifications exchanged either at Peshawur—by the Amir meeting the Viceroy there in November, if the negotiations could be disposed of in time—or at Delhi, if the Amir accepts the Viceroy's invitation to the Imperial Assemblage there.

---

#### (III)—Memorandum by Sir Lewis Pelly, dated Simla, 11th October 1876.

Captain Grey and I called to-day on the Kabul Agent, in view to ascertaining whether he correctly remembered the purport of the remarks addressed to him yesterday afternoon by His Excellency the Viceroy.

We found that the Agent had a perfect recollection of all that passed, and repeated the observations of His Excellency almost without hesitation.

The Agent evidently feared that the stipulations concerning telegraphic lines, and refrainment on the part of the Amir from all communications with external Powers, might seriously embarrass the progress of negotiations.

And, having regard to these remarks of the Agent, as well as to the arguments and views expressed in the letter which His Excellency is now addressing to the Amir, I explained to the Agent that His Excellency drew a distinction between subjects which would form matter for discussion between me and the Kabul Minister, and those which were essential, as a

basis, for arriving at any treaty engagement; that among the subjects which might lie over for discussion were those now specified by the Agent; but that the following conditions would have to be contained in any treaty engagement which could be accepted:—

1st.—The Treaty would be defensive and offensive.

2nd.—That, in the event of any Foreign Power making an unprovoked attack on Afghanistan, the British Government would support His Highness in repelling the attack by arms, men, and the material of war.

3rd.—And, in view to enabling the British Government to fulfil the above obligations, the Afghan Government would bind themselves to permit British officers to be placed on their frontier, *e.g.*, at Herat and Balkh, guaranteeing the personal safety, and respectful treatment, of those officers.

\* His Excellency may, perhaps, deem well to refrain from insisting on this clause, at all events until negotiations shall be entered upon. I venture to question whether the Commission might not do more harm than good. It is to be borne in mind that the people on our side of the boundary line would not be Afghan subjects, nor have given their assent to the definition. The country is wild, and the inhabitants reckless. Unpleasant accidents might readily happen to our officers, whether such accidents should be instigated by ill-wishers, or be the result of sudden and barbaric impulse. Would not our Political Agents along the frontier gradually acquaint themselves with its general outline, and collect all the information we require?

(Sd.) L. P.

4th.—That a mixed Commission\* of Afghan and British officers should define the frontier line.

5th.—That the Afghan Government should aid in facilitating an interchange of trade by improving and securing the safety of certain routes, and that Afghanistan should not remain closed to British subjects.

6th.—That the Amir should depute an Agent to the Viceregal Court, and, on occasion arising, receive special and temporary missions from the Viceroy.

The above clauses, I remarked, embraced all the wishes expressed by the Amir, whether through his Agents, or by letter; while they advanced no claims on our part other than those which were obviously essential.

But I added that, should the Amir so wish, His Excellency would be prepared to render the terms of the Treaty more favorable to His Highness than His Highness had formally requested, and that, in this view, His Excellency would agree—

1st.—To recognize Sirdar Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent to the throne of Afghanistan.

2nd.—And, should the Amir so wish, to aid the Amir with money, and otherwise, in improving the military defences of his frontier, and in drilling his troops.

† *Vide* Captain Grey's memorandum of His Excellency's remarks.

I explained to the Agent that, unless† the Minister were empowered to agree to the basis on which a Treaty would be possible of ratification, it would be futile for us to meet.

At the same time I venture to submit, for His Excellency's consideration, that, essentials admitted, the fewer questions we raise before the commencement of negotiations at Peshawur, the less will be the risk of an opportunity for negotiation falling through.

The Agent asked me as to the question of possible asylum for the Amir in British territories. I replied that I had no instructions, but that I deemed it probable the Viceroy would not object to an understanding to this effect, though it was obviously a matter to be treated confidentially, rather than in a public instrument of the character now contemplated.

I added further, that although His Excellency was very far from desirous of taking any action in regard to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, yet that, in the event of a treaty engagement being entered into, His Excellency would be prepared to receive charge of the Sirdar, should His Highness express a wish to such effect. But this matter also, I observed, was not one for insertion in a Treaty.

(II')—*Memorandum of the second interview at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Kabul, on the 13th October 1876, after consultation in Council in regard to certain points connected with its purport.*

*Present:*

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

SIR LEWIS PELLY.

MR. T. H. THORNTON.

LIEUT.-COLONEL O. T. BURNE.

CAPTAIN GREY.

His Excellency commenced by acknowledging the fullness and importance of the information which the Vakeel had now laid before him regarding the state of affairs at Kabul. He said he had treated the Vakeel confidentially, and had stated, without any reserve, all that he had in his mind. He had no doubt that the Vakeel would convey this faithfully to the Amir, and he trusted that it would cause the Amir to lay aside his present attitude of reserve,

and be equally frank and open. The Viceroy's object was, that the Amir should understand everything in His Excellency's mind, so that, if the Plenipotentiaries met, nothing should come as a surprise. At the same time the Vakeel should understand that His Excellency attached certain conditions to the opening of negotiations, without which it was needless for the Amir to send down his representatives—

(1.)—The location of British officers upon the Afghan frontier.

(2.)—An attitude of friendship and confidence on the part of the Amir.

As there were some points to which the Viceroy might have omitted reference at the first interview, he would proceed to recapitulate them.

*First*, as regards a *piel à terre* for the Amir in British territory, the Viceroy was quite willing to agree to the Amir's wishes in this respect, which, as far as was in the power of the British Government, should be complied with. The details must be settled hereafter.

*Secondly*, when the Viceroy agreed to recognize Abdulla Jan, this was not a mere form of words; it was, of course, impossible beforehand to make stipulations providing for every contingency that may arise; but the British Government's intention was to give the fullest effect to an engagement of this nature, compatible with the condition, urged by the Amir himself, of abstention from unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It would be, of course, impossible that the British Government should undertake to reverse accomplished facts. If the Amir, or his heir, were ever actually ejected from the throne of Kabul, the British Government would not undertake a war with the Afghans for their restoration. If, however, the Amir gave notice in due time, while still in possession of his throne, that he was in difficulties, and needed material assistance, such assistance would be afforded within the limits of what might be found practically possible at the time. But no such assistance would be practically possible, without greatly improved facilities for postal and telegraphic communications between British territory and Kabul; nor even then, if the Amir keeps us in ignorance of his true situation, disregarding our advice, till he is in extreme need of our help, and concealing his difficulties till we can neither avert them, nor extricate him from them. The Amir will, therefore, perceive that the first step towards giving practical effect to any such agreement must be the establishment, and adequate protection, of a line of telegraph from Kabul to some point in British territory.

The Viceroy wished to put no pressure on the Amir in regard to an alliance which was so advantageous to His Highness; but, if he is to guarantee the Amir against external attack, and to avert internal disturbance, he must be enabled to watch against the former by means of reliable Agents on the frontier, and against the latter by free communication with the Amir on all occasions, to be carried on through the medium of special missions or otherwise.

Should the Amir not consider the advantages worth the concession required from him, *viz.*, those of British Agency on the frontier, and a really friendly attitude on the part of the Amir himself, it would then be needless for him to depute his Minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy, and the Viceroy would be free to adopt his own course in his re-arrangement of frontier relations without regard to Afghan interests.

The Viceroy concluded by saying that he reposed full confidence in the British Agent, and trusted to him to bring the Amir to a comprehension of the real position of affairs; he hoped the Agent would be able to induce the Amir to be present at the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, whither all neighbouring Independent Rulers had been invited, and where the ratifications of the Treaty, should it be concluded, could be advantageously exchanged. An unusual opportunity would be thus afforded for manifesting, in the most public manner, the intimate political relations subsisting between His Highness and the British Government, and the recognition of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent.

The Viceroy then handed to the Agent an *Aide Memoire*\* for his guidance as to what he was authorized to state to the Amir on the part of His Excellency; also a letter\* for the

\* Appended.

Amir on the subject of the proposed negotiations, conveying also a formal and friendly invitation to the Amir on the part of the Indian Government to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

He then presented the Agent with a watch and chain, and bestowed on him a khillut of Rupees 10,000, in acknowledgment of the appreciation of the Government of his past faithful service.

---

(V)—*Aide Memoire for the British Agent at Kabul.*

I authorize the Agent to tell the Amir that I am glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my assumption of the government of India, and by a policy which His Highness has considered to be neither hot nor cold.

I authorize the Agent to tell the Amir that, if His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be a warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing all that is practically in my power to stand by him in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to confirm the succession in the person of his son, Sirdar Abdulla Jan.

I am, therefore, willing to give him a Treaty of friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance in arms, men, and money, for the defence of his territory against unprovoked foreign invasion. I am further willing to give him immediate pecuniary assistance, and to give to his son, Abdulla Jan, the public recognition and support of the British Government.

But I cannot do any one of these things unless the Amir is, on his part, equally willing to afford me the practical means of assisting His Highness in the protection of his frontier by the residence of a British Agent at Herat, and at such other parts of that frontier most exposed to danger from without as may be hereafter mutually agreed upon.

I do not even wish to embarrass the Amir, whose present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying out this arrangement, until after the signature of a Treaty of alliance between us, on terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our friendship; nor until after the Amir shall have had the means of making known to his people that the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan signifies that he is there, without interfering in internal State matters, as the firm supporter of the Amir, and of the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence and power of the British Government in defending their country against foreign aggression, and to discourage attempts on the part of the disaffected to disturb its internal tranquillity, or weaken the throne of His Highness.

It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the *external* affairs of the frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Amir, as well as to the British Government. Should the Amir at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled.

I have no wish to disturb the existing Native Agency at Kabul, or to urge upon the Amir the reception of a permanent British Envoy at his Court, if His Highness thinks that the presence of such an Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him. But, in that case I should, of course, expect that no obstacle be placed in the way of confidential communications between myself and His Highness, by means of special Euvoyes, whenever the interests of the two Governments may require them.

In short, it is my object and desire that the Treaty of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be a great strength and support to the Amir, both at home as well as abroad, and not a source of weakness or embarrassment to him.

I am quite ready to consult with the Amir, in a friendly and confidential way, through our respective representatives, as to the best means of placing our relations on the permanent footing of a Treaty engagement by which his independence and dignity will be assured in a manner satisfactory to himself, as well as to the British Government. But unless the Amir agrees to the arrangement indicated in paragraph 4 of this note, and cordially enters into it, it will not be practically in my power to undertake any obligations on his behalf, or to do anything for his assistance, whatever may be the dangers or difficulties of his future position.

## APPENDIX XX.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 119, Chapter FI.* ]

### INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR LEWIS PELLY.

(I)—Letter dated Mushobra, 17th October 1876, from Mr. T. H. THORNTON, Officiating Foreign Secretary, to SIR LEWIS PELLY.

Having been present at the interviews which lately took place between the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Kabul, you are aware that the Agent has been authorized by Lord Lytton to return to the Court of the Amir of Kabul, charged with messages from His Excellency, who has assented to the Amir's proposal that the Minister of His Highness, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, should meet you, either at Peshawur, or at some point on Afghan territory, for the purpose of there endeavouring to effect with you an agreement as to the terms of closer and more satisfactory relations between the British Government and that of His Highness. You are also aware that His Excellency has invited the Amir to attend the ceremonial about to be held at Delhi, on the 1st of January next, for the purpose of there exchanging with the Viceroy in person the ratification of the Treaty of alliance which you are authorized to negotiate with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah.

In accordance with the arrangements thus proposed, I have now to instruct you to proceed, at your early convenience, to the neighbourhood of Peshawur, and to wait there the Amir's answer to the messages now on their way to His Highness from the Viceroy. This answer will be communicated to you by the Commissioner at Peshawur, and you will then either await at Peshawur the arrival of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, or else proceed at once to meet the Minister, at any part of the Afghan territory which may be indicated in His Highness' reply to the Viceroy's letter, or in any communication from the Kabul Agent to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

For your more complete information, in regard to the object and character of the

(1.) Historical Review of affairs in Central Asia, 1872-75.

(2.) Kabul Précis, 1872-74.

(3.) Nos. 1 and 2, Kabul Mission papers.

(4.) Copy of Viceroy's Note, Kabul Mission, 5th July 1876.

(5.) Paper No. 4324, 8th March 1876, No. 70; copy of papers, extracts from Russian *Golos*.

(6.) Vol. of Aitchison's Treaties containing Kabul Treaties.

(7.) Government of India despatch, 30th June 1873, No. 60, Secret.

(8.) Government of India despatch, No. 75, dated 15th September 1873—Deputation of Nur Mahomed to Simla.

(9.) Secretary of State's despatch, No. 2, Secret, dated 22nd January 1875.

(10.) Government of India despatch, No. 19, dated 7th June 1875, in reply.

(11.) Secretary of State's despatch, No. 34, Secret, dated 19th November 1875, in rejoinder.

(12.) Government of India despatch, No. 10, Secret, dated 28th January 1876.

(13.) Copy of Secret Instructions—Secretary of State's No. —, Secret, dated 28th February 1876.

(14.) Copy of Foreign Office Memorandum, 19th July 1876, and K. W. Pros., Nos. 9-33, June 1875—Arms and money given to Amir since Ambala Conference.

(15.) Foreign Office papers entitled slavery in Afghanistan, including Secretary of State's despatch, No. 18, Secret, dated 12th April 1876.

negotiations which you are authorized by the Governor-General in Council to open with the Amir's Minister on behalf of the British Government, I am directed to furnish you, confidentially, with certain documents, marked in the margin of this letter. With the contents of these documents I believe you are already well acquainted, but I am to commend them to your careful and reiterated perusal.

The main objects of your negotiations with the Amir's Minister will be those ascribed by the Earl of Derby to the general policy of the British Government as regards Afghanistan in His Lordship's communication to the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, copy of which is herewith enclosed. These objects are—*1stly*, to provide for the external security of Afghanistan; and, *2ndly*, to ensure the internal tranquillity of that State, in a manner conducive to British interests.

The time has now arrived when, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, the attainment of the above-mentioned objects demand more definite arrangements than have hitherto existed between the Government of India and that of Afghanistan. The tone which you should adopt, and adhere to, in the discussion of such

arrangements, is so clearly prescribed, and so fully explained, by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in His Lordship's Secret despatch of the 28th February 1876 (to which I am to direct your special attention), that on this point I need not instruct you further.

The conditions on which the Governor-General in Council is now prepared to enter into closer and more definite relations with the Government of Afghanistan are in every particular the same as those desired by the Amir himself, on the occasion of his visit to Ambala, in 1869, and again in more or less general terms so urged by him on the Government of India through his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, in 1873.

\* (1.) Conversation between Amir and Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, 26th March 1869.

(2.) Interviews between the Amir and the Viceroy, 29th March and 3rd April 1869.

(3.) Note by Captain Grey, 31st March 1869.

(4.) Conversation between Foreign Secretary and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah of 1st and 3rd April 1869.

The enclosed papers\* will show you that in 1869 the Amir lost no opportunity, directly and indirectly, of stating that the paramount object of his heart was the conclusion of a Treaty with the Viceroy, declaring the friends and enemies of His Highness to be those of the British Government and *vice versa*, and that on this condition he was



willing to receive British Agents in various localities along the Afghan frontier for the better protection of those interests which would be publicly recognised in the proposed Treaty as common to the two allied Governments. In other words, there was in 1869 nothing to which the

Captain Grey's report, enclosed, 31st March 1869. Amir would not accede if the British Government were prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he might appoint; he was open "to any proposition for securing his northern border;" and, whilst doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, he still thought precautions should be taken, and expressed his desire to construct forts on his own part, or under British superintendence, and to admit European garrisons if ever desired; he, moreover, at that time affirmed that he would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul, which might lead to the supposition that his independence was undermined.

You will further learn from the subjoined papers that the Amir and his advisers were equally explicit in the profession, not only of their desire, but of their ability (if once assured of an open alliance with the British Government) to facilitate friendly intercourse, trade, and traffic, between this empire and all parts of His Highness' dominions.

The enclosed documents will also show you that in his personal interviews with Lord Mayo, the Amir spoke earnestly in the sense of the wishes and desires which he had previously expressed to others, saying that the "tranquillity of the country which the Viceroy had so much at heart would be the natural consequence of the security of his power and dynasty, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation), which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent Government."

The accompanying letter\* from the then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to the Foreign Secretary attests the emphatic character of the terms in which the Amir repeated his wishes to Sir Donald Macleod, urging that "a clause might be introduced into any official communication to him, to the effect that we have not, and will not have, relations of friendship with any one in Afghanistan apart from the Amir;" adding that "fire had been lit in that country by the declaration that we would acknowledge any one who should win his way to the throne, and that nothing short of declaration of this kind would suffice to extinguish it."

It is unnecessary here to explain the various reasons which, in 1869 and again in 1873, induce the British Government to decline the proposal for a definite Treaty of alliance which was then urged on their acceptance by the Amir of Kabul. I need only observe that those reasons had reference to a situation which has been essentially altered by the progress of events during the last seven years, and the position of affairs both in Europe and Central Asia at the present moment.

This altered situation is such, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, as to render inexpedient any prolongation of uncertainty as to the policy of the Afghan Government, or its practical means of self-defence in the event of future complications in Central Asia.

The Governor-General in Council is, for this reason, prepared to contract with the Amir of Kabul a definite and practical alliance on the terms desired by His Highness in 1869 and 1873, without exacting from the Amir any conditions of alliance to which the anticipatory assent of His Highness was not freely given in those years.

You are aware that the Amir has been informed by the Viceroy, through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, that His Excellency is ready to afford His Highness immediate and material assistance in the protection of the Afghan frontier against foreign aggression, on the condition desired by the Amir in 1869, *viz.*, the location of competent British Agents on that frontier for the purposes indicated in the general conferences on the occasion above referred to. On this point, therefore, your negotiation with the Amir's Minister will be confined to the friendly arrangement of the measures necessary to give practical effect to this principle.

In so doing you will be careful to consult the dignity and convenience of the Amir in every way not incompatible with the attainment of the object in view. The Amir, in 1869, appears to have expressed his reluctance to receive a permanent European British Agent at Kabul for reasons which he then explains. If those reasons still exist in the mind of His Highness, the Governor-General in Council, respecting their sincerity, will not urge such an arrangement on his acceptance. At the same time it may be well that you should point out to the Afghan Envoy the probable advantage which, in the event of any sudden accident to the health or the life of the Amir, the interests of the heir-apparent would derive from the presence in Kabul of a competent British representative, whose influence might effectually assist the Durbar in preventing the attempts likely to be made, should such a contingency occur, to inflict upon the country the calamities of a civil war, by disturbing the peaceable succession of the established dynasty.

As regards the security of trade between the territories, and the encouragement of friendly interests between the subjects, of the two Governments, as well as mutual aid in the management of Pass tribes and the maintenance of safe border highways, you will invite the Afghan Envoy to discuss with you, in the frank and friendly spirit evinced by himself and the Amir during the negotiations of 1869, such measures as may be expedient for the attainment of these objects.

On behalf of your own Government you will be equally frank and conciliatory. You will fairly point out to the Afghan Envoy the reciprocal character of those advantages, on behalf of which the loyal co-operation of his Government is desired and expected in regard to the protection of trade and the security of peaceful travellers; but you will abstain from putting forward any unreasonable demands, and you will not propose to make the Afghan Government responsible for the safety of British subjects entering its dominions without a passport from the British Government. This Government does not desire to impose on the Amir burdens which His Highness is demonstrably unable to sustain. Its object is not to weaken but to strengthen his hands.

You will, however, expect from him the amendment of that tone of evasion and mistrust which has recently characterised his language in reference to the possibility and reciprocal benefit of improved intercourse between his own subjects and those of the British Government.

You will impress on the Amir's Minister that the British Government will expect His Highness to recognise fairly and fully the duties incumbent on him as the avowed friend and ally of Her Majesty, and to give loyal effect to the declarations made by him to the Viceroy in 1869 that, "if the British Government would recognise him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and life; it being understood that the slightest failure on the part of himself or his descendants should vitiate all engagements on our part."

For the speedy improvement of the means of communication between the two Governments, it appears to the Governor-General in Council very desirable that the Amir should co-operate with the Government of India in establishing and maintaining a line of telegraph between certain points on Afghan and British territories, the selection of which may properly form one of the subjects of your negotiation. The same observation applies to the means of working and protecting any such line or lines of telegraphic communication. In the discussions of the measures necessary for that purpose, you will evince every reasonable readiness to comply with such wishes or suggestions as the Amir's Minister may submit to you on behalf of His Highness. On this point I need only add that the British Government is prepared to bear the cost of laying down the lines, if the Amir will guarantee the protection of those parts of them which are within his own territories, and come to some mutual agreement as to the safety of those portions passing through the intermediate borders.

There are many other conditions which, though not *sine quâ non* to the opening of negotiations, are essential to the satisfactory conclusion of them, and which should be agreed to by the Amir before the British Government can, on its part, formally undertake the protection of His Highness, at home and abroad, within the limits indicated by the Viceroy to the Kabul Agent.

In the first place, it is obvious that, if the British Government is to undertake any responsibility for the defence of the Amir's territories from foreign aggression, the Amir's external policy must not be conducted without reference to its advice. It will, therefore, be necessary that your negotiation should secure to the British Government an effective control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan. A stipulation to this effect can be worded in general terms, and in the manner which you may think least derogatory to the dignity and independence of the Amir, which it is most desirable to uphold in the eyes of his own subjects.

The next point demanding your attention, and which must be pressed upon the consideration of the Afghan Government, is the attitude now assumed by that Government towards the subjects and representatives of your own. This attitude, on the part of the Amir, should be frankly and promptly abandoned. The British Government cannot be his friend in need, and his friend in deed, if the friendship on which he is to reckon in his needs finds, meanwhile, no recognition in his deeds. You will, therefore, give the Amir's Envoy to understand that the offers of assistance in men, money, and arms, are conditional, on a distinct understanding that the Amir will encourage on the part of the tribes and Sirdars under his authority and, maintain on his own part, free, frequent, and friendly intercourse with the British Government and all its subjects.

The various modes in which practical effect may be given to this understanding will be the natural subject of discussion, and detailed arrangement between yourself and the Amir's representative.

Not the least important of the subsidiary arrangements on which the Governor-General in Council desires you to come to an understanding with the Amir's representative will have reference to mutual aid in the more friendly and effective control of the Afreedee tribes, who now infest the Khyber Pass, and not only impede free access between Peshawur and Kabul, but surround an important portion of our North-Western Frontier with a fringe of turbulent barbarism, the continued existence of which is most inconvenient to the Government of India. The independent character of these tribes, the practical difficulty of exerting over them any effective control, either from Kabul, or from Peshawur, and the general character of our relations with them, up to the present moment, as well as of their relations with the rest of the Afghan population, are all so well and accurately known to you that it is hardly necessary to do more than commend this object very earnestly to your attention.

The general character and extent of such Imperial support as the Amir and his dynasty may be fairly entitled to expect from the British Government, under the terms of the proposed Treaty of alliance, are also clearly indicated by the negotiations which took place

in 1869 on the subject of a similar instrument. The British Government has never desired, and can never desire, to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; nor is it probable that it will ever again be disposed to undertake such a war as was undertaken by it on behalf of Shah Sujah for the reimposition of a dethroned Prince upon the throne of Kabul.

For the same reason the British Government cannot contract any obligation to support the Princes of Afghanistan against the opposition of the Afghan nation, or any large majority of their subjects, whose loyalty has been alienated by misgovernment or oppression. But, subject to these reasonable and necessary limitations, the British Government will do all that may be practically in its power to maintain the just authority of the Amir, or his recognised successor, against those intrigues and conspiracies of unlawful and unscrupulous pretenders to the throne which are incompatible with the settled order, good government, and peace of the country. The precise form which, in case of need, the British Government may be prepared to give to such assistance must, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the moment, which are not susceptible of anticipatory definition in any formal document.

Assuming the Amir's loyal fulfilment of all his own obligations under the terms of the proposed Treaty, the British Government will be willing to afford His Highness, if he desires it, pecuniary or military assistance in the fortification of his frontier, or to provide him with the services of experienced British officers for the better organization of his military force. It is also willing to embody in the terms of the proposed Treaty its distinct recognition of the order of succession, as contemplated by His Highness, in the person of Abdulla Jan.

It would, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, be desirable that the Amir should attend the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, to which he has been invited by the Viceroy. He may, however, represent his inability to leave Kabul at the present moment, leaving behind him there his rebellious son, Mahomed Yakub Khan, a prisoner, but still the centre of intrigue and conspiracy. In that case, you will at once inform the Amir that if His Highness wishes it, the British Government is willing to take charge of Yakub, and to answer for his safe custody in British territory. Should the Amir show any disposition to respond to such an offer, you will immediately communicate with the Commissioner of Peshawur as to the best means of carrying it promptly into effect, so that the Amir may be relieved of all anxiety on account of him.

Whilst thus placing before you the general views and orders of the Government of India on the subject of the important negotiations with which you are entrusted, I am to state that it is not intended to fetter your discretion with reference to any stipulation not mentioned in this instruction as being essential. But you will understand that, in the Treaty you are authorized to negotiate with the Amir's Minister, there must be a fair and full reciprocity of benefit to the contracting parties.

For the weighty obligations which, on this condition, the British Government is not unwilling to undertake in the interests of the Amir, it will be your duty to secure an adequate return substantially advantageous to British interests.

To afford you the means of quick and confidential communication with the Viceroy during the course of your negotiations, I hereby furnish you with a Cipher Code. In your use of this Code, you will, on the one hand, abstain from unnecessary reference to the Viceroy in regard to matters of minor importance; and, on the other hand, you will keep His Excellency fully informed in regard to demands which ought not to be complied with, or concessions which ought not to be granted, without his sanction.

In conclusion, I am to express the confidence felt by the Governor-General in Council in your ability, tact, and experience. In the difficulties of your negotiations, you may be assured of the sympathy and support of the Government of India.

(II)—Letter dated Mushobra, near Simla, 17th October 1876, from His Excellency the Viceroy to SIR L. PELLY, with enclosures, viz., A *Aide Memoire* for a Treaty, B *Aide Memoire* for Secret Agreement.

Having been present at the interviews which lately took place between myself and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Kabul, you are aware that the Agent has been authorized by me to return with all possible expedition to the Court of the Amir, charged with messages from myself, inviting His Highness, in the first place, to instruct his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, to meet you, either at Peshawur, or at some point on Afghan territory, for the purpose of there negotiating the terms of a Treaty of alliance between the British Government and that of His Highness; and, in the next place, to attend the ceremonial about to be held at Delhi, on the 1st of January next, for the purpose of there exchanging the ratifications of this Treaty with the Viceroy in person.

In accordance with the arrangements then proposed, I have now to instruct you to proceed, at your early convenience, to the neighbourhood of Peshawur, and to wait there the Amir's answer to the message which is on its way to His Highness from myself. This answer will be communicated to you by the Commissioner at Peshawur, with whom you should at once place yourself in private communication, keeping him duly informed of your whereabouts. But you will not proceed to Peshawur itself until the Amir's answer is received by the Commissioner, and you will, in the meanwhile, be most careful to avoid attracting public notice to your movements.

Should the Amir's answer, when received, contain a refusal of the proposals I have now made to His Highness, you will write to me for further instructions. If, on the other hand, the Amir accepts the above-mentioned proposals, you will either await at Peshawur the arrival of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, or else proceed at once to meet that Minister, at any part of the Afghan territory which may be indicated in His Highness' reply to my letter, or in any communication from the Kabul Agent to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

For the avoidance of any misapprehension as to the object and character of the negotiations which, in the latter case, you are authorized

(1.) Historical Review of Affairs in Central Asia, 1872-75.

(2.) Kabul précis, 72-74.

(3.) Nos. 1 and 2, Kabul Mission Papers.

(4.) Copy of Viceroy's Note, Kabul Mission, 5th July 1876.

(5.) Paper No. 4324, 8th March 1876, No. 70, copy of papers, extracts from Russian *Golos*.

(6.) Volume of Aitchison's Treaties, containing Kabul Treaties.

(7.) Government of India despatch, 30th June 1873, No. 60, Secret.

(8.) Government of India despatch, No. 75, 15th September 1873, deputation of Nur Mahomed to Simla.

(9.) Secretary of State's despatch, No. 2, Secret, of 22nd January 1875.

(10.) Government of India despatch, No. 19, of 7th June 1875, in reply.

(11.) Secretary of State's despatch, No. 34, Secret, of 19th November 1875, in rejoinder.

(12.) Government of India despatch, No. 10, Secret, of 28th January 1876.

(13.) Copy of Secret Instructions. Secretary of State's No. —, Secret, of 28th February 1876.

(14.) Copy of Foreign Office Memorandum, 19th July 1876, and K. W. Proceedings, Nos. 9-33, June 1876—Arms and money given to Amir since Ambala Conference.

(15.) Foreign Office papers entitled Slavery in Afghanistan, including Secretary of State's despatch, No. 18, Secret, of 12th April 1876.

to open with the Amir's Minister, on behalf of the British Government, I hereby furnish you, confidentially, with certain documents marked in the margin of this letter. With the contents of these documents I believe you are already well acquainted, but I commend them to your careful and reiterated perusal.

The main objects of your negotiations with the Amir's Minister will be those ascribed by the Earl of Derby to the general policy of the British Government, as regards Afghanistan, in His Lordship's communication to the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, copy of which is herewith enclosed. These objects are—*1stly*, to provide for the external security of Afghanistan; and, *2ndly*, to ensure the internal tranquillity of that State, in a manner conducive to British interests.

The time has, in my opinion, now arrived when the attainment of the above-mentioned objects demands more definite arrangements than have hitherto existed between the Government of India and that of Afghanistan. The tone which you should adopt, and adhere to, in the discussion of such arrangements, is so clearly prescribed, and

so fully explained, by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in His Lordship's Secret despatch of the 28th February 1876 (to which I would direct your special attention), that on this point I need not instruct you further.

You are aware that the Amir has been distinctly informed by me that the British Government is not prepared to enter into negotiations with His Highness on any terms which do not include the permanent location of a British officer at Herat, or such other points on the Afghanistan frontier as may, in our opinion, require this precautionary measure for the adequate protection of that frontier. The Amir's assent to this condition being an understood preliminary to the negotiations which you are now authorized to open with His Highness' Minister, you will, of course, understand that the principle of it is not susceptible of discussion. The details, however, of the arrangement to be carried out, in accordance with that principle, will form one of the most important subjects of your negotiation. In the settlement of those details, I am willing to leave great latitude to your discretion; merely indicating, for your general guidance, the special importance attached by the British Government to this primary condition.

The location of a British officer at Herat, as a permanent Agent of the British Government (with adequate guarantees for the due protection of such an Agent), must, in my judgment, be firmly insisted on. The necessity of a permanent British Agent at Kandahar will be greatly diminished by the arrangements which I hope to conclude, on behalf of the British Government, with the Khan of Khelat, before the close of this year; and although I am disposed to think that a British Resident at Balkh might be exceedingly useful, not only as an Intelligence Department, but also as a means of counteracting the intrigues, both from within and from without the Afghan frontier, to which that point of the frontier seems to be specially exposed, still this last named arrangement is not, in my opinion, of such essential importance that you need insist upon it against any strong or serious opposition on the part of the Amir. Bearing in mind, however, the exorbitance of the demands which will probably be made on the part of His Highness and the impossibility of satisfying them all, you may possibly find it advantageous to put forward, on behalf of the British Government, demands similarly excessive, for the purpose of withdrawing them in the course of negotiation; and thus encouraging concessions on the part of the Amir by the appearance of concessions on the part of your own Government. In that case, it may, perhaps, be worth while to ask, in the first instance, for British Residencies at Kandahar and Balkh, as well as Herat, and to represent as a great concession to the present difficulties of the Amir, as well as a great proof of the goodwill of the British Government and your own conciliatory disposition, the subsequent withdrawal of your demands in reference to the two frontier posts which are of comparatively less importance.

You will find, by reference to the accompanying correspondence, that this question of British Agencies on the Afghan frontier has been, and still is, more or less, connected with that of a British or mixed Boundary Commission for the more precise definition of the frontier.



How far this connection should now be maintained, or abandoned, is a matter for very careful consideration, on which I am disinclined to fetter your discretion.

You will observe that, in 1873, it was proposed by the Kabul Minister that a Boundary Commission should first be agreed to, as a preliminary to the subsequent, and more permanent, location of British officers on some parts of the Afghan frontier,—a proposal which implied that the Amir would be less averse to the former than to the latter arrangement.

On the other hand, however, the British Government has rarely been fortunate in its management, or settlement, of boundary questions, which are full of traps and pitfalls; and there can be no doubt that the result of our arbitration on the Seistán boundary question has bitterly disappointed, and mortally offended, the Amir.

It is not impossible, therefore, that you may find His Highness, as represented by His Minister, extremely suspicious of any proposal on our part to deal with his present boundaries. I am myself, moreover, inclined to think that, for all practical purposes, these boundaries are already sufficiently definite.

I can hardly anticipate the possibility of an attack upon Afghanistan, either by Russia, or by Persia, at any point of the Afghan frontier, as to the rightful ownership of which there is, at present, a reasonable doubt; and I think there is some danger that, if a Boundary Commission were kept hovering around the Afghan frontier for an indefinite period, the officers of that Commission (whom we should be obliged to select for other than political qualifications) might easily get into difficulties, either with the population, or with the Kabul authorities, which would be very embarrassing in their consequences. Moreover, the Commission would call such universal attention to a recognized uncertainty in the limitation of territories guaranteed by us, that I fear it might do more to unsettle, than to settle, the latent doubts it would be intended to remove.

For all these reasons, I think it best that your judgment, in reference to any such arrangement, should be freely guided by the course of the negotiation in regard to other stipulations. It is desirable that the arrangement in question should be fairly and fully discussed between yourself and the Amir's Envoy; and, if you find that it is viewed with no excessive repugnance by the Amir, it may be well to include it among the conditions agreed upon. If, on the other hand, you find that it meets with vehement, or pertinacious, opposition on the part of the Envoy, you will possibly think it prudent not to aggravate the Amir's repugnance to the main condition, which cannot be waived, as to a British Agency at Herat, by coupling it with any positive stipulation in regard to a Boundary Commission, whether purely British or mixed. In either case, however, it will be your endeavour to ascertain whether the Amir has any serious designs, or cherished ambitions, for the extension of his dominions in any direction beyond that portion of their present frontier, for the definition of which it has been proposed to appoint such a Commission. I have no doubt that your judgment will be greatly influenced by the information you may succeed in eliciting from the Envoy, or by any indications he may let fall as to the Amir's views and hopes respecting a possible extension of his territory, either by force of arms, independent negotiation, or the favor of the British Government. It is obvious that any attempt, on the part of the Amir, to incorporate Turkoman tribes, or territory, beyond his present frontier, in the direction of the Caspian, or towards Merv, might bring him into immediate collision with the Russian Power; and that, similarly, any aggressive designs on his part, in the direction of Kunjud, Chitral, with its tributary glens of Kafirstan, Yassin, Chilas, and the Dardu country generally (which are geographically, ethnologically, and politically, portions of Kashmir territory), would bring him into collision with British interests. If, therefore, you find the Amir, or his Representative, disposed to assent to a Boundary Commission, in any hope that it may result in such an augmentation of Afghan territory as we cannot encourage, and could not assent to, you will be careful to guard the arrangement against all possibility of those misunderstandings and disappointments with which it might otherwise be pregnant. The circumstances and results of the Seistán arbitration furnish a sufficient warning on this point.

You will observe, by reference to the enclosed correspondence, that the establishment of permanent British Agencies on the Afghan frontier, or, at least, at Herat, has been, from first to last, insisted on by Her Majesty's Government as a *sine qua non* condition to any of those concessions which, assuming that condition to be accepted, you are authorized to offer the Amir on behalf of the British Government; and you are also aware that this is the only condition I have imposed as a *sine qua non* preliminary to the opening of negotiations. But I need hardly point out to you that there are many other conditions which are *sine qua non* to the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations, and which must be agreed to by the Amir before the British Government can, on its part, formally undertake his protection, at home and abroad, within the limits indicated by me to the Kabul Agent.

Some of these conditions it may be found advisable to embody in a public Treaty; others may more conveniently form the terms of a secret, but written, Agreement. I will now enumerate the principal points to which they refer.

In the first place, it is obvious that, if the British Government is to undertake any responsibility for the defence of the Amir's territories from attack by Russia or Persia, it must have an adequate control over the Amir's conduct towards those two Powers. The relations between His Highness and all Foreign States must, therefore, be subordinated to our policy and guided by our advice. In conformity with this condition, you will insist on the immediate cessation of all correspondence between the Amir and the Russian Generals in



Central Asia. You can inform His Highness that Her Majesty's Government have already pointed out to the Government of Russia that this correspondence is incompatible with the existing agreement between the two Governments, and will not be tolerated by the British Government, so long as Afghanistan has any recognized claim upon British protection. You can also point out that, if henceforth the Commanders of the Russian Forces in Central Asia should have legitimate occasion to communicate with His Highness on any matter of real importance to his interests, their communications can, and must be, addressed to the British Agent at Herat, for transmission to His Highness; and you will remind him, if necessary, that only a few years ago he himself evinced the strongest reluctance to receive, or reply to, any communication from General Kauffman, and implied a hope that the British Government would intervene to put a stop to the correspondence which His Highness has of late appeared disposed to encourage. The relations between the British Government and His Highness were not then either so intimate, or, on our part, so responsible, as those which we are now prepared to maintain with him. But we certainly cannot undertake to defend him against the armies of Russia, so long as he continued to conduct an independent correspondence with the leaders of those armies. It will be absolutely necessary to insert in the public treaty a stipulation securing to the British Government an effective control over all the foreign relations of Afghanistan; but the stipulation can be worded in general terms, and in the manner which you may think least derogatory to the dignity and independence of the Amir, which we are anxious to uphold in the eyes of his own subjects. More detailed conditions, having special reference to Russia or Persia, may be properly embodied in the terms of a secret Agreement.

The next point demanding your attention, and which must be pressed upon the consideration of the Afghan Government, is the attitude now assumed by that Government towards the subjects and representatives of your own. We now offer to undertake, on behalf of the Amir, obligations, and accept responsibilities, incurred by the British Government on behalf of no other Independent Prince. Yet, up to the present moment, the British Government is treated by the Amir with a marked discourtesy, which it would tolerate from no other Independent Prince. British trade and travel are virtually excluded from the dominions of His Highness, who has refused to let a British officer pass through his territories on a peaceful mission to another State, or to receive from us, even on a temporary mission, a friendly representative at his own Court. This attitude, on the part of the Amir, must be frankly and promptly abandoned. The British Government cannot be his friend in need and his friend in deed, if the friendship on which he is to reckon in his needs finds, meanwhile, no recognition in his deeds. You will, therefore, give the Amir's Envoy to understand that our offers of assistance, in men, money, and arms, are conditional, on a distinct understanding that the Amir will encourage, on the part of the tribes and Sirdars under his authority, and maintain, on his own part, free, frequent, and friendly, intercourse with the British Government, and all its subjects.

The various modes in which practical effect may be given to this understanding will be the natural subject of discussion, and detailed arrangement, between yourself and the Amir's representative.

I will here indicate, however, one or two of the subsidiary arrangements to which I attach much importance.

Not the least important of them will be a satisfactory understanding with the Amir for mutual aid in the better control of the Afreedee tribes, who now infest the Khyber Pass, and not only impede free access between Peshawur and Kabul, but surround an important portion of our North-West Frontier with a fringe of turbulent barbarism, the continued existence of which is scarcely creditable, and is certainly most inconvenient, to the Government of India.

The independent character of these tribes, the practical difficulty of exerting over them any effective control, either from Kabul, or from Peshawur, and the general character of our relations with them, up to the present moment, as well as of their relations with the rest of the Afghan population, are all so well and accurately known to you, that I will not presume to suggest to your experience and intelligence the best means of rendering our improved relations with the Amir of Kabul conducive to the object above indicated. I need only commend that object very earnestly to your best attention.

There is, however, another subsidiary arrangement which, if not more important, is of more urgent and pressing importance, than the one last mentioned, or, indeed, than any other. This is the early establishment, with adequate guarantees for its proper maintenance, of a line of telegraph from Kabul to some point, which may hereafter be determined, on British territory.

It is impossible for me to over-state, or to impress too strongly upon you, the paramount importance I ascribe to this condition. You will, of course, negotiate the acceptance of it, in connection with similar arrangements for facilitating communications with Kabul, by means of improved roads, and such a system of patrol, or such military posts, as may be necessary to ensure the freedom and safety of some convenient high road for trade and traffic between British India and Afghanistan. But the telegraph is the one condition of such a general arrangement which can be most quickly carried out, and which, for this and other reasons, will least bear postponement.

You will see, by reference to the accompanying protocol of my conversation with the Kabul Agent, that I have pointedly and purposely connected this concession, on the part of the Amir, with the most important of all the concessions, offered to His Highness by our-

selves, *viz.*, the amount of material support involved in our public recognition of Abdulla Jan as the Heir-apparent of His Highness. I think that in your negotiations with Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, you will find it convenient to maintain that connection, not allowing the Amir's Envoy, at any period in your negotiations, to treat the one question independently of the other.

The question relating to our recognition of Abdulla Jan is the one on which it is the most important that there should be no misunderstanding, either between the Viceroy and his Envoy, or between the Viceroy's Envoy and the Envoy of the Amir. I will, therefore, endeavour to explain to you, as clearly and as precisely as possible, the view taken of this question by the Government of India.

You will observe that the Government of India is authorized, by the Secretary of State's above-mentioned Secret despatch of the 28th of February last, to accord to the succession, as established by the Amir, in the person of his younger son, Abdulla Jan, a formal and public recognition, either by Treaty, or in such form as the Amir may most desire. Now, this important concession cannot even be mentioned in your negotiation with the Amir's Envoy, without suggesting to him an immediate enquiry as to the practical value of it, or the precise degree of efficient protection to the interests of the Amir's recognized heir which it implies and involves. It is necessary that you should be able to answer that enquiry without ambiguity or evasion. It is equally necessary that you should answer it with the utmost caution and circumspection, taking care not to pledge the British Government to obligations which it is not prepared to undertake.

Now, it is obvious that our formal and distinct recognition of the successor selected by the Amir as the only rightful heir to the throne of His Highness, fairly involves our refusal to recognize any other claimant, or pretender, in the same capacity. And, whatever be the verbal formula in which this recognition is embodied, it will, undoubtedly and justly, be taken by the whole population of Afghanistan to mean, at least thus much, if it means anything at all. For to make a great and public parade of recognizing only one particular Prince as a legitimate successor to the throne of Afghanistan, with an unexpressed, and carefully concealed, reservation of our intention to recognize, in the same capacity, the first rival, by whom the claims of that Prince may be successfully disputed, would be not only disingenuous, but stupid. Such a policy could not be acted upon without permanently destroying all confidence in the honor and good faith of the British Government. On the other hand, if the British Government be publicly committed to a pledge, that during the lifetime of Abdulla Jan, or whoever else may be the Amir's selected successor, it will recognize no other incumbent on the throne of Afghanistan; and if, in the meanwhile, either the Amir, or his acknowledged heir, should be deposed and driven from the country by a successful rebellion, the British Government may find itself in this awkward predicament—that, on the one hand, it will be precluded, by a due regard for its own honor, from entering into satisfactory relations with the *de facto* Government of Afghanistan, however strongly that Government may be established; whilst, on the other hand, it will be precluded, by a due regard for prudential considerations, from replacing the dispossessed Ruler, or his heir, by force of arms, upon the throne. At the same time, the necessity of frequent military intervention in the internal affairs of a State so unsettled as Afghanistan, or any unlimited liability to such an obligation, would involve a practical inconvenience which the British Government has no desire to incur. This point, therefore, is one of such great delicacy, and, at the same time, of such great importance (more especially if the Amir's present position be, as we have reason to suppose it, somewhat precarious), that I have submitted the point to the consideration of my colleagues in Council, by whom it has been carefully considered.

We are unanimously of opinion that our recognition of Abdulla Jan, if embodied in a formal Treaty with the Amir, must not be limited, either in purpose or in procedure, to a meaningless formula, conveying no definite idea, and involving no definite action. Much of the justifiable disappointment and resentment with which the Amir apparently regards his previous relations with the British Government, would seem to be attributable to the flattering fiction and sterile reality of a similar formula, which kept the word of promise to the ear, and broke it to the heart, in the letter received by His Highness from the Earl of Mayo in 1869. We are, however, no less unanimously of opinion that the Government of India can never again undertake such a war as was undertaken by it on behalf of Shah Sujah for the re-imposition of any deposed Prince upon the throne of Afghanistan.

The limits of our action, therefore, in reference to the pledge here under consideration, must be drawn within these two extremes.

When questioned by the Amir's Envoy as to the meaning attached by the British Government to its offered recognition of Abdulla Jan as the only rightful heir of His Highness, you will, in the first place, observe that it must, of course, be the object and intention of the British Government, in furtherance of its own interests and authority, to support the interests and authority of the Prince whom it is prepared to recognize publicly as its political protégé. You will, in the next place, point out how greatly the present position of the Amir and his Heir-apparent will at once be strengthened by such a recognition, on the part of the British Government, of their claims to its special interest and good-will. You will also point out that it is for the Amir himself to make prompt and judicious use of such an advantage, by showing his own sense of its importance, and advertising his reliance on it, instead of carping at its conditions, or evincing mistrust of its sincerity. In short, the Amir's internal enemies will

be discouraged, and his friends confirmed, in proportion as they may be convinced, by his own conduct, that the good-will of the British Government is really possessed by him, and sufficiently appreciated and deserved to be in no danger of interruption or withdrawal.

If, however, from inattention to our advice, or failure to reciprocate our confidence, or (what may unfortunately prove to be the case) the irretrievable deterioration of his popularity and power during the period of his voluntary isolation from our friendly counsels, the Amir should be deposed, he must clearly understand that the British Government will not move a soldier, either to replace him on the throne, or to maintain the cause of Abdulla Jan, against that of the usurper. Should such an event now happen, it will, in my opinion, be solely attributable to the political faults committed by the Amir, throughout a period of years during which the British Government was allowed no control over his conduct, nor even any knowledge of his affairs. For the result of such faults, the British Government, therefore, cannot accept any responsibility.

On the other hand, from the date of the signature of the proposed Treaty, the British Government will willingly do all that may still be in its power to assist the Amir in strengthening a position which must, no doubt, have been seriously weakened by its long previous isolation from the friendly protection of this Government. And, if we receive from His Highness full and timely information of any internal danger to his throne, not too far gone to admit of our prompt and efficient assistance in extricating him from it, we shall be willing to afford His Highness such assistance, either in a military or a pecuniary form, according as the one or the other may appear to us most applicable to the circumstances of the moment. In short, we are anxious to *keep* the Amir upon his throne, and willing to do all that can be reasonably required of us to effect this object; but we cannot undertake to *replace* him on his throne if, in spite of our assistance, he should have the misfortune to lose it. And in that case, but in that case only, we shall consider ourselves free to deal with the *de facto* Government of Afghanistan as common sense may suggest, or British interests require.

Finally, you will point out to the Amir's Envoy that the assistance we are willing to render His Highness, in case of need, under the circumstances, and on the conditions, above-mentioned, cannot be given, unless he himself provides us with the means of giving it. The first of these means will be some speedy arrangement for the rapid and confidential interchange of intelligence between the two Governments; and, for the present, this can only be effected by the establishment of a telegraphic wire between Kabul and the British frontier. The British Government will undertake the expense of laying down the line, but the Amir must undertake to provide for its protection. The course which it should follow, whether *via* Kandahar, the Khyber Pass, or the Koorum Valley, must be left for decision to your negotiations; but the early establishment of telegraphic communication with Kabul is a condition to which I attach such paramount importance that it must, in my opinion, form one of the conditions embodied in the public Treaty.

In negotiating the terms of this Treaty, you will bear in mind that, on our part, they will represent concessions greater than the British Government has hitherto accorded to any Asiatic Prince, and which may, when published, be exposed to much hostile criticism in England. It is, therefore, essential that the Treaty should also embody concessions on the part of the Amir of a substantial and easily appreciable character. It may be true that the firm hold which, without any such public concessions, on the part of His Highness, we shall, I doubt not, secure over Afghanistan, by means of the obligations which we are now about to undertake on behalf of its Ruler, will amply compensate, and more than compensate, all our proposed concessions to His Highness. But this consideration, sound as we believe it to be, will not warrant the omission, from a public instrument, of stipulations distinctly securing a more generally appreciable reciprocity of benefit. I must, therefore, request you to consider the satisfactory settlement of this point as one of the *sine qua non* conditions to the complete success of your negotiations.

Another arrangement to which I attach no less importance is the Amir's acceptance of my invitation to the ceremonial at Delhi, and the ratification of the contemplated Treaty on that occasion.

My motives in urging you to strain every effort, and exercise all your skill, for the attainment of this great object, are numerous and obvious. In the first place, no other conceivable arrangement will so effectively proclaim to the whole of the Eastern World the importance, significance, and solidity, of the change for the better which your negotiations will have brought about in our relations with Afghanistan, and the character of their future footing. It is only by some such indirect, but insignificant, advertisement of our definite policy in regard to Afghanistan that we can convince the Russian military authorities of the necessity of duly respecting it. In the next place, you must remember that the Treaty, when published, will be criticised by many political authorities, who, from their ignorance of the actual situation, are not yet fully prepared to recognize the prudence of its provisions.

The Treaty embodies a new policy; and, in inaugurating a new policy, the Government cannot be too careful to disarm, or avert, at the outset, that hostility, on the part of un instructed public opinion, which might otherwise impede the prosecution of it. The best opportunity of doing this is afforded, partly by the ratification of the Treaty by the Amir and the Viceroy in person on an occasion of great solemnity, and partly by the publication of the Treaty in connection with the many other striking announcements which will be made in reference to other matters of great importance on that occasion.

There is a third reason for the Amir's presence at Delhi on the 1st of January, which, I trust, it will be in your power to urge, with due effect, upon the consideration of His Highness. The increased strength of his position in Afghanistan, and the increased security of the succession, as established by His Highness in the person of Abdulla Jan, will be great and immediate, in proportion as the reality of the new alliance, the sincerity of our friendship, and the substantial character of our protection, are quickly appreciated, and widely realized, by the subjects of His Highness.

Now, these important facts, so advantageous to the Amir's authority, cannot be impressed on the mind of the whole Afghan population in a manner so rapid or so pregnant with warning to the disaffected, and encouragement to the loyal, subjects of His Highness, as by the presence at Delhi of the Amir and the heir-apparent, as the honored guests of the British Government; and in direct connection with the public ratification of a Treaty pledging to them the material assistance and definite support of that Government.

It is highly probable that, in reply to such arguments, the Amir may represent his inability to leave Kabul at the present moment, leaving behind him there his rebellious son, Mahomed Yakub, a prisoner but still the centre of intrigue and conspiracy. In that case, you will at once inform the Amir that, if His Highness wishes it, the British Government is willing to take charge of Yakub, and to answer for his safe custody on British territory. Should the Amir show any disposition to respond to such an offer, you will immediately communicate with the Commissioner of Peshawur as to the best means of carrying it promptly into effect; so that the Amir may be relieved of all anxiety on account of Yakub in time to enable His Highness to accept the Viceroy's invitation to Delhi. This arrangement may possibly oblige you to proceed to Kabul. All the practical details of it I leave with confidence to your energy and discretion; but you will allow *nothing* to interfere with the paramount object of getting the Amir and the heir-apparent to Delhi on the 1st of January. Should you succeed in the attainment of this most important object, you will consider whether it be advisable that you remain with His Highness till his departure from Kabul and then accompany him to Delhi.

For your general guidance, in reference to all other subjects of negotiation, I enclose a draft Treaty\* which may possibly serve as a rough model for the Instrument or Instruments to be agreed upon. But I wish you to understand that it is in nowise intended to fetter your discretion in reference to any stipulation not mentioned in this instruction as being essential. You will also freely exercise your judgment in deciding, as you proceed in your negotiations, what conditions should be embodied in the public Treaty, and what others in the secret Agreement. I am myself disposed to think that the public Treaty should be as brief and simple as you can make it compatibly with the adequate stipulation of all essential conditions.

It is, in short, I think enough to embody in this Instrument the broad principles on which our future relations with Afghanistan are to rest, reserving, for the secret Agreement, all detailed arrangements, more especially those which, if published, might appear, on the one hand, derogatory to the dignity of the Amir in the eyes of his own subjects; on the other hand, liable to misconception on the part of the public in England.

But you will, in any case, take good care that no important condition is left dependent on a merely verbal agreement; and that our interests are adequately secured by some document bearing the signature of the Amir, or of his Minister, to which the British Government can afterwards appeal in vindication of those interests if necessary.

To afford you the means of quick and confidential communication with myself, during the course of your negotiations, I have also instructed the Officiating Foreign Secretary to furnish you with a Cipher Code. In your use of this Code, you will, on the one hand, abstain from unnecessary reference to the Viceroy in regard to matters of minor importance: and, on the other hand, you will keep me fully informed in regard to demands which ought not to be complied with, or concessions which ought not to be granted, without my previous sanction.

In conclusion, I have only to express my implicit confidence in your ability, tact, and experience, and my warmest and most earnest wishes for your complete success (which, indeed, I do not doubt of) in the conduct of a most delicate and difficult negotiation; the consequences of which cannot but be of supreme importance to the interests of this empire. In the difficulties of that negotiation, you may be assured of all my sympathy and support, and your successful conclusion of it will receive my warmest acknowledgments.

---

(Enclosure A.)

Aid Memoire for Treaty.

Whereas a Treaty of friendship and amity was contracted between the British Government and the Ruler of Afghanistan in 1855; and whereas the course of events has rendered it expedient to revise and supplement that Treaty in the interests of the two Governments;



therefore the following Articles are hereby agreed upon between the Right Hon'ble Baron Lytton, G.M.S.I., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on behalf of the British Government on the one side, and His Highness the Amir Shere Ali Khan, Ruler of Afghanistan, on the other.

ARTICLE 1.

The British Government engages to respect the territories of Afghanistan now in the possession of the Amir Shere Ali Khan; and His Highness Shere Ali Khan, on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, makes the like engagement in regard to territories in alliance with, or under the rule and protection of, the British Government.

ARTICLE 2.

Between the British Government and that of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, Ruler of Afghanistan, his heirs, and successors, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship. The friends of the one Government shall be the friends of the other; and the enemies of the one Government shall be the enemies of the other.

ARTICLE 3.

In the event of the territories now possessed by His Highness the Amir Shere Ali Khan being invaded by a foreign enemy, the British Government will aid His Highness, in the defence of those territories, with men and material of war; it being clearly understood and hereby provided, that the conduct of the Amir and his Government shall, at the same time, be in strict conformity with the declarations contained in the above Article 2; and that His Highness shall have refrained from all provocation of aggression on, or interference with, the States and territories beyond his present frontier, save with the knowledge and consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 4.

In accordance with this understanding, His Highness the Amir agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in harmony with the policy of the British Government.

ARTICLE 5.

For the better protection of the Afghan frontier, it is hereby agreed that the British Government shall, on its part, depute accredited British Agents to reside at Herat and such other places in Afghanistan as may be mutually determined by the High Contracting Powers; and that the Ruler of Afghanistan shall, on his part, depute an Agent to reside at the Court of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Ruler of Afghanistan, on his part, guarantees the personal safety and honorable treatment of British Agents whilst on Afghan soil; and the British Government, on its part, undertakes that such Agents shall in no way interfere with the internal administration of Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 7.

Furthermore, with a view to facilitate expeditious and friendly intercourse between the two allied Governments, it is hereby agreed that such lines of telegraph as may be necessary for that purpose shall be, from time to time, constructed by the British Government in the territories of the Ruler of Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 8.

His Highness the Amir Shere Ali Khan also undertakes, on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully travelling or trading within his dominions, so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 9.

In proof of its desire to see the Government of His Highness Shere Ali Khan consolidated and undisturbed by domestic troubles, the British Government hereby agrees to acknowledge whomsoever His Highness may nominate as his heir-apparent, and to discountenance the pretensions of any rival claimant to the throne.

ARTICLE 10.

The British Government, its officers and agents, will, as heretofore, abstain from all interference in the domestic administration and internal affairs of Afghanistan, except in so far as their assistance may, at any time, be required and invoked by the Amir, his heirs, and successors, to avert from that country the calamities of a recurrence to civil war, and protect the peaceful interests which this Treaty is intended to establish and promote.

In that case, the British Government will afford to the Government of Afghanistan such support, moral or material, as may, in its opinion, and in general accordance with the foregoing declaration, be necessary for the assistance of the Amir, his heirs, and successors,



in protecting equitable authority, national contentment, and settled order, from disturbance by the personal ambition of unlawful competitors for power.

ARTICLE 11.\*

Trade shall pass uninterrupted between the territories of the High Contracting Powers, subject only to &c., &c.

\* \* \* \* \*

For this purpose, certain routes shall be appointed, and His Highness the Amir will use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders, and the free transit of traffic along these routes. The selection of such routes, the measures to be taken for their security, and the tariff of duties leviable upon merchandize carried over such routes, shall be settled by Commissioners to be jointly appointed by the two Governments.

ARTICLE 12.

The routes thus selected shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may deem most expedient for the general convenience of trade and traffic, and under such financial arrangements as shall be mutually determined between them. The Amir Shere Ali Khan undertakes, on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, to co-operate cordially with the British Government in its endeavours to keep all such roads and passes free from marauders, and to maintain the general tranquillity of the mountain tracts lying between British and Afghan territories.

ARTICLE 13.

His Highness the Amir Shere Ali Khan furthermore engages, on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, to support the British Government in checking and suppressing the trade in slaves, and to prohibit the practice of kidnapping, or seizing, human beings within his dominions for the purpose of selling them into bondage.

ARTICLE 14.†

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the permanent maintenance of his authority, and the efficient fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by His Highness on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, in accordance with this Treaty, the British Government agrees, on condition of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith contracted, to pay His Highness, his heirs, and successors———

---

\* The wording of this Article must be most carefully considered and recast by Sir L. Pelly in consultation with the Commissioner at Peshawur.

† NOTE.—Although I have no objection to a clause framed in this sense being inserted into the Public Treaty, should Sir Lewis Pelly find such insertion to be much pressed by the representative, and to be absolutely necessary, yet I am personally of opinion that it may be best omitted, and be made a portion of the Secret Agreement.

---

Dated Simla, 28th October 1876.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I.,  
To—Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

Allow me to enclose a copy of a letter I have received this evening from Sir Henry Norman concerning the subsidy Article.

---

(Enclosure to above.)

Dated Simla, 28th October 1876.

From—SIR H. W. NORMAN, K.C.B.,  
To—SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I.

You are aware that our meeting to-day was for the purpose of discussing the "subsidy" Article of the proposed Treaty with the Amir, and that the Viceroy expressed his desire to accept whatever conclusions might be arrived at by Bayley, Arbuthnot, and myself, after consultation with you. His Excellency further informed me that he had asked you "to add or omit the Article in whatever form we might decide."

There were two points to be settled with respect to the Article,—*first*, whether it should be in the Secret Engagement or the Public Treaty; and, *secondly*, what should be the amount of the subsidy.

As to the *first* point, we do not attach much weight to the point at all. If it is in the secret Article, the purport will not long remain secret; for it is impossible for us to make payments to Kabul without the fact becoming known, and perhaps the non-inclusion of the Article in the Public Treaty may seem suspicious to the Amir. The Viceroy, however, prefers its being in the secret Articles; and we, therefore, think that if the Amir shows no objection, it may be so entered; but we do not think the point should be pressed to any extent; and if the Amir wishes to have it in the Public Treaty, we would so enter it.

As to the amount of the subsidy, we are of opinion that the amount must be fixed by you, and all we have to do is to say that you will of course give no more than you find necessary after sounding the Envoy. It appears to us that the utmost limit to which you should go, if everything is satisfactorily agreed to, is a payment down of twenty lakhs, which would include the ten lakhs allotted to the Amir some time back, and an annual payment not exceeding, *under any circumstances*, twelve lakhs of rupees. We think that the exact amount you may agree to within the above limits should be distinctly stated, and that this will be better, and be more satisfactory to the Amir than the proposed Article saying that "a subsidy of not less than Rupees ——— shall be paid."

I think this is all I need say; but if you want any further explanations regarding this Article, please let me know.

(Sd.) H. W. NORMAN.

(Enclosure B.)

Aide Memoire for subsidiary Secret and Explanatory Agreement.

1.

In regard to Article 3, it is understood by the two contracting Powers that the words "invaded by a foreign enemy" shall be held to include European as well as Asiatic enemies.

2.

"It is likewise understood in regard to Article 4 that in return for the important pledge involved in the above Article, on the part of the British Government, the Amir binds himself to abstain from discussion of political, international, or State matters with any Foreign Government, save in friendly concert with the British Government, to whom His Highness will unreservedly communicate all correspondence, or overtures, of this nature.

3.

It is likewise understood in regard to Articles 5 and 6—

1<sup>st</sup>, that unless, or until, otherwise mutually arranged between the two Governments, a Native Agent only need reside at Kabul city;

2<sup>nd</sup>, that whenever, in the opinion of the Viceroy of India, it may be necessary to communicate direct with the Amir on matters of an important, or confidential character, a special British Envoy shall be deputed on a temporary mission to the Court of the Amir;

3<sup>rd</sup>, that the principal duty of the British Agent or Agents shall be to watch events outside the frontiers of Afghanistan, and to supply timely information to the British and Afghan Governments of any political intrigues, or dangers, threatening the peace, stability, or integrity, of the Afghan dominions;

4<sup>th</sup>, that the local Afghan authorities shall cordially co-operate with the British Agent or Agents for the common interests of their respective Governments.

4.

It is likewise understood in regard to Article 7—

1<sup>st</sup>, that the cost of the construction of a telegraphic line or lines shall be borne by the British Government, and that of the establishment and maintenance of such line or lines by the Amir, in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon between the two Governments;

2<sup>nd</sup>, that whilst the Amir engages to be responsible for the protection of such portions of the line or lines as may be within the limits of his own territories, the protection of any part thereof, across tracts intervening between Afghan and British boundaries, shall be provided for as the two Governments may mutually arrange.

5.

It is understood in regard to Article 8 that, until otherwise arranged, British subjects shall not enter Afghanistan without the authoritative and written permission of their Government, based on a mutual and cordial understanding between the two Governments.

6.

It is likewise understood in regard to Article 10 that the British Government in no way desires to change its settled policy of non-interference with the internal affairs, or independence, of the Afghan nation; it will, therefore, only afford material assistance to the Amir, his heirs and successors, at their express request; provided also that such request shall be accompanied by timely and adequate information, and that the British Government shall be the sole judge of the manner, time, and expediency of furnishing such assistance.

7.

It is likewise understood that, for the support of the Amir in the maintenance of his lawful authority and the efficient fulfilment of the engagements now undertaken by him on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, the British Government will, on condition of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith contracted, pay His Highness, his heirs, and successors, a sum of 20 lakhs of rupees immediately on the ratification of the present Treaty, and afterwards an annual sum of 12 lakhs of rupees in addition to such other material assistance in officers, men or money, as may be deemed from time to time beneficial for the interests of the two neighbouring Governments.

## APPENDIX XXI.

[*Referred to in paragraph 119, Chapter VI.*]

Dated Peshawur, 18th October 1876.

From—D. C. MACNABB, Esq.,

To—T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L.

Here is the translation of a letter from Buktia Khan, the Moonshee of the Agency at Kabul. As you will see, it is evidently dictated by the Amir himself, and is intended to show how anxious he is to avoid any rupture with us, but at the same time his anxiety that negotiations should be carried on in the way that pleases him, or as he puts it, in the way "that commends itself to his judgment." You may have observed in the last diary I sent you a notice of a so-called letter from the Akhoond of Swat. That was evidently a concoction of some of the leaders of the Mohmunds. The Akhoond has never talked of "his subjects," or "his country." The worthy old man's name is always used as a sort of Bogey by all parties. I hear that the Officer Commanding at Cherat, when one of his men was shot by some robbers, who had found their way into the heart of the Station, was under the firm impression that the act was dictated by the Akhoond of Swat.

*Translation of a letter from Moonshee Bakhtiar Khan, dated Kabul, 12th October 1876.*

From the day that Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan left Kabul, His Highness the Amir has manifested constant anxiety about his eastern frontier. Indeed, from letters received from Peshawur, it appears to be the general impression that at this time the disposition of the English Government is not favorable to the Kabul State, and that forces will soon be collected on the border under the pretext of punishing the Afreedees. God knows what may be the real ultimate result.

One day the Sadr-i-Azam, the Wazir-ool-dowla (Arsullah Khan), and the Mustaufi, in private Durbar, questioned His Highness as to the cause of his obviously anxious mood. He replied that he was in dread of any evil coming to the followers of Islam who are his subjects in Afghanistan, and that they who were his confidential advisers should, after reflection, give him the benefit of their views. They replied that His Highness was better able to judge than they themselves were, but that, so far as they could see, there was no such cause for anxiety. It frequently happened that difficulties arose between States that led even to fighting, but even then a good understanding, according to the exigencies of the time, was restored. To this the Amir replied that the exact strength of his kingdom was well known, so that any person could easily understand how it stood in the scale with such a Power as that of the British Empire. He now was anxiously watching whether the Agent would return or not, and when he comes, what he may report to be the wish of the British Government that the Kabul Government should undertake, and again whether he should be in a position to engage to carry out such wishes or not. This was the reason that he was uncertain whether or not to send troops towards his eastern border, to strengthen the hands of his Provincial Governors, and establish order and loyalty among his subjects, lest such movement of troops might give offence to the British Government.

If the British Government, looking on him as an established neighbour of Russia, should wish to communicate to him any delicate suggestions about the preservation of the integrity of his border, in such a way as should commend itself to his judgment, he would consider himself bound in honor to keep such communication secret.

His opinion was simply this, that the Russian Government had but one thought, that of extending its possessions in Asia, whereas the English Government thought more of consolidating its power within its own borders.

## APPENDIX XXII.

[*Referred to in paragraph 119, Chapter FI.*]

### INFORMATION AS TO PROCEEDINGS AT KABUL AFTER RETURN OF THE BRITISH AGENT IN OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1876.

Dated Peshawur, 19th November 1876.

From—D. C. MACNAB, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy.

The unfortunate outbreak of cholera at Kabul on the 9th has effectually prevented the interview between the Agent and Amir taking place, as the Amir, too unwell to think of quitting the Bala Hissar himself, sent the heir-apparent and his family into the country, and cut off all communication between the Bala Hissar and the town.

I have no doubt that the Amir has really been very seriously ill, as many merchants and others coming from Kabul to Peshawur say that one night the report of His Highness' death was current in the city, and that he is still ill.

Mirza Gholam Ahmad, my confidential Assistant, got a detailed account of the illness from a man who had it direct from the Hakim (doctor) who was in attendance on His Highness.

Kazi Gholam Kadir, who has been with the Amir throughout, is a Peshawur man, and his family receive accounts from him. Poisoning has not been suspected. Every one has fever more or less severely in the autumn, and it is often followed by pneumonia, which, if not checked in the early stages, as has fortunately been done in the Amir's case, is very generally fatal.

The Sadr-i-Azam's malady is of a different nature, and is one from attacks of which he frequently suffers. Doubtless he is well enough to discuss matters of business with the Agent; but he dare not do so without the Amir's permission, and His Highness seems determined not to approach any subjects requiring thought. Whether this determination is dictated by weakness, which prevents his thinking collectedly, or by his disinclination to enter on the discussion of propositions which his suspicious temperament makes him fear, he may not like to accept, and yet be afraid to object to. The Agent says that when he asked permission to pay his respects to the Amir and enquire after his health, he was told he might come; but a condition was made that the visit was to be strictly complimentary, and that topics of importance were not to be broached.

When the Agent was at Peshawur, I spoke to him several times about Baktiar Khan, warning him not to trust him, or to allow him to take so prominent a place as he has always hitherto done. I also urged him to endeavour to establish a better system of acquiring secret information, and of transmitting it without the knowledge of his subordinates.

The fact is, his position at Kabul is such that he is watched every hour of the day, and no man can get access to him without the knowledge of the Durbar; he is consequently forced to work through his personal attendants, whose proceedings do not attract so much attention.

---

Memorandum by DR. BELLEW, dated 23rd November 1876.

On Tuesday, the 21st November, Sirdar Fattah Khan, Khattak, came to see me, on hearing of my arrival here, he being an old friend of mine. In the course of conversation I asked him what news he had from Kabul, and he replied that he really did not trouble himself about the rumours floating about the city, but that he had recently seen a servant of the Afghan Sirdars domiciled at Jullundur, who informed him that the news in Kabul was that the Persian and Russian Envoys to the Amir had proposed to His Highness that he should make a Treaty of alliance with the Czar, as it would tend greatly to his advantage; because the Russian Government could give him a subsidy, and guarantee the restoration to him of the former Afghan possessions down to Jhelum. Fattah Khan added that Atta Mahomed, the British Agent, during his stay here, gave out that he was charged with secret messages from the Viceroy to the Amir, the nature of which would become public after his arrival at Kabul. In consequence of this, continued Fattah Khan, people are now expecting to hear the decision of the Amir, whether he throws up the English friendship and joins the Russians, or whether he will stick by the British Government. This statement of Fattah Khan's I have heard confirmed in the main by others with whom I have conversed, residents in the city. By some it is said the Amir, since the return to Kabul of Atta Mahomed, is not so hot as he was on the Russian friendship.

---

P.S.—The rumour amongst the Kazi Khel is to the effect that the subsidy offered to the Amir by Russia is five crores of *tilas* (the *tila* = Rupees 7), which is no doubt a great exaggeration.

Dated 1st December 1876.

From—D. C. MACNABB, Esq.,  
To—Officiating Foreign Secretary.

In reply to my letter of the 17th November, the Agent writes, on date the 23rd November 1876, that the reason of the delay in his obtaining an audience on business with the Amir was, that His Highness had, during the time he was so ill, studiously declined to enter on any business-matter with any one, and all approach to him by any one at all was stopped. As regards the proceeding of the Agents sent by the Russians, he says he has been unable to obtain information about any verbal communications they may have made to the Amir, or what the Amir may have said to them in private: such written communications as have passed between them from time to time, and have been handed to him, he has copied and handed to Government.

Each Russian Agent who has come has first of all gone to the Sadr-i-Azam, and has by him been presented to the Amir. On these occasions nothing of real importance has been advanced on either side. When they go again to obtain leave to depart, the audience has always been a short one.

They are not permitted to have intercourse openly with any of the members of the Durbar, and each Russian Emissary, as he comes, is handed over to Sirdar Mahomed Yusuf Khan, who provides for their accommodation; and whenever they go out of his house to take the air, they are accompanied by some of the servants of that Sirdar. The meaning of these frequent communications from Russia is obviously to establish friendly relations with the Afghans, and gain them over to an alliance with Russia. As soon as one Agent is preparing to take his departure, another comes.

Private letter from NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, dated Kabul, 23rd November 1876.

Yesterday morning His Highness the Amir sent for the Sadr-i-Azam, the Mustaufi, and the Wazir-ool-Dowlah Kharijah to his private apartment, and took counsel with them about the communications made by the Agent and the letters brought by him from His Excellency the Viceroy, desiring them to weigh all considerations, and give him their best advice in the interests of the Afghan State and people. What their advice was, after the consultation then held, has not been made known in detail. At 2 P.M. the same day His Highness sent for the Agent, and in the presence of the three Ministers above named, began to discuss with him those important matters. The conversation was long continued, and, though no definite decision was arrived at, the general result of their observations was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a position to receive British officers within its frontiers. The contemplation of such an arrangement filled them with apprehension.

The Agent endeavoured to explain away the objections raised, and to allay their fears, to the best of his ability. The meeting was dissolved after three hours, and further discussion postponed till a future occasion.

The Agent will continue to report the progress of negotiations, and will not fail to endeavour to convince His Highness of the advantages to his Government to be looked for from the proposals made.

Dated Peshawur, 2nd December 1876.

From—D. C. MACNABB, Esq.,  
To—T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L.

Private letter from Agent, dated 27th November, says that he had gone the day before to the Amir, and had tried to get him to talk about the Viceroy's proposals; but His Highness excused himself on the plea that he was feeling too unwell to discuss grave matters. Agent then went to the Sadr-i-Azam, and pressed him to bring matters forward. He also said the Amir was too ill to transact business, and also that he himself was still ill.

The Agent hears that whenever the Amir talks these subjects over in private with the Sadr-i-Azam and the Wazir-ool-Dowlah Kharijah, they always say that they are afraid to have English officers resident in Afghanistan.

Cipher telegram, dated 5th December 1876.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

On 29th, Agent pressed Sadr-i-Azam to obtain an answer from the Amir. On 30th, Amir told Agent he would associate Sirdar Sher Ali Khan and Mir Afzal Khan with his three chief Ministers, and, after deliberation, would give an answer.



Cipher telegram, dated 8th December 1876.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,

To—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Agent writes 4th December that on 1st and 2nd instant Councils were held. Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, Ursulla Khan, Ghilzai, Asmutulla, Ghilzai, and Ahmed Khan, vote for declining British propositions. Sirdar Sher Ali, Kandahari, said Amir should himself arrive at an opinion. Mustaufi was agreed, but no one supported him. Sadr-i-Azam spoke on both sides vaguely. He said it would be unwise to plainly decline, and remarked that, if Native Agents had been proposed, they would have been accepted.

---

Translation of letter from NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 4th December 1876.

In order to hold Councils on the questions of the (British) Government on Friday, the 1st instant, the Amir summoned in the morning—

The Sadr-i-Azam,

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ursulla Khan, Ghilzai),

The Mustaufi,

The Hashmat-ul-Mulk (Asmutulla Khan, Ghilzai),

Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan,

Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan,

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan,

to his private apartment, and directed them to think over and reflect on this matter. Their discussions with each other continued for some time, and then Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, and the Mir Akhor, considered it preferable to decline the request for the location of British officers on the border. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan advised the Amir to deliberate himself on those important questions, and not rely on the judgment of others. The Mustaufi appeared to be inclined to accept all the requisitions of the (British) Government, but no other member paid attention to his opinion. The Sadr-i-Azam neither agreed nor declined, but made some vague observations. At last, at 4 or 5 P.M., some of the members of the Durbar represented in concert—"In past times God has been the protector of our Government, and in future also the said Great Creator will be its guardian. To agree to the residence of British officers on the border, is to voluntarily surrender the country of Islam out of our hands." After deliberation the Amir observed, "to refuse point blank is not advisable; were natives to be posted on the border and placed under the British Agent at Kabul, I would by no means have declined (this request). Now this matter requires most careful consideration, and each of you should, therefore, after full deliberation, give opinions at the next sitting." Councils were again held on Saturday, the 2nd instant, from 7 to 10 A.M., but no decision was arrived at. I waited on the Amir to pay my respects, and, in order to obtain replies to the requisitions, made some re-assuring representations with arguments as to (his) loss and gain. After a debate of three hours His Highness observed that this matter is a most important one, and requires far-sightedness, and that he would give a reply after complete deliberation and consultation (with his officials). To-day also His Highness held a conference from morning to 3 P.M. with the Sadr-i-Azam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Mustaufi, but the result has not yet become known (to me). I am making great efforts for the realization of the wishes of the British Government (*lit.* superintending the demands) and for obtaining replies. It remains to be seen (how the matter is settled).

---

Cipher telegram, dated 10th December 1876.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,

To—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Kabul Agent writes 5th instant—received to-day—that all the Kabul Councillors reject the British propositions, and that he (Agent) urged Amir to deal with the matter himself. Amir then directed Agent to confer with Sadr-i-Azam; he did so, and on following day the two waited on Amir, with result that Agent believes that the propositions may be accepted, but further consultations must first take place.

---

Translation of letter, dated 5th December 1876, from NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

After holding Councils and consulting his Durbar officials, the Amir summoned me yesterday at 4 P.M. All the Durbar officials in concert gave opinions that the request of the (British) Government should be declined. When (with the exception of the Sadr-i-Azam)

these officials went (to their houses), after some assurances and great encouragement, I represented to the Amir in presence of the Sadr-i-Azam—"Every member of Durbar cannot be able (*lit.* it is not his business) to reflect on the consequences (*lit.* beginnings and ends) of difficulties in State matters. Discrimination between good and bad (consequences) in delicate State matters cannot be made without (great) experience. In this question of the (British) Government, Your Highness should use your own judgment as to its advantages and disadvantages (to you), and settle it as soon as possible." After great deliberation and lengthy discussions His Highness somewhat yielded (*lit.* arrived at a right conclusion), and observed that he would send the Sadr-i-Azam to my house this morning, that we should discuss personally with one another as to (his) loss and gain in this matter, and then wait together to-day on him to communicate (the result of our discussions) to him. Accordingly, the Sadr-i-Azam called on me to-day at 7 A.M. First I gave him various assurances, and then discussed the question with him, and, on giving him some arguments as to its results, made him yield (*lit.* tender) a little. Then we both waited in person on the Amir, and, after some assurances and representations as to the advantages of the promotion (*lit.* firmness) of friendship existing between the (two) Governments, made efforts (*lit.* attempts) in a pacific and pressing manner ("sard-o-garm"—cool and warm) for the realization of the wishes of the (British) Government. His Highness considered over this matter for some time, and then asked the Sadr-i-Azam to give an opinion, and the latter expressed himself less disinclined or indisposed ("irkhai-inam"—loosening reins) than on previous days. On the conclusion of our discussions, it appeared to-day, from the tone of the Amir's remarks, that he would probably agree to the residence of British officers on the border. He observed that his councils had not been brought to a conclusion, and that he would give a reply after full consultation (with his officials). Though I have not yet become quite confident of the realization of the objects (of the British Government), I hope, with the aid of God, that success may be attained (*lit.* it is not improbable that failure would not ultimately be the result in them).

---

Translation of a letter from NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 7th December 1876.

To-day I waited on the Amir to pay respects to His Highness, and, in private, solicited him to give a reply to the questions of the British Government. His Highness observed to the Sadr-i-Azam:—

"To-morrow I will attend the Durbar later. You should summon—

The Mustaufi,  
The Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
The Hashmut-ul-Moolk.

| Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan,  
Sirdar Sherdil Khan and  
Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan,

and hold a conference with them as to the advantages and disadvantages to this Government, and communicate to me the result of your councils in a free and unrestrained manner, in order that the matter may be settled. I do not join at this sitting, because (I desire) that you may in an independent (*lit.* fearless, bilalihaz) manner discuss with each other with full farsightedness as to the loss and gain and advantages and disadvantages of the (two) Governments. His Highness then told me that a suitable reply would be given after full deliberation in this delicate matter, in which permanent loss or gain of reputation is concerned." I met the Sadr-i-Azam, and asked him to give a decision (*lit.* took steps to gain our objects). He said that, as far as possible, he would make efforts in this matter to-morrow. I am giving assurances separately to the other Durbar officials to realise these wishes, and it remains to be seen (what will be their opinions).

---

Cipher telegram, dated 16th December 1876.

From—Commissioner of Peshawur,  
To—Foreign Secretary.

Agent writes, 11th instant, that Amir is yielding reluctantly (lailajan) by saying that the Prime Minister and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan must accompany British Agent to border to confer in regard to certain conditions on which English Residents will be received. After discussing conditions, the proposition may be accepted.

---

Translation of letter, dated 11th December 1876, from NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I asked the chief Durbar officials to give a reply to the questions of the (British) Government. Discussions between the Amir and the members of Durbar continued for two days, and then they observed privately—"Yielding to necessity, and in view to the continuance of the friendship existing between the (two) Governments, the location of British officers on the border may be approved of; but some conditions in regard to their residence must be fixed

for use for the future (*lit.* one day). The Sadr-i-Azam and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, Ishakzai, should go to British territory with the British Agent at Kabul to represent these conditions and other questions (*lit.* objects) of the (two) Governments, and get them sanctioned (*lit.* confirmed). These conditions have not been made known. I waited on the Amir yesterday, and solicited His Highness again to give a reply in this matter. His Highness observed—“We are occupied in this delicate (State) matter, and have become somewhat inclined to sanction these questions (*lit.* the proposal is somewhat meeting with success). God willing, in a short time a suitable reply will be given.” I intimated to him the advantages to (his) Government, and represented that the sooner he would settle this matter the more beneficial it would be (to him) to (the best of) my judgment, and that it would not be advantageous to make these important matters lengthy. It remains to be seen (what will be his decision). I am making great efforts.

---

Telegram, dated 25th December 1876.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,

To—Foreign Secretary, Imperial Camp, Delhi (also to Secretary, Punjab).

Agent reports further on 18th Amir remarked that Prime Minister and Mir Akhor and Aka Said Ahmed would accompany him (Agent) to British territory, but not till Kohistan Chiefs had been consulted. Agent expected final reply after 27th instant, Id festival.

---

Translation of letter from NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 18th December 1876.

To-day I held discussions in a suitable manner for three hours with the Amir and the Sadr-i-Azam on the questions of the British Government, and then His Highness observed—

\* Sister's son of Mirza Mahomed Hossain Khan, Mir Munshi.

“I propose to depute with you the Sadr-i-Azam, the Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, and Aka Said Ahmed Khan,\* to British territory, in order that, after making representations as to the views of the Kabul Government, they may bring British officers for residence on the border. However, as this matter is a most delicate one, and requires farsightedness, councils have not yet been brought to a conclusion. On the termination of the councils a suitable reply will be given. To make haste in such important matters is not advisable.” In short, the Amir awaits the arrival of the Kohistan Chiefs to consult with him. They have not yet arrived. The Kabul authorities will probably give a final (*lit.* full) reply in this matter after the “Id-u-Zuha” festival.†

† On 27th December 1876.

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,  
Commissioner.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 26th December 1876.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,

To—Foreign Secretary.

Agent writes on the 21st that no formal letter has been drafted, but that he learns four conditions will be urged by Amir's Agents, *viz.*, the Prime Minister and Mir Akhor:—

1st.—If Residents injured as to person or property, Afghan customs as to compensation or punishment to be followed.

2nd.—Resident's duty to be distinctly defined; no interference with internal administration, civil or military, being allowed.

3rd.—If Russian Agents come against British wish, British themselves to undertake the stopping of this.

4th.—If assistance tendered by British fall short of Afghan expectations, Afghans to be allowed to decline all assistance whilst still allowing Residents to be established.

---

Translation of Persian letter, dated 21st December 1876, from the British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

Yesterday in the matter of the wishes of the (British) Government, the Amir observed as follows:—

Since the day of the commencement of friendship between the Government of Afghanistan and the British Government up to the present time, as (shown) in former letters and documents, no effort has been spared (*lit.* interference or disturbance caused) by the Government of Afghanistan which God has given (me) in making the foundation of the palace of

the friendship existing between the (two) Governments firm. The members of this Government have always paid respect to (their) true (*lit.* pure) friendship with the British Government. Now for some time past, the British authorities continually send communications, in support of their confirmed views for the residence of British officers on the border. It is (well known) that this Government, which has been granted (to me) by God, has repeatedly (*lit.* several times after the first (motion) and several times before the termination (of the question) made representations in various ways as to the points which we (Afghan Government) regard as important. Even now, in my opinion, the residence of British officers on the border would not at all be advantageous to the (two) Governments. However, as the British authorities insist on this question every day, I have proposed, but merely to strengthen (my) friendship with the British Government, that after the "Id-u-Zuha" festival the Sadr-i-Azam and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan should go with the British Agent at Kabul to British territory; and, after making representations as to the views (of the Kabul Government), settle the questions and some important conditions, and then agree to the residence of British officers on the border.

In short, I submit this letter after perusal by the Amir.

---

Translation of letter, dated 21st December 1876, from the British Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I again solicited the Amir to give a reply to the questions of the British Government, and in consequence of my having used much pressure, councils between His Highness and his chief Durbar officials continued on the 20th instant from 4 P.M. to 7 P.M., and on the 21st from 8 P.M. to 12 noon. At 1 P.M. His Highness summoned me, and I made lengthy discourses in a very suitable (*lit.* energetic) manner till 5 P.M., with arguments as to advantages and disadvantages and loss and gain, and then His Highness observed—"God willing, forever the friendship existing between our Government and the British Government will remain more firm than before, and this true friendship will never be disturbed. Whatever objections or pleas (*lit.* discussions) have been hitherto made as to the residence of British officers on the border are owing to the savage conduct of the people (*lit.* contrary demeanour of the countries) of Afghanistan, and even now we agree to their residence on the border owing to helplessness ('na-etaj'). But in this matter it is most incumbent on us to represent some important conditions to the British Government; and, with a view to representing these conditions (*lit.* difficulties), and settling all the questions (*lit.* objects) of the (two) Governments, I depute the Sadr-i-Azam and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan to British territory, (and desire that) they should go with you after the Id-u-Zuba festival, and, after stating all the difficulties and settling all questions of the (two) Governments, bring the British officers to live on the border."

By desire of the Amir I enclose a Persian letter, after perusal, by His Highness. The Durbar has not yet proposed that a murrasila (to address of British Government) anent the deputation of the Sadr-i-Azam should be written. At present I have only received this information, that the chief Durbar authorities, in private, propose the following conditions:—

1st.—Should by any accident any injury occur to the life or property of any British officer in Afghanistan, steps should be taken (in such matters) according to the custom and law of Afghanistan, and the British Government should not put much pressure on the Afghan Government.

2nd.—The duties of all British officers on the border should be fully defined (*lit.* limited); they should not secretly or openly interfere with the internal civil and military affairs of Afghanistan.

3rd.—Should a Russian Agent come to Afghanistan, contrary to the wishes of the British Government, to make representations regarding any object ("wasila"), the British Government should make their own arrangements to prevent his arrival, and give no trouble as to this prevention to the Afghan Government.

\* 4th.—Should the British Government not give full aid in money, arms, &c., for the satisfactory promotion of the strength of Afghanistan, (other) assistance should be accepted on (*lit.* taken), and without any desire for an exchange or equivalent, (the Kabul Government) should allow British officers to remain on the border merely on (the understanding of) the friendship (existing between the two Governments).

\* Meaning (in my judgment) that, should the assistance in money, &c., offered by British Government seem insufficient to the Afghan Government, they may be allowed to decline any assistance, while still permitting the residence of the British officers.

(Sd.) F. R. POLLOCK,  
Commr. and Supdt.

It remains to be seen what will further happen: whatever happens will be reported.

---

Extract from Kabul Diary of 21st December 1876.

Some Durbar authorities represented to the Amir that, should the Sadr-i-Azam be sent away to settle the Eastern question, the balances drawn by him against several officials would remain unrecovered. The Sadr-i-Azam admitted that they spoke reasonably, but asked the Amir to hold these realizations of these balances in abeyance pending his return (to Kabul), and His Highness agreed to his request.

Cipher telegram, dated 29th December 1876.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Governor-General's Camp.

Agent writes on 25th that Amir says Prime Minister will leave on 31st, but will proceed by easy stages. Mir Akhor will leave earlier, proceeding by Lalpoora, to conciliate Nowroz Khan, and then pay his respects to Akhoond of Swat, and perhaps consult him on the British question, rejoining Prime Minister at Peshawur.

---

Translation of letter, dated 25th December 1876, from the Agent at Kabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

Yesterday I waited on the Amir and asked His Highness to fix a date for the departure of the Sadr-i-Azam. His Highness observed: "Unless any accident occurs, the Sadr-i-Azam will be sent with you on Sunday, the 31st December 1876. As the Sadr-i-Azam has been ill for sometime, care should be taken that (you proceed by) short marches." I submit this letter for your information. The date of arrival at Peshawur will be reported when we leave. It has been mentioned in to-day's diary that Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan desires to go to wait on the Akhoond of Swat. I think he goes with the advice of the Durbar authorities. The real object in his going is probably this, that the Akhoond may be consulted on those questions for the settlement of which the Sadr-i-Azam proceeds to British territory. Councils continue in this matter, and whatever further happens will be reported.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 4th January 1877.

From—Commissioner, Peshawur,  
To—SIR LEWIS PELLY.

Agent writes 30th December—Mir Akhor left 26th; will first consult Jellalabad Chiefs, then Syud Mahmood Simo of Kunar, then the Khans of Bajour and Akhoond of Swat; rejoin Prime Minister at Lalpoora or Peshawur. Prime Minister will reach Lalpoora in twenty marches. Starting 1st January, may be expected at Peshawur end of January.

---

Extract from Kabul Diary of 1st January 1877.

The Sadr-i-Azam did not leave to-day, as he says that his Durbar business has not been finished. He has promised to leave to-morrow. The Durbar has sent to the British Agent 1,000 Kabuli rupees for road expenses.



## APPENDIX XXIII.

### Chapter VI.

Memorandum by MAHOMED HYAT KHAN, Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, regarding Kabul policy, dated Lahore, 19th November 1876.

Of the 31 reputed sons of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, Afzal Khan was the eldest, by his first wife, who belonged to the Bangish tribe. His one son, Abdul Rahman Khan, was by his Begum from the Popalzai family. Abdul Rahman is now in Russian Turkistan, and a son of his, by name Abdulla Jan, by his Chatrari wife, nearly 16 years of age, is in company with him.

Abdul Rahman Khan and his father Mahomed Afzal Khan were for a long time, one after the other, Governors of Afghan-i-Turkistan, and he is still trying to bring Balkh, Maimana, and Badakhshan, into his possession. Although a bold soldier, he (Abdul Rahman) is not sufficiently qualified to be a ruler; and although he still retains his influence in Turkistan, he does not appear to have many friends in Afghanistan.

Of the five sons of Amir Sher Ali Khan, the late Mahomed Ali Khan and Mahomed Ibrahim Khan were brothers, sons of the same mother, who was the daughter of Fez Mahomed Khan of the Zardad Khel subdivision of the tribe of Popalzai Durrani. One of the sons of the late Mahomed Ali Khan, by name Ahmad Ali Khan, aged 15, is still living; his mother was the daughter of Sarfraz Khan, Babakar Khel Ghilzai, and he is said to be a promising and daring youth.

Ibrahim Khan, though eldest of all the living sons of Sher Ali Khan, and at present Hakim of Kabul, does not possess much shrewdness or military qualifications; nor is he in esteem with his tribe. It seems by no means likely that the people and courtiers in Kabul would give him an opportunity of becoming their Amir.

The mother of Yakub Khan and Ayub Khan is the daughter of Saadat Khan Mohmund. The education of Yakub Khan is tolerable, and he knows a little English too. Since his years of discretion he has been rather inclined towards soldiery; and from the fact of his being the leader of the army, the soldiers generally liked him. The bold manner in which he conquered and took Herat gained him the good name he possesses in Afghanistan, where he is considered to be the ablest of all the sons of the Amir. But from what I have heard of him, I am of opinion that, though Yakub may be a brave soldier, he cannot make much in matters of government. Even in his days of power he displeased many by his fickleness and irritability of temper; and the rumour as to his abilities does not appear to be without exaggeration, and may be attributed to his success against Fattah Mahomed Khan, rather than to anything else.

The fifth son of the Amir is Abdulla Jan, whose mother is the daughter of Mahomed Afzal Khan, Kandahari, and grand-niece of Purdil Khan, Kandahari, and is the favourite Begum of the Amir. I have seen Abdulla Jan personally when he came with his father to the Durbar at Umballa. As far as opinion can be formed from one's countenance and general appearance, I am inclined to think that he will be a man of coarse wisdom, though mild and affable.

As Amir Sher Ali Khan nominated Abdulla Jan his heir-apparent, and for the furtherance of his wishes molested all the enemies of Abdulla Jan and the friends of Yakub, no one dare express himself openly opposed to Abdulla Jan.

The people of Afghanistan do not, as a rule, attach any importance to connections on the mother's side; it cannot, therefore, be presumed that Abdulla Jan would be held in esteem by the people, for the reason of his being a pure Barakzai on the mother's side. So far as the Afghan history, particularly the affairs of the Barakzai family, are concerned, it is shewn that in Afghanistan no superiority is assigned to age, but the succession to the throne has always devolved upon excellence in sword and ability. It was probably grounded on the same reasons that Amir Dost Mahomed Khan laid his choice on Sher Ali Khan to be his successor in preference to his elder sons, and events proved that his choice was successful. I am far from thinking that in nominating his youngest son as heir-apparent, the motives of the Amir were merely to please his favourite wife, as is the rumour; but my conviction is that in making the selection, he gave full consideration to what might happen hereafter.

It now remains to consider whether the people of Afghanistan will view Abdulla Jan's accession, after the Amir's death, in the same light as they express themselves in his lifetime. It cannot be doubted that the Amir is doing all in his power to remove all obstacles in the way of Abdulla Jan when he should come to throne; and although his endeavours might be attended with success to some extent, yet, taking the Afghan disposition into consideration, one cannot help thinking that the heir-apparent will have to contend with difficulties before he comes to be the Amir.

The bitterest enemy of Abdulla Jan is Yakub, and there is not the slightest doubt that on the death of the Amir, and on his liberation, he will not be a small antagonist in the way of Abdulla Jan. There is reason to believe that the Mohmund and Ghilzai tribes are hearty

friends to Yakub. It is very improbable that the Ghilzai Sirdars should forget the breach of faith on the part of the Amir against Yakub, who surrendered himself to his father on trust in the statements and assurances of these Sirdars. Consequently the Ababakar Khels and Jabar Khels Ghilzai will probably be the foremost in taking up the cause of Yakub, and help will also not be wanting on the part of some of the Durrani and Char Imaq tribes in the neighbourhood of Herat, who are in distress from the intolerance of the Amir. Likewise all those fond of anarchy and of change, as is the characteristic of Afghanistan, would join in the disturbance on one side or the other. Under such circumstances, if Abdulla Jan be still young and be not able to gain influence, it is not unlikely that Yakub's side may be the stronger, although, on the other hand, Abdulla Jan receive help from the tribes of Kazalbash and Barakzai and Achakzai Durrani, as also from the people of Kandahar, partly on account of the influence of Mir Afzal Khan, maternal grandfather of Abdulla Jan, who is at present Governor of Farrah, and partly for the reason that the Amir has already gained the affections of all his military officers towards Abdulla Jan.

The next enemies to the heir-apparent will be Ibrahim Khan and Ahmad Ali Khan, son of Mahomed Ali Khan. The former holding authority in Kabul has the advantage of getting in favour with the people; but I have as much doubt of his success as I have of his ability. My belief is that people will not place reliance in him (as to his success) on account of his inability. Ahmad Ali, although an able youth, has scarcely means enough to succeed.

Next to those mentioned above is Abdul Rahman Khan, who will not remain inactive at the time of a crisis. He can effect but little with the few friends he has in Afghanistan, unless he gets help from without. It is feared, however, that he is in a position to be the element of disturbance in Afghan-i-Turkistan, which may be carried to some length through the instigation of Russia.

By virtue of the Treaty of 1856, and considering the previous dealings of our Government, our policy in respect to Afghanistan has been to protect and secure the interests of the existing Ruler against foreign enemies. We have always kept ourselves clear of their internal quarrels. This policy enabled us to remain neutral in the disturbances that followed the death of Dost Mahomed Khan; but it is feared it has also done something to impair the prestige of our Government, at least to some extent.

When I wrote on the affairs of Afghanistan in 1874, I clearly pointed out that the time had arrived when it was necessary to rectify our doubtful policy. It cannot certainly be denied that the question as to how far we are justified to interfere with internal matters of Afghanistan is one requiring a very careful consideration.

I would here detail some of the advantages and disadvantages accruing from it.

*Disadvantages.*—(1.) Interference with internal matters would be viewed with dissatisfaction both by the Amir of Kabul himself and his people. (2.) At every change of Government we may be obliged to take up the cause of either party which may lead to a military expedition. (3.) It may be looked upon as a step preparatory to an attempt on our part to take possession of Afghanistan, and the people might become our enemies. In such a case, the opposite party might find opportunity to induce them to rise against us in the name of jihad.

*Advantages.*—(1.) All internal disturbances may be checked, and each son of the Amir will be discouraged to try his luck for succession. (2.) When the people come to know that the succession to the throne of Kabul rests on the approval and help of the British Government, they will be convinced of the greatness of the British power, and our influence over them would be considerably increased. (3.) Our firm policy and direct steps will check any attempt on the part of Russia to gain over the Amir in order to come to terms with him.

In my opinion, time has arrived that our Government should maintain their connection with Afghanistan in a firm and express manner; perhaps the time is not far distant when we may be obliged, for the protection and well-being of our Indian Empire, to send an army into Afghanistan, and to do it against the will of the Ruler of Kabul, merely for the advancement of our interests, will be attended with difficulties, and Russia might possibly take advantage of instigating and persuading Afghanistan to rise against us in the name of jihad—an advantage of which we might stand in need on some future occasion.

It is also important that we should keep Afghanistan under our hands by a firm and express policy, and extend our influence, through public Agents in Afghanistan, and secret Agents among the tribes of Turkoman and Uzbek, as well as in the recent possessions of Russia.

I would urge the advisability of impressing on the minds of all the molested people that we are the Power to rescue them from the hands of a very dangerous enemy. This would raise on our side thousands of jihadis, not only as far as Charjui, but also in the new possessions of Russia. But this object can by no means be gained until we secure influence firmly and expressly in Afghanistan, the attainment of which rests, in my opinion, on the following facts:—(1.) We should approve of the nomination of the heir-apparent, and engage to protect him against internal and external enemies. (2.) We should appoint an Agent in Herat, and under him a Deputy Agent in Kabul, and another at Balkh, under whom two Assistants may also be appointed at Badakshan and Maimena.

It seems probable that the Amir will object strongly to the appointment by us of any European Political Officers in Kabul; but we must have his permission to have an Agent in

Herat, which seems to be the most important place to have in hands in case of emergency. When Khelat is once under our hands, we can take a direct road to Herat at the time of a crisis.

Experience has shown that the Barakzai family have always been our friends for their own purpose, and the secret wishes of the Amir have been known to be to play a double game on both sides, and at a crisis to join his hands to the side which may appear to him to weigh the heavier in the scale. It cannot be denied that our doubtful policy has had something to do with it.

If I am rightly informed, the Russian Agent who came to Kabul brought with him copy of the correspondence which Amir Dost Mahomed Khan addressed the Czar of Russia, stating that when Samarkand would be conquered by Russia, he would cease all connections with the British Government, and would become a friend to Russia. The Russian Agent came to Kabul with the sole object to have that promise fulfilled, and held private interviews with the Amir.

It is asserted that Amir Sher Ali Khan's wishes are—(1) that we should give consent to his nomination of the heir-apparent; (2) that we should pay him, from the day of appointment, an annual sum of Rupees 12,00,000; (3) that the boundaries of his dominions may be extended as far as the Indus; (4) re-consideration of the question of boundary fixed at Seistan, which he looks upon as injustice done to him; (5) his adopting the title of "King" may be authorized.

The first request may be acceded to without danger, under certain conditions like the following:—

(a.)—That he should agree to the appointment of European or Native Agent in Herat, with the Deputies in the different places mentioned above.

(b.)—That he will allow our troops to remain in Herat, Kandahar, and other places, in case of emergency.

(c.)—That he will have no correspondence with Russia, either openly or secretly, without an express permission from us.

(d.)—That he will not allow any Agent of Russia to enter or remain in his territory.

(e.)—That he will consider our friend as his friend, and our enemy as his enemy.

On our part, he should be satisfied that the Political Officer appointed in Afghanistan, under the above conditions, will have nothing to do with the administration of his country.

The second request may also be complied with, on condition the Amir agree to disburse the amount in consultation with our Resident, who will see that it is spent in the way it is intended; otherwise it will be possible that our grant may be used against us, as was shown in the conduct of Mahomed Akbar Khan, elder brother of the Amir, in 1842.

It is impossible to grant the third request of the Amir—(1) because, until our boundary is extended from the range of Hindu-Kush up to the black hills of Herat, our present frontier is the best position, both from political and military point of view; (2) it is not becoming our imperial dignity to give over the districts of Peshawur and Derajat to the Afghans, to say nothing of its effects in our internal political connections in India.

On the fourth request, I am not sufficiently informed to express an opinion.

Nothing was easier for our Empress than to comply with the fifth request of the Amir if he had been wise enough to attend the Imperial Durbar at Delhi, and made his wishes known to His Excellency the Viceroy, and, perhaps, the coming Durbar could have been the fittest opportunity for such a bestowal, in whatever light it may be taken.

In my humble opinion, we should take immediate steps to establish a firm and decided policy in Afghanistan, and extend our influence, as is well worthy the name of British Government. But I must not omit to state that in effecting these measures, great care must be taken that nothing is done in haste, lest the Amir might show opposition, and raise the people in the name of jihad: and the advantages accruing to us in the one case may be gained by our rival in the other.

Therefore, while upholding firm policy, utmost endeavour should be used that the Amir may be most perfectly satisfied that in all we do it is also meant to protect his interests, and guard his country against possible evil, provided that he may not be playing a double game on both sides.

The Amir has been trying of late to gain over the independent tribes of Bajour, Swat, Dir, and others who live between British India and Kabul from the range of Suleman as far as Chitral. He invited some of the leaders of these tribes, and conferred khilluts and rewards on them, with promises of favours in the future, and gave them indications to hold themselves in readiness for a jihad in case of necessity.

This conduct of the Amir, together with the manner in which he entertained the Agent of Russia at private interviews, warns us to be on our guard, and calls for our questioning the Amir what means this sort of double dealing. He should tell plainly whether he is a friend to the British Government or to Russia; and if friend to us, why he had been carrying on secret communications with her. He should be informed plainly that any such action on his part in the future would be viewed with disfavour by our Government. That if he is our friend, our best endeavours will be used to help him in every way possible, and to meet

all his reasonable demands ; otherwise we will have nothing to do with him, and we will do what we think best for the well-being of our Indian Empire.

It is hoped that such a frank expression on the part of our Government would have much greater effect than the wavering policy we have hitherto followed, and has proved unsuccessful.

## APPENDIX XXIV.

[*Referred to in paragraph 121, Chapter VII.*]

REPLIES FROM THE AMIR TO HIS EXCELLENCY'S LETTERS, DATED 11<sup>TH</sup> OCTOBER 1876.

Translation of a khureeta from AMIR SHEER ALI KHAN, to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 19th Zilhaj 1293 A.H.=30th December 1876.

Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the Agent at Kabul, reached Kabul on the 13th of Shawal, and Your Excellency's letter,\* dated 11th October 1876, reached me on the 4th Zikad through him. The friendly expressions of the above letter have come to my knowledge. The two news, one of the assumption of the title of "Empress of India" by Her Majesty the Queen, and the other of your assumption of the Viceroyalty, have been the cause of great gratification to me. Syud Nur Mahomed Shah has been appointed and will go to that side in two or three days. If God pleases he will relate all circumstances when he will see the British officers.

---

Translation of a khureeta from the Amir of Kabul, to the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 13th Zilhaj 1293 A.H.=30th December 1876.

Your Excellency's kind letter, which has been sent separately, dated 11th October, containing news of Your Excellency's holding an Imperial Assemblage on 4th Zikad 1293 A.H., reached me through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the Agent at Kabul. The contents thereof have come to my knowledge. As Syud Nur Mahomed Shah is on that side, I hope that the reasons of my inability to take a share in the Assemblage will come to your knowledge through him.

I hope that Your Excellency will make me happy from time to time with the accounts of your health.



## APPENDIX XXV.

[Referred to in paragraphs 121, 122, 123, 124, 127 & 130, Chapter VII.]

### CORRESPONDENCE, &c., TO AND FROM SIR LEWIS PELLY DURING THE CONFERENCE.

Dated Peshawur, 31st January 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

I have to-day had the honor of receiving Your Lordship's very kind and welcome letter of the 27th, with enclosure.

I now enclose for Your Lordship's information (as directed in Your Excellency's telegram of the 26th) my note of what passed on the occasion of the first meeting with the Envoy from Kabul. We were to have met again to-day, but the Envoy pleaded indisposition, and desired to postpone business until noon to-morrow. He has some affection of the mucous membrane. But my belief is that he has been engaged to-day in writing to the Amir. The Mirakhor seems to send his letters to Kabul apart from those of the Envoy. It is reported that this afternoon he despatched two horsemen with letters *via* the Khyber. If so, he must have easy command of the Pass route.

The Envoy is desirous of private communications with me. These can readily be arranged for by drives and social meetings. Syud Nur Mahomed doubtless thinks his own position a very delicate and even critical one; he fears and mistrusts the views and action of the Mirakhor, who may possibly represent the anti-English party at Kabul.

I have had Muhammad Shah watched, but he goes nowhere and sees no one. I have as yet no trace of the supposed Russian spy.

Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan's two sons arrived here a day or two ago, and proceed towards Kabul to-day. One of them accompanied Syud Nur Mahomed to a Penny Reading on Monday.

I have met with a very cordial reception here in society; and there is plenty of gaiety.

I cannot find that the Mirakhor gained any substantial benefit by his visit to the Akhoond at Swat. Some encouraging words were spoken, but I am told that the Akhoond's concluding speech was that the times showed that when a crisis arrives every one is guided solely by his own interests.

Some tribesmen passed southward along their own hills a few days ago, but nothing has resulted from their march as yet. I am disinclined to think that these Afridis, &c., are such incorrigibly bad fellows after all. At all events, I trust force on any great scale may not be used until we see the end of the Kabul negotiation; and if this fail, until we see what can be done with the borderers by entering into direct communication with their Chiefs, and by employing them and aiding them towards peaceful habits.

It is rumoured that Abdulla Jan is suffering from a sort of paralysis of one arm.

To-morrow I shall take the Envoy up on the question of the Amir's having submitted an expression of his wishes, *vide* the marginal note to the note now enclosed.

He will doubtless ask what misapprehensions occurred previous to Your Excellency's arrival (for he denies that any have occurred since). I shall then speak in the sense of paragraph 13 of the Secret Instructions.

He will then state his complaints probably.

None of these discussions concerning past misapprehensions will involve an opening of negotiation for a formal agreement as to the future. Therefore I purpose to allow the Envoy to discuss the past, and when he concludes, I shall again revert to the *sine quâ non* condition of British Agency on the Afghan frontier.

I have not *very much doubt* of being able to bring Syud Nur Mahomed to an agreement. What I increasingly doubt is his power to induce the Kabul Durbar to go with him. There must be some Chiefs near the Amir who are working on his fears or policy in a perverse manner. However, it is too early yet to state anything positively. In writing the foregoing, I simply desire to indicate the various directions in which my thoughts are regarding matters.

---

Dated Peshawur, 1st February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

I beg to enclose a note of the meeting with the Envoy to-day. To-morrow will be a Friday and therefore blank, as the Mirakhor is very pious.

This afternoon the Envoy called for me, and we took a drive together and chatted about our work. Among other matters he said somewhat earnestly, "I did not wish to come to Peshawur, because I knew that if I should be successful in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement with you, there are Sirdars and others about the Amir who would accuse me of having been untrue, or at least self-interested. But the Amir insisted on my going, and I then asked for four or five other officials to accompany me. This the Amir would not accede to. But on my pressing His Highness, he at length assented to the Mirakhor being ordered to Peshawur. The Mirakhor," he continued, "has been some forty years in the Government service, was formerly attached to the late Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, and has more recently been employed in the management of hill tribes, whom he well understands, though he is not well acquainted with the style of business we are now engaged upon. It is, however, better that the Mirakhor should be always present when we have our formal meetings, and many opportunities for private conversation will present themselves. But to return," he repeated, "if I succeed, they will doubt me, and if I do not succeed, they will say the failure is my fault. Meantime, however, I am most desirous of laying the history of our relations since the time of Dost Mahomed and the Treaty of Sir John Lawrence before you in all their details; and you shall then be judge of the merits of the case. Whatever you may then decide, I will accept, should my doing so be agreeable to the Amir or otherwise."

I said I should be happy to listen to all he might wish to state, but that I feared so detailed a history would delay the commencement of negotiation. And after all we should have to come back to the point we left on the first day of meeting, *viz.*, the *sine quâ non* condition of admitting the principle of our right of permanent British Agency at Herat and elsewhere on the Afghan frontier. Syud Nur Mahomed Shah concluded by saying he "trusted all would end to our mutual satisfaction, but that this would depend upon the British." He alluded also to the extreme poverty of Afghanistan, consequent on reiterated civil war.

From all this I think it not unlikely that after sketching the one-sided Treaty of 1855 and the several revolutions in Afghanistan, as also our acceptance of any successful pretender to the prejudice of Dost Mahomed's heir, and our shilly-shallying policy of 1873, and our I-will and I-won't assurances of 1869, the Envoy will finish by saying that the distractions of the country, the necessity for an army, and the ruin of the exchequer, are all traceable to us, and that in equity we should now make handsome compensation.

I asked the Envoy quietly how it happened that the Amir would not receive me at Kabul, when, as he well knew, in 1860-61 Dost Mahomed had without much pressure agreed to my travelling from Kandahar to Kabul and thence down the Khyber. He replied that he would explain all this when we come to it in the conference.

I fear the British Agent has made an awkward mistake in regard to the *Aide Memoire* which Your Lordship authorized him to explain to the Amir. Your Lordship wrote that the Amir's "apprehensions" might have been caused "by a policy which His Highness has considered to be neither hot nor cold." Captain Grey's Persian version when closely retranslated into English reads: a policy which *in the opinion of* the Amir, &c., &c.

Now the expression which Captain Grey uses for *in the opinion of* the Amir, is, "*vizd-i-Amir*," and it appears that this phrase means also *on the part of* the Amir. The Kabul Agent read the passage to me to-day in the latter sense, and on being questioned at once admitted that he had so explained the passage during two months to His Highness.

It doubtless will suggest itself to Your Lordship that the Envoy's tendency towards the slow and sure in our discussions may be in part attributable to a wish for time to communicate frequently with Kabul, and to a hope that the Russo-Turkish question may in the meantime assume an aspect favorable to his negotiation.

---

Dated Peshawur, 3rd February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

I am in receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday, and I venture to hope that the series of letters and notes of discussion with which I am almost daily troubling Your Lordship may be found to contain a sufficient summary of what I have to submit.

I beg to enclose a note of what passed at an unofficial interview I had with the Envoy this morning.

The letters and diaries received to-day by Sir R. Pollock from Kabul are, I think, important. The Agent's letter of the 28th January represents the Maliks residing in the neighbourhood of the capital as being dissatisfied with the conduct of the Afghan Government, and unwilling to leave their homes for a jihad. The Commissioner will report these communications by telegraph and post in the usual manner; and it is therefore unnecessary for me to do so.

I suspect the Afghan Envoy's line to be one of *delay*; and that he will endeavour to evade the Agency stipulation to the utmost of his power. It is also not improbable that he really wishes to review the past in order that its misunderstandings and other details may be explained.

On one or two occasions the Envoy has referred to the old Treaty of 1855. For instance, he asked if the Amir had ever broken that Treaty? Again, the Kabul diary just now received represents the Amir as having enjoined on some of his Chiefs or others to express their wish that no alterations in that Treaty should be made. And should the present negotiation not succeed, Your Excellency's Government may have to resolve on the view you would take of the old Treaty. The preamble of the new draft Treaty acknowledges that of 1855 as one which it is "expedient to revise and supplement." The Agreement of 1857 confirmed the Treaty of 1855.

I understand that among those about the Amir who are hostile to our influence appear to be Mir Afzul Khan, closely related to Abdulla Jan's mother; Rehma Allah Khan, Ghilzai; Arsullah Khan, Ghilzai; the Mirakhor, now here.

One of the Khans who has to do with the Khaibaris assures me that the opening or closing of that Pass is quite at the pleasure of the Amir.

I enquired this morning of the Envoy as to what is the real condition of the Amir's health. He replied that His Highness has been very ill, but is now recovered, except for a swelling of one of the knee-joints. He explained that this enlargement was not the effect of gout. As to Abdulla Jan, he said that this Sirdar had suffered from a twitching of the forearm and hinder part of the neck, but that when he (the Envoy) left Kabul, the Sirdar was well.

I think a little patience will have to be exercised until the Envoy shall exhaust what he has to say concerning the past; and then I must return to the Agency stipulation.

#### NOTE.

*Peshawur, 3rd February 1877.*

The translations promised at the last interview having been sent this morning to the

These were translations of the wishes and requests submitted by the Amir either in person, or through his Minister, or through the British Agent in 1869 and 1873, taken in connection with the Viceroy's letter to the Amir, dated 11th October 1876, paragraph 6:

Discussion, dated July 1873, at page 20 of volume, "Affairs of Central Asia, 1872-75."

The Amir's requests made in May 1873, *vide* page 19 of above-mentioned volume.

Paragraph 8 of Note, dated 29th March 1869.

Paragraph 3 of a letter from the Punjab Government to the Foreign Secretary, dated Ambala, 1st April 1869.

Kabul Envoy, Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded to the conference room at the hour appointed for meeting. On arrival there he received, through the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, a verbal message from the Kabul Envoy to the effect that he had received the translations and had perused them. He would now refer to his own papers and make his reply on Monday; till these translations were replied to and disposed of, he could not enter upon the discussion of other questions. But he would be glad to meet Sir Lewis Pelly now in an unofficial manner if convenient.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that he would be happy to meet the Envoy in the manner proposed at the conference room.

The Envoy having arrived, Sir Lewis Pelly observed that he was willing to meet the Envoy's wishes for a postponement of further discussion until Monday, 5th instant, at noon. And that in view to obviating unnecessary delay, he would now ask the Envoy whether he had a clear recollection of the contents of the *Aide Memoire* sent by the Viceroy for the information of the Amir by the hand of Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan. Sir Lewis Pelly added that if the Envoy so wished, he would be happy to cause the *Aide Memoire* now to be read over to him.

The Envoy asked for a copy of the *Aide Memoire*, and Sir Lewis Pelly said he would telegraph to the Viceroy on the subject.

Sir Lewis Pelly then mentioned that the Viceroy has expressed his desire for a most friendly and suitable reception of the Envoy, and doubtless would be glad to hear of his comfort and happiness.

The Envoy begged Sir Lewis Pelly to submit his respectful compliments to the Viceroy, and remarked that on all previous occasions of his coming to British territory he had been made most comfortable and happy by the honorable reception accorded to him, but on this occasion he had been treated with even greater consideration, and could find no words to express his gratitude. His happiness, the Envoy continued, was perfect whilst he was here, but its endurance would depend upon the way in which he should part from Sir Lewis Pelly after completing his negotiations.

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that the Envoy was well aware of the sincerely friendly intentions of the Viceroy; and that it would depend on the Amir whether the Envoy's departure should prove as happy as he desired.

The Envoy replied, "No, it depends on you," and then correcting himself added, "In truth it depends neither on you nor on the Amir, but on justice."

It was then arranged that the Envoy and Sir Lewis Pelly should resume their discussions on Monday, 5th instant, at noon.

Telegram, dated 5th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY,  
To—Viceroy.

Your Excellency's cipher of 4th instant. At conference this morning I took opportunity of reminding Envoy of prolonged deliberation at Kabul, and of informing him that the Viceroy now confidently expected that the Amir's Plenipotentiary would give a prompt and definite reply to his proposals. Envoy asked if I considered all agreements from 1855 as invalid and annulled. I replied I had no instructions to annul any Treaty, but was here in the hope of revising and supplementing the Treaties of 1855 in the manner originally desired by the Amir, and in accordance with recent agreements made through British Agent. Envoy asked what Amir should do if twenty years hence a future Viceroy should wish to revise Treaty now proposed. I answered, when one party to a Treaty desires and the other agrees to revise and supplement, it is in accordance with international practice that the instruments be modified accordingly. Envoy rejoined, if there be dissatisfaction in mind of Amir it is owing to infraction of Treaty; that he firmly holds to the opinions he has expressed on former occasions, and the Envoy would explain all the reasons for adhering to old opinion. I said I should be happy to hear all, but that, meantime, I would courteously beg to be informed whether the Amir adheres or withdrew from the assurance recently given through the British Agent concerning admission of the principle of allowing British Agency in the frontiers—an assurance which had been confirmed by the deputation of a Plenipotentiary to Peshawur. After many wanderings on the part of the Envoy, I again begged for a reply to the question of the Agency principle, as if the Amir withdrew from this, the Viceroy could not undertake the weighty obligations involved in strengthening and supporting the Amir, nor could I even open negotiations. The Envoy continued, his wish was to explain the reasons why the Amir and the whole of the Afghan people withdrew from that assurance. Envoy then proceeded to call in question our record of previous conference, and commenced a review of the past. He hoped that the friendship in conformity with the old agreement would always remain strong and lasting. Finally, he begged permission to continue his explanations to-morrow. Atta Mahomed Khan thinks it likely. Envoy may at last moment accept Agency principle, and says Afghan Government desires no concession in return, and that Envoy mistrusts Mirakhor, and fears being considered to be in our interests.

---

Telegram, dated 6th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY,  
To—Viceroy.

The Envoy evidently awaits further instructions from Amir. At conference to-day he repeatedly stated that he did not reject or accept the Agency clause. He begged me to allow him two or three days more to state his case as directed by the Amir; that he would then give a definite reply, and that I should find his last word would be of peace. I explained frankly in a friendly and unofficial manner that Your Lordship is prepared to enter into a defensive and offensive alliance, and formally to do what may be in your power for securing the succession and averting civil war, provided the Amir cordially accepts the conditions, in the absence of which it will be impossible for you to undertake such weighty obligations. The Envoy said he thoroughly appreciated the situation, the weakness of Afghanistan, her imminent danger from Russia, the successful support we afforded Turkey, that the Afghans were not fools, and quite understood the difference between our Government and that of Russia, and that they would never let go our skirts, saying if you cut off our wrist, we will still hold on by the arm.

---

Telegram, dated 6th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY,  
To—Viceroy.

Your Excellency's cipher of the 4th instant. The most trustworthy information I have collected leads to the inference that the Amir is in a highly excited and undecided condition of mind. Sometimes he inclines towards our alliance and us, then towards a Russian one. Again, his courtiers advise him to hold aloof from both. He mistrusts us, and occasionally suspects us of having one aim with the Russians. One day he is in favor of a jihad, and then deprecates quarrelling with us. He is perplexed by the dissensions in his own family, and by a doubt whether his subjects, whom he has so taxed and harassed by conscription, would cordially support him in a crisis. It is said that he dare not quit Kabul, lest the capital fall into the hands of a powerful faction. The Envoy is most persistent in his desire to review past relations, and is sore at our alleged inconsistencies. My impression is that the advisers now near the Amir have induced His Highness to swerve from the instructions which he gave to Nur Mahomed, and that the latter is referring to Kabul on 5th February.

Telegram, dated 6th February 1877.

From—Viceroy.

To—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur.

Your letter of 31st. Cordial thanks for its full and interesting information. I entirely approve your language to Envoy. You may of course speak to him in general sense of my telegram of 3rd. My telegrams and letters must not be communicated verbally, but they are meant for your assistance and use in any way you think judicious. What the Envoy calls misapprehensions, and as such disputes, were stated and complained of by himself in his first conversation with Bellew. They prove the need of more confidential intercourse if friendship be desired by Amir as by us, for they show that he has been for years harbouring resentment and mistrust on grounds only recently made known to present Viceroy, occasioned by previous acts of Government of India, which better knowledge of Amir's feelings would probably have prevented. When men meet in the dark, they hurt each other unintentionally. Our motive for seeking present understanding was not to interfere in Afghanistan, but avert danger of future interference by others. We had reason to suppose that if Amir be not more openly and actively supported by us, his independence may ere long be endangered. We are willing to give him such open and active support if, meeting us in the trustful spirit he evinced at Ambala, he on his part will give us the means of so doing, otherwise of course we cannot. Condition about Agents, therefore, is not a hostile ultimatum, though it is a necessary *sine quâ non* to any fresh concession by us. Your firmness on this point is fully approved.

Your telegram of 6th. Treaty of 1855 of course remains valid. But though it binds the Amir to espouse our cause in any war, it does not bind us to espouse his. I have been told Amir wrote recently to Khan, advising him not to break with us, but to sell himself dear, and get the most out of us. This is probably what Envoy will endeavour on Amir's behalf. Envoy's fear of his colleague and wish for private interviews is important. Your position may possibly render such interviews inexpedient or impracticable. But Bellew should see Envoy privately as often as possible. This may assist without compromising you. Avoid all appearance of wishing to gain anything from Amir. Envoy should not be allowed to suppose or represent that we are making demands. We make absolutely none, but merely offer advantages and favors on reasonable conditions which it is for Amir to accept or reject, as he pleases. Bring this out as strongly as you can. Atta Mahomed's language at Kabul may perhaps have failed to do so.

Telegram, dated 6th February 1877.

From—Viceroy,

To—SIR LEWIS PELLY.

Your letter, 1st. Highly approve your general language to Envoy. But let him tell out his story as he seems anxious to do, and don't refuse to hear anything he wishes or offers to say. What we want to encourage is frank explanations.

Letter from SIR LEWIS PELLY to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated Peshawur, 6th February 1877.

In obedience to Your Lordship's cipher telegram of the 4th instant,\* I availed myself of

\* Your telegram of to-day. No objection to furnish Envoy with copy of *Aide Memoire*, which, however, it is obvious he must possess already. His request indicates desire to prolong negotiation by pretexts for evasion and delay, against which you must be on your guard. Atta Mahomed was instructed to place our proposals without reserve before Amir, and he reported that he had done so. Amir took for their consideration an unusual time, which he prolonged by every available excuse before sending Envoy to communicate his answer, and you will give Envoy to understand that we now expect from him, understanding that he has full powers, a prompt and definite reply to our proposals.

an opportunity at the conference, yesterday, for politely reminding the Envoy of the unusual period of time that had been already occupied in deliberation, and for informing him that Your Excellency now expected a prompt and definite reply.

My two cipher telegrams, dated the 5th instant, have already summarized what appears to me to be the most probable account of the state of affairs at Kabul and the principal points of the discussion which had taken place at the conference of yesterday.

From a general survey of the situation I infer—

1st.—That the Envoy left Kabul authorized to accept the preliminary condition of Agency if insisted on by us, but with instructions also to evade this condition as long as possible and to review our past relations with Afghanistan in detail.

2nd.—That after the departure of the Envoy, the anti-English party at Kabul induced the Amir either to revoke or modify the instructions given to the Syud, who, a few days after his arrival at Peshawur, was overheard to say to the Mirakhor—"The Amir instructed me one way at Kabul and now writes the reverse (*khilaf*). My position is very heavy (*sungeen*)."

3rd.—That there are those, as well in Kabul as in Peshawur, who, from self-interested or other motives, have worked on the Amir's doubtful and unsettled state of mind by representing our military preparations as directed against him, and have further excited him by reports of proceedings in Khelat territory.



4th.—That the Envoy, perplexed by contradictory instructions and the rumours that reached him from other points, endeavours to gain time for further communication with the Amir, by lingering over a review of the past, in the hope partly that he might receive more favourable instructions before he should be requested to give an explicit answer to the Agency question.

5th.—That this question being pressed, he has given an answer in the negative, but still desires (as he urged yesterday) to continue his review: in brief, to occupy time until he shall again hear from Kabul.

6th.—That the Amir is really excited, perplexed and angry, and alarmed by the reports which reach him, by the dissensions in his own family, and by doubts as to how far he can depend on his people supplying recruits for the army.

7th.—That the Amir has caused the imminence of a (jehad) crescentade to be notified to or by his headmen, and that he is in part prompted to this course by the alleged fact that, according to the Sherah, a jehad enables him to summon to his ranks the sons and heirs as well as the fathers.

Since writing the foregoing, I have been to the conference room, and Your Excellency will have received my cipher telegram of to-day, summarizing the unofficial conversation that had taken place between the Envoy and me. I think he is desirous of meeting Your Lordship's wishes, but he is evidently awaiting some communication from Kabul, and fears the appearance of giving in too readily, lest the Mirakhor should denounce him to the opposition and to the Amir.

I am desirous of avoiding embarrassment of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah until I shall learn distinctly whether he will, and can, do what is wanted. But if I fail in this, I shall take him up on the perpetual friendship, and respect for territory clauses in the Treaty of 1855, and ask him whether he considers the refusal to allow Sir D. Forsyth's mission passage through Afghanistan, the rejection of a friendly special mission and even of Consular Agents, the exclusion of British subjects, and virtual hindrance of trade and traffic, and the murder of a British officer on our soil, as consistent with the spirit of that Treaty.

---

Translation of a letter from Kabul, dated the 8th Mohurram, 1294 A.H., corresponding with the 24th January 1877.

What I wrote before has come to pass.

2. Syud Nur Mahomed, Pishini, Sadr-i-Azam (Prime Minister), has started, and ere this is in Peshawur to negotiate a treaty with the English Government on the basis of the present and future affairs.

3. Think of the difference which time has produced since the reign of the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan and that of the present Amir Shere Ali Khan. The difference is such as exists between earth and sky.

4. Formerly the late Amir, who used to act on his own sound judgment and not on the suggestions of his courtiers, went in person to negotiate a treaty at Peshawur with Lawrence Sahib of Lahore. Now the present Amir, however he might feel well disposed towards the English, acts entirely on the advice of persons like Kazi Gholam Kadir and the Sadr-i-Azam, who are destitute of farseeing wisdom and throw obstacles in the way of the English interests.

5. These are the individuals who discouraged the Amir in undertaking the journey to meet Lat Sahib (Lord Lytton) at Peshawur, to witness the Imperial Durbar in Delhi, and conduct the present conference in person.

6. As the Amir is aware that the Syud Minister, whether by interest or zeal for the good of Afghanistan, is prejudiced towards the English, consequently he has ordered Mirakhor Ahmed Khan, an experienced, straightforward, and trusted servant, to accompany the Sadr-i-Azam. The Amir has advised the Mirakhor to be cordial and cautious, and not to allow him (Nur Mahomed) to break the thread of English *wish* asunder.

7. Previous to the departure of the Sadr-i-Azam to Peshawur, the Amir had several consultations with him. He has persuaded him that he was to confer with the Elchee Mookhtar Mootlaq (Sir Lewis Pelly) in such a crafty manner that the mission of the two former and of the third present Agent of Russia, and his engagements on the part of the Samarkand Russian Governor to supply all the wants of the Amir, should be accepted as true by the British Government, and at the same time show the authorities at Peshawur that the Amir having respect for the English alliance paid not much attention to their (Russian) overtures.

8. The Amir has told his Agents to speak his dissatisfaction regarding the occupation of Shal (Quetta) by the English troops, and to seek for their leaving that place; adding that it being close by Kandahar will create weakness of the Amir in the eyes of the Afghans, who will laugh at him and say that the English promising friendship have sent an army to take Kandahar and Herat. Such a thing will at the same time excite rebellion in the Amir's dominion, if not jehad against the English force.

9. The Mirakhor and Nur Mahomed Shah will also urge on the part of the Amir that the English Government must supply the Amir with sufficient money and ammunition of war to enable him to meet the Russians in the field, should they invade his dominions.

10. The Agents are also to state that when the Amir is thus fully supplied with funds, &c., by Government, let him alone deal with Russia without any loss of English life.

11. The Sadr-i-Azam and the Mirakhor have been ordered by the Amir not to promise the release of Sirdar Yakub Khan definitely. They are to state on this subject, if put forward, that when the unfortunate Sirdar suffers for his ill deeds and a suitable opportunity comes, he will be liberated, but that at present the Amir was afraid that the Sirdar may do mischief by raising tumult towards Herat and Russians in the occupation of Merv and advance on Herat. But this is nonsense of the Amir.

12. From the time the English force has appeared in Shal (Quetta), Derajat, Kohat, and Koorum, the Sadr-i-Azam has been telling the Amir that the English, sooner or later, will positively advance on Kandahar and Herat. After this they will pension him with his family and make him an idle sovereign in the Bala Hissar of Kabul, if not remove him to India. Thus for some time the mind of the Amir is poisoned.

13. News has reached from Peshawur that Russia cannot fight and has not invaded Constantinople, while her Governor-General of Samarkand in Central Asia has spread terror, and commands homage of the subjects of Mawarool Nahur. This intelligence has brought despondency in the Court of the Amir. They say that now the Russians in Turkistan will not make any stir towards Balkh and Herat, and therefore the English will show no activity in meeting the friendship and proposals of the Amir.

14. The Sadr-i-Azam has frequently told the Amir that this is the time suited for his pressing the English to give him money and ammunition, and never to forget to put off the coming of the English Resident by some pretext or other.

15. Otherwise the English will wait for an opportunity, when neither money will be given, nor they will ever give up the occupation of Kabul if once more there.

16. The Amir has finally said to the Sadr-i-Azam and the Mirakhor that in conference if they feel certain that the English will neither give money nor a fresh Treaty without the Amir's allowing the English Resident in Kabul, then they are to agree to bring some English officer to Kabul, after explaining to the Peshawur authorities that as soon as the Amir and the Court find that there was mischief intended by the Kabulis for the life of the Resident, the Amir, facing the difficulty and risk of all sort, will see him safely back to the British boundary. These are all excuses to frighten the English to send no Resident to Kabul.

17. It would be highly desirable if the English at Peshawur urge to gain by any means the approval of the Sadr-i-Azam for the safe conduct of the English Resident, and permit him to reside in the Upper Bala Hissar with about 2,000 soldiers and sufficient stores of ammunition and provisions in lieu of any money. The whole country will at once feel that their interests will be watched against the external enemy and internal exactions. They will be ready to serve the British cause. This the Amir knows well, and therefore brings forward the excuses of alarm in negotiations, that he will not be responsible for the Resident's life.

18. Some time ago the Amir had addressed letters to the heads of the Kohistanes and the Khawaneers of Afghanistan, Hazarajat, and the Jumwhaidees of the neighbourhood of Herat, that from one side the Russians are moving towards his dominions and from the other direction the English are threatening him, consequently he demands their cordial support.

19. Some of the Chiefs have replied that if the Amir was to release his brave son, Sirdar Yakub Khan, then they will fight with the Amir's enemy, whether that may be Russian or English. Others have answered to the Amir that his oppression, family dissensions, and bloodshed, have made them entirely broken in condition, and therefore unable to fight with his enemies, while others have been silent in acknowledgments. Few have promised to join his flag in time of war.

20. The Amir has advised the Mirakhor, Ahmed Khan, if Sadr-i-Azam, Nur Mahomed Shah, was not averse, he is to wait on the Akhoond at Swat and state the difficulties which surround the Amir at present. It is said now in Kabul that the Mirakhor went to Swat and stayed about a week with the Akhoond. The latter has not only blessed the Amir with victory over his enemies, but has written to all the frontier Chiefs, his believers, to lend the auxiliary force of tribes to espouse the cause of the Amir in time of need. The Amir has forwarded khilluts and cash to all of them.

21. The Amir has also told his Envoy to speak with the English Elchee deputed by Lat Sahab at Peshawur in the following manner:—

1stly.—His Highness the Amir had gone to the Ambala Conference. There the Government entered with him in friendly engagements and advised him to raise a large force, which made his expenses double.

2ndly.—The Amir made several demands for money and ammunition. He was furnished only with some portion. Consequently he fell in distress and debt.

3rdly.—Russians are daily gaining strength and steps in the direction of the Amir's boundaries towards Herat and Balkh. His income alone cannot fit him to oppose that power.

4thly.—The Amir wants money. With empty hands he can do nothing.

5thly.—Besides these things the scarcity of money has compelled him to keep his army in arrears, and therefore discontent and indiscipline prevail in the ranks.

6thly.—While in such dilemma, how could his men fight for him with an enemy who is *pulvan shreek*, partner of boundary (Russia).

7thly.—Twice the Russian Elchees came to the Amir, who dismissed them with mere common courtesy and made no terms with them.

8thly.—The third Russian Agent is now at Kabul. He engages that Russia will not interfere with the kingdom of Kabul, and promises the grant of the future conquest of the Punjab to the Amir by the Emperor of Russia, whose object is only to open the mercantile route to India.

9thly.—The Russian Agent has told the Amir to give up his claim to Seistán, which belongs to the Shah of Persia; adding at the same time that, agreeably with the bequest of the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, his grandsons, Sirdars Abdool Rahman Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan, must be provided for, and above all Russia will lend the Amir money and troops in such rapid abundance as *sailab* (torrent).

22. In short, these are the statements which the Sadr-i-Azam and the Mirakhor are to exaggerate and lay before the Elchee Mookhtar at Peshawur; whether the Russian Agent has submitted them to the Amir in all or in part is only known to few.

23. Two days after the departure of the Sadr-i-Azam towards Peshawur, the Amir and the Russian Agent have forwarded despatches to the Russian General at Samarkand through the Afghan officers on the Oxus.

24. In fine, without a large sum of subsidy neither a Treaty will be useful nor the permission of the Amir for the Resident at Kabul will be obtained. But take care that the English force is not withdrawn from the position they have now occupied in Swat, Bolan, Derajat, and Kohat, whether that force is composed of 100 or 10,000 men. Any backward step will spread news in Central Asia that the Amir, being displeased with the advance of the English and instigated by Russia, has forced them (English) to relinquish their posts.

Letter from SIR LEWIS PELLY to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated Peshawur, 8th February 1877.

The Envoy was too unwell yesterday to attend at the conference. Dr. Bellew called on him to ask after his health and whether he would like to drive out with me in the evening.

I beg to enclose a Note of Dr. Bellew's interview, which is, I think, interesting.

Before entering the carriage, the Envoy sat with me some time in my room. He denies that the Amir has been preaching a crescentade, and says that he has addressed His Highness on the subject, although he did not venture to mention all the reports current here. The Envoy added that reports of our having moved in force on Koorum and on Quetta had reiteratedly been made to the Amir by his officials, but that he would not credit them. The Envoy has probably caused it to be rumoured in Peshawur that he is come to Peshawur to ask for explanations as to those movements.

I incline to believe that the Amir drinks in private, but not to excess. It is said he is addicted to small garden parties, where he, with some boon companions and a woman (*Raree*) whom he took from Peshawur, amuses himself.

The Envoy will now have two or three days' run of consecutive review of the past. I shall then make my remarks, and I propose to show among other matters—

1st.—That all he said tends to support the opinion that the Amir has long been dissatisfied with the old Treaty, and begged repeatedly for an alliance of a formal defensive-offensive and dynastic character.

2nd.—That the Ambala and Simla conferences show that his mind was in no degree set permanently at rest by what then passed, and that one principal cause of his continued dissatisfaction was that the British Government, deeming the time was not arrived when the fulfilment of the Amir's wishes was expedient, whether in his own interest or ours, had declined to bind itself by a defensive-offensive or dynastic Treaty.

3rd.—That estrangement between the two Powers seems to have increased, especially since 1873, and that the causes of this estrangement evidently are traceable to mutual misapprehensions, which could not have occurred had our relations been more explicit and cordial, and our intercommunications more frequent and confidential. Hence followed want of confidence and mistrust of intentions.

4th.—That Your Excellency, having reviewed the situation in all its aspects, as well geographical as political, as well present as future, arrived at the conclusion that the march of events in Central Asia, the practical evils which had resulted from want of explicit engagements and mutual confidence, and the obvious fact of the ever-increasing peril to the integrity of Afghanistan and consolidation of the Amir's rule, rendered it both equitable and for the common interest of the Kabul and your own Governments that you should accord open and active support to the Amir against his danger of interference from without and of domestic faction, and that the offer of these advantages should be unaccompanied by any demands or conditions

on your part other than such as are reasonable and even plainly necessary to enable you to fulfil the obligations which you would accept in signing a Treaty Instrument of the character contemplated.

5th.—That among these conditions is one without agreeing on which it would be obviously futile to open negotiations, *viz.*, the admission by the Government of the Amir of the Agency principle; for it is manifest that Your Excellency could not undertake to aid in defending the Afghan frontiers except you should be allowed to collect through your own responsible Agents timely intelligence of what was passing on and beyond those frontiers, and thus be prepared for contingencies and for explaining to Her Majesty's Government from independent, unprejudiced, and reliable sources, the facts of any alleged aggression and the necessity which existed for repelling the same.

6th.—That Your Excellency considers that in now offering to formularize in a public and formal Instrument the wishes and requests preferred by the Amir in 1869-73 you make every desired concession, and evidence your sincere desire for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan; but if, unhappily, Your Excellency's offer should not be accepted, you will be compelled to consider that the notes of disputed, vague, and informal conversations and documents, which you supposed to contain a *resumé* of the Amir's wishes and requests, are repudiated by the Amir, who refuses to acknowledge that he expressed those wishes and requests, and who declines to embody them in a formal agreement.

7th.—That as to the Treaty of 1855, upon the maintenance of which the Envoy has so frequently insisted, Your Excellency admits that Instrument to be still valid, but that I would remind the Envoy that the last Article of that Treaty binds the Amir to espouse our cause against our enemies, but does not bind us to espouse his cause against his enemies. Again, that Article I of the 1855 Treaty declares there shall be perpetual friendship between the two Governments; and I would ask the Envoy whether he considers the exclusion of British subjects, the practical stoppage of passage for our subjects and goods, the refusal to allow Forsyth's Mission to pass, the refusal to accept a friendly and special Mission of a complimentary character, the omission to acknowledge the receipt of a friendly and complimentary letter of invitation from the Viceroy, the murder of Colonel Macdonald by one of his Governors' relatives, &c., to be in unison with the spirit of that Article.

To the Khelat question I would propose to reply that Your Excellency is unable to admit the right of any foreign Government to interfere with, or call in question, your relations with, or proceedings in, that Khanate, and that even had the facts been otherwise, the Amir, by refusing, during the entire period of Your Excellency's administration, to receive a special Mission, which, as he had been from the first informed, was authorized to discuss with him subjects of State importance, had closed the door against Your Excellency's endeavours for communication.

2 P.M.—We are now sitting in conference, and the Envoy is pouring out his review of the past.

---

P.S.—The Envoy's harangue is a long rigmarole, but its drift is to show that the wishes expressed at Simla and Ambala were not the Amir's but ours, and that to place British Agents on the Afghan frontier would be injurious both to Afghan and British interests.

---

Note of DR. BELLEW's private interview with SYUD NUR MAHOMED SHAH, dated Peshawur, 7th February 1877.

The Kabul Envoy, though better to-day, was not well enough to attend conference, and desired Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan to explain the reasons of his inability to do so to Sir Lewis Pelly. The Nawab stated that the Kabul Envoy was in some pain till nearly midnight, and then after the employment of his own remedies fell asleep, and is better to-day, but still not fit to do business.

At 2 P.M. I visited the Kabul Envoy to enquire after his health on behalf of Sir Lewis Pelly. He received me in his private sitting-room. I found him alone, with one servant in attendance, whom he dismissed on my entry. The Envoy had just risen from his couch on which he had been reclining. After compliments and a lengthy account of his illness, which, it appears, is the result of a chronic stricture of the urethra of many years' standing, he remarked that the hard work during the preceding two days of writing his despatches to the Amir on the subject of his conferences with Sir Lewis Pelly, and which occupied him far into the night, had somewhat fatigued him, but that the rest he had enjoyed to-day had restored him to his usual health.

The Kabul Envoy continued that he would be able to resume his conference with Sir Lewis Pelly to-morrow, and begged that I would intimate to Sir Lewis Pelly that he wished to state his own case on the part of the Amir's Government in detail, beginning with the Treaty made by the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan with Sir John Lawrence, then with a review of the meeting between the present Amir and Lord Mayo, and finally with a brief summary of the discussions he had with Lord Northbrook at Simla. He begged that he

might be heard throughout without remark or reply on the part of Sir Lewis Pelly, and that all he stated might be at the time taken down in writing. When he had finished his statement, which he said he hoped to do in two sittings, he would beg Sir Lewis Pelly to consider and weigh well all that he had said, and then to state on his own part the proposals he had to make on behalf of the British Government. He did not wish for an immediate rejoinder, the Envoy continued, from Sir Lewis Pelly, but would prefer that he considered and weighed all that had been stated by him (the Kabul Envoy) with care and foresight for three or four or more days before he (Sir Lewis Pelly) entered on the subject of the proposals of the British Government. The Kabul Envoy would then hear all that Sir Lewis Pelly had to say, and would in his turn give a final and definite reply, which would settle the business.

The Kabul Envoy here paused a short time and then said—"It is a very serious business, and this is the last time that the Amir will treat with the British Government. God grant that the issue be favourable (well). But you must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us, the responsibility rests with you." I interposed here and asked the Kabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to. He at once replied—"The residence of British officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan." He then went on with some warmth and excitement to enlarge upon the objections of the Afghan people to the presence of foreigners in their territories, and upon the difficulty the Amir would experience in protecting them from insult and injury in the event of his acceding to the condition of their residence in his country. He said further that he did not see why they were wanted on the frontiers at all, and even if there, what good they could do; for they would be utterly useless and helpless without the cordial support of the Amir.

I remarked that it was of course understood that the Amir, in accepting the condition of British officers being posted as Government Agents on his frontiers, if indeed he did accept the condition, did so with the conviction that it was for his own advantage, and was prepared to protect them and assist them as friends of himself and his Government.

The Kabul Envoy, in reply, shook his head negatively and said—"We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands." I replied that I felt sure that the disposition of the British Government towards that of the Amir was most friendly, and that its most sincere wish was to see the Amir's authority and country secured to himself and his heirs on a secure and a lasting foundation, and referred, in proof of its entire disinclination to interfere in the affairs of its neighbours, to the conditions of the border tribes between the territories of the British and Kabul Governments, all of whom enjoyed their former independence without the smallest encroachment on the part of the British Government, though it had been their immediate neighbour for nearly thirty years. On the contrary, I continued, the British Government not only entirely withheld from any attempt to enter their territories, but altogether abstained from interference in their internal affairs, and at the same time as a mark of its good will, whilst exacting no concession from them in return, allowed these border tribes the most free access to its territories and granted them the same protection of the laws as its own subjects enjoyed. "You may rest assured," I added, "that it is the sincere wish of the British Government to see the Amir and his dynasty firmly secured on the throne of Kabul as its trusty friends and allies, and it behoves the Amir to ponder well before he rejects its proffered friendship."

The Kabul Envoy replied that the Amir and his people thoroughly appreciated the friendship of the British Government. "We know," he said, "who rescued Herat from the Persians and gave it to the late Amir. We will not now speak of Seistán, but we know who assisted Turkey against Russia in the Crimea, and we know who is the friend of Turkey in this Servian revolt. We know on which side our interests lie. But this is a question I shall discuss in conference with Sir Lewis Pelly."

Referring again to the Servian revolt, the Kabul Envoy enquired whether it was true, as commonly stated, that the Russians had instigated the rebellion, and, producing a map, asked me to point out the positions on it of Herzegovina, Servia, Bulgaria, Crimea, Circassia, &c. Whilst looking over the map, the Kabul Envoy enquired how it was that the nations of Europe permitted Russia to send her soldiers to fight in the Servian ranks whilst the Russian Ambassador remained at Constantinople.

I told him my information did not enable me to answer his enquiry. The Kabul Envoy then alluded to the military preparations of Russia, and, pointing to Circassia on the map, said the *corps d'armee* there were in a position to threaten both Turkey and Persia.

I pointed out that the Circassian army was also in a position whence it could operate across the Caspian against the Turkomans and Merv, and, in doing so, ran my finger along the route by Meshed. But the Envoy at once corrected me, and in a similar manner traced the proper route for them to take by the Attrek Valley to Merv. He paused for some time scanning the map, and said they could be there long before an army could come up from India.

I replied this was one of the contingencies it behoved the Amir's Government to make timely preparation for. He became pensive, and for some time remained looking at the map, and then closed it without any remark.

The Kabul Envoy next observed that he was to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at 4 o'clock, and I consequently took leave of him.



Telegram, dated 8th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Envoy too unwell yesterday for business. Bellew paid friendly visit. It is now arranged that Envoy shall review the past uninterrupted by me, and that afterwards I shall reply. Envoy will then give definite reply to proposals. Envoy called on me last evening, and we afterwards drove out together. He declares jehad report to be grossly exaggerated. States he will explain Amir's silence concerning invitation. It has been given out that Envoy comes here to ask for explanations of our Koorum and Quetta movements. The Envoy is now preparing his review of the past. Its pith is to show that in 1873 the wishes were not preferred by the Amir but by us, and that it would be injurious to both Governments to have British Agents on the frontier.

For the reply to this telegram see paragraph 124 of Précis.

Telegram, dated 14th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

My remarks to-day will conclude with the words in the concluding portion of Your Lordship's telegram of 10th instant,\* to the effect that if the Amir finally reject Agency clause, we shall go on Treaty of 1855 and decline to support him and so on down to "provide against" probable contingencies. Does Your Lordship approve?

Telegram, dated 15th February 1877.

From—Viceroy, Calcutta,  
To—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur.

Your telegram of 14th. Whilst speaking in the sense you propose, be careful not to break off negotiations irrevocably before you have fully communicated with me by post and received my written reply. You will, in firm but very friendly terms, point out that if Amir rejects all we offer and all we ask, no basis of negotiation is left unless he himself has some practical and satisfactory alternative to propose. In that case our relative position will be such as you propose to define it in accordance with my telegram of 10th, and you will give Envoy no ground to propose that Amir will get from us either treaty, subsidy, or dynastic recognition, without an appreciable equivalent on his own part. If, however, Envoy in his definite answer rejects Agency clause unconditionally, or proposes any other condition, you will then say that this is a new point of departure, which you have no powers or instructions to discuss; that you are willing to refer it to the Viceroy, pending whose written reply negotiations must be suspended, but that you feel bound to tell the Envoy there is, in your opinion, no probability of the British Government agreeing to negotiate on any other basis than that to which your powers and instructions have been confined, and you fear the Amir has missed an opportunity, which can never recur, of greatly strengthening his own position.

Telegram, dated 19th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

The Envoy's reply has been a long statement tending to refuse warily, specifying that by the 7th clause of the Convention of 1857 Lord Lawrence pledged himself to have a Native not a European Agent at Kabul.

This of course is a mere quibble, as I have made no allusion to an English officer being sent to Kabul. After I had given my reply in the sense of Your Lordship's telegram of 15th instant, the Envoy begged that I would submit all he has said to Your Lordship and await Your Lordship's written reply when the Envoy would point out what might seem to him expedient or inexpedient in Your Lordship's decision, and give his final reply, or failing his being able to do so, would refer to the Amir for further instructions.

Telegram, dated 20th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Kabul Agent's reports show signs of jehad at Kabul breaking up. Mir Afzal Khan and Mustaufi giving Amir good advice. No mention of excitement in Kabul. Envoy was

evidently shaken yesterday, and laid so much stress on the assertion that the Afghan Government would never consent to depart from the Lawrence compact that British officer should not reside in Kabul as to leave room for inference that they might yield in respect to other places.

---

Telegram, dated 21st February 1877.

From—Viceroy, Calcutta,

To—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur.

Your telegrams of 19th and 20th and letters up to No. 20. I entirely approve your language to Envoy. You can inform him that you have reported to the Viceroy his long statement, that His Excellency is glad to have received through him such full and detailed information in regard to the Amir's views and feelings respecting both past and present, and that you are authorized to convey to the Envoy from the Viceroy His Excellency's thanks for the care and trouble taken by him in regard to the above-mentioned statement. You will add, with reference to the first portion of that statement, that whilst the Viceroy regrets that the Amir should have felt cause to regard his relations with the British Government during the past few years with dissatisfaction, the Viceroy deems it unnecessary to discuss past events, which are not under his control; that with regard to concluding portion of Envoy's statement, to which the Viceroy has given his most friendly and serious consideration, it does not appear to contribute to the improvement of the existing relations or the settlement of the present negotiations, any facts or considerations which have not been fully anticipated and considered by us; that the Viceroy is writing to you in acknowledgment of your reports on this subject, and more especially in reference to one point on which the Envoy appears to be laboring under some misapprehension as to our views and objects.

---

Telegram, dated 21st February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,

To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Note of proceedings of 19th instant went by last post. Atta Mahomed says he knows that when he left Kabul the Amir's instructions to Envoy were to oppose to his utmost the Agency clause, but that in event of our positively declaring that the rejection of that clause would involve loss of our friendship, he was to assent to British officer residing not at Herat but on the Oxus frontier, and that Russian officers should have the same option, as Amir could not prevent them. Further, that Envoy has been emboldened to his refusal of Agency by the assurance that we should none the less observe terms of the old Treaty, and that north-western frontier arrangements would not involve interference with Afghanistan, but Amir asserts he holds a paper from Lawrence fixing the Koorum River as the boundary between Afghanistan and British territory. I am of opinion, from reports that have reached me, that the Envoy will finally confirm his refusal if we do not thoroughly alarm him by explicit and self-asserting announcement of the position we hold, and of that which we have determined to assume under certain specified eventualities. Atta Mahomed suggests we should inform the Envoy—

1stly.—That the present attitude of the Amir in respect to our subjects, their trade and Governmental communications, constitute a chronic infraction of Article I of old Treaty.

2ndly.—That in strengthening our frontier, we shall arrange with the tribes between that frontier and Afghanistan from Biluchistan to Wakhan without reference to the Amir, and that we should consider any attempt on his part to subdue Bajour or Chitral, or interfere with Swat or the frontiers of other independent tribes, as an act unfriendly to ourselves.

3rdly.—That if through rejection of our present proposals the Amir should lose our support, and afterwards be interfered with from without in a manner endangering the peace and safety of our territories, we should take up whatever strategical positions that we may deem necessary to protect our frontier, wherever they may be.

## APPENDIX XXVI.

[Referred to in paragraph 131, Chapter VII.]

SIR LEWIS PELLY'S TELEGRAM AND LETTER DATED 16th MARCH 1877, AND ENCLOSURE.

Telegram, dated 16th March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,

To—Viceroy.

Your Lordship's instructions communicated yesterday to Envoy. To-day Envoy's Secretary called and said that Envoy was too ill to give an answer at present, but was prepared to answer my remarks at last Conference on 19th ultimo. Secretary was informed that if Envoy was well enough to be able to answer my remarks, he could not have any difficulty in giving a plain answer to Viceroy's instructions, and that any other answer could not now be received.

---

Dated Peshawur, 16th March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I.,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

I beg to enclose a note of what passed this morning at an interview which I gave the Secretary to the Envoy. This note, in fact, sketches what I proposed to submit in my letter of yesterday, *viz.*, the course of my relations with the Envoy since the date of the last Conference meeting on the 19th ultimo.

Your Lordship's instruction of the 4th instant is now being prepared in the precise words in which it was communicated yesterday to the Envoy, and will be submitted without delay.

I beg also to enclose a translation of a remarkable letter purporting to have been written by one of the Wababees of the Paloosee Colony to the son of the Head Mulla of Kotah in Yusufzai. This letter is considered authentic; but even supposing it to be a fabrication in Eusufzai, it is still very interesting I think as showing what is passing in the native mind, and the degree in which a native can appreciate political probabilities, which even many of our own officers have obfuscated their brains with.

This morning one of our pensioners called to say that the Mirakhor's sons were in communication with him, and could gain over their father. Christie feels sure we could secure the Envoy. My line is to let outsiders work these mines, and to be firm and inflexible myself. I have never doubted that if the Envoy could carry the courtiers and Amir with him, he would be ours. But under present circumstances, perhaps the plan best calculated to secure solid results will be to let the Envoy go back to Kabul and simmer with the Amir.

The *jehad* is the work of the Amir. It is intended to frighten us and to make his cause that of Islam. At the same time, when a lighted match is brought close to gunpowder, an explosion may ensue even against the will of the torch-bearer; and this is what we have to be prepared for.

There is a play within the play. I mean that of Nowroz *versus* the Amir. On the one hand, Nowroz, a faction at Kabul, and some of the Ghilzai Chiefs, wish to release Yakub Khan and reinstate him as Heir-apparent. On the other hand, the Amir is striving by every means to allure or force Nowroz to Kabul. I should not be surprised if the troops now at Lalpoora and Jelalabad were under orders to wait until the Envoy is safe through the Pass, and then to close on Nowroz and his Mohmunds. Khureem Buksh one of our mutineers of 1857, is commanding the force at Lalpoora. The action of the Amir in Bajour, Swat, and Dhir should enable him, with his own troops aligned on the Jelalabad-Lalpoora road, to encompass Nowroz. But this would not prevent Nowroz from escaping in person; and so long as he is free, he will, as the friend and relative of Yakub Khan, be a thorn in the Amir's side.

---

### MEMORANDUM.

On 16th March, about 12 o'clock, Munshi Mahomed Bakir, Secretary to the Kabul Envoy, waited upon Sir Lewis Pelly at the request of the Kabul Envoy. The Munshi stated that he now wished to answer the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly at the last meeting of the conference.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that the arrangements entered into between himself and the Kabul Envoy at the conference had been, that the Kabul Envoy should make his statement uninterrupted, that afterwards Sir Lewis Pelly should reply, and that the Kabul Envoy should then give a definite answer on the Agency clause.

The Kabul Envoy had occupied the whole time of three conferences in making his statement, absolutely uninterrupted by Sir Lewis Pelly. Sir Lewis Pelly had then replied briefly, and had requested the promised definite answer. The Kabul Envoy had then again requested

a delay of a week in order to make some additional remarks and give his definite answer. Sir Lewis Pelly had acceded to this request, and the Kabul Envoy had then given an answer which, though inexplicitly worded, appeared to Sir Lewis Pelly to amount to a rejection of the principle of the Agency clause.

Sir Lewis Pelly had informed the Kabul Envoy accordingly, and had explained to him that such being the case, he had no power or authority to open the proposed negotiations.

The Kabul Envoy had then requested that his statement might be submitted to the Viceroy, and the reply of the Viceroy be awaited when he (Kabul Envoy) would certainly give his definite answer.

Sir Lewis Pelly had acceded to this request, and, before the meeting closed for that day, reminded the Kabul Envoy that the Kabul Secretary had not written down the last remarks which he (Sir Lewis Pelly) had made.

The Kabul Envoy had therefore explained that he was too tired and ill to sit in conference any longer that evening, but that he would meet for the purpose of writing it down the next morning.

On the following morning the Kabul Envoy sent to say he was too ill to attend conference, and from that date (the 20th February) until to-day (16th March) the Kabul Envoy has continued to send messages to Sir Lewis Pelly to the effect that he (the Kabul Envoy) was too ill for work.

On several occasions Sir Lewis Pelly caused it to be intimated to the Kabul Envoy that his Secretary had not written down Sir Lewis Pelly's final remarks. Sir Lewis Pelly had explained that the writing them down or not was a matter wholly for the consideration of the Kabul Envoy, but that if the Kabul Envoy did wish to have them written, Sir Lewis Pelly would be happy either to send the Secretary to the Kabul Envoy's house, or receive the Kabul Envoy's Secretary at his house for the said purpose. After a lapse of many days, *i.e.*, about a fortnight ago, the Kabul Envoy sent his Secretary, and the remarks were taken down; and from that date to this Sir Lewis Pelly has heard no more of the matter.

Yesterday Sir Lewis Pelly had the honor of sending, by his Secretary, to the Kabul Envoy the written reply of His Excellency the Viceroy, drawn out in the Persian language; and now, within a few hours of receiving that reply, instead of affording the promised plain and definite answer, the Kabul Envoy has sent his Secretary to submit that he has prepared a rejoinder to the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly on the 19th February.

Sir Lewis Pelly therefore requested his Secretary to inform the Kabul Envoy that the arrangements agreed upon between them for the conduct of discussion at the conference having been amply fulfilled, he could not postpone the Viceroy's more recent reply and revert to a portion of the discussion which had been concluded.

But that if in giving his promised definite answer to the Viceroy's communication, the Kabul Envoy should make any relevant remarks, Sir Lewis Pelly would be happy to receive them with his wonted courtesy.

The Secretary then explained that the Kabul Envoy was too ill to consider the Viceroy's reply; but Sir Lewis Pelly contended that the Viceroy's communication required only a simple yes or no, and that if the Kabul Envoy were sufficiently in health to dictate criticism on Sir Lewis Pelly's former remarks, which the Secretary admitted he had in his pocket, the Envoy was also well enough to dictate a plain yes or no to the Viceroy's question on the admission or otherwise of the principle of the Agency clause.

The Kabul Secretary persisted in endeavouring to induce Sir Lewis Pelly to accede to the Kabul Envoy's wish, and Sir Lewis Pelly firmly replied that he must categorically decline.

The Kabul Secretary then said that it would be a long time before the Kabul Envoy would be well enough to consider the Viceroy's reply, evidently intending hereby to gain time for a further reference to Kabul; but Sir Lewis Pelly again firmly urged that the Viceroy had distinctly stated in his instructions that the principle of the Agency clause having already been considered and admitted by the Amir in Kabul, and subsequently fully discussed in conference, a further reference to Kabul would not be needed, and would not be awaited for the disposal of this point.

If therefore the Kabul Envoy adhered to his refusal of the *sine quâ non* preliminary, all that was necessary was for him to say so, and that he could supplement his refusal after his return to Kabul.

Sir Lewis Pelly asked when he might expect a reply to the Viceroy's instructions. The Secretary replied that he had no instructions to answer any question.

Sir Lewis Pelly then said he could only express his regret that the Secretary had troubled himself to come over.

Sir Lewis Pelly having then sent a polite message and expressed hopes for the speedy recovery of the Kabul Envoy, the Secretary withdrew.

## APPENDIX XXVII.

### PAPERS RELATING TO THE JEHAD PREPARATIONS.

Telegram, 14th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Kabul Agent reports Amir much disturbed by reports of Persian intrigues at Herat and Kandahar. Public feeling in Herat itself unsatisfactory to him. Amir using espionage at Kabul to ascertain what his subjects are saying and doing. Amir collecting camels for alleged transport of his family, and endeavouring to induce the inhabitants of outlying districts to respond to his jehad call. Bajour Chiefs had arrived at Jellalabad, and the Amir was preparing a flattering reception for them.

Later news to 6th instant from Kabul. The Kabul authorities alleged to have secretly written, through the Russian Agent at Kabul, to the Russian authorities at Tashkend, proposing an alliance with the Russian Government on account of desire of British Government to interfere in Kabul; otherwise the country will pass into the possession of the English, or their interference in the country will shortly increase.

---

Telegram, 25th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Police Officer has seen the attendant, whose statement is to effect—

1st.—That Amir's reason for strengthening his eastern frontier is that we are close, while Russia is distant.

2ndly.—That Khelat wrote to Amir for advice. Amir replied—"Hold out as long as you can. I am unable to assist you at present, but will watch an opportunity to do so." Khan then accepted our terms on obtaining increased subsidy.

3rdly.—That Amir had tampered with all the border tribes from Beluchistan to Swat, saying you form my buffer against the English; you will first be annexed, and then I shall be attacked. Fight to defend yourselves, and I will back you.

4thly.—That his object in strengthening the positions at Kandahar, Koorum, and Jellalabad, was to show a front in event of our enforcing our demand in proposed negotiations.

5thly.—That Akhoond of Swat gave Mirakhor his blessing, and issued jehad proclamation to certain Chiefs for distribution in case of need, and that he made over fifteen blank papers bearing his seal to one of his Moollahs, who is now at Dakka.

Police Officer thinks that the attendant has much more to say. As regards Atta Mahomed Khan, the Chief Kazi here informed the Police Officer that from what he learnt through communications with Kabul, Atta Mahomed, whilst really loyal to us, has lost influence at Kabul, where the Amir treats his representations with coarse banter or rebuff. Police Officer states that impression widely disseminated is, that we demand Envoy at Kabul and command of the Passes.

Police Officer understands that Mirakhor, when passing through Abazai, was visited by some of our Cavalry Guard there, and that Mirakhor said that our strength in all India was known from statistics to be only 60,000 English troops, and that he could produce that number of fighting men from Bajour itself.

As regards sending a messenger to the Akhoond of Swat, it is, in my opinion, to be regretted that this has not been done long ago; but at the present moment the friendly advance might be misinterpreted.

---

Telegram, 26th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Intelligence through independent channel, from personal attendant, is to effect that Amir in person proceeded about a month ago to Musjid Sufed in Kabul City, and caused proclamation to be read that if Sadr-i-Azim's mission failed to get him money, there would be *ghaza*, i.e., jehad. He then distributed 15,000 muskets to the people of Kohistan, Koh, Damaun, and Kabul suburb, saying he did not wish to enlist them as soldiers, but gave them this means of defending their families in case of himself and his army being destroyed; that present con-



ference was a game of chess, and it remained to be seen whether English would deceive them or they deceive us; that Amir would try to get money out of us, but would never consent to Englishmen residing in Afghanistan, as he fears their presence would draw his people away from him towards themselves; that he would never attack Peshawur, but would incite the Swats, Mohmunds, and Khybeerees, to raid on our frontier, while he himself made arrangements in another direction, meaning, as informant supposed, to attack Khelat from Kandahar; that Sadr-i-Azim was to obtain from us a document certifying that Amir had never broken the Treaties, to be shown afterwards to other Governments in proof of our having broken our promise to aid him with subsidy, on the faith of which he has had raised an army larger than his country can support; that Mirakhor having come down as the acknowledged opponent of the Sadr-i-Azim, professes now to be one with him in view, and the Amir has written instructing them to leave Peshawur on the 7th March. Attendant had not seen Russian Envoy. Informant promised to send more intelligence this evening.

---

Telegram, 27th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Letter from Buktia Khan, dated 19th instant. Envoy has reported to Amir from Peshawur that he has up to the present pressed his demands, but that he has not obtained his object in any manner; that military preparations have been made on an extensive scale in India, probably with a view to some great undertaking on the frontier. Buktia Khan reports that Amir, on learning this, became very perplexed and thoughtful, and anxiously awaits fresh intelligence from Envoy; that the Russian Agent at Kabul sends weekly reports *via* Tashkurgan and Bokhara to Samarkand; that it is not known whether the letter, mentioned in Buktia Khan's report to Commissioner of 11th February, has been forwarded or not. Letter from Buktia Khan, dated 22nd instant, gives it as his clear opinion that most of the people of Afghanistan desire English rule, owing to the multifarious oppressions of their own rulers, and that very few are satisfied with the Afghan Government. He states that jehad demonstrations are merely a ruse, and have no real foundation; that servant of Sirdar Mahomed Afzal Khan secretly informed the Amir that he had tested the proclivities of the people, at request of his master, from Furrak to Kabul; and that he found few were disposed to the Afghan Government, while the tribes of Kandahar especially were extremely eager for the English rule.

---

Dated Peshawur, 24th February 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I.,  
To—Viceroy.

I beg to enclose a Note\* of an interview I had yesterday morning with the son of one of the Bajour Khans. This youth is a discontented man, but his words are interesting as showing what may be the real feelings of the Bajourees towards the Amir, and as corroborative evidence of the Amir's jehad proceedings.

Your Lordship will have received my telegrams concerning the Envoy's ill state of health, and the consequent delay in communicating to him Your Lordship's views on the jehad question, and the substance of your telegram of the 21st instant.

Atta Mahomed reports that when he went (by my desire) to the Envoy last evening to inform him of the contents of Buktia Khan's letter of complaint, the Envoy became affected to tears, declared that matters were not thus when he left Kabul; that present proceedings there were the work of the opposition; that they were all mad at Kabul, and that for himself he wished to die. This may be in large measure fudge; but coming from an Afghan Envoy, and being reported by a British Agent, who would sacrifice any British interest rather than fall out with the Afghan Court, it indicates that even those who most acutely conceal all that we wish to know are unable to deny the hostile and insane attitude and measures of the Kabul Durbar.

---

P.S.—Syud Ahmed has just now brought me the enclosed Memorandum,† which is interesting and I believe reliable. The Syud's cousin, one Abdool Ghunnee, who resides here, is a brother of the Abdool Khadir in Kabul, who has charge of the Amir's Press, and translates our newspapers to His Highness.

---

### Enclosure No. 1.

Memorandum, dated 23rd February 1877.

Safdar Khan, son of Hyder Khan of Nawagai, in Bajour, came to see Sir Lewis Pelly to-day. The following is the substance of what was stated by him at the interview:—

Syud Mahomed Badshah of Kunar, at the instance of the Amir of Kabul, had persuaded a son of Hyder Khan to go to Kabul as a paid retainer of the Amir, on the promise of the

restoration of the fief of Donai to the Khan of Nawagai. The fort, village, and lands of Donai had been first granted in fief by the late Amir to Safdar Khan's grandfather, the late Amir Khan of Nawagai; but in accepting this fief, Amir Khan acted against the wish of his own tribe (the Brahm Khel), and of all the Tartaraluni clans (of which the Brahm Khel is only one), who feared that the grant of this fief to their chief would give the Kabul Ruler a pretext for interfering in their affairs, and would ultimately lead to the subjugation of their territory by the Kabul Amir. Consequently, on his death, the fief of Donai was relinquished by the son and successor of Amir Khan, *viz.*, by the present Hyder Khan of Nawagai, and was resumed by the Kabul Amir.

Syud Mahomed Badshah has now persuaded the son of the present Khan to go to Kabul on the promise of getting this fief of Donai restored to him. His name is Habibullah Khan, and he is a half-brother of the Safdar Khan above mentioned. But the Syud, knowing the aversion of the people of Bajour to any connection with the Kabul Government, has made the recent demonstrations at Kabul for a jihad the pretext for the Amir's summoning the Chiefs of Bajour, in common with all other Mussulmans on his frontier, to the support of Islam.

The people of Bajour however see that the jihad is only a pretext, and, whilst ostensibly consenting to join in it as Mussulmans, are fearful that if they do so they will lose their independence and territory to the Amir of Kabul. They are consequently angry with the Khan for allowing his son to go to Kabul, and say that they have never been the subjects of the Kabul Amir and don't wish to be so: they have always been independent and wish to remain so. They say that the object of the Amir in keeping the Khan's son to reside at the Court of Kabul is merely to gain a footing amongst them by means of friendly relations preparatory to demanding free access to their country for his troops. This they will not consent to, nor will they join him in a jihad, unless they are threatened at home.

Sir Lewis Pelly advised that Safdar Khan and the people of Bajour had much the best stay at home in their own independent territory, and mind their own business, and not trouble their minds about a jihad, which was a game two could play at.

---

## Enclosure No. 2.

### Memorandum.

Kazi Syud Ahmed learned from Kazi Abdool Ghani, brother of Kazi Abdool Kadir at Kabul, that the latter has written that the Amir has stopped the publication of the *Shams-ul-Nahar*, and has ordered him (Kazi Abdool Kadir), who is the Manager of the Press, to publish all the verses and traditions relating to jihad and send them round.

The Amir has also ordered the Moollas to preach the verse of the Koran—"Obey your God and obey your Prophet and your rulers who are from amongst you."

The Amir was the other day mentioning in the Durbar that he did not want more than 10,000 troops; but it was at the instance of the British Government that I have augmented my army to 80,000, in order that they may be a barrier to the Russians. Now the English, instead of aiding me in money, impose burdens upon me which I am unable to bear.

---

Telegram, 1st March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,

To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Intelligence from independent sources received by Police Officer as follows:—The jihad preparations all along the frontier are more extensive than we have any idea of, but are still merely a demonstration. The intention of the Amir is supposed to be this, that in case his Envoy's negotiation fail, he would incite the border tribes to hostilities against us, and that from Beluchistan to Swat they would, on appointed day, make a succession of simultaneous raids upon our border. In this event the Akhoond of Swat would take the field against us: but as he is opposed to Amir's policy, it is probable the Amir would be assassinated, and an Amir, friend to the Akhoond of Swat, succeed. Intelligence from Personal Attendant through Police Officer: first, that Envoy last evening received a Kabul dawk with strict injunctions from the Amir that he was on no account to break with the British Government, and that, if necessary, he, the Amir himself, would come down to conclude terms; secondly, that Envoy's illness was to a great extent put on in order to delay matters, as he was in hopes of being bribed by us to accede to the wish of Government; but that it was his final intention to accept them; thirdly, that Mirakhor had a quarrel with his son yesterday, and openly declared that, if they could not hold their own, he considered it best to join cordially with the British Government in friendly relations. Intelligence from Atta Mahomed Khan's spiritual guide is to effect—first, Atta Mahomed Khan, though loyal himself, is strongly opposed to present policy of Government in regard to our Afghan relations; second, that Buktiar is decidedly opposed to our Government, and is a mere creature of the Amir, who has allowed him to acquire land and property in Kabul, where he has married a wife. He only informs us what Amir directs, and

is not a reliable man. Being greedy and open to bribe, my own impression is that much of the above may have been designedly put forward in consequence of our firm attitude and arrangements elsewhere. I am most desirous that Atta Mahomed Khan should at once leave Peshawur; and if Your Lordship accede to, I would send him to his home in Derajat, on pretext of deputing him to quietly ascertain the feelings of the tribes in that direction.

---

Translation of a letter from MAHOMED BUKTIAR KHAN to NAWAB ATTA MAHOMED KHAN, dated 18th February 1877.

I beg to inform you that the people who used to pay visits to the officials of the Agency, noticing the attitude of the Court of Kabul, have given up their intercourse and abstained from conversation. Now Zain-ul-Abidin Khan, Kotwal, has openly prohibited Haji Khudo and other acquaintances altogether from coming to my place. The attitude of the Court is also not good. My servants now cannot go anywhere. I may say residence here is getting hard every hour, and it is difficult to carry on business. It is necessary that you should bring this state of affairs to the notice of the Commissioner Sahib, and pray for me that the Most High God may, in these dangerous times, save my honor, life, and property.

---

Telegram, 7th March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Intelligence from Mirakhor's personal attendant through Police Officer:—Mirakhor was unwilling to come to Peshawur, so Amir took Mirakhor's hand, and placing it in Atta Mahomed Khan's, said—"Trust this man as you would me. He will see to our interests." When Atta Mahomed Khan left Peshawur on Sunday, Mirakhor was much distressed, saying why is this man sent away. I was entrusted to him. There must be something wrong, and the English are angry. Atta Mahomed Khan had a long private interview with Kabul Envoy before leaving; but attendant does not know what passed except that Atta Mahomed Khan told Kabul Envoy to hold on, and not to fear. A firm at Kabul, writing to their agents here, say in figurative language the Amir (Kukree) is bold by reason of the Russian (wuddera) influence. Merchants from Bokhara state, they saw many laden mules and ponies escorted by one hundred Russian people at Karshee on road to Balkh, where they were to make over the loads for the Amir. A Khan of an important district here writes to a friend of mine that he wished to inform me what is going on in regard to the Amir's dealings, but can do so only on condition that no other of the rulers of Peshawur be aware of his doing so. Attendant states that Mirakhor had received instructions from Amir to make good friends with the Peshawur people, and feel the pulse of the district.

---

Dated Peshawur, 6th March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I.,  
To—Viceroy,

I beg to enclose a note I have received from Mr. Christie, transmitting précis of a letter, which is curious and interesting.

I enclose also translations or précis of the latest letters and diaries received from Buktia Khan; also a note of a conversation passed between Dr. Bellew and Mr. Christie concerning Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan. Mr. Christie expressed himself to the same effect in a conversation with me.

Atta Mahomed Khan went on leave (outwardly) to his home at Dera Ismail Khan, leaving Peshawur last Sunday evening.

Dr. Courtenay doubts the Envoy being fit for conference work within any reasonable time, so I propose to close the Conference by letter. I am causing the Envoy to be verbally informed that Buktia Khan is being instructed to proceed to Peshawur for the purpose of meeting me.

---

Memorandum of conversation with MR. CHRISTIE, dated 4th March 1877.

Mr. Christie stated that Atta Mahomed Khan had been all along most thoroughly opposed to the policy of Government in the recent conferences with the Kabul Envoy, but that he was a man who could do us great service if he were won over to the cause, inasmuch as he knew thoroughly everything that was going on about and beyond this frontier. Mr. Christie added that he received regular reports from all the news agents here, and exercised complete control over them; that the news agents of the Lieutenant-Governor and Major Bradford, and even his own informers, reported their news to him also; that he was

fully aware of the Kabul Envoy's and the Amir's views, but had taken no part in attempting to further the policy of our Government, nor had he actively opposed it in an open manner; that he was aware of the circulars from the Akhoond which had been sent into our districts and into the Peshawur City, but, on finding that Mr. Christie was trying to get possession of them, caused them to be at once secreted or suppressed. Mr. Christie also stated that he had heard on good authority (from the father-in-law) that Mian Gul, the son of the Akhoond, was about to set out for Kabul with Mufti Syud Mahomed on the promise of getting the Amir's daughter to wife; that the Akhoond had finally consented to this step in the expectation of civil war in Afghanistan, and the possible succession of his son to the throne of Kabul.

---

Information obtained from a private letter, dated the 26th February 1877, written by FAZL LATIF JAN, whose son is married to the Akhoond Sahib's daughter.

The Akhoond Sahib has, without doubt, circulated proclamations in all directions advocating a holy war. A copy of the proclamation is promised by the writer to his friend.

2. Amir Shere Ali Khan, subsequent to the visit of Amed Khan, Mir Akhor, to the Akhoond, sent Mufti Shah Mahomed to Saidugan. This man has been here some time, ostensibly to visit the Akhoond, but really to try and take away with him Mian Gul Khan, the Akhoond's eldest son, to Kabul.

3. Mian Gul Khan responded to the invitation, and, accompanied by horse and foot, crossed over to the right bank of the Swat river, and went to the house of Syud Mahomed Akhoondzada, his father-in-law, and brother to Tahir Jan, hakim in Peshawur. Syud Mahomed Akhoondzada lives in the village of Baudboti, Tappa Ranizai, 12 koss west of Saidugan.

4. Immediately the Khans of Swat heard of Mian Gul Khan's intentions, they held a jirga at Thanna, and sent a deputation after him to return to Allahdund, which he reached 6 P.M. on the 25th February 1877. Mian Gul Khan informed the jirga that he had been invited by Amir Shere Ali Khan under promise of being specially honored in Kabul (that is, giving him his daughter in marriage), and made and acknowledged Badsha of Swat. The jirga replied that the people of Swat were not capable of submitting to the oppressive rule of the Durranes, and threatened that if Mian Gul Khan attempted to carry out his intentions, the people of Swat would in a body, no sooner he reached Bajour, go into Peshawur, and apply for annexation by the English. Mian Gul Khan then appealed to the jirga, calling on them either not to dissuade him from going to Kabul, or else to appoint him Badsha of Swat. The matter was not settled, but remained an open question.

5. The writer, writing from Allahdund, ends his letter by expressing his own opinion that the probability was the Khans of Swat would not consent to Mian Gul Khan's being made Badsha of Swat. In the event of his going to Kabul, the writer hopes for certain to accompany him. Under any circumstances, he promises to furnish his friend with full and reliable information.

---

NOTE.—The above information is most reliable, and fully corroborates information from other sources. In the event of a general holy war demonstration along our border, as is contemplated by Amir Shere Ali Khan, through the help, and at the instigation, of the Akhoond Sahib, should the Amir play false in the cause of Islam to the advantage of his personal interests, he would to a certainty be murdered, and Mian Gul Khan, with all the influence of his father and their factions in his favour, would be one of the many aspirants to the Kabul throne. But Swat is in favour, and Kuz Swat against making Mian Gul Khan a Badsha. The Akhoond Sahib, although he preaches against his son's ambitious aspirations, would desire nothing better than to see his eldest son made Badsha before he (the Akhoond) died.

---

Translation of letter from MUNSHI BUKTIAR KHAN, dated Kabul, 27th February 1877.

After compliments, says—

A letter from the Sadr-i-Azim at Peshawur to the Amir has just arrived, which states that "the conversation which I have had with the English Envoy shows that the real object of the English Government is to make Afghanistan a protected State, and, in order to effect this, they are prepared to pay a large sum." The Foreign Minister said to the Amir that in accepting this state of dependence, apart from the injury to the Mahomedan religion which would result from a greedy desire for material advantages, there are three manifest injuries to the Afghan State—*first*, the loss of our independent authority; *second*, the diminution of our reputation and influence in governing; *third*, that "those who are now prepared to stand by us losing hope, will not again join us in necessity, and people will cease to trust us, and, far and near, people will look on us with contempt."

The Amir remained silent, and nothing certain is known as to what answer he sent to the Sadr-i-Azim's letter, because the Amir probably wrote the answer with his own hand and despatched it sealed.

Translation of letter from MUNSHI BUKTIAR KHAN, dated Kabul, 28th February 1877.

To-day I went to the Amir to give him some English newspapers. In the course of conversation the Amir privately told me that a man of the Jamshedi tribe, named Hoshyar Khan, who a long time ago being dissatisfied had gone to the countries beyond the Oxus, and who had now returned, reported that 120,000 Russian troops were on the Sea of Aral with the object of proceeding to Central Asia; that when the news of the arrival of these troops came, two Russian regiments at Samarkand were set apart to strengthen Charjui; that probably a detachment of that large army will have crossed the Sea of Aral, and the two regiments from i-Azim to give the detailed statement that he did to the English Envoy. Now it will be seen what answer the English officials will give to my requests after the expiry of the fixed period.

Translation of letter from MUNSHI BUKTIAR KHAN, dated Kabul, 1st March 1877.

I have heard from the mouth of a trustworthy man that the night before last, at 1 o'clock in the morning, the Foreign Minister (Arsulla Khan, Ghilzai) had a secret interview with Mulla Saifulla, a Russian subject. Next morning the Foreign Minister said to the Amir that "although Mulla Saifulla admits that a large Russian force has been appointed for arranging (literally='purifying') Central Asia, still it appears from the manner of his speech that the Russians for some years do not intend to advance into Central Asia; and it is not at all certain that the Russian Government will begin any communications (better perhaps='fencing') with the English Government in reference to Afghan affairs. No doubt the Russians' wish for some more interference on their part in Afghanistan is only by way of indirect means; hence, for the present, we cannot expect to obtain the object of our heart from Russia. And the object of our heart is that as Persia has for long been at peace on account of the friendship of four Governments, so we also may escape the unwelcome interference of Governments of another religion."

The Amir, upon hearing this, entirely despaired of any open aid from Russia, and remained thoughtful for a long time, and commenced talking irrelevantly.

A letter from the son of Mulla Ghulam, Kandahari, reached the Amir to this effect, that "either your subordinates do not report the state of Kandahar to you, or else you intentionally withdraw your attention from the Kandahar districts. Half of the people of Kandahar have turned towards the English, and it appears that others are following. The fame and reputation of the English on the frontier is daily turning the other half of Kandahar towards them. At last, by reason of the reduced state of the tribes, the condition of Islam in Kandahar has become so weak that you will be unable to remedy it."

The Amir, after reading this letter, remained silent. Then this much was decided that Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan and Sirdar Abdoolla Khan should, after Nowroz, on hearing how the Sadr-i-Azim's affairs were progressing, proceed to set things right at Kandahar.

Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan recently wrote a letter to the Amir, saying that "we have often requested you either to strengthen your own house by accepting the requirements of the English and arranging terms of peace according to their wishes, or else yourself to prepare for war. Now Nowroz is upon us. Don't be deceived by the promises of these common people to support you in a jihad. We are well acquainted with the opinions of the populace; these men are deceiving you. We are the sincere well-wishers of your Government. Do you yourself make some real arrangement."

After the Amir had read this note, addressing the Finance Minister and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Kandahari, said—"This man is an old man; he is well acquainted with the old disturbances, but he is not acquainted with the intricacies of the Governments of the present day. Do you privately write to him that I have exerted myself for the defence of Islam according as the necessities of the time seemed to demand, and that if he knows of any better plan, let him from time to time explain it."

The individuals who had been, to the number of about 4,000, discharged from the army through means of the former Sipah Salar and Naib Sipah Salar either from favour or bribes, or after payment of a fine, are again being enlisted by the orders of General Daood Shah, who has sent out 500 men into the outlying districts of Kabul to bring them together, and every one who is found is appointed to a new regiment; and if any one cannot be found, or is dead, a fine is levied from his relations. For this reason dissatisfaction is increasing among the tribes.

On the 26th February, a letter from the Sadr-i-Azim reached the Amir; on reading which he became much distressed, and remained a long time silent; he gave the letter to no one; only next day he held a council in the Tawa Khana (a room in the bath) with the Finance and Foreign Ministers, and wrote an answer to the letter; but nothing has transpired as to what passed. The Finance Minister, in his own house, merely let this much out—"that only eight days now remain of the period after which the English officers have promised to give answers to our requests, and it is getting hot—God knows what the result may be."



Dated Peshawur, 7th March 1877.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Christie added that the Mirakhor had, ever since his arrival here, been in communication with numbers of people both in and beyond our frontier, and with the former through indirect channels; that he had received instructions from the Amir to make good friends with the principal people in Peshawur, and to ascertain the feelings and dispositions of the people of the valley.

Mr. Christie further stated that merchants at Kabul wrote to their agents at Peshawur in figurative language, to the effect that the Amir (who was represented by the term *Kukri*, which is said to be the name of a Hindu caste in Punjabi) was very active, and "his market brisk" by the influence of the Russians (who were represented by the term *Waddera*, which is said to be also the name of a Hindu caste in Punjabi). Also that merchants arrived from Bokhara reported having at Karshi seen a number of laden mules and ponies on the road to Balkh under the escort of 100 Russian people, who were to make over the loads at Balkh to the Afghan authorities for transmission to Kabul.

---

Telegram, 9th March 1877.

From—SIR LEWIS PELLY, Peshawur,  
To—Viceroy, Calcutta.

Intelligence from Buktiar Khan, dated 4th instant. Well-informed persons say that the Afghan Government should maintain independence as of old; then just as the Russian Power approaches Kabul, so will the Afghan Government get estranged from the British; that, beyond doubt, the friendship of the Afghan Government with the British Government will prove to be only time-serving and insincere; in fact, that when the time comes, the Afghan Government will side with Russia and not with England. Amir, on learning from his Envoy here of the complaints made regarding his treatment of the Agency servants, summoned Buktiar Khan to a special audience, and ordered him there and then to write a denial for submission to the Peshawur Commissioner. With respect to *jehad*, Amir wrote to Envoy here, to effect that all the people of Kabul, high and low, on hearing of warlike preparations in India, had assembled at the Jumma Musjid, and selected a Committee of Counsellors, and sent for the Finance Minister and Foreign Minister, and told them of their readiness to give life and property in defence of their country if the English interfered with it in opposition to former engagements. On this, Amir sent for the Counsellors, and said that he had sent his Sadr-i-Azim to the British Government about this matter, and they would be informed hereafter if the English made any change in their policy. Sufdar Ali Khan reports from Kandahar to the Amir that large reinforcements are on the march to Quetta from Sind, and that the people of Kandahar are now favourable to the English, and that his authority is growing weak at the instigation of the local Governors. The people of Ghuznee and of the Mohmund districts have sent Amir assurances of support in the case of a *jehad*. In Lohgar a general conscription is set on foot by the Governor, and a fine of forty rupees levied on all ineffectives: the people consequently are extremely discontented. Envoy reports to Amir that all news of his Court reaches English Government, and that steps should be taken to stop this; that, in his opinion, English Government had not abandoned hope of attaining its objects; that some good fencing had occurred in conference, but he was preparing to continue it, and considered that the delay that had taken place would prove advantageous to the Kabul Government. On this Amir observed that if he could only get a respite of three months from the English Government counting from Nowroz, he would make such complete arrangements for himself as would prevent his ever being again deceived. When the Envoy addresses me on the subject of Buktiar Khan's denial, I propose to reply that, on the arrival of the Officiating British Agent at Peshawur, Government will enquire into the circumstances which led to the complaint and to its denial.

---

[Proclamation referred to in paragraph 136.]

Received in news-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated 15th April 1877.

After the praise of God and Prophet, the pen will indite these stanzas on religious war. To fight for religion, without greed of territory, this by the law of Islam is *jehad*. Learn you by heart some of the benefits of the *jehad* as set forth in the Koran and in the traditions of the Prophets.

O Muhammadans, it is your duty to wage religious war with infidels; and if you are faithful, make preparations soon. He whose feet are stained with the dust of the field of the *jehad*, he is saved from hell and is freed from fire.

The Mussalman who fights awhile for the sake of truth will enter into the gardens of heaven.

O brother, hear what the Prophet's tradition says:—The garden of heaven is under the shadow of the sword. Him who gives a mite towards this end, God will reward seven hundred fold on the Day of Judgment.

Whoso having given money wields the sword, his reward shall God make seven thousand fold. Whoso equips a *Gazi* at his own charges, God shall give him the like reward as though he joined the *jehad*. He who joins not the *jehad*, nor gives towards it, him shall God punish with calamity ere he die. He who sides with truth will not die even if cut into pieces: nay the *Gazis* live in heaven, and enjoy his bliss.

Martyrs are cleansed from the sins of their lives; and it is for this that they give their heads in battle. Martyrs fear not the sufferings of the grave, nor the resurrection from the dead when men shall answer for their sins, nor dread they the Judgment Day.

In them whose oncoming to the battle field is as though it were a wall, in them doth God delight. O children of Islam, ye have heard the fruits of the *jehad*. Come ye to field, and leave ye hearth and home. Let your houses, your possessions, your little ones be forsaken; rejoice and speed in the path that God has chosen. Hearth and home will await the survivors. Heaven shall reward the slain. Waning is the creed of the prophet, and waxing is unbelief. If the leaders of Islam had not thus waged *jehad*, India had not been the home of Muhammadans. The Muhammadan faith ever conquered by the strength of sword; but had its leaders yielded to sloth, the faith would have had taken no root. How long will ye idle in your homes; sloth bears no fruit but regret. Shame upon you if ye be not men; go out, meet your *Imams*, be martyrs, slay the infidel. After 1,200 years this, the day, has come; and shame smitten; but now thanks be unto God who is great, who hath given all things unto them. Yea, thou God, hast given us all things needful to prepare us for the battle, and hast made us nobles amongst men. Friends, 'tis no light thing we tell; the time has come, press on, and bare the sword.

---

[Letter referred to in paragraph 137.]

No. 20 C., dated Simla, 29th April 1876 (Confidential).

From—L. H. GRIFFIN, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,

To—T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Offg. Secy. to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 887P., of the 10th instant, on the subject of the supposed intention of the Amir of Afghanistan to possess himself of Bajour.

2. His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that, should such an intention become apparent, the Amir should be addressed in the same sense as in 1861, to the effect that the British Government is averse to any interference on the part of His Highness with the affairs of Bajour and Swat. His Excellency the Governor-General desires to be informed why, under present circumstances, occupation of Bajour by the Amir of Afghanistan is considered prejudicial to British interests.

3. In reply to this question, I am directed to observe that, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, it is,—assuming that the policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan is unchanged,—as inexpedient to-day as it was considered by the Government of the Punjab and the Government of India in 1858 and 1861, to permit the Amir of Kabul to possess himself of the districts named. Local circumstances render it as undesirable as ever to allow a powerful and independent State to take possession of districts on our immediate border, and communicating with the Peshawur Valley, already surrounded by hostile tribes by passes of no great difficulty. To oppose and prevent such occupation is, His Honor conceives, an ordinary measure of precaution, which it would be unwise to omit unless in some new and unforeseen conjuncture. It is very true that in 1857 and 1858 when the designs of the Amir of Kabul upon Bajour were checked, it was anticipated that the district would be held for the Amir by his brother Sultan Mahomed Khan, who is described by the Chief Commissioner as the sworn enemy of the English, and delighting in villainy and treachery of all kinds. But the accidental disposition of one member of the Kabul family, who might happen to have charge of the districts for the Amir, does not affect the practical question very materially.

4. The British Government is, at the present time, on friendly terms with Kabul, but that Court may at any time become unfriendly or hostile; and in such case, its position on the Peshawur frontier would cause the utmost inconvenience.

5. The opinion of Sir Herbert Edwardes, and it is one to which the Lieutenant-Governor attaches great weight, is fully conveyed in his letter of 5th January 1858 to this Government, which was forwarded to your predecessor with letter, No. 25, dated 15th January of that year:—

“In the only parallel case,” wrote Sir Herbert Edwardes, “of the Dour Valley, it mattered little whether that narrow strip were or were not kept intervening between our border valley of Bunnu and the Barakzai border valleys of Kurrum and Khost. The relative bearings of the two frontiers would practically remain the same; one easily accessible from the other in time of war. But to let Sultan Mahomed Khan become master of the countries between Lalpura and the Indus, would be to have our right flank turned by an enemy who hitherto had been only in our front. It could scarcely fail to unsettle Yusufzye; and indeed more or less the whole Peshawur District, by holding up before the eyes of our subjects what they would consider a standing proof that the Barakzye dynasty was only biding its time to recover the Peshawur Valley.”

6. In forwarding this letter and commenting upon the possible occupation of Bajour and Swat by the Amir, Sir John Lawrence, in the letter above quoted, remarked that so long as we hold the Peshawur Valley, we should, at all risks, prevent our enemies placing us in a false position.

7. With reference to the third paragraph of your letter, observing that the Commissioner of Peshawur does not appear to have included Swat among the territories within the scope of the Amir's supposed designs, it is necessary to briefly note the manner in which the question originally arose, and it will then be evident that so far as any claim of His Highness the Amir of Kabul is concerned, the position of Swat is identical with that of Bajour, and any claim advanced to one, would, in the nature of the case, include a claim to the other. This is the reason why no special mention of Swat has been made in the present communication of the Commissioner of Peshawur, but there have not been wanting indications of an intention on the part of the Amir to interfere also in Swat, and, as an instance of this, I am to refer to the Kabul Diary from the 11th to the 14th February last forwarded to you on the 19th February by the Commissioner of Peshawur, in which interference with Swat affairs is clearly foreshadowed. The great age of the Akhund of Swat, and the evenly balanced state of parties in the valley, seem to render it exceedingly probable that on the occurrence of the

\* Better known as Mian Gul.

death of the Akhund, his son, Abdul Hunan,\* the head of one party, or Sherdil Khan, Chief of the Ranazais, the head of the other, or perhaps both, will apply for aid, in establishing their authority, to the Amir of Kabul.

8. The question of the occupation of these districts was raised originally in a letter of instructions sent by the Amir of Kabul to his Wakil at Peshawur on the 27th September 1857, at the height of the mutiny, in which Dost Mahomed Khan objected to the real or alleged interference by the Commissioner of Peshawur with tribes whom he declared to be Kabul subjects residing beyond the British frontier. He laid down in that letter, as in a second letter to the Wakil of the British Government at the Kabul Court, and in a verbal communication to the British Agent, Nawab Fouzdar Khan, that under the written agreement which the British Government had made with him, all the territory which had formerly been owned by Maharaja Runjit Sing belonged to the English, and all the remainder of Afghanistan to the Amir of Kabul. The claim was certainly not supported by the Treaty of the 30th March 1855, nor by the Articles of Agreement of the 26th January 1857. These documents merely described the Amir's territories as "those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness' possession," and that this definition was not inserted without careful consideration and for a special object is clear from the letter of this Government, No. 719, dated 27th October 1857, to your address, in which Sir John Lawrence states that the Amir is perfectly well aware how much discussion took place with Sirdar Haidar Khan in regard to the definition of His Highness' territory, and how steadily the Chief Commissioner resisted the claim to his being recognized as Chief of all Afghanistan, exclusive of the provinces held by the British Government. The claims of the Amir to Swat and Bajour were vigorously contested by Sir Herbert Edwardes in a letter of considerable length addressed to the British Agent at Kabul, and his action was approved by the Government of India in their letter, No. 140, dated 19th February 1858.

9. With special reference to the supposed design of Sultan Mahomed Khan upon Bajour, the directions of the Government of India were, that it was to be pointed out that as the Swat movements could not take place without the Amir's permission, and as it could not fail materially to affect our border, it was expected that the Amir would give no authority to such a measure without first consulting the Government of India. Nothing was to be said which, in the event of Sultan Mahomed persisting, would not leave the Government free to act or refrain from acting as it pleased.

10. The next allusion to Bajour was in the Kabul Diary of the 20th January 1861, in which the Agent reported that the Amir had heard that the Commissioner had, at the request of the people of Bajour, sent an Agent to them, and that the British Government had ulterior designs on that district; His Highness adding "if on further enquiry I find this to be true, I shall certainly make a representation to the Commissioner of Peshawur, as Bajour has always been a part of the Kabul Government." It was also reported that the son of the heir-apparent had left with a force to proceed against Ata Mahomed Khan, the rebel of Laghman.

11. The Commissioner, in sending this on, remarked that he did not for a moment suppose that His Highness credited the rumour of his being in communication with the Bajour Chief, or that this Government had ulterior designs in that country; he considered that the matter had been brought forward as a feeler; but taken in conjunction with the movement of the son of the heir-apparent to punish a rebel Chief, with a force, however quite disproportioned to that object, he suggested that he should reply to the Agent that Bajour not having been in His Highness' possession at the time of the treaty, it has hitherto been supposed to form a portion of his territory, and that such changes in that direction as were likely to affect our border, it was expected His Highness would not sanction without first consulting the Government of India.

12. The Commissioner was then requested to intimate to His Highness, through the Wakil, that this Government was averse to any interference by the Amir in the affairs of

Bajour and Swat. His Highness was also to be distinctly assured that the Commissioner had sent no Agent to Bajour, and that this Government had no ulterior views in regard to that territory.

13. Copy of the correspondence was sent to the Government of India, which approved of the instructions sent to the Commissioner (see letter, No. 1651, dated 6th April 1861), and Governor-General was further of opinion that no further communication should be at present made to the Amir.

14. This is a brief *resumé* of the facts of the case. It is, however, Sir Henry Davies thinks, sufficient to show that the question of the occupation of Bajour and of Swat has been considered both by the Amir and the British Government as one and indivisible, that there has been, whenever the question has been discussed, but one opinion as to the inexpediency of permitting the Amir of Kabul to assert and maintain his rights over the districts in question. The communication made to His Highness in 1861 has been sufficient to restrain him from any interference with Bajour or Swat from that time to this—signs are now visible of an intention on his part to again interfere in their affairs. The last letter from the Government of India, expressing the opinion of the Governor-General that no further communication should be at present made to the Amir, seems to presume that a further communication would be made should His Highness fail to accept the warning of the Government, or at any future time, take action in this question in opposition to its expressed wishes. But during the last fourteen years the occasion has not arisen. The desire of encroachment was effectually repressed, and British territory has remained undisturbed by the designs of the Afghan Government or its representatives. As between that Government and ourselves, therefore, the policy pursued has been successful. As at present informed, the Lieutenant-Governor would recommend adherence to it, though he can understand that circumstances with which he is unacquainted may demand a re-examination of the ground on which the claims of the Amir to all Afghan districts not included in British India has hitherto been rejected.

[ *Firman referred to in paragraph 137.* ]

Translation of the firman granted by the AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN to RAHIMATULLAH KHAN of Dir, under his own seal and that of the heir-apparent and of the MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA, whereby to confirm him (the Khan) and his posterity in the Chiefship.

This was written on an illuminated paper with red ink.

AMIR'S SEAL.

How-ul-Ghalib Abul-Fath Moin-ud-din Bahadur Shere Ali Khan, i.e., God is victorious. (The Conqueror and Defender of Faith, Shere Ali Khan Bahadur.)

The Most Gracious and High God.

NO. I.—ILLUMINATED.

Since imperial orders have issued that every one of the sincere well-wishers and faithful friends of this Government, who have, with sincerity, honesty and good intentions, rendered such services as they ought to have done, should be raised to high offices under Government and should be distinguished and exalted among their rivals and equals,—as a proof of this, the most honored and exalted Rahimatullah Khan Yusufzai, the greatest of all the chiefs and principals, who has surpassed every one in attachment and friendship, and is well worthy and deserving of royal favors and support, in consideration of his being a kinsman and relative of His Highness, has been favoured at these propitious times with the title of Nawab, Chief of his tribe. This high dignity he has succeeded in obtaining through the Royal liberality. If it pleases the Most High God, this title will continue to the Khan and his successors from His Highness the Amir so long as this God-granted empire continues and from the Heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdullah Jan, the illustrious and successful son of His Highness, so long as he lives and the foundation of this Government lasts; and in proportion he (the Khan) increases in friendship, his credit will increase with this Government.

\* 3 months ago.

Dated Thursday, the 22nd Safar-ul-Mozaffar\* A.H., 1294.

SIRDAR ABDULLAH JAN'S SEAL.

Wali Abd-i-daulat-i-Khuda-dad-o sawwido amr-i illalah-Afghanistan, Abdullah Jan, 1291, i.e., the Heir-apparent of the God-granted empire of Afghanistan. I confide all my affairs to God.—Abdullah Jan, 1291.

MUSTAUFI'S SEAL.

Abul Mulk Mustafá Mamalik-i-Afghanistan, 1290.

(Police Report, No. 42, dated 3rd May.)

Translation of a firman granted by the AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, recognizing MAHOMED SHARIF KHAN as successor to his father RAHIMATULLA KHAN of Dir, on a plain paper.

NO. II.—PLAIN PAPER.

Imperial orders have been issued that our honored and exalted friend, the greatest of all chiefs and principals, Rahimatullah Khan, who has been distinguished and honored by royal favor, should be apprised that our respected and sincere friend Mahomed Sharif Khan, his intelligent son, has waited on us. He has displayed the elegance of manners befitting man, and has given proofs of his sincerity. And as he has now been given leave to return home, it is deemed expedient to write the Khan a friendly letter, and since the honorable Mahomed Sharif Khan is endowed with a sound judgment and is quite able, and the Khan has nominated him as his successor, we approve of it, and recognize him such.

Let the Khan rest assured about everything else.

AMIR'S SEAL.

How-al-Ghalib Abul-Fath Moin-  
ud-din Amir Shere Ali Khan, i.e.,  
God is victorious. (The Conqueror  
and Defender of Faith, Shere Ali  
Khan.)

(*Police Report, No. 42, dated 3rd May.*)

---

NOTE.—See also Monthly compilations of Kabul news—April to October 1877.



## APPENDIX XXVIII.

### INFORMATION RELATING TO THE FIRST TURKISH AGENT.

[*Referred to in paragraph 141, Chapter VIII.*]

Police Special Report, Peshawur, No. 47, Monday, 14th May 1877.

A person calling himself Haji Gulam Hassan reached Peshawur early on Friday, the 11th, and put up at the Serai Nazer Bagh, outside the city, close to the fort. He was quite alone. Apart from his bedding and a small canvass bag, he had with him two ordinary-sized portmanteaus and one small one.

He called on Hafiz Mahomed Amin, the preacher of the mosque close to the Gorkhutri, inside the city, known as Masjid Khawja Martif. Hafiz Mahomed Amin is the noted preacher at Kabul, introduced to the Amir by Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent. He came away from Kabul just before Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan started for Peshawur; his antecedents were furnished last March to Sir Lewis Pelly.

Haji Gulam Hassan was most cordially received, and was shown every possible attention by Hafiz Mahomed Amin and his family. He started for Kabul this morning, the 14th, accompanied by a couple of servants and a guide. Before starting he was visited by me. The following contents of a letter (copy of which is enclosed), written and posted by Hafiz Mahomed Amin from Peshawur to Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan at Simla, will explain the mission of Haji Gulam Hassan :—

#### *Rough Translation.*

After compliments, prayers, and blessings, be it known to you that after extreme suspense and expectation your letter from Simla reached safe and conferred great joy. May God grant that the desires of your heart be successfully realized. Oh gracious patron! I swear by the oath of your salt that no moment passes without my praying in your behalf. I pray that you may not forget me.

The latest news here is that on Friday, 27th Rabi-ul-sani (11th), when engaged preaching in my mosque for the relief of my mind, a man well-clothed and of gentlemanly exterior entered and joined the audience. I lifted my hands and asked for a blessing on you, and with the congregation all attention. I turned my face to the wall and cried. The stranger cried likewise. After service I went home; the stranger followed me to my house, and addressed me in Arabic. After some conversation I asked him his name. He replied—"Where is the necessity for my name or address?" I quoted a passage from the traditions of our Holy Prophet, and explained that for friends it is necessary that they should make mutual communication of their names and personal particulars. He then said—"Well, then, my name is Mahomed Hassan, and you know me well, but eleven years or upwards have passed since our last meeting: at that time I was (khidmutgar) servant to Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, and with his consent left him and went to Mecca and Medina. Now I am in the service of the Sultan of Turkey, by whose order I am going to Kabul."

Whatever was possible I did for his comfort. On Saturday I paid him a visit in the Government Serai under the fort, and found he had a letter for the Amir in a cover of superfine cloth of gold. The cover was sealed with the seal of the Sultan of Turkey. He had also two superb carpets for prayers, richly worked in gold and silver; each was worth at least Rupees 5,000, or Rupees 11,000 for the pair. There is no doubt that similar carpets for prayers would be most rare in any other than that Court (Turkey). He likewise had a small box full of handkerchiefs, made of silk: one handkerchief worked in gold and silver was worth at least Rupees 300. Another present was a large-sized looking-glass, about three-fourths of a yard in size, illuminated with the names and titles of "Hazrat Mahbub Subhani" in letters of gold. This Mahomed Hassan is taking up as a present from himself. The carpets and handkerchiefs were from the Sultan of Turkey. Within the next two or three days Mahomed Hassan will start for Kabul. I enquired from him if he knew what was written in the mura-sillas. He said one was for the Shah of Bokhara, in which he is advised to unite with Amir Shere Ali Khan, as his bitterest enemy was at his door, namely Russia. It was necessary for him and the Amir to combine in trying to annihilate Russia; otherwise Russia would acquire a permanent ascendancy over them, when it would be too late to live in vain regret. The Amir has been written to much in the same terms for him to gird his loins for a holy war against Russia, who is a "sakht kafer" (hard infidel). Not a single individual accompanied Haji Mahomed Hassan. Servants have been entertained for him here.

## APPENDIX XXIX.

### COPY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS FURNISHED TO THE ENVOY BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

[*Referred to in paragraph 143, Chapter VIII.*]

#### TRADUCTION.

Instructions données à S. E. Ahmet Khouloussi Effendi, chargé d'une Mission Extraordinaire auprès de l'Afghanistan.

D'après les informations obtenues l'Emir d'Afghanistan, Chir-Aly-Khan, pendant ces derniers temps est tombé sous l'influence de la Russie moyennant quelques subsides et des présents qui lui avaient été offerts par le Général Kaufmann, Gouverneur Russe en Turkestan et moyennant la promesse d'une subvention annuelle, et qu'en vue de réaliser les projets de la Russie une foule d'intrigants furent expédiés à Caboul la Capitale d'Afghanistan. Le Viceroy des Indes, dans le but de neutraliser les intrigues et les projets de la Russie, avait demandé la permission de nommer des Agents aux endroits convenables de l'Afghanistan, l'Emir susnommé ayant refusé la demande l'Envoyé Anglais demeurant à Caboul fût rappelé.

Sur cela, Chir-Aly-Khan déclara la guerre sainte contre les Anglais des Indes et poussa à la guerre les habitants de l'Afghanistan, cependant cette conduite fût reprouvée tant par l'Akhounde de Swat que par les notables de l'Afghanistan, et la guerre avec les Anglais fût péremptoirement repoussée.

Le fait que Chir-Aly-Khan a déclaré la guerre sainte aux Anglais, et l' a laissé prendre à l'amorce de la politique Russe, a provoqué un grand mécontentement dans le pays des Afghans, et il est probable que des conséquences désastreuses puissent en résulter pour la personne de l'Emir.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman mu par l'obligation que lui impose le Khalifat, croit de son devoir de faire tous les efforts pour combattre les projets de conquête pernicieux pour les races Islamiques que la Russie a entrepris de réaliser dans la sus dite contrée; attendu qu'elle est en rapports d'Amitié sincère avec l'Angleterre et que celle-ci est animée des meilleures intentions.

Le fait que l'Emir de l'Afghanistan se laisse tromper par les intrigues de la Russie ne saurait avoir pour résultat que de précipiter ses états et ses sujets dans la gouffre où sont tombés d'autres Gouvernements Islamiques qui dans ces derniers temps sont arrivés en leur déclin, ainsi que de pousser dans la même voie les Gouvernements Islamiques voisins qui n'ont pas encore perdu leur indépendance. L'Afghanistan par suite de sa position ne saurait attendre son salut que des rapports d'amitié avec l'Angleterre. Ne pas comprendre ce point et aller jusqu'à déclarer la guerre à cette Puissance, c'est faciliter les vues de la Russie et accélérer la destruction complète des communautés Islamiques de ces pays.

Le Sublime Porte a pensé que soit sous le point de vue religieux, soit sous le point de vue d'opportunité politique, il est de son devoir sacré de s'empresser à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir de pareils désastres. Ce sont ces pensées qui ont provoqué la mission importante de S. E. Ahmet Khouloussi Effendi. Seulement afin de faciliter la réalisation de cet objet important au milieu des intrigues de la Russie; qui ont commencé à y prendre racine, il est nécessaire que nos dispositions soient prises avec soin—c'est pour quoi, il a été jugé nécessaire de nommer un Agent à Peshawur, situé au nord de l'Industan, et qui est le dernier point où aboutit le fil télégraphique, et une des villes les plus importantes de l'Inde, parmi celles qui sont limitrophes de l'Afghanistan. Cette charge ayant été donnée à Ahmet Effendi, membre du Conseil de l'Instruction Politique, il accompagnera le sus dit Ambassadeur à fin d'être l'intermédiaire au commencement de l'exécution de sa mission, et être employé pour faire parvenir par la ligne de Peshawur la correspondance télégraphique qui sera échangée avec Constantinople. Lal-Shah-Effendi, un notable Afghan, devait aussi accompagner l'Ambassade, le sus dit Ambassadeur est tenu d'agir et de remplir sa mission en conformité des instructions suivantes.

Le susdit Ambassadeur se rendra d'ici à Bombay par voie d'Egypte, et de là en prenant avec lui le Consul Ottoman Hussein Effendi, arrivera à Peshawur. Il s'y arrêtera alors provisoirement afin de poser les bases de sa mission, et d'en régler l'action, parceque Chir-Aly-Khan ayant des penchants Russes ne saurait que prêter l'oreille aux insinuations que les Russes dans leur anxiété et leur frayeur à la nouvelle de l'envoi d'une Ambassade Extraordinaire de notre part s'empresseront de faire. Conséquemment il est à présumer que l'Emir tâchera de ne pas faire savoir au peuple l'objet de l'Ambassade et de rendre celle-ci sans effet.

Cependant ainsi qu'il a été expliqué ci-dessus, l'Akhounde, qui réside à Swat, étant comme un guide pour le peuple, et tenant entre ses mains les rênes de l'opinion des habitants, la reproche de la conduite de Chir-Aly-Khan envers les Anglais a été partagée par l'opinion publique, et la plupart, et peut être la généralité des notables des ulemas du pays, penche vers les idées et les ordres de l'Akhound, conséquemment à l'encontre de la partialité pour les Russes de Chir-Aly-Khan, il est d'une majeure importance de gagner d'abord l'Akhounde et par son intermédiaire les notables du pays. Ainsi lorsque le sus dit Ambassadeur arrivera à Peshawur il enverra immédiatement le susdit Ahmet Effendi en compagnie de Lal Shah à la ville de

Swad pour faire savoir qu'il a été envoyé en mission spéciale par S. M. S., qui ayant en connaissance des séditions ourdies par la Russie à l'égard de l'Afghanistan s'est proposé d'indiquer aux habitants Mussalmans de ce pays la voie du salut, et de les éloigner du feu des intrigues et du mensonge de l'ennemi.

Cependant il dépend des efforts patriotiques d'une personne éminente et renommée pour sa piété comme l'Akhounde d'engager tout le monde d'obéir aux Augustes injonctions de notre Seigneur l'Imam de l'Islam.

En outre l'Ambassadeur fera son possible pour faire savoir au peuple par des intermédiaires convenables qu'il arrive en Ambassade de la part de l'Auguste Caliphe. Bref, avant d'entrer les fruits de sa mission.

L'Ambassadeur après avoir accompli ces mesures se rendra à Caboul, qui est le siège du Gouvernement, ayant avec lui le Consul Hussein Effendi et il aura une entree avec Cher-Aly-Khan, à qui il remettra officiellement ses lettres de créance. Il visitera ensuite le Sadr-Azem et le Cheik-ul-Islam de l'Emir et d'autres notables du pays qu'il devra traiter avec politesse et urbanité. Seulement comme il est dit que Chir-Aly-Khan a quelques ennemis et concurrents, embrasser leur parti ouvertement Tendrait la tâche de la mission difficile. C'est pourquoi il faut être attentif sur ce point dans les entrevues et conversations qui auront lieu.

A la suite des mesures que l'ambassade prendrait durant sa résidence à Peshawur en vue de faire connaître sa mission, devant compléter ainsi l'emploi des moyens requis pour l'accomplissement de son mandat, il expliquera dans son entrevue avec Chir-Aly-Khan par des preuves irrécusables les vues de conquête de la Russie à l'égard des Gouvernements Islamiques de l'Asie Centrale, et après lui avoir donné bien à comprendre les intentions et les arrière-pensées de l'ennemi; il lui représentera que tandis que jusqu'à présent la Perse était l'ennemi naturel de l'Afghanistan par suite de sa position et de ses intérêts, maintenant l'Afghanistan devrait beaucoup plus se mettre en garde contre les intrigues de la Russie qui s'avance de jour en jour dans la conquête des communautés Islamiques du Turkestan, et qu'on doit profiter de la leçon offerte par l'état digne de pitié des Gouvernements qui ont déjà disparu, que lorsque ils ont aboli le Gouvernement du Kokand et se sont emparés du pays, bien qu'il fût évident qu'ils pouvaient l'anéantir complètement, ils n'ont pas touché au Gouvernement de Boukhara, et ils ont laissé subsister ce pays uniquement pour ne pas s'aliéner l'Afghanistan, mais qu'il n'y a aucun doute que lorsqu'ils auront une fois préparé les moyens de la conquête de l'Afghanistan ils s'empareront du même coup des deux pays; que la raison pour laquelle ils procèdent lentement dans l'exécution de leurs funestes desseins ne procède que de la difficulté qui existe dans l'envoi des troupes et des munitions; que pour s'opposer à ces entreprises évidentes de la Russie le Gouvernement Afghan, profitant de la circonstance qu'un Gouvernement puissant comme l'Angleterre a des affinités avec les Indes, et qu'il est l'ami de la Turquie, devrait faire tous ses efforts pour être en paix avec cette Puissance; que les Russes sous les apparences de la justice font toute espèce d'intrigues pour s'emparer de son pays et pour annihiler son Gouvernement; qu'en se prêtant à de pareils procédés entachés de fausseté, il livre d'un côté à l'ennemi les 5 à 6 millions de Mahométans qui se trouvent sous sa juridiction, et il cause la destruction des Gouvernements Islamiques, qui sont situés dans le voisinage de l'Afghanistan; qu'une telle conduite désastreuse étant en opposition avec la sainte loi du Prophète, l'Ambassadeur a été chargé par l'Auguste Caliphe de l'Islam d'offrir des conseils sincères: que S. M. I. en l'envoyant comme Ambassadeur n'a aucunement en vue de toucher au Gouvernement, de l'Afghanistan mais seulement de montrer la voie du salut à l'Islam, pour empêcher que leur pays ne devienne la proie de l'ennemi, et pour préserver leur indépendance; que la valeur guerrière des habitants de l'Afghanistan étant connue à l'univers entier, si l'Emir à l'instar de tous les Gouvernements que de notre temps, pour repousser les dangers venant de l'ennemi se procurent des troupes et des armes, a soin de préparer une armée régulière de 150 mille hommes il, pourra toujours résister aux attaques de la Russie, et il sera toujours à même de conserver l'indépendance de son pays.

L'Ambassadeur expliquera tout cela en détail, et en due forme. De même quand il verra l'Akhounde il lui fera part de ces vues dans la limite de ces détails, et il ne négligera rien en paroles ou en faits de tout ce qu'il peut pour contribuer à soustraire l'Afghanistan à l'influence de la Russie. Il fera son possible pour renouveler les relations d'amitié entre l'Afghanistan et le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique.

L'Ambassadeur mettra le plus grand soin dans l'adoption de ces mesures et il tâchera de détailler séparément à chacun des notables du pays les communications que, de la manière sus-indiquée il aura faites à Chir-Aly-Khan, ainsi que de trouver parmi eux de fidèles intermédiaires.

Enfin, lorsqu'il aura une entrevue avec l'Akhounde de Swad il lui prodiguera les mêmes marques de respect qu'il aura montrées à Chir-Aly-Khan, et il fera tous ses efforts pour gagner sa bienveillance.

Ces détails ne sont basés que sur des considérations résultant de nos onidères.

La conduite à suivre en présence des circonstances qui se produiraient sur les lieux est laissée entièrement à l'habileté de l'Ambassadeur.

Quand il aura réussi à remplir sa mission il laissera le sus dit Ahmet Effendi à Peshawur, et il se retournera à Constantinople par voie de Bombay 1st Redjets 1294.

[Secret despatch, No. 55, dated 9th August.]

## APPENDIX XXX.

### INSTRUCTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO THE RECEPTION AND JOURNEY THROUGH INDIA OF THE TURKISH ENVOY.\*

[Referred to in paragraph 145, Chapter VIII.]

1. The main principles to be always kept in view are—

(a) that nothing be done to associate the Government of India and its authorities with the Mission;

(b) that, subject to this condition, no suitable courtesy or hospitality be omitted.

† The Viceroy leaves it to Sir R. Temple to decide what official shall receive the Envoy on landing, but he inclines to think that an official connected with the district would be preferable to an official connected with the local Government.

2. The Envoy should be received on landing by an official of the British Government and honored with a salute of 15 guns.†

3. Envoy and suite should be lodged as comfortably as possible both at Bombay and wherever they may stay *en route*, and the former should receive an allowance of Rupees 100 per diem.

4. It is most undesirable that the Envoy should remain for any length of time in Bombay. His stay at that place should, accordingly, be abridged by all means compatible with courtesy. Explanations on this point will be made by Major Bradford to the Turkish Consul-General in accordance with His Excellency's verbal instructions.

5. A discreet and competent officer will be appointed by the Bombay Government to accompany the Mission to the frontier. This officer will communicate with the local authorities on the subject of the Envoy's journey, and settle with them as to the necessary details in regard to which local Governments will be instructed to act on his requisitions.

6. Deputations to the Turkish Envoy from public bodies, visits from newspaper correspondents, and interviewing, whether at Bombay or elsewhere, should be discouraged and prevented by all available means.

7. A saloon and first class carriage should be provided for the Envoy and suite for his journey by rail, and private refreshment rooms set apart at all stations where he may stop for meals. The officer in charge of the Mission will prevent interested persons from taking advantage of such opportunities to interview the Envoy or to present addresses.

8. At the Railway Stations of places where the Envoy stops for the night, he will be received and accompanied to his residence by the district officer, and if the station is a military station, a salute of 15 guns will be fired on his arrival and departure, in the event of such arrival or departure being during daylight.

9. The dates and hours on which the Envoy is to arrive at, or depart from, the places on his route should be kept as secret as may be practicable.

10. The local authorities of the places at which the Envoy may pass the night or require temporary lodging of any kind should provide for the Envoy and his suite a private house sufficiently commodious, and as far removed as possible from the native town or bazaar, and within easy reach of the district or divisional officer.

11. Such house should be provided during the Envoy's stay thereat with a police guard; no military sentry need be provided.

12. The officer in charge of the police-guard should receive instructions to report to the proper authority the names of all persons visiting the Envoy.

13. The officer in charge of the Mission will be considered responsible for the Envoy's passage through India, with all possible quietness and unobtrusiveness, but at the same time with every courtesy and hospitality that can be shown. He will keep the Foreign Secretary constantly informed of the progress of the Mission, noting any incidents which may occur, and keeping the Government of India informed of the daily address to the Mission.

14. It is advisable that the Mission should not remain 24 hours at Lahore or any other large Mahomedan town on his journey to the frontier. Arrangements should, therefore, be made for affording the Envoy and his suite such rest as they may need at Allahabad, and for passing them on *without detention at Lahore to Jhelum*. It is undesirable that he should remain any length of time at Peshawur: he will therefore be expected to stay at Rawal Pindee until he receives from Peshawur intimation that the necessary arrangements have been made by the Amir for his safe conduct to Kabul, and will then proceed on his journey without passing a night in Peshawur.

15. Major Bradford will explain to the Turkish Consul-General confidentially the necessity for avoidance of all ostentation in the progress of the Mission through India and the impossibility of allowing the Envoy and suite to make a prolonged stay in any of the Mahomedan towns in India, and more especially Peshawur.

16. The Turkish Consul-General will probably accompany the Envoy to the frontier; if he does so, and does not proceed to Kabul, he will be expected to return at once to Bombay.

\* To Major Bradford, No. 1777P., dated 23rd July.

## APPENDIX XXXI.

SYUD LALL SHAH.

[Referred to in paragraph 146, Chapter VIII.]

The following information has been supplied by Kazi Syud Ahmud :—

“Syud Lall Shah is originally a native of a place in the Rawul Pindee Division. He was for many years in Peshawur, where he got married, and has now a family and children. About 16 years ago he went to Kabul, and thence to Herat and Meshed, where he stayed for some time. From Meshed he went to Teheran, where he married a Persian of the Syud family, and stayed about two years. Subsequently he went to Constantinople, where he is said to have married a third wife.

“When at Peshawur, he was known to be a man of a dissolute character, and similar accounts were heard of him at Teheran.

“Being a Syud, he followed no profession while at Peshawur, and like his brethren (Syuds) depended for his maintenance on the charity of the ‘Murids’ (disciples) of his father, who was known to be a holy man.

“Chand Badshah and Zuman Shah are the other members of the family to which Lall Shah belongs.”

Captain Hunter's Memo., dated 28th July 1875.

Captain Hunter, when at Constantinople in 1875, collected the following information regarding him :—

“My informant heard of this man through one of the Hindustani Fakirs at the Takauja, who described him as a native of some place near Peshawur, but not in British territory, and that he had arrived in Constantinople about a year ago. My informant went to his house to see him, but he was not there. But he saw a man who was living in the same house, from whom he enquired the name of Lall Shah's village. He said he did not know, but that it was something like Lall Shah's own name. It struck me that the place might be Lalpura. I thought it possible that Lall Shah might be Major Macdonald's murderer, so I did all I could to hear more about him, but failed, and my informant afterwards heard that he had left Stamboul.”

Captain Hutchinson, District Superintendent of Police, in reporting the arrival, &c., of the Mission party at Jhelum, wrote as follows regarding Lall Shah :—

“There is, with the party, a Syud, a native of Pindi Gheb, who afterwards went to Peshawur and Kabul, and thence to Constantinople, where he has resided for the last nine years. He brought with him letters for Mirza Azam Beg from his son, who is at Constantinople, and on arrival he sent for him to the house. \* \* \* \* \* I am of opinion that from what I know of the movements of the Syud Lall Shah while at Jhelum, that he is a man who ought to be carefully watched.”

From Commissioner of Rawul Pindee, received 24th September.

In a subsequent letter, Captain Hutchinson reported what these movements were—

“Colonel Disbrowe, the Envoy, the Consul-General from Bombay, and myself left at once for my house. Mr. Merk remained behind to look after the remainder of the party and the baggage. Syud Lall Shah was put into one of the last carriages; on the way from the station, he stopped the coachman, and got out and walked (notwithstanding the great heat) to the Post Office.

“The Agent, Military Horse Van, after sending off all the party to my bungalow, returned to the Post Office, and there he found Lall Shah seated on a charpoy haranguing a number of natives about the state of Turkey and the war. He recognized him at once, and induced him to return to my bungalow in a carriage.

“In the evening at the dinner table I noticed that Lall Shah was again absent, and when I enquired where he was, I was informed that he had just heard of the death of his son at Peshawur, and therefore could not appear.

“The next morning he was absent again, and I found that he was at the house of Mirza Azam Beg, and that he had there been receiving visitors, among whom were Karim Elahi, the Native Hospital Assistant, and a Moulvie of the school. He only returned to my house in time to proceed with the party to Rawul Pindee.

“I should not have taken much notice of these movements if he had acted openly; it was the secrecy with which he went about, which was especially remarked.

“His visit to Mirza Azam Beg alone would not have been noticed perhaps, as it was only natural he should go to see him, having met his son in Constantinople from whom he brought several letters.”

\* Punjab, No. 343C., dated 28th August, and No. 366C., dated 3rd September.

At Rawul Pindee Lall Shah behaved much in the same way as at Jhelum.\* The following is an account of his visit to Sirdar Jalaludin :—

“About 6 P.M. Lall Shah got into a carriage and said he was going to see the Brigadier-General, but in an undertone asked the coachman if he knew where Sirdar Jalaludin lived.



Deputy Inspector Harsukh Rae was near enough to overhear the question, and volunteered his services, and conducted him to the house. After conversing with Jalaludin on ordinary topics, Lall Shah mentioned that the former Sultan (Azeez) lost his throne, because he wished to be on friendly terms with Russia. Jalaludin replied that he had read of it in the papers how the Sultan committed suicide : on which Lall Shah said he had done nothing of the kind, but had been made away with, but it had been given out as a suicide to prevent excitement. Lall Shah also said that the present Sultan was very much liked. Lall Shah also said that he should like to see Turkey, Kabul, and Swat friends ; and that they should join together and assist each other in time of need. He also stated that if the Envoy succeeded, Ahmed HILLAM Effendi would remain as Turkish Ambassador at Kabul, and Ahmed Effendi in the same position at Peshawur. That he, Lall Shah, was going to start in a few days for Swat, to see the Akhund, rejoin the Envoy at Peshawur, and proceed thence to Kabul ; and that he would, if possible, return *via* Bagdad to Turkey. Lall Shah also stated that he was married to a distant relative of the Sultan, and had a son by this wife. Lall Shah then proposed an interview between Jalaludin and the Envoy, but Jalaludin said he would do whatever the Envoy wished."

Telegram from Deputy Commissioner,  
Peshawur, dated 6th September.

The Envoy was made aware of the Syud's character, and arrangements were made to watch the latter's movements at Peshawur and Kabul.

## APPENDIX XXXII.

TRANSLATION OF AN ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEWS OF THE TURKISH MISSION WITH  
THE AMIR OF KABUL DURING THE MONTHS OF SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1877.  
PREPARED BY SYUD LALL SHAH.

[ *Referred to in paragraph 148, Chapter VIII.* ]

At 9 A.M., on the 27th September, all the members of the Mission were accompanied into the Amir's presence by Mustaufi Habibulla Khan. A guard of honor was in attendance, and saluted the Envoy. We were conducted through the room ordinarily occupied by Sirdar Abdulla Jan. On approaching the place where the Amir was seated, he got up and came forward to receive us. After saluting him, in accordance with Turkish etiquette, the Envoy presented the firman of the Sultan, and placed it in the hands of the Amir, who received it most graciously, and, after raising it to his head, he handed it to the Mustaufi. Then returning to his place, the Amir sat down, and invited us all to be seated, saying—"You are most welcome. Consider this as your own home. I would have given you a public interview the day of your arrival, but I was unwell. Now I am very much better, and hope to see much of you. The Sultan is the guardian of Mecca and Medina; and, as you are his delegates, I am highly pleased at your having come. What news of the foxes (English), and what is their intention?"

*Envoy.*—"I observed nothing but their chicanery. They (English) say they are the friends of the Government of Islam, but they are not its well-wishers. The Europeans are all one. Should the Russians occupy Constantinople, the English look upon Egypt as their portion. Our Government (Turkish) is not at all satisfied with them."

*Hosain Effendi.*—"What did the English do for us at the late International Conference that we should expect anything from them now? I do not entertain the smallest hope of friendship from them."

*Amir.*—"What are the Russians like? Are they deceitful, or can they be trusted?"

*Envoy.*—"They are all deceitful."

*Amir.*—"All infidels are of one mind, but what is the condition of France?"

*Envoy.*—"They likewise are devils."

*Amir.*—"The European powers can never be our friends. We, Pathans, are the descendants of the Israelites. We came from Syria, and were converted to Mahomedanism during the time of Khalid, when our ancestors emigrated to these parts."

At this stage of the interview, we all stood up with the Amir, and the Envoy displayed the presents sent by the Sultan. The most important gifts were handed to the Amir, one by one, by the Envoy. A copy of the Koran, a holy hair of the Prophet, and a sacred curtain of the shrine of Mecca, received special reverence, and were kissed by the Amir. Then certain standards (flags) were presented; after which the Amir sat down, the rest of the company following his example. The remainder of the Sultan's gifts were laid out before him, among which were a number of Turkish caps. Taking up one of them, the Amir removed his own hat; and, placing it on his head, he continued seated with the Turkish cap on his head for some time.

The Amir, then, turning to Baba Effendi, Ibrahim Effendi, Khurshaid, and Farhad, spoke to each of the members of the Mission most kindly and courteously. The Envoy complained that his foot pained him; and, as he felt uncomfortable, he desired permission to leave. We then left and returned to our quarters, contrary to the wishes of the Amir, who showed every indication of being desirous for us to remain and continue the conversation.

After the interview, when we had returned to our quarters, the Envoy remarked that the Amir had failed to pay him (the Envoy) proper respect, in having failed to come out and receive him. He was also surprised at the Amir not having the firman of the Sultan read out to him, and had abstained from saying anything against the Russians, but had expressed himself against the English, and proposed to at once telegraph to the Sadr Azim (Grand Vizir) that the Sultan's firman had been presented, but that the Amir's reception had not been courteous; that Russian influence was in the ascendant; and that the Amir spoke ill of the English. After expressing himself in this manner, the Envoy prepared a telegram in consultation with Hosain Effendi, and despatched it to Peshawur. I could not learn its contents. The Envoy, probably owing to the facts, was not in a good humour on that day.

The very same day I noticed a change in Hosain Effendi. He was reserved and avoided conversation with me. It was evident that he had complained to the Envoy about my having taken precedence of him at the interview and felt annoyed with me. Next morning Hakim Khan Peshawuri and the Moulvie Mirakhor told me that, when they were in attendance upon

Ill feeling between Hosain Effendi and Lall Shah.

the Envoy the evening previous, alluding to precedence, the Envoy had explained to them that "Syud Lall Shah ranked below Hosain Effendi; and that he had done wrong in taking precedence of him at the interview with the Amir, who should be warned not to trust Lall Shah." I, in truth, did not take precedence of Hosain Effendi by virtue of my position; but went before him, in order to be close to the Envoy, so as to act as interpreter, as he was ignorant of the Afghan languages. To questions put by the Amir, I would have answered in keeping with local custom. This was the only reason which influenced me, without regard to my position. From that time, on every occasion, Baba and Ibrahim Effendis were placed above me. The Envoy ever after considered me in quite a subordinate position, and acted in keeping with his own ideas. Hosain, Baba, and Ibrahim Effendis, all three, even at meals, took precedence of me. I was invariably last.

On the 29th September, the Amir's agents came to our quarters, and accompanied us into his presence, where we received a most cordial and hearty welcome. When we were all seated, and the usual enquiries after our respective healths had been concluded, the Amir addressed the Envoy in the following terms:—

"My Government has been highly honored by the Sultan, greatly in excess of all similar honors ever paid to it by other Mahomedan rulers, and I am most grateful. May God Almighty ever maintain the power of the Sultan! What can I do, situated between two Powers? On one side I have the Russians, and on the other side the English, who have indicated signs of aggression on my dominions. Before ridding myself of both, I can do nothing. Yes, if not interfered with, I would undertake to settle Persia's fate. God willing, in two or three months, I would dispose off the Persians, and sweep them off the face of the earth; then joining the Sultan, I would devote my life, property, and wealth, in the defence of Islam. The English constantly urge me to allow their agents into my country. How can I consent? All Afghans look upon infidels as their enemies. If I, out of regard for their friendship, allowed English agents into my territories, the people are certain to create a disturbance, and assassinate them. What possible explanation could I then offer to the English Government? I consequently abstain from consenting to their proposal. The Russians are likewise devils (Shaitan), devoted to the extermination of Islam; but God, who is the up-lifter of the faith, will never permit its downfall at their desire. His intentions are just (*alamgiri*). They have, on various occasions, sent their agents to me, invariably Mahomedans of Samarcand and Tashkend, with numerous proposals, but I have consented to none. Both nations (English and Russians) propose to furnish me with officers to instruct my army, and to reform my administration. If the offer came from the Sultan, I would willingly accept of the offer; but as the other nations are infidels, I do not require such help of them. With reference to the medals and other presents sent by the Sultan for the officers of my Government, I regret to say that the appointments of Sadr Azim and Dabir-ul-Mulk are at present vacant. I, therefore, beg of you to leave the medals and presents with me to be made use of hereafter, and to be conferred upon those whom I may consider most deserving."

The Envoy here remarked that he wished to say something in private. Then every one left the room, leaving the Amir alone with the Envoy; but, as they could not carry on a conversation without an interpreter, Hosain Effendi was asked to join the Envoy. After we had been seated outside for some time, Baba Effendi remarked that he did not consider it proper to be sitting outside; so we all returned to our respective apartments crest-fallen and ashamed.

The Envoy with Hosain Effendi remained with the Amir, who spoke to them of the state of his own country; complained of the Amir of Kashgar; condemned the Khan of Khokand as a traitor to his country and religion; referred at some length to the progress made by Afghanistan, and of his own exertions in manufacturing arms and increasing his army. He then complained of the English having entered Beluchistan in violation of their treaty; of their proposal to locate agents in his possessions; and of his refusal, as he considered it injurious to himself, to allow Europeans within his territories; and, in a matter of this nature, he insisted that every ruler was the best judge of the interests of his own country.

Then the letters from the Grand Vizir (in Turkish) and Shaikh-ul-Islam (in Arabic) were presented to the Amir, who called in Kazi Abdul Kader, and directed him to read them: the Kazi could only read the one in Arabic, and that with difficulty. The letter from the Grand Vizir was subsequently translated and submitted to the Amir.

Next day, Sunday, the 30th September, the Amir sent Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Kandahari, to the Envoy to enquire of him whether he had come to Kabul simply in the interests of the Sultan to form friendship between Turkey and Afghanistan, or as a mediator between the Amir and the English. To this enquiry the Envoy replied that he was no mediator, but had come simply as an agent of the Sultan.

On the 2nd October the Envoy caught a cold, and was slightly indisposed. Hosain Shah was sent by the Amir to prescribe for him, and Sirdar Bahadur Gulam Naz Band Khan came several times to enquire after his health.

On the 4th October, by special desire of the Amir, I paid my respects to him at 10 o'clock A.M. He received me most graciously in private: no other person was present. The Amir commenced the conversation by expressing his extreme satisfaction with the honor paid to him by the arrival of the Turkish Mission, and then said—"I am most desirous to join the Sultan, and assist him, who is the supporter and guardian of Islam; but I regret that I cannot approach him owing to the absence of all communication. Otherwise I would unite with him, and devote my life and wealth to his service. I am an Israelite, and our real home is in Arabia. By the grace of God, may there be unity and friendship in Islam! God willing, such will yet be the case."

After some further conversation, I alluded to the Envoy, and proposed to the Amir, that it was necessary that he should send an agent of his to the Sultan, to which the Amir agreed. He next asked me several questions, to which I answered to the best of my ability. He also questioned me concerning other powers. Of the Russians, the Amir remarked—"They are inveterate enemies of the faith. I am situated between two Governments, and am in a dilemma. I can at present do nothing but keep aloof from both: fidelity was not to be expected from either; they both consult their own interests. I have just heard of the arrival of a Russian agent at Mazara Sharif; he will soon reach Kabul. I am at present unacquainted with his mission. The former agent, Saif-uddin, living in the house of Mahomed Yusuf Khan, has been here for the last seven months. A letter, received the same day from my agent at Bokhara, informs me that a party of Russian troops had arrived at a place nine miles from Bokhara, where it was to remain for some days, and march on the 24th September for Sherabad. The object of the Russians is to make a display of their power. Calling themselves my friends, they offer me the use of their troops. I fully understand that they are trying to circumvent me; and I am convinced that the promises of these people are not worthy of credence. All Christians desire the extermination of Mahomedanism from the face of the earth. It is best for me to bide my time and see what God decrees. Persia is a great barrier between me and the Sultan. I entertain hopes that with the help of the Sultan it will be removed."

Amir's views of Persia.

Our conversation in connection with Persia lasted some time. The Amir most commendably spoke in praise of my travels. To command respect in a foreign land is a difficult task. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Arsulla Khan, and Asmut-ulla Khan came in; then Kazi Abdul Kader was sent for. I twice solicited permission to withdraw. The Amir, on each occasion, said—"Sit quiet, it is a fast, we'll converse." When Kazi Abdul Kader put in his appearance, the Amir ceased to converse on matters of importance. After a couple of hours the Amir allowed me to leave, conferring upon me tokens of special favor.

On the 6th October, Saturday, all the members of our Mission again waited upon the Amir. When we were in the outer enclosure, the Amir hailed us with the usual salutations of welcome. The Envoy replied as we entered the Amir's audience room. After most cordial greetings, the Amir commenced general conversation, and after a time turned to politics, saying—"I am much beholden to the Turkish Government; that I, an insignificant Afghan Chieftain, have been honored by the arrival of so important a Mission, the members of which are so highly enlightened, and carry with them the *Insignia* of the Sultan. I have been greatly honored. Please God, I will ever respect this token of affection; and, removing myself from alliance with the Nazarene, I will ever continue to keep aloof. I will now disclose my present relations with Russia. It is now eight months since the Russian agent has been seated in Kabul, begging for a reply to his letter, which he has not yet received. News has just reached me that another agent has arrived at Mazara Sharif, accompanied by a man of the Amir of Bokhara. They are daily expected to arrive here. I do not know what to do with them. The Russians are devils; they understand nothing but what concern their own interests. An Agent of mine is at Bokhara; he is a 'Muta-walli' of the shrine at Mazara Sharif, and a Syud of Kunar, grandson of the late Syud Babu Jan. Lall Shah knows him." And, turning to me, the Amir remarked—"I have already spoken to you of him." I replied—"Yes, Sir, you have spoken of him." The Amir then continued—"To-day a letter has come from him, in which he reports that a party of about 5,000 Russian troops had arrived at a place some nine koss from Bokhara, and was about to leave for Sherabad, which is quite close to the Jaihun Canal. It is not yet known what is the real object of the Russian Governor, but it will be known on the arrival of his agent. The English have encroached upon my possessions. Quetta has been taken up as a permanent military station by them without my consent according to what rules of friendship, and in accordance with what treaty? Strange treaty indeed! Is such the good faith of all Powers? First to make a treaty, and then to enter the possessions of others without their consent! Such conduct can never, under any circumstances, be justifiable. That country from time immemorial has been included in Afghanistan. Without reference to me the Khan was talked over, and allowed a monthly grant. It has been a most serious mistake. Under the circumstances, it is best for me to keep aloof from both the Russians and the English. At the present time I am greatly beholden to the Turkish Government; all my possessions are at its service. You are at full liberty to do with them what you

Amir's relations with Russia.

Amir's displeasure with English.

consider proper. If the Turkish Government can remove these Powers, well and good. I will wait for some time in expectation. If nothing transpires from your direction, then, having no other alternative, I will do whatever is most judicious respecting my own interests. My hands are in the mouths of each of these Powers. I will for certain, and of necessity, form an alliance with one of them. Hereafter the Sultan will have no cause for complaint against me. You who are present be witness that I make this statement in sincerity, and not intending to deceive. I have publicly made the same declaration throughout my possessions with the assistance of the religious teachers of the present time. These facts have been pointedly made public. I regret the distance which separates me from the Sultan; otherwise I would attend upon him in person, or else send my heir-apparent to him. At present I have no choice, I am helpless. This country is yours; do not look upon it as mine, but as your very own. You have come here to so great a distance with considerable trouble; all I possess, together with my country, is at the service of the Sultan and of his Government."

On the 12th October we again attended upon the Amir. After welcoming us, he said—  
Fourth interview of Mission.

Amir's speech to Envoy. "The letters from the Grand Vizir and the Shaikh-ul-Islam distinctly enjoined friendship with the English, but such does not transpire from your (Turkish Envoy) representations. You declare that you have come to form an alliance with Islam, and have no other object; but the Grand Vizir and the Shaikh-ul-Islam pointedly allude to the English as their friends, and appeal to me, as the Chief of the Afghans, to declare war with the Russians, accepting the English as my friends. The letters further declare that the English have always been my friends, and are still friendly disposed towards me; on which account I am advised to be at unison with them, and to be faithful to their interests. The Russians are alluded to as the enemies of Islam, who desire the complete removal of Mahomedanism from the face of the globe; and I am requested to declare war against them, provided I have the power. It is for you to judge what am I to do now. For me, at present, both Powers are alike; both are causing me anxiety. The Russians,

Amir's displeasure with the English. up to the present, have not encroached upon my possessions. The English, in violation of their treaty and engagements, have invaded my country. Such conduct is opposed to good faith. Beluchistan was in subjection to me; the Beluch Khans were with me; between them and me a treaty existed. I used to send them khilluts; they acknowledged my supremacy. The English have made several grave mistakes: (1) an Englishman, deputed by his Government, incited to rebellion an undutiful son of mine; they have come into my house and made themselves a fixture. They have taught the son of the Khan of Beluchistan to rebel, and promised his friend a place at Delhi. I heard of their intentions; but watching their opportunity, they enticed him away, and presented him with khilluts. I have decided upon electing my heir, and have chosen Abdulla Jan in this matter. I desire no interference, and intend to adhere to my choice during my existence. After my death, God's will be done. Letters of submission were received by me from the Khans of Beluchistan—one from Khodadad Khan and another from Mullah Ahmud. I sent both the letters to the English Government. Up to the present moment, the letters have not been returned to me, nor have I received a reply. What manner of friendship is this? If they desire to enter Beluchistan, they should have sent word to me to depute my agent there. Considering that the English never agree to any of my proposals, I decided that it was best for me to refrain from sending agents or writing letters. Quetta is within my limits, that side Sidader and this side Pishing. This matter is not creditable to them, and the result will never be to their advantage. No ruler ever acts in this wise. Subsequently troops were collected at Rawulpindi and Kohat. I, having no alternative, collected all my co-religionists, and explained to them that the infidels were encroaching from both sides, and that I was in danger. Appealing to them as Mahomedans, I begged of them to join me in protecting their country. As for me, I explained that I was but a poor beggar; if any person entered my house, so long as I had life I would fight; until all of my religion were annihilated, not till then would I seek a place of refuge. I am prepared for any contingency, having well considered all the circumstances. You who have come as an Envoy from so great a Power—your letters contain advice to form friendship with the English—having heard my explanation, say what am I to do. Are you agreeable to my making over my country to the English? If the Government of the Sultan, in truth, desires me to continue friendship with the English, let it enquire of the English why they have encroached upon Afghanistan, and let it advise them to return to their own limits, and to respect their treaty. In this matter, whatever is decided upon by the Sultan with the English, I am prepared to abide by his decision. Please acquaint the Sultan of my intentions, so that in the future there may be no cause for complaint against me. Also inform the Sultan that you have communicated with me on the subject of forming a friendly alliance with the English, but that I declined. I beg to urge upon you that this is no time for you to go to Mecca; on the contrary, you should hasten your return to Constantinople, and explain matters to the Sultan. After doing so, you will be at leisure to go where you please. It is incumbent upon every person to first discharge the duty entrusted to him, and then to attend to his own affairs."

Envoy.—"I have been charged simply with the duty of cementing the ties of Islam, and nothing more, as explained to you at my first, second, and third interviews. I am charged with no other message, but was simply entrusted with what has been fully explained to you."

Envoy's explanation of his Mission.



*Amir.*—"I cannot credit what you say; you have been deputed by your Government to incite war against the Russians, and to cement the former bonds of friendship with the English; how is it that you do not thus declare yourself?"

Notwithstanding considerable discussion, the Envoy would not give in. I then alluded to the Seistán deputation, conducted by the late Syud Nur Mahomed Shah and Sir Richard Pollock.

*Amir explained.*—"The deputation was connected with a boundary dispute between me and Persia. The British Envoy at Teheran, Sir R. Pollock, from India, and Syud Nur Mahomed Shah from Afghanistan, assembled on the spot. After considerable enquiry, the decision arrived at was the sterile waste was mine, and the rich and productive lands were the Shah's. The award was reduced to writing, duly sealed and signed, and still exists. However, whatever happened, did happen. All the condescension shown by me, and the attentions paid by me to the arbitrators as my guests, availed nothing."

On the 13th October Shaghassi and Hakim Khan came, and invited Hosain Effendi and Amir's interview with Hosain Effendi myself (Lall Shah) to the presence of the Amir, when, and Lall Shah. approaching him, we saluted and paid our respects. The Amir, after enquiring after our respective healths, said—"I have sent for you in order that you may thoroughly understand the contents of the letters brought by you."

The Mirza was sent for, and ordered to read the letters.

The Sultan's letter was read first. After the usual preliminaries, mention was made of the delegation of the Mission to Afghanistan, laudation of Islam, then of the Government of Afghanistan, and, lastly, a hope was expressed that the friendship now formed would be firm and lasting.

The letter from the Grand Vizir, after the formal preamble, gave certain particulars of the present condition of Turkey, and closed with the advice to form an alliance of friendship with the English.

After the reading of this letter, the Amir remarked—"The advice offered is most acceptable; but the Grand Vizir is evidently not informed of the behaviour of the English in their relations with me. They have possessed themselves of my country, and are vaunting their strength before me. How is it possible for us to become friends. Such a contingency to be brought about is most difficult and far removed."

The letter from Shaikh-ul-Islam was much to the same purport.

After the reading of the letters, conversation turned upon Beluchistan, when the Amir said—"The Khan of Beluchistan is at present here, and has arrived displeased at the hands of the English. I have not yet informed my ministers. He will on no account subordinate himself to the English. It is, as is generally reported, that the Khan of Khelat looks to me for support. It may be asked that, if the Khan looked to me, how was it that he attended the Delhi Durbar? I declare that he was hoodwinked into going. Briefly, the facts of the case are, that at first the English incited the people to rebel against their Khan. They came to my Durbar with their complaints. I pacified them completely, and wrote to the English desiring them to join me in working a reconciliation between the Khan and his people. No reply was condescended to my reference. After that the English wrote repeatedly asking me to depute an agent of mine. In this proposal there was trickery. It was cold weather at the time, and I sent no one. Their object was subsequently discovered here, namely, that the English, with the help of my agent, might be enabled to acquire a knowledge of the country, and then build a fort of their own. On this account I refrained from sending any man of my own. Finally, English agents were instrumental in working a reconciliation between the Khan and his tribe. Without reference to me, the English located troops at Quetta, and took the Khan to Delhi, agreeing to allow him Rupees 10,000 monthly. From these facts I am convinced that the English are selfish, and I, therefore, severed our friendship. I maintain that Quetta, from the time of Ahmed Shah, including Shalkote, is a portion of Afghanistan. Ahmed Shah presented it to Nasir Khan. Afterwards Shalkote was given to Walada Bibi, the mother of Nasir Khan, for her personal expenses, by Wazir Fateh Khan, my uncle, who used to call her his paternal aunt.

Displeasure with English. Sidader is at present mine. What manner of justice is this of which the English have been guilty? If they wish me to declare war against the Russians, let them furnish the means, and I will fight, instead of which they actually threaten me with their own power and strength. I am a human being holding power, why should I fear. If their intentions are of so questionable a nature, it matters little whether they are my friends or foes. Every one understands his own interests best. The actions of the English are of this nature: During the life-time of my revered father, he interviewed Sir John Lawrence at Peshawur, and entered into a treaty with him, which still exists, and is thus worded:—"Their enemies are my enemies, and their friends are my friends, but my enemies are not their enemies, and my friends are not their friends." Even according to this agreement entered into by my father, let them demand whatever they desire." Getting excited, the Amir continued—"In this wise are these people friends to their own interests, to

an extent that I have never seen equalled in any other race. In short, I have no alternative in this matter now, but simply to submit to whatever the Sultan dictates. Do whatever you think proper. You who have come charged with this message, how is it you do not return with the utmost speed? Your carrying now is not desirable. The best pilgrimage for you at the present juncture is to obey the orders of your Government: a holy war is more desirable than a pilgrimage. The visit to Mecca affects you only as an individual; but to negotiate between two Governments, affects all Islam. I consider it to your advantage to return with the utmost speed to Constantinople, and to communicate my reply to the Sultan. Probably the result will be of advantage to me, as well as to Islam in general. It is incumbent upon me to thus express myself to you; at the

Amir's relations with Russia.

present, I have in no way formed an alliance with the Russians, or made them any promises of friendship. Left to myself, I must, of necessity, join one party, whichever proves

Amir's feelings towards English.

is, that from the very first I have been in friendly relations with them; and to seek a new friendship is not desirable. I have never been guilty of anything to their pre-

Amir's objections to English Agents.

judice. They press me to allow their agents to take up certain positions in my country. In reply, I tell them that for their agents to reside within my territories was not desirable, owing to the extreme bigotry of my subjects. God forbid, if any of their agents were assassinated, they would at once come down upon me, and charge me with being the instigator. In this country of Afghans I am myself surrounded with enemies, who desire nothing better than my ruin, and would designedly be guilty of acts of violence for which I would be held responsible. With this explanation detailing the difficulties, I declined to consent to the proposal; otherwise I have no objection whatever. In all countries agents of other Powers are admitted. I am much beholden to the English for numerous favors, and would have, if possible, gladly met their wishes. I even now entertain hopes that, if they really desire my friendship, they will not release my hand. Let

Amir's hope of an English alliance.

them relinquish Quetta, and I am as ever their friend. If the English desire the Russians to be restrained, let them rest assured that, until I have exhausted all my resources, and risked my very existence, I shall never give them passage to Hindustan. If the Russians contemplate the annexation of Afghanistan, God Almighty will himself protect His own possessions. A bird even when hard pressed by the fowler, will fly to an eminence and perch in safety. Compared with the English, I am as a bird possessing no power of my own, nor do I boast of my capabilities. Russian agents have already come to me repeatedly, desirous of negotiating a treaty; hitherto I have avoided giving any reply. Now, the Sultan desires friendship between the English and Afghanistan. I will never oppose the wishes of his Government: whatever he considers is to the advantage of my country, let him carry out. I am prepared to act in conformity with his exalted wishes.

Amir's anxiety for the speedy return of the Mission.

Tell the Envoy not to delay his departure, as the object desired may be attained through the instrumentality of the present

Errors of British Administration.

Mission, and you all would thus reap the advantages of both worlds. If, in your opinion, the English are not at fault, well and good, I submit; but in my opinion, in their Indian career, they have made three grave mistakes,—1st, without annexing the Punjab, they invaded Afghanistan, with their rear cut off: failing to obtain support, they were discomfited; 2nd, forcing obnoxious reforms during the year of disturbances in Hindustan, they very nearly worked their own ruin; 3rd, for a place like Quetta they have severed friendship with an old and trusted friend, for whose country they have expended large sums of money, and now they are causing anxiety to a friend of theirs of such long standing as myself. On these three occasions they have misapplied their wisdom. I cannot tell whether the border agents of the English furnish faulty reports to their Government, or whether it is that the English Parliament simply takes into consideration its own national interests, I am bewildered. If reconciliation is brought about through the mediation of the Porte, I shall be most thankful."

## APPENDIX XXXIII.

MEMORANDUM, DATED 11TH JULY 1878, BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, CALLING FOR EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATING TO KABUL AFFAIRS, AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED BY HIS HONOR THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF THE PUNJAB, MAJOR CAVAGNARI, DR. BELLEW, MR. PLOWDEN, AND OTHERS.

[Chapter IX.]

All our recent official, and demi-official, information from Peshawur seems to indicate that the affairs of Afghanistan are, in various directions, approaching a crisis. The course of these affairs, though apparently critical, may perhaps be long continued without violent disturbance. But, if it is interrupted, the interruption will probably be sudden.

2. Our present Afghan policy is advisedly a passive and a waiting one. But circumstances are conceivable, in which some serious alteration in the condition of Afghanistan might oblige us to exchange a passive, for an active, policy, in reference to this neighbouring State. It is very desirable that we should not be hurried into the adoption of such a policy, without having considered beforehand the objects to which our action must be directed, the principles by which it should be guided, and the conditions by which it may be determined.

3. There are certain contingencies which it is possible to foresee, and for which we ought to be prepared. The policy to be pursued in reference to each of these contingencies must, however, be the policy of Her Majesty's Government; on whose orders the action of the Government of India is practically dependent. It is not possible for us even to suggest beforehand a definite, or detailed, line of action in reference to events which have not yet occurred; for whatever action such events may hereafter impose upon us must necessarily be varied in detail to suit the varying circumstances of the case; but it is possible for us to endeavour to ascertain beforehand what are the actual social, political, and personal, facts and forces likely to influence the turn of Afghan affairs in any foreseen contingency. It also possible for us to form, from the careful and timely review of such facts and forces, conclusions which will hereafter be useful in proportion to the accuracy and fullness of the information on which they are founded; and it is equally possible for Her Majesty's Government, if so disposed, to lay down, for our timely guidance, certain broad principles of action in any one of the contingencies, to which these conclusions may be applicable.

4. I, therefore, deem it expedient that the Government of India should now lose no time, *firstly*, in collecting, and collating, all the scattered information, at present in its possession, respecting the general condition of affairs in Afghanistan; *secondly*, in sifting and verifying all such information, by applying to it whatever tests may be available for that purpose; *thirdly*, in endeavouring to supplement the result, wherever it may be found deficient, on any point of obvious importance; *fourthly*, in submitting confidentially to our most experienced frontier authorities, for their opinion, such practical questions as may be submitted by a careful review of the information thus collected; and, *fifthly*, by communicating to Her Majesty's Government, in a convenient form, our final conclusions, together with the materials from which they are deduced. In short, my object is that, should the occasion for action ever arise in reference to our relations with Afghanistan (and whenever it does arise it will in all probability arise suddenly), we may not be reduced to the necessity of casting about, in haste, amongst a scattered mass of undigested and unverified materials, for the information requisite to guide our action.

5. Now, there are three possible contingencies which, at the present moment, seem to indicate special cause for forethought and preparation on the part of the British Government, in reference to the affairs of Afghanistan. The first of these is the death of the present Amir. The second is a serious, and widespread, revolt of the Afghan troops, or tribes, during the lifetime of His Highness. The third is some dispute, which might afford a pretext for a *casus belli* between Persia and Afghanistan.

6. As regards the first of these three contingencies, all our present information as to the state of the Amir's health, during the last two years, indicates a strong probability that his life may, at any moment, be suddenly ended by natural causes; and all our information as to his political position, indicates an equally strong probability that his life may also, at any moment, be suddenly ended by assassination, or suicide. In either case we may confidently anticipate immediate civil war throughout Afghanistan.

7. With regard to the second contingency, our latest information records the existence of open revolt on the part of one of the Afghan tribes; of a mutinous temper on the part of the troops, whose pay is in arrears; of deep and widespread dissatisfaction on the part of the Amir's subjects, who have been heavily taxed for the maintenance of a standing army which the country cannot afford; and of profound mistrust of the Amir's character on the part of some of his closest councillors and most powerful Sirdars, who, apparently, believe their lives and properties to be insecure under the present régime. The smallest, and most casual, spark, falling on such inflammable materials, may, at any moment, create a sudden conflagration; and, in that case equally, we must anticipate civil war throughout Afghanistan.

8. Assuming the outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan, we cannot as yet say what will be the probable number of hostile candidates for the throne, nor what will be their relative strength. But we can, with confidence, predict that each of them will, sooner or later, appeal for assistance to some Foreign Government,—either the British, the Russian, or the Persian,—and that each applicant for foreign assistance will be eager to offer, to the Power from which he seeks it, almost any terms, to be fulfilled hereafter, in return for effectual support in his immediate necessities. We are also aware that, in the person of Abdul Rahman, the Russian Government keeps under his hand one candidate for the future *musnud*, who may, or may not, be formidable. We know that the candidate at one time the most popular, and the most powerful, throughout Afghanistan, is the Amir's eldest son, Yakub Khan, who has been for many years a close prisoner at Kabul. We cannot say what are the chances of his surviving his father in the event of any popular or military revolt; nor, assuming him to survive such a danger to his life, can we say how far the strength, either of his spirit, or of his party, or of both, may have been broken by his long confinement. We know that there is another candidate for the throne in the person of the Heir-apparent, Abdullah Jan, whose claims to the succession have never been formally recognized by the British Government. But we cannot say what is the character, or capacity, of this young Prince, nor what may be the strength of his party in the Palace, or amongst the people. According to our present information, his mother, and those who act with her, seem to regard his chance of the succession as mainly dependent on his chance of our support. We know that there are other candidates in the family of the Amir, and also in the rival family of Shah Shujah; but we know not whether they have, or are likely to find, any following. Finally, it is not impossible that some unforeseen competitor for the throne may hereafter be found among the more powerful Sirdars, or present Ministers; such, for instance, as the Mustaufi.

9. Turning now to the third contingency, we know that complaints have of late been frequent, and increasingly vehement, on the part of the Persian Government, in reference to reported military movements and imputed hostile designs, by the Amir of Kabul in the direction of the Persian frontier. We have, I think, no information indicating any serious foundation for these complaints; but we know that the Amir, on his part, has been simultaneously manifesting great uneasiness respecting reported military movements and hostile designs by the Persian Government in the direction of the Afghan frontier; and that he appears to be apprehensive of the existence of some confidential understanding, between Persia and Russia, prejudicial to his interests. Neither for these alarms, any more than for those of the Persian Government, does our present information indicate any solid foundation; but it is obvious that between two neighbouring States so covetous of each other's territory, and consequently so suspicious of each other's policy, it would be easy for any third Power to provoke, if so disposed, serious misunderstanding leading to open conflict. The Persian Government has already more than once called upon the British Government, under the terms of the treaty of Paris, to prevent the Amir from prosecuting the designs it imputes to him. If, by the renewal and persistency of such appeals, Persia can force us to acknowledge that we are either unwilling, or unable, to control the Amir, she will, naturally, claim freedom of action against him. At present she maintains a large garrison in Meshed, close to the Afghan frontier. This she can, at any time, strengthen on the plea of danger to herself from the Amir. To all appearances she is now fomenting the growing discontent of the Amir's subjects in that part of Western Afghanistan most accessible to her influence, and encouraging their desire to pass under her milder rule. At least this seems to me the probable explanation of the large migration, now going on, of Afghan subjects into Persia. And I apprehend that, if freed from the danger of interference on our part, she would have no difficulty in annexing Herat. I think, therefore, the British Government must be prepared for this third contingency; but, for the immediate purposes of the present note, it is only in reference to the two first that information is specially needed.

10. The following questions indicate the heads under which such information should be collected and grouped:—

- (1.) In the event of the death, or dethronement, of the present Amir, who would be the probable candidates for the vacant throne?
- (2.) What would be their relative importance?
- (3.) What are, according to general report, the character, the views, sympathies, and tendencies, of each candidate named in answer to question 1?
- (4.) What is considered to be each candidate's relative chance of success?
- (5.) Who are the principal supporters of each of the probable candidates?
- (6.) In what part of the kingdom would each candidate be likely to find most support?

11. In addition to the information indicated by the foregoing questions, a carefully revised list should at once be prepared of all the principal personages in Afghanistan—Sirdars, Ministers, Generals, heads of tribes, members of the reigning family, &c.

12. In this list the reputed character and tendencies, as well as the probable power and following, of each of the personages mentioned, should be concisely indicated.

13. A similar statement should also be drawn up, showing the strength and distribution of the Amir's army, so far as this can be ascertained; the names of its principal general officers, and the supposed character and tendencies of each. Primary materials for the completion of such a statement will, I think, be found in the archives of the Foreign Department.

For all other requisite information, I request the Foreign Secretary to be so good as to communicate officially with Major Cavagnari, Major Sandeman, and any other frontier authorities who may be thought best acquainted with the details of Afghan politics and the character of Afghan personages. Instructions on this subject should be addressed to Major Cavagnari through the Punjab Government; and, in addition to information as to actual facts under the headings above indicated, the Punjab Government, Major Cavagnari, and Major Sandeman should be requested to furnish the Government of India, at the earliest possible date, with a clear statement of their respective views as to what is likely to happen, and what would be the probable course and result of affairs, in the event of either of the first two contingencies.

14. When the answers to these inquiries have been obtained, I should be glad if the Foreign Secretary would be so good as to lay them before me with a general report, or memorandum, by himself, indicating his own conclusions and opinions on the subject of them.

15. Much of the information required, doubtless, exists already in scattered reports, books, and despatches; but this should now be completed, verified, and organized, in a single, intelligible, and convenient form: the details of it being specially arranged according to their relative bearing on the contingencies above referred to. An officer of the Foreign Department might, I think, be advantageously charged with the organization of such information as exists in the archives of that Department.

16. I would request the Foreign Secretary to take immediate action on this note, and also to circulate a copy of it for the information of my colleagues in Council.

Memorandum by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

In the 13th paragraph of the Confidential Minute of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 11th July 1878, I am directed to furnish a statement of my views as to what is likely to happen, and what would be the probable course and result of affairs, in the event of two contingencies, specified in paragraph 5 of the same Minute.

These contingencies are—

1. The death of the present Amir.
2. The occurrence of a serious and widespread revolt of the Afghan troops, or tribes, during the lifetime of His Highness.

With reference to the first contingency, it will be convenient to review briefly the names of those who may be considered likely to put forward claims to the throne of Kabul. They may be divided into the following classes:—

- I.—Direct heirs of Amir Shere Ali.
- II.—Collateral heirs of the Amir, being descendants of the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan.
- III.—Afghan Chiefs not Barakzais.

Taking the first class of claimants, we know that for the last nine years the Amir Shere Ali has been desirous that his son *Abdullah Jan* should succeed him in the kingdom, and has been constantly working to this end. In 1873, when Syud Nur Mahomed Shah came to visit the Viceroy at Simla, one of the requests which the Envoy put forward on behalf of his master was, that the British Government should recognize and support the Amir's nomination of a successor to his throne. This request was not granted, but the Amir, in November 1873, formally nominated and invested Abdullah Jan as his heir. This youth has therefore for five years been the recognized heir-apparent of the Amir. His mother is the daughter of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan of the Kandahar branch of Barakzais, a first cousin of the Amir. The principal Sirdars and officials of the Amir have approved of the nomination of Abdullah Jan as heir to the throne, and are, therefore, in some degree, committed to support him.

On the death of the Amir, Abdullah Jan would have the advantage of being in possession of power, and he could, by continuing to carry on the administration under the Chiefs and officers appointed by his father, secure their support, which would give him great strength throughout the country, while the weakness of his character and his youth (for he is not more than 15 years old), would throw power into the hands of his ministers, and thus incline them to support him.

The second surviving son of the Amir, *Yakub Khan*, has been in close confinement since 1874. He is reported to be a man of talent and energy, and is about 30 years old. His mother was a daughter of Saudat Khan Mohmand of Lalpura, and he probably has the sympathy of the men of that tribe, as well as of many others in Afghanistan. From his having been so long in confinement, his followers and adherents must be much discouraged, and were he to regain his liberty on the death of the Amir, some time would elapse before he could collect money and followers to support him in his claim to the throne. Khan Aka Jamshidi, his father-in-law, who lives near Herat, might, perhaps, support his son-in-law if he could escape into that part of the country, but Yakub Khan is in the power of whoever has possession of Kabul, and on the Amir's death it is not probable that he would be allowed by Abdullah Jan to escape.



*Ayub Khan*, the brother of Yakub Khan, is in exile at Mashad, and is not likely to be able to raise a following either on his own account or for his brother.

*Ibrahim Khan*, the eldest surviving son of the Amir, aged about 31 years, is not a man of any ability, and has shown himself unfit for government. He appears very unlikely to attempt to gain the throne, or to succeed if he made the attempt.

*Ahmad Ali Khan*, son of the late Mahomed Ali Khan, eldest son of the Amir, is a young man of the same age as Abdullah Jan, and is, from accounts which appear of him in the news-letters, and in the biographical summary, clever and intelligent. He lives with his uncle Ibrahim Khan, and has no separate party of his own. It is not probable that he will put forward a claim to the throne.

I have named above all the male descendants of the Amir, who have any claim by hereditary right to succeed to the throne.

I proceed now to consider the names of claimants of the second class, which comprises other members of the Barakzai family, descendants of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, who might possibly claim succession, and might, perhaps, be able to raise a party in their favour.

*Abdurrahman Khan*, son of the late Mahomed Afzul Khan, now an exile at Samarcand, might be supported by Russia in a claim to succeed to the throne of Kabul. He is not likely to have a strong party in any part of Afghanistan, except perhaps in the Turkistan Province. If supported by Russia, he would be a formidable rival to any other claimant; without such support, he would have very little chance of success.

*Mahomed Sharif Khan*, full-brother of the Amir Shere Ali, is in exile at Dera Doon, and could only aspire to power in Kabul with the support of the British Government.

*Ahmad Khan*, a half-brother of the Amir, is in exile at Jalandhar, and cannot hope to gain power in Kabul without the assistance of the British Government.

*Jalaludin Khan*, son of the late Mahomed Akbar Khan, is an exile, residing at Rawalpindi in British territory, where he has been since 1867. As the son of the eldest son of Dost Mahomed Khan his claim by descent might be considered a good one. He has, however, not shown any talent for government, this long exile has probably reduced his party in Afghanistan to insignificance. If he were supported by the British Government, he would, of course, be important, just as Abdul Rahman Khan would, if supported by Russia, but without such assistance there is no chance of his succeeding.

*Wali Mahomed Khan*, half-brother of the Amir, has adhered to the Amir Shere Ali Khan, and has been appointed to various offices of trust by the Amir. Recently he is said to have been made Prime Minister in the place of Shere Ali Khan, Kandahari. From his position in the government he must be a man of ability, but it is improbable that the Amir would have trusted him so highly unless assured of his fidelity. Should the heir nominated by the Amir fail to succeed, Sirdar Wali Mahomed might have some chance of success in a general revolution. His misgovernment of Kuram rendered him unpopular there, and his bad reputation as a Governor would tell against him.

None of the other collaterals seem of importance enough to be mentioned.

Proceeding to the third class of claimants, I do not mention here any of the Sadozai family, descendants of Shah Shujah, as none of them have any chance of success unless supported by the British Government. It is possible that some of the Chiefs, other than the descendants of Dost Mahomed Khan, may attempt to seize the kingdom. The most powerful of them are—

*Habibullah Khan*, Wardak, the Mustaufi, or chief Revenue Minister of the Amir.

*Shere Ali Khan*, Kandahari.

*Hussain Ali Khan*, Kazilbash, Commander-in-Chief at Herat.

*Asmutullah Khan*, Gbilzai.

These are all men of note, who might obtain adherents in the tribes, or in the army. Judging, however, from the past history of the struggle for power in Afghanistan, I think it unlikely that any claimant, who is not a Barakzai, will have much chance of obtaining the throne on the death of the present Amir.

Considerable prestige surrounds the reigning family, which has many members capable of ruling. The weak Sadozais were for a long time supported by their powerful Barakzai Wazirs, and the Barakzais did not attempt to seize the throne until no Sadozai fit to hold power was left. I think that no one, not a Barakzai, will aspire to the throne immediately upon the Amir's death, though hereafter should the Barakzais fail to put forward a fit man, the Chiefs of other tribes may claim sovereignty, either in the whole kingdom or in some of its provinces.

Should the Amir die within the next year, I think it is probable that Abdullah Jan will be placed upon the throne. He will keep Yakub Khan in confinement, or will put him to death; and he will, in all probability, at once seek the support of the British Government which has so strongly aided Shere Ali in consolidating his power by grants of money and arms, and by detaining in exile his turbulent relations, who were likely to give him trouble by their oppositions.

So far I have given my opinion regarding the probable course of events, in case the Amir Shere Ali Khan dies a natural death. If his death is brought about by violence or treachery, a new set of considerations will arise. The persons who conspire against him may be prompted

by private wrongs, and may be politically unimportant. The events, which I anticipate would follow the Amir's natural death, would then probably ensue. If the conspirators were men of importance impelled by ambition and backed by a large party in their favour, they would carry out their design after making preparations and securing support, and thus some Chief might be unexpectedly raised to power whose pretensions it is impossible at present to foresee.

But the formation of such a conspiracy seems very improbable. The Amir Shere Ali is the strongest Governor the Afghans have had since Ahmad Khan Durani.

The accounts which we receive now of his government are derived from persons who are not well informed, and probably not well disposed to the Amir. Their news is generally tinged with hostility. Every bad point is put prominently forward, nothing good is mentioned. It is needless to say that such accounts must be received with great caution, and it would be dangerous to infer from them the existence of disaffection which is likely to break out into active rebellion. We hear much of the oppression, conscription, and grievous taxation in Afghanistan, but there can be no doubt that the Amir's authority is felt throughout the country and acknowledged by every one. I much doubt if the Amir's Government is worse than that of his predecessors, or is really disliked by his subjects to such a degree as to make any general rising against him probable. His Governors are well in hand, and there is no sign of his troops being mutinous. If there were any mutinous feeling in the army, it must have appeared, one would think, amongst the force employed to put down the rising amongst the Ghilzais near Muka. There the people rose against the imposition of the house tax, which is most unpopular, and has been with much difficulty collected. If the troops were mutinous, they would probably have sympathized with those who resisted the hated impost, and would have joined with, instead of coercing, them, but there is no report of any disaffection amongst the troops, even where it might be reasonably expected to exist. I am, therefore, inclined to think that no rising of the troops against the Amir Shere Ali is likely to occur.

The disturbance in the Ghilzai country, to which I have alluded, appears, from the reports received, to be local, due to a particular grievance connected with taxation, and to be led by no Chief of importance. According to recent accounts from Kandahar, the leaders of the insurrection have been treacherously seized by the son of Shahghassi Sher Dil Khan, and this may, perhaps, put an end to the rising. If not already put down, it does not seem likely to assume anything more than local importance. No revolt of the troops or tribes seems impending, and, if any such rising takes place, it will occur under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, and its results cannot therefore be calculated.

I do not discuss in this paper the results of interference by England or Russia in the internal affairs of Afghanistan on the death of the Amir Shere Ali. Such interference would change the whole course of events, and the disposal of the succession would be virtually in the power of the British Government. But, if Kabul is to be independent, and the people of the country friendly to us, the interference which we exercise should be in favour of a ruler who is acceptable to the country, capable of ruling well, and likely to remain a friendly ally of the British Government.

---

Memorandum by DR. H. W. BELLEW, dated 26th July 1879.

The answers given to the subjoined questions are the result of knowledge acquired during several years' residence on the Peshawur frontier and two visits to Afghanistan, as well as conversations with natives of that country up to three months ago. Of more recent events connected with Kabul politics I have no information.

*Question 1.*—In the event of the death, or dethronement, of the present Amir, who would be the probable candidates for the vacant throne?

*Answer 1.*—Ever since the Amir's return to Kabul from the Ambala Durbar, there have been three names prominently before the public as those of avowed claimants to the throne of Kabul in succession to the reigning Amir. They are these, *viz.*—

1.—Sirdar Abdullah Khan, youngest son and nominated Heir-apparent of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, aged about 18 years.

2.—Sirdar Yakub Khan, second surviving son of the present Amir, aged about 30 years.

3.—Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, eldest son of the late Amir Mahomed Afzal Khan, aged about 33 years.

*Question 2.*—What would be their relative importance?

*Answer 2.*—The answer to this question is a matter of opinion, the correctness of which must depend upon an intimate and full knowledge of the strength, position, party, influence, and resources of each of the several candidates for the vacant throne. This knowledge I have at present no means of acquiring; but I venture to state my opinion in the matter as a mere speculation to be valued at what it is worth.

I think that the claim of Sirdar Abdullah Khan stands in the first place in point of importance; and next to his that of Sirdar Yakub Khan, his half-brother. The claim of Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, a refugee in Bokhara and Russian territory since 1869, is of importance now only on account of the possibility of his claims being countenanced and supported

by Russian intrigue, or intervention ; and the degree of this importance will depend upon the views and aspirations of the Russian authorities in Turkistan. Unless his claim is taken up by the Russians directly, or by the Amir of Bokhara at their instance and on their behalf, I don't think the claim of this Sirdar would now meet with much favour at Kabul.

*Question 3.*—What are, according to general report, the character, views, sympathies, and tendencies of each candidate named in answer to question 1 ?

*Answer 3.*—The first candidate above named, Sirdar Abdullah Khan, is a delicate youth of very indifferent parts according to the Afghan standard, and is not judged favourably as a probable ruler by the Afghan nobles generally. It is, however, held by his adherents and supporters that the careful education he has received will tell in his favour as an intelligent, mild, and just ruler, if they succeed in establishing him upon the throne. The Sirdar, however, is decidedly of dull intellect, and suffers besides from scrofulous tumours in the neck and weakness of the spine. These afflictions prevent his leading the active life and joining in the martial sports which Afghans so much admire as the proofs of manliness and courage.

But he is naturally well inclined towards the British, as his best friends and well-wishers ; and in these views, sympathies, and tendencies he will be strengthened and guided by the teachings of his mother. This lady is the daughter of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan of Kandahar (who is the most powerful and important Chief now in Afghanistan, at least in all that part of the country westward of Ghazni), and she is very favourably disposed towards the British Government, in the hope of hereafter securing their support and recognition for her son. She is said to be a clever and courageous woman, and is credited with having amassed considerable wealth for the support of her son's claims when the time for action arrives.

The second candidate above named, Sirdar Yakub Khan, is a close prisoner at Kabul, and has been so during the last three years, on account of rebellion against the Amir, and conspiracy against the throne. Personally he stands very high in the estimation of the Afghans of all classes, and has the character of being a brave and successful soldier, a liberal-handed prince, and a firm ruler. Altogether he is about the most popular of the young Chiefs in the country ; and there is reason to believe that the severity of his imprisonment has operated to increase the public sympathy with his cause. This fact has not escaped the notice of the Amir, and has at times been a source of much anxiety to him.

I have been told by one who has relations at the court of Kabul that on one occasion, when some of the courtiers ventured to speak in palliation of the offences of Yakub Khan, and to suggest that it would be an act of grace on the part of the father if he forgave and liberated his son, the Amir became so enraged that he abused them roundly, and, summarily dismissing the Durbar, retired to his harem. On returning to his private sitting room, the Amir summoned Sirdar Abdullah Khan, and warned him that in Yakub he would find a deadly enemy, and that he must overcome him for his own safety. The Amir said that he could not himself take Yakub's life, as the lad was his son, and of his own body, and because the deed would leave an indelible disgrace upon his name. But he gave Abdullah his solemn injunction to see Yakub killed the moment after he himself should die, and charged him to do this before attending to his funeral, or to take the consequences of his neglect.

There is no doubt that Yakub still has a strong party in his favour, both in Kabul and at Herat, on account of the popularity and reputation he gained in 1866-69, when fighting to reinstate his father on the throne. But latterly he is said to have suffered greatly, both in body and in mind, owing to the rigorous confinement and diet he has endured ; and by many he is now looked on as a broken down constitution and spirit—very different from the energetic, fiery, and strong-willed youth of a few years ago. If Yakub Khan should effect his escape from prison on the death of the Amir, it is not unlikely that he would receive the prompt support of the Kazilbash party and the Kabul Ghilzais. What would then be his views, sympathies, and tendencies, it is impossible to forecast, owing to my ignorance of the current of recent events in Kabul.

On the supposition that Yakub Khan actually does appear on the scene at Kabul as claimant to the throne, his line of conduct will be influenced by the circumstances of the moment surrounding him. For instance, if he find the field clear at the capital, by either the flight, or the death of Abdullah, he will probably still have to make good his authority over Kandahar and Balkh by force of arms ; and such an undertaking will necessarily require time and money. Of the latter, it does not appear that Yakub will have so great a command as it is supposed Abdullah is sure of. If the chiefs of his party at Kabul are not already committed to terms provisionally with Russian agents, it is probable that, in the event of their success at Kabul, they will induce Yakub to establish himself independently at the capital, in the hope that Herat at least, if not the other provinces, will at once acknowledge him as Amir, and tender allegiance. Should the provinces voluntarily do so—and this does not seem very probable—Yakub would have the field clear before him to arrange his government according to his judgment. But even in this case, which is the most favourable view one can take, he will be met by his first difficulty in the entire want of money ; and this will be the certain and early cause of discontent and defection to the side of the first rival appearing in the field. It is necessary then that Yakub look abroad for recognition and support directly he secures possession of Kabul ; and there are three quarters in which he may seek them, *viz.*, Persia, Russia, and India.

In his choice Yakub will be guided by the pressing wants of the moment more than by any fixed views, or sympathies, or tendencies he may naturally have formed. In his own judgment he is, I think, assured of the power and liberality of the British Government, and he is not, I believe, ill-disposed towards it, and would willingly court its friendship if he could trust it; but this he does not, and cannot do. There is, however, a considerable section of his party who would gladly see him turn to India, and secure a fixed understanding with the British Government, merely for the sake of retaining their dominant position in the country, and without any desire or intention to enter into free and friendly intercourse, or to depart from their present exclusive system.

What may be Yakub's views with regard to the Russians, I have not the information to guide me to an opinion, though I believe that, in common with the bulk of the Afghan people, he has an innate mistrust and dread of them on account of their unscrupulous and aggressive character, and reputation for violence and deceit, exaggerated accounts of which are current all over the country in connection with their conquest and administration of the Turkistan Khanates. Any such feelings and conditions, however, are not likely to interfere with the current of communications with them; and it will depend upon the skill of the agents employed by Russia whether Yakub is immediately won over to their side or not. At the same time it must be borne in mind that their task will be deprived of much of its natural difficulty by the urgency of his position, and the intriguing character of the Ghilzai Chiefs, who are supposed to favour Russian advances as a set-off to British interference.

With Persia, Yakub is supposed to have a good understanding; and it is certain that, whilst Governor of Herat, he was on more intimate terms with the Persian authorities at Mashad and Seistán than was at all pleasing to the Amir. His connection with the Persian Government originated, under the guidance of his father, out of the necessities of the latter during the civil war which broke out on the death of the Amir in 1863. It is said that the interview of Yakub Khan with the Shah at Mashad in, I think, 1867 was the commencement of an understanding between the Shah and the Amir, in consequence of which the latter was enabled to resume with success his efforts to recover the throne, whilst the former was allowed to advance his border into Seistán. Up to the time of Yakub's recall from Herat, and his sudden arrest and imprisonment, he was in constant communication with the Persian authorities on that frontier, and doubtless he might now find it to his interest, in the event of his succeeding to the throne, immediately to open negotiations with them, if only to secure the support of the Kazilbash colony at Kabul in the first instance, and with the ulterior object of maintaining himself at Herat in case of his being forced to abandon his position at Kabul.

And this, so far as I can judge, is the course Yakub is most likely to pursue, should he find himself in possession of the throne at Kabul; unless indeed, and this is a conclusion I have purposely excluded from the reckoning, he has good grounds for depending upon support from the side of India. Because the Afghans know the Persians well and are not afraid of them, feeling confident that they are more than a match for them in the field; whereas it is very different with the other Powers. The Afghans not only fear them on account of their proved invincibility, but they mistrust them on account of their aggressive tendencies, whilst they hate them as being infidels. And of the two, if anything, they hate the Russians more cordially than they do the English. This hatred of the foreigner is especially keen in Kabul as distinguished from Kandahar, Balkh, and Herat, in which provinces the people are less fanatical as a mass than are the vicious and turbulent Kabulis. They are more indifferent also as to whom they are governed by, though, of course, they are always ready and willing to give the preference to the best ruler.

The third probable candidate abovenamed, Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, is considered to be a good soldier and able governor, and is generally popular amongst his own tribe, though he has no great following in the country as a whole. He has been living on the bounty of the Russians in Turkistan for several years past, and is devoted to their interests in the well-grounded hope that they will some day assist him to the throne of Kabul. Except for this connection, his chances in Kabul are not now of much value; but it must not be forgotten that the mere fact of his being supported by Russia in his claim to the throne is of itself sufficient to entirely alter the aspect of the political situation at Kabul, and to render him the most dangerous rival of any, not only as concerns the interests of the Heir-apparent, but also as respects the relations of the country with India.

*Question 4.*—What is considered to be each candidate's relative chance of success?

*Answer 4.*—Considering the proverbial instability of parties and politics in Afghanistan, and my present want of information concerning the course of recent events in that country and the prevailing aspect of affairs at Kabul, I find it difficult to answer this question in a manner satisfactory to myself. I will, however, venture to state my views such as they are under the circumstances indicated.

Of the three above-named probable candidates for the throne of Kabul, it appears to me that the nominated Heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdullah Khan, has the best chance of success; and this because it seems determined to make the attempt to establish him on the throne, and because it appears that his party is the strongest in money and strategical position—conditions which give him a considerable advantage over any other claimant likely to appear in the field to contest his right.



On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that these favouring conditions on the side of the Heir-apparent have probably undergone considerable modification since the rupture of the Amir's relations with the Government of India; and the influence of his party will most probably have suffered detrimentally in consequence of the decline in the popularity and prestige of the Amir resulting from his attitude of hostility and reserve towards the British Government. To what extent this may be the case I am not in a position to indicate; but this much may be taken as certain, namely, that in proportion as the influence of Abdullah's party declines, will that of his rivals increase. And which of the two before named as his probable rivals will appear with the strongest party, it is difficult to forecast without a more exact information on the relative position of their parties than I at present possess.

But whatever be the upshot of the first struggle for the succession, it appears to me that neither one, nor the other of the rival claimants will be able to maintain the Government in its existing integrity without very material aid and countenance from abroad. It appears to me as much more likely that, in the course of the contest which is confidently predicted to break out on the death of the reigning Amir, we shall see the end of his dynasty and the dismemberment of his kingdom; the several provinces being seized and held independently by the several candidates for the throne, or by local Chiefs, and all with diverse views, sympathies, and tendencies according to their several positions. Thus, in the event of such contingency becoming matter of fact, Kandahar will probably look for alliance to the Government of India, Herat will most likely declare for that of Persia, and Balkh, more than likely, will at once join with Bokhara under Russian protection; whilst Kabul itself is almost certain to make a determined stand to maintain independence, although it be with isolation at first.

But, setting aside for the moment this probable contingency of the break-up of the Afghanistan Government, let us consider the points in favour of Sirdar Abdullah Khan's being able successfully to carry it on after the death of the Amir. In the first place, he is the nominated and proclaimed Heir-apparent by the Amir's choice and special act, and has been formally acknowledged as such by the Chiefs and nobles of the country, who have solemnly pledged their sincerity by oath on the Koran in public Durbar to accept him as the Amir's successor. Then, he has been carefully educated for the duties of the position to which he has been nominated, and has been placed in command of an important division of the army, with the express object of securing the loyalty and fidelity of the whole body. Again, care has been taken to consolidate a party in his favour, and to secure their fidelity and attachment by appeal to their personal interests in the shape of rank, position, favours, and appointments; whilst, further, the most important commands have been given to trustworthy adherents, who have been raised to positions of responsibility and power from very subordinate situations solely for the purpose of securing their services on behalf of the Heir-apparent in the hour of his need.

The most important of these appointments outside the capital are the command of the troops at Kandahar under General Safdar Ali Khan, and the government of the Balkh Province under Shabghassi Sherdil Khan. Both these officers accompanied the Amir when he came to India in 1869 to meet Lord Mayo at the Ambala Durbar. At that time the former held the position of treasurer of the Amir's household, and the latter that of a chamberlain in his court.

Finally, the grandfather of the Heir-apparent is Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan of Furrab in the Kandahar Province. He is a Chief of undoubted influence in all the country westward of Ghazni, and by some is considered the most powerful noble in all Afghanistan. His proclivities, until recently, have uniformly been manifested on the side of Persia; and when the Amir decided on proclaiming his grandson Heir-apparent, this Sirdar ostensibly deprecated the act, and maintained a show of favouring the prior claim of Yakub in order to allay jealousy and factions amongst the tribes, and to appease the Persian party with whom he was in good favour. But it is well understood in the family that his influence and sympathies are in reality all on the side of his grandson; and since the imprisonment of Yakub this has been manifested by his abstaining from interceding for his release, and, on the contrary, acknowledging that the punishment was the just retribution of a rebellious son's ambitious and parricidal schemes aimed at the overthrow and usurpation of the throne.

Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan is reputed one of the best informed of the Afghan nobles, and is looked up to on account of his age and experience, and his advice is supposed to carry weight in the councils of the Amir. He is a fine type of the Afghan Sirdar of the old school, though he is not quite so conservative as to neglect the teachings of the logic of facts in so far as is connected with the immediate interests and welfare of his people and country. Latterly, his political tendencies, it is said, are cautiously veering round to the British side, on account of the troublous prospect ahead, and his dread of Russian encroachments. He is supposed to be anxious to effect a restoration of the previous friendly relations with the British Government in order to secure their good-will and support in the interests of the Heir-apparent, as well as for himself and family, in the event of civil war and the dismemberment of the country.

Besides these above-mentioned points in favour of the success of Sirdar Abdullah Khan as a candidate for the throne, he has also the ostensible support of the Kizilbash and Ghilzai factions at Kabul. It appears, however, that neither of these is to be depended upon; and in this uncertainty lies the danger of the Heir-apparent's position at Kabul. Everything at first will depend upon the conduct of the troops. If the army, on which he relies for support



is loyal to the Heir-apparent, and faithful to his cause, then matters will go well with him, and all parties, accepting the situation, will preserve their *pardah*, that is escape committing themselves by any rash act of opposition.

But, in the opposite case, if his party proves treacherous, if the troops be successfully tampered with, and the army swerves from its allegiance and fidelity, then civil war is sure to eventuality, be found on the side of the Heir-apparent.

What may be Abdullah Khan's chances of overcoming such opposition and defection it is difficult to define, as I am ignorant of the existing state of parties at the capital; though outside of Kabul he would probably be able to rely on the loyalty of Kandahar, and, perhaps, of Balkh, so long only, however, as he could show a bold front in the field; but not a whit longer, certainly in the case of the latter province.

All these above-mentioned advantages in favour of Abdullah's success, it must be distinctly understood, are what he possessed in their fullness prior to the Amir's rupture with the Government of India. To what extent they have suffered by that act of his father, it is difficult to gauge with the scanty information at my command. There can, however, be no doubt that they have suffered materially, and, to some extent, been nullified as a result of the Amir's loss of popularity and prestige consequent upon his suicidal attitude towards the British Government; the friendship and support of which is acknowledged by the people of all parties in Afghanistan to be the mainstay of the independence, and integrity of their country. Another point, which must not be omitted from the calculation, as telling against the chances of the Heir-apparent's success, is the character of his father, and the estimation in which he is held by the people as Amir.

Shere Ali Khan has never been a favourite amongst his own people. At the time when he was Governor of Ghazni, during the lifetime of his father the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, he had the unenviable reputation of being a violent, irascible, and severe ruler, addicted to indulgence in opium and hemp drugs, and subject alternately to fits of aberration of intellect and religious zeal. Neither has he acquired popularity, or favour, since his accession to the throne as Amir. His stability in this position has been secured to him solely by the friendship and good offices on his behalf of the British Government. And so great was the influence of his friendly relations with the Government of India, that during the first years of his reign he was enabled to carry out, without any active opposition, a number of obnoxious innovations in the administration of the Government—changes which at the time produced loud complaint and widespread discontent, and were prevented from exciting revolt solely by the strength of his position in alliance with the British Government. These distasteful acts of the Amir have not tended to make him a popular ruler amongst his countrymen at any time; and now, since his rupture with the British, he is decidedly unpopular; and it is very doubtful whether he can continue much longer to maintain his present attitude of isolation. At present the evil hour appears to be deferred from day to day by makeshift intrigues with Russian agents, who, if popular rumour is to be credited, are fast entailing Shere Ali in their snares, to the distraction of his own better judgment and natural inclination for a renewal of relations on the side of India.

All this does not pass unnoticed by the people, and, coupled with the declining star of Shere Ali's prosperity, cannot fail to reflect some influence upon the Heir-apparent's future prospects. The unpopularity of the father may pass to the son of his choice, and the Heir-apparent may be rejected by the people. Be this as it may, there seems to be no doubt of the determination of his adherents to put Sirdar Abdullah Khan forward as the rightful successor to the throne of Kabul. What will be the issue of the attempt remains to be seen. I have discussed the *pros* and *cons* of his chances, so far as my acquaintance at the moment with the kaleidoscope of Afghan politics has enabled me to do. And at the best his chances of succeeding to the Government in its integrity, though better, in my opinion, than those of the other probable candidates named, are small indeed.

As regards the chances of success on the side of Yakub Khan, it appears to me that this Sirdar will be very fortunate if he have the opportunity of trying any chance at all. But on the supposition that he is liberated, or effects his escape from prison, the probability is that he will not lack friends, nor find difficulty in rapidly uniting his adherents and well-wishers into a formidable coalition, either at Kabul or Herat, according to whether he is able to make a *coup-de-main* upon the capital, or is forced to flee to Herat, there to organize his attack.

Should he escape assassination on the death of the Amir, or before that event, or his dethronement, and be liberated by his adherents in the city, he would probably at once secure the support of the Kizilbash and Ghilzai Chiefs of Kabul, together with that of a portion at least of the army at the capital.

And if this be so, it means the flight, or capture, or death, of the Heir-apparent, and a clear field at Kabul itself in the first eventuality, and probably over the whole country at no distant date in either of the others, provided he is met by no early check, or opposition, from other rivals.

So far as I can judge, it seems highly improbable that Yakub can settle himself in the throne of his father without opposition. The Kandahar tribes and the Tarnak Valley Ghilzais under Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, grandfather of the Heir-apparent, are not at all likely to submit to be squeezed to fill the empty treasury at Kabul without firm opposition. Whilst as for

Balkh and Herat, it is impossible to forecast the exact nature of the influences they may come under, though it may be reckoned as most probable that, in the event of the Heir-apparent's failure, Balkh would be at once seized by Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, who would then confront Yakub as a rival for the possession of the throne; and that Herat would be pounced upon by the Persians, if not by preconcerted arrangement held by some local Chief in the interest of Yakub, or, which is less likely, if not already secured by precautionary measures on the part of the Kandahar Governor.

But, setting aside such possible contingencies, and supposing Yakub to be in undisputed possession of Kabul, it does not seem likely that the other provinces will acknowledge his authority, so long as Kandahar successfully resists it. Much will depend upon the season of the year at which the contemplated contest for the throne takes place; because from the middle of November to the end of February no active military operations on an adequate scale can be carried on from Kabul against any of the provinces, owing to the closure of the road at Ghazni, and of the passes over the Hindu Kush, by snow.

So that if the Amir were to die, or be dethroned, towards the close of the year, the provincial Governors and local Chiefs would, in the event of their taking such step, have ample time to secure their independence, and to make their arrangements to maintain it against the capital which drained them of their revenue and resources without any compensatory return.

In such case, Yakub would have to content himself with holding Kabul alone as the whole of his Government. And this, it appears to me, will be the ultimate limit of the authority of the ruler of Kabul, whoever he may be; for I do not believe in the possibility of the existence of the country in its present integrity for a much longer period, simply from its inability to produce the revenue required to carry on the administration of the Government on the system now pursued.

I have stated, in my answer to question 1, that the claim of Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan to the throne of Kabul is of importance now only on account of the probability of his cause being promoted by the Russians. But this contingency, it is necessary here to bear in mind, is one of the gravest importance as a factor in turning the scales of success from one side to another. The open, or even clandestine, espousal of this Sirdar's cause by the Russians is calculated to completely change the heretofore existing political status of the country, by importing into its sphere an order of interests diametrically opposed to those of the British Government, and hostile to the peace of the Indian Empire, and, as the least disturbing influence, to lead to new combinations, which will very speedily alter the map of the country, as well as its foreign relations.

In the event of this Sirdar appearing on the scene as a candidate for the throne of Kabul on the death of the Amir, his chances of success will depend, in my opinion, entirely upon the amount of support accorded to him at the first start by the Russians. I have never heard that he has any large, or influential, party at Kabul; but there are certain circumstances connected with his claim which carry great weight amongst the Afghans generally, and amongst the Barakzais, his own tribe, especially.

To understand clearly the importance of these circumstances, it is necessary to recall to mind a few facts connected with the succession to the throne of the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan. I briefly recapitulate them here for convenience sake.

The late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, several years before his death, and previous to his interview with Sir John Lawrence at Peshawur in the beginning of 1857, nominated Sirdar Ghulam Haidar Khan, a younger son by a favourite wife, as his Heir-apparent; and on his predeceasing in 1858, the Amir nominated his full-brother, Sirdar Shere Ali Khan (the present Amir), as Heir-apparent in his stead, and in preference to the claims of his two eldest sons, the Sirdars Mahomed Afzal Khan and Mahomed Azim Khan, who were full-brothers by another wife.

This choice of the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan was, on each occasion at the time, received with great disfavour by the Afghan nobles, as being an arbitrary innovation upon the old-established rights of primogeniture as acknowledged by the nation at large; and, up to the time of the old Amir's death, the subject was a constant theme of discussion, and fruitful source of dissensions and party combinations amongst the tribes. The Amir was fully aware of the sentiments of his people on this particular, and of their party coalitions; but he never swerved from his determination, although, for years before his death, it was everywhere well understood that the event would be the signal for a bloody contest between the rival claimants of the throne.

And surely, as was predicted and expected, the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan was no sooner dead (he died at Herat about July 1863), than war broke out between his nominee, the present Amir Shere Ali Khan, and his elder sons, the brothers Afzal and Azim. The country was convulsed by civil war for five and a half years, when, in the beginning of 1869, Shere Ali finally overcame all opposition, and, recovering Kabul for the third time, straightway threw himself upon the British Government for support, and, leaving his son Yakub in charge of his capital, came to India to meet the Viceroy and Governor-General in Durbar at Ambala.

At the time that Amir Shere Ali Khan recovered Kabul, that city and province were held by Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, who, on the death of his brother Afzal in 1867, had assumed the Government as Amir of Afghanistan. His title, however, had never been acknowledged by the Government of India, nor by other neighbouring Powers, and his name

is not now reckoned amongst the Amirs of Afghanistan. But it was otherwise with his elder brother and lawful successor to the throne, by right of birth and right of conquest, the Amir Mahomed Afzal Khan. His claim to the title and dignity was acknowledged by the people, and recognized by the Government of India under Lord Lawrence, and his name is now counted as the second Amir of Afghanistan.

On the death of Amir Mahomed Afzal Khan after a reign of about six months, during which Shere Ali was a fugitive in the direction of Bokhara, his eldest son, Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, hastened down from his Government in Balkh to Kabul, and claimed the succession; but he was opposed by his uncle Azim, who, under an agreement with the Amir Mahomed Afzal Khan, had taken his vacant place on the throne.

Abdurrahman made a fruitless attempt to enforce his claim, and, being driven from Kabul territory, fled to Bokhara, where he found an asylum with the Amir there. From this he passed on to Russian territory, and there met with an hospitable reception.

At this time it was expected by the Sirdar's partizans in Kabul that he would shortly make another attempt to secure the throne under the auspices of Russian countenance and support; but Shere Ali's position as Amir at once became so secure on his return from the Ambala Durbar, that hope abandoned all his enemies; and the adherents of Abdurrahman, in common with those of others in the field of intrigue and ambition, seeing no prospect of success, quickly surrendered his cause, and accommodated themselves to the new régime.

It is now ten years since this Sirdar fled from Kabul; and his claims are at this time almost forgotten by the people, except by his family and tribal kinsmen. But it is still very possible, should he appear in the field with a fair following, that the merits of his case would speedily arouse general sympathy, and bring a considerable party of the tribesmen to his side; because he is the rightful heir of Amir Mahomed Afzal Khan, who was the rightful heir and successor of the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan. His chance of success, however, would depend entirely upon his backing at the outset, and even then would not be of any stability unless he had the support and recognition of the Russians; and this aspect of the case would in turn depend upon the views and action of the Government of India; for, as before stated, I do not believe in the continued integrity of Afghanistan under any Amir who has not the support of the British Government.

*Question 5.*—Who are the principal supporters of each of these probable candidates?

*Answer 5.*—This question I have indirectly answered in my remarks following the two preceding questions. I am at present unable to give the names of any leading men, or tribal Chiefs, who have identified themselves with the cause of either of the above-named probable candidates.

*Question 6.*—In what part of the kingdom would each candidate be likely to find most support?

*Answer 6.*—From what I have already said it will have been gathered that my information leads me to the belief that, provided Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan does not enter the field backed by Russia, the Heir-apparent, Sirdar Abdullah Khan, has a fair chance of support at Kabul, in Kandahar, and at Balkh. But at the same time it appears to me very improbable that the successive Russian agents at the court of the Amir should have entirely failed to avail themselves of the opportunities of their position to foster in the minds of the friends and adherents of Abdurrahman Khan the hope of their exiled prince making his appearance at the right time to claim his throne; and it is not out of the range of probability that they may have arrived at an understanding on this point with Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, the Amir's Governor at Balkh.

In this view of the case, Abdurrahman would find no difficulty in making himself master of Balkh; and this would be the signal for his partizans at Kabul to collect their forces for his support directly he advanced across the Hindu Kush. If the case of Abdurrahman is left out of the reckoning, and we consider only Yakub's and the Heir-apparent's respective likelihood of success, then I think the latter has the best chance in Kabul, Kandahar, and Balkh; whilst Yakub would find support, out of Kabul, only in Herat, and the two provinces are cut off from communication for fully three, if not four, months of the year.

---

Memorandum by MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, dated 29th July 1878.

The rapidly becoming disorganized state of Afghanistan, consequent on the misgovernment and oppressive rule of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, affords opportunity for speculating on the course that events are likely to take when the crisis, which sooner or later must occur, shall have been reached. That a revolution or popular demonstration of some kind has not taken place ere this, is a matter of surprise; but, nevertheless, there are reasons to account for what appears to be most extraordinary patience and long-suffering by the people of Afghanistan, under oppression and exactions unequalled perhaps in their past history.

The principal reason may be said to be the want of a leader to organize and direct any such revolutionary movement; for Shere Ali Khan, from the time he re-established himself in power throughout his kingdom, devoted all his attention to either deporting from Afghanistan,

or keeping under close surveillance at Kabul, every one who could be regarded in the smallest degree a rival. He also took care to entrust the government of the principal provinces to men possessing no family influence in the localities they were placed in charge of. An exception to this may be noticed in the appointment of Mir Afzal Khan at Kandahar; but, as he is the father of the Amir's favourite wife, no apprehensions regarding his loyalty existed. The case was somewhat different with regard to Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, the Amir's half-brother, who was placed in charge of the province of Kuram, and who was not altogether a man that Shere Ali Khan could afford to despise, even though he did not possess the capabilities of some of the other competitors. The Kuram Valley was not, however, a good *point d'appui* from which to start any designs against the Ruler of Kabul, nor were its inhabitants likely to stand by their Barakzai Governor in any crisis of the kind.

On the whole, therefore, the Governors of provinces were men who had no great personal ambition, and who devoted their time to filling their own pockets at the expense of the people of the districts they were sent to govern. As long as the revenue due to the Kabul Treasury was remitted, it mattered nothing to the Amir what his lieutenants might exact on their own account, though subsequently this afforded Shere Ali Khan the pretext for demanding a share in these ill-gotten gains, by threatening to call upon them for an account of their stewardship. The chief appointments in the army were conferred on men of no great social position, such as Hosain Ali Khan, Safdar Ali Khan, and Daud Shah—men who fully recognized that the retention of their posts depended entirely on the Amir Shere Ali Khan continuing in power. The complete failure of Sirdar Yakub Khan's attempt at rebellion, when he was in power at Herat, and his submission to the Amir, seems to have convinced every one of the utter hopelessness of any design against Shere Ali Khan, as far as internal revolt, unsupported by external aid, is concerned.

It is, moreover, felt that the estrangement between Shere Ali Khan and the British Government is only temporary, and that, in the event of a future reconciliation taking place, the same assistance would be given to annihilate those who, in the meanwhile, trusting to the withdrawal of the moral support of the English authorities, had attempted to defy the Amir's power, as was given after the Ambala Durbar, and which unquestionably did much in helping Shere Ali Khan towards consolidating his authority throughout Afghanistan.

One more reason may be put forward to explain the inaction, up to the present, on the part of the people of Afghanistan, namely, that since the Amir commenced levying money by every conceivable process of extortion, and added to the discontent of the nation by introducing compulsory enlistment, an amount of unnatural excitement has been kept up throughout the country which has prevented the people from having too much leisure to ponder over their own grievances, and has made them cling to the hope that something would take place which would procure the relief they wished for, without forcing them to take the initiative.

During the summer of last year, the calling to Kabul of the Chiefs of the tribes, and the pretended preparations for a holy war, gave people plenty to talk and think about; then followed the Turkish mission to Kabul, which was supposed to portend a reconciliation between the Amir and the British Government; and, latterly, the complications in Europe arising out of the war between Turkey and Russia, led to the general idea that something would take place which would, at all events, relieve the pressure and produce some change—the cry of one and all being that any change must certainly be for the better.

The following brief *résumé* of the Amir's line of conduct during the past twelve months will help to preface the remarks about to be made on the present situation of affairs at Kabul.

After the closing of the Peshawur Conference, the Amir endeavoured to attract attention by his efforts to create religious excitement along the British frontier by preparations for a holy war; and with the object of increasing his own self-importance, and to shew the influence he could exercise over the neighbouring petty States, he summoned their Chiefs to Kabul to tender allegiance to him as the Mahomedan ruler of Afghanistan, and unite with him against a common enemy.

Attracted by promises of having fixed allowances granted them for the future, in addition to receiving immediate presents of money and arms, a certain number of Chiefs and representatives attended at the capital. They speedily discovered that they were not likely to receive more than a very small proportion of what they had been led to hope for, and the result of their visit to Kabul did not impress them at all favourably. The want of moral support from the Akhund of Swat—who openly declared that Shere Ali Khan was really trying to auction himself to the highest bidder of the two European Powers, and that, in his endeavours to raise a holy war, he was only animated by worldly desire—caused the "jihad" movement to attract but little notice, and it soon ceased to be even talked about. Having failed in this matter, and being more especially discomfited at the attitude of indifference displayed by the British authorities,—imagining, as he did, that the mere suggestion of the possibility of a Mahomedan rising on the frontier would be certain to create sufficient alarm to suit the purpose he had in view—the Amir turned his attention towards the Russian authorities in Turkistan, and commenced a correspondence with Governor-General Kauffmann, which is still going on. It was evidently not at all the Amir's intention that anything definite should come of this intercourse, as he believed that the war with Turkey would prevent the Russians from



devoting much attention to Afghan matters, and he trusted in the meanwhile to be able to keep up a flirtation that should cause anxiety to the British Government, hoping that this would lead to steps being taken in order to dissuade him from entering into an alliance with the Russians, and that this might pave the way to a re-opening of negotiations with the Government, and that he might be saved the loss of pride in having to take the first step towards reconciliation.

He has been grievously disappointed at the result. On the one hand, the British authorities have shewn the most complete indifference to what the Amir has done; while, on the other hand, the Russians appear to have lost no time in taking advantage of whatever overtures the Amir may have made them. Not only so, but they have evidently led him to imagine that, if he does not consent to the proposals they have submitted for his consideration, they will regard it as an affront sooner or later to be resented. The Amir also perceived that, even if he had really contemplated any sort of alliance with the Russians, they were by no means prepared to give him what he wanted, or to throw out any hopes that the same kind of pecuniary aid would be given as his English allies had furnished him with on more than one occasion; and if a report received on this subject can be credited, it would seem that the Russian Agent at Kabul, with a candour not generally noticeable in the dealings of the nation he represented, admitted that there was no intention to supply the Amir with grants of money, but that he should be content with the promise of support and recognition as the Ruler of Afghanistan.

It is highly improbable, now that the situation in Europe is changed, that the Russians, whatever their intentions may have been, will openly interfere with Shere Ali Khan within the recognized limits of Afghan territory, nor has the Amir, up to the present time, ever had any real apprehensions on this score. What he does fear, and what the Russians could easily do without directly appearing in the matter, is, that the cue might be given to Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan to recommence intrigue in Balkh or Badakhshan; and though the Amir, with his habitual contempt for his remaining rivals, might care little for what his nephew could do on his own account, he knows full well that, with the moral support of the Russians, he would not be a competitor to be thought too lightly of; and, at all events, that in the present discontented state of the country, any serious disturbances in the northern provinces might set the whole of Afghanistan in a blaze, to quell which would tax the Amir's resources to the very utmost.

Meanwhile, the Amir, so as not to provoke the displeasure of his powerful neighbours, has endeavoured to gain some little time by informing the Russian emissary at Kabul that, before he can give a definite answer to the proposals he has received, it will be necessary for him to consult the wishes of the Chiefs of his country. But even the temporary delay gained by this reply is, by all accounts, of small comfort to the Amir, who is described to be at the present moment in the greatest alarm and perplexity. He himself has no great confidence in the Russians, nor would an alliance with them be acceptable to the Afghan nation. He would, it is generally believed, gladly embrace any opportunity for re-opening communication with the British Government, provided he had not to make the first move.

As regards the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan, the present situation of affairs may be briefly described.

It has been already stated that the people of the country are groaning under the taxes and exactions put upon them by the Amir. The troops, irregularly and badly paid, and often without food to subsist upon, have latterly taken to foraging for themselves at the expense of the peasantry. But without a leader, capable of welding into one mass the different tribes and factions into which the country is divided, it seems most unlikely that any combined movement in the shape of a general revolution can take place. A sporadic case or two of disaffection, such as occurred in Kuram last year, or the more recent disturbances at Mukar in the Ghilzai country, could not be expected to effect much good. The usual practice in dealing with such cases, is for the Amir to despatch to the disaffected locality a few regiments recruited from tribes which have no clannish sympathy with the rebels; and as the soldiers are allowed full liberty in the matter, they are by no means disinclined to pillage and enrich themselves by whatever they can lay hands on. It therefore follows that the people of a single district, unless they are assured of some powerful assistance from without, hesitate before they plunge into rebellion; and even when once committed to open resistance against the authorities, they usually, when struggling by themselves, have but little heart to persist in it, when they perceive that coercive measures are in course of preparation against them.

It is on this account that the Amir has little fear of the people of the outlying districts and provinces being able, of themselves, to do much against his authority, and he has done his best to deprive them of leaders. Moreover, in the past history of Afghanistan it does not appear that disturbances of the kind, as a mere demonstration against oppressive government, have caused more than temporary anxiety to the ruler of the day. What has generally happened, and what may possibly take place in the present instance, is that the people being in a very disaffected state, would gladly take the opportunity to turn against the Amir and give their support to any influential Chief who, with the view to seizing the government of the country, should place himself at the head of a rebellion, and especially if the enterprise presented fair prospects of ultimate success. Among the influential Chiefs of the Barakzai family, or of the leading men throughout Afghanistan, there is now no one left who can be described



as a staunch or useful adherent of the Amir. He has completely alienated, by his utter want of consideration, the sympathies of many who rendered him good service during the time he was struggling with other competitors for the Afghan kingdom.

For some time Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, son of Sirdar Mirdil Khan, Kandhari, was reputed to be one of the most loyal adherents the Amir possessed. Even though disappointed about the Governorship of Kandahar, he managed, during his sojourn at Kabul, to retain for a considerable time the Amir's favour; but latterly this has entirely changed, and it is reported that the Amir goes so far as to abuse him publicly in open Durbar. Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, Governor of Kandahar (provisionally for Sirdar Abdullah Jan, the Heir-apparent), though not hostile to the Amir, has no great trust in him, and does not venture to Kabul for fear that he should be called upon to pay something under the pretence of arrears of revenue—a demand from which no one, however loyal, appears able to escape.

Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan's loyalty was always of a time-serving character. He has managed to keep fairly well with the Amir by voluntarily tendering a cash contribution of some two or three lakhs of rupees. He has latterly been rather apprehensive of some further call for money being made from him; as are also the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, and the Commander-in-Chief, General Daud Shah Khan; and this has led to all three entering into a defensive coalition to stand by each other should the Amir attempt to disgrace any one of them.

Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, the Amir's eldest son, and now Governor at Kabul, needs no special notice. He is unambitious, and utterly incapable. Mirakhor Ahmed Khan is perhaps the only devoted adherent the Amir possesses; but he has not any influence. Even he has become somewhat discontented in consequence of the Amir paying no attention to his recommendations in favor of the appointment of the late Nouroz Khan's son to the Governorship at Lal-pura; and also because the Amir appeared inclined to press him in the matter of the collecting of the revenues of Jalalabad.

General Ghulam Haidar Khan, recently summoned to Kabul from Dakka, where he commanded the troops, appears to have acted up to the Amir's wishes, if the report connecting him with the late assassination of Khudai Nazar Khan is correct. This will cause him to be hated by the Mustaufi, and the Wardak tribe generally.

At Herat, Sirdar Mahomed Umar Khan, the Governor, and Hosain Ali Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the troops, are said to be loyal to the Amir's interests; but, as they are men of no personal influence, and only derive their authority from the Amir himself, they would not be able to render him much assistance if his power appeared to be on the decline.

The same may be said of the petty Governors of districts; for the policy which induced the Amir to appoint to these charges men of no local influence, for fear that they might become too powerful, will be found to re-act against him in times of serious trouble; but doubtless the over-confidence of the Amir induces him to think that this latter contingency is not likely to arise.

The Generals and Colonels of the Army would, in the event of a crisis, act as these men have always done hitherto. There would be the usual amount of tampering with, and defections, and the party which could bid highest would be sure to secure the services of a great portion of them. It would, of course, depend materially on the person in whose cause their services were required, and whether there appeared a fair chance of success.

The death of Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, the Governor of Afghan Turkistan, has lately been reported. It took place at Bamian during his return from Kabul. There is a rumour, which is currently believed, that for some time past the Amir has suspected him of carrying on secret correspondence with the Russians in Samarcand and Tashkend, and that lately some such letters were intercepted by the Amir's spies. It is supposed that poison was put in the Shahghassi's food, and that Lal Mahomed, Farrashbashi, who, under orders from the Amir, proceeded at once to Balkh to take charge of the government, was concerned in the matter. This event following so soon after the assassination of Khudai Nazar Khan, Wardak, and the same system of removing objectionable parties having been followed in the cases of Mahomed Aslam Khan, Atta Mahomed Khan, Shahghassi, and others, cannot do otherwise than increase the feeling of insecurity which exists at Kabul; and the treatment suffered by the widow of Mulla Hukmat of Tagas has shewn every one that the Amir will stop at nothing.

Whether the death of the Shahghassi will make any difference in Afghan Turkistan, or whether Lal Mahomed will be able to manage that province, remains to be seen. As the ex-Mirs of Maimana and Shibbarghan, and such leading men in Turkistan and Badakshan regarding whom the Amir had reason to be anxious, are either in confinement or under surveillance at Kabul, or have disappeared across the Oxus, it is unlikely that there will be any trouble in these northern provinces of Afghanistan unless it comes from without.

The Chiefs of tribes and clans such as the Ghilzai, Kohistanis, Kizilbash, &c., need but very little mention. They are, without exception, dissatisfied at the treatment they have received from the Amir. Arsala Khan, Ghilzai, served the Amir faithfully, and did much towards keeping his tribe in order; yet the breath was scarcely out of his body when the Amir made large demands from Mazulla Khan, his son and successor, and reduced the allowances the late Chief enjoyed.

Ismatulla Khan, the Chief of the Jabbar Khel Ghilzai, has never tried to conceal the dissatisfaction he felt at the imprisonment of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, as this Chief had given the Sirdar solemn assurances of considerate treatment by the Amir when he persuaded him to leave Herat and accompany him to Kabul; yet the Amir did not hesitate to disavow the safe conduct this Chief had given. At the same time, the Amir has shewn a certain amount of deference towards Ismatulla Khan in other respects, and apparently does not care to press this influential Ghilzai Chief too much.

Faiz Mahomed Khan, a petty Chief amongst the Ghilzai, is at present in command of the Amir's levies at the lately reconstructed fort at Ali Masjid in the Khaibar Pass. He is said to be loyally disposed to the Amir.

Of the competitors who challenged Shere Ali Khan's succession to the throne on the death of the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, or who took a conspicuous part against him during the civil war in Afghanistan, the only survivors of any importance are—Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, who is, together with his cousin Sirdar Mahomed Ishak Khan, in exile at Samarcand; Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, at present at Kabul; and Sirdars Mahomed Sharif Khan and Jelaluddin Khan, who are residing within British territory.

The former partizans of the Sirdars, who are in exile, have long ceased to regard them as having any chance whatever of effectually carrying out their ambitious designs against the Amir; and even though the present disaffected state of Afghanistan offers very favorable opportunities for political intrigue, it is very unlikely that these Sirdars, being without money, and with their personal influence very much lessened owing to the long time they have been absent from their country, could induce many people to embark on such a very unpromising undertaking. Could, however, any of these exiles give the smallest indication that they were being supported in any way by the Governments under whose protection they have been residing, the case would be somewhat different, and it is likely enough that they could succeed in stirring up a rebellion which might cause Shere Ali Khan the loss of his throne. But, even if such action resulted in doing this, the change would be of no immediate benefit to the people of Afghanistan, for the country would once more be plunged into civil war; competitors would again arise, each vying with the other, either for the succession to the throne, or for the government of the most favored provinces; and though each party might be sufficiently powerful to hold its own in different parts of the kingdom, there would be no single Chief who would be powerful enough to crush the rest and restore order and tranquillity throughout Afghanistan.

The adherents of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan have long since become disheartened; and, unless his release from prison could be first secured, popular as he used to be, there would not be found many who would rush to arms on his behalf, believing, as they do, that any serious demonstration of the kind would be the signal for the young prince's assassination.

Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan is not likely to initiate any opposition against the Amir. He may be driven to do something of the kind, or circumstances might occur which would give him an opening for claiming the throne; and as he has a very strong faction in his favor, possesses money, and is on the spot, he might have a better chance of success than others who are more brilliant than he is. He would be quite a puppet in the hands of the Mustaufi, and it would consequently suit the latter's purposes to see him at the head of the Government.

To speculate as to what turn affairs in Afghanistan may take, has always been, at the best of times, a most uncertain undertaking.

It is quite possible that the people, driven to utter desperation, may at any time rise in rebellion, which, once started in any of the provinces, would rapidly spread over the whole kingdom; and the Amir's difficulties might be enhanced by a mutiny amongst the troops. Should such an event take place, or, what appears to be a more likely contingency, should the death of the Amir re-open the question regarding the succession to the throne, what would probably be the position of affairs? One thing may be regarded as tolerably certain to take place, and that is, that if the Amir were to find himself hard pressed and forced to leave the capital, or if he considered himself to be at the point of death, he would most assuredly cause the assassination of Yakub Khan. Even the sudden death of the Amir would not benefit the Sirdar unless he had adherents on the spot to open his prison-gates and set him at liberty; but they would have to act very promptly, to anticipate the designs of the Heir-apparent's mother, who would, without the slightest delay, cause Yakub Khan to be put to death. It would then be a question between her influence and that of Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan with the principal personages of the Kabul Durbar. She has the reputation of being a clever woman; and as she has complete access to the private treasure amassed by the Amir, she would be able to expend the necessary amount of money in order to strengthen her faction. If she succeeded in getting her son proclaimed Amir at Kabul, she would then summon her father, Mir Afzal Khan, from Kandahar to act as regent for Abdullah Jan. If Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan perceived that he had no prospect of succeeding to the throne, he would be content with the Governorship of Turkistan. It would be in this province that either Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan or Abdullah Jan would have to take immediate measures for preventing its falling into the possession of Abdurrahman Khan, who, unless restrained by the Russian authorities, would, the moment he heard of the Amir's death, or of a revolution in Afghanistan, at once cross the Oxus and endeavour to regain his lost authority. He would have, however, to bring with him a tolerably large force to obtain even

a temporary footing in Afghan Turkistan, or he would have to be fairly confident of being able to tamper with the troops; as the Amir has taken the precaution of placing the principal commands throughout that province in the hands of officers like Faiz Mahomed Khan, Logarri, Syud Parwez Shah, and Syud Ahmed (brother-in-law to the late Naib Mahomed Alum Khan), all of whom are bitter personal enemies of Abdurrahman Khan.

In Kandahar and Herat, the cause of either Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, or the heir-apparent, would prosper equally well. The relationship by marriage between Wali Mahomed Khan and Mir Afzal Khan is just as close as the latter's connection with Abdullah Jan, and, as long as the Kandahari family were conciliated with grants of government in Kandahar, Girishik, and Farrah, they would probably be content for a while to remain passive and watch the progress of events. At Herat, Mahomed Umar Khan (whose death, lately reported, appears to have been unfounded) and the Commander-in-Chief of the troops, Hosain Ali Khan, would carry on as they are now doing. Both Wali Mahomed Khan and the mother of the Heir-apparent are well disposed towards an English alliance; and it is probable that the temporary success of either would lead to overtures being made for support and recognition by the British Government; and it would depend very materially on the nature of such support as to whether any further struggle for supremacy ensued or not; for, even assuming the succession of either of the two Sirdars to have been effected as easily as has been above depicted, it could scarcely be expected that the new Ruler would find himself left for long in uncontested possession of the throne. The latent spirit of rivalry and intrigue which has been kept down by the stern and crushing measures adopted by Shere Ali Khan, would, if time were given for development, soon burst out into as fierce a competition for supreme authority as was the case fifteen years ago when the present Ruler succeeded his father.

But, if neither the death of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, or a general revolution against his government, are of proximate occurrence, it seems desirable to consider what should be the policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan. The policy of indifference with regard to the unfriendly attitude of the Amir, which has been followed since the termination of the Peshawur Conference, has, without doubt, been the proper course to adopt. It is questionable whether it is advisable to continue passive much longer.

The Russian military movements in Trans-Oxiana, though probably very much exaggerated in the reports that were first received, appear at all events, whatever their ultimate object may be, to be directed at present to the establishment of Russian stations along the banks of the Oxus. By their treaty with the Amir of Bokhara, the Russians obtained the right to establish on the Bokharian banks (*i.e.*, both banks) of the Oxus, wharves and storehouses for merchandize, the Government of Bokhara being responsible for their protection. It would not be out of keeping with their customary commercial transactions with these petty States, that the Russian authorities should find it necessary hereafter to locate military cantonments, in consequence of the Bokhara Government having been found unable to provide the protection it guaranteed. But, in the present instance, the farce of putting forward "commercial reasons" does not seem to have been thought necessary, for, according to native opinion, the campaigns against Khiva and Khokand practically extended the Russian Empire up to the banks of the Oxus, and the movements they are now engaged with, will only be considered as the act of taking possession of what had been acquired by right of conquest. The natives of the country thoroughly understand the position of affairs, no matter what explanations may be offered to the European Governments. The optimists who believed in Prince Gortchakoff's manifesto of 1864, excusing the capture of Chemkend as being absolutely necessary for the strategical requirements of the southern Russian frontier, will perhaps now perceive that the Russians do not consider that the expansion of their Empire in Central Asia has yet reached its limit.

In consequence of the present estrangement between the British and Afghan Governments, and availing themselves of whatever overtures the Amir, for his own purposes, may have made them, the Russian authorities in Turkistan have been trying to induce Shere Ali Khan to concede the right of way from the Oxus through Akteha and Andkui to Maimena, and thence by the valley of the Murghab to Sarakhs and the Perso-Turkoman frontier.

The apparent abandonment of Romanoffski's project to open railway communication from the Caspian, either from Mertvi Kuli Bay to the Sea of Aral, or from Krasnovodsk to the Oxus, seems to denote that the Russians are prepared to depend more upon their position at Chikishliar, and their hope of ultimately acquiring the Attrek line, than to looking forward, as the means of connecting their southern Turkistan frontier with the Caspian, to the doubtful possibility of crossing the intervening desert tracts, whose sand-storms, according to Vambéry, might bury not only the rails, but the entire railway-train.

Their direct line would be from Charjui to Merv; and it seems by no means unlikely that their attention at present is directed to a combined movement from the Caspian and the Oxus against the latter place; and if the Amir can be induced to permit them to pass through North-Western Afghanistan, instead of having to construct wells and open up the direct line from Charjui across the desert, they will have obtained very great advantages.

Even supposing that the Russians have no immediate object beyond a desire to connect their Turkistan base with the Caspian, it is obvious that the British Government cannot afford to see them located on the frontiers of Afghanistan, and endeavouring to exercise influence over the Amir of Kabul, without adopting some measures to counteract the evil effects their presence is certain to have on our prestige in Asia.

The first step that is necessary is to put pressure on the Amir to force him to renew friendly relations with our Government; and he should be given distinctly and unmistakeably to understand that, if he declines the proposals that may be made him, or, having accepted them, if he fails in his part of the engagements entered into, the British Government will take measures to protect its own interests, without any reference to him whatever.

This would not be opposed to the principles of the policy we have always avowed in regard to Afghanistan, namely that we desire to see a strong, friendly, and independent power on our north-western frontier; but, having failed to effect this, owing to the obstinacy of the ruler of that country, it would be preposterous if any scruples existed to prevent the free exercise of the power we possess to defend our own interests. If reasons were wanted for treating the Amir as an actual enemy, his conduct during the past eighteen months, and the ill-treatment our merchants and other subjects have suffered while passing through his country, would furnish a full bill of indictment more than sufficient for the purpose; and it is time that he should learn that our forbearance has reached its limit, and that now, for the last time, he is given his choice of being our friend or our declared enemy.

From the remarks recorded above on the state of Afghanistan, it will be observed that to displace the Amir would not be at all a difficult task to perform at the present moment; but it would require quite as much active support on the part of the Government to sustain in power the new ruler desired to be set up, as to obtain more directly on our own account the possession of such places as are deemed indispensable for the protection of our interests. Shere Ali Khan is beyond doubt the most able of the Barakzai family. The manner in which he has succeeded in consolidating his power throughout the country is evidenced by the hesitation to resist his authority, notwithstanding that the whole nation is incensed against him. Could he by any means be made a firm friend, it is clear that he is the best man we could desire to see on the Afghan throne. But it would be quite as unsafe to trust to his assurances of friendship, as to hope that he will, of his own accord, make overtures for a reconciliation, unless the motive in either case was prompted by fear of evil consequences to himself and his dynasty. His temperament is such, that it is very probable that a threat of the kind which has been described above would produce the desired effect.

But, in conveying to him this threat, it would be advisable to keep it in the back-ground at first, and only to use it as an ultimatum in the event of all reasoning with him being of no avail.

It is one of his principal excuses for the failure to effect an amicable understanding at the Peshawur Conference, that his Agent did not study his interests; and it has also been asserted that Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan did not do as much as he might have done in the interests of the British Government when he was sent from Simla to explain the Viceroy's wishes to the Amir.

The duty, therefore, of explaining everything to the Amir, and removing, if possible, whatever doubts there may be in his mind, can only be safely intrusted to a British officer. It would be much more dignified for the Government to depute a British officer than to send a Native Agent, provided that, in the first instance, intimation was sent to the Amir to the effect that the present state of affairs will not be permitted to continue, but that, before putting into force, for the protection of British interests, measures which would be injurious to the Amir, the British Government had decided on deputing a British officer to explain to him its views and proposals, and that the Government is induced to do this from a consideration that possibly the Amir has not been made fully acquainted with the wishes of the British Government. In this communication the Amir should be made to understand that the non-submission of a reply, or the sending of a reply objecting to the course proposed, would be considered as a complete breach of the relations which have existed between the two Governments. The objections to sending a Native Agent would be, that the proceeding would bear a less authoritative appearance than if a British officer was sent, and it would accordingly be regarded as if the Government were desirous of making the first overtures for a reconciliation; the Native Agent's arguments or threats would not carry the same weight as those delivered by a British officer; and lastly, the presence of a British officer would indicate that the Government had determined on taking vigorous measures for re-establishing its influence throughout Afghanistan.

Should the Amir decline to receive the mission, or should the latter fail to effect what was desired, the Government would have to take immediate steps to let it be seen that its relations with Shere Ali Khan were completely at an end and beyond all hope of future reconciliation; and whatever arrangements are decided upon, would have to be put into practice with as little delay as possible.

The policy the Government decides to adopt with regard to Kabul affairs should be acted upon without delay; for inaction at the present moment, when the endeavours of the Russians to establish their influence in Afghanistan are exciting much comment, and are causing our proceedings to be watched with intense interest, would assuredly be ascribed to weakness; and though our position is infinitely stronger than it has ever been, any hesitation would tend to lessen our prestige, and would detach from us many influential parties who are anxious to attach themselves to our cause, and who desire to see a restoration of friendly relations between the British Government and the Ruler of Afghanistan.



Memorandum by T. C. PLOWDEN, Esq., Foreign Under-Secretary, dated 9th August 1878.

(1) *In the event of the death or dethronement of the present Amir, who would be the probable candidates for the vacant throne?*

1. In attempting an answer to this question, I propose to take a somewhat wide range. I would divide the possible candidates for the throne of Kabul into the following five classes, and afterwards select from each the individuals most likely to assert a claim :—

- (i) The descendants of the present Amir Shere Ali ;
- (ii) The descendants of Dost Mahomed, the present Amir's father, excluding, of course, persons named in class (i) ;
- (iii) The descendants of Payinda Khan, Dost Mahomed's father, excluding persons named in classes (i) and (ii) ;
- (iv) The Sadozais ;
- (v) Powerful Chiefs, belonging to neither Royal house.

2. The present Amir's descendants are as follow :—

By a Popalzai wife ... (1) Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan. (2) Sirdar Ibrahim Khan  
(deceased, killed at Kajbaz).

|  
Sirdar Ahmed Ali Khan (by  
a Ghilzai wife).

By a Mohmand wife ... (1) Sirdar Yakub Khan. (2) Sirdar Ayub Khan.  
Sirdar Musa Khan.

By a Barakzai wife ... Sirdar Abdullah Jan.

Among these, Sirdar Yakub Khan, Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan, and Sirdar Abdullah Jan are the probable candidates.

3. From class (ii)—the descendants of Dost Mahomed—I select the following :—

(a) Sirdar Abdul Rahman, son of Sirdar Mahomed Afzal Khan, who reigned from May 1866 to October 1867, and died 7th October 1867. Sirdar Abdul Rahman's mother was a Popalzai, and he has a son, Sirdar Abdullah Khan, also by a Popalzai wife.

(b) Sirdar Azam Khan, reigned in Kabul from 7th October 1867 to January 1869, died 6th October 1869 ; has left, among others, the following issue :—

- (i) Sirdar Mahomed Hashim Khan, by a Khosti wife ;
- (ii) Sirdar Mahomed Ishak Khan, by an Armenian wife ;
- (iii) Sirdar Mahomed Sarwar Khan, by a Ghilzai wife.

(c) Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan, the surviving full-brother of Shere Ali ; has several sons—amongst others, Sirdars Hashim and Kazim Khan, by a Barakzai wife ; Tahir Khan, by a slave-girl ; and Sher Mahomed Khan, by a Popalzai.

(d) Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, half-brother of the present Amir, has four sons—one of them, Nur Mahomed Khan, by a Barakzai wife.

In this class, the most likely candidates are Sirdar Abdul Rahman, Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, and Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan.

4. The third class comprises the Kandahari and Peshawari Sirdars, and other miscellaneous descendants of Payinda Khan, Dost Mahomed's father :—

(a) The Kandahari Sirdars—Payinda Khan had five sons by a Ghilzai Hotak wife. The eldest of these was Mehr Dil Khan, and the youngest Pur Dil. From their descendants I take the following as possible candidates for the throne :—

- (i) Sirdar Sher Ali Khan (Kandahari), son of Mehr Dil Khan by a Babari wife ;
- (ii) Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, son of Pur Dil Khan by a Barakzai wife.

(b) The Peshawari Sirdars, descendants of Payinda Khan by an Alukozai wife. By this wife Payinda Khan had five sons, of whom the eldest, Sirdar Sultan Mahomed, has left an almost innumerable progeny. Two of these—Sirdar Zakaria Khan by a prostitute, and Sirdar Yahya Khan by a Popalzai wife—are men of some note. None of the others appear worth mentioning.

(c) Miscellaneous descendants of Payinda Khan. Of these, two families are prominent :—

(1) Nawab Abdul Jabbar Khan (dead), son of Payinda Khan, by a slave-girl. His son by a Barakzai wife, Sirdar Rahman Khan, is the father of Sirdar Abdul Salam Khan, by a Popalzai wife.

(2) Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan (dead), son of Payinda Khan, by a Barakzai wife. Azim Khan had, by a Kizilbash wife, Sirdar Sultan Ahmad Khan of Herat, who is dead, but has left by a Barakzai wife—

- (i) Sirdar Abdulla Khan,
- (ii) Sirdar Sikandar Khan,
- (iii) Shah Nawaz Khan (his death has just been reported).



I should conjecture that none of the Sirdars named in this class have much prospect of succeeding to the throne of Afghanistan. But, if the country were broken up, one might expect to see Mir Afzal Khan establish himself at Kandahar and Farrah, while Shah Nawaz Khan would possibly try his luck at Herat.

5. Of the Sadozais, the only two that I need mention are Shahzada Shahpur and Shahzada Safdar Jung, sons of Shah Shujah-ul-Mulk, now residing at Ludiana upon pensions from the British Government. Shahpur's mother was a well-born Popalzai lady; Safdar Jung's mother was nobody. The following note by Mr. Thornton, dated 13th July 1877, gives some information concerning them:—"Shahzada Safdar Jung, eldest surviving son of Shah Shujah, called on me yesterday. In the course of conversation he informed me that two men from Kandahar had called upon him and described the deplorable condition of their country, and that he had taken the opportunity of pointing out to them the absurdity of the people of Afghanistan looking towards Russia, which had seized Khokand, Khiva, Bokhara, and Serrekhs, and declared war against the Sultan; instead of looking to England, which was the friend of Turkey and of Islam. He added that, from what he heard from these men and from other sources, it was clear that, in Kandahar and the tracts adjacent, which he described as 'the root of Afghanistan,' there was wide-spread disaffection to the rule of Shere Ali Khan and the Barakzais, and that he felt sure that the slightest encouragement from the British Government would cause the inhabitants to rise against their oppressors. 'If,' he continued, 'the British Government would send me *via* Quetta to Kandahar, I could, in forty days, bring the entire country under the control of the British Government, and Kabul would quickly throw in its lot with Kandahar.' 'Mark my words,' he added, 'by the time I reached the Bolan Pass, the Duranis would be up in arms in my favor, and my entry into Afghanistan with a small escort would be the signal for a general rising in my favor. The British Government has already squandered lakhs of rupees, and enormous gifts of arms and ammunition upon Shere Ali Khan, and has only got in return the proclamation of a *jehad*. Send me to Kandahar, and I will do all you want for Rupees 50,000 at the outside, without asking for a single regiment.'

"Shahzada Safdar Jung resides at Ludiana, and receives a pension from Government of Rupees 250 per mensem. At the time of our disasters in Afghanistan, he joined the ranks of the Duranis and was for a time our enemy. Latterly he behaved better, and, when Nott left Kandahar, he handed over the keys to Shahzada Safdar Jung. Though he is the eldest surviving son of Shah Shujah, he is not the highest in rank; his half-brother, Shahpur, a very respectable man, and also a Ludiana pensioner, ranks above him, and sat for a few days on the throne of Kabul."

6. As to the remaining class—powerful Chiefs belonging to neither royal house—no Dewan Purnea or Salar Jung is to be found in their midst. There seems little reason to expect that any one of them will attempt to usurp the throne. But, if such an attempt were made, the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, Wardak, and Ismatulla Khan, Ghilzai, are the only two who could make it.

## (II) *What is the relative importance of each candidate?*

7. I do not propose to attempt to answer His Excellency's second and remaining questions in respect to all the candidates named in the foregoing paragraphs. The chances of some of them appear so remote as to render the mere mention of their names sufficient notice. Those whose prospects appear worth considering are—

Sirdar Abdulla Jan,  
Sirdar Yakub Khan,  
Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan,  
Sirdar Abdurrahman,  
Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan,  
Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan.

The order in which they are named, indicates my opinion as to the relative importance of each. Even if Sirdar Yakub is permitted to survive his father, I estimate his chance of succession as inferior to that of Sirdar Abdulla Jan.

\* He was placed in surveillance on the 6th November 1874.

During the four years\* that Sirdar Yakub has lain in prison, his influence must have waned. Meanwhile, every endeavour has been made to secure Abdulla Jan's position; and, if our information is trustworthy, he would start with the support of all the chief officers of State, including, of course, his grandfather, Mir Afzal Khan of Kandahar. Besides, his mother has access to the Amir's secret treasure, and the power of the purse, in Afghanistan at any rate, is paramount.

In the event of Yakub Khan being put out of the way, the chances of Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan would, I think, rise. This Sirdar is the son of the late Heir-apparent, the Amir's eldest and favorite son.

One might expect to see a man like Sirdar Wali Mahomed take up Sirdar Ahmad Ali's cause as a means of furthering his own interests and chances.

I should look upon Sirdar Abdurrahman's prospects as entirely dependent upon the extent of external aid afforded him.

(III) *What are, according to general report, the character, the views, sympathies, and tendencies of each candidate named in answer to question (I) ?*

8. *Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-apparent*—This Chief is too young to have evinced any marked tendencies. Ghulam Ahmad, who visited Kabul in May 1874, describes him as a lad of ordinary intelligence who was making fair progress in Arabic and Persian. He had ceased learning English, which he commenced to study after the Ambala Durbar. His present age is about 16½, and he is, apparently, delicate. Thus, he is said to suffer frequently from slight fever and rheumatism, while a recent diary (dated 6th July 1878) mentioned his being seriously ill. He is betrothed to a daughter of Naib Mahomed Alam Khan, and also to a daughter of Sherdil Khan, Shahghassi. Each of these Chiefs was successively Governor of Afghan Turkistan, and both are dead.

9. *Sirdar Yakub Khan*.—The following extract from the Kabul Biography deals with this Sirdar's character, &c.:—"Yakub Khan, who is now about 30 years of age, is connected by marriage with the families of Sirdar Yahya and Khan Aka Jamshidi, a daughter of each of whom he has married. He has a younger brother, Ayub Khan, who is now a fugitive in Mashad. Regarding his personal character not much is known. He is said to be a man of pleasant address. Of his talent and energy there can be no doubt, and he enjoys the reputation of being a firm administrator. It was probably not so much owing to the faults of his administration, or to his personal unpopularity amongst the people of Herat, that he was unable to organize a resistance to his father, as to the steady growth of the Amir's power, and the consolidation which has of late years accompanied it. The mixed population of Herat have, in fact, lately shown a tendency to settle quietly down to their pursuits, and to appreciate the value of peace and quiet. They saw, moreover, that the Amir's power was overwhelming, and that resistance was impossible in itself, and rendered doubly hopeless by the absence of any funds from which it could be supported. Writing regarding Yakub Khan in 1873, Sir R. Pollock said—

"The misunderstanding which exists between the Amir and this, his most able son, is due to the following causes:—

\* She was a Mohmand Pathan, daughter of Saadat Khan of Lalpura.

"(1) His mother not being a Durani\* prevents his being looked up to.

"(2) When Shere Ali, after his defeat at Kelat-i-Ghilzai by Azam, returned to Herat and wished to squeeze the Herat officials, as persons who, by their office, had acquired wealth, Yakub thwarted him, wishing to secure the good services of his dependents, and taking a far-sighted view of the matter; this check, and the disputes that grew out of it, commenced the misunderstanding that exists between father and son."

As to his views, sympathies, and tendencies we have but meagre information. The general belief is that he is hostile to the English, but it is possible that the remonstrance in his favor by Lord Northbrook's Government may have changed him. He might be expected to seek aid from Persia, with which country his relations were frequent and intimate. The following is a brief account of them.

Yakub Khan commenced friendly intercourse with Persia very soon after establishing himself at Herat. In March 1872, he received a letter and some presents from Mir Alum Khan, Governor of Kayn. His father, the Amir, thereupon reprimanded him for carrying on friendly correspondence with adherents of Persia at the time when the Seistan controversy was proceeding. When Yakub sought refuge in Persian territory in 1871, Mir Alum Khan received him well. In August, a Persian agent arrived at Herat with the nominal object of settling the peace of the Perso-Afghan border. The visit was repeated in January 1874, when Yakub used every endeavour to procure some promise of material assistance from Persia. In June 1872, the British Agent at Kabul mentioned a rumour that Yakub Khan was remitting money from Herat to Mashad. Mr. Thomson was unable to confirm this rumour; but he said that, although Yakub Khan's visit to the Shah at Meshed in 1867 was unsuccessful, the Persian Government had ever since considered him favorable to Persia. Accordingly, they sympathized with him during his revolt in 1871 against his father. Further, there was good reason to believe that Yakub Khan had been in correspondence with Persian authorities in Khorasan. Since Yakub's imprisonment, his brother Ayub has found an asylum in Persia. At first (January 1875) he was coldly received; but later reports show that he has been honorably treated, and that quarters and an allowance of Rupees 160 per diem have been assigned him.

10. *Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan*, son of the late Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, the Amir's eldest son, is about 14 years old, and said to be "very smart and intelligent." Is married to a daughter of Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan. Regarding him, Ghulam Ahmad writes—"His manners are likely to make him popular. He considers himself as a claimant for the Heir-apparentship of the Amir, as his father was His Highness' eldest son, and was appointed by him his Heir-apparent. Should, eventually, the reins of the government of Afghanistan be assumed by Sirdar Abdulla Khan, or should they fall to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, he will bear a grudge to them, though, as appears from the present state of affairs, he will not be able to cause any injury to them. The Amir is very favorably disposed to him, and he occasionally waits on His Highness to pay compliments. He is under the guardianship of his uncle, Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Kabul."

Sir R. Pollock calls him Ahmad Mir Khan, and, in 1873, wrote regarding him—

"His mother is a Ghilzai; his age 10 years. On his father's death (in the battle of Kajhaz) the Amir treated this grandson with special favor, and, at that time, considered him entitled to the Wali-Abadship in room of his father; but, in 1869, Abdulla Jan's name was mentioned by the Amir as Wali-Abad, owing to his mother's influence; but for her interference, Ahmad Mir Khan would have succeeded."

The following account is taken from a memorandum received from the Punjab Government, dated 28th May 1877:—

"The Amir treats the youth with great favor. No special work has yet been assigned to him. He commands troops in conjunction with the Heir-apparent, Abdulla Khan."

In another report, dated May 1877, he is said to have turned out a fine fellow, and to be much in favor at Court.

11. *Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan*.—The able son of an incompetent father. Is the best soldier among all the Afghan Sirdars. Thus, in 1864-65, he conquered Turkistan from Fateh Mahomed Khan, who governed the country for Amir Shere Ali. In May 1866 he completely defeated Shere Ali, the present Amir, at Shekhabad, and again at Kelat-i-Ghilzai in January 1867. In September of the same year he defeated Faiz Mahomed, half-brother of Amir Shere Ali, at Kila Alladad. Appears confident that he could regain power in Afghanistan if he had sufficient resources. Is said to receive an annual allowance of 25,000 roubles from the Russian Government, of which report says that he only spends 5,000 roubles per annum. Sir R. Pollock wrote concerning him—

"Was well thought of as a soldier and commander when in charge of the army; showed less talent for administrative work. Has now lost all his possessions, both at his home and at his place of refuge, and has no resources by which he could collect a party. Without help as to money or arms he could do nothing. If supplied with money by Russia or Bokhara, and promised a backing, might attempt to recover his possession. Probably such an attempt would be unsuccessful if made in the Amir's lifetime. If later, after Amir's

\* Naib Mahomed Alam Khan is dead.

death and when Turkistan had Mir\* Alam Khan as Governor, or some equally corrupt, incapable person, the issue might be in Abdurrahman's favor as far as Turkistan is concerned. On the Amir's death, such an attempt may be looked upon as likely, unless a good Governor should previously have taken Mir Alam Khan's place. Abdurrahman Khan's influence has already declined rapidly, and fortune is never likely to favor him again to the extent it did when he was fighting for Azam and Afzal. There was strong sympathy on the part of the nation for these elder sons, who had been set aside by the Dost in favor of Shere Ali Khan. Besides, the King of Bokhara afforded assistance, which he is not likely, now or later, to give."

Abdurrahman has married a Turkistani (Kulab) wife at Samarkand, and also a daughter of Mir Hakim Khan of Shiberghan. He has one son, Abdulla Khan, at Kabul. His step-mother, Bibi Marwarid, is dead; the other members of his family are believed to be at Kandahar, and the Amir has refused them permission to leave. In the diary of 14th to 17th January 1876, a rumour was reported that Abdurrahman had collected some of his followers and asked the Russian authorities to permit him to proceed to Balkh, which place he hoped to be able to seize while the regular garrison was occupied in attacking Maimana. In the event of the present Amir's death before the Russian Government has succeeded in establishing its influence in Kabul, Abdurrahman would probably be the Russian candidate for the throne. He would be hostile to the British Government and to all the descendants of the present Amir. If the kingdom of Afghanistan were divided, Abdurrahman might secure Afghan Turkistan, with Balkh for his capital.

12. *Sirdar Wali Mahomed*.—Sir R. Pollock, writing in 1873 regarding Wali Mahomed, said that he had "lost much of his ambition on the death of his brother, but might, owing to age and standing, possibly prove one of the claimants for the throne should the Amir die within the next few years." Ghulam Ahmad, who visited Kabul in May 1874, thus described him—

"Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, Governor of Kuram, takes many bribes and realizes excessive revenue for himself; and if complaints are made to the Amir, His Highness passes over them, because he is an influential Sirdar. Though, after the death of the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, he took part in stirring up strife in the family, he appears to have now desisted from such intentions. He owns about seven to eight lakhs of rupees in cash. . . . The Amir desires to see Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan in some occupation (to keep him out of mischief)."

In the diary of 9th to 12th May 1876, Wali Mahomed is mentioned as one of those officers to whom the Amir is not well disposed. He was summoned to Kabul in 1876 in consequence of the numerous complaints made against him by the people of Kuram, and was dismissed from the Governorship, Kadir Khan being appointed in his stead. Was offered the appointment of Governor of Khost, but declined it. Kadir Khan declined the appointment, which was given to Sirdar Shahbaz Khan. Appears to be living at Kabul in receipt of an allowance.

13. *Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan*.—Is the last surviving full-brother of the Amir, and is now about 45 years of age. Among all the many turn-coats in Afghanistan, Sharif Khan is entitled to the first place, for he has changed sides oftener than any. Since 1872 he has been residing at Dehra as a political *detenu*, the British Government having consented

to take charge of him. His allowance has been recently increased, and he has been permitted to go to Mecca, or travel about India on this side of the Indus, under a promise that he will neither attempt to return to Afghanistan nor intrigue against the Amir.

(IV) *What is considered to be each candidate's relative chance of success ?*

(V) *Who are the principal supporters of each of the probable candidates ?*

(VI) *In what part of the kingdom would each candidate be likely to find most support ?*

14. It will, perhaps, suffice if an attempt be made to answer these questions as regards the three best known candidates—Sirdars Yakub Khan, Abdulla Jan, and Abdurrahman. I should say that, if England and Russia abstain from interference, none of these Sirdars is likely to be able to secure undivided possession of the throne of Kabul. It is only strong men like Dost Mahomed and the present Amir—and then only after prolonged warfare—who are capable of such an achievement. Sirdar Yakub, if he had not been imprisoned, and if he were to regain his liberty, might have some chance. But it is only natural to suppose that his cause has suffered during his long incarceration; and, in estimating his prospects, it is impossible to omit from the calculation the great risk he runs of assassination. As to Abdurrahman, as long as Abdulla Jan, Yakub Khan, and even Ahmed Ali Khan survive, his chances of success, unless he receives substantial assistance from without, appear to me very doubtful. To turn now to the chief supporters of each Sirdar.

15. *Sirdar Yakub Khan*—Would naturally look for support to two quarters. *First*, to the Mohmand tribe, whose country stretches from Fort Michni almost up to Kabul. It is to be remembered that this tribe is not unanimous. The section favorable to Yakub is the party of the late Chief Nauroz Khan, which the Amir has striven hard to break up. Thus, amongst other measures, he has withheld the Chiefship from Nauroz Khan's sons, and bestowed it on Mahomed Shah Khan, a grandson of Saadut Khan. He has deprived Nauroz Khan's sons of their allowances, but has increased the stipend of Mahomed Shah from Rupees 12,000 to Rupees 20,000 and has, besides, presented him with a khillut. *Secondly*, to the Jamshidis of Herat, whose principal Chief, Khan Aka, *alias* Mahdi Kuli Khan, is Yakub's father-in-law. This tribe numbers 10,000 families, and is reported able to furnish 4,000 cavalry. Although Khan Aka held aloof from Yakub during the latter's dispute with Amir Shere Ali, and counselled peaceable measures, he is said to have promised to raise assistance from the Turkomans in the event of an open rupture.

As to Herat itself, it seems uncertain whether the city, where he was personally unpopular, would declare for Yakub. Not only in the town, but also in the district of Herat, which comprises the territory from the banks of the Murgab to Farrah—a tract about 70 miles long from north to south—the Afghans are in the minority, and the language is Persian, and not Pushtu. Further, according to Vambery, the sympathies of Herat are towards those princes under whose rule the city enjoyed a kind of independence. They revere the memory of Sultan Ahmed Jan and his two sons, and execrate Dost Mahomed and Shere Ali. Persia might possibly sympathize; but the Treaty of Paris would bar open assistance. At the same time, I should not be inclined to repose much confidence on the restraining power of this Treaty, if the pressure from without was at all serious. When Dost Mahomed besieged Herat in 1863, the Shah was with difficulty prevented from marching the Persian troops at Mashad to Sultan Ahmed Jan's aid. Whether he would abstain, should the opportunity again arise, is an open question. In 1863 the memory of the war with England was still green. During the fifteen years which have since passed, English influence has waned, while that of Russia has waxed strong. Hence I should predict that, in the event of disturbances in Afghanistan, Persia would act towards Herat as Russia might dictate. Possibly, it might suit Russia, as a useful and uncompromising means of assisting Abdurrahman, to prohibit Persia from interfering in any way.

If, however, the chance of Persian and Herat sympathy is doubtful, it is certain that Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kelat-i-Ghilzai would be against Yakub. In his rebellion of 1870, the two last-named places shut their gates in his face; and it was the two leaders of the Ghilzai tribe, Arsla Khan and Ismatulla, who were Shere Ali's chosen instruments in inducing Yakub to come to Kabul. It is true that they repudiated any knowledge of the Amir's subsequent treachery, and remonstrated against it; but they have continued to be his chief advisers. Against Kandahar, in 1870, Yakub was also completely unsuccessful; and naturally the influence of Mir Afzal Khan, Abdulla Jan's father-in-law, would be hostile to him.

Among the leading Chiefs in Afghanistan it is difficult to say who would support Yakub. He has no open and avowed adherents.

16. *Sirdar Abdulla Jan*.—The Chief owes his numerous adherents to his noble descent and the abilities of his mother, to his nomination as Wali-Ahad, or Heir-apparent, and to the Amir's influence, which is wholly exercised in his favor. His mother being a Barakzai, and a daughter of Mir Afzal Khan, Abdulla Jan has advantages of birth which Sirdar Yakub Khan cannot claim. His maternal connections, further, secure for him the sympathy of Kandahar and Farrah. The support of the Amir naturally inclines the principal officers of State to his cause. Such are the Mustaufi Habibulla of the Wardak tribe, which is said to contribute 10,000 soldiers to the Kabul army; and Shahghassi Sherdil Khan,\* Barakzai, father-in-law of Abdulla, and present Governor of Afghan Turkistan. It is in this province that Sirdar Abdur-

\* Just deceased.



rahman would probably command the greatest influence. Hence the importance in the Amir's eyes of entrusting the government to a devoted adherent. Naib Alam Khan and Shahghassi Sherdil Khan were chosen servants; and the loyalty of both was confirmed by the betrothal of the heir-apparent to a daughter of each. There is, however, this to be said about the Shahghassi, that his two nephews were attached to Sirdar Yakub Khan. And the Shah-

\* According to the latest account, the Shahghassi died a natural death.

ghassi's recent death is said to have been compassed under the Amir's orders, who suspected him of intrigue with Russia.\* As to the Mustaufi, in a news-report, dated 28th June last, it was said that he had privately united with Sirdar Wali Mahomed and General Daud Shah, while Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, Kandahari, Mirza Abdul Nabi, Mir Munshi, and Mirakhor Ahmad Khan formed another party. These three persons, if any, would support the Russian proposals.

Another Chief who may be counted among Sirdar Abdulla's supporters is Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, Kandahari. Formerly he was Governor of Kandahar, but was removed on account of quarrels with General Safdar Ali and for alleged dishonesty. He owes something to Abdulla Jan's mother for having successfully interceded in his behalf in 1871 and secured Kandahar for him. On the other hand, he is hostile to the Mustaufi, who opposed his appointment. He is wealthy and influential. Ghulam Ahmad, who visited Kabul in 1874, thus described the position of Shere Ali:—

"Sirdar Shere Ali Khan (Kandahari), though somewhat annoyed at his removal from the government of Kandahar, and on account of the discontinuance of some allowances, is not so adverse as to stir up any disturbances, nor can he do so during his residence at Kandahar."

In the diary of 19th to 22nd May 1876 Shere Ali is mentioned as one of those towards whom the Amir is not well disposed. (But see Kabul news for April 1877, page 6, which gives a different account.)

Next comes Ismatulla Khan, who, since the death of Arsla Khan, has become the most powerful person in the Ghilzai tribe. He also possesses influence with the tribes between Kabul and Jalalabad. It is to be observed here that some authorities doubt the devotion of Ismatulla to the present Amir. Ghulam Ahmad, who visited Kabul in 1874, declared that both Ismatulla and Arsla Khan were secretly well-disposed towards Sirdar Yakub. One of Arsla Khan's daughters is said to be betrothed to Abdulla Jan.

Two other persons—Hassan Ali Khan and the Mirakhor—must not be omitted. The former is a Kizilbash, and is now Commander-in-Chief at Herat. He was tutor to Abdulla Jan, and is devoted to the Amir. At the same time, he is Chief of no tribe, and is personally unpopular. The Mirakhor Ahmad Khan is also a person of no social standing. He is Governor of Jalalabad, and one of the most trusted advisers of the Amir. He is said to be bitterly hostile to the English.

Finally, there is Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan. Writing in 1873 regarding Afzal Khan, Sir R. Pollock said:—

"Has not openly acted against the Dost or the present Amir, but several times rebelled against the former in his earlier days. His daughter is married to the Amir, and is the mother of Sirdar Abdulla Jan or Khan, the heir-apparent. For many years past has been Governor of Farrah, and is intimately acquainted with the whole of that border. Sided with Amir Shere Ali in the civil war, and is much trusted by him. Said to own about eight or

\* In paragraph 674 of Mr. Wynne's *précis*, another son is mentioned, Sirdar Abdul Wahab.

nine lakhs. Has two\* sons—one, a youth, is named Abdulla Khan, born of a slave-girl; in his father's absence, takes command of the border troops. The second son is still quite young, Ghulam Mahomed Khan. His mother is a Barakzai."

Ghulam Ahmad, who visited Kabul in 1874, wrote:—

"Of the Kandahari Sirdars, Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan is the senior, and possesses about twelve or thirteen lakhs of rupees. He is Governor of Farrah, and is really loyal to the Amir."

The following account is taken from a memorandum, dated 28th May 1877, received from the Punjab Government:—

"He is loyal to Amir Shere Ali Khan. Is the Amir's father-in-law, and the maternal grandfather of the heir-apparent, Abdulla Khan. As a person of vast worldly experience, it was at his wish that the Amir appointed Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan as His Highness' heir-apparent, in order that continued peace of the country would be ensured."

17. *Sirdar Abdurrahman* has been too long absent from Afghanistan to have many local adherents. He would look for support to Russia, Bokhara, Jehandar Shah, ex-Mir of Badakhshan, and the Turkomans. Recent information mentions his having quarrelled with Jehandar Shah, who had left Samarkand for Khokand. Everything would depend upon the assistance afforded him. Without external aid his chances appear small, for he possesses neither money nor arms. This, at least, is Sir F. Pollock's opinion. But, according to other information, Abdurrahman has saved for a long time past the greater portion of the allowance assigned him by the Russian Government. He is entirely subservient to Russia, who would employ him as circumstances might require. Probably, they would use his pretensions to frighten Shere Ali into compliance with their demands, rather than give those pretensions open



material support. Thus, in May last, when war between Russia and England seemed imminent, there was a rumour that Abdurrahman would be directed to petition the Russian authorities for leave to attack Balkh, and that the petition would be sent to Shere Ali as a hint that he had better yield to the requests which Russia might prefer to him. And it was said that the news made the Amir uneasy. Again, in June it was reported that the Russian authorities were showing Abdurrahman marked attention, which circumstance, together with the Shah's visit to St. Petersburg, greatly disturbed Shere Ali. If Abdurrahman were let loose upon him from the north, and the Persians made themselves disagreeable on the south-west, the difficulties of his position would be much aggravated. That Persia is quite alive to her powers of mischief in this direction, may be gathered from the persistency of the questions to the British Minister at Teheran regarding apprehended disturbance on the Seistán border.

18. *General Remarks*.—The broad conclusions at which I have arrived as to the present position and future prospects of parties in Afghanistan, may be thus stated. The present Amir has established himself firmly on the throne. He is strong enough to overcome all internal opposition as long as Russia and England leave him alone. The domestic troubles which beset him now are not comparable with those which he has overcome in the past. I am not unmindful that some authorities represent the people of Afghanistan to be on the verge of rebellion. But many months have passed since these representations were first made, and, in the interval, things have gone from bad to worse. Taxes have multiplied, and the people are said to groan under the burden of their oppression. And yet, except the recent not very formidable outbreak among the Ghilzais, nothing has happened. Hence, I argue, either the Government of India have been misinformed as to the true state of the country, or the position of the Amir is much stronger than is supposed. And, if the internal affairs of Afghanistan, were alone to be considered, I should guess that things would go on very much as they do at present, and that Shere Ali would maintain his position. But the Amir has also to remember his external relations, and he seems fully aware that these will compel him, sooner or later, to declare either for Russia or England. The popular belief seems to be, that the Amir recognizes in England his most powerful friend and most formidable foe. His present estrangement is described as mere temporary sulkingness, which he would gladly exchange for the cordial relations of the past. Pride alone prevents him from making the first move.

I venture to differ from this complacent view of our own attractions.

For, what is the history of our relations with Shere Ali? During his father's lifetime this Sirdar was noted for his hostility towards the British Government. British policy during the five anxious years of alternate disaster and success which followed Dost Mahomed's death, can hardly have enhanced Shere Ali's regard. Professedly neutral, our attitude was nevertheless such as to encourage his rivals. His father's chosen successor, he succeeded at first, in spite of some opposition, in establishing himself on the throne. But the friendly congratulations and assurances of the British Government were delayed. Dost Mahomed died in June, but the kharita of recognition to his successor was withheld until December. Two years later, Shere Ali was vanquished at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and Afzal Khan ascended the throne. He received the congratulations of the nobles of Kabul on the 16th May, and within six days Sir J. Lawrence telegraphed the recognition of the British Government. In October 1867, Afzal Khan died, and on the 13th November a British Vakil was sent to Kabul with a letter of congratulation to Azam Khan, who had not deigned to communicate his succession to the British Government. The tardy recognition in his own case, and its prompt accord to his two brothers, cannot have escaped Shere Ali's attention. The importance of that recognition will be understood from the fact that even Dost Mahomed's power was believed to be consolidated and strengthened by the knowledge of the support of the British Government.

Then came Shere Ali's final success, followed by the Ambala Durbar with its fair promises and its presents of money and arms. But the occasion was soon to arise which would test the sincerity and value of these professions. Early in 1870 it was proposed to refer the Seistán dispute to the arbitration of England. At the cost of some pressure, the Amir accepted the proposal, under a misunderstanding of the position which the British Government would occupy in the matter. The Persian version of Lord Mayo's letter contained these words:—"There is no doubt that the settlement of the Seistán border *will be conducted to the satisfaction of those States which adjoin the Persian border*, and the ties of friendship existing between the British and Afghan Governments, though already firm, will become so more than ever." The expression in italics altogether misrepresented the Governor-General's words. Nevertheless it conveyed to the Amir a confident expectation that, by the kindness of the British Government, he would get Seistán. And when, by the award of Seistán Proper to Persia, this hope was disappointed, the Amir's belief in British honor and good faith received its first and perhaps rudest shock. For the Peshawur Conference shows that the Seistán award has never been forgiven nor forgot. Its effect at the time may be gathered from the correspondence regarding the gift of arms and money which the British Government tendered as a peace-offering. The arms were accepted, and the money contemptuously refused.

Next came the agreement with Russia as to the limit of the northern frontier of Afghanistan. The Seistán affair had taught the Amir a lesson, and he wrote asking for definite pledges of support. In June 1873 he sent an Envoy to Simla with full instructions. It was all in vain. Her Majesty's Government declined to sanction other than general assurances, and

Synd Nur Mahomed returned to Kabul convinced of our bad faith. From that time until his death, this powerful Minister never ceased to work against British interests. There are many instances of the Amir's continued unfriendliness; indeed, it would not be too much to say that from the date of the Seistán award until now, His Highness has never been our friend. His so-called "temporary" sulkiness has extended over six years.

On the other hand, what are his relations with Russia? From the time of the agreement as to the northern boundary of Afghanistan, the Amir has fully understood that, sooner or later, he would be entangled with Russia. Alone he could not hope to offer a successful resistance. Either he must get assistance from England, or he must arrange with Russia. He preferred the British Government, which rejected his overtures. The other alternative remained; and year by year we have watched the increasing intimacy with General Kauffman, and the growth of Russian influence. Still His Highness hesitated to commit himself beyond power of recall. And, while he wavered, two circumstances occurred in which he was able to contrast Russian with English sentiment. In November 1873 he notified to the Viceroy the nomination of Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent: in January 1874 he also informed General Kauffman. The Viceroy's reply evaded a direct recognition of Abdulla Jan's position, and the expression of good-wishes was cold and cautious. General Kauffman wrote very differently. His congratulations were prompt, cordial, and outspoken, while the peculiar wording of his letter led the Kabul Sirdars to exclaim—"This time the Russian Government has made itself partner in the protection of Afghanistan. This paragraph is of a new tone. God knows what State secrets are revealed in it." Shortly afterwards came Yakub Khan's imprisonment. He had withstood his father's authority, and declined to recognize Abdulla Jan's position as heir-apparent. But the circumstances of his treacherous seizure aroused British sympathy, and, disregarding Lord Mayo's solemn assurance at the Ambala Durbar, the Government of India wrote in chiding terms a remonstrance in Yakub Khan's favor. This letter, most unpalatable in itself, contrasted ill with General Kauffman's policy towards Yakub. The Russian Government had not bound themselves by any assurance such as that given by Lord Mayo; nevertheless, when Yakub Khan's rebellion of 1871 collapsed, General Kauffman wrote to the Amir—

"My sympathies have been with you throughout the affairs, since right was on your side. For God favors not a son who rebels against his father, nor do men wish success to such an one."

In my humble opinion, the events of the last eight years point to the conclusion that Russian diplomacy and British errors have relegated English influence at Kabul to the second place. No doubt, Shere Ali would prefer to remain neutral and passive. As long as he can he will play off one nation against the other. But when he is forced to cast his lot with one or the other, I think that he will choose Russia, who will promise more even though she may perform less. For instance, I don't suppose that the Government of India will be permitted to offer a dynastic guarantee. If not, an arrangement with Russia affords the best safeguard to the succession of Abdulla Jan, who would then be secure against Abdurrahman. And, in Vambéry's opinion, the Russian alliance would accord with the feelings of the majority of the people in Afghanistan. One thing seems certain, that without external help, either English or Russian, not one of the rival competitors will succeed in establishing his dominion over the whole of Afghanistan. The Amir knows this as well as anybody, and hence it is natural that he should make terms with the Power best able to ensure the accession of the successor of his choice. A few years ago this Power might have been England; now I think it would be Russia.

(Sd.) T. J. C. P.

Memorandum by LIEUT.-COL. F. H. JENKINS, dated 13th August 1878.

*Question I.*—In the event of the death or dethronement of the present Amir, who would be the probable candidates for the vacant throne?

*Answer.*—(1) Abdulla Jan, son of Amir Shere Ali, the Heir-apparent.  
(2) Yakub Khan, also son of the Amir, now a prisoner at Kabul.  
(3) Ibrahim Khan, eldest son of the Amir.  
(4) Wali Mahomed Khan, brother of the Amir.

Besides the above there are three others, viz.—

Abdurrahman, nephew of the Amir, supposed to be with the Russians.

Mahomed Sharif Khan, brother of the Amir, now at Dehra-Dun.

Jelaluddin Khan, nephew of the Amir, now at Pindi.

But these are considered outsiders, having few supporters in Afghanistan.

*Question II.*—What would be their relative importance?

*Answer.*—They are mentioned in order according to their importance.

*Question III.*—What are, according to general report, the character, views, and sympathies and tendencies of each candidate named in answer to Question I?

*Answer.*—(1) Abdulla Jan is a young, untried man, known to be fond of show, and exercises on horseback with sword and spear; but reputed to be wanting in force of character

and energy. Having been named Heir-apparent, and having the support of Nadir Hosain Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, who would carry at least half the army with him, Abdulla Jan's chance would be excellent. Indeed, it would be odds on him against all the other candidates if he possessed sense and courage. He is not, however, believed to be fit to take his own part in the disturbances which would follow the death or dethronement of the Amir; and as his principal supporter, Nadir Hosein Khan, commands at Herat, Abdulla Jan might be without his assistance, at a critical time, and would probably fail to show to advantage. However this may turn out, no one believes that Abdulla Jan will be able to keep the business together, even if he is proclaimed Amir. Kandahar, where his mother's relatives live, would strongly support him.

(2) Yakub Khan is about 28 years old, and has proved himself to be a fine brave man. He knows what belongs to soldiers, and never kept the troops in arrears of pay if he could possibly help it. He is much liked by the army, and at Herat, where he commanded for some time. He is proud and impetuous, and talks too much. He hates the British, and would like to get up a religious war against them. The Mohmands, being his mother's relatives, would be all in his favour. Should Shere Ali die suddenly, Yakub Khan, being in prison, will stand a great chance of being at once murdered. If this does not happen, then the other candidates are not the men they are said to be. If Yakub escaped from prison, he would probably get the upper hand and be proclaimed Amir. His principal supporter would be Daud Shah, the second-in-command of the whole army, and now commanding in Kabul. This officer is ostensibly in favor of Abdulla Jan, but he is believed to be a traitor who would declare for Yakub if he escaped being killed in prison.

(3) Ibrahim Khan, eldest son of the Amir, is about 33 years old. He stutters in his speech, but has pleasant manners. He governs the city of Kabul, and is very corrupt, taking bribes with both hands. Notwithstanding this, the people like him, as he is kind to them, and gives them justice after his own fashion when his own interests have been served. He is a clever man; he does not talk about his own affairs. He is ambitious and might be dangerous to Nos. 1 and 2, if an outbreak occurs in Kabul.

(4) Wali Mahomed Khan, brother of the Amir, is about 50 years old, perhaps more. He is very wealthy and powerful, his influence being chiefly with the Kizilbash tribe, with which he is connected. Our men (who for the most part belong to this tribe) all swear by Wali Mahomed, and I cannot help thinking myself that he is a man of the right sort. One proof of his tact and ability is, that he has always kept friends with Shere Ali, and never been in danger of his life. He was formerly Governor of Kuram, and has supporters there; but I cannot believe that the people are very fond of him, as he treated them with great cruelty. He is now living in Kabul, and people who ought to know say that he will do his best when the right time comes. It might be inconvenient to support him, as he is said to be a man of action with no scruples, and he will probably commit atrocities.

The general opinion of natives with whom I have spoken on the subject, is that the death or dethronement of the Amir will be followed by a state of anarchy and civil war which will oblige the British Government to interfere.

All the candidates are said to be anxiously watching the British Government, whose assistance they consider indispensable.

I ought to add that I heard, about a week ago, that three Russian Agents had arrived in Kabul, and that they were considered to be of sufficient importance to be received with a salute of guns. I cannot tell with what object these people have come to Kabul, or how long they are to remain there; but it seems to me to be absolutely necessary for the Russians to do something to maintain their credit in Central Asia, especially as their army in Turkistan is said to be weak.

Shere Ali is said to dislike the English and Russians equally, as he suspects that they will settle their differences at his expense.

---

I have been trying to get a distribution return of the Kabul army; but as furlough has been closed to our men till lately, I have not been able to get information on which I can rely. From enquiries which I made about two years ago, I should say that the Amir had about one hundred thousand men on the rolls, of which about twenty-five thousand are tolerably efficient, many of them being individually very good men indeed, and soldiers by choice. The rest are not up to much, being pressed into the service for life, and of all ages from 16 to 60.

The Amir seems to have copied all parts of our system which are most unsuitable to an army like his; and probably the least of all the difficulties encountered by an Invader would be to defeat the Kabul Army.

He has 200 guns of sorts, and some Sniders; but the Government know more about the latter than I do. When our men return from furlough, I shall be able to get some information from them about the distribution of the Kabul Army without exciting suspicion, as I am in the habit of talking to them on such subjects.

Memorandum by COLONEL W. G. WATERFIELD, Officiating Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 13th August 1878.

On the 1st July, news reached me that the Governor of Tashkend had sent an agent with a letter from the Emperor of Russia, and that the agent was detained at Balkh, but that the letter had been sent to the Amir, who had replied to it. This was followed by a letter from the Governor of Tashkend to the Amir, in which he proposed to station Russian troops between Khiva and Kelat-i-Nasir, at Girishk, Furrab, and other places. The bearer of this letter was a Russian dressed as an Afghan, who arrived in Kabul by horse post.

On the 16th July, Munshi Bakhtiar Khan gave me information as follows. The Amir has ordered the Mustaufi to inform the Russian Envoy that he should not persist in pressing for a reply to the letter of the Governor of Tashkend, as it was a grave matter, to which an early reply could not be given.

Meanwhile, the Amir received a letter from the Shahghassi Sherdil that a Russian and a native of Urganj had appeared in Andkoi, Aktcha, Saripul, and Shibbarghan, and Maimena, ostensibly upon a commercial visit, but that, in conversation with the Governor of Maimena, the Russian remarked that the Russian Government had determined to place troops on the Afghan frontier, and that it had sent an Envoy to inform the Amir about it.

The Amir had not settled what to reply, when he received another letter from the Shahghassi, to the effect that two Russian agents had now brought a letter from the Governor-General of Tashkend pressing for a reply, and that the Russian Government had decided to post troops at Kandahar, in opposition to the British troops at Kelat, and also intended placing some troops in Badakhshan, to guard the passage by which Alexander the Great and other conquerors had gone in the direction of Kashmir. [Now, this is curiously supported by the *Times*' Paris Correspondent on the very same date, July 16, when he says that the left wing starting from Margilan in Farghana (Khokand) will move south over the Alai Dag, down the Kizzil Ser Valley, to the Amu Darya or Oxus, when it will follow that stream. This will bring the force into Derwaz, and opposite them will lie Badakhshan and Fyzabad. The Utch Kargan Pass, however, is said to be difficult. With reference to the allusion to Alexander the Great, he is supposed by Khokandis to be buried in Margilan.] Other troops were to be located in Herat and Balkh, and a bridge-of-boats was to be thrown over the Oxus.

On the 17th July, I heard from another source that the Russians wished to place troops in Kandahar to watch the English in Kelat. Also, that the Governor of Tashkend had announced to the Amir the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey, that the English would occupy an island, and that the Russians now wished to move through Afghanistan.

The Khokandis in Peshawur, on the 16th July, said that the Amir of Bokhara was collecting supplies at Karshi.

On the 30th July, Bakhtiar Khan again mentions that the object of the Russian Envoy then in Kabul, was to obtain a road through Afghanistan for his Government, in order to strengthen their frontier!

On the same date, from quite a different source I heard that the Russian Envoy had publicly asked for a road through Maimena and Herat to Seistan.

Again, in the Kelat diary, of the 14th February 1877, information was received, in a letter to the Khan, that, on the 1st February, merchants were saying that the Amir had sent Envoys to the Peshawur Conference, but that a Russian Envoy had arrived at Kabul, and had requested the Amir to give Russia possession of Herat, saying that the Russian army was going to *Seistan*, and that, in lieu of Herat, the Russians would give the Amir the Ahmadshahi country which had formed part of the Empire. The Amir had decided not to reply to this letter until his Envoy had returned from Peshawur.

Again, all our reports confirm the *Times*' Paris Correspondent news, that the Russian forces are at Jam on the border south of Samarcand.

And it has been mentioned several times that the Russian Envoy now in Kabul, besides a letter from the Governor-General of Tashkend, has also brought a letter to the Amir from the Emperor of Russia, which the Amir would not open in Durbar.

Again, we have had repeated information that the Amir was anxious about Herat, and feared intrigues with the Persians. And we have heard the report that a Persian Envoy was also expected in Kabul.

And on the 1st August Bakhtiar Khan again reported to the same effect, that a road was asked for by the Russians to Kelat, and the location of troops in Turkistan, Herat, and opposite Kelat.

Although my first impressions were that the present Russian Mission to Kabul was in connection with the long contemplated advance on Merv, and the passage of Russian troops through North-Western Afghan Turkistan, yet the more I think of it, the less likely it appears to me that this time should have been chosen for this advance on Merv alone. It might hamper them much; though, on the other hand, they may have less fears at the present moment of any counter-move on Herat. Still, I am inclined to think, if Russian troops are marching on Kizzil Arvat, that it is merely a flank operation to keep the Turkomans in check. I suspect Russian designs are deeper, and that she is not losing the opportunity afforded her by our differences with the Amir of Kabul. Perhaps she offers to hold us in

check at Kelat, perhaps she may be making the Amir offers regarding Seistán, but I don't know enough of Russo-Persian policy to say whether this is in the least likely, or even possible. Probably it is not.

It is noticeable that native report never alludes to a Russian move on Merv; had such been contemplated, what better excuse could Russia have had for her Kabul Mission? On the other hand, we know that lately Russia has been objecting to the number of troops kept up by the Amir of Bokhara, and has prohibited him from dealing with the Amir of Kabul; and two days ago I was informed by Ahmed Baksh Seth, the well-known Kabul and Bokhara merchant, that the Russian Mission had proposed Abdurrahman Khan as Governor of Balkh, to the Amir. I should say it was far from improbable that the Russians should reconciliation between the Amir and his nephew, being themselves answerable for the future loyalty of the latter. What could suit them better?

No doubt, the Amir is greatly perplexed by the proposals of the Russian Mission. The same merchant told me that it had been detained on its way to Kabul for ten days on the Oxus, the boats having been removed to the left bank of the river for this purpose.

Nor do I think that the Russian Mission is merely connected with a move up to the northern bank of the Oxus. The treaty with Bokhara at the end of 1873 gave Russian troops, steamers and other vessels the right to navigate the river, and to build store-houses and wharves on the Bokharian bank only. She has no rights upon the left bank; but we don't hear of Russian vessels as yet navigating the Upper Oxus, nor do we hear of the appointment of a Russian Envoy in Bokhara itself, which was also part of the treaty.

Regarding the possible extent of the interference of Russia in the affairs of Afghanistan, Mr. Schuyler distinctly says that, when it was stated in April 1873 that the influence of England over Afghanistan would be confined to friendly advice, the Russians looked upon this as a formal repudiation of the whole transaction, and that they were no longer bound to guarantee the inviolability of Afghan territory; and he quotes the *Official Gazette* that the two Governments are no longer pledged to each other, and have preserved their freedom of action. And he adds that the Russians can cross the Oxus and retaliate upon Afghanistan, if troubles arise. It was before this, in 1870, that General Kauffmann assured Shere Ali that Russia had no intention of interfering in his affairs.

On the other hand, we have up to the very last assured Shere Ali that we would scrupulously respect his independence. It is difficult to guess what better terms Russia can now be offering him! But the Amir, of course, fully understands that he, on his part, has not abstained from interference with tribes and territories not his own, and that he has not remained faithful to the treaty obligations.

Until reassured by us, he certainly will feel his danger; and the universal native opinion is, that, unless he is rescued by a forward movement on our part, he must come under Russian influences, which he has so far encouraged, but from which he now would gladly escape. However, I myself think that people are perhaps giving expression to their own feelings rather than to those of the Amir.



## APPENDIX XXXIV.

MEMORANDUM ON THE POLITICAL STATE OF KABUL, DATED AMRITSAR, 25TH OCTOBER 1878.

[*Referred to in paragraph 152, Chapter IX.*]

Before I commence the real subject of this paper, I must briefly state the circumstances under which I went to, and lived in, the capital of Afghanistan. Having been offered a handsome salary by His Highness the Amir, with bright prospects of my future, I obtained leave without pay from the Punjab Government, and left Peshawur on the 17th December 1876. I had no particular instructions from this Government, and had nothing at all to do with politics.

I remained in the city of Kabul from the 24th December 1876 to the 8th of July 1878, during which time I resided in the fort called "Bala Hissar." The fort is situated on the eastern side of the city, from which it is only separated by a ditch. My principal office was as Physician and Surgeon to His Highness the Amir and his family; but I was also made to act as Superintending Surgeon to the Army Hospitals. I had also to lecture the hakims (physicians) on different subjects connected with the science of medicine, as on "quinine," circulation of blood," &c., &c. I had perfect liberty to go about in the city, and also to treat patients at the place where I lived. I soon acquired a great amount of practice amongst all classes of the residents, because I did not mind my fees, and even supplied medicines free of charge to the poor. I had free access everywhere in the city; while people of the surrounding villages, and even from great distances, came to consult me at my residence. Here also were treated many of the officers and soldiers who did not attend at the military hospital.

I had also ample opportunities of studying the private and public life of His Highness the Amir, and of learning his views on politics. I had almost always to be present at the time when newspapers were read, and on these occasions politics were freely discussed. His Highness treated me with great regard and kindness, and gradually (though not at first) came to place perfect faith in me as Physician and Surgeon. He raised my salary to Rupees 1,000 *Kabulis per mensem* (= Rupees 800 *per mensem*).

But as the Amir was very suspicious generally, and especially as I had to live in Kabul in the days when his relations with the British Government were not friendly, I could not freely avail myself of the opportunities of making enquiries. Any person who, during my stay there, happened to be known to be inquisitive, was suspected to be a spy of the British Government, and punished accordingly. I was particularly watched and suspected for a long time. Still my case was different from that of other people. Being a physician, people of all sorts saw me now and then. I could learn public opinion and current news of the place. At first I used to keep notes of important events, and of the history, &c., of the important personages, &c., &c.; but, unfortunately, I was constrained to burn them.

Now I come to the real object of this paper, and I think the ruler must be described  
The Amir. before the subjects he rules.

The Amir Shere Ali Khan is 58 years of age. He is of a gouty constitution, has long suffered from chronic bronchitis, and has recently shown symptoms of consumption: but his general health can be said  
His physical health. to be pretty good, as he partakes of hearty meals, and has not lost much flesh. He looks much stouter than when he came to Ambala, though he is not so well in this respect now as he was two or three years ago.

Though he is said to be a good General, and to have been a very good horseman, he cannot, on account of repeated sufferings from gout, and sedentary habit have a long ride now. His hands are a little shaky.

As to his general character, he has many good parts. He is wise, shrewd, hard-working, humorous, independent, and above religious prejudice; but, at the same time, he is proud, fond of praise, stern, and stone-hearted. He is very suspicious, and has perfect faith almost in none. He seems to have no trust even in those whom he himself places in high authority.  
His general character.

Privately, the Amir seems to be indifferent to any fixed religious principles, but he professes to be a Mussulman for the sake of policy. He urges his people not to be Mussulman in appearance, but to be devoted to the cause of Islam; and to take advantage of favorable opportunities of increasing its sphere and influence. He openly bates the so-called Mullahs and Syuds, and says to his people that these classes of persons are merely nominal religious guides, while, really, they retard their progress, and are a useless burden on society and the State.  
His religion.

On the part of the Amir himself, there is perfect religious freedom; but the officials and masses of the people hate and oppress the Hindus, and the few Christians and Jews that there are.  
His treatment of people of other religions.

The Amir is especially fond of the Sikhs, and he believes that these are the persons who can comparatively be relied upon.

The Amir is not only very intelligent, but keeps himself well informed as to what is going on in other countries. He has a good knowledge of geography, especially of Europe, with the modern history of which also he is well acquainted.

But, surrounded, as he is, by self-interested people, sometimes he knows very little of the oppression and tyranny of his own officials, even in the city in which he lives.

With reference to his views of foreign people, the Amir looks upon the Iranians and people of Turkistan with contempt, as weak and effeminate. Europeans are all hated. The Russians are considered rough, cruel, but faithful to the Asiatics; while the British are regarded as mild, shrewd, but deceitful. The Sikhs are praised for their bravery and sincerity, but blamed for want of union.

For the time that I was at Kabul, and up to the day of my leaving that city, the Amir always said that he preferred alliance with the British Government to that with Russia—saying that, though he looked upon both parties as evils to his country, he regarded the English as the lesser evil. He appeared to think that the British Government intended to take his country by bribing his Chiefs, and by fraud. He said he was justified in refusing the terms of the new treaty proposed at the Peshawur Conference. He used to say he would never allow permanent European residents in his territory. He said that he was annoyed with the British Government, and he used to state the following as his grievances:—

(1) The occupation of Quetta, which he said had been given to the Biluchis by the Kings of Kabul, in order to supply food, &c., to the armies that might have to pass through Biluchistan.

(2) The British Government insisting upon permanent British residents being posted in his country.

(3) The British Government insisting upon his troops being trained by European officers.

(4) Mustaufi being sent back when he was coming to Peshawur in place of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah to resume negotiations with Sir Lewis Pelly.

In short, the Amir thought that the British Government wanted to make him their vassal like Princes of India, and he did not like this idea.

As to the employment of time, the Amir employed the whole of his day and some little part of his night in business, and the greater part of all this in looking after his arms, field-pieces, soldiers, finances, and politics.

He is also fond of play and jokes, but these he manages to have at the same time when carrying on his business.

Though, really, the Amir is led by no one, yet he lives in the same atmosphere which is breathed by the members of his Council, the Durbar people, and his domestic attendants, who, as a matter of course, must influence him to some extent. The following persons, collectively or separately, according to the nature of the subject in hand on different occasions, form his Council:—

Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan (when at Kabul).  
Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Kandahari.  
Wazir Asmatulla Khan.  
Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan.  
General Daud Shah.  
Mustaufi Habibulla Khan.  
New Mustaufi Abdul Rahim.  
Mullah Mahomed Shah (new Foreign Minister).

I know nothing in what way the business is conducted in these Councils; but, in the Durbar, most of these persons merely say ditto to what the Amir says. Besides the above-mentioned gentlemen, who are allowed to sit in “khilvats” or private discussions of the Council, the following persons usually attend the Durbar:—

Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan.  
Mirakhor Ahmed (when he is at Kabul).  
The late Wazir Arsla Khan's son.  
Sirdar Abdulla Khan.  
Sirdar Mahomed Hashim Khan.  
Sirdar Mahomed Twair Khan.  
Sirdar Mahomed Yusuf Khan (if at Kabul).  
Sirdar Shahbaz Khan.  
Sirdar Zakarya Khan.  
Sirdar Yakub Khan's father-in-law from Herat, commonly called Agba Lalla.  
Sirdar Nur Mahomed Khan.  
Sirdar Mahomed Surwar Khan.  
Sirdar Abbas Khan.  
Sirdar Attaulla Khan.  
Sirdar Bahadur Ghulam Nakshband Khan.  
Azizulla Khan.  
Kazi Abdul Kadr, Peshawuri.

There are also other persons connected with the Durbar or household, or are otherwise important to know, viz.—

Sirdar Ahmed Ali Jan (the Amir's grandson).  
 Sirdar Abdulla Jan's mother, daughter of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan.  
 Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan.  
 General Ghulam Haidar, Wardak.  
 Sepah Salar at Herat.  
 Shahghassi Mahomed Yusuf.  
 Lal Mahomed Khan, Officer of the Chalintra or the Octroi.  
 Ghulam Haidar Khan, Peshkhidmat.  
 Yar Mahomed Khan, ditto.  
 Mahomed Usman Khan, ditto.  
 Mahomed Aslam Khan, Kotwal.  
 Shah Zuman Khan, Khan of Bala Hissar.  
 Ahmad Ali, the late Wazir.  
 Rustam Khan, the late Treasury Officer.  
 Mahomed Akbar Khan of Tarrakbel.  
 Divans or Hindu Revenue Officers.  
 Three principal Hakims or Physicians.

In order to know the position and influence of the different persons in the above lists, some short details are necessary, and these I proceed to record as follows :—

*Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan*, father of Sirdar Abdulla Jan's mother (*i.e.*, father-in-law of the Amir), appears to have very great influence, specially in Kandahar. He is the only person for whom the Amir has any real respect. Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan cannot, however, prevail upon the Amir. He is very bigoted superstitious, and enemy, as it were, of the Hindus. If things be left to their ordinary course, and there be a struggle for attaining the throne after Amir's death, he is the person most likely to succeed. He is an old but strong man of 70 years of age.

*Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Kandahari*, was once Governor of Kandahar. He belongs to the party of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, Kandahari; but if circumstances allow, he may also try to possess himself of the throne. He is not much liked by the people of Kabul. He has a disposition to be tyrannical. When once appointed in charge of the office of Syud Nur Mahomed Shah, he took large bribes, and incurred the Amir's displeasure.

*Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan*, the Amir's step-brother, is the richest person in Kabul. He was once Governor of Kuram. He is now and then deputed to some financial or other business by the Amir. Did circumstances permit, he would attempt seizing the throne. But he has no party to support him. As long as Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan is friendly towards the Amir, he has Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan to recommend him.

*Sirdar Ahmed Ali Jan*, a young man, about 19 years old, is the son of Sirdar Mahomed Ali Jan,\* the only eldest son of the present Amir, who distinguished himself, and died in the battle of Kandahar with one of Shere Ali Khan's brothers. Sirdar Ahmed Ali is a clever young man, much liked by the people. He is a good soldier; he has also been learning English, which he can speak, and write a little. By his good conduct and attention to what he is told to do, he has won the favor of the Amir to such an extent that, even during the lifetime of Abdulla Jan, the former seemed to have a mind to make Ahmed Ali his heir-apparent, because Abdulla Jan was dull, and did not fulfil the Amir's expectations. As long as I was there, Ahmed Ali had not yet been allowed to have a part in politics. He seemed to have a liking for the English. He is much liked by the majority of the people, but he has no strong party to support him. Abdulla Jan's mother is his deadly enemy.

*Sirdar Abdulla Jan's mother*, daughter of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, was once the great favorite of the Amir. But, in these days, she has lost her influence. She is the bitterest enemy of Sirdars Yakub Khan and Ahmed Ali Jan. One of her daughters (the youngest, Shah Jan, commonly called Agha Jan) is a pet of the Amir. Abdulla Jan's mother is very clever and contrives, or rather tries to continue, to keep Ahmed Ali out of the Amir's favor.

*Sirdar Yakub Khan*.—I have very little to say of this Sirdar beyond so much that he is very popular throughout Afghanistan. I saw him occasionally in the court-yard which is common to his father's bed-room and his own room in which he is imprisoned. He appeared to be in good health. At Kabul, it seemed to me that he had very little chance of release.

*Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan*, the eldest living son of the Amir (aged about 38) is not a clever man. Though not "half-witted," he is not very intelligent. He is City Magistrate of Kabul, but has little real influence with the Amir or the people. He is said to have collected a great treasure. It is also said that he has a design on the throne. Some three years back, he conspired against the Amir, but failed in his designs. The latter became known, but he was forgiven. The only party in his favor seems to be Sirdar Abdulla Khan, his wife's brother.

*Wazir Asmatulla Khan*, one of the two principal Chiefs of Ghilzais, and about 45 years old, is a man of no great talents, but of much influence in his tribe. He is respected by the Amir on account of his influence. He is quiet, simple man.

*Mulla Mahomed Shah.*—I know little of this man. I know him as a good Arabic scholar, but he did not seem to me to be a clever politician. He has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Mustaufi Habibulla Khan*, one of the headmen of the Wardak tribe, was once the Financial Minister and Accountant-General to the State, having been raised to the high rank by the Amir from a common mirzaship (*i.e.*, clerkship). But recently, it having been found out that he had allowed his subordinates and Governors of the districts to embezzle Government money, the Mustaufi has been removed from his office, which is now filled by one Abdul Rahim, the new Mustaufi, a Shia by religion. Mustaufi Habibulla is liked by the people, and is very popular in all quarters. He is also looked on with favor by the Sirdars and by Abdulla Jan's mother. Habibulla Khan seemed to be well disposed towards the British Government.

*Abdul Rahim*, the new Mustaufi, has obtained this post by bringing out and proving several charges (of embezzlement, neglect of duty, &c.) against Habibulla Khan. The new Mustaufi is much disliked by all classes of the people. In financial matters, he has great influence with the Amir.

*Agha Syud Ahmad* is another new official, and belongs to the party of the new Mustaufi, like whom, he is equally unpopular with the people and the Chiefs.

*General Daud Shah*, a Pathan, of common parentage, and not head of any particular tribe entirely made by the Amir as it were, is said to have fought several battles with success. He is about 45 years of age, and knows geography and history to a certain extent. He is almost in sole charge of the ammunition manufactories at Kabul. He is said to have been a great favorite of Yakub Khan. He is proud, and not much liked by the people or his subordinates. He is supposed by the people to be making away with Government money, on which account it was said that he would soon meet with the Amir's displeasure. General Daud Shah seemed to have some influence with Abdulla Jan's mother. The Commander-in-Chief at Herat, and General Ghulam Haidar, Wardak, are his great enemies. The Amir also seemed to be somewhat suspicious about him.

*Mirakhor Ahmad*, now Governor of Jelalabad, is the bitterest enemy of the Hindus, and perhaps more so of the British. He is a very bigoted man. He is not at all a wise man, and is often styled by the Amir as an "old ass," and yet he holds the appointment of a Governor, because he is a stern ruler, and a good revenue collecting officer, and thus serves the purpose of the Amir. He has great influence with some tribes.

*Gulam Haidar, Wardak*, appears to be an able General, and he has great influence with the Wardak tribes. Owing to the ill-feelings that Daud Shah has towards him, he does not enjoy the same favor of the Amir which he used to do sometime back. Ghulam Haidar, Wardak, should not be confounded with another Ghulam Haidar, who is now a General, and in command of the forces at Lalpura. This man is a favorite of Daud Shah.

*Sepah Salar*, or the Commander-in-Chief, remained at Herat. At one time he used to be Abdulla Jan's private servant. A majority of the people at Kabul liked him. He is popular with the soldiery.

*Arsla Khan's son.*—Arsla Khan was the Foreign Minister, who died last winter. His son has great influence with the Ghilzai tribe; he does not hold the same position which his father had.

*Sirdar Abdulla Khan* is a wise young man, and good scholar. He is a nephew (from sister's side) of the Amir, and son of Sirdar Sultan Jan, who held Herat and fought with Amir Dost Mahomed Khan. One of Sirdar Abdulla Khan's brothers is at London, and one died in Persia only last summer. Abdulla Khan seems apparently to be contented with his lot. For some time lately, he was appointed Governor of Lughman, and ruled to the satisfaction of the people. The Amir appears to like him; but both parties have suspicions lurking in their minds. Abdulla Khan is a man of great influence. He is only about 23 years old.

*Sirdar Mahomed Hasham Khan*, son of Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan, and son-in-law to the Amir, seems to be a quiet young man. He has, together with his brother, Mahomed Twair Khan, recently been sent for from India where they lived as State prisoners with their father. Mahomed Hasham Khan seems to have been keeping aloof of the party feelings.

*Sirdar Mahomed Twair Khan*, son of Sirdar Mahomed Sharif Khan by a Hazara slave-girl, is a very cunning boy. Only a short time after his arrival at Kabul, he won the Amir's favor. He is especially appointed to look after spies or mukhbars from the British territory. He seemed to like the British Government.

*Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan*, now ruler of Girishk, one of the districts adjoining Seistan, is a step-brother to the Amir, who looks upon him to certain extent as an obedient brother. He is not a strong ruler, but rather an effeminate man, and much given to luxury.

*Sirdar Shahbaz Khan*, one of the nephews of the Amir, and late Governor of Kuram, has been called back on account of misgovernment. His accounts were under consideration when I left Kabul.

*Sirdar Zakarya Khan* is the head representative of Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Tillar's family. He is one of Sultan Mahomed's eldest sons. He is popular, and well known for his generosity. Though respected by the Amir, he has no influence with him. He possesses his estate at Lughman, but often remains in debt. He is well-disposed towards the British Government.

*A Herati Sirdar*, father-in-law to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, and commonly known by the name of Agha Lalla, and said to belong to the Alaman tribe on the frontiers of Herat, lives almost as a State prisoner at Kabul. He is ill-disposed towards the Amir, on account of Yakub Khan's imprisonment.

*Sirdar Mahomed Surmar Khan* is one of the Amir's cousins, and possesses an estate on the other side of Jelalabad, and also at several places near Kabul. He is popular on account of his generosity. He is inwardly discontented. He is son of Sirdar Mahomed Usman Khan.

*Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan Alakozai*, generally called Vallo Jan, is son-in-law to Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan. His ancestors were once rulers of Herat. He appears to be somewhat discontented. He knows a little English.

*Sirdar Abbas Khan*, Wazirzada of the Sadozai tribe, once Tehsildar of Shabkadar, in the Peshawur district, and a pensioner of the British Government, has got an estate near Jelalabad, where he resides in the winter season. In summer, he lives at Kabul. He, as well as his brothers, Ataulla Khan, Innatulla, and Hayutulla (brothers-in-law to the Amir), have little or no influence. All of them, however, seem to be discontented. The Amir seldom sees Ataulla Khan's sister.

*Sirdar Nazar Mahomed Khan*.—One of the Amir's cousins, and brother to the mother of Sirdar Vallo Jan Alakozai, is also discontented. He seems to have some influence with the people, but not much. He is believed to possess much wealth.

*Hakims or Physicians*.—The Amir has got three physicians of his own country, viz., H. Abdul Wahid, Abdul Rashid, and Divan Jaish. Divan Jaish regularly attends every night. His principal duty is to prepare wines and liquors for the use of the Amir. The other two physicians are the usual family doctors. The Amir seemed to have more faith in Abdul Rashid.

*Shahghassi Mahomed Yusuf*, son of Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, commanded some of the troops at Ghazni. General Daud Shah is opposed to him. The Amir has much faith in him.

*Kazi Abdul Kadar*, or Kazi Peshawuri, is one of those men who daily attends the Durbar. His principal duty is to read newspapers to His Highness the Amir, and to compose addresses (supported by quotations from the Koran and other sacred books) purporting to be from the Amir to the people, exhorting them to serve the State as good Musalmans, and to remain in readiness for crusade against the Kafirs that may be opposed to them.

The Kazi also serves to tell amusing stories, in order to tranquillize the cares and anxieties of the time being.

In political matters, he has no influence. Being respected by the Amir, people respect him, but they hate him from within. He is an able and accomplished Arabic scholar. He has composed some books on military exercise for the army in the Afghani language.

*Sirdar Bahadur Ghulam Nakshband Khan* is a pensioner of the British Government. He is one of the Mians of Kunur, and has a jagir given to him by the Amir. He is a regular attendant in the Durbar, and sits the whole day there. But the Amir suspects him as a news-writer to the British Government, and tries to keep everything secret from him.

*Lal Mahomed Khan* has arisen to great favor. He was once a furrash (carpet-spreader), then a "furrashbashi," head of the men who spread carpets and perform the duty of shampooing), and now officer in charge of the Kabul octroi duty. He is always with the Amir at night, and he is the man whom he most trusts. *Ex officio*, he has great influence with the traders and other people. He is also in some way the head of the commissariat.

*Ghulam Haidar Khan and Yar Mahomed Khan* are considered to be very faithful of the peshkhidmats (servants in attendants) by the Amir.

*Mahomed Usman Khan*, another peshkhidmat, and *Mahomed Aslam Khan*, city Kotwal, are two brothers, and both of them are looked upon with much favor by the Amir. The only influence that they have with the people is on account of their official position.

*Shah Zaman Khan*, an Arab, is Khan or Chief of Bala Hissar. He is officer of the police of the fort. He is a Shia.

*Ahmad Ali*, the late Wazir, and *Rustam Khan*, his brother, and late officer in charge of the treasury, are now out of favor. Once they were men of great influence. With Ahmad Ali, the Wazir, the Amir used to drink together. These brothers have some influence with the Shia sect, but not much with other people.

*Divans*, i.e., the Hindu servants of the State, as a rule, do not attend the Durbar, but they are now and then summoned in the presence of the Amir for explanation of some matters connected with the State revenue. The Divans are mostly employed to collect land revenue or the octroi. They are under the Accountant-General or Mustaufi. They all have much influence with the landholders and cultivators of their respective divisions.

To a certain extent, all of them complain of the oppression of the Amir; but really they seem to like the Afghan Government, because they profit by it. They, however, do not like the present Amir, as he is too careful of the finances.

The names of the Divans are —

D. Enshar Dass.	Divan of Ghilzais.
D. Jwabar,	Kohistan.
D. Sadda Nand,	Lohgar.
D. Harji Mal,	Chahar Dehi.



The latter was lately in some great difficulty on account of some misunderstanding in the accounts.

I think that the description that have given of the different individuals is sufficient to show the state of parties at Kabul, and the degree of influence that persons most in authority have with the people or the Amir himself. But it is necessary to add that, as a rule, Hindus and Kizilbashis or Shias, and the few Armenian Christians and the Jews that there are in Kabul, are eager to have British rule, in the hope that, under the latter, they will not be allowed to be oppressed by their fellow-subjects of a different religion. The traders, who have travelled in India, have a similar desire. Mullas and Syuds, as a rule, have a hatred towards the present Amir. But these, as well as the masses of people, have an inherent dislike for all the unbelievers in the Prophet, and especially for Europeans.

Notwithstanding all the miseries and oppressions of the Afghan rule, they are ready to fight and give up whatever they possess for the sake of preserving an Islam Government in their country. Excited by the fanatic feelings, and allured by prospects of plundering the notoriously rich cities of India, and remembering the times of Mahomed Ghaznavi (and ignorant altogether of the powerful rule of Britain), they become ready for "jihad" or crusade in a moment. On the other hand, I may remark that it is an element of the Afghan character that mild words of an opponent increase their pride; but when they are once well brought under the influence of a stick, they never raise their head again. There is a saying that a stick is the only teacher of Afghans.

Kobistanis of Punjsher strove to make themselves independent of the Amir. In fact, all the people of Afghanistan like to remain independent if they can. Those who are independent love their independence; and those that are not, sigh for it.

The tax of four rupees per head that was levied last year, greatly oppressed and disturbed the people. It made the Government of the present Amir far weaker than it ever had been.

The strength of the army of the Amir is said to be above 80,000. The soldiers generally are fine young fellows. Many of them are brave, daring, and naturally robust. But as they are kept in crowded and damp barracks, without any regard for sanitation, their health commonly is not good. The Lalpura soldiers are notoriously sick. Malaria almost always remains rife, and enlargement of the spleen prevails. The Lalpura cantonments are not at all worth staying in.

Though the soldiers are not supplied with costly clothes, yet the latter are better than what they would have worn at their homes. In winter, they get warm uniform. They have got tents, blankets, postins, &c., &c. All soldiers are supplied with muskets, and some also with a pistol, and many with swords. The cavalry men are also supplied with spears. The swords are good and sharp. Many of the muskets are Henri-Martini, and many are made at Kabul, just like those of Henri-Martini's. I saw many rifled muskets, and it was said that most of the regiments were fully supplied with them.

For the artillery, they have very large guns and cannons many of which are rifled. I myself saw several large guns that were rifled. The guns were commonly used with solid shot; but, for some months past, they had been very busy with their experiments with hollow balls or shells. They managed to prepare shells, but they could not manage to get them to burst at the mark they required. Sometimes the shells burst short of, and at others past, the mark. The number of large guns, such as are drawn by mules and bullocks, was said to be about 150 throughout the Amir's territory.

As far as I could judge (I have not much knowledge of this kind), the troops looked well-disciplined and well-trained. The soldiers were often put to very hard work. The officers appeared to understand their business. In the city of Kabul, there is an army school where young men are taught how to read and write, and especially mathematics, before they join the army. Officers especially are recruited from this class.

Besides, there is a Mulla attached to each regiment. Each regiment has a band of music and a bandmaster, and the songs are sung in *Pushtu*. The soldiers are also drilled in *Pushtu*.

To each regiment is also attached a physician, a surgeon, and an *attar* or apothecary. The surgeons, though they are mostly illiterate, know much of the practical work. They can well manage a fractured limb; they can stop bleeding, and treat ordinary wounds. Yet the soldiers did not place the twentieth part of the confidence in them as they do in one acquainted with the modern surgery.

The Amir has got a private treasury of several crores of rupees, which he used to say he would spend in time of war.

The people of independent Afghanistan are more hostile to the British Government than the people who are ruled by the Amir.

(Sd.) CHETAN SHAH.

## APPENDIX XXXV.

MINUTE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE EDWARD ROBERT LYTTON BULWER  
LYTTON, BARON LYTTON OF KNEBWORTH, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF  
INDIA, DATED 4<sup>TH</sup> SEPTEMBER 1878.

[*Referred to in paragraph 159, Chapter IX.*]

A mission, under the charge of General Sir Neville Chamberlain, is about to proceed to Kabul to confer with the Amir; thus affording us our first, and possibly last, opportunity of entering into personal explanations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, in his own capital, regarding the relations between his country and the British Empire.

Resulting, as this mission does, from Russia's recent action in Central Asia, it cannot but raise the whole question of the relative positions of Russia and England in those regions, and may not improbably lead to a final settlement of that long vexed question. It is, therefore, desirable that we should very carefully examine, in the light of recent events and disclosures, the problem of our future in Asia; with a view to arriving at such broad and definite lines of policy as may serve to guide our Envoys in their difficult task, and to direct our efforts for the consolidation of our dominion and due influence in the East.

In the present Minute I shall endeavour first, to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, and show how it has arisen; and then to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves:—

1. At the beginning of last century, Russia's most advanced posts, at Orenburg and Petropaulovsk, were nearly 2,500 miles distant from the Progress of England and Russia in the East. insignificant British settlements in India. Our only rivals there were the French. The advance of Russia southwards seemed practically bounded by the vast and almost impassable deserts of the Kirghiz Steppes. For a century past, her progress and conquests had been entirely in an easterly direction; and no one could at that time foresee that England and Russia would ever come into collision in Asia.

2. About 1730, Russia commenced the absorption of the hordes of the Kirghiz Steppes, and the gradual occupation of those arid deserts,—a task which occupied her for more than a hundred years; and her outposts began to draw nearer to India. England, meanwhile, had not been idle. Bengal had been conquered, or ceded to us, the Madras Presidency established, and Bombay became an important settlement; and at the close of last century less than 2,000 miles intervened between English and Russian possessions.

3. In the beginning of this century, the more rapid progress was made on our side. While Russia was laboriously crossing the great Desert, and slowly consolidating her power in the Kirghiz Steppes, England was advancing with great strides over India. The North-Western Provinces, the Carnatic, the territories of the Peishwa, Sind, and the Punjab, successively came under our rule; and by 1850 we had extended our dominion to the foot of the mountains beyond the Indus. Thus, during the first half of this century, the distance between the outposts of England and Russia had been reduced, almost entirely by advances on our side, from 2,000 to less than 1,000 miles.

4. In 1854-56 the Crimean war temporarily checked the designs of Russia in Europe; but this seems rather to have stimulated her progress in Asia. The great Desert once crossed, Russia found herself in presence of fertile and settled countries, whose provinces fell under her control as rapidly as those of India had fallen under ours. Twenty-five years have not yet elapsed since that war; and, during this period, the distance between England and Russia in the East has been reduced, this time entirely by advances on Russia's side, from 1,000 to less than 400 miles.

5. It might seem unnecessary to recall such well known facts, were it not that there are those who argue, even now, that there is no imminent risk of contact with Russia in Asia; that we have no reason to anticipate further advance on her part; and that the dread of such advance is groundless, since we are still separated from her by vast distances and almost impassable obstacles. It is, therefore, well to show how little vast distances and impassable obstacles have hitherto stayed the advance of the British and Russian Empires towards each other in the East; and, by measuring the past, to attempt to estimate the probable future, rate of progress.

6. It appears, then, that the approach of the two Powers has, for nearly two centuries, been steady continuous movement; undiverted by any obstacles, whether purely physical or of human origin,—most rapid on our side during the first half of this century, and recently on the side of Russia—never ceasing, however, but, on the contrary, constantly increasing in rapidity. The progress towards contact made in the first half of this century was greater than during the whole preceding one; and during the last quarter of the century it has been proportionately greater than during the first half century.

7. We have also been told, however, that the further advance of Russia cannot prove formidable, because further advance and conquest means greater weakness. But conquest and extension of dominion do not necessarily weaken a great Power. Is the British Empire less powerful, now that England has extended her rule to Peshawur, 1,500 miles from Bombay and

Calcutta, than when she was painfully struggling for a foothold round her factories? Doubtless there is a measure of extension which cannot be passed without danger; but what proof have we that Russia has reached that limit? *Has* Russia been weakened by the extension of her power over 1,000 miles from Orenburg to the Oxus? On the contrary, all that we know as a fact is that she has put more forces in the field, and shown more energy, in her latest and most distant expeditions in Asia than in any former ones. And I shall, I think, be able to show hereafter that Russia will actually gain in strength by further progress.\*

8. We know, then, that the approach of the two great rival Powers in Central Asia has continued uninterruptedly for two centuries, and has made progress at an ever accelerating rate, as if governed by the laws of attraction that rule material bodies. We know that the conditions which govern the relations between civilization and barbarism are unchangeable, and that every cause which has acted in past times to compel the advance of ourselves and of Russia, continues to act with undiminished force; and we know that neither Power has yet shown signs of failing strength or vitality. Therefore we can calculate, as certainly as we calculate on the succession of the seasons, that the same causes will continue to act, and to produce the same results; and that within a time which can almost with certainty be computed as less than a generation, and which may prove much shorter, England and Russia will be conterminous in the East. Accepting this as certain and unavoidable, it remains for us now to determine where that contact shall take place.

9. Assuming, as we may with certainty, that neither Russia nor England will recede from any position they now occupy, it follows that the line of ultimate contact must be either the present frontier of one of the two countries, or some intermediate line; and these possible lines I will now proceed to examine.

10. The present north-west frontier of India has been the subject of much discussion, and high authorities have recorded opinions in favor of it. Many of these opinions, however, were given when Russia was 600 miles further distant than she now is, when Afghanistan was looked upon as a certain ally, and when, consequently, the whole conditions were different. Had these high authorities lived to this day, they would probably have seen reason to modify their opinions, as Lord Napier, the most distinguished living Indian military authority, has done. No one who has studied the question can doubt that a rapid change is taking place in public opinion on the subject,—a change especially remarkable during the time I have been in India. Two years ago the opponents to an occupation of Quetta, or to any extension of our military frontier, were numerous and powerful: now they have dwindled to a comparatively small minority.

11. Our present frontier dates from the annexation of the Punjab. It was not a chosen line, accepted after careful study and with farseeing prevision; but was adopted because it represented, approximately, the points to which the Sikhs had at that time pushed their power. Had the annexation of the Punjab taken place a little earlier or a little later, we should have had a different frontier. It would be strange if a line thus taken by chance should combine more advantages than can be found in any line selected by human ingenuity; and yet that is the contention of some of its advocates.

12. Undoubtedly, at the time, this frontier had much to recommend it. It is natural for a Government, looking to the interests of the moment, to carry its conquests to the foot of a mountain tract, and stop at the point where military operations become more difficult, and results less satisfactory. Rich plains are easily overrun and held; and they respond to the benefits conferred by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are difficult to traverse and subdue; and, when subdued, their administration presents a still more ungrateful task. The foot of the hills also offers a well-defined line; whereas once the hills are entered, it is difficult to know where to stop. So long, therefore, as we had only the rude hill tribes to consider, there was much to be said in favor of the line we found drawn. It was not a strong line, except in the sense that a prison wall is strong to the prisoner; and it was not a favorable line, as it left our boundary peculiarly exposed to inroads and insult, while limiting our power of external influence or chastisement. But, on the whole, it might fairly be argued that the inconveniences of advancing beyond it exceeded those of remaining there; and, in that sense, and that sense alone, it was a good line.

13. Regarded, however, as a great strategical line, it is dangerously and fatally defective. The theory of awaiting attack behind a mountain range belongs to the pre-Napoleonic period of military science, and to the time of wars of position; when armies manœuvred opposite each other for months, and the capture of one town was considered a sufficient result of a year's campaign. Napoleon shattered this theory, with many others: and in every instance where such defective strategy has since been adopted, it has resulted in utter defeat and ruin.

---

\* NOTE.—I am aware that there are those who say that Russia, threatened with bankruptcy and socialism, is now formidable only to herself. I would remind these prophets that precisely the same language was held, with equal plausibility, at the time of the Crimean war; since which time Russia has largely developed her railways and increased her military strength, has carried her armies to the walls of Constantinople, has permanently acquired the most important harbour and fortress in Asia Minor, and has added the Khavatees to her conquests in Central Asia—instructive commentaries on the predictions of 20 years ago. I would further remind them that it was not France the prosperous monarchy, but France of the Revolution, bankrupt and socially convulsed, which overran Europe, and crushed every well established monarchy in turn. It is strange to what little practical purpose history is studied by some of our political prophets.

Modern military authorities are agreed that the value of an obstacle such as a great river, or a mountain range, depends upon the command, on both sides, of the points of passage; and on the power of operating at will on either side of the obstacle. To the combatant who securely holds the passes it is of incalculable value, enabling him to mask his movements, to concentrate his force in safety, and to strike at will; or to hold his adversary in check while maturing his defence or preparing his counterstroke. To him who does not command the passes, it is, on the other hand, a barrier which hampers his movements, and a screen which masks and protects his enemy. Hence the value of the great German fortresses on the Rhine, and of the former Austrian fortresses in the Italian Quadrilateral; and hence the value to France of Nice and Savoy, which give her the command of the passes of the Alps.

14. But along our existing frontier every pass is in the hands of tribes independent, if not hostile; and who, if we elect to remain permanently within our present border, must ultimately become allies and subjects of our great rival. And whenever the time of actual collision arrives, we should have to choose between forcing passes, defended against us as they have never yet been defended, to seek our adversary in a hostile country, far from our base and from all friendly support; or awaiting him along a frontier line of 1,000 miles, pierced at all points by passes which are open to him, and with a river at our back.

15. It is true that the recent occupation of Quetta has materially improved our position. The command of the southern passes is now in our hands; and from Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles, our frontier is well guarded. While we, securely established at Quetta, can at any moment descend on the plains of Kaudahar, or advance to meet our adversary in the open field, no enemy can debouch on our plains without first besieging and taking Quetta,—a task of no slight difficulty, and involving much loss of precious time—and then forcing a long and difficult pass held by us. But on the northern, and more directly exposed, portions of our frontier, our line is as fatally defective as ever.

16. I conceive, then, that it would be simply suicidal to allow Russia to establish herself peaceably and securely at Kabul, and extend her authority to our present borders and over the passes leading into India. She would gain fresh and almost inexhaustible sources of military strength in the wild warriors who inhabit the countries round Kabul and Herat; and who, in her ranks, would rival the best native troops we have in India. She would add enormously to her prestige, a factor never to be lightly thought of in war, and of almost magic power in Eastern warfare. Her dream of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and of a new and shorter line of communication with her Central Asian possessions, would soon become a reality; and all her present difficulties of distances and communications would disappear. We cannot rely on her friendship; and the rich plains of India might prove a too alluring bait to the occupiers of the barren and profitless mountains of Afghanistan. To attack Russia, securely established in such a position, would be a task that might prove beyond even our military resources; to await her in the plains below would be to court defeat. Russia could offer the plunder of the plains, and the conquest of regions once their own, to the Afghans and hill tribes who join her ranks; we have nothing to offer them in return. Even Lord Lawrence, the great advocate of our present frontier, says—"I feel no shadow of a doubt that if a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the Afghans, *en masse*, from the Amir of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would readily join it." And though he believes that such hordes would make no impression on the troops we could oppose to them, the conditions would be different were these hordes armed, drilled, and led by European officers, and supported by European troops.

17. The Russian Frontier, from the Caspian to the Pamir Steppe, is about 1,200 miles long; 200 miles longer than our north-west frontier. Of this, however, less than half is open to attack, as from the Caspian to Samarcand it is covered by the great Khivan desert. But the fatal defect in this line is its want of inter-communication, and its distance from support. While every part of our frontier is within 200 miles of railway communication, and most of it much nearer, Tashkend, the centre of Russian power in Turkistan, is more than 1,000 miles from the nearest railway; and many of the frontier posts are 1,500 miles distant from such support.

18. The difficulties attending a military occupation, under such conditions, are necessarily great; and the entire force that Russia, with her vast military resources, can maintain in Turkistan, does not exceed that which we maintain in the Punjab alone. It would be easier for us to collect 100,000 men at any point in our frontier than for Russia to collect 25,000 on hers. This heavy drawback has been long felt, and has led to various schemes for connecting the distant provinces of Turkistan with the centres of Russian power—among which may be mentioned Romanoffsky's Oxus-Caspian Canal and Aral-Caspian Railway; and a proposed railway from Orenburg to Tashkend, 1,350 miles long.

19. Russian Statesmen and Generals have long perceived that the true base for their Central Asian possessions is on the Caspian. From Samarcand by Tashkend to Orenburg is about 1,500 miles. From Samarcand to the Caspian by Merv is about half that distance; and the disproportion is greater in the case of the Russian stations on the Oxus. It was with a view to opening a new and shorter line of communication with the Khanates that the military settlement of Krasnovodsk was established. Owing to the difficulties of the desert between Krasnovodsk and Khiva, this scheme has failed; and, though projects for a railway are still discussed, Russian attention is now mainly directed to a more southern and fertile route along the Persian frontier.



20. In an able paper by Colonel Veniukoff on the Russian position in Central Asia, he indicates a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence northwards to Kunduz and southwards to Shikarpoor, as the great natural line of communication between Western Europe and the British and Russian possessions in the East. That Russia accepts this view, as regards her possessions, we have abundant evidence. The maintenance and increase of her establishments at Krasnovodsk and Chikislar, and her recent advance to Kizil Arvat, can have no object but that of opening communication with Turkistan; and in our Merv despatch we have already explained the almost overpowering necessity which forces Russia towards Merv, in furtherance of this object.

21. Colonel Veniukoff, in the paper above quoted, further draws attention to the importance to Russia of Badakhshan, and of the minor Usbeg States of And Khui, Sir-i-pul, and Maimena; and to the fatal error which he conceives Russia to have committed in acknowledging the rights of Afghanistan over them. "These small Usbeg States," he says, "form the last oases in the southern borders of the Turan Steppe, at the very foot of the Paropamisus. To replace them by any other localities favorable to sedentary life in our future frontier on the south, is impossible. Russia cannot halt in her progressive movement till she encloses on the south the steppes extending to Khorassan and the Hindu Kush." And of Badakhshan, he says, "without possessing it and colonising it, we can never guarantee peace in Turkistan, or even the solidity of our rule there. It occupies the most flourishing district in the basin of the Oxus, and feeds a numerous population," and "without Badakhshan the Russians must consider themselves in Central Asia as guests without any settled habitation, and unable to form one."

22. Nor is this an exaggerated picture of the necessity she is under. Were England securely established at Kabul, with the passes of the Hindu Kush in her possession, and outposts at Faizabad, Kunduz, Balkh, and Herat; while Russia still occupied her weak and extended line, severed by the Khivan desert from her military establishments on the Caspian, her position would be indeed insecure. Peshawur and Tashkend are about equally distant from the passages of the Oxus; but, while Peshawur is only 150 miles from a railway, and can be rapidly reinforced by the whole military resources of India, and of England, Tashkend is practically isolated, and can only slowly, and with infinite trouble, receive small reinforcements from Russia. The result of a contest on the Oxus, under such conditions, cannot be doubted; and the loss of a battle there might entail on Russia the loss of most of her Central Asian possessions.

23. Thus it appears that both Russia and England have, now, weak frontiers, at which they cannot willingly accept contact with a great rival Power; and are both equally urged forward by considerations of military and political expediency, and by the instinct of self-preservation, towards the Hindu-Kush, the great natural boundary between India and Central Asia. Long continued inaction under such conditions is impossible; and I will now examine the intermediate regions into which both are thus impelled, and where the ultimate boundary line may possibly be found.

24. The wild country intervening between the present Indian and Russian frontiers contains the key to both India and Turkistan. It comprises that great range of mountains which, under various names, extends from Herat in the west, past Kabul, to the extreme northern boundary of Kashmir; and forms the watershed dividing the waters running south towards the Persian Gulf and Indian Seas, from those running north into the great inland seas and deserts. Such a vast natural barrier has always a high influence and significance in the ultimate demarcation of empires and of races, beyond its mere strategical value; and I believe it is destined to become a great line of national demarcation in the present case.

25. The routes crossing or turning this barrier, and connecting the Asiatic possessions of Russia and England, may be roughly classed in three groups. The first or eastern one comprises those leading from Kashgaria, over the Karakorum and other passes, through Ladak and Kashmir. The second or centre group comprises the roads from Kashgar, Kokand, and the Pamir Steppe by Chitral; from Bokhara and Samarcand by the Bamian and other passes; and from Herat and Merv by Maimena and the Bamian Pass; all meeting about Kabul and Jellalabad. The third or western group comprises the roads leading from Persia and the Caspian by Herat or Birjand, on Kandahar and the lower Indus.

26. Of these groups, the eastern is the least important, owing to the length and difficulties of the roads, the rugged and inhospitable country they traverse, and their distance from the centre of Russia's power. The centre group comprises the shortest and most direct routes connecting the two countries. The distance between Peshawur and Tashkend, the most important garrisons of India and Turkistan respectively, is little more than half that from the Caspian to the lower Indus; but the roads connecting them cross a double chain of mountains, with difficult passes, before emerging on India. The western group presents the easiest roads and those best adapted for military operations. But they are the longest, and debouch at one end on a desert line backed by a broad river, the Indus, at the other on the Caspian, where Russia has a secure base, and insignificant military settlements only to strike at.

27. We shall not willingly be the aggressors in any contest with Russia. We have no desire to extend our conquests further; and our object being confined to the defence of India, ours will naturally be essentially a defensive policy. But theory and experience alike prove



that a strategy purely defensive almost certainly ends in disaster; and if this principle holds good where an army is defending its own soil, surrounded by a friendly and sympathising people, it applies with tenfold force in India, where we have no such advantages, and where retreat or inaction would probably raise us even more dangerous enemies in rear. When the occasion arises, India must be defended by a vigorous offensive; and in choosing our line of contact with Russia, we have to consider what facilities it offers for striking quick and hard, even more than what protection it affords.

28. Bearing this in mind, a study of the map will show the immense importance to us of the triangle formed by Kabul, Ghazni, and Jalalabad, with the possession of the passes over the Hindu Kush. Defensively, this position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, and with its communications unassailable, directly commands the central group of roads, while indirectly threatening both the eastern and western group. Offensively, it gives the power of debouching at will on the plains of the Oxus, and threatens every point of Russia's extended frontier. It is difficult to imagine a more commanding strategical position; and whenever the moment of collision with Russia arrives, it must find us in possession of it, as friends and allies of the Afghans if possible, but firmly established there in any case.

29. With this as our great central bastion and line of defence, it remains to determine the flanks and outposts of our position. To the east our line may be easily defined. I cannot anticipate much danger to

Eastern group of roads.

India from operations undertaken by Russia on this side; and I can hardly conceive any circumstances in which we should wish to engage a force in the long and difficult passes of Kashmir, for the sake of debouching on Kashgar, and striking at Russia in that direction. Except for this purpose there would be little use in holding the northern debouches of the passes; and it would be difficult to cross the ridge and establish ourselves in Sarikol and the valleys leading to Kashgaria, without being gradually drawn further into regions where we have no interests to defend. Beyond these mountains we should meet Russia at a disadvantage; while the passes leading into India are so few, so long, and so difficult, that they could easily be stopped if occasion required. From the Karakorum to the Baroghil Passes, therefore, our ultimate boundary should be the great mountain range or watershed; and our officers in Kashmir have accordingly been instructed, whilst endeavouring to extend our influence over the petty chieftoms along the southern slopes of this ridge, to avoid interference with the tribes beyond it.

30. On the left or western group of roads our position is eminently satisfactory. Our flank is covered by the Arabian Sea and the sandy deserts of Western Biluchistan; while the roads and passes leading

Western group.

into India are commanded by Quetta. From a military point of view, our position here leaves little to be desired, beyond the improvement of our communications between Quetta and the Indus; and though we can never allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of a rival Power, and political or special military considerations may make it necessary for us to occupy that town, I do not consider that such occupation would actually strengthen our western frontier.

31. But the central group, between the Chitral Valley and Quetta, presents a much more difficult problem. Two lines here naturally suggest themselves—an inner and an outer one; the inner following

Central group.

the Hindu Kush to the head of the Helmund and thence down that river to Girishk and Kandahar; the outer one following the recognized frontier of Afghanistan along the Oxus from Wakhan to Kojah Saleh and thence across to Herat and the Persian frontier.

32. Of these, the inner line would probably, from a military point of view, most recommend itself. From the Pamir to the Caspian by this line is 1,200 miles. But the assailable points on this frontier are practically confined to three—Chitral, Kabul, and Kandahar—of which the two last only are important. The Chitral passes might, perhaps, be best defended by closing the debouches at Chitral or Jalalabad. But the Bamian and Khawak or Panjsher passes are the great high roads between India and Turkistan; and of these it would be necessary to hold the northern debouches to secure the full advantages of the position. Between Kabul and Kandahar our information is very imperfect, but the line is not, so far as we know, pierced by any important passes; while, on our side, there is good intercommunication, except in the depth of winter, by the Ghazni and Khelat-i-Ghilzai Valley. Finally, the communications with all parts of the line are good and well covered.

33. The outer line is 1,700 miles long, and includes Wakhan, Badakhsan, Balkh, and other provinces subject to Afghanistan lying in the basin of the Oxus. It may be necessary on grounds of policy—such as to secure an alliance with Afghanistan—to include these in our sphere; but, militarily and financially, we should suffer by advancing into the valley of the Oxus. We should gain no accession of strength, for the Oxus offers no good military line; and we should be withdrawing further from our base, and increasing the strain on our military and financial resources. These provinces, also, belonging to the great basin of the Oxus, are by race and interests more closely allied to Bokhara than to Kabul; and we should there become involved in interests which might make it difficult to stop even at the Oxus.

34. I am aware that great stress has been laid on our retention of Wakhan, through which lies the only high road of commerce between Eastern and Western Central Asia. If we are prepared boldly to cross the great mountain range, occupy the valleys of the Oxus on one side, and of Kashgaria on the other, and contest Central and Northern Asia with Russia, then, undoubtedly, we should never allow Wakhan to pass out of our hands. But if, as I

hold, we should in the main confine ourselves to the south of the great mountain range, only occupying such points beyond it as are absolutely necessary for the protection of India, then I think Wakhan should naturally pass into the hands of the Power that spreads over the country north of the mountains. To oppose an obstacle to a trade which we cannot ourselves develop or control would neither be generous nor wise ; and, on the other hand, the more we stop Russia's southern advance, the more desirable it seems to be to give her every facility for expanding eastwards.

35. The real point of difficulty in the choice of our line—the point where military, political, and financial considerations have to be most carefully weighed—is Herat. The objections to a military occupation of Herat are obvious. It lengthens our communications by 360 miles, and our frontier by 500 miles. To garrison it properly, and hold its long line of communications, would require a considerable increase to our army, and to our already heavy military expenditure. It draws us away from a naturally strong and compact line, and creates a weak and exposed salient, with bad communications, one road exposed to Persia, the other to the Turkomans and the Russians on the Oxus ; and it entails on us the ultimate subjugation and pacification of a wild and unremunerative tract of mountain land, occupied by hitherto unsubdued tribes. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so commanding, and its probable influence on Russian progress in Central Asia so great, that Imperial considerations may well outweigh all such objections.

36. The importance of Herat, both as a fortress and as the capital of Western Afghanistan, long an independent State, is well known. It is also in a peculiar degree associated with our name and reputation in the East. We have made an attack on it a *casus belli* with Persia, and have successfully fought for it: on one occasion it was defended by a British officer. To yield it now to Russia would be to falsify all past policy, to declare wasted the lives and money expended in the Persian war, and to proclaim to the Eastern world that, while prepared to fight Persia, we are not prepared to fight Russia, for this point.

37. But Herat has also a special importance from its geographical position. Without acknowledging its right to the title of “key” of India, of which Empire it is only a distant and rather inconveniently situated outpost, it is undoubtedly the key to Eastern Persia and Western Afghanistan, and to the roads from the Russian possessions in Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. It is also the centre of the most fertile region, and of some of the most powerful tribes, of Afghanistan ; and we may well hesitate before surrendering to a rival Power such a source of strength.

38. In the natural progress of civilized and civilizing Powers which I have already dwelt upon, wherever we leave a vacuum, Russia will assuredly fill it up ; and if we leave Herat outside our sphere, Russia will sooner or later occupy it, and extend her power southwards through Western Afghanistan and Scistan, and probably to the Persian Gulf. Thus ultimately we should be conterminous with, and enveloped by, Russia along the whole of our frontier from the Pamir Steppe to the Arabian Sea ; and the increased military expenditure entailed on us by such contact would fall little short of that entailed by an occupation of Herat.

39. But if we securely hold Herat, I believe its command of position to be so great that it will definitively and finally stop the southern progress of Russia, not only in Afghanistan, but in Eastern Persia ; and probably divert her expansion permanently eastwards. Our contact with Russia on this side would then be restricted to the space between Herat and the Pamir ; an influence equal to, or greater than, that of Russia might be regained in Persia ; and we might watch, without anxiety, Russia's efforts to open a new line of communication from the Caspian through Merv to Turkistan. The scheme of a Railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence southwards to India, and northwards to Central Asia, would no longer be a mere visionary dream, but an idea which might become an accomplished fact within the next generation ; and, instead of a source of danger, might prove an element of stability, and of development and commercial prosperity alike to Persia, England, and Russia, in the East. Lastly, our frontier, though in appearance lengthened, would really be shortened ; for so long as we hold Herat, our western frontier between that and the sea will never be seriously menaced.

40. To sum up then. As a purely military line, the strongest frontier we could take up would be along the Hindu Kush from the Pamir to Bamian, holding the northern debouches of the principal passes ; and thence southwards by the Helmund, Girishk, and Kandahar to the Arabian Sea. Though political considerations of the moment may compel and justify an extension of our line to the northern frontier of Afghanistan, this would weaken, rather than strengthen, our general position. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so great that, though it lies beyond our natural frontier, it cannot be excluded from our line of defence. This line, therefore, should ultimately run from the Hindu Kush along the Paropamisus to Herat, and thence down the western frontier of Afghanistan and Biluchistan to the Arabian Sea.

41. It will be seen, then, that the frontier problem which has ever pressed for solution is this:—Granted that Russia and England are steadily drawing nearer to one another in the East ; and that there are certain points necessary to the safety of India, which we must secure against absorption by Russia ; how can these be secured with least danger, disturbance, responsibilities, and expense ?

Present situation.

42. I do not here discuss whether the contact which is ultimately inevitable between Russia and England will be beneficial to us, or the reverse. While, on the one hand, such contact will doubtless tend towards the civilization of Central Asia and the development of commerce, it is equally certain that it will gravely increase our anxieties in India, expose our Empire in the East to the influence of every political disturbance in Europe, and render necessary the maintenance of armaments on a very different footing to that which has hitherto sufficed, and on a scale more proportionate to those of the great European military Powers. But this question seems to me to be outside the actual problem before us; for no one, so far as I know, has ever maintained that we should let Russia touch us at a line of *her* choosing.

43. The solution hitherto sought has been to maintain Afghanistan as a friendly, but independent, State, between Russia and ourselves; guarding those points which we deem necessary to India's security. No one will question the wisdom of the policy, though we may disapprove the system of absolute non-intervention which was thought necessary to give effect to it. The error which vitiated this policy was an assumption that Russia would appear in Afghanistan in the character of an enemy, as an invading and conquering Power; and that if we only held aloof and gave no cause for offence, Afghanistan, when the time came, would certainly throw herself into our arms. Even before landing in India I drew attention to this most dangerous fallacy. I pointed out that Russia was too farseeing and wary to shipwreck her cause by a wild premature invasion; that she would first appear at Kabul in friendly guise; and that what we had really to fear was the gradual establishment there, by friendly means and by a policy more active than our own, of an influence hostile to us. This is precisely what has happened. While British officers have been rigorously excluded from all parts of Afghanistan, Russian officers have been permitted to visit Maimana and other points on her northern frontier; a Russian mission has been received, and hospitably entertained at Kabul, where it still remains; and proposals have been openly made to the Amir to receive Russian workmen to aid in the improvement of his manufactures, among which arms and soldiers would doubtless be included. This is the situation with which we have now to deal; and which has forced on us the somewhat undignified course of hurriedly despatching a rival Mission, without even waiting to learn how it will be received.

44. So long as the Ruler of Afghanistan was, in appearance at least, on good terms with us, and Russia abstained from interference, the system of maintaining an independent State as a barrier could be adhered to. But this policy necessarily requires that the intermediate State should be friendly to us, and not subject to the influence of our rival. These conditions being reversed, such a State becomes a source of very real danger, and one of two alternatives is forced on us; an immediate and definite understanding with that State, adverse to our rival, or an immediate and definite understanding with our rival, adverse to that State. Either we must re-establish a preponderating influence in Afghanistan and exclude Russia, or, disregarding Afghanistan, we must endeavour to effect with Russia some mutually satisfactory arrangement by which we shall be secured from the dangers to which our present weak frontier exposes us.

45. There is, indeed, a third course, but it is one which is surrounded with difficulties and dangers, while leading to no practical final solution; and could only be justified were our position here too weak to be defended in any other way. It is to attempt to stay Russia's progress in Asia, by making any further advance on her part a *casus belli*. To do so, a definite line must be drawn somewhere, at Kizil Arvat, or Merv, or Herat, or Kandahar. But in reality such line would be variable, and dependent on the views and temperament of the Ministry in power; and Russia would thus be ever tempted to trespass. She will doubtless give any required assurances; and a distinct declaration on our part would probably delay her advance for a time. Its immediate effect, therefore, would be to allay alarm, and so defer the measures necessary to our permanent security. But, unless we undertake the control of the countries which we forbid her to meddle with, the position would soon become impossible; and we could hardly avoid ultimately accepting all the responsibilities of a guarantee, without securing the advantages we might originally have gained from it. It is also certain that Russia would disregard all her assurances, when an opportunity seemed to offer the means of doing so with impunity. One of two results must then follow—either we should have to withdraw from our declarations, and allow Russia to continue an advance, against which her assurances have prevented our properly securing ourselves; or else go to war with her, at the time selected by her as most disadvantageous to us.

46. War with Russia is not a thing to be lightly undertaken. The obligation to undertake it for an object which might have been attained by other means, would be most discreditable to our statesmanship. A British statesman, remembering the American war, and the lasting effect which a few hostile cruisers have had on America's commercial prosperity, may well hesitate before exposing British commerce to the same risks. The contemplation of war with Russia in Central Asia has been forced on my mind in the study of the anxious question now under consideration. But the more closely I contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the repugnance with which I regard it—a repugnance amounting almost to horror. In such a war we should doubtless be successful, for we can meet Russia with far superior forces on the Oxus. But it is the consequences of success that we have to consider. We should probably stir up a Mahomedan rising throughout the Khanates; and we can realize the horrors of such a rising, if we picture to ourselves another Indian mutiny, in which the mutineers would be supported by a victorious European army. As we advance, and drive the Russians out of Central Asia, and perhaps back to Orenburg, our difficulties and responsibilities would

increase. We cannot undertake the whole administration of Central Asia; nor prevent Russia stepping in again to restore order in the countries which, by our withdrawal, we have abandoned to the wildest anarchy. And, when she does this, she will assuredly take signal vengeance on all who sided with us during the war.

47. Nor has such a war ever finally stopped the progress of a great advancing Power. We spent thousands of lives, and 80 millions of money, on the Crimean War; and within 20 years the results of that war have been lost, and the interests for which we then fought have been still more seriously endangered. While, therefore, to secure a peaceful solution, war must always be kept in view as a possible ultimate measure, it is one to be resorted to only when all others have failed; and threats of war held over Russia will only be effective if accompanied by, and subordinate to,—not substituted for—such direct action in Afghanistan as I now propose to consider.

48. Of the two courses indicated in paragraph 44, that of a direct understanding with Afghanistan presents the greatest advantages. It would be in accord with our old policy, and would involve no undignified withdrawal from long asserted positions. It has the advantage of avoiding the delay and complication of European references and diplomacy, and of requiring action in India alone; and it could in all probability be more promptly and effectively carried out than any arrangements requiring negotiation with Russia.

49. If this course be selected, we should, in the first place, endeavour to establish our influence in Afghanistan through the present Amir. There is no man in Afghanistan his equal in character and ability. He has firmly established his rule, and secured it by disposing of all who might be dangerous rivals; and no successor could, for many years to come, wield the power that he now wields. Whether we can win him to our side is questionable. He has become estranged; he has learnt thoroughly to mistrust us; and all recent information confirms the belief that, of his two great neighbours, he hates the Russians the least. On the other hand, he knows that we are nearer, and more powerful for good or harm, than is Russia; and that no assistance from her could preserve his country or his throne against us.

50. But, if we wish to bind the Amir to us, we must appeal to something besides his fears—we must hold out hope of advantage to him as well. He will probably demand a subsidy; though he seems latterly to have extracted from his subjects a revenue sufficient for his wants, and to be comparatively indifferent to money. In the next place, he will require some territorial guarantee. To expect him, for our convenience, to agree to any arrangement by which he might lose part of his territories, would be absurd; nor would it be less manifestly unjust to interfere with his making his own terms with the Russians, and yet not protect him from them. Lastly, he will probably seek some sort of dynastic guarantee. What guarantees to require from the Amir, and what to grant him, are the points requiring the most careful consideration, in framing the instructions for the present Mission.

51. In the first place, then, it is evident that we cannot simply return to the *status quo ante*. Neither the withdrawal of the Russian Mission, nor any assurances on the part of Russia, will cancel the fact that a Russian Mission has been well received at Kabul, after one from us had been refused; and that Russian officers have had full opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Amir and his councillors distrust and dislike towards England, belief in Russia's power and destiny, and hopes of assistance against us from that country. And, as Russian promises have not kept Russian Missions out of Kabul in the past, to accept them as guarantees for the future would be blind folly. Some visible proof of England's supremacy in Afghanistan is, therefore, essential; and the terms which it seems necessary to demand on our part, as the conditions of a friendly alliance with the Amir, are,—1<sup>st</sup>, the dismissal of the Russian Mission, if still at Kabul, and the exclusion of Russian agents from Afghanistan for the future; 2<sup>nd</sup>, an engagement on the part of the Amir to enter into no diplomatic relations with foreign Powers without first consulting us; 3<sup>rd</sup>, the establishment of a British representative at the Amir's Court, or free access for British Missions to Kabul, and to the Amir, when considered necessary; 4<sup>th</sup>, failing the establishment of a permanent Mission at Kabul, the location of agents at Balkh and Herat, or at any frontier towns where the presence of such agents may seem necessary to anticipate and frustrate foreign intrigue.

52. The question that then presents itself is, what inducements can we hold out to the Amir that shall be sufficient, when coupled with his fears, to induce him to accept these terms, and identify his interests with ours? A reasonable subsidy may be granted; but the question of guarantees is more difficult. The objections that exist to giving territorial guarantees have been often and fully urged. By any such guarantee we shall in a manner become contentious with Russia along the northern border of Afghanistan, and hasten that contact which it is our avowed policy to delay. It will further bind us to the distant and inconvenient line of the Oxus. Many and weighty objections can also be raised to rendering ourselves responsible for the protection of a country over whose administration we have no control; and incurring responsibilities which may ultimately entail interference in, and control over, the interior administration of Afghanistan. But we must keep clearly in view the problem before us, *viz.*, to secure certain points necessary for the safety of India, and to do this with least possible danger, disturbance, or expense. Would a war with Russia, or an internal revolution brought about by us, or an invasion with a view to a forcible occupation of the points we require, attain our end with more certainty and with less danger, disturbance, or expense? Could we, indeed, confidently depend on any of these alternative courses to secure for us all the points we require—Herat for instance?



53. It is true that such territorial guarantee practically hastens contact between England and Russia. But it brings it about under conditions the most favorable to us, and at a line the least favorable to Russia. It is true that it compels us permanently to adopt a line exposed to disadvantages already pointed out; but that line is far more disadvantageous to Russia. It is true that such a guarantee exposes the guarantor to risks and demands which it is difficult fully to measure or foresee; and to guarantee a weak State against a near and overwhelmingly powerful neighbour, as we have done in the case of Belgium and of Asia Minor, is indeed to accept grave responsibilities. But the risks of the guarantee depend on the relative power of the guaranteeing State, and of that against which the guarantee is directed; and when the guaranteeing State is relatively powerful, as we should be against Russia on the Oxus, the risks are comparatively slight, because the guarantee is not likely to be defied. Moreover, in the case of Afghanistan, it may well be questioned whether such a guarantee *does* increase our responsibilities. I have already pointed out that to declare a *casus belli* against Russia would involve us in responsibilities still wider, and more dangerous because more vague; and it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which, if we have made any sort of friendly arrangement with Afghanistan, we could allow Russia to invade its territory. Lastly, it is true that a territorial guarantee will probably entail some ultimate control over the administration of Afghanistan. But it has been already shown that such control *must* be ultimately exercised either by Russia or by England. Unless we are prepared to yield it to Russia, we must be prepared to assume it ourselves; and there is no way in which it can be more gradually and advantageously introduced.

54. We ought, therefore, to be prepared to give a territorial guarantee to the Amir if it is pressed for, and if other circumstances, such as the prospects of securing the Amir's alliance, and of the stability of his throne, make it desirable to enter into close relations with him. Such guarantee will not materially add to our necessary responsibilities regarding Afghanistan; while it affords the easiest, and only reasonably certain, means of securing the positions we require there. The conditions likely to be asked by the Amir may be inferred from the negotiations of 1873, and seem to be such as we can in the main reasonably assent to, and as would be covered by a guarantee against *annexation*. This, therefore, is the form I conceive our guarantee should take; being made dependent, of course, on the location of British agents at exposed points of the frontier, and free access to the Amir.

55. The question of dynastic guarantee is less difficult. We should be prepared to recognize any heir whom the Amir, with the concurrence of his principal nobles, nominates and proclaims. Further, we should be prepared to acknowledge his succession on the death of the Amir; and to continue to him whatever subsidy the Amir has received, so long as he proves himself generally acceptable to the Afghan people, and able to maintain his throne. But we should distinctly decline to enter into any engagement to support him by force of arms. It is probable that the Amir will seek a promise that we will not interfere in the internal administration of Afghanistan: and this promise would be a sufficient reply to any such proposal on the part of His Highness.

56. But, in thus determining the basis of an acceptable agreement with the Amir, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the Envoy. He must be careful to make it clear that we do not seek to ally ourselves with the Amir alone, but with the people of Afghanistan; and that we will not sacrifice either our interests or those of Afghanistan to the personal interests of the Amir. He must also assure himself, as far as possible, that the Amir is in a position to carry out any promises he makes, and that his throne shows such reasonable promises of stability as to make it desirable to enter into close relations with him.

57. If the Amir proves hopelessly estranged, and we fail in all efforts to win him; or if the Envoy considers that, from any cause, it is not desirable to involve ourselves in engagements with him, we must take immediate steps to neutralize his hostility, and to secure our interests. The best course then open to us would probably be to aim at dethroning him, and replacing him by a candidate more favorable to ourselves. There seems little doubt that we could easily dethrone him, but the results of such action must be well considered. The candidate whose prospects were fairest, and whose interests seemed most allied with ours—the only candidate who could reasonably hope to succeed to all his father's possessions—has just died. Were Yakub Khan abroad, and could we secure him to our interests, he might prove even a better candidate. But this we have no right to anticipate; though the Envoy, if opportunity offers, might endeavour to open relations with him. What the result of a free contest for the throne, in present circumstances, would be, may, perhaps, be guessed. Abdurrahman, supported by Russian influence, would establish himself in the trans-Hindu Kush provinces as a feudatory of Russia. Herat would probably fall to Persia; Kandahar and Southern Afghanistan to us; while Kabul would remain a centre of disturbances, struggles for power, and bigoted fanaticism, hostile and dangerous to all neighbours alike, and ultimately we should be obliged to forcibly pacify and hold it. We should, doubtless, after fighting and much trouble, gain our necessary mountain frontier; but it is not so certain that we should secure the passes and their debouches, and Herat might be lost to us for ever.

58. Meanwhile, the measures which should be immediately adopted on the failure of our Mission are,—*1st*, an armed occupation of the Koorum valley; *2nd*, the concentration of a force at Quetta sufficient to threaten Kandahar; *3rd*, the opening of direct negotiations with the various semi-independent tribes along the border, with a view to detaching them from the Amir's cause. The occupation of the Koorum would be an easy task. It is a comparatively open and fertile valley, with a peaceful and agricultural population, who have been much



oppressed by the Amir, and have long sought to come under our rule. By this route the Khyber Pass and Jelalabad are turned ; and a force located at the head of the valley would equally threaten Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad.

59. As the results of our Khelat policy, the concentration of a force at Quetta can now be effected with the same ease and certainty as at any point in the interior of India ; while we should find useful auxiliaries in the Brahuïs, who have already offered to join our standards in the event of a rupture with the Amir. The Ghilzais, the most important Afghan tribe between Ghazni and Quetta, have recently sent in a deputation to Quetta, offering their services against the Amir, and requesting the presence of a British officer ; and there can be little doubt that the Khyber tribes, the Kakars, and others, would gladly separate themselves from the Amir, and ally themselves with us. With the high road to Kabul thus open, with the principal cities of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan directly threatened, and the communication between Kabul and Kandahar closed by the Ghilzais, the Amir's power could not stand long. So long as we maintain our threatening position in the Koorum, no candidate hostile to us could establish himself in Kabul ; and it is probable that our mere presence there, without further action on our part, would secure the throne for the candidate whom we favor. If we could thereby secure an overwhelming influence at Kabul, giving us at the same time the command of Herat, and of the passes of the Hindu Kush, while not involving us in responsibilities regarding the Oxus provinces, this would probably be the best solution of all for us. But it may be doubted whether a candidate, thus enthroned at Kabul, would be able to establish his authority at Herat ; where Persia would appear on the scene with decisive effect, long before we could approach it. And to recover Herat from Persia, abetted, and perhaps actively aided, by Russia, would be no light task.

60. There still remains the course indicated, of coming to an amicable arrangement with Russia. Russia has before this suggested a partition of Afghanistan ; and, whatever views Russian enthusiasts may have on India, there can be little doubt but that she would consent to our occupation of Kabul and Southern Afghanistan, if thereby she could secure the Oxus provinces. That we must offer her some such terms, if the arrangement is to be a pacific and amicable one, is evident ; for it is not to be expected that Russia will willingly accept any arrangement so prejudicial to her interests, and incompatible with the realization of her long cherished hopes, as final and absolute exclusion from the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

61. An arrangement with Russia might be a not undesirable final solution of the Central Asian question, if concluded on the terms already indicated as necessary to our security on this side, *viz.*, the possession by us of the debouches of the Kabul passes, and of Herat. As regards the former, it is probable that Russia, in return for the cession of the Oxus valley, and having regard to the difficulties attending any advance beyond the Hindu Kush, would accept these conditions ; but it is more doubtful whether she would willingly abandon Herat to England, and so finally renounce all hopes of seeing it either in her own hands, or in those of a vassal ally.

62. A most important point to be considered, in any such understanding with Russia, is that we must be prepared to *act* on it immediately. For if, while Russia is left free to advance to the Hindu Kush, England remains quiet, and content with assurances that the rest of Afghanistan is beyond her sphere of action, we should soon see renewed, and under conditions much more unfavorable to us, the difficulties we are now contending with. Any such treaty with Russia, therefore, must be promptly followed up by the actual and visible occupation of the tract necessary to us. The nature of such occupation would depend on the circumstances under which the agreement with Russia was made, and may be considered later.

63. I conceive, therefore, that our first object should be to use every endeavour to re-establish such relations with the Amir as will give us due influence in Afghanistan, and for ever exclude Russia therefrom ; and that, to effect this, we must appeal both to his fears and to his hopes. Failing in all efforts for this purpose, we shall have to take such steps as may be necessary to protect our own interests, irrespective of his ; either by action in Afghanistan, or by direct arrangements with Russia, or both. It remains now to determine the nature of the instructions to be given to the Envoy, and the further measures to be taken, should the Mission fail.

64. The general character of the instructions to be given to our Envoy may be deduced from what has been said in paragraphs 51—56. He should, in the first place, condole with the Amir on his recent heavy loss, and declare the friendly character of the Mission ; having for its object to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Amir last conferred personally with the Viceroy. In proof of the friendly character of the Mission, he will point to the selection made of an officer personally known to the Amir, and whose deputation might be supposed to be specially agreeable to him.

65. If the Russian Mission is still at Kabul, he will insist on its withdrawal, or, at least, on the Amir requesting it to withdraw, and renouncing all further communication with it, before entering on the immediate subjects of negotiation. To this condition I attach the highest importance. I think it alike inconsistent with the dignity of our Government, with the line hitherto pursued towards Afghanistan, and with the respect due to the high officer selected as our Envoy, that he should appear in the character of a rival suing for the Amir's favor ; nor could I anticipate any satisfactory results from negotiations conducted under such conditions. It is essential that the Amir should, from the outset, understand that he

must make a definite choice in his alliance; and that he will not be again permitted to play off one Power against another, or prolong a chronic state of uneasiness and uncertainty. The Envoy will, therefore, explain to the Amir the circumstances of the negotiations entered into by us with Russia on behalf of Afghanistan in 1869; and the assurances given, and repeatedly renewed, by Russia regarding non-intervention in Afghanistan; and he will demand the dismissal of the Russian Mission.

66. If the Amir hesitates, the Envoy will place very distinctly before His Highness and before the principal Chiefs and councillors of the kingdom, the probable consequences of a refusal. It would, perhaps, be desirable to communicate this representation to the Russian Mission also. But he will discuss no other subject with the Amir; and if, after reasonable time allowed, the Russian Mission still remains in communication with the Amir, and entertained by the Court of Kabul, our Mission will withdraw.

67. If the Russian Mission has left before the arrival of our Envoy, or withdraws on his representations, he will then proceed to set forth, but in conciliatory tone, the various unfriendly acts of the Amir, culminating in the rejection of a Russian Mission after the rejection of ours; and will ask explanations of this last open affront. The refusal to admit Sir D. Forsyth, and the terms in which that refusal was couched, should be especially emphasized.

68. The Amir's reply to this will probably be a long indictment against England, and a recapitulation of alleged acts of unfriendliness on our part; to which the Envoy can reply that those misunderstandings are entirely due to the policy of seclusion adopted by the Amir, and might have been avoided by freer intercourse between his Government and ours. If the Amir endeavours to fix the discussion on those points, the Envoy will say that he has not been informed on them, and that his deputation has for its object the *future* relations between the two Powers, and the prevention of such misunderstandings hereafter.

69. In opening the actual negotiations, it should be assumed that all past promises or engagements on our part were abrogated by the Peshawur Conference, and the discovery then made of the different and irreconcilable interpretations put on these verbal engagements by the parties to them, as well as by the Amir's subsequent unfriendly conduct.

70. The conditions which the Amir will be required to accept as the bases of future amicable relations are broadly—

1st.—An engagement not to receive Russian agents; nor to enter into relations with any Powers under the political influence of Russia, without first consulting us.

2nd.—Free access for British Missions on special and suitable occasions to Kabul, and to the presence of the Amir.

3rd.—The reception of permanent British agents at Herat and Balkh, or at any points which may be exposed to danger from without. Or else, the reception of a permanent British Agent at Kabul, with free access for British officers, on special and suitable occasions, to Herat, Balkh, or any other exposed points of the Afghan frontier.

The precise terms of all such engagements must, however, be left to the discretion of the Envoy; provided that no arrangement can be accepted as satisfactory, which does not exclude the agents of Russia, and give to us a real and visible preponderance, and recognized position of authority in Afghanistan. The reception of a permanent British representative at Kabul has not been put prominently forward, because of the repugnance which the Amir has, on several occasions, shown to such a proposal. But, if the Envoy finds His Highness not unwilling to accede to it, such an arrangement, coupled with the above-mentioned condition of occasional access to the frontier localities, would be preferable to any other, and might be advantageously substituted for Nos. 2 and 3.

In addition to the above, some satisfactory and effective arrangements should be entered into for keeping open the Khaibar Pass; either through the agency of the Amir, or by our personally dealing with the Khyberees, and relieving the Amir of all responsibility on their behalf.

71. In return, the Envoy may promise as follows:—

1st.—An annual subsidy, not, for the present, exceeding in amount twelve lakhs of rupees.

2nd.—The recognition, by the Indian Government, of the heir formally named by the Amir with the concurrence of his Sirdars; and the continuance to such heir, on succession, of the subsidy granted to the Amir.

3rd.—A territorial guarantee against *annexation*.

Much must be left to the discretion of the Envoy in regard to these terms also; but the following indication of the views of Government on the subject may serve to guide him in the negotiations.

72. The Government is prepared to recognize the heir of the Amir's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, and is accepted by the chief nobles of Afghanistan. The Government will formally recognize such heir as successor on the death of the Amir, and will pay him at once one year's subsidy, to assist him in establishing himself on the throne. But if he proves incapable, and, with these advantages in his favor, cannot maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate

him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State; and it will be pointed out to the Amir that an armed intervention in favor of any candidate would be inconsistent with these views.

73. The arguments in favor of a territorial guarantee have already been explained. Such guarantee should not be unnecessarily offered by the Envoy; and, if asked for by the Amir, the Envoy should, in the first place, make him understand that it may entail our exercising a certain control over his foreign policy. But if the Amir distinctly desires it, it should be frankly and unhesitatingly given; for it is better that it should be refused by the Amir, on the grounds of the future pretext for interference which it may offer, than that he should be rendered suspicious and distrustful by the provisos under which we endeavour to guard ourselves. The guarantee desired by the Amir in 1873 was that we should aid him by arms, money, or troops, to *repel* any invasion of his territory; and this guarantee we may give.

74. It will be evident, however, that this guarantee must directly depend on the admission of officers to the exposed points of the Afghan frontier; and that whatever modifications of the conditions may, in the discretion of the Envoy, be made, these two must stand or fall together. It would, perhaps, be to our interest not to ask for an agent at Balkh, if the Amir does not ask for a territorial guarantee; but an agent at Herat is of the highest importance; and some arrangement giving adequate expression to our undisputed influence at Herat, must, in any case, be insisted on, whether the territorial guarantee be given or withheld.

75. If the Amir refers to Quetta and our action in Biluchistan, he must be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta were stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than twenty years' standing with the Ruler of Kbelat, renewed two years ago; and in pursuance of the policy determined on, in accord with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of the trade of the Bolan Pass. Assurances may further be given him against any hostile intentions in that direction; and the Envoy, if he thinks fit, may inform the Amir that the Mission to Kabul, proposed two years ago and rejected by His Highness, was to explain to the Amir, beforehand and unreservedly, the nature and objects of our policy in Biluchistan, and its thoroughly friendly and unaggressive character. In fact, the presence of British troops at Quetta, so far from being *intended* as a menace to the Amir's *real* interests, practically increased our means of assisting His Highness in the defence of those interests against designs on the part of Russia, which, though probably unknown to the Amir, were not unknown to the Viceroy before that measure was adopted. If, therefore, the presence of British troops at Quetta has been to His Highness a cause of apprehension, this is entirely due to his own conduct in refusing us the opportunity we sought of removing every cause of apprehension, and not to any unfriendly or inconsiderate disregard of it on the part of the British Government. Our Envoy, however, must at once disallow, and decline to discuss, any claim advanced by the Amir to a voice in the affairs of Biluchistan.

76. If the Amir asks for arms, he must be informed that such assistance will be considered in connection with the arrangements for the defence of his frontiers.

77. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and removing trade restrictions, it will not be desirable to press the Amir; though it will be extremely advantageous to secure such concessions if the Amir seems not unwilling to grant them.

78. Lastly, the Envoy may most emphatically assure the Amir, and impress on His Highness by every means in his power, that, so long as he proves himself friendly and loyal to us, it is our desire to see him prosperous and independent; and to promote and confirm his power alike against internal troubles and external dangers.

79. But if it appears that we cannot find, in a friendly alliance with the Amir, the necessary security for our north-western frontier, we must then be prepared to take immediate steps for making the security of that frontier independent of him. The military measures proposed for this purpose have already been indicated, *viz.*, the advance of a column to the head of the Koorum Valley, and the assembling at Quetta of a force sufficient to threaten, and, if necessary, occupy Kandahar. For the first purpose, 4,000 men might suffice, and for the second, about 10,000, exclusive of the present garrison of Quetta. Orders have already been issued to detail these forces. But, as it is indispensable, both for the security of the Mission, and for the full trial of the pacific policy which is its object, that nothing should now be done which could in any way be interpreted to indicate hostile intentions on our part, I have withheld my sanction from any active preparations.

80. It will be seen, from what has been already said, as well as from the smallness of the proposed military preparations, that no invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan is contemplated. Such a measure would at once rekindle the animosities of that fanatical people, and probably destroy any party we may now have there, uniting the whole nation against us. It would require military operations on a very different scale from that now contemplated, with a proportionately heavy expenditure; and it would probably entail a permanent military occupation of the country—a step which, however feasible from a military point of view, would involve financial burdens we could hardly bear.

81. Moreover, remembering always the object in view, which is to secure certain points necessary to our safety in India, we must consider whether these points, and Herat especially, *would* be certainly secured by such a measure. If we invade Afghanistan, she will imme-

diately throw herself into the arms of Russia ; and even if Russia, unwilling to involve herself at this moment in a great European war, does not actively assist her, she will certainly assist her with money, arms, officers, and advice. At the Court of Persia, according to the reports of our Minister, Russian influence is paramount and British influence *nil*. Persia has always coveted Herat, and asserted a claim to it ; and it is more than probable that, if instigated and supported by Russia, she would be prepared to resist our occupation of it by force of arms. It may be doubted whether any force we can put in the field would be strong enough to march from the Indus to Herat, a distance of 750 miles, carrying with it heavy artillery, and all the necessary appurtenances for a difficult siege ; to cover its flanks along the whole of this long and exposed line, against the Afghans on one side, and the Persians on the other ; and, finally, to undertake, by European arms, officers, and skill.

82. For these reasons I view an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Russia, as a measure which may become unavoidable, and must, therefore, be taken into consideration in our forecast ; but which is only to be resorted to in case of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. Our immediate object should be to apply such pressure only as may be necessary, either to bring the Amir to a truer sense of his interests, or to dethrone him and give an opportunity to the party which still remains favorable to us at Kabul. And such pressure should be applied in the directions, and in the manner, which seem least likely to bring us into collision with the Afghans, or arouse their fanatical spirit of independence.

83. It is possible that the evidence, which the action proposed in paragraphs 58—59 would afford the Amir, of our own earnestness, and of his powerlessness to oppose us, might lead him to reconsider his position and make overtures to us. In that case we should be most favorably placed to dictate our terms. As a preliminary, we should require the Amir to come personally to our head-quarters, or into British territory, to negotiate ; and we should insist on the retention of a British force in the Koorum Valley. Thus firmly established in close proximity to his capital, we should be in a position to renew or modify our previous proposals under conditions far more favorable to us.

84. If the Amir still remains hostile, we should take no further action against him, beyond entering into negotiations with all the tribes and parties in Afghanistan who are unfriendly to him ; and there is little doubt that his kingdom would fall to pieces of itself. Nor could any candidate, hostile to us, maintain himself on the throne of Kabul ; which would thus necessarily fall to a successor friendly to us. To such successor we should endeavour, by every means in our power, to secure the whole of Southern and Western Afghanistan ; but we should decline to incur any responsibilities for the northern provinces ; and we should insist on maintaining our position in the Koorum, and on having representatives at Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

85. If, in the course of the convulsions which may be expected to precede and follow the fall of the Amir, Herat should fall into the hands of Persia—a contingency already indicated as probable, we should then, as the ally of the Ruler of Kabul, insist on its immediate restoration. This, however, is to be attained, not by an expedition marched across the whole breadth of Afghanistan, but by pressure applied to the exposed southern provinces of Persia, as in 1857. Russia cannot there help her ; and Persia must either submit to the loss of some of her most important provinces, or resign Herat. Nor could we establish ourselves in Herat under more favorable conditions than those created by a treaty, in which we appear as the friends of Afghanistan, and the recognized liberators and guardians of Herat against Persia.

86. Thus far, I have practically left Russia out of consideration, and considered Afghanistan alone. We must now consider what will probably be Russia's action, and what should be our relations with her. In the first contingency, *viz.*, that our mission succeeds in displacing the Russian Mission and securing the cordial alliance of the Amir, it is not likely that Russia will venture on any direct hostile action. England and Afghanistan united would be far too powerful for Russia on the Oxus, as the latter well knows ; and any hostile action on her part would risk the loss of the Khanates and her expulsion from Central Asia. When the treaty has been completed, it might be desirable to communicate it to Russia, and obtain her concurrence in the guarantee undertaken ; but rather as a matter of diplomatic courtesy than for any strength or security we should gain by her concurrence.

87. If the Mission fails, and our troops advance to the Koorum, it is probable that Russia's reply will be to advance her columns to the Oxus, and perhaps across into Balkh and Badakhshan. It would undoubtedly be advantageous to interpose at once between Kabul and Russia by seizing the Bamian Pass ; but, considering the distance of Bamian from Peshawur and Tashkend respectively, I cannot think this point likely to be gravely threatened. On the other hand, I consider it above all things desirable that we should not engage in an open invasion of Afghanistan, and thus give Russia the chance of appearing as her ally and guardian. I conceive, therefore, that we should not attempt any hostile advance on Kabul, but should still confine our action to strengthening our position in the Koorum, and detaching the neighbouring tribes from the cause of the Amir.

88. The Russian column assembled at Djam can hardly exceed, and probably falls short of 5,000 men. Such a force could hardly, in any circumstances, dare to push on to Bamian, 500 miles from all possible support, with the probability of there meeting a superior British force. But, even if it does, before it reaches the pass, one of the two contingencies discussed in paragraphs 83 and 84 will probably have occurred—either the Amir will have changed his tone and accepted our alliance ; or he will have lost his throne, and been succeeded by a ruler



friendly to us. In either case, we shall then be in a position to repel a Russian advance, without involving ourselves in a hostile invasion of Afghanistan.

89. But, in any case, the time will have come for opening negotiations with Russia and determining the future line of demarcation in Central Asia. Russia is not now in a position to contest supremacy with us on the Oxus, unless we commit the fatal mistake of driving Afghanistan bodily into her arms by an invasion. Russia knows this, and knows also that, if once our troops come into collision with hers, our advance is not likely to stop at the Oxus. It will, therefore, in effect remain with us to determine our ultimate boundary; and I would practically draw it at the Hindu Kush, while requiring however, the withdrawal of Russian troops behind the Oxus. The terms I would, in this case, offer Russia are the acknowledgment by us of her protectorate over Bokhara, and all the country north of the Oxus, on the understanding that she acknowledges a similar protectorate on our part over Afghanistan proper; and that the limit of advance for the troops on the two sides should be the Oxus and the Hindu Kush (including Bamian) respectively—either Power reserving to itself full liberty of action, should the other pass these bounds.

90. There remains the all-important question of Herat—the turning point of all negotiation and all action in Central Asia. It may be doubted whether Russia, weak as she now is in Central Asia, would go to war for Herat; unless with the assured support of Afghanistan, as well as Persia. The arrangement above proposed would still hold out hopes to her of ultimately gaining the line of communication between the Caspian and Turkistan, and the frontier of the Hindu Kush Mountains—the avowed objects of her Central Asian policy; and it is, therefore, probable that she would not break off negotiations on this point.

91. Lastly, it remains for us to consider the military and financial bearings of the policy now discussed. If the mission succeeds, our frontier will be stronger and safer, than it has been at any previous time. Russia will have received an open check, and the relations between the Amir and ourselves will be closer than they have yet been; and this, coupled with our most satisfactory position in Kelat, cannot but re-act favorably throughout the frontier. An agent, with a small escort, will be located at Kabul or Herat, and possibly others at Balkh and Fyzabad, but the cost of such agencies will be small; and no increase of military expenditure need be contemplated in this case.

92. If the Mission fails, a force will be moved to the head of the Koorum Valley, and that valley occupied; and, whether the Amir subsequently accepts our alliance, or whether another ruler, under our auspices, succeeds him at Kabul, this force should never be withdrawn. It is probable that 6,000 men will suffice, both to form the necessary cantonment at the head of the valley, and to protect its communications with our present frontier. But, as a force so placed will relieve the pressure on Peshawur, and in other ways strengthen our frontier line, a large part of it might be drawn from Peshawur, and from its support, Rawal Pindi; and such occupation need add little, if at all, to the permanent establishment maintained in India.

93. The force to be collected at Quetta, and possibly to move on Kandahar, is intended as a demonstration only; and its functions will have ceased when either contingency above discussed has been brought about. The force might consequently be then withdrawn. But the opportunity thus offered should be taken to permanently strengthen our garrison there. This also might be done at little, if any, additional cost, by drawing troops from stations further inland, where their presence is no longer specially required.

94. To advance our garrisons further, and occupy Kandahar and Herat, would doubtless entail a large increase of force, and consequently of military expenditure. But I anticipate no necessity for such permanent occupation, even of Kandahar; unless we should unfortunately find ourselves embarked in a great war with Afghanistan. This contingency we may reasonably hope to avoid. If, as the result of amicable arrangements with Afghanistan, or with Russia, or with both, we find it necessary to establish ourselves visibly at Herat and the Hindu Kush passes, we should do so by the location of agencies, with small escorts only, at those points; supported, under certain contingencies, by locally raised corps, paid from British funds. But such local forces should in no case exceed two or three thousand men in all; and being less costly than regular troops, the additional charge would not be great.

95. It is not by a military occupation of Afghanistan that our position there is best won and secured; nor do I conceive that it would be desirable, even if possible, to undertake to garrison Herat for many years to come. Against Persia, it is best secured by our known power to invade her southern coasts; against Russia, by the risks which a war would entail on her exposed frontier in Turkistan.

96. I have thus endeavoured to carry out the task I originally set before myself, *viz.*, “to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, showing how it has arisen; and to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves.” In doing so, I have necessarily looked a long way ahead, and speculated, perhaps rashly, on the future; for many contingencies, not foreseen in this Minute, may, and probably will, arise. But I conceive that such forecasts, however defective, have their use in guiding our general lines of policy. Above all, I have endeavoured to show that war, whether with Russian, or with Afghanistan, would be the most expensive, as it would probably be the least satisfactory, and least statesman-like, solution. I recognize fully the necessity that may arise for referring to the arbitration of the sword; but I earnestly hope and trust that we shall be able to attain, by peaceable means, a settlement of the questions considered in this Minute which shall be alike becoming to the dignity of the great British Empire, conducive to the security of that part of it specially committed to our charge, and beneficial to the neighbouring States concerned.



## APPENDIX XXXVI.

PERSIAN TEXT OF LETTERS, DATED 7TH AND 10TH SEPTEMBER, ADDRESSED BY COLONEL WATERFIELD TO THE MUSTAUFÍ, THE MIRAKHOR, AND FAIZ MAHOMED KHAN.

*[Referred to in paragraphs 160 and 168, Chapter IX.]*

Copy of a letter from MAJOR WATERFIELD, to MIRZÁ HABIBULLAH KHÁN, the Mustaufi-ul-Mamálík, dated 7th September 1878.

Mihrabán-i-dostán, dost-i-mihrabán Mirzá Habibullah Khán Mustaufi-ul-Mamálík salámat. Bad az ishtiák-i-mulákát-i-masírrat áyát wázih bád ki ba wusul-i-khabar-i-pukhta min makám-i-Shimla hawála-i-kalam-i-múánsat rakam míshawad ki ba táríkh-i-shanzdaham-i-September sannah-i-1878 yaum-i-doshanba mutábik-i-hejdaham-i-Ramazán sannah-i-1295 yaum-i-doshanba mission yaní alá safárat-i-daulat-i-angrezí zaruratan az Pesháwar rawána-i-Kábul khwáhad shud khwáb Nawwáb Gholám Hasan Khán andar-ín arsa-i-táríkh-i-shanzdaham-i-September Sannah-i-1878 fáiz-ul-khidmat-i-janáb Amir sáhib babádur shawad yá na-shawad, wa dar mámúri-i-mission maksad-i-dostána ast. Agar dar iftáh-i-rah-i-mission uzre shawad wa azán báis dar umúrat-i-mission-i-dostána haraje yá nuksáne ba wukú áyad, pas darán súrat áinda khass amr-i-dushmaní tasawwur karda khwáhad shud, wa haróina dákhil shudan-i-mission-i-ala-i-daulat-i-Angrezi kabl az máh-i-Ramazán saannah-i-1295 Hijri dar-us-saltanat-i-Kábul na khwáhad shud. Ziáda khairiyyat nasíb bád. Almarkúm haftum-i-September 1878.

---

Copy of a letter from MAJOR WATERFIELD, to MIRAKHOR AHMAD KHÁN, Governor of Jalálábád, GENERAL GHOLÁM HAIDAR KHÁN, Commandant of the Daka force, and FAIZ MAHOMED KHÁN, Commandant of the Levies at Ali Masjid, dated 10th September 1878.

Wázih bád ki ba táríkh-i-16 yá 17 September 1878 mutábik-i-hejdaham-i-Ramazán 1295 yaum-i-doshanba yá sehshanba mission yaní ala safárat-i-daulat-i-Angrezi baráe maksid-i-dostana az Pesháwar rawána-i-dár-us-saltanat-i-Kábul khwáhad shud, wa hích gúna tawakkufe wa taattule dar rawánagi-i-mission manzúr-i-khátir-i-sarkár-i-wálá nest. Agar ba sabab-i-uzra-i-darún-i-ráh-i-Khaibar kudám haraje yá nuksáne ba wukú áyad pas ba tasawwur-i-khass amr-i-dushmaní zimmáwári-i-án bar aháli-i-daulat-i-Kábul khwáhad shud. Chunánchi ittila-i-ín maní ba Mustaufi-ul-mamálík-i-daulat-i-Kábul dádah shud. Magar azánjá ki hifázat-i-ráh waghaira intizám taalluk ba íshán dárád, bináan alaih ittiláan hawála-i-kalam shud, fakat. Almarkúm dahum-i-September 1878, seshanba, nuhum-i-Ramazán 1295 Hijrí.

## APPENDIX XXXVII.

[Referred to in paragraphs 161 and 165, Chapter IX.]

From HIS EXCELLENCY SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., late Envoy Extraordinary to Kabul, to  
A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th October  
1878.

My several confidential telegrams and letters, which I despatched from Peshawur, placed His Excellency the Viceroy in early possession of all that was taking place; but it now remains for me to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a more formal and connected report of the proceedings of the Mission. I regret that indisposition since my return to Simla has prevented my discharging this duty at an earlier date.

2. On the 7th September you communicated to me the instructions of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and on the following morning I left Simla.

3. I reached Peshawur on the evening of the 12th; and at once placed myself in communication with Major Waterfield, the Commissioner; and also with Major Cavagnari, who was then specially charged with the conduct of our intercourse with Kabul and with the Afridi tribes.

4. The position of affairs at that time was as follows. The Mission was directed to leave Peshawur on the 16th, or as soon after as possible, so as to reach Kabul about the end of the month, by which time the full period of mourning and of the Fast (Ramzan) would have ended. This was also the time named by the Minister, as the period when His Highness the Amir of Kabul would be able to attend to State affairs. Major Cavagnari, in obedience to instructions previously communicated to him by His Excellency the Viceroy, was then in course of arranging with the independent Khaibari tribes for the safe conduct of the Mission through the Pass as far as Ali Masjid, at which place it would come into contact with, and under the protection of, the officers of His Highness the Amir of Kabul. This was, in fact, to follow the course adopted in the case of the Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, who had been previously sent to Kabul, to convey to the Amir a letter of condolence from His Excellency the Viceroy on the loss of the Heir-apparent, and also a letter to announce the coming of the Mission.

5. Arrangements with the independent tribes always take time; but all seemed to be going on satisfactorily, when, on the morning of the 14th, intimation was brought to Major Cavagnari that Faiz Mahomed Khan, the Commandant of the Amir's troops stationed at Ali Masjid, had sent in to Peshawur to summon back to the Pass all the Khaibari Maliks, or headmen, who were then in course of negotiating with Major Cavagnari. The Maliks applied to Major Cavagnari to know what course they should adopt, as they felt that, if they disobeyed, they would risk the loss of the allowance they were then in receipt of from the Amir.

6. This action on the part of the Amir's officials was most discourteous, if not hostile; for the occupation of Ali Masjid by the Amir's troops had been of no long duration, whilst indeed it could at no time have been carried out had the measure been objected to by the Government of India. It was, however, impossible that such occupation could, under any circumstances, be accepted by the British Government as being allowed to interfere with, or to become a bar to, our right to hold independent relations with these tribes, or to interfere in any manner with our previously existing relations with them.

7. The Afridi mountains border the Peshawur Valley for many miles. The trade of the tribes is also exclusively with that valley and with our subjects. We have, therefore, continual intercourse and dealings with each other; and, in the main, we live together in friendly relations.

8. Whilst it was quite beyond reason to accept the position now assumed by Faiz Mahomed Khan, still, so great was the desire not to give the Amir any plausible ground of complaint, that the course was adopted of addressing to Faiz Mahomed a courteous and friendly letter,\* explaining to him the object of the Mission, and our motive for arranging with the Pass men for its safe conduct as far as Ali Masjid.

\* Copy annexed.

9. The purport of this letter was explained by Major Cavagnari to the Maliks, who fully understood and approved of its conciliatory nature, and expressed themselves as willing to abide by the result. They were further told that up to that time it was considered that their previous arrangements with the Amir were held to be in force; that nothing had occurred to put an end to them; but that if the Amir, because of their relations with us, stopped their allowance, it would then be continued to them by the British Government.

10. I, at this period, wrote to His Excellency the Viceroy that I was not sanguine of receiving a satisfactory answer, for I felt that a man in a subordinate position like that held by Faiz Mahomed, would never dare assume the responsibility of acting as he had done without orders, and that, therefore, he had, most probably, only carried out the instructions

he had received from Kabul. However, the object of the Mission was to promote peace, and to bring about, if it was possible, a return to friendly and close relations with the Amir, so that I still urged that all reasonable delay should be overlooked, so as to give Faiz Mahomed time to refer for orders to his nearest superior—the Mirakhor—should he consider it desirable to do so—rather than to seem to assume the position of forcing on matters to a decisive issue sooner than was absolutely indispensable.

11. So far from Faiz Mahomed Khan feeling any embarrassment in replying to my letter, he did so at once, and I received his answer\* late on the afternoon of the 16th. There could be no room for

\* Copy annexed.  
misunderstanding his meaning. He was a soldier in command of an outpost; had no orders to allow the Mission to pass, and would stop it by force of arms if need be. The position thus assumed was, in fact, to imply that the relations then existing between the Amir and the British Government were tantamount to a state of war; and thus all doubt was removed as to the nature of the orders given to Faiz Mahomed, or the source from which they emanated. Just one ray of hope might, however, be extracted from his last paragraph. The Mirakhor was, he said, just about to arrive at Ali Masjid from Dhakka; he might be the bearer of fresh instructions from Kabul; and he recommended me to delay the advance of the Mission.

12. My first impulse was to await the arrival of the Mirakhor at Ali Masjid, and then to address him direct; but as time passed on, I felt that if the Mirakhor's visit to Ali Masjid was of a friendly character, it would have been his first duty to make this known to me, whilst to repeat to him the assurances already made to Faiz Mahomed Khan would be to risk placing my Government in the position of seeming to plead for privileges which belonged to it as of right.

13. News of the Mirakhor's arrival duly reached me; and it was reported that his object, instead of being of a friendly character, was to see that Faiz Mahomed did not flinch from the execution of his orders.

14. It was now clear to me that all hopes of a peaceful advance of the Mission—except possibly upon conditions to be dictated by the Amir—were at an end; and that it only remained to carry out the orders of my Government in bringing to a decided issue whether the Amir's troops would, or would not, offer hostile opposition to the advance of the Mission.

15. If there had been any room for previous doubt as to the intentions and acts of the Amir's officials stationed at Ali Masjid, the mask had now been completely thrown aside; for it was well authenticated that both Faiz Mahomed Khan and the Mirakhor were not only doing everything in their power to prevent the Afridis located nearest to us from giving us a passage, but were endeavouring to induce those sections of the tribe located beyond Ali Masjid, and who were therefore more under their immediate control, to intervene between us and their clansmen, in order to thwart our negotiations with them, and to make them, under any circumstances, close the Pass to the advance of the Mission.

16. If our negotiations, which had for their object merely to enable us to have a right of way as far as Ali Masjid, were to be continued with any chance of success—or if, indeed, our right to contract engagements at all with the independent Pass tribes was to be upheld—there was now nothing left for it but for us also to throw off the reserve which, out of consideration for the Amir, had already hampered us so much in coming to terms with the Afridis. Accordingly, with the sanction of His Excellency the Viceroy, the Afridi Maliks were told (on the 19th) that we were ready to deal with them independently of all other considerations; that we repeated the promise of indemnifying them for any loss they might sustain from the Amir withdrawing his allowance; and that we were, in fact, prepared, if necessary, to take over the whole Pass arrangements into our own hands for the future, and to pay them the Pass-money out of the British Treasury.

17. The day following (the 20th), the Maliks announced the assent of their tribesmen to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, or to any nearer point until we should come into contact with the Amir's officials; and that they would also, if necessary, give it safe conduct back to Jamrud. They asked for the delay of one day to enable them to make their arrangements for the security of the Pass.

18. Whilst the events above narrated were taking place, letters arrived from the Nawab. These announced his arrival at Kabul, and subsequent interviews with the Amir and with His Highness' Ministers. At these interviews the Nawab was told of the bad humour of the Amir, because of the grievances of which His Highness considered himself to be the victim at the hands of the Government of India, though the Amir admitted that we also might have complaints against him. The Nawab was also told that the Russian Mission had come with the sanction of the Amir, and that it would be honorably sent away after the Eed, and that, as to the English Mission, it should not be pressed upon him inopportunely; but that His Highness claimed the right to have time to consider the matter as to its reception, and that if, after reflection, its reception should prove agreeable to him, he would then fix the time for its arrival, and make suitable arrangements to receive it honorably. The Nawab made to repeat these communications in his letters; and was further made to express the Minister's hope that the answers to his letters would, God willing, bring about a reconciliation between the two Governments, but that, if the British Mission started on the 18th, or without the previous sanction of the Amir, matters would assume a different aspect.

19. With reference to the above, I feel called upon to say that the Nawab was merely the bearer of the Viceroy's two letters to the Amir, and was charged to announce verbally and formally to His Highness the despatch and advent of the Mission. The Nawab had no authority otherwise to represent the British Government. He was invested with no diplomatic powers; and it was altogether beyond his province to enter into communications with the Kabul Government on State affairs. His letters, as a matter of fact, merely echoed the views or wishes—or, more strictly speaking, the mere words—of the Amir; and it was manifestly no part of my duty to send answers to such communications.

20. Whatever may have been the nature of the relations entered into between the Amir and the Russian Mission—or whether His Highness' mind was made up, or not, as to any definite course of future policy—it is, I consider, beyond question that his object was to procrastinate, and to defer as long as possible being forced into giving any definite answer to the Viceroy's letters; and further, to prevent, if possible, the passage of the Mission through the few miles of the Khaibar which separate Jamrud from Ali Masjid. His Highness hoped thereby to prevent the officers of the two Governments from coming into personal contact; and his mind was made up that, if they did so before he accorded his assent for the onward passage of the Mission, it should be stopped, and stopped, if need be, by force of arms and by bloodshed. The acts of His Highness' officers at Ali Masjid, His Highness' own words to the Nawab, and the words of his Minister to the same person—all bore testimony to this intention. It was tantamount to saying that if the British Government would renounce all right to independence of action, and leave it to the Amir to decide whether the Mission should be received or not, and if to be received, to leave it to him to decide the precise time, that then, at his pleasure, he would give an answer, when, if it was favourable to us, he would depute a suitable person to receive the Mission, and treat it honorably.

21. Most assuredly no Asiatic Prince has ever thus treated the British Government unless prepared to go to war; and equally certain is it that the Amir would never have thus dealt by the Russians, unless ready to trust to the same arbitrament. In fact, we have it in his own words to the Nawab, that he invited the Russian Mission—and be it remembered it came at *its own appointed time*—not deeming it advisable to break with the Czar.

22. On the 21st, the Mission moved to Jamrud and encamped there for the day. Major Cavagnari was deputed to ride on to Ali Masjid, with a small escort, to demand from the Amir's officials permission for the advance of the Mission. A report of his interview with

\* NOTE.—Also a copy of report by Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, Commanding the Escort.

Faiz Mahomed Khan is annexed.\* It announced the fixed intention of the Amir's authorities to oppose the passage of the Mission; and it is evident that, but for the tact displayed by Major Cavagnari at one period of the interview, even the lives of the British officers and of their small escort were endangered.

23. This result having been reported by telegraph to the Viceroy, I, early on the morning of the 22nd, received His Excellency's orders to return with the Mission to Peshawur. Before

† Copy annexed.

doing so, I addressed a letter† to Faiz Mahomed Khan at Ali Masjid, informing him of withdrawal of the Mission, and that his act would be viewed as being that of the Amir. I also sent a letter† to the Nawab, directing him to immediately take leave of the Amir, and to return forthwith to Peshawur.

24. As I was about to mount my horse to leave camp, I saw the friendly Afridi Maliks. I told them they had honorably discharged their engagement with us, and that their service was considered the same as if they had escorted our last baggage animal safe under the walls of Ali Masjid. They appeared pleased at this recognition of their services; but, as my remarks drew from some of them the question as to what they should do if the Amir visited them with his displeasure because of their engagement with us, I replied without hesitation that we should take them under our protection, and would defend them to the last. This promise subsequently received the full approval and confirmation of His Excellency the Viceroy.

25. The Mission had failed; it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amir's dominions, with an affront delivered before all the world. It failed, because of the Amir's indifference to any indignity imposed by him on the British Government; whilst he himself would not tolerate anything which could be strained to bear the appearance of even a slight to his kingly privileges.

26. It seems to me that a reasonable way of judging of our position is to suppose the conditions inverted. Let it be supposed that the Amir had considered that his interests and his honor called for the immediate despatch of an Envoy to the Government of India to discuss pressing differences in a friendly manner; that he had deputed a confidential agent of rank to the Viceroy to announce the approaching departure and early arrival of a Mission; that the Government of India, thereupon, had sent no direct answer to the Amir, but had endeavoured to bar the passage of the Mission through neighbouring friendly tribes; and that, on its succeeding in reaching our most distant outpost, it had been met and turned back by the threat of a resort to force if it ventured to continue on its errand. There can, I think, be no room for two opinions, unless the relations between neighbouring States are to relapse into the worst form of barbarism, and to be controlled only by brute instincts and by brute force.

27. It may be said with certainty that a Mission despatched under such conditions would have met with no success had it been allowed to advance, and that it was better to fail at starting through a direct insult, than to reach Kabul to arrive at no result.

28. Before concluding this report, I desire to correct a misapprehension which has prevailed as to the strength of the military escort attached to the Mission. It consisted of 150 cavalry and 50 infantry, or a total of 200 men; and, considering the description of country to be traversed, and the habits of the tribes to be passed through, this number was not in excess of requirements.

29. My Mission was not of the nature of a surprise, and to be conducted secretly and expeditiously; it had therefore, according to custom, to be accompanied by a proportionate amount of camp equipage, baggage, and transport animals; whilst in addition to our own requirements was added the charge of valuable gifts to be presented to the Amir. I had, in fact, to go in the most open and formal manner, to represent the dignity of my sovereign and the claims of my country; and to do this suitably, a certain amount of outward state was customary and necessary.

30. No exception is ever taken by this Government to the amount of escort which accompanies any foreign Prince visiting India; and whenever the Amir of Kabul, or one of the Princes of that house, has come to India, he has invariably been accompanied by an escort far in excess of that which I was to take; although, be it added, any individual of any nationality may traverse the length and breadth of India, unarmed, with perfect security and without let or hindrance.

31. Finally, I would observe that so great was my desire to prevent, if possible, any false rumours of armed preparations preceding me to Kabul, that I even requested the Brigadier-General Commanding the Peshawur Garrison to suspend the movement of troops ordinarily carried out at that period for the preservation of the men's health, consequent upon the setting-in of the sickly season.

---

Translation of a letter from FAIZ MAHOMED KHAN to HIS EXCELLENCY SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN  
(letter not dated).

Your friendly letter which you sent me by the hands of Arbab Fateh Mahomed Khan has reached me to-day, the 17th Ramazan (16th September). I was gratified by the perusal thereof, and feel obliged.

Kind (Sir), you mention therein that you have been ordered to proceed on a friendly Mission to Kabul, and that you are negotiating with the Afridis for an escort to Dakka. But the Afridis are a faithless (literally, "fearless") and covetous race. No confidence can be reposed in their engagements. Their headmen and chiefs are all with us, and in receipt of allowances from His Highness the Amir. The letter which my kind friend, Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawur, wrote on the subject of the advance of a friendly Mission to Kabul, I have forwarded by the hands of my servant to the Mirakhor, our superior and chief at Jalalabad; but as yet we have received no orders from Kabul or Jalalabad which we might communicate to you, whether to let the British Mission to proceed or to stop it. When we hear that the Amir has no objection (to your going), we shall do you good service, and escort you to Dakka, whether there be any Afridis or not; for the friendship between you and the late Amir Sahib is clearer than the sun. When we receive orders from the capital (Kabul) to invite you, we shall be bound to serve you well. But as yet we have received no orders to let you go. We are servants to carry out the orders (of our master). Should you come without His Highness' permission or orders, it will lead to a collision between us and the Afridis on one side, and you on the other; all hopes of friendship will be lost.

While I was writing this letter, a man arrived from Dakka with news that the Mirakhor would shortly be here with two sowars. As he is a great man, he may have brought some orders which he, by way of friendship, will communicate to you. He will also learn your views ("jawab-o-sawal"). What I have stated above is all that I have to communicate. Further, you are at liberty to do what you like. Whether you stop at Peshawur until the Mirakhor arrives, and has a friendly communication with you, or you proceed at once by force, you can do what you choose.

---

Dated 22nd September 1878.

From—MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., on Special Duty, Kabul Mission,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary,  
Kabul Mission.

In obedience to Your Excellency's instructions, I left Peshawur early yesterday morning, with the view to proceeding to the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khaibar Pass, in order to ascertain from the Amir's officials in charge of this post, whether they would permit the British Mission to pass through the Khaibar, and be responsible for its safety and proper treatment during its journey to Kabul, or not.

2. On arrival at Jamrud, where the camp of the Mission was pitched, I communicated with Colonel Jenkins, Commanding the Escort, and it was arranged that he and Captain W. Battye, with a small escort of cavalry, should accompany me on my mission.

3. Negotiations had been concluded on the previous day with the Khaibar headmen present at Peshawur to escort the British Mission from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, or to any other



point within the Khaibar at which the Amir's officials might be stationed, and back to the British frontier, if it was necessary to return. I therefore sent off the Khaibaris, who had preceded me to the camp at Jamrud, to make arrangements through the Pass; and I deputed messengers to Ali Masjid to inform the Mirakhor, and Faiz Mahomed Khan, the Commandant of the fort, that I, with two other British officers, were leaving Jamrud for Ali Masjid, in order to have a personal interview with them.

4. After waiting a sufficient time at Jamrud to enable the Khaibaris and my messengers to get well ahead, I left camp and entered the Pass. On reaching Mackeson's bridge, I was met by one of my messengers, who was returning from Ali Masjid, and who informed me that Faiz Mahomed Khan had desired him to return and request the officers to halt at whatever place the messenger should meet them, and that he would come to interview them. As this was palpably an attempt to gain time, a line of conduct the Amir's officials are specially proficient in, and as it was my object to get as near Ali Masjid as possible, so that there should be no question as to the responsibility of the Amir's officials for any obstruction I might meet with, I directed the messenger to return and informed the Khan that I intended to proceed onward until I met him.

5. When we reached the heights above Lala China, which are about a mile from Ali Masjid and within sight of the fort, some of the Khaibar headmen met us, and informed me that the ridges in front of us, which completely commanded the remainder of the road to Ali Masjid, were held by the Amir's levies (Khasadar), who would not let our party pass. We also observed large numbers of men descending from Ali Masjid to strengthen these positions, indicating beyond doubt that there was every intention to oppose us if we attempted to proceed. As these pickets were within the limits of that portion of the Pass the Khaibaris who accompanied me were responsible for, I sent a party of them to parley with the levies; but the latter threatened to fire if any one approached. I therefore sent another messenger to Faiz Mahomed Khan, inviting him to come and meet me, or to arrange for my safe passage to Ali Masjid, as his men held command of the road and refused to allow my party to advance.

\* Afridi Khan of Mulazai. As some time passed and no definite answer was received, I sent one of the Kalil Khans,\* who had accompanied me, to ascertain the position of affairs; but shortly afterwards I received a report that the Khan had been stopped and was not permitted to advance.

6. I then prepared to write a letter to the address of the Mirakhor and Faiz Mahomed Khan, informing them that I had been stopped by the advanced pickets of the Ali Masjid post under their command, but that I intended to proceed until fired upon, and that, if this occurred, the responsibility would be theirs, and that the act would be held to indicate that as† the

Amir of Kabul's representatives absolutely declined to allow the British Mission to advance. I intended to let a reasonable interval pass, and then, if no satisfactory reply was received, Colonel Jenkins and I, with a few men, were to advance towards Ali Masjid until fired upon, when we would have retired under cover of the remainder of the escort which was to be left with Captain Battye on the heights where we had halted.

7. Before this letter was ready for despatch, a message was brought me from Faiz Mahomed Khan to the effect that he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed of the stream just below where we were halted, and that, on his arrival there, he would send for myself and three others and would hear anything we had to communicate.

8. As it appeared to me that it would have been an indignity to have remained and waited until Faiz Mahomed Khan should send for me, as well as to be dictated to as to the number of men that should accompany me (it would have been different had I been permitted to proceed with my escort to the fort of Ali Masjid, when, of course, I would only have entered the post with as many men as the officers in command choose to admit), I determined to advance at once with as many men as I thought fit to take, and endeavour to meet Faiz Mahomed Khan before he should reach the spot named by him.

9. Accordingly, Colonel Jenkins, myself, and one or two of the guide cavalry, with some of the Khaibar headmen and the Native gentlemen marginally noted, descended without delay into the bed of the stream, and advanced to meet Faiz Mahomed Khan. A party of Afridis, headed by Abdulla Nur, a Kuki Khel Afridi Malik in receipt of special allowances from the Amir,

Nawab Bahadur Sher Khan.  
Arbab Serferaz Khan.  
Arbab Fateh Mahomed Khan.  
Afredi Khan.  
Munshi Bukhtiar Khan.  
Abbas Khan and several others.

attempted to stop me, saying that only four persons should advance. I rode past him, telling him that my mission concerned the Kabul officials, and that I desired to have no discussion with the Afridis. The Malik made no further opposition—in fact, he knew that most of his tribe were with me, and he himself was only acting a part to save his allowances.

10. After meeting Faiz Mahomed Khan and exchanging salutations, I pointed to what I considered a suitable place for an interview—it was a watermill with some trees close by it, and on the opposite side of the stream to the spot originally named for the place of meeting. Faiz Mahomed Khan was accompanied by the Naib, or Deputy, of the Mirakhor, a considerable number of the Ali Masjid levies, and some of the Afridi headmen of the upper villages of the Khaibar, and their respective followers.

11. When we had seated ourselves, I commenced the interview by pointing out to Faiz Mahomed Khan that he and myself were servants of our respective Governments, and had

met to carry out whatever orders we had received ; so that, whatever the result of our meeting might be, there need be nothing personal between him and myself. After the Khan had fully reciprocated this friendly sentiment, I proceeded to state that he was well aware that the British Government had decided on sending a friendly Mission of European British officers, accompanied by a suitable escort, to His Highness the Amir of Kabul ; that the Mission was encamped at Jamrud, and intended to proceed through the Khaibar on the following day ; that, in consequence of various reports received, I had been deputed by my Government to ascertain from the Amir's officials at Ali Masjid whether they had received instructions, or were prepared to guarantee the safe passage and proper treatment of the Mission during its journey to Kabul, or not ; and I hoped that, if there was any latitude for independent action in the orders he had received from Kabul, he would do all he could towards an amicable adjustment of affairs between the two Governments. Faiz Mahomed Khan replied that he had every desire to act in a friendly manner, and that, actuated by such motives, he had allowed Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan to proceed without any detention, but that his action in this respect had met with disapproval from the Kabul Durbar ; that if he had not been friendly disposed, he would not have consented to the present interview, or have restrained his levies from firing on my party ; that he had received no orders from the Amir to let the Mission pass his post ; and that, without such orders, he could not let it proceed ; but that, if the Mission would only wait for a few days, he would communicate with Kabul and ask for orders. I replied that my orders were distinct, and that I was instructed to say that the Mission would advance on the next day, unless I received a reply from the Amir's officials that its advance would be opposed ; and I begged the Khan not to take upon himself such a heavy responsibility as to say he would oppose the advance of the British Mission, unless his orders were clear and distinct in the matter ; for whatever his reply was, it would be considered as that of the Amir of Kabul. Faiz Mahomed Khan replied that he was only a sentry, and had no regular troops, but only a few levies ; but that such as his orders were, he would carry out to the best of his ability, and that, unless he received orders from Kabul, he could not let the Mission pass his post. I rejoined to this, that it did not signify what the actual strength of his post was, as the Mission was a friendly one and bent on peaceful objects, and I again urged him not to take such a grave responsibility if he had any option in the matter. He replied that it was a very heavy matter for him to decide upon ; as, on the one hand, he could not act without orders from Kabul, while, on the other hand, he was told that his reply would be considered as that of the Amir of Kabul. He then began with much warmth to question the friendly intentions of the British Government by stating that it was not a sign of friendship for the British authorities to negotiate direct with the Khaibar tribes, who were subjects of the Amir of Kabul, and in receipt of allowances from that ruler, and induce them to escort Nawab Ghulam Hassan, and also some British officers (meaning my party), without the Amir's permission. I replied that there was no cause for dissatisfaction in what had been done in the matter. It was never anticipated that a friendly Mission would have met with any opposition, as such Missions are never opposed in any civilized country ; and that the arrangements made with the Afridis were merely to induce them to undertake the safe conduct ("*badragga*") of a peaceably-disposed Mission, which every independent Pathan tribe has a right to undertake in its own country. Faiz Mahomed Khan continued with increasing warmth to allude to the subject, and there was an uneasy sort of murmuring commencing amongst the people around, which appeared to me (and, as I afterwards ascertained, the same idea occurred to Colonel Jenkins and to some of the Native gentlemen with me) to indicate that, if the discussion was any longer prolonged, the movement alluded to might assume a more decided form, which might possibly be one which our small party could not deal with in a suitable manner. I therefore interrupted the Khan by saying that the subject was one which it did not behove subordinates to discuss, and that, if the Amir considered what had been done as a grievance, I had no doubt that the British Government would give him a suitable answer. I then asked the Khan for the last time if I correctly understood him to say that, if the British Mission advanced as intended on the following day, he would oppose it by force ; and he replied that such would be the case. I then got up and shook Faiz Mahomed Khan by the hand, and assured him that I had no unfriendly feelings against him personally, and that I hoped to meet him again on some future occasion. I then turned to the Native gentlemen who were with me, and asked them if they did not consider a clear and decisive answer had been given ; and they replied that it was so.

12. In fact, there was scarcely any necessity for an interview to settle this point, as the hostile preparations made by the Ali Masjid garrison on seeing my party approach, notwithstanding that my object in coming, and the small strength of my escort, had been communicated to, and received by, the Commandant of the fort, and the Amir's representative, the Mirakhor, would ordinarily have been quite sufficient to indicate predetermined affront and insult ; and I believe that, with any other of the Amir's officials but Faiz Mahomed Khan, who, from first to last, has behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favorably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and myself, a collision of some kind would have taken place. The general belief is that Faiz Mahomed Khan was acting under the direct orders of the Mirakhor, who had been purposely deputed by the Amir to supervise Faiz Mahomed Khan's management of Khaibar affairs, and to see that, without orders to the contrary, he checked the advance of the British Mission. I have no doubt that Faiz Mahomed Khan softened down a great deal of the insult that was intended, though, short of actual collision, it is impossible to imagine what more could be done to effect the Amir's object.

13. The Khaibaris, as far as their conduct was tested, acted faithfully to their engagements, and, but for their assistance, we should not have been able to bring matters to a definite issue with the Amir's officials without a great deal of trouble, expense, and delay.

14. The interview with Faiz Mahomed Khan being concluded, we returned to Jamrud, and I returned to Peshawur and personally reported to Your Excellency all that had taken place.

15. In conclusion, I would desire to bring to Your Excellency's favorable notice the ready and courteous assistance I received from Colonel Jenkins.

The Khaibar arrangements were managed by Arbab Fateh Mahomed Khan, and I purpose bringing his services to notice in due course.

---

Dated Camp Peshawur, 22nd September 1878.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. H. JENKINS, Commandant, Corps of Guides (Q.O.),

To—CAPTAIN ST. V. HAMMICK, Military Secretary to SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

I HAVE the honor to make the following report for the information of His Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B.

2. According to his orders, I marched from Peshawur, early on the 21st September, with the camp of the Kabul Mission, and reached Jamrud soon after 7 o'clock.

3. About 8 o'clock, Major Cavagnari arrived in camp, and told me that he was going up to Ali Masjid to get an answer from the Officer Commanding regarding the passage of the Mission through Ali Masjid, and its safe conduct to Kabul.

4. After a short delay, to allow the headmen of the Kuki Khel Afridis to send some of their people ahead of us up the Khaibar Pass, to tell Faiz Mahomed Khan that Major Cavagnari was coming to talk to him, and that he had only a small escort with him, Major Cavagnari and I started from Jamrud, having with us Captain Wigram Battye and twenty-four men of the cavalry of the Corps of Guides.

5. We marched by the gun-road made by Colonel Mackeson in (1840), which we found in very good order, and, before noon, reached a hill, from which we could plainly see Ali Masjid, about three-quarters of a mile distant from the fort.

6. When the people in Ali Masjid saw our uniform on the hill, they immediately made preparations to resist us. Some manned the walls of the fort, and some occupied a ridge, along the foot of which the road between us and Ali Masjid ran. At the same time one or two signal shots were fired.

7. If we had advanced, then I am sure that we should have been at once engaged with three or four hundred men under circumstances of great disadvantage, for we should have been fighting on the lower ground, with the enemy strongly posted on our front and right flank. Besides this, I am persuaded that the Amir's officers would have excused themselves from all blame for what might have happened, by saying that we had rashly come into collision with their troops without giving time for explanation.

8. Under these circumstances, Major Cavagnari, wisely I think, decided to remain on the hill, where we were, for a short time; but it was agreed that if Faiz Mahomed could not be induced to come and meet us, Major Cavagnari and I, with a couple of men, were to go towards the fort and get an answer to the question he had come to ask.

9. After waiting on the hill for about two hours, during which more than one message was sent to Faiz Mahomed Khan, Afridi Khan, Arbab of Malazai, came back to say that the Sirdar was coming to meet us in the valley below, where we were standing. Shortly after this, we saw Faiz Mahomed coming with fifty or sixty followers, and Major Cavagnari and I, with two men of the Guides, went down and met him. Major Cavagnari had also with him Fateh Mahomed Khan, Arbab Afridi Khan, and a few of the Kuki Khel Afridis who had come with us up the Pass; also Bahadur Sher Khan, the Bangash Chief.

10. After shaking hands with the Sirdar, we crossed the stream, and sat down under a tree close to the village of Lala China. Directly we sat down, several more of the Sirdar's followers turned up, and we had 150 or 200 of them close round us while we sat and talked.

11. Major Cavagnari began by saying that the British Government was sending a peaceful Mission to the Amir Shere Ali Khan, of which due notice had been given to the Amir, that the camp of the Mission was at Jamrud, and that he came to ask for a passage through Ali Masjid, and a safe conduct to Kabul.

12. The Sirdar replied that he had already written more than once to say that the Mission could not pass Ali Masjid without the Amir's sanction, which had not been received, and that we must wait, and that he would again refer to the Amir for orders on the subject.

13. Major Cavagnari said that the Sirdar's letters had been received, but that the British Government would not believe that a peaceful Mission, going to the Amir on business of importance, would be refused a passage, and had, therefore, sent one of its own officers to ascertain how matters stood. Major Cavagnari added that, as the Amir knew that the Mission was on its way to him, if it was stopped at Ali Masjid, the British Government would consider that the Amir had himself stopped it.

14. The Sirdar owned that this was true.

15. Major Cavagnari then asked whether, under these circumstances, the Sirdar would oppose the passage of the Mission; and the Sirdar said that he would most certainly do so. In fact, the Sirdar never flinched from first to last, but gave us distinctly to understand that he would oppose the passage of the Mission by force, and that it was waste of time to argue with him.

16. Major Cavagnari then said to the Sirdar—"You are a servant of the Amir, and you take upon yourself to stop a Mission going to him from the British Government with which he has long been on friendly terms. How do you know that the Amir himself will not be very angry with you for doing this?"

17. The Sirdar replied—"What friendship is there in what you are doing now? If the Amir had given me orders, I would have gone down to Jamrud to meet you, and bring you up the Pass; but now you have come here on your own account, and bribed the Amir's servants to give you a passage. You are setting Afridis against Afridis, and will cause strife and bloodshed in this country, and you call yourself friends!"

18. The Afridis who were standing round us applauded this speech; and it would not have been prudent to have continued to converse in this tone. Therefore Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar—"We are both servants—you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the Mission by force?"

19. The Sirdar said—"Yes, I will; and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already." After this we shook hands and mounted our horses; and the Sirdar said again—"You have had a straight answer."

20. We returned to Jamrud by the road we came, and reached camp about 5 o'clock in the evening.

21. I was very much struck with the behaviour of the Kuki Khel Afridis who went with us up the pass. Their conduct was excellent throughout the day.

22. I enclose a slight sketch of the ground about Ali Masjid to explain this report.

---

Dated Camp Jamrud, 22nd September 1878.

From—HIS EXCELLENCY SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,

To—FAIZ MAHOMED KHAN, Commanding H. H. the Amir's Troops at Ali Masjid.

You are aware that the camp of the British Mission arrived at Jamrud yesterday, with the object of proceeding to-day through the Khaibar Pass on a friendly Mission to His Highness the Amir of Kabul. Major Cavagnari and two other British officers were deputed yesterday afternoon, under my orders, to hold an interview with you, in order to obtain from you, as His Highness' Commandant at Ali Masjid, the necessary assurances of safe conduct to enable the Mission to proceed on its journey.

The said officers were prevented from approaching the fort of Ali Masjid, as your pickets were posted commanding the road, and refused to allow them (the officers) to advance. After these British officers had sought and obtained an interview with you at a place (Lala China) some short distance this side of Ali Masjid, and after you had been warned by them that your reply would be regarded as that of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, you declared that you had received no instructions to permit the British Mission to pass your post, and stated that you would certainly oppose it by force if it advanced. I am therefore commanded by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to inform you that your reply is considered as being that of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, and the British Mission is now returning from Jamrud to Peshawur. I again assure you that the British Government entertains nothing but friendly feelings and intentions towards the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan.

---

Dated Camp Jamrud, 22nd September 1878.

From—HIS EXCELLENCY SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,

To—NAWAB GHULAM HASSAN KHAN, on Special Duty at Kabul.

I SEND, for your information, copy of a letter I have just addressed to Faiz Mahomed Khan, Ghilzai, Commanding His Highness the Amir of Kabul's troops at Ali Masjid.

I am commanded by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to direct you, immediately on receipt of this letter, to take leave of His Highness the Amir of Kabul and to return at once to Peshawur.

## APPENDIX XXXVIII.

PERSIAN TEXT OF AMIR SHERE ALI'S LETTERS, DATED 6TH OCTOBER 1878, TO THE VICEROY. BROUGHT FROM KABUL BY NAWAB GHULAM HASSAN.

[Referred to in paragraph 168, Chapter IX.]

Copy of letter from the late AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated Sunday, 8th Shawál, 1295 A. H., corresponding with 6th October 1878.

Janáb-i-jalálat-o-nabálat maáb, rafáat-o-manáat iyáb mahabbat-o-mualafat intisáb Nawwáb-i-mustatáb-i-maáli alkáb Viceroy Lord Governor-General sáhib bahádur farmán-farmá-i-Kishwar-i-Hind Zádá Khullatohú rá bad-i-sharh-i-maáni-i-mahabbat-o-muálat wa tarh-i-mabáni-i-khullat-o-musáfát wázih-i-khatir-i-tawaddud mazáhir midárad. Rakimat-ul-widád-i-án janáb ba sahábat-i-álí jáh izzat-o-sadákat hamráh Nawwáb Gholám Hasan Khán mutazammin-i-mámuri-i-mission-i-dostána yáni safárat-i-daulat-i-Britania ba mulábaza-i-dostdár darámad, wa bar maáni-i-mundarija ittila-i-Kámil hásil shud, wa lek Nawwáb-i-mausúf hauúz sharaf yáb-i-huzur na shuda wa maktúb-i-mihr uslúb-i-án janáb ba nazar-i-dostdár na rasída ki khatte az jánib-i-Major Waterfield Commissioner-i-Pesháwar ismi-i-álí jáh izzat hamráh Mirza Habib-ullah Khán mulázim-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád rasída az nazar-i-níazmand-i-dargah-i-Iláhi gozárish yáft wa az nigárish-i-mushár ilaih yani Commissioner-i-makám-i-Pesháwar kamál-i-taajjub-o-tahayyur dast dád ki dostí-o-muráwada-i-daulati rá in kism nawishta-i-pur shor wa mámuri-i-mission-i-dostána rá in taur ámadan ba zor natija-o-faida kudám wa samrá-i-án rá chih nám khwahad búd. Pas azám sih kita khatt-i-digar niz az taraf-i-mushár ilaih bar humán watera-o-siák ismí-i-kar-gozarán-i in daulat-i-Khudádád mulábaza shud, balki dar arsa-i-eband roz eband kita murásala azán táraf barchi ba mulábaza rasíd kháli az fikrát ná muláim wa ári áz sukhunán-i-durusht ki munáfi-i-rusúm-i-rifk-o-mudará-o-mukhálif-i-atwár-i-dosti-o-muása ast ba nazar dar nayámad, nazar ba hujúm-i-humúm wa zahúr-i-ghumúme ki in aukát ba hasb-i-takdir baráe dostdár dast dáda, wa khafkán-i-ziade dar khátir-i-níazmand-i-bárgáh-i-samadi jáegír shud umána-i-daulat-i-Britania rá darín makám sabr-o-sukún lázima ba gbáyat pasandída-o-bajá búd, marhala-i-murawada wa arsa-i-guftgú rá in kadar sakht-o-zík giriftan wa ba mulázimán-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád az dar-i-munázara-o-itáb darámadan khud-i-án janáb mulábaza foamáyand, ba tarika-i-anika-i-dosti-o-widád chikadar tafáwut khwáhad dásht ba har takdír aháli-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád rá ba hích gúnah izhár-o-tazkáré ki azán taraf ba mujib-i-nawishtaját-i-tahdidána-i-umaná-i-daulat-i-Britania ánci fil hál barúe kár ámada wa dar dast-i-mulázimán-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád maujúd ast bá daulat-i-Britania sar-i-muánadat wa khiláf nest, balki bá hích daulaté khiál-i-dushmaní-o-inád nadárand. Hargáh dígare rá bá ahali-i-in daulat-i-Khudádád bidún-i-sabab wa be mujib sar-i-dushmaní-o-inád báshad supurd-i-umúr ba Khudáwand-i-ghafúr, wa kárhá basta ba mashíyyat-o-irádat-i-hazrat-i-úst. Hasbo nalláho wa nimal wakíl.

Álójáh izzat-o-sadákat hamrah Nawwáb Gholám Hasan Khán hámil-i-rakimat-ul-widád hasb-ul-tahrír-i-umaná-i-daulat-i-Britania darkhwást-i-murakhkhasí-i-khud rá az huzur-i-banda-i-dargáh-i-samad-i-be níaz namúdah murakhkhasí yáft, fakat. Tahrír-i-yaum-i-yakshanba hashtum-i-shahr-i-Shawwál-ul-mukarram Sannah-i-1295 Hijri-i-Nabawi sallallah-o alaih-i-wa álihí wa sallam.

Copy of a letter from the late AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated Sunday, 8th Shawál, 1295 A. H., corresponding with 6th October 1878.

• Janáb-i-jalálat-o-nabálat maáb, rafáat-o-manáat iyáb, mahabbat-o-muálat intisáb, Nawwáb-i-mustatáb-i-maáli alkáb, Viceroy Lord Governor-General sáhib bahádur farmán-farmá-i-kishwar-i-Hind zádá Khullatohú, rá bad-i-sharh-i-maáni mahabbat-o-muálat wa tarh-i-mabáni Khullat-o-musáfát wázih-i-Khátir-i-ulfat zakháir midárad. Murásalat-ul-widád-i-muálat bunyád mabní ba izhár-o-tazkár-i-afsoos wa daregh-i-ziád dar wákia-i-irtihál wa hádisa-i-intikál-i-farzand-i-khalf-i-arjomand-i-in dostdár Sardár Abdullah Khán walí-ahad-i-daulat-i-Khudádád-i-Afghánistán ba sahábat-i-álójáh izzat-o-sadákat hamráh Nawwáb Gholám Hasan Khán ba nazar-i-tawaddud-asar-i-dostdár dar ámad. Ánci ba iktizái marásim-i-dosti-o-widád darín wákia-i-gham afyá ki ba hasb-i-takdír-i-Iláhi baráe níazmand-i-dargáh-i-samadi dast dád izhár buzu-o-malál kardah búdand albatta muktazá-i-rusúm-i-khullat-o-muáfakat chunin wa lázim-i-ahwál-i-dostán dar masáib-i-dostan hamín ast wa lakin chún ba Kazá-i-Iláhi já-i-sitez-o-áwez wa az takdír-i-janab-i-subbáni rah-i-goriz-o-gozir nest, pas razá ba kazá dádan wa sar bar khatt-i-taslim nihádan ba har hál aulá wa ausal ast. Ziáda bajuz sharh-i-wifák chi dar kalam árad fakat. Tahrír yaum-yakshanba 8 shahr-i-Shawwál-ul-mukarram Sannah-i-1295 Hijri-i-Nabawi.



## APPENDIX XXXIX

### PERSIAN TRANSLATION OF BRITISH MANIFESTO REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 170, CHAPTER IV.

#### I L Á N.

Az jámb-i-janáb Viceroy o Governor-General, yanf Naib-us-saltanat o Farmán farmá-i-Hind, ba taraf-i-Ámír Sher Alí Khán Wálí-i-Kábul, wa Sardarán, wa raáyaash wa tamám-i-áhl-i-Áfghánistán.

Alhál, karíb-i-dah sál ast, ki Ámír Sher Alí Khán, bad az koshish-i-bisyár wa jang-i-mumtadd, ákhr-ul-amar kámyáb shudah, khud rá bar takht-i-Kábul mutamakkin sákht; darán hangám saltanatash hanoz istihkám-talab búd, wa wasatash hanoz ghair-mahdúd; darín hálat Ámír mazkúr, ki az sarkár-i-Britania kabl azán imdád-i-nukud o asliha bado rasídah búd, khwáhish-i-mulákát-i-janáb Náib-us-saltanat-i-Hind izhar kard. Multamas-i-orá sarkár az díl makrún ba ijábat sakht. Janáb Naib-us-saltanat bás dar Ambálah ba khush-akhláki pesh ámadah lawázim-i-mihmán dáriash ba ihtirám bajá áward. Baráe himáyate wa íanate, ki baráe tahsíl-i-án ámadah búd, bado itminán o khátir-jamai dádah shud. Dar humán wakt atáyá-i-asliha o nukúd, ghair mashrút ba hích sharat, yáft. In álmát-i-nek-niyatí-i-sarkár-i-Britania, Ámír rá bad az murájaat ba mulk-i-khud, dar istihkám-i-páyá wa tausi-i-hukumat-i-khud bisyár dastgírí namúd. Bar wakt-i-muáwadat az aláka-i-sarkár-i-Britania, ba sipás-guzári ikrár-i-kadr-i-ín imdád kard.

Bad azán Ámír Sher Alí Khán dígar atáyáe asliha az sarkár-i-Britania yáft; wa azín nek-niyatí-i-sarkár, ba subút rasíd. Az sabab-i-wajáhat-o-itibír-i-kawi-i-sarkár-i-Britania, Shahansháh-i Rus hadd moáyyin fímábaen-i-saltanat-i-Kábul o riyásatháe Bokhárá-o-Khokand rá chunán ki báýad, kabúl namúd. Az hamán jihat, hukumat-i-Ámír bar Wákhán o Badakhshán, ki tá án wakt, sarkár-i-Rúsia darán harfe wa nizáe dásht, musallam o mukarrar shud. Raáyaash mujáz búlah-and, ki dar mamlokat-i-Hindustán, baráe tijárat, be-kaid amad-o-shud numáyand, wa az asbáb-i-muháfazat, ki sarkár-i-Britania baráe riáyá-i-khud muhiyá sákhta ast, bahra bar dárاند. Dar kalam-rau-i-sarkár-i-Britania, yak bár ham hamehunín na shudah, ki bá íshán ba zulm-o-babad-sulúki raftár shudah báshad. Baráe ín hama mihrabánihá, Ámír Sher Alí Khán, hích iwaz adá na kardah ast, balki dar iwaz-i-án khusumat-i-sakht wa be-ádabí-i-alánia azo ba zuhúr rasídah. Ámír az sabab-i-tasallute ki orá bar Badakhshán ba itibár o wajábat-i-sarkár-i-Britania hásil shudah búd, afsar-i-zi-rutbat-i-daulat-i-Britania rá, ki az safárat-i-riásat-i-muttasilah murájaat mi-namúd, az guzashtan azán mulk máne gasht, wa shawáli-o-ráh-háye ki dar miyán-i-Hind-o-Áfghánistán, wáki and, bar raáyáe daulat-i-Britania o tijárat-i-íshán bast, ba raáyáe daulat-i-Britania bad-sulúki namúlah tujjár-i-án daulat rá dar kalam-rau-i-khud ba ghárat dad, wa na ba moháfazat-i-íshán pardákht, wa na ba dád-i-shán rasíd; wa bar baze raáyáe khud, sírf badín gumán, ki íshán ba daulat-i-Britania, khat-o-kitábat dárاند, dast-i-taddi daráz kardah, íshán rá bukusht, wa alánia-o-ba sir-garmí ba ákwál-o-áfál koshídah ast, tá náirah-i-khusumat-i-mazhabí bar khiláf-i-Angrezán mushtail kunad, wa jang bá saltanat-i-Hind barpá namáyad.

Ámír, afsarán-i-sarkár-i-Britania rá, áwwul az tamám jáhár mulk-i-khwish khárij kardah, wa az kabul kardan-i-safárat-i-Britania ibá namudah, wa ba jawáb-i-murásalaját-i-dostána ki janáb Náib-us-saltanat-i-Hind bado irkám namudah búd, na pardákhtab, wa jamí-i-masái o kosheshhá rá, ki dar báb-i-ijráe ámad-o-raft-i-dostánah darmiyán-i-sarkar-i-Hind o khude o ba takdím rasánidah shud, radd sákhta; safárat-i-Ruúsia rá ba mujib-i-rasm-o-káidah kabúl kard, wa dar Kábul alániah lawázim-i-mihmándári-i-án bajá áward; wa ín kár ki azo sádir shud, basabab-i-wákiáte ki mukárin-i-án zamán dar firangistán sunuh yáftah búd, wa níz ba sabab-i-waza-i-daulat-i-Rús o Inglistán nisbat-i-hamdigar darán wákiát sangíni-i-khass baham rasánid. Aláwah barán, o khúb mi-dánist, ki daulat-i-Rúsia, ba mujib-i-uhúd o paymánha-i-ki bá Inglístan bastah búd, mutabhid-i-án shudah ast, ki mamálik-i-o rá ba kullí berún az híta-i-tasallut o tásir-i-khud bidánad. Baz ham ín kár rá kardah ast. Ákhr-ul-amar, wakte ki safárat-i-Rúsia hanoz dar páye-i-takhtash maújud búd, o ba zor, safir-i-áli martabat-i-daulat-i-Britania rá az sarhadd-i-khud ránd, bá wajúde ke janáb Náib-us-saltanat, ittila-i-ámadanash hasb-i-zabita o bar wakt, ba zariya-i-murásalah bado dádah búd, wa azán murásalah zarúr o mahim búdan-i-safárat, sábit mi-shud. Báý ham chunki sarkár-i-Britania mi-khwást, ki masálih-i-jang rá dafa numáyad, harkat-i-makhálifána rá multawi sákhta, mauka-i-ákhír ba Ámír dád, táki khud rá az sazáe-ki ba sabab-i-aamál-i-khud mastujib-i-án shudah búd, birihánad; magar azín mauka, Ámír khud rá mustafid na sákht.

Khwáhish-i-sarkár-i-Britania bamesha in budah ast, ki baráe sarbadd-i-Hindustán lifazat-i-támmah ba sabab-i-dostí-i-chunin riásate ki dar mustahkam kardan-i-ázadí-i-án, mi-koshad, wa ba wasíta-i-íttehad-i-raise ki dar káim dáshtan-i-sarir-i-saltanatash, imdád namúdah ast, hásil namáyad. Ba báis-i-ín khwáhish-i-sarkár-i-Britania baráe istihkám-i-chunán rawábit-i-karíbah o sádikánah ki baráe masálih-i-har do kishwar-i-muttasilah lázim mi-báshad, marratan bád-i-ukhrá, jidd-o-jihad ba takdím rasánidah ast, ámuwá masái-i-sarkár bad azán ki Ámír paiwastah dast-i-radd bar ánhá zadah ast, alhál ba be-íhterámí o mukhálafat-i-alániah ánjamíd.

Ámir Sher Ali Khán tahammul-i-daráz-i-daulat-i-Britania rá az ghalat-fahamí haml bar kam-zarí-i-an namúdah, khud rá amadan maurid-i-ghazab-i-wájib-i-án daulat sákht.

Sarkár-i-Inglishia, bá Sardarán o áhl-i-Afghánistán hanoz hích nízæ na dárád, wa na hích khwáhish-i-án dárád. Íshán az áfál-i-tázah-i-Ámir barí-uzzimmah and, wa chunki az íshán hanoz hích khatæ sar-zad na shudah, azín jihat sarkár-i-Britania mí-khwáhad, kí ázádí-i-íshán rá malbúz-i-khátir dárád, wa ba raza-o-raghibat íshán rá zarare na khwáhad rasánd, wa na bá íshán gharaze khwáhad dásht, wa na sarkár-i-Britania hích daulate rá khwáhad guzásht, kí dar muámalát-i-andarúni-i-Áfghánistán, mudákhalate numáyad.

Zimmáwári-i-ikhtiyár kardan-i-mukhálafat-i-Kaesar-i-Hind, ba jáe dostí-i-án uliá janáb, fakat bar gardan-i-Ámir Sher Ali Khán ast ; fakat.

Al-markum 20 November 1878 Isawi.

## APPENDIX XL.

MEMORANDUM BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY OF OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN  
ON 21ST NOVEMBER 1878, IF THE AMIR OF KABUL IS DECLARED AN ENEMY OF  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

[*Referred to in paragraph 170, Chapter IX.*]

Her Majesty's Government having decided that an ultimatum shall be sent to the Amir, demanding an apology and the acceptance of a permanent British Mission in Afghan territory; and that, failing the receipt of a satisfactory reply by November the 20th, the Amir shall be treated as a declared enemy of the British Government; the following orders will be issued in the Foreign and Military Departments:—

1. The troops will be held in readiness to cross the frontier at all points on the 21st instant.

### *Peshawur Line.*

2. On receipt of the order to cross the frontier, a column formed from the troops now assembling at Peshawur and Hassan Abdal will advance on the Khaibar and expel the Amir's garrisons from the Pass. The advance on this line will be limited to Dakka, or such position as may be selected by the General Officer in command for the defence of the western debouche of the Pass.

3. So soon as the Pass shall have been cleared and the necessary force established in position at the western extremity, the bulk of the troops will be withdrawn to British territory.

4. The troops posted for the defence of the Pass should be, as far as possible, selected for local knowledge and frontier experience. The Guides should form part of this force, which will be under the command of Colonel Jenkins, to whom, if necessary, the local rank of Brigadier-General will be given.

5. The protection of our communications through the Pass will be provided for, as far as possible, by levies raised among the local tribes. These will be under the command of Colonel Jenkins, who, in subordination to the General Officer Commanding at Peshawur, will be responsible for the military arrangements for the safety of the Pass.

6. Major Cavagnari will be attached to the General Officer in command of the column as Political Officer during the operations against the Amir's troops in the Khaibar. When these are concluded he will remain with the head-quarters of the Officer Commanding in the Pass; and, under the direct orders of the Government of India, will have charge of our political relations with the surrounding tribes, and of any necessary communications with Kabul.

7. It will be desirable, after our troops shall have taken possession of the Pass, to lay down a telegraph line between Peshawur and the head-quarters of the Officer Commanding in the Pass.

### *Kuram Column.*

8. The operations of the Kuram Column will include the occupation of the Kuram Valley and Paiwar Kotal, and the expulsion of any garrisons the Amir may have established in the Upper Kuram Valley, or on this side of the Shutur Gurdan Pass. In no case will any troops be pushed beyond the range of mountains dividing the watersheds of the Kuram and Kabul rivers. The Officer Commanding the Column will also push his reconnaissances, as opportunity may offer, into the Khost Valley, and will, if military considerations permit, dislodge the Amir's administration from that tract so as to prevent the Amir from drawing either supplies or revenue from it. He will also explore the roads leading to the country beyond.

9. The Officer Commanding the Column will have the chief direction of political as well as military affairs within the limits of his command beyond the British border, and a Political Officer will be attached to him. On military matters he will correspond with the Commander-in-Chief, and on political matters with the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

10. Upon entering the Amir's territory, the Officer Commanding will ascertain and determine what measures, if any, are necessary for carrying on the ordinary civil administration of the country which his troops will occupy. His object will be to preserve order; while withdrawing from the Amir's civil officers all authority, except such as may be left to mere local officials, and he will at once prohibit and intercept the collection of any revenue for the Amir's treasury. He will at the same time spare no efforts to obtain the good-will of the inhabitants of the country within which he operates, and of the neighbouring tribes; and he will protect them as far as possible from being molested, or from suffering hardship by the passage of the troops through their lands. He will endeavour to settle a friendly understanding with the Ghilzais and other tribes in the vicinity, or at least to secure their neutrality, explaining that the British Government desires to avoid all interference with their internal

affairs ; and that the military operations are directed against the army of the Amir alone. He will take steps for keeping himself well informed regarding the course of events and the state of feeling in the interior of Afghanistan, especially in the Kabul Valley and at the Capital. But he is not authorized to entertain any negotiations with the Amir or the Kabul Sirdars ; and any such overtures, if they are made, will be referred to the proper authorities in the Khaibar Pass or at Peshawur.

*Kandahar Line.*

11. Simultaneously with the advance of the Khaibar and Kuram Columns, the Quetta force will move forward and occupy Pishin ; if in the judgment of the Officer Commanding at Quetta the force at his disposal is sufficient for that operation. No further advance, however, will be undertaken in this direction until the assembly of General Stewart's Division at Quetta.

12. In order to minimise the pressure on the resources of Biluchistan, and to facilitate the collection of the necessary reserve supplies at Quetta, General Stewart's force will be halted at suitable points below the Bolan Pass, until it is reported that two months' supplies for his and General Biddulph's Columns have been stored at Quetta. During this halt General Stewart's regimental transport should, as far as possible, be placed at the disposal of the Commissariat to assist in forwarding supplies.

13. A Reserve Division composed of troops from Bombay and Madras will be prepared and directed to assemble at suitable points on the Indus so soon as General Stewart continues his march. It will furnish all necessary posts below the Bolan Pass, and be prepared to advance and reinforce General Stewart if required. But it will not advance beyond the Bolan Pass unless General Stewart applies for such reinforcements and states his ability to feed them.

14. It is of considerable political importance to relieve Biluchistan, which is a friendly country, from the strain upon its resources which may be caused by the presence of large bodies of troops. General Stewart's plans will consequently be arranged so as to avoid, as far as may be possible, the stationing of large bodies of troops within Kelat territory, and with the object of passing forward as speedily as possible the forces destined for ulterior operations.

15. The Commander-in-Chief will be requested to take into consideration whether, in view of the difficulty of feeding large numbers of horses, the cavalry force under General Stewart's command might not be reduced. The Governor-General's Agent in Biluchistan will be called upon for a report on the resources of the country in which General Stewart's Column will operate, as regards forage for horses and camels.

16. Within the territory of the Khan of Kelat the Governor-General's Agent will be the chief civil and political authority, and all communications with the Sirdars and people of Biluchistan will be carried on through him. But as soon as the troops cross the frontier, the chief authority, in political as well as in military affairs, will become vested in the General Officer Commanding. A Political Officer will be attached to him and all negotiations with the rulers and people of Southern Afghanistan will be carried on by him. He will correspond on military matters with the Commander-in-Chief, and on political matters with the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

17. The operations on this line will, for the present, be limited to an advance to Kandahar, the attack and dispersion of any forces the Amir may oppose to us, and, if necessary, the occupation of Kandahar. General Stewart will, however, use his best endeavours to effect this occupation by friendly negotiations with the Kandaharis, to whom he will be authorized to offer protection from the Amir if they will separate themselves from the Amir's cause and remain friendly to the British Government. He will also be careful to make his occupation of the country as little burdensome as possible to its inhabitants, and to avoid as far as may be all interference in their affairs.

18. Should General Stewart, after establishing himself at Kandahar, feel himself strong enough to push forward without risk to Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the one side, or to the Helmund on the other, he will be authorized to do so, but in no case should his occupation extend beyond the range indicated by these two points.

19. All detachments and posts which it may be found necessary to establish on our communications below the Bolan Pass will be furnished by the Reserve Division ordered in paragraph 13 of this memorandum, which will also furnish a flying column for operations above the Pass if required. The protection of the road through the Bolan Pass, and beyond, through Biluchistan to the Afghan border, should, as far as possible, be provided for by arrangements with the tribes and by levies raised in the country. Beyond the Afghan border it will be for General Stewart to decide how to provide for his communications ; but on political grounds it is desirable that the services of friendly inhabitants of the country should be enlisted for this purpose as far as possible.

20. General instructions will be issued by the Government of India in the Foreign Department for the guidance of the Officers Commanding the several Columns in their political dealings with the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan.

## APPENDIX XLI.

TRANSLATION OF MEMORANDUM ON KABUL AFFAIRS, BY NAWAB GHOLAM HASSAN KHAN,  
C.S.I., DATED KOHAT, 19TH OCTOBER 1878.

### [ Chapter IX. ]

The following are my recollections of conversations with the Amir at different times during my 28 days' stay in Kabul, where I had been sent as the bearer of despatches from His Excellency the Viceroy of India to His Highness the Amir. He states much as follows:—

For the last six years the British Government have caused me from time to time annoyance and anxiety: such as, sometimes they send me letters of slighting and harsh tone; secondly, their reconnoitring the Khaibar Pass; then they (also) made engagements with my son, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, at Herat; again they took possession of Quetta and the Bolan Pass without previously informing me; and, finally, they forcibly send a Mission with a camp of 1,000 men without my permission and without consulting me. It is as if they considered me contemptible, and consequently used force. No Mission or Envoy of our Government has ever been sent to another Government with so many followers; 40 or 50 men are sufficient escort for a journey. I have considered the coming of the Mission with so great an escort a slight on my Government, and have therefore forbidden to let it come. Had the British Government considered me their friend, they would have given me time, because at present my mind is unsettled on account of the death of my Heir-apparent, and would have held friendly and conciliating correspondence with me through you, who are come here from the British Government; and I would certainly have done what was befitting me. I would have called the Mission with but a small escort, taking the responsibility of their protection on myself, and would have discussed matters with them. But as meanwhile the Commissioner of Peshawur and His Excellency the Envoy wrote by order of Government that the Mission was to leave on a certain date, and if the officer at Ali Masjid prevented the Mission from proceeding, this prohibition would be considered as authorized by me, his prohibition would be my prohibition, thereupon no arrangements having been made for the security of the road and for carriage, and the Mission advancing forcibly with such a large escort, I considered it a slight on my Government and declined to admit the Mission. His Excellency Sir N. Chamberlain is my friend, and had he himself written to me requesting an interview I would have acceded to the request; or I would, after reflection and deliberation on the *murasilas* (letters) which you (meaning the Nawab) have brought from His Excellency the Viceroy, have arranged to invite the Mission with some escort; but on the contrary, while the answer to the *murasilas* (letters) of His Excellency the Viceroy was not yet drawn up, and even before your (the Nawab) arrival with the letters, the Commissioner fixed a date for the departure of the Mission, and wrote to my servant, Faiz Mahomed Khan, that the Mission would certainly pass through the Khaibar; that is to say, whether permission to do so was given or not, and that opposition on his part would be reckoned as the act of the Amir. Sometime ago the British Government recalled Nawab Ata Mahomed Khan of their own accord, and now they have themselves recalled you; I have not dismissed you. The advent of the Russian Envoys in this country is the result of the British Agent having been recalled; I mean in this way: when the Russians ascertained that discord had sprung up between the English and the Kabul Government, they of themselves came as far as the Oxus, and thence sent me an intimation of their wish for (diplomatic) intercourse. Finding that friendship with the English no longer existed, I did not think it advisable to break my relations with that quarter (Russia) also, and therefore I called them. I have had several interviews with them, but they have not mentioned anything about granting them a passage (*lit.*, road), &c., nor have I done so. They said that as their border had joined mine, they came only to see me, and for no other object. However, they observed that they would send me some presents, and begged me to accept them, which I refused to do. Then they replied that if the presents were from their Emperor, would I accept them; and I said if so, that I would accept them, but that my friendship with the English, which was of old standing, had been broken because I declined to take money and other things offered by them, at which the English Government became offended with and distrusted me. Had I accepted their offer, I would have been constrained to fulfill their wishes; but that I denied obedience and influence over my country to any one, and that for these reasons I accepted nothing, and our friendship and mutual confidence ceased; for the rest they might do as they pleased. I made these remarks to the Russian Envoys with a view to preventing them from giving me anything and to making them understand that I do not accept such presents.

The Amir supported the above remarks by oath, and further went on to say as follows:—

As long as I am alive and have power I will not give the English or the Russians entry into, or influence over, my kingdom. While my people remain attached to me, I am afraid of no Power and can offer a good resistance. Besides my regular army I have four hundred thousand levies and have money and ammunition sufficient for a year. On the contrary, should my people become discontented and desert me, I shall leave my home and houses, which are of no value, and take my family across the mountains west from Kabul, where I shall live



quietly and humbly in peace and comfort and make over my people and kingdom to Russia by written deed (of sale).<sup>\*</sup> I have vacated Kandahar, leaving only a few men there; I have only a couple of unserviceable guns and a few khandars (a measure of weight) of gunpowder there; and should the English advance there, I shall surrender these and also Kandahar. It is advisable that the British Government should not alarm and terrify me, otherwise I shall ruin them as well as myself; and forming an alliance with the Russians we would advance from Herat, or the Russians would advance *via* Herat and I come to their assistance. The result is with God; whatever may happen, let it happen. For God's sake tell the British Government not to give me trouble and alarm; they should have patience. I do not endeavour to do them harm, and they should not try to injure me.

As regards the people of Kabul or of the Khaibar, they take money with one hand and fire a pistol with the other; to gain an object they give their wives and daughters, and then when gained they do not shrink from assassination. They give me great trouble, and no other Government will succeed (do well) with them.

In reply to the above, I represented to His Highness the Amir, whether the British Government neglected or annoyed him, that he should remember that he gave no reply to the murasilas; but made preparations for a religious war; that His Highness sent for the Wazirs and Afridis, who were connected with the English Government, and granted them khillats and guns and incited them to ill-feeling with the British Government; that His Highness had admitted the Russian Envoys into his very palace and denied admittance to a British Mission (what an insult was this!); that the action of His Highness was reckless; and that he ought to have admitted the British Mission, having allowed the Russian Envoys to come, and after an exchange of views could have decided whether to continue a friendship with the English or not, and could then have dismissed the British Mission. Now that I was returning to British territory I did not know what reply I could give to the question which would be asked me,—what were the views of the Amir?

On this the Amir told me to reply to the effect that he was not the enemy of any State, that he was the friend of every Power, and that no Power ought to interfere with him and he would interfere with none. I said to the Amir—"I hope you remember what I said before to you in presence of your Wazir, Shah Mahomed Khan, and I repeat it for the interests of your Government. The Russians, although they possess territories and troops, have little money; they are themselves hungry; what can they give to others? Besides this they do not adhere to their engagements and are cruel and harsh. Further, they care neither for propriety nor friendship. God keep you from giving up Afghanistan; you will deeply regret it! For the rest, you are master of your own actions." To this the Amir replied—"You are a grey beard and belong to my Durrani tribe; so I am not angry at your speech: what you say is correct. The Russians are typhoid fever (*lit.*, a burning fever, short and sharp—*tap-i-muhamka*), and the English hectic fever (a low fever, long protracted—*tap-i-diqq*); but I have no remedy, I have been burnt at the hands of your Government, and have therefore turned my mind in another direction. Balkh and my other exposed Provinces yield a revenue of about 60 lakhs. Should I without cause fall out with the Russians, I shall lose the above Provinces. My people have no ill-feeling towards the Russians, as no previous enmity exists; but there is a blood feud between them and your Government. I believe that in the former war about 150,000 Kabulis and 60,000 English, including the Lord (meaning Sir W. Macnaghten) were killed. Their sons are alive and ill-disposed towards the English." I asked the Amir whether or not he would let the Russians pass, if requested, and he replied, asseverating:—"By Allah! I am not a descendant of the late Amir Dost Mahomed Khan if I consider the British Government my enemy and the Russians my friends. I consider both equally my friends; but there is this matter, that the British Government give me offence, whereas the Russians have given none as yet. Should the Russians or the English express a wish for the favour of a passage through my territory, I will deny it to both. Should Russia forcibly lay hands on my land, I will ally myself with your Government; and should your Government interfere, I will of necessity join the Russians. If no one interferes with me I will show enmity to no one: since I am weak and poor, and have not the strength of others, so also I should not be interfered with." I then asked His Highness—"If the Russian Envoy appoint an Agent at Kabul, whether he be a Russian or a Mahomedan, and you agree to it, will you accept a similar request from the British Government?" His Highness replied:—"I will dismiss Envoys and not keep them; you will hear after a few days that they have been dismissed and are gone. If I agree to one of their Agents remaining at Kabul, I will agree to keeping a British Agent also, whether a European or a Mahomedan. I will accept the Agents of both Governments. You have been recalled; I did not tell you to go. The people in Dhakka and the Khaibar have become excited, therefore you should go *via* Kuram." I said—"I am a soldier, and do not feel much apprehension." But His Highness remarked that it was advisable to go *via* Kuram, and I agreed. He gave me an escort of about 30 sowars with Mahomed Aslam Khan, Kotwal, and made arrangements for my safety and carriage and entertainment as far as his border. The escort came with me as far as Thal. At the time of my departure I received the following khillat from His Highness:—1 horse, 1 Abrah chogha, 1 Khalkham shawl. I asked him whether he would send a reply if I wrote any letter to him by permission of the British authorities on my return to India, and he said that if a suitable letter were sent, he or his Wazir would send me a reply.

<sup>\*</sup> NOTE.—Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan explains this as meaning the Amir would become a Russian pensioner.

As regards my reception at Kabul, I have been treated better than on previous occasions, but so long as I stayed there strict orders were given that no person should come to me. If I wished to send one of my servants into the market to buy anything, permission had to be obtained and a servant of the Kabul Government used to accompany. The Amir seems detached from the English, and is no friend of theirs, and he has attached himself to the Russians, whom he will not throw over. Though he and his Wazir, Shah Mahomed Khan, make statements upon oath, I do not trust them. Two of the three Russian officers and some sowars are at Kabul, and one had gone back. I think he has gone with some object, in which both the Russians and the Amir are interested. The Amir is always praising them. But notwithstanding that he was a friend of His Excellency General Sir N. Chamberlain, he has now refused to call the Mission and will bring about his own ruin. He places no confidence in his own branch of the Barakzai clan, the Mahomedzai. His son, Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, is in prison, and his second son, Sirdar Mahomed Khan, is not trusted by him, and the latter is prepared to ruin his father. Mahomed Ibrahim Khan sent me a message and also a letter, to the effect that formerly he had sent messages and letters to the British Government through Nawab Ata Mahomed Khan, but had received no reply; and that if he possessed a certain amount of money he could attach Kohistan and the Ghilzai country and some of the troops to the British Government. The Sirdar asked me to return his letter with a reply, and I returned the letter, and told him that if he liked, he could send an agent to Peshawur, who on my return should receive some reply, as I could not say more without permission. The Amir does not trust his troops; they are in a distressed condition and abuse him. The majority of the people are either disaffected or wavering. The Amir reminds the people of the former campaign, and urges them heartily to join in a religious war, and again he abuses them. He has summoned Wazirs, Afridis, and Khaibaris; granted them khillats and persuaded them to remain hostile towards the English. He sometimes in conversation expresses his inability to oppose the British Government. I believe he acts in this way at the instigation of Russia, otherwise he himself would not have the confidence to do so. It would be a good plan, the time of year being favorable, to occupy Ali Masjid and a hill called Hardur Khani in the Mohmand country, west of Michni, the Kuram Valley, and as far as Ali Khel (in Haryob) between the Paiwar and the Shutar Gurdan, Khost, and Kandahar. Further advance can follow if necessary.

## APPENDIX XLII.

### COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSIAN MISSION AT KABUL. EXTRACT FROM RUSSIAN NEWSPAPERS IN RESPECT TO POLICY OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.

[Referred to in paragraph 174, Chapter IX.]

Extract from the *Novoe Vremia*.

*Further particulars respecting General Stoletoff's Mission to Kabul.*—The correspondent of the *Novoe Vremia* at Samarcand supplies the following additional information on this subject, under date of 3rd-15th September last:—

"It is known that General Stoletoff was despatched from Tashkend in the latter part of May, in the capacity of Extraordinary Envoy to Shere Ali, Amir of Afghanistan. This journey, through an almost unknown country, occupied a long time, and rumours of a most unfavourable kind continued to reach us. It was said that General Stoletoff, on arriving at the ferry over the Oxus at Tchardjui, was stopped by Afghan troops, and that Shere Ali Khan would not allow a Russian Mission to enter his territory. All this, however, turned out to be false. General Stoletoff had certainly to wait at the ferry over the Oxus for the arrival of an Afghan Beg, who had been appointed to escort him in the place of the Afghan who had died. A whole month was spent in waiting for the functionary, but our Envoy was eventually received with great honors.

"A special ceremonial exists at Kabul for the reception of foreigners of distinction; an English Ambassador would accordingly receive a salute of 13 guns, a Maharaja 30 guns, and an Indian Viceroy 51 guns. General Stoletoff received a salute of 115 guns, and he was met by Shere Ali in person at a considerable distance from Kabul. That an Amir of Kabul should go out so far to meet an Envoy is an event without any parallel in the history of the country.

"On the 31st August=12th September, at 11 P.M., General Stoletoff returned to Samarcand, and he was accompanied by the Afghan Envoy and his suite. The Afghan Mission consists of Mirza Magdazan, Minister of War, two Colonels, and a Secretary. They have an escort of twenty-one Afghans. From Samarcand the Afghans proceeded to Tashkend, where they were received by the Governor-General.

\* \* \* \* \*

"According to the accounts of the members of the Russian Mission the road they journeyed by to Kabul was very fatiguing, included nine mountain passes, and occupied twenty-one days."

The Orenburg correspondent of the *Golos*, No. 283, 13th (25th) October, says, "that the Afghan Embassy, which arrived at Tashkend on the 5th (17th) September, was presented to the Governor-General of Turkistan on the terrace at his villa, where all the Commanding Officers were assembled. The *cortége* drove up in numerous carriages, under the escort of the Governor-General's Body-guard, composed of a select sotnia of Cossacks. This escort met the Afghan Mission on its entrance into Tashkend, near the village of Nogai-Kurgan. The Envoys produced a very favourable impression on the multitude.

"Unlike Bokharians or Khivans, and while different from them in dress and bearing, they bear the stamp of a more civilized people. They speak bluntly and without flattery. They presented themselves in their national costumes, with adornments of uniform common to Anglo-Indian officers.

"Major-General Stoletoff, who returned from Kabul to Tashkend on the 10th (22nd) September, proceeded to Livadia. The members of the Russian Mission—Colonel Razgonof, Titular Councillor Malevinski, Mr. Benderski, Lieutenants Nazarof and Zaman-Bek—remain at Kabul until further orders."

The following is taken from a communication to the *Novoe Vremia*, dated Samarcand, 3rd (15th) October:—

"There is in Kabul a special regulation in respect to the reception of foreigners, according to which an English Envoy receives a salute of 13 guns, the Maharaja 30, and the Viceroy of India 51. General Stoletoff received a salute of 115 guns, and Shere Ali, who came some little way to meet him, received the Russian Envoy with marks of honor unheard of in the history of Kabul.

"On the 31st August (1st September), at 11 A.M., General Stoletoff returned to Samarcand, accompanied by Mirza Magdazan, Shere Ali's Minister for War (Kamnaf), by two Colonels (Karni) Gholam Haider and Dimirshah, and by Gholam Hussein, a Secretary to the Embassy. This Embassy proceeded to Tashkend to the Governor-General, in response, probably, to the Mission of General Stoletoff. The four above-mentioned Afghans entered Samar-

cand, dressed in black kaftans and wearing English helmets with green eye-shades, the rest were arrayed in various coloured kaftans, with dark well-arranged turbans; in their respective belts was a whole arsenal of weapons.

"This Embassy was received with all due honor by the authorities of the region, and by all the Samarcand troops ranged along the Abramof boulevard.

"The members of the Russian Mission who have returned to Samarcand say that they were 21 whole days on the way; the road was exceedingly fatiguing, as they had to cross nine very high Passes. It appeared to the Mission as they passed through Afghanistan that it was by far not so rich or populous a country as it has been represented by tourists; on the contrary the travellers had to perform journeys of 50 and 60 versts over barren deserts from village to village. The Afghan villages contain very few inhabitants and are poverty-stricken. The country is filled with mountains, large tracts of the lowlands being inundated. Kabul, surrounded by mountains, is even worse and more dreary-looking than Samarcand or Tashkend. The buildings are wretched, and poverty stamps the whole place. The Amir's palace, built in European style or architecture, is the only ornament of the city. The bazaars in Kabul are insignificant, and are distinguished from other Central Asia bazaars by even more filth and disorder. Generally speaking, the city with its solitarily straying and gloomy inhabitants produces an unfavourable impression. We may conclude that the obstacle to a closer acquaintance with Afghanistan and to friendly relation with its ruler is now for ever removed."

---

(TRANSLATION.)

Extract from the *Golos* of November 14th-26th 1878.

THE *Golos* of the 14th-26th November 1878 contains the following letter addressed to it by a correspondent from Kabul, and descriptive of the journey of the members of the Russian Envoys to the Amir of Afghanistan. This letter, the *Golos* says, was dispatched by special opportunity soon after the arrival of the Mission at Kabul, posted to St. Petersburg at Tashkend on the 4th November, and received here on the 25th of the same month:—

"Kabul, August 2-14.

"The Russian Mission, consisting of seven officers (among whom was one General), twenty-two Cossacks, four servants, and fifteen Kirghishor seamen, left Samarcand on the 2nd-14th July.

"Our route lay through Bokharian territory, and as the Amir of Bokhara was at Karshi, we proceeded in the direction of that town.

"The Amir of Bokhara showed the Mission every courtesy, and the members presented themselves to him.

"The road selected for reaching the Oxus was through Huzar, Shirabad, and Cushkogosar, which, though presenting some difficulties, running as it does along a rocky ridge of hills, was traversed in five days. On this route the Mission passed through the famous defile known in ancient times under the name of the 'Iron Gates,' and now called Burghasse Khana.

"At Shirabad we met an Afghan messenger, who was the bearer of a letter to the chief of the Mission. In this letter Shir-i-dal Khan, the Governor of Afghan-Turkistan, asked us to wait ten days at Shirabad, as he had not yet made the necessary preparations for the reception of the 'prized visitors.' He also informed us that he had not yet organized the honorary escort which was to accompany the Mission from the Oxus to Mizar, Sheriff, and, further, to Kabul.

"Notwithstanding this request, General Stoletoff considered it advisable to continue the advance to the Oxus, and there to halt if it were really necessary to do so. The Oxus was crossed by the Mission in very primitive boats. On the banks of this river we waited three days when we were joined by the Afghan escort, consisting of 200 men and two Generals. They were all well armed, and excellently equipped. They received the Russian Mission with great politeness, and apologised for having caused its detention. In order to avoid the great heat of the day, which reached 41 degrees in the shades, it was determined to resume the march at night.

"The advance of the Mission was very picturesque. Two long lines of horsemen, with pennons flying, flanked the Envoy and his party on both sides, and closed the rear. The sounds of drums and trumpets broke the silence of the desert. We progressed all night across a sandy arid steppe, intercepted by hillocks, and next morning reached Karshiak settlement, which is situated in a cultivated country.

"We made three stages before reaching Mizar and Sheriff, and on entering the latter town, which was lined with soldiers in our honor, we were received by Hosh-dal Khan, son of the Governor of the Province. A salute of eighteen guns was also made to welcome our arrival.

"Great crowds thronged the street, and gazed with curiosity on the people from the distant north. There were no visible traces of fear or fanaticism among the spectators. In this town, where we were to pass a fortnight, we were lodged in the palace of the Governor-

General, which was shaded by large Chinar trees. The Governor-General, who was ill when we arrived, and could consequently not welcome us personally, died soon after. The Mission was, under these circumstances, unable to proceed until the appointment of a new ruler had been made.

"After an interval of some days Hosh-dal Khan received his nomination from Kabul as Governor in succession to his deceased father.

"On the expiration of two weeks we resumed our journey in the direction of Kabul, the escort from this point was still more numerous and brilliantly equipped. The Afghans showed themselves very well disposed towards us by anticipating all our wishes. On reaching a halting place we always found everything prepared for us; tents were spread and excellent repasts frequently provided, &c.

"After leaving Tashkurgan we reached the spurs of the Hindu-Kush, and journeyed to Kabul during twenty days.

"Ascending at first in gentle slopes, the Hindu-Kush gradually rises higher and higher, forming, amidst its frequent passes, terraces of increasing height.

"After traversing a series of such terraces, we reached the elevated Bamian Valley (8,500 feet), in the proximity of which are the Kalu and Great Tran Passes (13,000 feet).

"A few stages before Bamian we were welcomed by Lal Mahomed Khan, Governor of Bamian, who was accompanied by a numerous suite.

"After passing the famous Bamian idols, chiselled on the face of the rock, we cleared the Great Tran Pass, and then descended from the Ugly Pass into the Kabul Darya Valley. A journey of three days was still before us.

"At Koteashirk village, 50 versts from Kabul, we were met by the Sirdar Nasr-ud-din Khan, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, and at Kala and Kazy by the Afghan Vizier, who was mounted on an elephant. Here the members of the Mission were also supplied with elephants, each elephant carrying two persons, and in this manner we advanced to Kabul.

"At a distance of seven versts from Kabul we were met by Prince Abdullah Khan, Shere Ali's nephew. He rode on an enormous elephant, of ashy grey colour, and with long gilded tusks. The Prince himself was seated in a basket profusely ornamented with gold. He invited General Stoletoff to seat himself on his elephant, and they then entered the town together. We followed also on elephants, the howdahs of which were ornamented with silver. A brilliant body of cavalry followed in the rear of the Prince. Crowds lined both sides of the road, and even the neighbouring rocks and trees were covered with people. The 'Urus' were the objects of the greatest curiosity, and the blessings of the four Caliphs were invoked on them.

"Entering on a large plain we found it filled with regular troops. On the left flank stood the cavalry, and twelve brass and steel guns, which glistened in the sun, were placed in front. As soon as the elephant on which the Envoy was seated was in a line with the troops, a salute of 36 guns was fired. The mournful, though very original air of the Afghan National March was struck up, the strains of which were, however, soon drowned by the vociferous exclamations of the crowd, who called down on us, especially on General Stoletoff, the blessings of the first four Caliphs. This greeting is equivalent to the Russian hurrah. Followed by these exclamations we entered the Bala-Hissar, or citadel of Kabul, and at the gates we were met by its keepers, who wore the highland uniform. After traversing some of the streets we reached Shere Ali's palace, where everything was in readiness for the reception and entertainment of the Russian Mission. The Amir himself did not come out to meet us, and it was only on the following day, namely, the 30th July (11th August, new style), that, with General Stoletoff at our head, we were formally received by him in audience in his hall of State, and in the presence of the highest nobles of Afghanistan. Further particulars of this reception I shall send hereafter."

---

Communicated from Kabul under date 1st (13th) September to the *Golos*, No. 339, 8th (20th) December.

A CARAVAN leaves either to-morrow or the day after, so I send you some extracts from my diary.

General Stoletoff's Mission arrived at Kabul on the 29th July as already described by me. A palace was assigned to the Mission in the Bala-Hissar, which occupies the highest point commanding the entire city of Kabul. The palace, which is quadrilateral, is surrounded by a high wall. There are two buildings within this quadrangle, one on the north, and the other on the west side. That on the north is a large building four storeys high, with the windows facing the interior. It is built of sun-baked brick, a building material common throughout all Central Asia. The front is faced with wood; queer-looking carved figures set in wood, terraces, turrets, and balconies make it very like our ancient *terems*\* and Boyar *horoms*†. The upper-storey terminates in a wide terrace, from which there is a beautiful view of the city and the adjacent country. At our feet lies the large city of Kabul, with its gardens and suburbs, literally buried in foliage. Here and there stand out the white walls of castles, surrounded

---

\* Portions of the Tsar's palace inhabited by the Tsarina.

† Mansions.



by groves, cultivated fields, and meadows which border the city on the south-east, and towering above all these is the battlemented wall which runs along the crests of the hillocks by which the town is surrounded. The other building is considerably smaller, and its windows look out on the fields and meadows that lie to the east and south-east of Kabul. The courtyard is strewn with sand and its cleanliness is actually glittering.

Both buildings contain a good many rooms, all fitted up in Central Asiatic taste. Shutters of wood wonderfully carved, in lieu of window sashes, floors covered with soft carpets, ceilings lined with white linen or calico, a few arm-chairs and tables of very simple workmanship—this is the only furniture and ornamentations in the palace of the Amir of Afghanistan. It contains nothing that recalls the fabulous luxury of Eastern potentates. The palace occupied by Shere Ali is distinguished by still greater simplicity; that in which the Mission is lodged had previously been occupied by the Amir's favourite wife, who was removed to another building before our arrival.

The Russian Mission made its official visit to the Amir the day after its arrival, namely, on the 30th July (11th August). All its members wore their full dress uniforms, and although the distance between the Amir's palace and the house occupied by the Mission was only 50 fathoms, they proceeded on horseback, accompanied by 14 Cossacks and a detachment of Afghan guards.

The Amir received the Mission on an open terrace overlooking a garden with a large stone basin. This terrace served the purpose of a throne room. The reception took place in the presence of a few superior dignitaries. During the presentation of the members of the Mission, Shere Ali lost no opportunity of saying something complimentary or witty to each person. Thus, to Sub-Lieutenant Nazarov he said that he looked at his uniform with love and respect, since he, the Amir, was "above all a soldier at heart." On the presentation of Mr. Malevinski, attached to the Mission as a proficient in the English language, the Amir, with humorous disquietude, expressed an apprehension lest the interpreter should, as an Englishman, "again carry fire and sword into Afghanistan." When Yavorski, physician to the Mission, and one of its youngest members, was presented, the Amir expressed astonishment that so young a man should have mastered the "mysteries of medical science," observing at the same time that in his country a grey-beard was the distinguishing mark of a physician. Nevertheless the Amir at once offered himself as a patient, complaining of a cold from which he had been suffering for two years.

When General Stoletoff presented the members of the Mission, the Amir gave his hand to each as they approached in rotation the gilt arm-chair on which he sat. The Amir was altogether very amiable. He is about 60 years of age. His tall figure and strong constitution bear, however, evidence of the ravages of time; he is somewhat bent, and his flesh has lost its firmness; his broad chest is slightly bent inwards and his shoulders are raised. His long, oval, though somewhat broad face is covered with wrinkles; his brown eyes are not yet without fire; the beard shows grey hairs, and a helmet covers his closely-cut grey hair. He wore the uniform of a General, with a broad red ribbon over the left shoulder, and carried a crooked Afghan sabre. There were no orders or other marks of distinction on his breast. The helmet was of an English pattern, with a chain which only reached his chin, and short, white ostrich feathers were stuck into the spike hole.

The audience lasted about an hour; the conversation, which related to a variety of matters, was very animated. The Cossacks, who were formed in front of the terrace, attracted the particular attention of the Amir. Shere Ali expressed astonishment at the Cossacks resembling Russians so entirely, as he had always thought they were of Mongol race, and identical with the Kirghizes.

The Amir took an interest in examining the Berdan rifles with which the Cossacks were armed, and the construction of which he highly approved. He then ordered some of his breech-loading muskets to be brought in. In explaining their mechanism, and likewise in using them, the Amir showed much knowledge. His muskets were not of any European pattern, and although their originality was striking, Colonel Rozgonoff pronounced them to be neither handy nor practical. They were entirely hand-made. The Amir expressed regret that the condition of mechanical science in his kingdom precluded the possibility of establishing a small arms factory capable of manufacturing more rapidly the necessary number of muskets, and also that very few muskets had yet been made, owing to the slow progress of hand work.

A great dust storm put an end to the audience. The dust was blown about in all directions by strong gusts of wind, until it became impossible to remain on the terrace any longer. Therefore the Mission, after making its obeisance to the Amir, returned home. The darkness caused by the dust was so great that nothing could be seen a few yards off. The Afghan dignitaries who accompanied the Mission said that dust storms were quite rare in July, but that they were very usual in the spring during a certain period. The storm was, however, soon over, and the summer sun once more smiled upon us.

In the evening the town was illuminated. From the elevated terrace of the palace the effect was very good, the city appearing in a flood of red and green Bengal lights. The illuminations lasted an hour, after which the pale moon rose from behind the hills, and gently lit up the city and the Embassy palace, in which the wearied members of the Mission, under the influence of the varied impressions experienced during the last few days, soon retired to rest.

Their awakening, however, next morning was not particularly pleasant. A strong shock of earthquake, lasting about two seconds, called them all simultaneously to their legs. The shock was so strong that the beams of the ceiling made a noise of cracking. The shock was, however, not repeated.

At about midday of the following day (on the 31st July), the higher Afghan officials, viz., the Vizier, Dabir-ul-Mulk, and some others, came to inquire after the health of the Mission. After an exchange of greetings, the Dabir-ul-Mulk and General Stoletoff remained alone for negotiations. This order of things was generally maintained during the succeeding days; the Vizier and Dabir-ul-Mulk came about midday and worked with General Stoletoff over the treaty. Stoletoff went to see the Amir several times, particularly when any misunderstanding arose between the negotiators. The treaty related to the Afghan system of government in general, to the question of succession to the throne, to the recognition of the present policy of Afghanistan by Russia, and so forth. With respect, however, to the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Afghanistan, that is a pure invention on the part of English journalists, who are making a mountain out of a mole-hill. I know positively that there is nothing of the kind in the written treaty. Nevertheless, Russia has, in that treaty, bound herself to maintain morally the integrity and inviolability of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the other members of the Mission began to feel weary of this monotonous life within four walls. They all wanted very much to see the city, to visit its bazaars, praised in song by Baber, or even have a ride through the suburbs of Kabul, spreading out so attractively from the very base of the Embassy palace. But the wish was in vain. A guard of *honour* stood at the gate of the palace, and allowed no one to pass without an order from the Vizier. Sentries patrolled along the four walls. To the members of the Mission, all this appeared to be too much *honour*. They several times expressed to General Stoletoff their desire to visit the city and suburbs, but invariably met with a positive refusal, on the ground that there was nothing in the city particularly worth seeing. To this was added the expression of a fear of arousing the fanaticism of the people. This was, however, a groundless apprehension, because the citizens frequently called upon the doctor attached to the Mission; these people never refused the medicine which was given them, and they faithfully acted on the doctor's advice.

Seeking an opportunity for visiting the city, our doctor availed himself of an opportunity as follows. A daughter, aged 16, of the Vizier, Shah Mahomed Khan, was seized with an illness. The doctor ascertained that she was suffering from a chronic catarrh in the bowels. He had the necessary remedies with him, but wishing to see the native apothecary shop, he declined to apply it, saying he was not provided with some of the requisite medicine, and expressing a desire to go to the native chemist to compose the necessary mixture for the patient. The doctor's object was not, however, achieved. He was not allowed to visit the native chemist. But another opportunity soon occurred. At 5 p.m., on the 3rd (15th) of August, the doctor was summoned by General Stoletoff, who directed him to proceed at once to administer relief to Abdul Khan, the heir-apparent. The way to the residence of the Prince lay through a part of the town, and through the bazaar. Thus he was enabled to observe that the buildings and the type of the streets were exactly the same as in Central Asian towns. There were the same narrow lanes, with dirty low houses and shops. He passed several medressehs in no way differing from those of Tashkend or Samarcand, except perhaps in their still more modest appearance.

The residence of the Prince was, as usual, a court inclosed within four walls. A number of covered palanquins stood along the wall; some were being carried away and others were being brought, and out of these emerged figures wrapped in white cloths. The doctor found himself in a harem, for the Prince lived in his mother's house. In the centre of the court was a building raised on a stone terrace; it resembled a pavilion with extraordinarily large glass windows.

The interior of this pavilion was very well lighted, and its position was so elevated that a considerable extent of the city of Kabul was visible from the windows. The furniture inside consisted of two common Sart bedsteads and several arm-chairs. The windows on the sunny side were screened with reed blinds. There were several people grouped around the bed in the chamber, on which an elderly man, with an Uzbek countenance, held the sick Prince in his arms. The Prince was groaning very loudly, his eyes were closed, his arms hung down, his body was sinking powerlessly, and he was breathing heavily.

The Prince was only 15 years of age. No European had ever seen him. Our doctor was the first and the last European to set eyes upon Abdul Khan. He approached the invalid's bed, and, having examined him, he bid his assistant to prepare some medicine. The people surrounding the invalid watched the doctor with great respect and eager anxiety, burning with impatience to hear what he would say. It appeared on inquiry that the Prince had suffered from palpitation of the heart, on account of which he had been sent up into the mountains, whence he had returned about three days previously, comparatively well. But no sooner had he returned to Kabul than the old symptoms recurred. The native doctors, hereupon, *in conformity with their usual practice*, gave him a strong purgative, which acted upon him violently, producing hæmorrhage. He had also vomited bile and blood. In a couple of days, the sick youth fell into a state of insensibility, in which he continued up to his death. On returning home, our doctor informed General Stoletoff that the Prince was in a hopeless condition, that no physic could save him, as there were signs of inflammation of the bowels, against which it

was impossible to contend. At seven o'clock the doctor again visited the patient, finding him somewhat quieter, but the sickness and purging had not ceased. Finally, at midnight, after bleeding from the nose and vomiting blood, the Prince expired.

The Prince was the Amir's favourite son, on whom he reposed all his hopes; it was therefore to be expected that Shere Ali Khan would be deeply affected by his death. But in his funeral oration the Amir displayed a remarkable firmness and self-control. He concluded his speech with the following words:—

"You know that this was my favourite son and the heir to the throne; but it depends upon me to select any heir I choose, and I shall endeavour to find a man worthy of the succession. Therefore be not sad, but of good courage."

Nevertheless, mourning was ordered on account of the death of the Prince.

The ordinary occupations of the above-mentioned Afghan plenipotentiaries with General Stoletoff proceeded from day to day, and before a final agreement was arrived at, the treaty was re-written several times.

When the negotiations were ended, Shere Ali Khan informed General Stoletoff that he had received intimation of the fact that the English intended to send an Embassy to Kabul, and desired to know whether the Amir would receive it. The Amir observed hereupon that, in his opinion, the English had nothing to do at Kabul, and that he consequently intended to send a refusal to the English demand. At the same time the Amir asked General Stoletoff for his advice as to the course he should adopt in this case. General Stoletoff replied evasively, not giving a positive answer either in a negative or affirmative sense. He, nevertheless, gave the Amir to understand that a simultaneous presence of Embassies from two countries in almost hostile relations would not be quite convenient. The Amir then decided to answer it with a refusal.

The reason given for the refusal was the insecurity of the road through the Khaibar, because the Amir did not wish to be responsible for anything disagreeable that might befall the English Embassy on the way. He also pointed out that the Embassy might not be quite free from danger even in Kabul on account of the fanaticism of the people and their ill-will towards the English. The English Envoy having pointed out that the Russians had passed safely, and even enjoyed perfect security in the midst of the fanatic population, the Amir replied that the Russians had never done anything disagreeable to the Afghans, whereas the English, in the year 1842, had ruined nearly the whole country, a circumstance which was still preserved in the memory of the people.

Another English messenger arrived a week later, bringing a letter in which it was said the English would take their own measures for the security of their Embassy, and so absolve the Amir of all responsibility. For this purpose a regiment of Hussars was attached to the Mission for its protection. The Amir sent a refusal to this letter also, urging this time the mourning on account of his son's death; mourning forbids the reception of an Embassy. He observed, at the same time, that an Embassy accompanied by a large military force loses its character, and that it was only an advanced column seeking to occupy certain points on the road to Kabul. The Amir said that the Russian Mission had arrived at Kabul with only 20 Cossacks and a few Uzbeks. Accordingly, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Amir could not receive the English Embassy.

On the following day, *i.e.*, on the 12th (24th) August, General Stoletoff took his special departure for Tashkend, accompanied by the doctor and 10 Cossacks.

According to intelligence just received, General Stoletoff reached Tashkend on the 4th (16th) of September, having performed a tedious journey of 1,300 versts (about 870 miles) in 22 days.

The following members of the Mission are now left in Kabul: Colonel Rozgonof, Mr. Benderski, topographer, Mr. Malevinski, Sub-Lieutenants Nazarov and Zaman Bek, with attendants and 11 Cossacks.

(Sd.) ROBERT MICHELL.

6th January 1879.

THE *Golos*, No. 38, dated 7th (19th) February, publishes the following communication from Mazir-i-Sharif, dated the 18th (30th) December:—

"In the month of November, General Von Kauffmann directed that a medical man should proceed to join the Russian Mission at Kabul. He was to take with him a supply of drugs, of which the Mission stood in great need; and indeed, a doctor was an essential requirement of the Mission. A doctor had accompanied the Mission in the first instance, but he had returned to Tashkend with General Stoletoff in the beginning of September. This second journey gave me the opportunity of traversing some interesting and little known districts.

"I had a convoy of 10 Cossacks, and took with me a medical assistant, an interpreter, and several djigits. Our baggage consisted of 18 bales.

"We left Samarcand on the 27th of September,\* expecting to encounter severe frosts, especially in the Passes (the Great Iran† and Kalu have each an elevation of 13,000 feet), as

\* The dates quoted are all old style.

† Irak.

well as bad weather, which usually prevails there at that season of the year. We were obliged to provide ourselves with warm clothing and warm tents. The ordinary Kirghiz tents were not suitable, owing to their weight (30 púds each), and to the time required to pitch them. We therefore took only the upper parts of the tents, lengthened the poles which form the cone, sharpened the lower ends so that they might be fixed more firmly in the ground, and fitted the upper ends so that they might be socketed in a cross piece. This framework, covered with felt, formed a sufficiently warm tent impervious to rain, weighing, when dry, only from three to four púds, and capable of accommodating five or six persons. These preparations occupied some time. But I was also much exercised in exchanging Russian money for Bokharian currency. I found that the Russian paper rouble was accepted at only 60 copecks. Russian silver was not of much higher value. According to the papers, the value of the rouble in European markets stood at 62½ copecks. In France, 100 roubles appeared to be worth 245 francs, which placed the rouble at 61¼ copecks. It was evident from this that the Sarts of Samarcand and the Jew money-changers kept a keen eye on the quotations of the money markets.

"From Samarcand we proceeded to the Kara-tiubé Pass. This is the most direct road to the Oxus, but a great length of it passes through a mountainous country, and is therefore not an easy one. The Kara-tiubé Pass, which is steep, is particularly difficult; the road lies over a rocky, granite surface; in parts very slippery, but more especially so on the summit of the Pass. From Yartépé to Kaltaminar the road is again very difficult, the ground being rocky, covered with gravel, and scattered with fragments of stone; the distance from Samarcand to Patta-Kissar (ferry), on the Oxus, is about 350 versts (233 miles).

We left Samarcand at 4 P.M. Kara-tiubé, the nearest place within reach, was 125 verst (83 miles) distant, so that the greater part of this march was performed during the night. But the moon was at its full, and we had the benefit of all its light; otherwise our progress would have been greatly impeded, for the packs frequently fell off the animals' back which brought us very often to a halt.

"As we advanced, the mountains on either side of the blue valley stood out in bolder relief and their snow-capped summits shone brightly in the moonlight. We became sensible of the cold and increased our pace. We had been traversing an open steppe, when the road gave a sudden turn into a defile, and the glimmering light of Kara-tiubé opened to our view. I sent forward a djigit to prepare accommodation for ourselves and forage for the horses. When we arrived in the village, all was ready. The hospitable caravanserai received us in its gloomy embraces; to the shivering traveller it seemed to offer every comfort, and in an hour's time we were all fast asleep.

"On the next day, we had to surmount the great difficulties of the Kara-tiubé Pass. The road gradually ascends a long defile scattered with stone and gravel. The last four versts of road were actually steep; the summit was slippery to an extreme, owing to its smooth granite surface, covered with a crusting of ice which did not thaw even at midday. For a verst to the summit of the Pass the ground was thickly covered with snow, which did not melt in daytime. The water sources and rills were all either entirely frozen or belted with ice, while far below, in the depth of the valley, the sparkling streams were garnished with an emerald verdure. The Pass is about 6,000 feet high. The southern descent was perfectly free from snow. Half-way down we observed a flower, but we could not reach our hands to it. The southern descent is shorter and much steeper than on the north side. On one side was a sheer cliff and on the other a yawning abyss.

"A splendid view of the Shahr-i-Sabz valley is obtained from the top of the Pass; the towns of Kitab and Shahr, and a little further to the east, that of Yakobak appear as on the palm of your hand. The entire valley is in the form of a gulf, with its head, somewhat to the east of the Kara-tiubé Pass, wedging in between the mountains of Samarcand, and the spurs of Hazret-Sultan on the south-west. On the left-hand side are the towering snow-covered heights of Hazret-Sultan.

"The descent, as already observed, is very steep and is five versts long. Further on, as far as Kainar village, the road passes through Bokharian territory, by a steep defile, with a mountain torrent obstructed in parts by rocks which have rolled down from the adjacent heights. Occasionally one finds fragments of blue marble.

"Before reaching Kainar we were met by a son of the Bek of Kitab, who told us that he was sent by his father to meet the doctor, and to inquire about his health. He informed us that all was made ready for the reception of those whom the Amir regarded as valuable guests. We were astonished to learn from him that the Amir, who generally passes the winter in Bokhara, was at Shahr, and we did not expect to pass through the Bokharian dominions with Chinese ceremony. It was not, however, to be avoided. The Bokhara Government was evidently aware of passage on the way to Kabul, and had prepared to entertain us with Bokharian pomp. The Amir was at Shahr, and we were obliged to pay him a visit. The doctor was looked upon as an "elchi," and he was therefore bound to cast aside a superfluous reserve.

"Some little way short of Kitab we were met by the highest officials of the State, among whom were the Uidachi-Shadi-Bek, Dur-bin-Bek, Abdu Kbalil-Bí, and Yashkli-Bek; these are the most confidential Councillors of the Amir. With the customary courtesy they first inquired about the health of the Governor-General. They wished to know how soon General Ivanof would return to Samarcand from furlough, and made inquiries about numerous acquaintances at



Samarcand and in Tashkend. Some of them had frequently visited those places in the capacities of members of Bokharian embassies, and nearly all of them were in Samarcand when the head-quarters were located in that city. Some of them had seen our doctor twice before, so that they recognized him at once. The Uidachi was an old acquaintance of the doctor's, having made his acquaintance in the summer when he was on his way to Kabul, and had seen him again in the month of August at Shahr on his return journey with General Stoletoff. An animated conversation enlivened the ride as far as Kitab, at the gates of which place we were received by the Bek Abdu-ul-Gafar-Inak. The Bek of Kitab invited us into his house to rest, and to fortify ourselves with some food. Abdu-ul-Gafar-Inak is a little wizened man about 60 years of age, but he is very lively and has sparkling eyes. His house, like that of all Central Asian rulers, great and small, is situated within the fortress.

"Like all other forts in Central Asia, that of Kitab is enclosed by a crumbling mud wall; the inside is filled with unsightly little dwelling-houses. In the centre of a large and very cleanly kept court rose an edifice which indeed deserved to be so called; it was about 70 feet long by 35 feet deep, and about 21 feet high, the apertures, serving both as windows and doors, were numerous, the walls inside were smoothly stuccoed. The room into which we were ushered was furnished with a rudely and hastily constructed table, and with little benches of the same make; an enormous carpet covered the whole of the floor; open carvings decorated the window-doors at the top, and in place of glass bladder skins were stretched over them. This embraces all the decoration and luxury of the palace of one of the most wealthy Beks in Bokhara. I had, however, almost forgotten to mention the ceiling, which was painted in all the colours of the rainbow, with representations of a variety of figures. The ordinary refreshment was served round, but what was extraordinary was the serving of several pairs of knives and forks and spoons. There were soup and tea spoons, all, however, of zinc, and bearing a Russian trade mark. Some clean plates also adorned the board. It was still more remarkable that Ministers sitting down with ourselves at the invitation of the doctor, dipped their spoons into one and the same bowl, and used their knives and forks. This greatly astonished me, inasmuch as I had observed nothing of the kind on my way to Kabul in the summer. The fact is that these Bokharian Ministers had been to Samarcand in the interval, where they had dined with the Russian authorities, and from them had copied these habits. There was even no lack on this occasion of table napkins.

"Bokharian hospitality should become proverbial among us Russians. Bokharians are great adepts in the matter of treating others and spare nothing to entertain their guests; they offer all they have. By reason of this social virtue the Bek pressed us to stay the day and to pass the night in his palace, but we were obliged to decline the invitation.

"The journey to Shahr was like a triumphal progress. An immense cavalcade accompanied us all the way to the doors of the house which was set apart for us. The horses ridden were very restive, and their trappings were really gorgeous, whilst the riders were dressed in heavy brocaded khelats trimmed with ermine, &c.

"From Kitab to Shahr the roads pass through a continuous garden, with here and there an intervening cotton and tobacco plantation. Crowds of gaping natives had come out to see the procession, of which there had been several this summer. They seemed to be much interested in our Cossacks, but there was no symptom of animosity or of fanaticism, and no such sentiment could be read in their typical faces.

"We finally reach Shahr,\* enter through the gateway, and pass through rather foul quarters. On our right is a masjid, at one time doubtless an edifice of some grandeur, but now in a state of dilapidation. Over the doors and on the cupola there still remain some vestiges of an Arabic inscription. We reach the quarters which, with General Stoletoff, I had occupied in the month of August, and put up in one of the houses facing a small court. I recognize the small terrace with an aryk running through it, but the flowers which had decked the place are all faded and gone. . . .

"In the evening the Amir sent his Bacha dancers to amuse us. . . .

"On the next day we paid the Amir a ceremonial visit. He was located in the citadel, and our way to it lay through the town and by the bazaar. An immense crowd of people followed us up to the gates, the preserver of public decorum rode in front, bearing a parti-coloured wand. Here we were obliged to dismount. Walking across a court, we came to a gate between two colossal towers, 105 feet high. In times past these towers were very magnificent in their beauty, but now the glazed tiles had mostly fallen off, and the columns were dilapidated. Passing through the gate we entered a very clean court, on the opposite side of which was a modest-looking building, where the Amir was said to be. The Uidachi, as the person in most immediate attendance on the Amir, alone crossed the court with the doctor, but even that high functionary proceeded with a hesitating step, looking around him as if fearing some danger. When we reached the door of the house the Uidachi trembled with fright, and, venturing to look in, told the doctor that the Amir was there, and passed him in with the interpreter.

"The Amir was seated on a little arm chair of a very rude make, in the centre of the chamber, which was very clean, and carpeted. He wore a plain dark khelat, a white cambrie turban, and yellow embroidered slippers.



"The Amir slightly rose on the approach of the doctor, and after usual compliments asked him to sit down, when an animated conversation was carried on between them for 20 minutes. He was pleased to see the doctor a third time and always in good health. The road to Kabul he remarked was long, but he wished the doctor a pleasant journey, observing that the skies evidently favoured him, for that notwithstanding the lateness of the season the weather was everything that could be desired, and his own observations led him to expect a continuance of fine weather. The doctor expressed a fear that he might have to work his way through snow on the road between Tashkurgan and Kabul, but the Amir assured him that as yet there was no snow there. The Amir then referred to his ill-health, and asked the doctor to give him some medicine. The Amir was suffering from ordinary ague, and after the audience the doctor sent him some quinine drops. On leaving the Amir he found a splendid horse—a pure Uzbek—awaiting him at the gate. It was covered with a brocaded cloth, and the bridle was studded with turquoises. The horse was a present from the Amir.

"On the following day, resisting a pressing invitation to stay some days longer at Shahr, we started in the direction of the Oxus. Our road lay through Yartiubé, Kaltaminar, Karakhoval, Sirab, and Shirabad. As far as Yartiubé it lay through the Shahr-i-Sabz valley, which in that part is well populated and carefully cultivated. Kishlaks were observable on all sides, with heaps of clover on the roofs of the houses, the barley and wheat being stacked in the fields. It was evident that the natives were industrious, and if not prosperous, at all events free from poverty; the people were not, however, satisfied with the sunny weather, they would have preferred rain. A dry season threatens a failure of crops in the ensuing year, and possibly a famine, as was the case in the year 1877. The majority of the people are Sarts with a sprinkling of Uzbeks; their principal occupation is farming.

"Within 15 versts (10 miles) of Yartiubé (from Shahr to Yartiubé is a distance of 27 miles), the cultivated lands are succeeded by a steppe, and cultivation is renewed within 5 versts of Yartiubé. From Yartiubé to Shirabad the entire road passes through a mountainous district. In some parts the road is very difficult, as for instance, between Yartiubé to Kaltaminar, and then again from Karakhoval to Shurob, between which places occurs the famous Iron Gates,—a simple cleft in the transverse rocky range, widened and washed by a torrent which is swollen in the spring by the thawing of the snow, but which runs dry in the summer. From Shurob to Sirab the road again passes through the very difficult Shurob defile. But this defile, as well as the preceding one, may be avoided, as is, indeed, done by travellers in the spring, when the torrent rushing through the defiles hurls down enormous rocks.

"The village of Sirab nestles in a ravine containing a sprinkling of archa trees at the very foot of a precipitous mountain side; the place is surrounded by shady orchards of walnut, pistachio, prune, and peach trees; grapes of various kinds also grow there. A spring of water in the vicinity of this village gives rise to a stream full of fish. There are two gigantic chinars (sycamores) on each bank of this stream, which may be hundreds of years old. The natives have it that the Caliph Ali reposed under these trees, thus attributing to them an age of more than one thousand years. The diameter of one of these trees at a height of 9 feet from the ground is 31 feet 4 inches. The following has been cut in its bark:—'Lieut.-Col. Maëff, 1875.'\*

"At Shirabad the mountains terminate, giving place again to level steppe. From Shirabad to the Oxus it is about 33 miles, the road being tolerably good, except an extent of 10 to 13 miles to the Oxus, which is sandy. Close to the village of Patta-Kissar (ferry across the Oxus) are very extensive ruins of an ancient town. Fragments of burnt brick lie scattered over 70 square versts of ground. A solitary tower is the only erect building in this scene of desolation; it is built of small burnt brick, and is about 35 feet high. Three rows of inscriptions formed of pebbles are still in preservation on the tower, the characters appeared to me to be Chinese. Neither my interpreter nor any of the educated Bokharians who were with me could make anything of the inscription, telling me that it was not in Mussulman, *i.e.*, Arabic characters. There is not a single glazed tile inside the tower, and although we found some among the rubbish around, not one of them bore an inscription. There is no tradition relative to these ruins among the natives. There are traces of enormous irrigation canals in the neighbourhood, but they are overgrown with rushes.

"We at last reach Patta-Kissar; this is a small village with but poor gardens, in which clipped mulberry trees—a sure sign of silk-worm rearing—prevail. In Kabul there are splendid mulberry trees, and silk-worms are extensively reared, yet the trees are not clipped there, and Kabul is famous for the fruit of that tree. Clipped trees are always indicative of silk-worm rearing, because the worms feed only on the fresh leaves of the first year's shoot. At this place the Oxus flows in a single channel, its breadth does not exceed 250 fathoms, with a depth of about 7 feet. In the summer, during the thawing of the snow, the river expands to 1½ verst (1 mile), and its depth increases to 21 and even 28 feet. In the month of August I crossed during a flood, when the steppe at Chushka-Hissar, which is 40 versts (27 miles) below Patta-Kissar, was widely inundated. It was impossible to cross at Chushka-Hissar, so that Colonel Stoletoff proceeded to Patta-Kissar. The passage here is effected in two kayuks of a pre-historic form of construction, which are towed by swimming horses.

"On the opposite bank we found an Afghan troop, which was to escort us to Mazar-i-Sharif. Passing through a forest, some two versts broad by seven in length, which skirts

\* Colonel Maëff, of the Etât Major, was the first Russian who traversed this road.

the river, we struck across a sandy desert, the dreary surface of which was relieved only by occasional clumps of sprawling saxaul between the dunes.

"This bleak waste extended as far as the eye could reach. Only on the far distant horizon was discernible through a haze the mountain limit of the desert. This zone of sand stretching from the Oxus is 27 miles broad, and merges with the Turkoman steppe on the west.

"The village of Siogyrt is situated on the margin of this desert 27 miles from the Oxus, and in proximity to the ruins of a large town. Here one is again impressed by the scattered mass of burnt brick. The style of the architecture is not easy to discover, but it had evidently no resemblance to anything Arabic. There are no traditions here respecting the ruins. It is only 20 miles from this place to Mazar-i-Sharif. One already perceives in the distance the dark mass of the town through the mists.

"As one approaches nearer, this undefined mass assumes a more distinct form, until on advancing closer the town is seen steeped in a sea of verdure, against a dark back ground of the precipitous spurs of the Hindu-Kush.

"You enter the town in the expectation of seeing something original, for you know you are in Afghanistan, that *terra incognita* to all Europeans, of which there are so many fabulous accounts, and you are led to form these expectations from the marvellous things described by Burnes, the first Englishman who visited Afghanistan. But you are doomed to disappointment; it is Central Asia all over, as represented in Tashkend, Karshi, Shahr, Shirabad, &c. You see the same mud houses, the same dusty and offensive lanes, the same gardens, and you observe the same facial types, except in the occasional Afghans whom you encounter, who bear such a striking contrast to the local inhabitants.

"The Afghans strongly resemble Europeans, and their short garments and long hair remind one of the mountaineers of the Caucasus. The Afghan is always armed from head to foot, although his arms are far from perfect. His proud air of defiance betokens the 'lord and master.' The native Tajik bows very humbly before the Afghan, who scarcely deigns to notice him. The latter is always on his guard, and ever ready to draw his weapon, regardless of any odds against him.

"I found accommodation in the house which had previously been occupied by the Russian Mission on its way to Kabul. It stood in a court closed in by high walls, with an avenue of immense sycamore trees (chinars). The trunk of one of these trees was defaced with the following inscription cut into its light green velvety bark:—"N. Grodekof, 7 to 19 October 1878," and "P.M., 23 November 1878,"—the latter made by Colonel Matveyef when on his way to Badakshan. The first inscription needs no explanation, nor is there any reason why it should not be mentioned that Colonel Grodekof left on furlough in the autumn of 1878, but taking the circuitous way to St. Petersburg through Mazar-i-Sharif, Maimena, Herat, Meshed, and the Caucasus.

"I doubt whether the Russian Mission did not leave some signs of its presence in Afghanistan in the shape of similar inscriptions on walls as well as on trees, for I found the walls of the apartments which our officers had occupied freshly stuccoed. . . .

"An Afghan officer silently ushered me into my apartment, and sitting himself down on the floor, silently and with a graceful movement of the hands gave me to understand that I might also sit. The silence of my guide, the melancholy bareness of the spreading branches of the sycamore trees which projected through the windows, the sighing of the wind, and the deepening gloom of evening made me feel anything but cheerful. The gaiety of the place had certainly departed, and a heavy dark cloud had descended over the place.

"A sombre cloud had indeed enveloped Afghanistan. My guide has good reason for his pre-occupied air and melancholy appearance. He knows that a storm has broken over his country, and shaken the power of Afghanistan to its foundations. But ask him for news from Kabul; he will tell you that he knows nothing. He will tell you that he has heard nothing of military events. The circumstances in which Afghanistan is placed are at the same time very deplorable. The English have beaten the Afghans at various points. This was to have been expected; and yet how long is it since our war-loving newspapers vied with each other in crying out that the English would not commence operations in the winter; that in all probability they would not undertake any operations, because the Amir of Afghanistan was known to possess a force of 60,000 regular infantry, with 100,000 cavalry, and could therefore successfully resist the English; they argued even that, far from waiting for a declaration of war by the English, the Amir would himself carry the sword into India, being fully capable of striking at the very root of the English dominion.

"Sorry pack of brawlers! In the spring of last year they likewise affirmed that England was only indulging in bravado; that she only made a pretence of being ready to measure her arms with Russia in the field or on the ocean. What followed? England practically obtained possession of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus under our very noses, in sight of the formidable, glorious, and, be it remembered, too, very numerous Russian army; and in the present instance, also, our home-bred Chauvinists find the tables turned upon them.

"England, at all events, knows very much better than we do the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan. Only two years have elapsed since England broke off direct relations with Afghanistan, and they acted with great circumspection. There was no longer any necessity to give subsidies to the Amir of Afghanistan when the time had already come for him to pay

these subsidies to England in the form of tribute. Having thoroughly studied Afghanistan, they achieved their object when they have flooded the country with emissaries and spies, who kept the Anglo-Indian Government informed of everything. We now see the proofs of this system.

"The Russian papers first alluded to the Russian Mission in the month of August. The Indian papers, however, wrote about it in June; the day on which the Russian Mission crossed the Oxus was very accurately determined in the Indian papers (the Russian Mission received the *Allahabad Gazette* in Kabul). Again the death of Shir-Dil-Khan, the Governor of Afghan Turkistan, which occurred at Mazar-i-Sharif when the Russian Mission was there, was at once announced in the Indian papers. Who is it that communicates thus with the English? Surely not the Afghan Government.

"The English were in this manner perfectly well informed in regard to the host they had to count with. They would certainly not have taken such a decisive step in their Central Asian policy with a trust only in chance. The protests made by (Lords) Lawrence and Grey are very fine; replete with excellent arguments respecting the fatal consequences to England of a war with Afghanistan; but Gladstone's protest against a war with Russia were, perhaps, still more forcible and better founded; yet what did they lead to? Notwithstanding all those protests, England very nearly commenced a war with Russia, and if she did not begin it, it was not through lack of courage to pronounce the word, nor was it because she attended to the voice of Mr. Gladstone. Simply, there was no need to utter that costly word, for even without it she soon achieved all she desired.

"The loud protests of the famous Ex-Viceroy of India were as a voice in the wilderness, and had no particle of influence over the determination of England to go to war with Afghanistan, or over the hastening of her preparations; and England has already occupied a series of valuable positions. Kandahar has been occupied; the Khaibar Pass has been forced, in which, as it was predicted by our newspaper writers, the English would find another Kurd Cabul defile; the Afghan army has been scattered to the winds, losing 700 men; Lalpoora has also been occupied. The road to Kabul is open to the English, so that they may finish the campaign before the spring. It is reported that the Amir intends to come here, leaving Yakub Khan in Kabul to conduct negotiations with the English. The Amir's wife and family arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif this day, and a salute of 70 guns was fired in their honor.

"Such is the position in which Afghanistan is at present placed, and my guide has really something to ponder over. It may be that in his heart he entertains more than one reproach against me, as a member of the Russian Mission which has played no unimportant part in the circumstances which have proved so disastrous to the Afghan State."

(Sd.) ROBERT MICHELL.

4th March 1879.

---

No. 1005, dated St. Petersburg, 18th December 1878.

From—LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg,

To—MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I HAVE the honor to inclose, in translation by Mr. Michell, the following articles from the Russian Press on the future policy of Russia in Afghanistan:—

1. From the *Novoe Vremia*, an independent organ of Slavist tendencies. This article considers that, in the event of English successes in Afghanistan, Russia should claim the district of Wakhan, Badakshan, and Maimena, forming the northern part of Afghanistan, to be annexed to Bokhara.

It suggests that the occupation of Merv by Russia would serve as compensation, and that then a new agreement should be concluded with England, with the right also of Russia to send an Agent to the Amir of Afghanistan; England enjoying a similar right in regard to the Amir of Bokhara.

It considers that, even with these concessions, the positions of England in Central Asia would be more favorable than that of Russia.

Should England meet with discomfiture, it considers that Russia should thus enter into the closest relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, so as to gain him to the cause of Russia.

Under no circumstances would it have been advisable for Russia to have actively participated in the war.

2. An article from the *Russki Mir* on the occupation of Merv observes that it does not recognize the importance of this occupation. It was only put forward by the Russian Press as the means of aiding a Russian advance to Afghanistan, and it views its occupation merely for the purpose of subjecting the Turkomans, and for maintaining Russian prestige in Central Asia, as ridiculous.

---

[TRANSLATION.]

Extracts from the *Novoe Vremia* and *Russki Mir*.

FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA AS REGARDS AFGHANISTAN.—The *Novoe Vremia* of the 1st December inserts the following article on the subject of the policy to be pursued by Russia towards Afghanistan, either in the event of the triumph or discomfiture of England in that quarter:—

"Whatever may be the result of the English campaign against Afghanistan, the general condition of things in Central Asia will undergo a material change. It is necessary to consider beforehand the position we are to assume in the event of a favorable issue for the English in their Afghan war, and to clearly define the policy which would be most profitable for us to pursue if the foes of Shere Ali are defeated—a consummation, however, which is very improbable.

"On the occupation of the passes leading into India, and having transformed the Ruler of Afghanistan into their submissive tool, the English will close the routes to India from the Russian frontier, and they will be in a position to intrigue in Bokhara and create all manner of difficulties for us in Turkistan. Consequently, once Afghanistan succumbs *de facto* to the influence of the Indian Government, the re-establishment of an agreement between England and Russia in regard to the sphere of influence of each country in Central Asia will become impracticable. Russia accepted this agreement while the Russian and Indian frontiers were open, and we were divided by an independent State. But when the English once establish themselves in Afghanistan, all the advantages of such an arrangement will be on their side. Of course, we cannot in any case fully counterpoise those advantages which the English will obtain after defeating the Amir, but nevertheless it is necessary that Russia should strive to obtain, at least, that which can partially compensate her.

"This compensation might, in a measure, be effected by the alienation from Afghanistan of those semi-independent Khanates situated between that State and Bokhara, *i.e.*, Wakhan, Badakshan, Maimena, and others, the annexation of which to Afghanistan Russia only consented to after coming to an agreement with England. It would be desirable to annex these Khanates to Bokhara, and at the same time to strengthen our influence in the latter place.

"The occupation of Merv might also serve Russia as part compensation. After securing, in this manner, to some extent her position, Russia might conclude a new agreement with England; but the primary condition of such an agreement must be the right of Russia to send an Agent to the Amir of Afghanistan. In return for this England might enjoy a similar right to accredit an Agent to the Amir of Bokhara. Even if we succeed in obtaining these concessions, England's position in Central Asia will be more favorable than our own, as, surrounded on all sides by natural frontiers, she may, like a great iron-clad, thrust out her paws and annoy her enemy.

"It may, of course, happen contrary, however, to all expectation that the English will meet with a defeat in Afghanistan. It is necessary to prepare also for this contingency; and we should then enter into the closest relations with the Amir, so as to attract him to the side of Russia.

"But however undesirable for Russia is the war between England and Afghanistan, and whatever the result of such may be, Russia could not, and should not, in any way, have actively participated therein. True, in the event of England's success, we lose a weapon with which we could have seriously injured our enemy, but it is necessary to reconcile ourselves to this idea, as our interference in the Afghan question might have easily caused a collision in Europe."

With reference to the occupation of Merv by Russia, the necessity of which has been often urged by many Russian newspapers, the *Russki Mir* of the 18th December 1878 observes that it does not see the importance of this occupation for the mere purpose of supporting Russia's prestige in Asia. Merv, it further remarks, is of no political signification, and its annexation to Russia can only be justified on the ground of the desirability of subjecting the Turkomans to Russian influence. "The occupation of Merv was advocated by the Russian Press only with a view of ensuring our advance to Afghanistan. It is ridiculous, therefore, to regard the occupation of Merv—that nest of Turkoman robbers—as a means for maintaining our prestige in Central Asia."

---

No. 12, dated India Office, London, 23rd January 1879.

From—LIEUT.-COL. O. T. BURNES, Secretary, Political and Secret Dept.,

To—A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secy. to the Government of India, Foreign Dept.

I FORWARD herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy, copy of a letter from the Foreign Office, dated 9th instant, with enclosures, in regard to the views of the Russian Press respecting Afghanistan.

---

Dated Foreign Office, London, 9th January 1879.

From—SIR JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

To—SIR LOUIS MALLET, C.B., Under-Secretary of State for India.

I AM directed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, to be laid before Viscount Cranbrook, the papers marked in the margin, containing articles from the Russian Press upon Afghanistan.

Lord A. Loftus' Nos. 966 and 1011.

No. 966, dated St. Petersburg, 4th December 1878.

From—LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg,

To—MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I HAVE the honor to inclose to Your Lordship an article, in translation by Mr. Michell, from the *Golos*, relating the reception of the Russian Mission at Kabul by the Amir of Afghanistan in Durbar.

I also annex the following articles from the Russian Press on the Afghan question, which have been published in translation by the *Agence Russe* :—

1. A leading article by the *Agence Russe* (a semi-official organ), commenting on the despatch of Viscount Cranbrook to the Viceroy of India.

This article more especially comments on the motive which could have produced the sudden change in the disposition of the Amir of Afghanistan, after having evinced his alarm of the Russian progress in Central Asia, and it seeks to attribute it to the change of policy on the part of the English Government as evinced by the occupation of Quetta; the proposal of sending British officers to the frontier limits of Afghanistan and Turkistan; and, lastly, by the counsels given to the Sultan to engage the Amir to support England, and to be the "sentinel in Central Asia," as the Sultan was in the East, of the jealousies and hostilities of the British Government towards Russia. The Amir, having to choose between the two States, chose that which required nothing of him, and which remained faithful to the Clarendon Convention.

2. A leading article by the *Agence Russe*, referring to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855, and asserting that if the policy of Lords Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook based on it had been continued, the Amir of Afghanistan would not have adopted the course he has taken, and that the present war would not have taken place.

3. An article, in translation from the *Golos*, on the English policy in Afghanistan.

This article refers also to the Treaty of 1855, and accuses the English Government of violating it by unduly interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan.

It is to be remarked that, in the weak and erroneous arguments resorted to in these articles, no mention whatever is made of the Russian Mission to Kabul, or to the intrigues of General Kauffmann, which he had been carrying on for nearly two years previously.

Extract from the *Golos* of November 18th-30th, 1878.

THE *Golos* of the 18th November 1878 contains the following particulars, Contributed by its Orenburgh correspondent, respecting the reception of the Russian Mission by the Amir at a Durbar held by him at Kabul :—

"The Amir summoned a Durbar at Kabul of 250 loyal Chiefs of tribes. The Conference was held under tents specially erected. The day following the arrival of the Chiefs, the War Minister having reported that nearly all the Chiefs had assembled, the Amir proceeded to the camp where the Durbar was to be held, accompanied by his suite, numbering about 100 persons, consisting of his Ministers, Generals, and principal Ulemas of Kabul. The Amir was enthusiastically received by the Chiefs, who crowded round their sovereign with demonstrations of love and respect.

"The Amir told them that the Russian Emperor Alexander had sent a Mission to Kabul for the purpose of strengthening the bonds of friendship which had long existed between Russians and Afghans. As Russia had always shown hospitality towards the Afghans who frequented with their caravans the Russian markets at Troitsk and Orenburgh, at a time when Afghanistan was but little known to other European nations, he, the Amir, considered it his duty to give a hearty welcome to the Russian Mission, and to receive it with due honor.

"This declaration of friendship on the part of the Amir towards his Russian guests at Kabul called forth enthusiastic and approving exclamations from the Chiefs present at the Durbar. After this short speech the Amir ordered his seal-bearer to read a concise memorandum on the power, glory, and extent of Russia, her troops and subjects, in order that the Afghan Chiefs could be able to form a correct idea of the Power of which representatives were then at Kabul. The concluding speech of the Amir was as follows :—

" 'Return to your brethren, sharpen your knives and lances, saddle your horses, so that you may be ready to take the field so soon as I shall call on you to fight the enemies of our country.'

"The Amir then left the camp and returned to Kabul. The two following sessions of the Durbar were devoted to an examination of the military budget of the country, the distribution of the regiments, a consideration of the forces available for a war with England, and the necessary measures to be adopted for supplying the troops with food and provender. The Amir was not present at these last two assemblies, which were presided over by the Afghan War Minister. With regard to the stay of our Mission at Kabul, it is known that the Amir lodged his dear guests in his best place or in the Model Hissar, formerly occupied by his son Yakub Khan, and endeavoured to surround them with every comfort, and to show them every attention; the warmest welcome was accorded to them without stint of expenditure,



notwithstanding the supposed unsatisfactory condition of the Afghan finances. Hunts were also organized for the members of the Mission, and the most remarkable mosques of the city thrown open to their inspection. Whenever the Russians visited these places the natives followed them in crowds along the streets with demonstrations of joy, and threw their caps into the air. After the departure of General Stoletoff to Livadia, Colonel Rozgonoff took his place as Russian Representative, and he has already succeeded in gaining the good-will of the inhabitants of Kabul."

St. Petersburg, Jeudi soir, le 16th-28th Novembre, 1878.

Extract from the *Agence Russe*.

**LE TRAITÉ ANGLO-AFGHAN DE 1855.**—Si ce Tribunal International tant désiré par les écrivains de droit public, appelé à connaître des différends entre les Etats, existait et avait été appelé à se prononcer dans la querelle actuelle entre le Gouvernement Anglais et l'Emir de Caboul, nul doute qu'après avoir pris connaissance des pièces du procès, il ne se fût déclaré contre la guerre.

En effet, au dire du Gouvernement Anglais lui-même, la loi réglant les rapports des deux Etats était le Traité de 1855. Or, que dit ce Traité? En voici la traduction verbale d'après le texte même qui était joint comme annexe à la dépêche explicative de Lord Cranbrook :

Art. I. "Entre l'Honorable Compagnie des Indes Orientales et Sa Hautesse l'Emir Dost-Mahomed-Khan, Vali de Caboul et de tous les territoires actuellement en sa possession et ses héritiers, il y aura paix et amitié perpétuelles."

Art. II. "L'Honorable Compagnie des Indes Orientales s'engage à respecter les dits territoires de l'Afghanistan actuellement en possession de Sa Hautesse et à ne jamais y intervenir."

Art. III. "Sa Hautesse l'Emir-Dost Mahomed-Khan, Vali de Caboul et des territoires actuellement en sa possession, s'engage pour lui et ses héritiers à respecter de son côté les territoires de l'Honorable Compagnie des Indes Orientales; à ne jamais y intervenir, et à être l'ami des amis et l'ennemi des ennemis de la dite Honorable Compagnie des Indes Orientales."

Dans sa dernière dépêche explicative Lord Cranbrook déclare que le jour où le Gouvernement Anglais s'est substitué à la Compagnie des Indes Orientales dans l'administration de la Colonie, il a reconnu ce Traité, lequel est, à son avis, encore en vigueur.

Dès lors, on se demande comment le Gouvernement Anglais peut concilier sa conduite, telle qu'elle résulte des actes ordonnés par lui à Lord Lytton et rapportés dans la dite dépêche, avec ses engagements tels qu'ils se trouvent explicitement consignés dans ce Traité de 1855, d'un dispositif si clair et si précis.

Est-ce que, par exemple, la prétention comminatoire de Lord Lytton de faire résider des Agents Anglais dans toutes les villes de l'Afghanistan, à l'exclusion de Caboul, alors que dans ce pays peu civilisé l'idée de résidence d'étrangers est inconciliable avec celle de l'indépendance du pays, n'était pas en contradiction manifeste avec l'esprit voire même avec les termes de l'Article II de ce Traité, stipulant la non-intervention absolue de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales (par suite du Gouvernement Britannique et de ses Représentants) dans l'intérieur des domaines de l'Emir? Enfin, et surtout, est-ce que la prise de possession du Fort de Quettah n'en était pas la violation effective?

Certes, le droit pour toute Puissance Souveraine et indépendante d'être seule juge du ce qu'elle croit offensant pour sa dignité est un droit imprescriptible, indiscutable; mais du moment que la dépêche de Lord Cranbrook pose la question sur le terrain de la violation par l'Emir de Caboul du Traité de 1855, les faits, le bon sens, l'impartialité, et la logique se tournent contre lui et lui donnent tort.

Il devient alors évident que Sir Lord Lytton avait reçu du Gouvernement Central pour instructions de s'en tenir à la politique de ses prédécesseurs, les Lords Lawrence, Mayo, et Northbrook, lesquels étaient tous d'avis de ne point insister auprès de Shir-Ali pour l'envoi sur le territoire Afghan d'Agents Anglais à résidence fixe, mais de s'assurer la tranquillité de ce côté par une entente directe avec la Russie, entente qui a été établie par Lord Clarendon, et rompue par Lord Beaconsfield, ainsi que nous le prouvions l'autre jour, les défiances de l'Emir à l'endroit de l'Angleterre n'auraient été ni justifiées, ni même provoquées et que, dès lors, la guerre actuelle n'aurait pas eu lieu.

St. Petersburg, Mardi soir, le 14-26 Novembre, 1878.

Extract from the *Agence Russe*.

**LA DÉPÊCHE DE LORD CRANBROOK.**—Soit par suite de la convocation du Parlement pour le 5 Decembre, soit sous la pression du Comité Afghan où siègent, entr'autres, deux anciens Gouverneurs des Indes, le Gouvernement Anglais vient enfin de publier un document expliquant les rapports de l'Angleterre avec l'Afghanistan dans les dernières années et justifiant, à son point de vue, sa déclaration de guerre contre l'Emir.

Nous n'avons pas la prétention d'analyser cette longue dépêche de Lord Cranbrook, qui prend les choses de loin et les conduit jusqu'à la rupture actuelle. Nous y relèverons seulement une lacune, mais une lacune importante, qui prouverait même que cette dépêche est plus significative par ce qu'elle ne dit pas que par ce qu'elle dit.

On y cherchera en vain, en effet, la raison pour laquelle l'Emir, qui se montrait au début si alarmé des progrès de la Russie et se jetait dans les bras de l'Angleterre, rejetait en suite les offres d'alliance du Gouvernement des Indes, si larges, si généreuses qu'elles fussent. Cette raison est cependant importante puisque seule elle peut expliquer ce revirement soudain dans la conduite de l'Emir, constaté dans la dépêche officielle par des preuves aussi nombreuses qu'intéressantes.

Cette raison, la voici : c'est le retour du Gouvernement Anglais, sous l'Administration Tory, à la politique de défiance et de précautions matérielles, à laquelle la Convention Clarendon avait en pour objet de mettre fin ; politique qui se manifesta tout d'abord par la prise de Quettah, par la proposition d'envoyer des officiers Anglais sur les limites qui séparent l'Afghanistan de la Turkménie et, finalement, par les Conseils donnés au Sultan d'engager l'Emir à prendre fait et cause pour l'Angleterre et à se faire, en Asie Centrale, comme lui s'était fait en Orient, la sentinelle avancée des rancunes, des jalousies, et des hostilités du Gouvernement Britannique contre la Russie. L'Emir a dû nécessairement et successivement comprendre alors qu'entre les deux puissants Etats qui l'entourent—la Russie et l'Angleterre—celui qu'il avait à craindre c'était celui qui, avec son alliance, lui offrait des subsides, lui proposait de poster partout sur son territoire des officiers et qui occupait déjà Quettah, et non pas celui qui ne lui demandait rien et était resté fidèle à la Convention Clarendon.

C'est donc encore à la "high spirited policy" de la nouvelle Administration Britannique qu'il faut attribuer le revirement de Shir-Ali et les difficultés qui en sont résultées pour l'Angleterre.

---

Extract from the *Golos*.

LA POLITIQUE ANGLAIS EN AFGHANISTAN.—Dans le même numéro et en regard de l'article, où justement il trouvait inutile et même déplacé que nous nous occupions de l'Afghanistan, le *Golos* se livrait sur le même sujet aux réflexions suivantes :—

"La longue dépêche de Lord Cranbrook au Viceroy des Indes, Lord Lytton, est surtout intéressante dans sa première partie par les renseignements qu'elle nous fournit sur l'histoire des anciennes relations de l'Angleterre avec l'Afghanistan. Il paraît qu'en vertu du Traité conclu dès 1855 entre la Compagnie des Indes et l'Emir Dost-Mahomed-Khan, le Gouvernement Anglais s'était obligé à respecter l'inviolabilité des 'Etats de l'Emir, et à ne jamais se mêler des affaires intérieures de l'Afghanistan,' à la seule condition que de son côté l'Amir prît le même engagement vis-à-vis la Compagnie. Ce Traité fut plus tard reconnu par le Gouvernement Britannique lorsqu'il prit l'administration directe des Indes. D'après la déclaration de Lord Cranbrook, 'il est encore actuellement obligatoire pour les deux parties signataires.' Tous les Vicerois de l'Inde, depuis Lord Lawrence jusqu'à Lord Northbrook, se sont considérés comme obligés d'observer ce Traité. De plus, tous sans exception, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, et Lord Northbrook, ont trouvé que le meilleur moyen d'éviter les difficultés de la question Afghane consistait dans une entente amicale à son égard entre l'Angleterre et la Russie. Lord Northbrook, jusqu'au dernier moment de son séjour aux Indes, regardait comme impossible l'immixtion de l'Angleterre dans les affaires intérieures de l'Afghanistan. Lord Lytton fut envoyé aux Indes pour y inaugurer une politique radicalement opposée à celle de ses prédécesseurs. Il lui fut prescrit d'entrer en rapport immédiat avec l'Emir, et de lui offrir de forts subsides, la reconnaissance de sa dynastie par l'Angleterre, et l'obligation peremptoire de la part du Gouvernement Anglais de le défendre contre toute agression extérieure 'qu'il n'aurait pas provoquée volontairement.' Par contre, le Viceroy devait exiger l'établissement de Résidents Anglais dans toutes les villes Afghanes, sauf Cabul. Telles étaient les propositions que Shir-Ali déclina, refus qui lui a valu la déclaration de guerre de Lord Lytton. De pareils faits parlent par eux-mêmes. Le Gouvernement Britannique a donc, sans le moindre motif sérieux enfreint un Traité qu'il avait reconnu jusqu'à ce jour, et s'est justement immiscé dans le, 'affaires intérieures' qu'il s'était obligé à respecter ! Il a violé le territoire de Shir-Ali qu'il avait promis de respecter tant que ce dernier agirait de même à l'égard des possessions Anglaises dans les Indes !

"Or, chacun sait que l'Emir ne s'est pas permis la moindre infraction à ce sujet, et, néanmoins, l'armée Anglaise a envahi l'Afghanistan, et le Gouvernement Britannique ne dissimule pas que le but de ces opérations militaires est de détruire l'indépendance de l'Emir ! Faut-il s'étonner après cela si certains membres du Cabinet Beaconsfield ne partagent pas son opinion sur la question Afghane ! Ils craignent avec raison la responsabilité d'une guerre effectuée sans l'assentiment du Parlement. Sur la demande de ces Membres du Cabinet les Chambres seront convoquées le 5 Décembre, et à la fin de cette semaine seront publiés de nombreux documents sur les affaires Afghanes. A en juger par la dépêche de Lord Cranbrook, il est douteux que ces documents contiennent quoi que ce soit qui puisse justifier la rupture par l'Angleterre du Traité Anglo-Afghan de 1855. L'Europe aura enfin l'occasion de juger jusqu'à quel point on peut attribuer au Cabinet du Comte Beaconsfield le rôle de 'Conservateur de la sainteté des Traités' qu'il s'est si délibérément octroyé depuis trois ans."

No. 1011, dated St. Petersburg, 20th December 1878.

From—LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
To—MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I HAVE the honor to inclose to Your Lordship, in translation by Mr. Michell, an article from the *Golos* of this day, which contains a letter, dated the  $\frac{1st}{13th}$  October, from its correspondent at Kabul.

Extract from the *Golos* of December 20th, 1878.

(Translation from the Russian.)

THE *Golos* (No. 339) of the  $\frac{8}{20}$ -th December 1878 contains the following letter, dated the  $\frac{1st}{13th}$  October last, from its correspondent at Kabul:—

“As a caravan is to start to-morrow or the day after, I shall communicate some extracts out of my diary to you.

“General Stoletoff's Mission entered Kabul on the  $\frac{29th\ July}{10th\ August}$  under the circumstances already described, and was lodged in the Bala-Hissar palace. . . . The official visit of the Russians to the Amir was made on the following day the  $\frac{13th\ July}{11th\ August}$ . All the members of the Mission were in gala uniform, and although the Amir's palace was only about 50 fathoms distant, they proceeded on horseback to it, escorted by twelve Cossacks and a detachment of Afghan guards. The Amir received the Mission on an open terrace which faces a garden, and which served as a hall of audience. The reception took place in the presence of a few high functionaries. On the presentation of each member of the Mission the Amir paid him some compliment, or made a jocose remark. Thus, on presentation of Malevinski, who was attached to the Mission as English interpreter, the Amir, with a simulation of anxiety, said he hoped that Malevinski, as an Englishman and interpreter, was not the bearer of fire and sword through Afghanistan. . . . The Amir shook hands with each member as he was presented by General Stoletoff, retaining his seat on a gilt chair. The Amir was very amiable with all. . . . The audience lasted about an hour, the conversation being very animated and on many topics. . . . In the evening the town was brilliantly illuminated, and there was a display of fireworks and Bengal lights.

“On the  $\frac{31st\ July}{12th\ August}$ , at noon, the highest Afghan dignitaries—the Vizier, Dabir-ul-Mulk, and some others—came to inquire after the health of the members of the Mission. Having exchanged compliments, the Vizier and General Stoletoff were left alone for the purpose of negotiation. This order of things was generally observed during the succeeding days; the Vizier and Dabir-ul-Mulk used to appear about midday, and work at the Treaty with Stoletoff. Stoletoff went several times to the Amir, especially when a difficulty arose between the negotiators. The Treaty had general reference to the Afghan system of administration, to the question of succession, the recognition by Russia of the existing political régime in Afghanistan, &c. As regards the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Afghanistan, this is a pure invention on the part of the English journalists, who made an elephant out of a fly. I can positively assert that there is nothing of the kind in the Treaty; nevertheless, Russia in this Treaty binds herself morally to support the integrity and independence of Afghanistan. . . .”

“The correspondent then describes the illness and treatment of Abdulla Khan and his subsequent death.

“The labours of General Stoletoff and the Afghan representatives proceeded from day to day, but several drafts of the Treaty had to be made before a final understanding was arrived at.

“On the conclusion of the negotiations Shere Ali Khan informed General Stoletoff he had received information that the English were also desirous of sending a Mission to Kabul, and that they wanted to know whether the Amir would receive it. At the same time the Amir observed that, in his opinion, the English had nothing to do in Kabul, and that he therefore intended to refuse the English request. The Amir, however, asked General Stoletoff's advice as to the course he should pursue in the case. General Stoletoff gave an evasive reply, which was neither of an affirmative nor yet of a negative nature. He, nevertheless, gave the Amir to understand that the simultaneous presence of the Missions of two States, which were in almost hostile relations with each other, would not be very convenient. Thereupon the Amir decided to answer by a refusal.

\* \* \* \* \*

“On the  $\frac{12th}{24th}$  August, General Stoletoff, accompanied by the doctor and escorted by ten Cossacks, left for Tashkend, which place we hear he reached on the  $\frac{4th}{16th}$  September, after a fatiguing journey of twenty-two days, and extending over 1,300 versts. The following members of the Mission still remains at Kabul—Colonel Rozgonoff, Benderski (topographer), Malevinski (interpreter), Sub-Lieutenants Nazaroff and Zaman Bek, with eleven Cossacks and attendants.”

## APPENDIX XLIII.

INSTRUCTIONS, DATED 11TH APRIL 1879, TO MAJOR CAVAGNARI, IN THE EVENT OF A BRITISH MISSION PROCEEDING TO KABUL TO ARRANGE THE TERMS OF PEACE.

*[Referred to in paragraph 180, Chapter IX.]*

No. 1194 E.P., dated Camp Lahore, 11th April 1879.

From—A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—MAJOR P. L. N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Officer on Special Duty, Jelalabad.

THE overtures for peace made, through you, to the British Government by Sirdar Yakub Khan of Kabul, have now reached a stage at which there is some prospect of settling a basis for the formal negotiation of a Treaty. The whole correspondence on this subject has passed through your hands; and a very brief recapitulation of it will sufficiently define the situation of affairs to which it has contributed, and on which I am now to furnish you with instructions from the Viceroy.

On the 20th February, Sirdar Yakub Khan addressed to you a letter expressive of his desire for a reconciliation with the British Government, and the cessation of hostilities between India and Afghanistan. To this letter, in which the Sirdar enquired whether the differences between this Government and that of the late Amir were susceptible of pacific adjustment, you replied on the 7th March. Your reply conveyed to His Highness the Viceroy's acknowledgment of his expressions of anxiety for the renewal of friendship, and communicated to him the preliminary conditions upon which the Viceroy would be prepared to entertain negotiations for the conclusion of peace. These

1.—The Amir of Kabul must renounce all claim to authority over the Khaibar and Michni Passes leading from Jelalabad into the Peshawur district, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these Passes.

2.—The district of Kuram, from Thull to the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi, will remain under the protection and control of the British Government.

In the next place, the foreign relations of the Kabul Government must be henceforth conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; and European British officers, accredited to the Kabul Government, must be permitted to reside, with suitable personal guards, at such places in Afghanistan as may hereafter be determined upon.

this last-mentioned point; and you were at the same time authorized to ascertain, through your messenger, whether His Highness was disposed to invite to Kabul a British officer for personal conference on the subject of it, and with a view to the early removal, if possible, of all remaining impediments to a re-establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments.

You have since received, early in April, a further letter from the Sirdar, in which he earnestly reiterates the assurance of his desire for the friendship of the British Government, but again declares his inability to accept the territorial condition.

The letter ends, however, with offer to receive a British Envoy at Kabul. This invitation the Viceroy has resolved to accept, if satisfied that it has been made in good faith, and that arrangements can be concluded for the proper reception and adequate security of the British Envoy. You have accordingly been instructed to send Bakhtiar Khan to Kabul for the purpose of making such arrangements with the Sirdar. And, if these arrangements are satisfactory, you will, yourself, proceed to Kabul, as the Viceroy's Envoy. You are hereby invested with full powers to treat with the Ruler of Kabul on behalf of the Government of India; and I am directed to communicate to you the following instructions for your guidance.

It should be your endeavour, in the first place, to induce Sirdar Yakub Khan, by argument and explanation, to accept the territorial condition, as originally communicated to His Highness; and thus to clear the way for negotiation upon the basis already laid down. As regards the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram, the simplest, and ultimately most satisfactory, settlement would probably be their absolute cession, by Treaty, to the British Government. In the demand, however, which has reference to these districts, the object sought by the British Government is not the acquisition of territory, or revenue, but the military command of the great Passes between India and Afghanistan. You are, consequently, empowered to explain, or modify, this demand to whatever extent, and in whatever manner, you may deem desirable, provided always that the primary and essential object of it is fully secured.

Your recent visit to Lahore has placed you in complete possession of the Viceroy's views and intentions in reference to this most important condition; and to your discretion in carrying them out His Excellency accords, with confidence, the widest possible latitude.

If in any form which sufficiently secures the object of them, Sirdar Yakub Khan eventually accepts the conditions essential to satisfactory relations between this Government and his own, you will proceed to the negotiation of a Treaty for the formal record, and practical application of the principles embodied in those conditions. I inclose a draft project of Treaty which may be useful to you as an *Aide Memoire* in the negotiation of such an instrument; and I am to add some explanatory remarks and observations upon the relative value attached by the Government of India to the several provisions it contains.

The first two Articles are merely formal.

The 3rd Article, which stipulates for an amnesty, is in substance essential, and the wording given in the draft should be adhered to as closely as possible. It may be necessary to explain to the Kabul Government that this condition is inseparable from the conclusion of any agreement with the Government of India.

To the 4th Article the Sirdar has already unreservedly agreed.

The 5th Article should not be proposed or suggested by you; but it may be accorded, if the Sirdar expresses special anxiety for the recognition of his selected heir by the British Government, and if the negotiations are proceeding upon a footing of mutual confidence. In that case, this Article should be treated as a concession of much personal value to the Ruler of Kabul. You will be careful to explain that the Government of India is prepared to recognize the heir chosen by the acknowledged Ruler, provided that the Ruler's choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, or to the known rules and principles which have always governed successions in the Kabul dynasty. But that if notwithstanding the advantage he will necessarily derive from our public recognition of his legitimate claim to it, the heir, thus chosen, eventually proves incapable of maintaining his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him.

The 6th and 7th Articles may be noticed together. In regard to the former, the Sirdar has at present consented only to the residence of a British Representative at Kabul. But you will explain to His Highness the strong motives which have induced the British Government to desire the presence of an Agent at Herat, and the extent to which the effectual protection of his own frontier, in that direction, must necessarily depend on this arrangement, when the foreign relations of His Highness have been placed under the control of the British Government. You will also intimate that the right to place Agents at other places on the Afghan frontier will be exercised with due regard to the condition of the country, the extent of the Amir's authority, and the general aspect of affairs upon the borders of his kingdom.

Article 7 must be understood as guaranteeing to the Resident at Kabul reasonable freedom of movement, and reasonable intercourse with the inhabitants of Kabul and its environs.

Articles 8, 9, 10 stipulate for commercial facilities and for telegraph lines. It is of great importance to profit by the opportunity which a new Treaty will afford for opening the trade between the two countries, regulating the duties, and protecting the main thoroughfares.

The 11th Article restores to Kabul all the territory now in possession of our armies, except those districts which, in one form or another, must remain under our direct control and protection, for the permanent security of our own frontier. As regards the evacuation of the country restored, I am to observe that although it will be carried out as expeditiously as is possible with due regard to military necessities and the health of our troops, this operation may probably be delayed till the autumn, and will in any case be dependent on the state of the country at the time, and the Kabul Government's due observance of its Treaty engagements.

By the 12th Article it is proposed to give some of the leading Sirdars a direct interest in the Treaty, through the guarantee, which they will thus obtain from the British Government, for the payment of their customary allowances.

The 13th and final Article empowers you, if you think fit, to agree to an annual subsidy from the British Government to the Kabul Ruler. Possibly the question of a subsidy may never be raised at Kabul; and in any case your treatment of it will depend largely upon the manner in which the other subjects for negotiation shall have been settled, and your confidence in the good faith and stability of their settlement. If you decide that a subsidy may be granted, the maximum amount should not exceed 12 lakhs; and, unless the Kabul Government agrees to insert in the Treaty the foregoing Article regarding the payments to the Sirdars, it may not be worth while to give the full sum.

I inclose a letter from the Viceroy addressed to Yakub Khan as Amir of Kabul and its dependencies. This letter is a reply to the letter in which Yakub Khan informed His Excellency of the death of the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, and his own election as Amir by the nobles and people of the country. The opportunity has been taken to inform the Sirdar that his offer to receive a Mission has been accepted, and that you have been deputed to Kabul with full powers to act on behalf of the Government of India.



## Draft project of Treaty.

The following Articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and the AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Amir of Kabul and its dependencies :—

## ARTICLE 2.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and His Highness the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

## ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., engages immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with, or assistance to, the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from punishment or molestation on that account.

## ARTICLE 4.

His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government.

## ARTICLE 5.

The British Government further engages to recognize the Heir-Presumptive and successor designate to the present Amir, who may hereafter be nominated by His Highness and duly and formally declared as such, according to the custom of the country. And the British Government will consider the heir so nominated and declared to be the legitimate ruler of Kabul and its dependencies from the time of his accession to the throne.

## ARTICLE 6.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Kabul and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort and place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to reside at Herat and other places upon the Afghan frontier, whensoever and for whatever period this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States. His Highness the Amir of Kabul may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

## ARTICLE 7.

His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall in no way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.

## ARTICLE 8.

His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., undertakes on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

## ARTICLE 9.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of the Amir of Kabul may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Kabul agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along certain routes to be selected within his dominions. The routes thus selected shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the selection of these routes, for their maintenance and security, and for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these routes, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through the dominions of His Highness, are stated in a separate annexure to this Treaty.

## ARTICLE 10.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that such lines of telegraph as may be necessary for that purpose, shall, with the assent of the Amir of Kabul, be from time to time constructed by, and at the cost of, the British Government, in the territories of His Highness; and the Amir of Kabul hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of all such wires.

## ARTICLE 11.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram and Pishin, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government; and that the jurisdiction of the Amir of Kabul, &c., over the district of Sibi, shall be transferred to the British Government. His Highness the Amir also renounces all claim to authority over the Khaibar and Michni Passes leading from Jelalabad into the Peshawur District, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these Passes.

## ARTICLE 12.

His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees that the allowances which have been customarily paid to certain Chiefs and Sirdars in Afghanistan, for the protection and tranquillity of certain parts of the country under their superintendence, shall continue to be paid to them in accordance with the schedule annexed to this Treaty.

## ARTICLE 13.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of

## APPENDIX XLIV.

### COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATING TO THE AMIR'S RECEPTION AT GANDAMAK AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

[Referred to in paragraph 182, Chapter IX.]

Memorandum on the visit of AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR S. BROWNE and MAJOR CAVAGNARI, dated 9th May 1879.

It having been arranged with His Highness that he should pay a return visit to Lieutenant-General Sir S. Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., V.C., and Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., Mr. Jenkyns, C.S., Political Assistant, and Captain Hamilton, Aide-de-Camp to General Sir S. Browne, proceeded at 4 o'clock P.M., with an escort of the 11th Prince of Wales' Own Lancers, to the camp of His Highness to accompany him to the Durbar tent.

2. A guard of honor of the 51st King's Own Light Infantry was in attendance and presented arms on arrival and departure of His Highness.

3. A salute of 21 guns was fired on the arrival and departure of His Highness from the British camp.

4. After some ordinary remarks and inquiries after health (during which His Highness alluded to his imprisonment and the injurious effects it had produced on his health, which made him feel slightly indisposed yesterday evening) the Lieutenant-General introduced the under-mentioned officers to His Highness:—

Major-General Maunsell, C.B. (Commanding, R.E).

Brigadier-General Appleyard, C.B. (Commanding, 3rd Brigade).

Brigadier-General Macpherson, C.B., V.C. (Commanding, 1st Brigade).

Brigadier-General Gough, C.B., V.C. (Commanding, Cavalry Brigade).

Brigadier-General Tytler, C.B., V.C. (Commanding, 2nd Brigade).

Colonel Williams, C.B. (Commanding, Artillery).

Colonel Macgregor, C.S.I., C.I.E. (Assistant Adjutant-General and Assistant Quarter-master-General).

Major Sanford, R.E. (Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General).

Major Smith (Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General).

Captain Hamilton (Aide-de-Camp to Lieutenant-General).

5. His Highness requested the interpreter (Mr. Jenkyns) to ask after the health of the officers, and to say that he feared they must have had a rough life since they entered Afghanistan.

6. After a short interval Major Cavagnari said:—

I take the opportunity of introducing to Your Highness certain gentlemen who are the representatives of the principal newspapers in England. Your Highness is perhaps aware of the deep interest that the British nation takes in all matters connected with literature and in the fine arts, and also in reporting correctly all important current events, and I feel sure Your Highness will be glad to permit the gentlemen I have alluded to, to be presented to you.

7. The undermentioned gentlemen were presented to His Highness:—

\* Introduced with the officers.—(Sd.) N. C. Lieutenant-General Vaughan,\* C.B. (*Times*).

Mr. Simpson (Special Artist for the *Illustrated London News*).

Mr. Villiers (Special Artist for the *Graphic*).

† Invited, but was unavoidably prevented from attending.—(Sd.) N. C.

Mr. Browne † (Correspondent for the *Standard* and *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore)).

8. His Highness remarked that he knew the *Illustrated London News* (which he pronounced in English) very well. His Highness was then informed that the *Illustrated London News* and the *Graphic* were the best illustrated papers in England, if not in the whole world, and that at all important ceremonies a representative was always sent if possible.

9. After tea had been served, His Highness arose and took his departure. Both on arrival and at the departure of His Highness, Lieutenant-General Sir S. Browne and Major Cavagnari accompanied the Amir to and from the edge of a carpet which led from the door of the Durbar tent to the roadway.

10. The same ceremony was observed in conducting His Highness to his camp as was carried out on his leaving his camp.

CAMP SAFED SANG, }  
9th May 1879. }

(Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, Major,  
Political Officer.

[ CONFIDENTIAL. ]

Memorandum of a personal interview between His Highness the Amir of Kabul and MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., at Safed Sang, on Saturday, the 10th May 1879.

PRESENT :

HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR.

MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

MR. JENKINS, Secretary and Interpreter.

Major Cavagnari began by enquiring what news the Amir had recently received from Badakshan, informing him that we had heard through the British Agent in Gilgit and other sources, that the country was in a state of great confusion, and that the Kabul troops had been expelled by the inhabitants, and the guns taken from them.

His Highness admitted that there had been some disturbances in Badakshan; but he professed himself quite able to put an end to them if once his quarrel with the British Government were adjusted. He said that the people of Badakshan had been very much oppressed by their late Governor, and that it had been decided to appoint Sultan Murad Khan of Kunduz to the Governorship of the country. The inhabitants, however, wished to have no more foreign Governors, but to have one of themselves set up over them under the suzerainty of the Ruler of Kabul. His Highness said he was resolved not to accede to this wish.

Major Cavagnari then proceeded to review the position of England and Russia in Central Asia, with special reference to Afghanistan. He said that we wished to postpone as much as possible the day when the frontiers of England and Russia should be conterminous in Asia, on account of the necessity that would then arise for the maintenance of large military forces even in time of peace. He informed the Amir that Russia had incidentally proposed to the British Government to divide Afghanistan—England taking one share and Russia the other—but that the British Government had refused to entertain the proposition for two principal reasons :—

*Firstly*, because England was then under friendly relations with the Amir Shere Ali Khan; and

*Secondly*, because she had no desire to hasten the time when the frontiers of the two European powers should be conterminous in Asia.

Major Cavagnari added that the present war had dissipated the mistaken notion held by certain persons in India and elsewhere that we were the weaker power and were afraid to move in opposition to Russia; for, in this war we had really thrown down the gauntlet to Russia, while she refused to take it up.

His Highness the Amir replied that he did not see any advantage in lengthened allusions to Russia and her policy, because, for his part, he had not the least intention or wish to enter into any communications with that Power. His father, Amir Shere Ali Khan, he said, had not any desire to throw himself into the arms of Russia; but that when he fell out with the British Government, he was obliged to have recourse to Russia. His intention, he believed, was to go to St. Petersburg, and there, by means of a Congress, obtain a reconciliation with the British Government.

Major Cavagnari then came to the point of the conditions on which peace could now be arranged between His Highness and the British Government. He remarked that His Highness had accepted two out of the three fundamental conditions, and he wished to know what difficulty he had in acceding to the third condition, *viz.*, that which referred to the re-adjustment of the frontiers.

The Amir replied that he considered that his honor was involved in the relinquishment of Afghan territory; he did not think of the pecuniary loss which he would suffer; but he feared that he would be disgraced in the eyes of the Afghans if he accepted such a condition.

Major Cavagnari said that the territory which the British Government proposed to annex had been taken from the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, and that it did not appear how His Highness, the present Amir, would be disgraced if the British Government refused to relinquish it.

His Highness answered that his Government is a poor weak one, scarcely fit to be styled a Government, and that he had left Kabul and come down to Gandamak, hoping that such an exhibition of trust in the generosity of the British Government would be rewarded by the relinquishment of the territorial condition *in toto*; but if that were not obtained, what could he say to the people of Kabul that he had gained by his visit?

Major Cavagnari pointed out that although the British Government might be satisfied with the friendly assurances of the Amir Yakub Khan, yet, as he was mortal and would in the ordinary course of nature die (an event which, he hoped, was long distant), the Government could not consent to abandon the absolute control of the Passes into Afghanistan, as past experience had shown that on the death of the Kabul ruler disorganization in the affairs of the kingdom had generally taken place, and that this was a special reason why the positions necessary for the protection of the British Indian frontier could not be permitted to remain dependent on the friendship of any Ruler of Kabul.

Major Cavagnari also pointed out the advantages to the Amir himself from the occupation of the Peiwar, &c., by British troops, but His Highness said he did not wish to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of this condition\*—he earnestly hoped that the British Government would not insist upon it.

\* This was not said in an abrupt manner as if the Amir declined to discuss the matter. He desired to trust to pleading for better terms.—N.C.

His Highness requested that it should be clearly and concisely stated to him, either in writing or verbally, what the territorial demands of the British Government were.

Major Cavagnari informed His Highness that whereas the British Government might have been expected to occupy Dakka or Basawul for the protection of the Khaibar and Michni Passes, it had been determined, if a friendly alliance should be effected with the Kabul ruler, not to advance beyond Lundikotal. The whole of the Jelalabad district would be restored to the Amir, and the country adjoining the Khaibar and Michni Passes would continue, as heretofore, to be considered independent territory, beyond the control of the Kabul ruler.

With respect to Kuram, the Government had definitely decided to have a cantonment on the Peiwar Kotal.

On the Kandahar side, the whole of the Kandahar district would be restored to the Amir; but the districts of Pishin and Sibi would not be relinquished.

His Highness, after hearing this statement, said that he would take time to consider his reply, as it was obviously not a matter in which he could give an answer on the spot.

Major Cavagnari then asked the Amir how he would like that the districts of Pishin and Sibi should be merely assigned by His Highness to the British Government, the surplus revenue being paid to His Highness, but the administration being in the hands of the British Government. The districts would still remain, nominally, part of His Highness' dominions, but be entirely managed by the British authorities.

Major Cavagnari said that he asked this question merely on his own part without implying that it was the intention of Government to adopt any such proposal.

His Highness answered that he would take time to consider this proposal also.

The interview then ended.

SAFED SANG, }  
The 10th May 1879. }

(Sd.) W. JENKINS,  
On Special Duty.

---

Telegram, dated 10th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

I HAD two hours' personal interview with Amir this morning. The fact of my having succeeded in breaking ground without any of the Amir's councillors being present is important as indicating a determination on my part to deal directly with the Amir whenever I deem it expedient to do so.

After reviewing briefly the situation of the Central Asian question, I went straight to the point regarding the territorial demands. The Amir pleaded hard and earnestly that the Government should take no territory from him, and urged that it was to obtain this concession that he came in person. I replied that however much the British Government trusted to his assurances of friendship, the question of his death in the ordinary course of nature had to be considered, and consequently Government could never permit its absolute control of the Passes to depend on the life of any Amir of Kabul, and that this resolution is justified from the experience of the disturbances which have always arisen on the death of the Ruler of the country. The Amir asked what he could show to the people of Afghanistan as his gain by coming to plead in person. I replied that there would be many things. I said that in order to command the Michni and Khaibar Passes, it would have been considered necessary to place a cantonment at Dakka or Bassauli, but that the Government not having had any quarrel with him, and in consideration of his assurances of friendship, did not desire to annex an inch of the Jelalabad district, and would therefore be contented with a position on the Lundikotal—an arrangement which would be effected with the independent Khaibaris, who alone are entitled to be consulted. I consider Amir was pleased at this and secretly expected it.

As regards Kuram, I said that the British Government has decided to have a cantonment on the Peiwar, and that I had not discretionary powers in the matter, but that if the Amir would let me know how I could achieve the Government object and at the same time make it palatable to him, I would do all in my power for him.

As regards Pishin and Sibi, I asked how he would like these districts to be treated as assigned districts, the British Government paying him surplus revenues. I said that I could not say positively that the Government would agree to this, but that if I would report that he considered this a friendly concession, it might perhaps be arranged. Amir said (he would) think over the matter.

On the whole, the interview was as satisfactory as could have been expected for a first interview, and it had the advantage of being free from interruptions by Daud Shah. I was



disappointed with Yakub Khan's acquaintance with State affairs; his arguments were weak (and) easily answered. I think, however, it is likely that he would in time submit to the personal influence of a British officer.

My next plan is to arrange a personal interview with Daud Shah and Mustaufi; at first receiving them together; afterwards, separately.

---

Telegram, dated 13th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

I HAVE had some very satisfactory conversations with Daud Shah and (the) Mustaufi. The former, outwardly at all events, has changed his tone. Both promised to do all in their power to persuade (the) Amir to agree to the bases of negotiations. Yakub Khan had commenced to take the peevish tone I feared he might adopt, and proposed writing to me to say he could not return to Kabul unless the whole Afghan territory was restored, and that if his request was not acceded to, he would wish to proceed to England as our pensioner: part of this is of course mere acting, and I expect he will yield after a little.

I have explained to his Ministers the risk that will be run if complications in Turkistan and Badakshan provinces are allowed to remain unsettled, and I also (hinted) at the designs of Persia who apparently desired to take advantage of the unsettled state of affairs in Afghanistan to extend her frontier in the Herat and Seistan direction.

I will arrange for an interview with Amir for to-morrow, when I hope something satisfactory may be arrived at.

---

Telegram, dated 13th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

HAD two hours' interview with Amir this afternoon. As Mustaufi requested me to give him a little more time in which to influence Amir, conversation was only on general Central Asian subjects.

Khosh was not mentioned in the general territorial demand, and I presume that the Government has no intention with reference to it. I have not even hinted at the concession to treat Kuram as assigned district. I should like to induce Amir to leave territorial settlement in my hands and then gain his gratitude by making the said concession.

Mustaufi told Bakhtiar that if friendship was established, Amir would take our advice regarding strength of his army, administrative reforms, &c.; and that his first step would be to visit his frontier, accompanied by British officers.

---

Telegram, dated 14th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

AMIR still appears unwilling to give way about retention or minor occupation of any part of Afghan territory. He adheres with almost childish perverseness to the argument that because he has come to negotiate for peace, (the) British Government should revert to the *status quo ante bellum*, and trust entirely to his promise of friendship without requiring any material guarantee for good faith. I cannot believe he will persist in a course which under existing affairs in Afghanistan must be rapidly and completely ruinous to him, but Afghans are not reasonable beings. I have informed Mustaufi that early decision is expected.

Mustaufi said to Bakhtiar, "you can judge of the condition of Afghanistan, when the inexperienced Yakub Khan is the ablest of the Barakzai nobility."

Assuming it to be absolutely necessary to prevent break with Yakub Khan, is the Government prepared to give up Pishin and Sibi absolutely, and be contented with military positions on the Peiwar and Lundikotal, treating Kuram as assigned district, giving Yakub Khan surplus revenues?

---

Cipher telegram, dated 15th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram 14th. The right to maintain at pleasure military garrisons in Pishin and Sibi with control of necessary communications is an essential point on which we cannot give way.

Cipher telegram, dated 15th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Clear the Line.*—In continuation of my telegram this day. You will understand that our control of administration of these districts is very desirable, and should be obtained if possible. The distinction between this and military garrison may make little difference to Yakub.

Telegram, dated 15th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

AMIR sent Daud Shah and (the) Mustaufi to me this afternoon as a final effort to obtain further relaxation on the territorial demand. I explained the great concession already granted about Pishin and Sibi, by which they would remain part of Afghanistan, though administered by British agency. I have not disclosed the additional concession sanctioned. On the Kuram side, I said that the British Government would forego all demand regarding Khost, provided (the) Amir by good government of the (?) district, secured the flank of the Kuram communications from annoyance.

I think that the struggle is nearly over: once Yakub Khan gives way on the territorial point, remainder of the Treaty will not occupy much time.

Cipher telegram, dated 15th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Viceroy, Simla.

WITH reference to Your Lordship's letter of 16th April and Secretary of State's telegram sanctioning protection to Amir of Kabul against external aggression, I propose to word the clause as follows:—

*Begins*—The British Government undertakes to protect the territories of the Amir of Kabul from foreign aggression, by money, arms, or troops according as the occasion may, in the judgment of the British Government, require, and the Amir of Kabul, on his part, undertakes that he will fully acquiesce in and facilitate the despatch of British troops whether to Herat or any other part of his dominions for the protection of which their temporary presence may be requisite whenever, in the judgment of the British Government, such a measure has become necessary. In the event of the despatch of troops into any part of the Afghan territory becoming necessary, it is to be distinctly understood that the said troops will enter the Amir's territories as his declared allies and under a defined obligation to withdraw therefrom as soon as ever their presence there has effected the purpose for which alone it is agreed to; namely, the protection of such parts of the Amir's territory from danger of foreign aggression. *Ends.*

Assuming Yakub Khan to have no objection to secret Treaty, would it be better to embody the above in a secret Treaty, or in the public one.

Cipher telegram, dated 16th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram 15th to Viceroy. Viceroy considers it will be sufficient to make following addition to Article 4 of draft Treaty inclosed with my letter, 11th April: Addition begins. On these conditions the British Government will support Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, and troops to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose.

Cipher telegram, dated 16th May 1879.

From—Viceroy, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

YOUR telegram of 15th. Military authorities attach great importance to Khost Valley. Was Khost understood by Amir to be included in original demand, and could control of it be still secured without gravely embarrassing negotiations.

Telegram, dated 16th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

HAD short interview with the Amir this morning, at which I asked him to reply to territorial point. He said that there were some matters that he wished to communicate to me through his councillors.

Daud Shah and the Mustaufi visited me this afternoon. Their object was to ascertain what special advantages Government intended giving Yakub Khan. I replied peace and the friendship of the British Government through which Yakub Khan would be made the most powerful ruler Afghanistan has ever had; but I declined to enter into details until the bases of the negotiations were accepted.

I shall press for a reply to-morrow.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 17th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram, 15th. We understand that additional concession sanctioned on Kuram side means its treatment as assigned district, and that without specific orders you will not relax demand to retain in some form protection and control of district. Your telegram, 16th, received.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 17th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Viceroy, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Your Lordship's telegram of last night. Quite impossible to include Khost in the Kuram arrangements without seriously embarrassing negotiations. It was not included in the formal demands made in my letter of 7th March, and although I asserted that it was understood to be included in the Kuram Province, Amir was disposed to regard it as a new condition. I therefore did not press this point. The question can only be re-opened at the risk of unsettling what has been effected.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 17th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Had a personal interview with Yakub Khan this morning, no one else (being) present.

After much fencing, Amir (agreed) to the following:—

That (the) districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram shall be treated as assigned, and remain under the management of the British Government, the surplus revenues, after deducting civil charges, to be paid to the Amir of Kabul.

The Michui and Khaibar Passes to be managed by the British Government: this will include the Mohmand hills south of (the) Kabul river and the tribes in the Khaibar Pass from Lundikotal to Jamrud.

Amir begs as a personal favour that the administration of the Kuram district shall only extend to Ali Khel, and that he may be permitted to manage from that point to the crest of the Shuturguridan, the British Government retaining the right to locate troops within the said limit, if necessity for doing so arises: Amir urges that this will prevent friction with the tribes beyond Ali Khel. Unless it is contemplated (to) permanently occupy up to the Shuturguridan crest, there may perhaps be no objection to grant this. Early reply on this point (is) requested.

It will be advisable to omit the concluding portion of Article 11 from the words "Amir also renounces all claim" to the end of the Article. It will give us no additional hold over the tribes to press this point, and it will tend to wound the sensitiveness of the Amir's Afghan nature. Our cantonment on the Khaibar Pass will indicate *per se* that the Amir has no authority there, and the country held under British management will also be distinctly specified. It would be somewhat of an admission that the Amir formerly had some claim, if he were now required to renounce the same. I have during negotiation declined to discuss this point, and have treated the tribes concerned as independent.

Regarding (?) Agency clause, Amir consented that the British Government shall have right to depute European British Agents to visit the frontier of Afghanistan whenever it is necessary to do so, it being understood that without Amir's consent the permanent location of such Agent on the frontier shall not be pressed, though Yakub Khan declares his intention to thoroughly meet Government's wishes on all matters regarding the frontier of Afghanistan.

I expect to obtain a promise that the Amir will reduce transit duty and make arrangements for the protection of traders, but he is not prepared to bind himself at once to a fixed tariff. As regards European British traders, it is to be understood that no Europeans are to enter Afghanistan without passport from the British Government after a reference to the Amir: this is considered necessary until (the) affairs of the country are more settled.

I doubt possibility of obtaining Article 11 (*sic*). Any hint made to them has been met with the reply that this is interfering in the internal administration of the kingdom. I am working Mustaufi to help in this matter.

Up to the present, Amir has not hinted at dynastic guarantee.

It has been my endeavour to secure the main objects of the Government, and at the same time to obtain Yakub Khan's (consent) in a manner that will give hope that he will

honestly act up to them in future. This seems better than driving him to accept more stringent conditions. The policy of non-annexation is also adhered to, whilst material guarantees quite equal to annexation are secured.

---

Telegram, dated 18th May 1879.

From—Viceroy, Simla,

To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang.

I CORDIALLY congratulate you on success of your able negotiations. Arrangements reported in your telegram of 17th May generally satisfactory. I will communicate as quickly as possible instructions on points requiring them. We assume that consent to control of Amir's foreign relations and English Resident at Kabul holds good.

---

Telegram, dated 17th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your clear the line telegram of to-day. The additional concession referred to that mentioned in your telegram, 15th. In my telegram, 15th, the words "on the Kuram side" commences a new sentence.

---

Telegram, dated 18th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

*Clear the Line.*—Amir earnestly desires following arrangement: that British administration of Kuram district shall extend only to Ali Khel, leaving in Amir's hands management from Ali Khel to crest of Shuturguridan, we retaining right to locate troops if necessary beyond Ali Khel and right of access to Shuturguridan. Amir urges (that) this will prevent friction with tribes. We consider sufficient to hold Amir responsible and propose to agree if objections are not very strong.

Your opinion required immediately in cipher.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 18th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Viceroy, Simla.

YOUR Lordship's telegram of to-day. European British Resident at Kabul and foreign relation clause fully agreed to.

---

Telegram, dated 19th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Your cipher message of yesterday afternoon.

I hope there will be no material alteration in the text of the Treaty you propose sending. I understood the draft given me had been finally decided upon with such alterations as have since become necessary. I have given a copy to the Amir to think over, and any serious alteration would certainly raise suspicion.

I also hope that Military Department will decide to move back troops at once, otherwise I foresee a struggle on this point. Afghan suspicion as to our honest intentions I have had to contend against at every stage.

---

Telegram, dated 18th May 1879.

From—GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

IT would be preferable to retain in our hands all the country up to (the) crest of (the) Shuturguridan; but I see no cogent reason against British administration being limited by Karaktiga, sixteen miles beyond Anik, six miles short of (the) Shuturguridan. Karaktiga is boundary between Jajis and Ghilzais. It is politically important to have complete hold of Jajis, who are Sunnis, not Shiahs: this we should not have by stopping short at Ali Khel. The Shamu Khel is the most powerful section of Jajis; they occupy from Kermanuo, south of Ali Khel to Rokian and Drekhula, and have always held Jajithana, the principal post in the Hazardarakht, two miles this side of Karaktiga. Ali Khel, in fact, juts into the heart of the Shamu Khel country, part of which would be under British, part under Afghan rule. At Karaktiga, the Pass leading from Mongals, Jadrans, and Ghilzais, joins Hazardarakht. I proposed building a thana there to command this important Pass. This thana would clearly define boundary

between British and Afghan administration. During an ordinary winter, it will be scarcely possible to keep troops at Ali Khel, and yet I don't see how we can leave it unoccupied, unless whole of Jaji country is under our control. One section, the Ahmad Khel, still hold aloof; and if Amir has power over any portion of Jajis, much trouble will ensue. Amir well knows that power limiting our administration to Ali Khel would give him complete control over Jaji tribe—means eventually influence over Mongal and other independent tribes.

In my opinion it is essential for peace in Kuram that Amir should have nothing whatever to do with Jaji tribe.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 18th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang.

ROBERTS telegraphs:—No cogent reason against British administration being limited by Karaktiga, six miles short of Shuturgurdan. Karaktiga is boundary between Jajis and Ghilzais. Politically important to have complete hold of Jajis. This we should not have by stopping short at Ali Khel. Shamu Khel, most powerful section of Jajis, occupy from south of Ali Khel to Rokian and Drekula, and have always held Jajithana, principal post in Hazar-darakht. At Karaktiga the Pass leading from Mongals, Jadrans, and Ghilzais joins Hazar-darakht. I propose building thana there to command this important Pass. This would clearly define boundary between British and Afghan administration; otherwise Jajis will be partly under British, partly under Amir's jurisdiction, and much trouble will ensue in Hariob valley, as troops can hardly be kept at Ali Khel during winter. In my opinion it is essential for peace in Kuram that Amir should have nothing to do with Jajis.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 20th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram, 17th, considered in Council. We agree to treat Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram as assigned; but regarding Pishin, our arrangements for passage of troops, whenever required, by Thul Chotiali must not be interfered with. We also admit as regards Kuram the proposed concession to Amir's personal wishes under limitations necessary to retain our complete control and protection of Jaji tribe—see separate telegram from Roberts—also under following additional conditions:—First, road to crest of Shuturgurdan to be completed by us and maintained by Amir. Second, Amir to build no fort commanding this road. You will judge how far these conditions need specification in Treaty, or may be recorded separately, and whether Treaty should contain Article providing for demarcation of boundaries by mixed Commission.

Concluding portion of Article 11 may be omitted as you advise.

Clause 12 need not be pressed, though in discussing subsidy you may perhaps introduce its principle.

Amnesty Clause should be effective as possible.

Draft Treaty with amendments necessitated by above instructions is approved. Telegraph text where amended, stating whether you found necessary to include Articles 4, 5.

---

Telegram, dated 19th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

I HAVE had interviews with the Amir, also with his Ministers, on the Commercial and Telegraph Clauses. Amir objected to European traders being mentioned in the Treaty. I told him this is essential to a friendly understanding with us, but that the execution of the agreement would not come into force for some time, and restrictions such as passports, &c., would be put in.

I said the telegraph from Kabul to the advanced military position in Kuram is absolute necessity, but that a reasonable time would be given to enable him to restore order throughout the country and arrange for the protection of the line.

I hope (to) secure some immediate concession regarding transit duty on tea, piece-goods, and indigo.

The carrying out of the Amnesty Clause will give us trouble in future, as the Sirdars and others, who have assisted us, are known to be defaulters or embezzlers of revenue due to the former (?) Government.

I spoke to the Amir about Russian letters. I think they are only letters of condolence; but the Amir has promised to show them to me, and take advice as to his reply.



I had to speak rather plainly to them to-day, but the interview is likely to be productive of good results.

---

Telegram, dated 20th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Your cipher message of to-day regarding passage of troops by the Thul route. Is not this a new condition, referring to country or (as?) part of Pishin and Sibi? In my arrangement regarding these districts, the complete control and management remain with the British Government. If the right now demanded is only exercised on very special occasions, I may be able to induce (the) Amir to agree, but I think that he will object to this line being used as the ordinary road to Quetta.

Will send text of the amended Treaty to-morrow.

Telegram from General Roberts alluded to in your telegram under reply not yet received.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 21st May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Precedence.*—*Personal.*—Your telegram, 20th. It is improbable that Thul route will be wanted as ordinary road to Pishin; but Amir must understand that we may need to use it sometimes, especially for withdrawal of Kandahar force. The tribes are practically independent of his authority; and assuming his friendship with British Government, he ought to raise no objection to occasional passage of troops through such a country.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 21st May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Text of draft Treaty, made over to the Amir for consideration, is as follows:—Wording of Articles 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14,\*  
\* *Sic*, perhaps 13 is meant. except amount of the subsidy which has been left blank, is a literal translation of your draft.

ARTICLE 4.—Following addition:—"On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose."

ARTICLE 5.—Omitted. If the Amir spontaneously asks for this it will be granted.

† *Sic*.

ARTICLE 6.—Sentences omitted:—"To† reside at Herat and other places upon," also "and for whatever period."

ARTICLE (11†?).—*For* "Amir of Kabul agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram

† No, omitted.

§ *Sic*.

and Pishin," *read* "Amir of Kabul agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi" full stop. §—*From* "administrative control of the British Government" to the end of the Article, *substitute* "that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deduction of civil charges shall be paid to the Kabul Government."

"The British Government will retain in its own hands the complete control of the Khaibar and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawur and Jelalabad Districts, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these Passes."

ARTICLE 12.—Nothing additional entered in your draft. Article omitted. The principle will not be lost sight of; and, if it can possibly be managed, some arrangement will be made.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 21st May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

In continuation of my telegram this day, stipulations regarding adjustment of boundaries by mixed Commission, and the arrangements about country between Jajis boundary and crest of the Shuturguridan will either be included in the Treaty, or form a separate annexure. Regarding Thul-Chotiali route, I await your reply to my telegram of the 20th May, before introducing the subject to the Amir.

Cipher telegram, dated 22nd May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram, 21st. In the amended Article about Khaibar and Michni Passes, instead of words “and over the independent tribes,” substitute the words as follow :—  
“and of our relations with the independent tribes.”

Cipher telegram, dated 22nd May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—My interview yesterday afternoon with Daud Shah and (the) Mustaufi was satisfactory.

I am informed that the Amir has prepared a memorandum of his wishes regarding draft Treaty submitted to him. This will be sent to me this afternoon. I anticipate no further difficulty about Treaty of Peace, though it may take three or four days more to get it signed.

Regarding Thul route, it will be better to say nothing at present about passage of troops. When the necessity for using this route arises, the troops should march by it; and if the Amir raises any objection, it can then be put before him that it was understood to be part of the arrangement connected with the concessions made to him regarding Pishin and Sibi, as well as being a sign of sincere friendship.

After Treaty has been signed, I presume that Government intend to withdraw (the) Kandahar forces to Pishin, if not to British territory. I should like early information of Government decision on this point, and also regarding withdrawal of the Jelalabad forces.

Cipher telegram, dated 22nd May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your clear the line cipher message of to-day's received subsequent to despatch of telegrams to Viceroy and yourself this morning. I will await further orders about Treaty.

Cipher telegram, dated 23rd May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram, 22nd. Viceroy considers that subject of our using Thul-Chotiali route cannot be altogether postponed until after signature of Treaty. You might mention in connection with withdrawal of Kandahar troops, our intention to use this route on special occasions, Jelalabad troops will be withdrawn soon as possible after peace. Sanitary questions hinder immediate decision.

Cipher telegram, dated 22nd May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

BAKHTIAR has seen the amendments in the wording of the draft Treaty as proposed by the Amir. They are not what Government would agree to, and B said to Amir that he could not bring such amendments to me without my permission. I had instructed him that if there were material alterations he was not to bring any draft from the Amir. I have now directed him to inform Amir that I will visit him to-morrow morning, and that if he wishes me to take proposed amendments, I will do so and forward them to the Government, but that I know what the reply will be.

Though I consider a great deal of this is mere acting, it does not speak well for Yakub Khan's stability of character.

Cipher telegram, dated 24th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI.

*Clear the Line.*—Your telegram of 22nd. Draft Treaty as telegraphed by you having been approved by Cabinet, it is most undesirable that any alteration should now be made. Explain this to Amir. Press for Treaty as now settled. Avoid reference to us if possible. If Amir presses any amendments, hint that we may also alter our demands.

Please correct following two errors in Article 9. Corrections begin.—1st, for words ‘civil charges,’ substitute ‘charges of administration.’ 2nd, for words ‘of our relations,’ substitute ‘of all relations.’

Cipher telegram, dated 23rd May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Visited Amir this morning. He assured me there was no material alteration in his proposed draft of Treaty, but that certain matters relating to very important alterations that he will press.

*Sic.*

His amendments are principally frivolous additions and alterations evincing suspicion on his part. Amir wishes to know strength of the Kabul Resident's staff; and telegraphs and trade he did not wish insertion in the Treaty, for fear of offending some who would say he was introducing English reforms too rapidly.

I find on examining his draft there are not the permanent escorts. He will only consent at present to the insertion in the Treaty regarding one telegraph line, *viz.*, between Kuram and Kabul. He proposes some absurdly small remission of transit duty. I have recommended him to accept 7th Article of Treaty, and, in lieu of the word schedule, to agree that, at expiry (of) one year, a Commercial Treaty will be executed. He wished to be styled Amir of Afghanistan and Afghan-Turkistan. His titles should be, I think, Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, *Amir-i-Mamalik-i-Afghan* Wahad-ud-motalikan, but if he prefer his own (?) proposal, I see no objection to grant it. He introduces no dynastic clause. If he does not waive his amendments, I will telegraph text of them to-morrow.

I fear he will strongly object to our occupation of Kandahar; if it is insisted on, I suppose he will be permitted to have his own Governor and administer the territory up to the Pishin and Sibi frontier. If it can be possibly arranged, I would urge that the troops retire to Pishin.

Telegram, dated 25th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Personal.*—Held a Council to-day with the Amir and his Ministers. Treaty discussed from beginning to the end. I strongly impressed on the Amir the undesirability of any change. He urged, and I think with reason, that unless he was permitted to suggest alterations, the Treaty would be one which he had to sign by force. It should be remembered that the draft given him to consider was amended after final settlement of the bases of negotiation, and that (the) commercial and telegraphic and other clauses on which the Government may have (may not have been?) prepared to break off negotiation had yet to be conceded to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. I have obtained Amir's consent to them (?) which, with some unimportant verbal alterations and additions, fully meets the wishes of Government. I am preparing to take the responsibility of signing the Treaty to-morrow, and feel confident in being able to justify the necessity.

If it is definitely decided to retain troops for the present at Kandahar or other places within the territory promised to be restored by Article 9 of the Treaty, I must mention this to the Amir before asking for his signature. Although we have the undoubted right to select a proper season for withdrawing our troops, I strongly urge, if it can be possibly arranged, that the troops should be withdrawn as quickly as possible and so not risk unsettling what has been secured.

Very important that I should receive immediate reply.

Unless you wish, do not regard this as an official telegram.

Cipher telegram, dated 26th May 1879.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang.

*Clear the Line. Personal.*—Your personal telegram of yesterday. Our troops must positively hold Kandahar until proper season for withdrawal, as immediate evacuation would damage our reputation and ruin our friends, besides being seriously inconvenient.

The Treaty may be signed and witnessed without ceremony if preferred.

Telegram, dated 27th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—The following are the alterations made in the Treaty signed yesterday as compared with the previous amendments telegraphed by me in cipher on the 21st of May. Heading and conclusion as ordered. Preamble and Article 1 unaltered. Article 2, words "immediately" and "or assistance to" omitted for reasons that will be explained by letter. At end of Article 3 add—"Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished." Article 4, after the words

" in the interests of both States " add " on the occurrence of any important external event." Articles 5 and 6 unchanged. Article 7, instead of " along certain routes to be selected within his dominions," *substitute* " along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan." Instead of " for the selection of these routes," *substitute* " for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads." For word " routes," *substitute* " roads." For the words " are stated, &c.," *substitute* " will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country." Article 8, for " such lines, &c.," *substitute* " this telegraph line." Article 9, for " civil charges," *substitute* " charges of civil administration." For the words " and over the independent tribes inhabiting," *substitute* " and of all relations with the independent tribes of, &c." Article 10, the word " six " inserted. On this subject more by post. Amir's titles are Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan Amir-i-Mamalik-i-Afghanistan Wahad-ud Mutallik-i-an.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 27th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the Line.*—Your cipher message to-day. I have already telegraphed what you ask for.

Regarding Thul-Chotiali, I mentioned yesterday that we should require to use it when withdrawing Kandabar troops, and whenever special necessity should arise. Amir made no objection.

He was very sore about the continuous occupation of Kandahar, but submitted (that) arrangements should be at once made for the Governors he appoints for Kandahar and Jelalabad to be given charge of the administration, and (that) interference by our officers should be prohibited. If this is judiciously carried out, it will show Amir that the presence of our troops and officers in his dominions in no wise interferes with, or lessens his authority.

Jenkyns left early this morning with the Treaty.

Families from Turkistan are soon expected at Kabul.

After signing the Treaty the Amir promoted General Daud Shah to the Commander-in-Chiefship of the whole army; and the Mustaufi was appointed Finance Minister, from which (post) he had been dismissed by the late Amir.

I am arranging peace between Sirdars in our camp and the Amir.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 27th May 1879.

From—Viceroy, Simla,  
To—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang.

I CONGRATULATE you heartily on signature of Treaty and satisfactory result of negotiations; success of which I attribute mainly to admirable manner in which they have been conducted by you. News has given much satisfaction at home. I have received suggestions from home that it would have good effect if Yakub were invited to visit me here. Telegraph your opinion. Perhaps it might be better if invitation were given, but declined for the present on ground of season and affairs at Kabul, with expression of hope of coming to see me in winter.

---

Cipher telegram, dated 27th May 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Viceroy, Simla.

I FEEL highly honored at Your Lordship's expression of approval, and trust that the future result will be as satisfactory as the present aspect of affairs promises they may be. I think it would be better for Yakub Khan to return to Kabul and proceed to Turkistan and Herat, and visit Your Lordship in the winter. I can arrange that he shall write and announce this intention; or, if preferred, he can reply to an invitation in the manner suggested; if an immediate visit is preferred, it is possible to arrange it. Please inform me which of the three courses is preferred.

---

Telegram, dated 6th June 1879.

From—MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang,  
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

RATIFIED Treaty presented to Amir this morning in Durbar. His Highness after receiving it expressed his earnest hope that he and his subjects of every grade would do all in their power to preserve and increase the friendship now established. In saying farewell to the General and other officers the Amir expressed the hope that, when he visits India, he may renew his acquaintance with them.

*Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879, between the British Government and the Amir Yakub Khan of Afghanistan.*

	Original draft in No. 1194E.P., dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari.	Alterations.	Final Draft sanctioned and signed.
HEADING ...	The following Articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and the Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, Amir of Kabul and its dependencies:—	Cipher Telegram, dated 23rd May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.  “ Amir wished to be styled Amir of Afghanistan and Afghan Turkistan. His titles should be, I think, Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, Amir-i-Mamalik-i-Afghanistan Wa Hudud-i-Mutallika-i-an, but if he prefer his own proposal, I see no objection to grant it.”  Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari.  “ Amir's titles are Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, Amir-i-Mamalik-i-Afghanistan Wa Hudud-i-Mutallika-i-an.”	Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Mahomed Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., Political Officer on Special Duty, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Hon'ble Edward Robert Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empire, and Viceroy and Governor-General of India.”
ARTICLE I ...	None.		ARTICLE I.
ARTICLE II.	From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and His Highness the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.	.....	From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.
ARTICLE III.	His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., engages immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with, or assistance to, the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from punishment or molestation on that account.	Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.  “ Article 2 (3 in original) words ‘ immediately’ and ‘ or assistance to’ omitted for reasons that will be explained by letter.”*	ARTICLE II.  His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.
ARTICLE IV.	His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government.	Cipher Telegram, dated 15th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Viceroy.  “ At end of Article in original draft, Cavagnari proposes to add:—‘ The British Government undertakes to protect the territories of the Amir of Kabul from foreign aggression by money, arms, or troops according as the occasion may, in the judgment of the British Government, require, and the Amir of Kabul on his part undertakes that he will fully acquiesce in and facilitate the despatch of British troops whether to Herat or any other part of his dominions for the protection of which their temporary presence may be requisite whenever, in the judgment of the British Government, such a measure has become necessary. In the event of the despatch of troops into any part of the Afghan territory becoming necessary, it is to be distinctly understood that the said troops will enter the Amir's territories as his declared allies and under a defined obligation to withdraw therefrom as soon as ever their presence there has effected the purpose for which alone it is agreed to, namely, the protection of such parts of the Amir's territory from danger of foreign aggression.’ ”	ARTICLE III.  His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

\* Note.—The explanation alluded to was subsequently received in a demi-official letter.



*Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879, between the British Government and the Amir Yakub Khan of Afghanistan.—(Continued.)*

	Original Draft in No. 1194E.P., dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari.	Alterations.	Final Draft sanctioned and signed.
		<p>Cipher Telegram, dated 16th May 1879, from Foreign Secretary, to Major Cavagnari.</p> <p>“ Viceroy considers it will be sufficient to make the following addition to Article 4 of draft Treaty :—On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, and troops to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose.”</p> <p>Cipher Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.</p> <p>“ At end of Article 3 (4 in original draft) add—Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.”</p>	
ARTICLE V ...	The British Government further engages to recognize the Heir-Presumptive and successor designate to the present Amir, who may hereafter be nominated by His Highness and duly and formally declared as such, according to the custom of the country. And the British Government will consider the heir so nominated and declared to be the legitimate ruler of Kabul and its dependencies from the time of his accession to the throne.	<p>Cipher Telegram from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary, dated 21st May 1879.</p> <p>“ Article 5 omitted. If the Amir spontaneously asks for this it will be granted.”</p>	Omitted altogether.
ARTICLE VI.	With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Kabul and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort and place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to reside at Herat and other places upon the Afghan frontier, whensoever and for whatever period this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States. His Highness the Amir of Kabul may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.	<p>Cipher Telegram from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary, dated 21st May 1879.</p> <p>“ Article 6, sentences omitted ‘ to reside at Herat and other places upon’ also ‘ and for whatever period.’ ”</p> <p>Cipher Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.</p> <p>“ Article 4 (Article 6 in original) after the words ‘ in the interests of both States’ add ‘ on the occurrence of any important external event.’ ”</p>	<p>ARTICLE IV.</p> <p>With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.</p>
ARTICLE VII.	His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall in no way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.	.....	<p>ARTICLE V.</p> <p>His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.</p>

*Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879, between the British Government and the Amir Yakub Khan of Afghanistan.—(Continued.)*

	Original Draft in No. 1194 E.P., dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari.	Alterations.	Final Draft sanctioned and signed.
ARTICLE VIII.	His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., undertakes on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.	.....	ARTICLE VI.  His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.
ARTICLE IX.	In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of the Amir of Kabul may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Kabul agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along certain routes to be selected within his dominions. The routes thus selected shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the selection of these routes, for their maintenance and security, and for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these routes, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through the dominions of His Highness, are stated in a separate annexure to this Treaty.	Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.  "Article 7 (9 of original draft) instead of 'along certain routes to be selected within his dominions' substitute 'along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan,' instead of 'for the selection of these routes,' substitute 'for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads,' for word 'routes,' substitute 'roads.' For the words 'are stated, &c.' substitute 'will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.'"	ARTICLE VII.  In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.
ARTICLE X ...	With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that such lines of telegraph as may be necessary for that purpose, shall, with the assent of the Amir of Kabul, be from time to time constructed by, and at the cost of, the British Government, in the territories of His Highness; and the Amir of Kabul hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of all such wires.	Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.  "Article 8 (10 of original draft) for 'such lines, &c.' substitute 'a line of telegraph from Kuram to Kabul shall be constructed, &c.' For 'all such wires,' substitute 'this telegraph line.'"	ARTICLE VIII.  With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kuram to Kabul shall be constructed by, and at the cost of, the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.
ARTICLE XI.	In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram and Pishin, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government; and that the jurisdiction of the Amir of Kabul, &c., over the district of Sibi, shall be transferred to the British Government. His Highness the Amir also renounces all claim to authority over the Kbaibar and Michni Passes leading from Jelal-	Cipher Telegram, dated 17th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.  "It will be advisable to omit the concluding portion of Article 11 from the words 'Amir also renounces all claims' to the end of the Article."  Cipher Telegram, dated 20th May 1879, from Foreign Secretary, to Major Cavagnari.  "Concluding portion of Article 11 may be omitted as you advise."  Cipher Telegram, dated 21st May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.  "Article 11. For 'Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram and Pishin' read 'Amir	ARTICLE IX.  In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed,* shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall

*Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879, between the British Government and the Amir Yakub Khan of Afghanistan.—(Continued.)*

	Original Draft in No. 1194E.P., dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari.	Alterations.	Final Draft sanctioned and signed.
	abad into the Peshawar District, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these Passes.	<p>of Kabul, &amp;c., agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi.' From 'administrative control of the British Government' to the end of the Article, substitute, that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deduction of civil charges shall be paid to the Kabul Government. The British Government will retain in its own hands the complete control of the Khaibar and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jelalabad Districts, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these Passes."</p> <p>Cipher Telegram, dated 22nd May 1879, from Foreign Secretary, to Major Cavagnari.</p> <p>"In the amended Article 11 about Khaibar and Michni Passes, instead of words 'and over the independent tribes' substitute the words as follows:—'and of our relations with the independent tribes.'"</p> <p>Cipher Telegram, dated 24th May 1879, from Foreign Secretary, to Major Cavagnari.</p> <p>"Please correct following two errors in Article 9 (11 of original draft), for words 'civil charges' substitute 'charges of administration.' For words 'of our relations' substitute 'of all relations.'"</p> <p>Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.</p> <p>"Article 9 (11 of original) for 'civil charges' substitute 'charges of civil administration.' For the words 'and over the independent tribes inhabiting,' substitute 'and of all relations with the independent tribes of, &amp;c.'"</p>	<p>not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.</p> <p>The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khaibar and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jelalabad Districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.</p>
ARTICLE XII.	His Highness the Amir of Kabul, &c., agrees that the allowances which have been customarily paid to certain Chiefs and Sirdars in Afghanistan, for the protection and tranquillity of certain parts of the country under their superintendence, shall continue to be paid to them in accordance with the schedule annexed to this Treaty.	<p>Cipher Telegram, dated 20th May, from Foreign Secretary, to Major Cavagnari.</p> <p>"Clause 12 need not be pressed, though in discussing subsidy you may perhaps introduce its principle."</p> <p>Telegram, dated 21st May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.</p> <p>"Article 12, nothing original entered in your draft. Article omitted. The principle will not be lost sight of; and, if it can possibly be managed, some arrangement will be made."</p>	Omitted.
ARTICLE XIII.	For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of	<p>Telegram, dated 27th May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.</p> <p>"Article 10, the word 'six' inserted. On this subject more by post."</p>	<p>ARTICLE X.</p> <p>For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.</p>

*Treaty of Peace, dated 26th May 1879, between the British Government and the Amir Yakub Khan of Afghanistan.—(Concluded.)*

	Original Draft in No. 1194E.P., dated 11th April 1879, to Major Cavagnari.	Alterations.	Final Draft sanctioned and signed.
CONCLUSION.	None           ...           ...           ...	<p>Cipher Telegram, dated 21st May 1879, from Major Cavagnari, to Foreign Secretary.</p> <p>"Please telegraph correct form for heading and concluding Article of the Treaty, with statement of the Viceroy's titles in full, also any other necessary formalities."</p> <p>—</p> <p>Cipher Telegram, dated 22nd May 1879, from Foreign Secretary, to Major Cavagnari.</p> <p>"Conclusion begins:—'Done at this           day of May 1879, corresponding with           ', For signatures, see No. 159, page 352, Volume 6, Aitchison. Viceroy will ratify after signature by Amir."</p>	<p>CONCLUSION.</p> <p>Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jumadi-us-sani 1296, A.H.</p> <p>(Sd.) AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN.</p> <p>(Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, Major, Polit. Officer on Special Duty.</p> <p>(Sd.) LYTTON.</p>





[CONFIDENTIAL.]

---

PRÉCIS OF THE PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE, &c.,

SHOWING

THE POLICY

AND

RELATIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

TOWARD AFGHANISTAN.

APRIL 1872-MAY 1879.

WITH APPENDICES AND TWO MAPS.



COMPILED BY

TREVOR CHICHELE PLOWDEN, B. C. S.,

UNDER-SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, FOREIGN DEPT.

---

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT PRESS.

1879.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Para.	Subject.	Page.
	INTRODUCTION ... ..	1
	CHAPTER I.	
	THE SEISTÁN ARBITRATION. FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR BRITISH MEDIATION TO THE DELIVERY OF GENERAL GOLDSMID'S ARBITRAL OPINION.	
1	Preliminary remarks ... ..	1
2	Early history of the Provinces of Seistán and Lash-Jowain ... ..	1
3	The Persian Government propose to send a military force to Seistán. Corre- spondence between Mr. Murray and the Sadr Azim on the subject ... ..	4
4	Murder of Ali Khan by his nephew, Taj Mahomed. Correspondence on the subject between the British Minister at Teheran and the Persian Gov- ernment ... ..	5
5	Mr. Eastwick's memorandum, Lord Stanley's remarks thereon, and in- structions to Mr. Doria ... ..	6
6	Correspondence of 1858 between Mr. Murray and the Sadr Azim regarding Lash-Jowain ... ..	6
7	Relations between Persia and Afghanistan in respect to Seistán and Lash- Jowain in 1862-63 ... ..	7
8	Views expressed by Her Majesty's Government on the Seistán question during the years 1861-63 ... ..	9
9	The Shah's memorandum of August 1865 regarding Seistán ... ..	11
10	Movements of Persian troops towards Seistán in 1865-67 ... ..	11
11	Pretexts alleged for these movements ... ..	12
12	Ibrahim Khan seeks assistance from the British Government. Colonel Phayre's report ... ..	13
13	Persian raid on Kandahar. Amir Shere Ali's representations in regard to Seistán ... ..	14
14	Representations by Sirdar Afzal Khan, and instructions by the Amir Shere Ali ... ..	15
15	Apprehensions by Persia arising out of the Ambala Durbar. Mr. Thomson's summary of the position ... ..	15
16	Proposals for submitting the Seistán question to the arbitration of the British Government. ... ..	17
17	Persian Government accept conditional arbitration. Their memorandum dated 19th April 1870 ... ..	18
18	Correspondence between the Government of India, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Alison, as to the precise basis on which the Persian Government had accepted arbitration ... ..	18

Para.	Subject.	Page.
19	Further reference to the Shah, Mr. Alison's report thereon, and instructions issued by Lord Granville ... ..	19
20	Despatches from the Government of India on the subject of the proposed arbitration ... ..	20
21	Remarks by Sir R. Temple and Lord Mayo on the Seistán question ...	22
22	The Persian assent is communicated to the Government of India. Further telegrams as to the scope of the arbitration and deputation of an Indian officer. Duke of Argyll's instructions to General Goldsmid ...	25
23	Action taken by the Government of India. Lord Mayo's letter to the Amir of Afghanistan, dated 8th September 1870, explaining the course which the proceedings would take ... ..	26
24	Selection of Colonel Pollock as representative of the Government of India and instruction as regards his functions ... ..	27
25	Amir Shere Ali's reply to Lord Mayo's letter, dated 8th September, and temporary postponement of the Seistán arbitration ... ..	27
26	The Persian Government object to the deputation of an Afghan Commissioner, and renew their contention as to the exclusion of a portion of Seistán from arbitration ... ..	27
27	The Amir reopens the question of arbitration in regard to Seistán ...	28
28	Further correspondence regarding the basis of the arbitration ... ..	29
29	The Government of India represent the impossibility of asking the Amir to consent to arbitration on the limited terms accepted by Persia ...	30
30	The terms drawn up by Mr. Alison are finally accepted by Persia ...	31
31	Letters to and from the Amir Shere Ali, dated 31st October, 13th November, 29th December 1871, and 14th January 1872 ... ..	32
32	Departure of General Sir F. J. Goldsmid for Persia and report of his early proceedings ... ..	33
33	Description of the Fort of Nasirabad ... ..	34
34	Further correspondence about the flag question ... ..	35
35	Difficulty about an interview with the Amir of Kain ... ..	35
36	General Goldsmid's tour from Nasirabad. Remonstrances by Maasum Khan ... ..	36
37	Arrival of General Pollock and Syud Nur Mahomed at Banjar ...	38
38	Brief <i>ad interim</i> report by General Goldsmid to the Secretary of State ...	38
39	Statement by the Afghan Commissioner of the Afghan case ...	39
40	Informal memoranda on Seistán by General Goldsmid and General Pollock	43
41	Further correspondence as to the basis of arbitration. General Goldsmid instructed not to deliver arbitral opinion unless the Persian Government accepted ancient right as well as present possession as basis ...	43
42	Arrival of the Mission at Teheran. Statement of the Persian case called for ... ..	45

Para.	Subject.	Page.
43	Suggestion that the Amir should, under certain circumstances, receive compensation from British Government ... ..	46
44	Rejoinder by the Afghan Commissioner to the Persian statement ...	47
45	Counter-statement of the Persian Government ... ..	48
46	The Persian Government apologize for Mirza Maasum Khan's conduct. General Goldsmid explains his decision. Protests by both Commissioners ...	50
47	Action taken by the Government of India on receiving telegrams intimating delivery of the award ... ..	51
48	Condensed arbitral opinion delivered to the Commissioners ... ..	51
49	Despatch from the Government of India to Secretary of State on the arbitration ... ..	53
CHAPTER II.		
SEISTÁN ARBITRATION. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE DELIVERY OF GENERAL GOLDSMID'S ARBITRAL OPINION AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF LORD GRANVILLE'S FINAL DECISION. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE AFGHAN COMMISSIONER.		
50	Appeal lodged by the Afghan Commissioner against the award ...	55
51	Memorandum of a conversation between the Viceroy and the Afghan Commissioner at Poona on the 25th November 1872. Compensation for losses incurred by Afghan subjects in Persian raids ... ..	57
52	Arrival of Syud Nur Mahomed at Kabul. Sentiments of the Amir and of the Kabul Durbar in regard to the arbitration ... ..	59
53	Conversation at Teheran between Mr. Thomson and the Sadr Azim regarding the award. Remarks as to the presence of General Pollock at the arbitration ... ..	60
54	Measures taken by the Persian Government to maintain the existing condition of things in Seistán ... ..	62
55	Appeal presented by the Persian Government to Her Majesty's Government ... ..	63
56	Decision of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Proposed Mission to Kabul ... ..	65
57	Action taken by the Government of India on hearing of the confirmation of the award. Proposal to depute Mr. Macnabb to Kabul ... ..	66
58	The Amir's views as to the proposed deputation of Mr. Macnabb ...	67
59	The Amir's alternative proposal that he should depute an Envoy to India ...	69
60	Arrival of the Kabul Envoy at Simla. Acceptance of Lord Granville's decision by Persia. Proposal to modify boundary south-west of Kohak Bund ... ..	70
61	Memorandum of a conversation between Syud Nur Mahomed Shab, the Kabul Envoy, and the Foreign Secretary, dated 1st July 1873 ...	71



Para.	Subject.	Page.
62	Memorandum of a conversation between the Kabul Envoy and Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd July 1873 ... ..	72
63	Memorandum of an interview between Lord Northbrook and the Kabul Envoy at Government House, Simla, dated 30th July 1873 ...	74
64	Memorandum of conversations between Kabul Envoy and Foreign Secretary, dated 31st July and 1st August 1873 ... ..	74
65	Kharita from Lord Northbrook to the Amir, dated 6th September 1873 ...	75
66	Despatch to the Secretary of State summarizing the result of the discussions with the Envoy in regard to Seistán ... ..	76
67	Reply of the Amir to Lord Northbrook's letter, dated 6th September, and rejoinder from the Viceroy ... ..	77
68	Final letter from the Secretary of State on the subject of the Seistán arbitration ... ..	79
<hr/> <b>CHAPTER III.</b>		
<b>FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE ON SEISTÁN AFFAIRS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACCEPT- ANCE OF LORD GRANVILLE'S DECISION.</b>		
69	Question of constructing irrigation works on the Helmund ... ..	80
70	Application by Persia for a rectification of the Seistán boundary by including the Naizar and Takht-i-Shah in Persian territory ... ..	80
71	Rumoured Afghan aggressions on Seistán and proceedings of Sharif Khan ...	81
72	Apprehensions entertained during 1876-77 by the Persian Government of an attack on Seistán from Herat. Question of British intervention under the Treaty of Paris ... ..	82
73	Application by the Persian Government for the removal of Sirdar Sharif Khan from Killa-i-Fath ... ..	85
<hr/> <b>CHAPTER IV.</b>		
<b>COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE AMIR REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF AFGHANISTAN. OTHER MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH THE KABUL ENVOY AT SIMLA IN JULY 1873.</b>		
74	Brief notice of the later correspondence between the British and Russian Governments regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan ... ..	86
75	Final reply of the Russian Government accepting the conclusions of Her Majesty's Government. Question as to the nature of the "influence" to be exercised by the English Government over Shere Ali ... ..	90
76	Communications between the Government of India and Shere Ali on the subject of the understanding with Russia as to the boundaries of his dominions. Shere Ali's views. Despatch to Secretary of State ...	91
77	Discussions with the Kabul Envoy on the result of the negotiations with Russia, and on the effect of the understanding arrived at in respect to Afghanistan ... ..	95

Para.	Subject.	Page.
78	Text of the memoranda of the interviews between Lord Northbrook and the Envoy, and Mr. Aitchison and the Envoy ... ..	96
79	Final letter to the Amir, dated 6th September 1873, summing up the result of the conferences with Syud Nur Mahomed. Despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 15th September ... ..	104
80	Previous correspondence relating to the gift of arms bestowed on the Amir after the visit of the Kabul Envoy ... ..	107
81	Delay in the supply of these arms, and consequent suspicion on the part of the Kabul Durbar ... ..	108
82	The murder of Major Macdonald at Michni by Bahram Khan. Opinion of the Punjab Government as to the course to be pursued ... ..	109
83	Conversations with the Envoy regarding Major Macdonald's murder ... ..	111
84	Communication to the Amir and the Punjab Government of the proposals for the punishment of Bahram Khan and Nowroz Khan. Action taken by the Amir, and final correspondence with Lord Northbrook ... ..	114
85	Proposed visit of Colonel V. Baker to Afghanistan. Correspondence regarding Mr. Forsyth's contemplated return to India from Yarkand <i>via</i> Badakshan ... ..	117
86	Annoyance of the Amir at the deputation of Ibrahim Khan to Wakhan ... ..	119
CHAPTER V.		
FROM THE NOMINATION OF ABDULLA JAN AS HEIR-APPARENT TO YAKUB KHAN'S IMPRISONMENT AT KABUL, AND SIRDAR AYUB KHAN'S REBELLION AND FLIGHT—NOVEMBER 1873 TO MARCH 1875.		
87	The nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent. Description of the ceremony observed on the occasion of his public recognition. Acquiescence of principal tribes and Chiefs ... ..	125
88	The Amir informs the Government of India of his selection of Abdulla Jan as Heir-apparent. Lord Northbrook's reply. Despatch to the Secretary of State ... ..	127
89	Communications addressed by the Amir to Russia, Bokhara, and Persia on the subject of Abdulla Jan's nomination ... ..	129
90	Further accounts of Sirdar Yakub's dissatisfaction and apprehensions regarding his designs. The Sirdar's proposal that Furrah, Zamindawar, Girishk, and Kandahar be made over to him ... ..	131
91	Sirdar Yakub Khan's overtures to Persia. Political intrigue with Yakub denied by the Persian Foreign Minister ... ..	131
92	Arrival at Kabul of the Mirakhor and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nasiri. Their account of Yakub's designs and proceedings ... ..	133
93	Arrival of Mulla Yahya at Kabul ... ..	135
94	Final decision as to the terms to be offered to Sirdar Yakub. Return of the Mirakhor accompanied by Shahghassi Sheredil Khan to Herat ... ..	135
95	Visit of Extra Assistant Commissioner, Ghulam Ahmed, to Kabul in May 1874. Sir R. Pollock's observations on the feelings of the Amir towards the British Government ... ..	135

Para.	Subject.	Page.
96	Arrival of the Mirakhor and Shahghassi Sheredil Khan at Herat. Their reception by Yakub Khan and deputation of Abdul Tahir to Kabul ...	138
97	Abdul Tahir and the Shahghassi return to Kabul with statement of Yakub Khan's conditions ... ..	139
98	Departure of Arsla Khan and Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzais, and Abdul Tahir for Herat ... ..	140
99	Yakub Khan comes to Kabul. His reception by the Amir ... ..	140
100	News of Yakub Khan's imprisonment conveyed to the Government of India. Lord Northbrook's message to the Amir and despatch to the Secretary of State ... ..	141
101	Detailed account of Yakub's arrest and imprisonment ... ..	142
102	Effect produced on the Amir and Kabul Durbar by Lord Northbrook's message. The Amir's verbal reply... ..	142
103	Communication of state of affairs to the British Minister at Teheran ...	144
104	The Mustaufi and Mirakhor march against Herat. Flight of Sirdar Ayub Khan to Persia and fall of Herat ... ..	144
105	Mr. Taylour Thomson's suggestion for intervention on behalf of Yakub is disapproved by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government	146
106	Dissatisfaction of Sirdar Ayub Khan with the manner of his reception by the Persian authorities. Proposal to place him under British protection, negatived ... ..	147
<hr/> <p>CHAPTER VI.</p> <p>CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—JANUARY 1875-FEBRUARY 1876. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMIR PRIOR TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE—FEBRUARY TO DECEMBER 1876.</p>		
107	Lord Salisbury's instructions in respect to the appointment of an English officer as British Agent at Herat ... ..	149
108	Discussion on Lord Salisbury's proposal and reply of the Government of India, explaining the situation and dissenting from the policy of Her Majesty's Government ... ..	151
109	Further instructions from Her Majesty's Government ... ..	156
110	Rejoinder of the Government of India ... ..	159
111	Secret instructions of February 1876 for the despatch of a temporary Mission to Kabul, with the object of establishing permanent English Agencies in the Amir's territories ... ..	164
112	Initiatory measures undertaken for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Despatch of a Native Agent to Kabul, bearing a letter to the Amir from the Commissioner of Peshawur...	169
113	The Amir's reply declining the proposed Mission. Letter from the British Agent at Kabul explaining the situation ... ..	170

Para.	Subject.	Page.
114	Measures taken by the Government of India on receipt of the Amir's reply. Further letter to the Amir and instructions to the British Agent at Kabul ... ..	172
115	Local opinion at Kabul as to the political situation. Effect produced by Sir R. Pollock's second letter; the Amir's rejoinder ... ..	175
116	The Government of India decide to summon British Agent at Kabul to Simla ... ..	176
117	Interview between the British Agent and Sir L. Pelly accompanied by Colonel O. T. Burne and Major Grey ... ..	177
118	Interviews between His Excellency the Viceroy and the British Agent. Instructions as to communications with the Amir and letter from the Viceroy to His Highness ... ..	177
119	The British Agent's return to Kabul. <i>Ad interim</i> arrangements pending expected arrival of the Amir's Envoy ... ..	180
CHAPTER VII.		
THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE AND CONNECTED PROCEEDINGS. THE AMIR'S PREPARATIONS FOR A JEHAD—JANUARY-OCTOBER 1877.		
120	Arrival of the Kabul Envoy at Peshawur. Informal interview between him and Dr. Bellew ... ..	182
121	First meeting between Sir L. Pelly and the Envoy ... ..	183
122	Second meeting between Sir L. Pelly and the Envoy ... ..	184
123	Third and fourth meetings on 5th and 6th February ... ..	186
124	The Envoy's continued ill-health. Unofficial communications between him and Dr. Bellew and Sir L. Pelly ... ..	189
125	Fifth and sixth meetings on the 8th and 10th February ... ..	189
126	Seventh meeting of the Conference on the 12th February ... ..	194
127	Eighth meeting on 15th February. Sir L. Pelly's reply on the whole case ... ..	197
128	Ninth and last meeting of Conference on 19th February ... ..	199
129	Serious indisposition of the Kabul Envoy ... ..	203
130	Final instructions, dated 3rd March, from His Excellency the Viceroy to Sir L. Pelly, directing closure of the Conference ... ..	203
131	Communication to the Envoy of His Excellency the Viceroy's instructions... ..	210
132	Continued illness and death of Syud Nur Mahomed. Letter of condolence to the Amir ... ..	210
133	Measures taken for closing the Conference in consequence of Syud Nur Mahomed's death ... ..	212
134	Intrigues of the Mirakhor with the Akhund of Swat. The Viceroy's proposal to communicate with the Akhund and explain British policy to him ... ..	212